Guballa vs. Caguioa 78 SCRA 203 No. L 46537 July 29 1977 PDF

VOL.
78, JULY 29, 1977 203

Guballa vs. Caguioa
*
No. L-46537. July 29, 1977.
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS
and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
Attorneys; Pleading and practice; Due process; Fact that the person who represented defendant at the
initial stage of the litigation, filing of answer and pre-trial, turned out to be one who is not a
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
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204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Guballa vs. Caguioa
member of the Bar does not amount to denial of defendant’s day in court, particularly where default
order was rendered not only because by “counsel” did not attend the pre-trial, but also because defendant was
also absent at the pre-trial and said defendant was assisted by bona fide lawyers at subsequent stages of the
cases when he sought reversal of the judgment of the court below.—Respondent Judge’s forthright denial of
the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for
lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the
litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pre-trial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the
Bar did not amount to a denial of petitioner’s day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages
of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona
fide members of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence
and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner’s rights had been amply
protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by
counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not
only on the alleged counsel’s failure to attend the pre-trial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his
own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to
countenance further delay in a proceeding which had already taken well over six years to resolve.
RESOLUTION
SANTOS, J.:
In this petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order
of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and
allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in
an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza, Jr. As a
consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer
thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W.
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VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 205

Guballa vs. Caguioa
1
Vida, Jr., of the law firm of Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates.
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial conference on April 6, 1972,
despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to
present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of
private respondent Forteza, Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking
the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence
and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano
Mercado, another member of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
“a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in
default, it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
“b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;
“c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law;
and
2
“d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.”
The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm.
The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G-R. No, 52610-R.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo
V.L. Santos II. However, the same was denied and the decision became final on June3 29, 1977
and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution.
A Motion for Execution was thereafter
4
filed by private respondent with the lower Court which
was granted by respondent Judge.
On July 6, 1971, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment alleging his
_______________
1 Petition, Annex “A”, pp. 22-24.
2 Id., p. 4.
3 Id., p. 5.
4 Id.
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guballa vs. Caguioa
discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of
the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately protected and 5
his
properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law.
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is “. . .a clear case of dilatory
tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant. . .” herein petitioner, and, that the6 grounds
relied upon “. . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals. . .”
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of
execution, issued by respondent7
Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge’s forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver
is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person
who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e.,
8
the filing of an Answer and
the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar did not amount to a denial of
petitioner’s day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after
the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fide members
of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and
the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner’s rights had been
amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently
assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in
default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel’s failure to attend the pretrial conference
on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To
allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already
taken well over six years to resolve.
________________
5 Id., Annex “B”, pp. 16-21.
6 Id., Annex “C”, p. 25.
7 Id., p. 5.
8 Id., Annex “D”, p. 26.
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Guballa vs. Caguioa
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby
dismissed. The law firm “Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates” of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao,
Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why
Irineo W. Vida, Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan,
when he is not a member of the Bar.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquinoand Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition Dismissed.
Notes.—A party-defendant who had been declared in default cannot appeal from the judgment
on the merits without first having secured a setting aside of the order of default. (Strachan &
MacMurray Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals,62 SCRA 109).
An appeal is not an adequate remedy where a party was illegally declared in default. (Omico
Mining and Industrial Corp. vs. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285).
It is incumbent upon the defendants, as counter-claimants, to move that the plaintiffs be
declared in default and that judgment by default be rendered against the plaintiffs with respect
to the counterclaim. Not having filed such a motion, the defendants cannot fault the lower court
for not having declared the plaintiffs in default. (Gayos vs. Gayos, 67 SCRA 146).
The reception of evidence by the clerk of court after a declaration of defendant’s default is
wrong in principle and orientation and has no basis in any rule. It should be discontinued (Lim
Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425).
The service of summons on the husband is binding on his wife. (De Leon vs. Hontanosas, 67
SCRA 458).
A party in default is not entitled to notice of motion to declare him in default (Phil. British Co.,
Inc. vs. De los Angeles, 63 SCRA 50).
——o0o——

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VOL.

78, JULY 29, 1977 203

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Guballa vs. Caguioa

VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 205

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 78, JULY 29, 1977 207

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquinoand Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

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