Unedited Evidence CASE Digest 1

EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST Page 1 of 88
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. when the doubt or difference arises as to what
Court of Appeals, the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a
298 SCRA 83, G.R. No. 124043 October 14, question of fact when the doubt or difference
1998 arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts.”In the present case, the CA did not
Facts: doubt, much less change, the facts narrated by
In 1980, YMCA earned, among others, an the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts.
income of P676,829.80 from leasing out a That its interpretation or conclusion is different
portion of its premises to small shop owners, from that of the CTA is not irregular or
like restaurants and canteen operators, and abnormal.
P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from
non-members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued
an assessment to private respondent, in the
total amount of P415,615.01 including
surcharge and interest, for deficiency income
tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on
rentals and professional fees and deficiency
withholding tax on wages. Private respondent
formally protested the assessment and, as a
supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter
dated October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR
denied the claims of YMCA.Contesting the
denial of its protest, the YMCA filed a petition
for review at the CTA which grants the appeal.
CA affirmed the CTA ruling. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the issue is a question of fact or law.
Ruling:
Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the
factual findings of the CTA, when supported by
substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is shown that the said court
committed gross error in the appreciation of
facts. In the present case, this Court finds that
the February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did
not deviate from this rule. The latter merely
applied the law to the facts as found by the
CTA and ruled on the issue raised by the CIR:
“Whether or not the collection or earnings of
rental income from the lease of certain
premises and income earned from parking fees
shall fall under the last paragraph of Section 27
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977,
as amended.”
The distinction between a question of law and
a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been held VILLANUEVA V. CA
that “[t]here is a question of law in a given case
FACTS: Villanueva and the Register of Deeds of

Quezon City.
This case involves 2 cases of the same parties
over the same property. On July 12, 1993, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision upholding the ground for
1st case: dismissal but made the following disquisition:
On March 16, 1989, herein petitioner filed a
complaint for reconveyance of a property with Nonetheless, considering the special
circumstances of the case pointed out by
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-
respondent Judge, We strongly urge private
2002 against Grace O. Villanueva and
respondents to elevate this decision to the
Francisco O. Villanueva Supreme Court who alone has the power to
Romeo L. Villanueva, brother of the plaintiff suspend the rules.
and Gaudencio L. Villanueva (late husband of
defendant Grace O. Villanueva), died single ISSUE:
and intestate on July 10, 1983 at Tagudin,
Ilocos Sur, leaving behind a property consisting Whether res judicata does not apply because
of a parcel of land situated at Project 6, the two complaints have different parties and
Quezon City and described and registered in causes of action. Nonetheless, assuming res
his name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. judicata applies the rules of procedure can still
132256 of the Registry of Quezon City together be disregarded in favor of substantial justice.
with a residential house erected thereon, RULING:
which, for purposes of brevity is hereinafter
referred to as the Project 6 property. No.
On October 6, 1983, Victoria L. Villanueva The requisites of res judicata are the following:
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of Romeo L. Villanueva, wherein she a) The former judgment or order must be final;
waived her right over the Project 6 property in
favor of Gaudencio L. Villanueva. b) It must be a judgment or order on the
merits, that is, it was rendered after a
Defendant Grace O. Villanueva, being the one consideration of the evidence or
residing at Quezon City, was entrusted with the stipulations submitted by the parties at the
original and duplicate copies of Annex C and trial of the case;
was requested by the heirs to attend to the
registration thereof with the Registry of Deeds c) It must have been rendered by a court
of Quezon City. Plaintiff came to know later having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
that defendant did not take any action on it. the parties; and
This case was dismissed. d) There must be, between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
2nd case:
and of cause of action. This requisite is
On November 26, 1991, petitioner filed another satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91- between the same parties.
10741. The complaint was for annulment of
Re: SECOND REQUISITE
title and damages with prayer for a temporary Anent the second requisite, while it is true that
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary the judgment or order must be adjudicated on
injunction involving the same real property. the merits, i.e., it is rendered after a
Included as defendants were Ma. Pas O. consideration of the evidence or stipulations
submitted by the parties at the trial of the case,

this rule, however, is not without exception
(see Feria, Civil Procedure, p. 627). Be it noted
that one of the exceptions of the rule that the
former judgment or order was on the merits is
the dismissal under Section 3, Rule 17 which
provides that:
If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial,

or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these rules or
any order of the court, the action may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the courts own motion. This dismissal
shall have the effect of adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
(underscoring supplied)
The instant case falls under the aforestated

exception considering that herein plaintiffs
former case was dismissed for failure to
appear during the pre-trial or otherwise stated,
in the words of the court, for lack of interest to
pursue the case. Thus, the second requisite.
PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.
Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic

FACTS:
On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the and prevent recovery of assets illegally
Philippines, represented by the PCGG, and obtained.7
assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General, Petitioner filed a motion bill of particulars
filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. but was denied. Hence this petition for
0035, entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al.” for prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, injunction and/or restraining order. This also
restitution and damages. The petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution,
together with Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and
were defendants in the said case.
file a bill of particulars, or that said respondent
It was alleged that; 1) he acted in be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant
unlawful concert with the principal defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to
in the misappropriation and theft of public submit the said bill of particulars.
funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion,
blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other ISSUE:
acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power;3 (2) he acted as Whether the complaint filed are sufficiently
dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself supported by factual facts; whether bill of
to be incorporator, director, board member particulars are evidentiary in nature
and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially
held and/or controlled by the principal HELD:
defendants;4 (3) he acted singly or collectively,
The allegations in the complaint, above-
and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in
referred to, pertaining to petitioner are,
flagrant breach of public trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with therefore, deficient in that they merely
gross and scandalous abuse of right and articulate conclusions of law and presumptions
power and in brazen violation of the unsupported by factual premises. Hence,
Constitution and laws of the Philippines, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner’s
embarked upon a systematic plan to motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the
accumulate ill-gotten wealth;5 (4) he (petitioner) petitioner cannot intelligently prepare his
taking undue advantage of his position as responsive pleading and for trial.
Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with
grave failure to perform his constitutional duties Furthermore, the particulars prayed for,
as such Chairman, acting in concert with such as, names of persons, names of
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda corporations, dates, amounts involved, a
R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the specification of property for identification
withdrawals, disbursements and questionable purposes, the particular transactions involving
use of government funds;6 and (5) he acted as withdrawals and disbursements, and a
dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing statement of other material facts as would
himself to be used as instrument in support the conclusions and inferences in the
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the
government concessions, orders and/or contrary, those particulars are material facts
policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be that should be clearly and definitely averred in
incorporator, director, or member of the complaint in order that the defendant may,
corporations beneficially held and/or controlled in fairness, be informed of the claims made
by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. against him to the end that he may be
Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal
The rules on pleading speak of two (2)

kinds of facts: the first, the “ultimate facts”, and
the second, the “evidentiary facts.”
The term ‘ultimate facts’ as used in Sec. 3,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, means the
essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause
of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out, without leaving the statement of
the cause of action insufficient, x x x”, (Moran,
Rules of Court, Vol. 1,1963 ed., p. 213).
“Ultimate facts are important and substantial
facts which either directly form the basis of the
primary right and duty, or which directly make
up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant. The term does not refer to the
details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are
to be established. It refers to principal,
determinate, constitutive facts, upon the
existence of which, the entire cause of action
rests.” while the term “evidentiary fact” has
been denned in the following tenor: “Those
facts which are necessary for determination of
the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon
which conclusions of ultimate facts are based.
Womack v. Industrial Comm., 168 Colo. 364,
451 P.2d 761, 764. Facts which furnish
evidence of existence of some other fact.”
FAR EAST MARBLE V CA

G.R. NO. 94093
FACTS: Private respondent Bank of the had made previous repeated requests and
Philippine Islands (BPI) filed a complaint for demands for payment.
foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin
against petitioner Far East Marble, Inc., Ramon
A. Tabuena and Luis R. Tabuena, Jr. Far East claimed that during the more than 10
years which elapsed from the dates of maturity
of said obligations up to the time the action for
In 1976, petitioner Fareast Marble received foreclosure of the chattel mortgage securing
from private respondent the following, viz: said obligations was filed, it had not received
from BPI or its predecessor any demand for
(1) several loans evidenced by promissory
payment and thus, it had “labored under the
notes; AND
belief that they [the obligations] have already
(2) the former was extended by the latter been written off” in the books of BPI.
credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts;
BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear

Petitioner Tabuenas executed in favor of BPI a affirmative defenses, alleging that its causes of
“continuing guaranty” whereby they bound action against Far East have not prescribed,
themselves, jointly and severally, to answer for since within 10 years from the time its cause of
the loan obligations of Far East to the bank. action accrued, various written extrajudicial
However, Far East failed to pay its obligations demands were sent by BPI and received by
(both the promissory note and the trust Far East. Moreover, BPI offered several written
receipts) and Ramon and Luis Tabuenas also documents whereby Far East supposedly
did not comply with their solidary liability under acknowledged its debt to BPI. Withal, BPI
the “continuing guaranty”. As a result, in 1987, maintained, the ten-year prescriptive period to
private respondent BPI filed a complaint for enforce its written contract had not only been
foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin interrupted, but was renewed.
against petitioners;
On the same date, BPI filed a motion for

Far East filed a compulsory counterclaim summary judgment on the ground that since
where it admitted the genuineness and due Far East had admitted the genuineness and
execution of the promissory notes but alleged due execution of the promissory notes and the
further that it has already prescribed, so it deed of chattel mortgage annexed to its
raised the defense of prescription and lack of complaint, there was no genuine issue as to
cause of action; it also denied that BPI made any material fact, thus entitling BPI to a
prior demands for payment. favorable judgment as a matter of law in regard
to its causes of action and on its right to
foreclose the chattel mortgage.
Far East filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim admitting the genuineness and
due execution of the promissory notes The trial court dismissed the complaint against
attached to the complaint, but alleging further the defendant Far East Marble (Phils.) Inc. for
that said notes has already prescribed, Far lack of cause of action and on grounds of
East thereupon raised the affirmative defenses prescription.
of prescription and lack of cause of action as it
denied the allegation of the complaint that BPI
An appeal therefrom was forthwith interposed extended credit facilities in the form of trust
by BPI, assailing the findings of the trial court receipts to Far East;
with respect to its finding that BPI’s cause of 2. Said promissory notes and trust receipts had
action has prescribed and the consequent matured; and
denial of the motion for summary judgment. 3. Despite repeated demands, Far East failed and
refused to pay.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that
remanding the case to court of origin for further “despite repeated requests and demands for
proceedings, “including the resolution anew of payment, Far East has failed to pay” is
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment . . ., sufficient to establish BPI’s cause of action.
reception of the evidence of the parties and, Besides, prescription is not a cause of action; it
thereafter, to decide the case as the facts may is a defense, which having been raised should
warrant.” be supported by competent evidence.But even
as Far East raised the defense of prescription,
BPI countered to the effect that the prescriptive
ISSUE: period was interrupted and renewed by written
extrajudicial demands for payment and
acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.
HELD: The claim in petitioner’s complaint has
not prescribed and petitioner has a valid cause
of action. A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient
notice of the cause of action even though the
allegation may be vague or indefinite, for in
Complaint is a concise statement of the such case, the recourse of the defendant
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause would be to file a motion for a bill of particulars.
or causes of action.
The circumstances of BPI extending loans and
credits to Far East and the failure of the latter
to pay and discharge the same upon maturity
What then are the ultimate facts which BPI had are the only ultimate facts which have to be
to allege in its complaint so as to sufficiently pleaded, although the facts necessary to make
establish its cause of action? the mortgage validly enforceable must be
proven during the trial.
A cause of action consists of three elements:

1. the legal right of plaintiff;
2. the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation
extending loans and credits to Far East and the
of said legal right.
failure of the latter to pay and discharge the
same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts
These elements are manifest in BPI’s which have to be pleaded, although the facts
complaint, where it alleged that: necessary to make the mortgage valid and
enforceable must be proven during the trial.
1. for valuable consideration, BPI granted several
loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and
In fine, the finding of the trial court that

prescription has set in is primarily premised on
a misappreciation of the sufficiency of BPI’s
allegation as discussed. The records will show
that the hearing conducted by the trial court
was merely pro forma and the trial judge did
not sufficiently address the issue whether or
not a demand for payment in fact made by BPI
and duly received by herein petitioner Far east.
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 90478
FACTS: Private respondents Bienvenido R.
Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago—
together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria
R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-
Pineda—are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008
of the Sandiganbayan.
The case was commenced by the Presidential reiterated their motion for bill of particulars,
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in through a Manifestation.
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
Afterwards, by Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out,
The complaint which initiated the action was for bill of particulars, and for leave to file
denominated one “for reconveyance, reversion, interrogatories, holding them to be without
accounting, restitution and damages,” and was legal and factual basis. Also denied was the
avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. PCGG’s motion to strike out impertinent. The
14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the
complaint to be “sufficiently definite and clear
enough,” there are adequate allegations x x
After having been served with summons, which clearly portray the supposed
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their involvement and/or alleged participation of
answer, jointly filed a “MOTION TO STRIKE defendants-movants in the transactions
OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT described in detail in said Complaint,” and “the
AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF other matters sought for particularization are
OTHER PORTIONS”. The PCGG filed an evidentiary in nature which should be
opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to ventilated in the pre-trial or trial proper x x.” It
the opposition. By order, the Sandiganbayan, also opined that "(s)ervice of interrogatories
in order to expedite proceedings and before joinder of issue and without leave of
accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG court is premature x x (absent) any special or
forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to extraordinary circumstances x x which would
make more specific certain allegations.4 justify x x (the same)."
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer
“motion for leave to file interrogatories under with Compulsory Counterclaim. In response,
Rule 25 of the Rules of Court” and the PCGG presented a “Reply to Answer with
“Interrogatories under Rule 25.” Basically, they Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim."
sought an answer to the question: “Who were The case was set for pre-trial.
the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from
its Chairman, Hon. Ramon Diaz, who verified
the complaint) who approved or authorized the Tantoco and Santiago filed with the
inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
and Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in “Interrogatories to Plain-tiff," and on an
the x x case?" The PCGG responded by filing a “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"as well as
motion to strike out said motion and a Motion for Production and Inspection of
interrogatories as being impertinent, “queer,” Documents.
“weird,” or “procedurally bizarre as the purpose
thereof lacks merit as it is improper, ISSUE:
impertinent and irrelevant under any guise."
In compliance with the Order, the PCGG HELD: Involved in the present proceedings
filed an Expanded Complaint. As regards this are two of the modes of discovery provided in
expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago the Rules of Court: interrogatories to
parties, and production and inspection of pleadings filed by the parties; but that, only in a
documents and things. very general way. Only “ultimate facts” are set
forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest
outline of the factual basis of a party’s claims
The resolution of controversies is, as or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law
everyone knows, the raison d’etre of courts. says that every pleading “shall contain in a
This essential function is accomplished methodical and logical form, a plain, concise
by first, the ascertainment of all the material and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
and relevant facts from the pleadings and from which the party pleading relies for his claim or
the evidence adduced by the parties, defense, as the case may be, omitting the
and second, after that determination of the statement of mere evidentiary facts."31
facts has been completed, by the application of
the law thereto to the end that the controversy
may be settled authoritatively, definitely and Parenthetically, if this requirement is not
finally. observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged
too generally or “not averred with sufficient
It is for this reason that a substantial part of
definiteness or particularity to enable x x (an
the adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied
adverse party) properly to prepare his
with assuring that all the facts are indeed
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial,” a
presented to the Court; for obviously, to the
bill of particulars seeking a “more definite
extent that adjudication is made on the basis of
statement” may be ordered by the court on
incomplete facts, to that extent there is
motion of a party. The office of a bill of
faultiness in the approximation of objective
particulars is, however, limited to making more
justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no
particular or definite the ultimate facts in a
less than of judges to see that this objective is
pleading. It is not its office to supply evidentiary
attained; that is to say, that there be no
matters. And the common perception is that
suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or
said evidentiary details are made known to the
distortion of the facts; and that no party be
parties and the court only during the trial, when
unaware of any fact material and relevant to
proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising
the action, or surprised by any factual detail
from the pleadings.
suddenly brought to his attention during the
trial. The truth is that “evidentiary matters” may
be inquired into and learned by the parties
before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and
It is the duty of each contending party to lay policy of the law that the parties—before the
before the court the facts in issue—fully and trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial—
fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the should discover or inform themselves of all the
material and relevant facts known to him, facts relevant to the action, not only those
suppressing or concealing nothing, nor known to them individually, but also those
preventing another party, by clever and adroit known to their adversaries; in other words,
manipulation of the technical rules of pleading the desideratum is that civil trials should not be
and evidence, from also presenting all the facts carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court
within his knowledge. make this ideal possible through the
deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in
Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts jurisdictions has been that ample discovery
before the court is accomplished by the before trial, under proper regulation,
accomplished one of the most necessary ends expedition’ serve to preclude a party from
of modem procedure: it not only eliminates inquiring into the facts underlying his
unessential issues from trials thereby opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the
shortening them considerably, but also relevant facts gathered by both parties is
requires parties to play the game with the essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
cards on the table so that the possibility of fair party may compel the other to disgorge
settlement before trial is measurably increased. whatever facts he has in his possession. The
x x."32 deposition-discovery procedure simply
advances the stage at which the disclosure can
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery be compelled from the time of trial to the period
procedure was designed to remedy the preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of
conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of surprise. x x."35
the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-
formulation and fact revelation theretofore That the matters on which discovery is
performed primarily by the pleadings. desired are the same matters subject of a prior
motion for bill of particulars addressed to the
The various modes or instruments of
PCGG’s amended complaint—and denied for
discovery are meant to serve
lack of merit—is beside the point. Indeed, as
(1) as a device, along with the pre-trial already pointed out above, a bill of particulars
hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify may elicit only ultimate facts, not so
the basic issues between the parties, and called evidentiary facts. The latter are without
doubt proper subject of discovery.44
(2) as a device for ascertaining the facts
relative to those issues.
The Court also finds itself unable to sustain the
The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable PCGG’s other principal contention, of the
the parties, consistent with recognized nullity of the Sandiganbayan’s Order for the
privileges, to obtain the fullest possible production and inspection of specified
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil documents and things allegedly in its
trials and thus prevent that said trials are possession.
carried on in the dark.33
The Court gives short shrift to the argument
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be that some documents sought to be produced
covered by depositions or interrogatories is as and inspected had already been presented in
broad as when the interrogated party is called Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG’s
as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed,
extends to all facts which are relevant, whether scrutinized and even offered objections thereto
they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only and made comments thereon. Obviously, there
those matters which are privileged, The is nothing secret or confidential about these
objective is as much to give every party the documents. No serious objection can therefore
fullest possible information of all the relevant be presented to the desire of the private
facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for respondents to have copies of those
use upon said trial. documents in order to study them some more
or otherwise use them during the trial for any
purpose allowed by law.
Hence, “the deposition-discovery rules are to
The PCGG says that some of the
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No
documents are non-existent. This it can allege
longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing
in response to the corresponding question in
the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction

for doing so unless it is subsequently
established that the denial is false.
The claim that use of the documents is
proscribed by Executive Order No. 1 has
already been dealt with. The PCGG is however
at liberty to allege and prove that said
documents fall within some other privilege,
constitutional or statutory.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the

petitioner’s theory, there is good cause for the
production and inspection of the documents
subject of the motion. Some of the documents
are, according to the verification of the
amended complaint, the basis of several of the
material allegations of said complaint. Others,
admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the
plaintiff, It is matters such as these into which
inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of Fortune Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
discovery, to the end that the parties may 229 SCRA 355, G.R. No. 108119 January 19,
adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The 1994
only other documents sought to be produced
are needed in relation to the allegations of the Facts:
counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; An action for breach of contract was filed by
petitioner Fortune Corporation against
their disclosure may not be opposed.
respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation,
before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City, Branch 30. After respondent corporation
had filed its Answer, petitioner served the
former with written interrogatories pursuant to
Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The
interrogatories were answered by respondent
corporation through its board chairman, Juanito
A. Teope.
The pre-trial conference was thereafter
scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April
22, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, however, petitioner served
upon private respondent a Notice to Take
Deposition Upon Oral Examination 2 dated
March 26, 1992, notifying the latter that on
April 7, 1992, at San Pablo City, herein
petitioner would take the deposition of said
Juanito A. Teope, in accordance with Section
15, Rule 24.
Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not what facts are really in dispute and need to be
To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to tried. Experience had shown that the most
Plaintiff's Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral effective legal machinery for reducing and
Examination, 3dated March 27, 1992, alleging clarifying the issues was a preliminary
inter alia that : examination, as broad in scope as the trial
(a) herein petitioner has previously itself, of the evidence of both parties.
availed of one mode of discovery, that This provision explicitly vests in the court the
is, the written interrogatories which power to order that the deposition shall not be
practically covered all the claims, taken and this grant connotes the authority to
counterclaims and defenses in the case; exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is
(b) there is absolutely no sound reason well settled, however, that the discretion
or justification advanced for the taking of conferred by law is not unlimited; that it must
the oral deposition; be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or
(c) such taking would cause annoyance, oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and
embarrassment and oppression upon in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the
the prospective deponent, Juanito A. end that its purpose may be attained.
Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no intention of The rule is that certiorari will generally not lie to
leaving the country; and review a discretionary action of any tribunal.
(e) the intended deponent is available to Also, as a general proposition, a writ of
testify in open court if required during certiorari is available only to review final
the trial on the merits. judgments or decrees, and will be refused
The trial court thereafter issued on April 3, where there has been no final judgment or
1992 an order 4 that the requested deposition order and the proceeding for which the writ is
shall not be taken. Upon denial of motion for sought is still pending and undetermined in the
consideration this instant petition for certiorari. lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been
held that certiorari will not lie to review or
Issue: correct discovery orders made prior to trial.
This is because, like other discovery orders,
Ruling: orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are
The rules providing for pre-trial discovery of interlocutory and not appealable, considering
testimony, pre-trial inspection of documentary that they do not finally dispose of the
evidence and other tangible things, and the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it.
examination of property and person, were an But then, there are concomitant limitations to
important innovation in the rules of procedure. discovery, even when permitted to be
The promulgation of this group of rules undertaken without leave of court and without
satisfied the long-felt need for a legal judicial intervention. As indicated by the Rules,
machinery in the courts to supplement the limitations inevitably arise when it can be
pleadings, for the purpose of disclosing the real shown that the examination is being conducted
points of dispute between the parties and of in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
affording an adequate factual basis in embarrass, or oppress the person subject to
preparation for trial. The rules are not the inquiry. Also, further limitations come into
grounded on the supposition that the pleadings existence when the inquiry touches upon the
are the only or chief basis of preparation for irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized
trial. On the contrary, the limitations of the domains of privilege.
pleadings in this respect are recognized. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is
Thus the rules provide for simplicity and brevity only upon notice and for good cause shown
in pleadings, which in most cases will terminate that the court may order that the deposition
with the answer; and at the same time adapt shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is
the old and familiar deposition procedure to to be determined by the court in the exercise of
serve as a device for ascertaining before trial judicial discretion. Good cause means a
substantial reason—one that affords a legal of such motion has been served to the other
excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons party.
exist is for the court to determine, as there is Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is
no hard and fast rule for determining the to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking
question as to what is meant by the term “for of his deposition. No doubt, private respondent
good cause shown.” and its representative who is to be examined
It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that will be inconvenienced—as are all parties
under the present Rules the fact that a party when required to submit to examination—but
has resorted to a particular method of this is no ground for denial of the deposition-
discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery process.
discovery devices, as long as the party is not
attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court,
or to harass or oppress the other party. As a
matter of practice, it will often be desirable to
resort to both interrogatories and depositions in
one or the other sequence. Additional lines of
inquiry may come to light after the deposition
has been taken, as to which written
interrogatories probably would be adequate,
and there is no reason why the examining PEOPLE V PARUNGAO
party should not be entitled to obtain all the FACTS:
relevant information he desires if no substantial
prejudice is done to the party from whom On May 30, 1989, early in the morning, the
discovery is sought. detention prisoners in Cells No. 2 and 6 of the
The availability of the proposed deponent to Pampanga Provincial Jail at the Provincial
testify in court does not constitute “good cause” Capitol in San Fernando, staged a jailbreak.
to justify the court’s order that his deposition On the occasion thereof, Jail Guards Conrado
shall not be taken. That the witness is unable Basa and Emilardo Valencia were killed, while
to attend or testify is one of the grounds when Jail Guard Arnel Aldana was seriously
the deposition of a witness may be used in wounded. Several pieces of firearms valued at
court during the trial. But the same reason P41,000.00 were also forcibly taken and
cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the carried away from the Provincial Jail Armory.
taking of his deposition.
We are also in conformity with petitioner’s
submission that the mere fact that the court The incident triggered the filing on April 16,
could not thereby observe the behavior of the 1990, of an Information against herein
deponent does not justify the denial of the right accused-appellant Abelardo Parungao and 15
to take deposition. other prisoners charging them with the crime of
Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation Robbery with Homicide and Serious Physical
that petitioner merely intended to annoy, Injuries.
harrass or oppress the proposed deponent
cannot ably support the setting aside of a Accused-appellant anchors his appeal on what
notice to take deposition. Orders to protect the he considers to be reversible error on the part
party or witness from annoyance, of the trial court in accepting and giving full
embarrassment or oppression may be issued if probative value to the hearsay and
the following requirements are complied with: uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution
(a) that there is a motion made by any party or witnesses and on the basis thereof, in finding
by the person to be examined; (b) that the him a co-conspirator and a principal by
motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that inducement.
there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice
The prosecution presented four witnesses evidence being merely hearsay because said
Mario Quito, Ronnie Pilapil, Arnel Aldana, and witnesses testified and conveyed to the court
Fernando Pacheco to establish the existence matters not of their own personal knowledge
of conspiracy and that accused-appellant was but matters only narrated to them by other
co-conspirator and a principal by inducement in detainees. There is nothing in their testimony
the commission of the crime charged. pointing to accused-appellant as the very
source of their information that he planned the
jailbreak. However, it must be noted that
Plainly the foregoing testimony of Quito, Pilapil, neither accused-appellant nor his counsel
and Aldana that accused-appellant was the objected to the admission of the testimony of
mastermind of the jail break is not sufficient to Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana.
prove such fact, such evidence being merely
hearsay because said witnesses testified and Same; Same; Same; Same; Admissibility of
conveyed to the court matters not of their own evidence should not be equated with weight of
personal knowledge but matters only narrated evidence—hearsay evidence whether objected
to them by other detainees. There is nothing in to or not can not be given credence for it has
their testimony pointing to accused-appellant no probative value.—The general rule is that
as the very source of their information that he hearsay evidence is not admissible. However,
planned the jailbreak. However, it must be the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may
noted that neither accused-appellant nor his result in its being admitted as evidence. But
counsel objected to the admission of the one should not be misled into thinking that
testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana. such declarations are thereby impressed with
probative value. Admissibility of evidence
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is should not be equated with weight of evidence.
not admissible. However, the lack of objection Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
to hearsay testimony may result in its being be given credence for it has no probative
admitted as evidence. But one should not be value.
misled into thinking that such declarations are
thereby impressed with probative value. Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional
Admissibility of evidence should not be Law; Right of Confrontation; Cross-
equated with weight of evidence. Examination; To give weight to the hearsay
testimony of witnesses and to make the same
the basis for finding the accused a co-
ISSUE: conspirator and for imposing the penalty of life
imprisonment gravely violates the hearsay rule
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not and the constitutional right of the accused to
can not be given credence for it has no meet the witnesses face-to-face and to subject
probative value. the source of the information to the rigid test of
cross-examination, the only effective means to
RULING: test their truthfulness, memory, and
intelligence.—To give weight to the hearsay
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay
testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana, and to
Evidence; The testimony of witnesses who
make the same the basis for finding accused-
testified and conveyed to the court matters not
appellant a coconspirator and for imposing the
of their own personal knowledge but matters
penalty of life imprisonment, gravely violates
only narrated to them by other persons is not
the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of
sufficient to prove the fact sought to be
the accused-appellant to meet the witnesses
established.—Plainly the foregoing testimony
face-to-face and to subject the source of the
of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana that accused-
information to the rigid test of cross-
appellant was the mastermind of the jailbreak
examination, the only effective means to test
is not sufficient to prove such fact, such
their truthfulness, memory, and intelligence. In

case of conflict between a provision of the
Constitution giving the accused a substantive
right and mere technical rules of evidence, we
have no choice but to give effect to the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although

there is no direct evidence of prior agreement
to commit the crime, conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the crime which are indicative
of a joint purpose, concerted action, and
concurrence of sentiments.—Conspiracy has
not been established beyond reasonable PRATS & COMPANY vs PHOENIX
doubt. It is a rule that although there is no INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD,
direct evidence of prior agreement to commit CONNECTICUT
the crime, conspiracy may be inferred from the G.R. No. L-28607 February 21, 1929
acts of the accused before, during, and after
the crime which are indicative of a joint Facts:
purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of This action was instituted in the Court of First
sentiments (People vs. de Leon, et al., 245 Instance of the City of Manila by Prats & Co., a
SCRA 538 [1995]). The record is bereft of any mercantile partnership, for the purpose of
evidence indicating a prior plan or agreement recovering from the Phoenix Insurance Co., of
between accused-appellant and the other Hartford, Connecticut, the sum of P117,800.60,
inmates in the implementation of a common with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to
design to bolt jail, kill the guards, and rob the have been sustained by the plaintiff, on August
prison armory. There is no evidence that 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said
accused-appellant participated in the killing of loss was covered by policy of insurance No.
the two guards, Basa and Velencia, nor in 600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by
inflicting injuries on Aldana. In fact, the defendant company to the plaintiff.
accusedappellant before, during, and after the
incident never left his cell. On July 10, 1923, Francisco Prats, Elias
Hanna and Isidro Bejar registered two
mercantile partnerships in the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry for the purpose of
engaging in mercantile business.On May 27,
1924, Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar & Co.,
purchased a one-story building at 95 Plaza
Gardenia, Manila; and soon thereafter he
begun to assemble in this place the stock of
merchandise which was the subject of
insurance in this case.By August 21, 1924,
there had been assembled and stored by Prats
in the place above described a stock of goods
which, according to the documents exhibited
by him, had a valuation of P211,329.72, on
which he had taken out insurance to the extent
of P410,000. At midnight of the day mentioned
a fire occurred at 95 Plaza Gardenia, which
destroyed the building and ruined its contents, In this connection it should be remembered
the amount realized from the salvage of the that many of the technical rules of evidence
stock being P11,731.93. Prats insured this which are often invoked in our courts were
various products for 9 policies. originally worked out in England and the United
States, where the jury system prevails. These
Issue: rules were adopted for the purpose of keeping
Whether the ruling of the trial court is proper. matter from juries which — it was supposed —
might unduly influence them in deciding on the
Ruling: facts. They have little pertinence to a system of
In the course of long experience we have procedure, like ours, in which the court is judge
observed that justice is most effectivly and both of law and facts, and in which accordingly
expenditiously administered in the courts it is necessary for the court to know what the
where trivial objections to the admission of proof is before it rules upon the propriety of
proof are received with least favor. The receiving it. Apart from these considerations is
practice of excluding evidence on doubtful the circumstance mentioned above that the
objection to its materiality or technical objection time consumed in the trial on such collateral
to the form of the questions should be avoided. points is generally many times greater than
In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a would be consumed if the questionable
judge of first instance, in the early stages of the testimony should be admitted for what it is
development of the proof, to know with any worth. What has been said above finds special
certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; relevancy in this case in view of the action of
and where there is no indication of bad faith on the trial court in refusing to consider the proof
the part of the attorney offering the evidence, referred to in the opinion showing that the
the court may as a rule safely accept the plaintiff, while engaged in assembling its stock,
testimony upon the statement of the attorney procured maritime insurance upon a fictitious
that the proof offered will be connected later. importation of silk. We earnestly commend the
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the maintenance of liberal practice in the
heat of the battle over which he presides a admission of proof.
judge of first instance may possibly fall into Our examination of the case leads to the
error in judging of the relevancy of proof where conclusion that the result reached by the trial
a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. court was correct.
When such a mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed
and possibly unable to correct the effects of ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT OR
error without returning the case for a new trial, CREDIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
-- a step which this court is always very loath to PRATS & CO. VS. PHŒNIX INSURANCE
take. On the other hand, the admission of proof CO., 52 PHIL. 807, NO. 28607 FEBRUARY
in a court of first instance, even if the question
21, 1929 (BEWARE, SOBRANG EWAN)
as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is
doubtful, can never result in much harm to
either litigant, because the trial judge is FACTS
supposed to know the law; and it is its duty,
upon final consideration of the case, to This action was instituted in the Court of First
distinguish the relevant and material from the Instance of the City of Manila by Prats & Co., a
irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is mercantile partnership, for the purpose of
followed and the cause is prosecuted to the recovering from the Phoenix Insurance Co., of
Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then Hartford, Connecticut, the sum of P117,800.60,
has all the material before it necessary to make with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to
a correct judgment. have been sustained by the plaintiff, on August
21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said
loss was covered by policy of insurance No. Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of
600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by the contents of the bodega before the fire. In
the defendant company to the plaintiff. For this connection it appears that forty-five cases
answer, the defendant, Pheonix Insurance Co., of old stock of Hanna, Bejar & Co., at Legaspi,
admitted the insurance of the policy of P. I., were shipped to Manila before the fire,
insurance but, by way of special defense, but instead of being taken directly to 95 Plaza
alleged, among other things, that the fire in Gardenia, they were housed for a time in the
question had been set by the plaintiff, or with back part of the lower floor of the Bazar Filipino
its connivance, and that the plaintiff had in which Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co.
submitted under oath to the defendant a had their offices. Moreover, a quantity of
fraudulent claim of loss, in contravention of the merchandise purchased from place shortly
express terms of the policy. Upon hearing the before the fire, instead of directly to 95 Plaza
cause the trial court absolved the defendant Gardenia; and it is the theory of the defendant
from the complaint with respect to the that new merchandise purchased from
obligation created by the policy which was the Talambiras Brothers was substituted for the old
subject of the suit, but ordered the defendant to stock in boxes from Hanna, Bejar & Co. at
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11,731.93, with Legaspi, leaving the old goods to be deposited
interest from the filing of the complaint, upon in the bodega to swell the debris of the fire.
account of moneys received from salvage There is evidence also, which was credited by
sales, conducted by the defendant, of the court, to the effect that on various
remnants of the insured stock. From this occasions before the fire goods were removed
judgment the plaintiff appealed. from the bodega to the store of B. Abolafia, at
Manila, where they were received without
Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar & Co., invoice. Some of these goods were
purchased a one-story building at 95 Plaza subsequently sent away by Abolafia for sale in
Gardenia, Manila; and soon thereafter he the provinces.
begun to assemble in this place the stock of
merchandise which was the subject of We note that about the time the bodega at 95
insurance in this case. The building referred to Plaza Gardenia had been purchased, Domingo
was purchasd outright for the sum of P1,600. It Romero assisted one Ramon Osete to rent No.
was old and was scarcely more than a shed 69 Calle Gardenia, which was close to the rear
but had been used in times past for human of the building at 95 Plaza Gardenia. Osete
habitation. In effecting the purchase of this appears to have been the individual chose for
building Prats availed himself of the service of the role of incendiary, and he slept at the place
Domingo Romero, who lived only two doors mentioned until the night of the fire. A night or
away at 97 Plaza Gardenia. There had been two before the fire this Osete, accompanied by
assembled and stored by Prats in the place one Antonio Prats, appears to have brought
above described a stock of goods which, two cans of petroleum to his lodging place at
according to the documents exhibited by him, 69 Calle Gardenia. After these cans had been
had a valuation of P211,329.72, on which he taken to Osete's bathroom by his muchacho,
had taken out insurance to the extent of the latter was sent out on an errand; and while
P410,000. At midnight of the day mentioned a he was gone the petroleum disappeared. After
fire occurred at 95 Plaza Gardenia, which the fire had been started in the
destroyed the building and ruined its contents, plaintiff's bodega shortly after midnight on
the amount realized from the salvage of the August 21, 1924, Osete conveyed this boy in
stock being P11,731.93. his automobile to the fire alarm box on Plaza
Gardenia. Reaching this place, Osete planted
The proof submitted by the defendant tends to the boy there with instructions to stop anyone
show that obscure manipulations were used by who might attempt to turn in the alarm by
the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 telling him that he (the boy) had already done
so; and in fact, after the fire had gained some conclusion that the fire had originated from an
headway, one Joaquin Silos, who lived near intentional act. Reflection upon the proof
the bodega, ran to the box to turn on the alarm before the court engenders in us the same
but was stopped in the act by a person who belief and conducts us to the further conclusion
stated that he had already given the alarm. that Prats & Co. was not alien to the deed.
Nevertheless, when Fire Chief Vanderford
reached the scene of the fire a few minutes The finding of the trial court in the effect that
later, he found that the box had not been the plaintiff had submitted false proof in the
disturbed and he himself turned on the alarm. support of his claim is also, in our opinion, well
The boy stated that when he was on the way founded. That conclusion appears to have
with Osete to the alarm box, as just stated, an been based upon three items of proof, and with
explosion took place in the bodega and a dull respect to at least two of these, we think that
sound was emitted. Vanderford says that upon the conclusion of his Honor was correctly
his arrival he saw that the smoke issuing from drawn. These two facts are, first, that the
the bodega black, suggesting the combustion plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in
of some inflammable material like petroleum. the fire as of a value of P12,800 when th erule
He also noted the odor of petroleum, as did value of said jewelry was about P600; and,
also some of the firemen who reached the secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to
scene. It may be added that when the debris of recover from the insurance company the value
the fire was subsequently searched, of goods which had been surreptitiously
merchandise soaked with petroleum was found withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the
in the ruins. fire. Neither of these two facts are consistent
with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and
Domingo Romero, who had been living at 97 each constituted a breach of the stipulations of
Plaza Gardenia, had before the fire taken his the policy against the use of fraudulent devices
family temporarily to the home of Prats in and false proof with respect to the loss.
Pasay. But after the fire was over the family
moved back to 97 Plaza Gardenia, although The other point relied upon by his Honor to
that place had been considerably damaged by sustain the conclusion that the plaintiff had
the flames. attempted to deceive the defendant with
respect to the extent of the loss was at least
Among those who suffered from the fire were competent in its general bearing on the good
the members of the Artigas family, living at 93 faith of the plaintiff, even if, as is probably true,
Gardenia, on the side opposite Romero's not alone sufficient to constitute a breach of the
house. Another neighbor who likewise suffered same stipulations. The point is this: After the
from the fire was one Juan Atayde, occupant of fire the plaintiff presented to the adjuster
67 Calle Gardenia, at the side of the house certain cost sheets and cpies of supposed
occupied by Osete. Soon after the fire invoices in which the prices and expenses of
Domingo Romero quietly passed a 100-peso importation of a quantity of goods were stated
bill into the hand of Maria Luisa Artigas, a at double the true amount. The adjuster soon
daughter belonging to the Artigas family. discovered the artificial nature of these
Romero likewise gave the same amount to documents, and, with his consent, they were
Juan Atayde. It is self-evident that the gifts thus withdrawn by Prats and subsequently
made by Romero to Luisa Artigas and Juan destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated that
Atayde had other motives than pure charity these documents had been fabricated in order
and that the money probably came from some that they might be exhibited to intending
other source than his own modest earnings. purchasers of the goods, thereby making it
After the fire that a special investigation was appear to them that the cost of the
made by the police department with the result mercahndise had been much greater than it in
that Deputy Chief Lorenzo came to the fact was — a ruse which is supposed to have
been entirely innocent or at least not directed EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE;

against the insurer. But a question naturally LIBERAL ATTITUDE INDICATED.—The court
arises as to the purpose which these commends the maintenance of a liberal
documents might have been made to serve if attitude on the part of trial judges in the matter
the fire, as doubtless intended by its designers, of admission of proof. The practice of excluding
had been so destructive as to remove all evidence on doubtful objections to its
vestiges of the stock actually involved. Upoon materiality, or relevancy, or technical
the whole we are forced to state the
objections to the questions, should be avoi
conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused
the fire to be set, or connived therein, but also
that it submitted fraudulent proof as the trial
judge found. PEOPLE VS. PRECIOSO
G.R. NO. 95890
Before concluding this opinion we are
constrained to make a few observations with
reference to the trial of this case and the
inordinate amountof time consumed in the FACTS: About 9:30 p.m. of 6 August, 1985,
proceedings. We are told in the appellant's Leah Alimpoos, who was sleeping at the
brief that the trial of this case covered a period Galvadores’ store at SitioAndanan,
of almost two years, in which fifty separate Maygatasan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, with
sessions were held, without counting the her niece, Maryjane, and PaquitoCamarin, a
numeruos hearings upon the taking of the househelp, was awakened by four armed men.
deposition of Francisco Prats, a partner in the
plaintiff firm, whose testimony was taken at the
instance of the defendant. Taken all together, The faces of the four were covered with
the time thus consumed was out of all handkerchiefs and stockings and only their
proportion to the difficulties of the case. An
eyes and mouths were visible. Despite this, the
examination of the voluminous transcript
frightened girl recognized appellant Rolando
reveals at least part of the reason for this
inordinate consumption of time; since we find Precioso, a neighbor, through his voice and
that far too much of the space in the transcript general physical appearance. The men
is taken up with the record of petty skirmishes instructed her to wake up her elder sister, Irene
in court resulting from objections over the Galvadores, on the pretext that Maryjane was
admission of evidence. suffering from a stomachache.
ISSUE
As instructed, the hapless girl shouted, ‘Ne,
Whether petitioner submitted fraudulent proof matakayguisakitansiMaryjanengtiyan’ (Ne, you
as the trial judge found. wake up because Maryjane has a stomach
ache) “Rafael Galvadores and his wife, Irene,
RULING were roused from their sleep. Rafael called out
FIRE INSURANCE; AVOIDANCE OF to TeresitaPescador, a househelp, who was
POLICY; INCENDIARISM ; FRAUDULENT sleeping with their daughter, Ana, in another
PROOF OF LOSS.—The insurance policy room to open the door. “Teresita, who had just
which was the subject of action in this case awakened, did as told and was surprised to
was held to have been avoided by the see the three armed men rushing inside and
connivance of the insured in setting fire to the telling her not to move and to keep quiet. She
insured goods and the submission by the immediately recognized appellant Precioso,
insured of fraudulent proof of loss. one of their neighbors who frequented the
store, through his physical appearance, his brought Leah to the side of the house and
clothes, and his voice, raped her there a second time.
When the couple went out of their room, About 11:00 p.m., appellants and their
appellant Precioso herded them to the sala of companions left, taking with them P6,000.00
the house, and forced Teresita and Ana into cash, pieces of jewelry valued at P4,000.00,
the couple’s room. At the sala, Rafael was three pieces of calculators valued at
made to lie down on his stomach, as the men P1,000.00, car stereo worth P2,000.00,
ransacked the house looking for valuables. personal belongings valued at P7,000.00, and
assorted stocks in the store valued at
P10,000.00.
Later, Rafael and Leah were brought to the
store by appellant Precioso, where Rafael was
made to lie down on his stomach again, While The trial court rendered its judgment of
one of the men pointed a gun at him, appellant conviction. Hence, their present appeal.
Precioso forced Leah to lie down, removed her
panties, and raped her in the presence of
Rafael, Paquito and Maryjane, all the time
threatening Leah with death if she would not
keep quiet and submit to his lust. Appellant ISSUE: Whether in ruling that the two accused
Precioso removed the cover of his face to kiss had been positively identified by the rape
Leah, allowing Leah and Rafael to recognize victims, allegedly basing its decision not on a
him. correct findings of facts but on inferences,
surmises and presumptions
Back at the house, appellant Monforte dragged

Teresita to the garage where he removed her HELD: The issues on appeal hinge on the
panties and raped her at gun point. Struggling question of credibility of the witnesses and their
and crying, Teresita scratched his face, as a testimonies. Once again, we reiterate that the
result of which his mask fell off, allowing her to trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the
see his face. When he was finished, appellant witnesses’ testimony is accorded great respect
Monforte sent her back to the room of the on appeal, and the records do not show that
Galvadores couple. the court below disregarded any consideration
which would warrant a departure from this
jurisprudential dictum. Appellate courts will
generally not disturb the factual findings of the
After raping Leah, appellant Precioso brought
trial court on the raison d’etre that the latter is
her back to the sala of the house. A few
in a better position to weigh conflicting
minutes later, appellant Monforte brought her
testimonies, having heard the witnesses
to the pigpen at the back of the house. He
themselves and observed their deportment and
threatened her with a gun, told her to lie down,
manner of testifying, subject to exceptions
hit her at the back just at the top of the
which do not obtain in the present case.
shoulder, and then raped her. At the time of the
rape, Leah was able to see his face since the
handkerchief over his face was removed. After
raping her at the pigpen, appellant Monforte The transcripts of the notes taken at the trial
reveal that the witnesses for the prosecution
testified in a clear, consistent and forthright We also gather from the evidence that the
manner. The testimonies of the complainants complainants have no ill motives or any
were basically congruent with and mutually plausible reason whatsoever to impute the
corroborative of each other, and were commission of such serious offenses upon
confirmed by those of the other prosecution appellants if, in truth, the latter are guiltless as
witnesses. Their minor errors and claimed. Accordingly, as we have held in a
inconsistencies do not affect the substance of number of cases, the absence of evidence of
their declaration or adversely reflect on their any improper motive impelling the principal
veracity. witness sustains the conclusion that his
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
In contrast, the testimony of appellants The foregoing doctrine squarely applies to

consist merely of denials and alibi, without any the multiple rapes committed by appellants on
other credible evidence to sustain their their two victims. Furthermore, considering the
exculpatory claims and defense. We have inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to
consistently ruled that denials, if airing in public things that affect her honor, it is
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing hard to conceive that the complainant would
evidence, are negative and self-serving assume and admit the ignominy she had
evidence which deserve no weight in law and undergone if it were not true. Complainants
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight Leah Alimpoos and TeresitaPescador, both
over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, young barrio girls, would not have publicly
as between the positive declarations of the admitted that they had been criminally ravished
prosecution witnesses and the negative if that was not true, for their natural instinct is to
statements of the accused, the former deserve protect their honor. Their testimony given at a
more credence. public trial wherein they narrated their ordeal
with all the sordid details thereof, as
Appellants further argue that they were not synthesized in appellee’s brief and set forth
properly identified. However, the records show earlier, could not have been conjured and
that Precioso and Monforte were positively fabricated by these hapless and innocent
identified by the two rape victims in a police victims.
line-up and in open court. They were further
definitely identified by complainant Irene
Galvadores and her husband, complainant The defense of alibi interposed by appellants is
Rafael Galvadores. All these witnesses had evidentially sterile and jurisprudentially weak
sufficient time and ample opportunity to as they were not able to demonstrate by
recognize and identify appellants. convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed. We
In People vs. Calixtro, we ruled that private need merely repeat the invariable rule that the
complainant’s identification of the accused defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges
through the latter’s voice may be accepted on credibility, and is an unavailing defense
considering that they are barriomates and especially if contradicted by eyewitness
friends. Here, with much more reason can we testimony.
accept the identification of appellants since the
prosecution witnesses not only heard their
voices but actually saw their faces. From what has been established by the
evidence, the defense version is entirely
unbelievable. It derives no support from the Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an
facts and circumstances that have been solidly Affidavit3 of even date, executed by its general
established by the prosecution. Appellants manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board
cannot, therefore, expect the absolution which of directors conducted a special teleconference
they seek from this Court in their appeal. on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty.
Aguinaldo attended.
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Order denying the motion to dismiss, giving
Appeals, credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo and
459 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 152392 May 26, Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors
2005 indeed conducted a teleconference on June
25, 1999, during which it approved a resolution
Facts: as quoted in the submitted affidavit.
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
established and registered in the Republic of Order, contending that it was inappropriate for
South Korea and licensed to do business in the the court to take judicial notice of the said
Philippines. Its general manager in the teleconference without any prior hearing. The
Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its trial court denied the motion in its Order dated
appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo August 8, 2000.ETI then filed a petition for
and his law firm. certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. of the RTC.
Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint against ETI with
the RTC of Manila, for the collection of the Issue:
principal amount of P260,150.00, plus Whether the court may take judicial notice of
attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The the facts presented.
verification and certification against forum
shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who Ruling:
indicated therein that he was the resident Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice
agent and legal counsel of KAL and had have three material requisites: (1) the matter
caused the preparation of the complaint. must be one of common and general
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on knowledge; (2) it must be well and
the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
authorized to execute the verification and uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
certificate of non-forum shopping as required the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL principal guide in determining what facts may
opposed the motion, contending that Atty. be assumed to be judicially known is that of
Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
registered as such with the SEC as required by notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
the Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was records and facts of general notoriety.
further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one
the corporate secretary of KAL. Appended to not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is
the said opposition was the identification card either: (1) generally known within the territorial
of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing that he was the jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
lawyer of KAL. accurate and ready determination by resorting
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized be questionable.
to file the complaint through a resolution of the Things of “common knowledge,” of which
KAL Board of Directors approved during a courts take judicial matters coming to the
special meeting held on June 25, 1999. knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by because of the money saved, among other
mankind as true and are capable of ready and advantages.
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which In the Philippines, teleconferencing and
are universally known, and which may be videoconferencing of members of board of
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other directors of private corporations is a reality, in
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities
they are of such universal notoriety and so and Exchange Commission issued SEC
generally understood that they may be Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November
regarded as forming part of the common 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be
knowledge of every person. As the complied with related to such conferences.
commonknowledge of man ranges far and Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have persons in the Philippines may have a
been judicially noticed as being matters of teleconference with a group of persons in
common knowledge. But a court cannot take South Korea relating to business transactions
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is or corporate governance.
dependent on the existence or non-existence
of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.
In this age of modern technology, the courts ESTRADA V DESIERTO (with help from net
may take judicial notice that business itong facts ang haba kasi di ko na alam alin
transactions may be made by individuals importante)
through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is FACTS:
interactive group communication (three or
more people in two or more locations) through On the line in the cases at bar is the office of
an electronic medium. In general terms, the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito
teleconferencing can bring people together Estrada alleges that he is the President on
under one roof even though they are separated leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
by hundreds of miles. This type of group Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring
communication may be used in a number of personalities are important enough but more
ways, and have three basic types: (1) video transcendental are the constitutional issues
conferencing—television-like communication embedded on the parties' dispute. While the
augmented with sound; (2) computer significant issues are many, the jugular issue
conferencing—printed communication through involves the relationship between the ruler and
keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
—verbal communication via the telephone with
optional capacity for telewriting or telecopying.
A teleconference represents a unique Estrada was inaugurated as president of the
alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
was first introduced in the 1960’s with with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice
American Telephone and Telegraph’s President.
Picturephone. At that time, however, no
demand existed for the new technology. Travel In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis
costs were reasonable and consumers were “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the
unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for President, alleged that he had personally given
using the picturephone, which was regarded as Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden
more of a novelty than as an actual means for in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a
everyday communication. In time, people found grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s
it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the allegation also caused controversy across the
course of business and corporate governance, nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his
Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the family later left Malacañang Palace.
impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s
was brought to the Senate and an
leaving the palace, which he countered by filing
impeachment court was formed, with Chief
a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of further proceedings in cases filed against him
rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to not until his term as president ends. He also
grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to
private schools and left-wing organizations. be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the to discharge the duties of his office, and
Philippines and other bar associations joined in declaring respondent to have taken her oath as
the thousands of protesters. and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
On January 19, The Philippine National Police
provisions of the Constitution.”
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined ISSUE:
the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for
RULING:
the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said Same; Same; There is not enough evidence to
that he wanted the impeachment trial to warrant the Court to enjoin the preliminary
continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will investigation of former President Estrada by
remove him from office. the Ombudsman—the former President needs
to offer more than hostile headlines to
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on
discharge his burden of proof, more weighty
television, calling for a snap presidential
social evidence to successfully prove the
election to be held concurrently with
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-
congressional and local elections on May 14,
free decision.—Applying the above ruling, we
2001. He added that he will not run in this
hold that there is not enough evidence to
election.
warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared investigation of the petitioner by the
that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to
that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. offer more than hostile headlines to discharge
Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal- his burden of proof. He needs to show more
Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence weighty social science evidence to successfully
of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th prove the impaired capacity of a judge to
president of the Philippines. render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the
cases against the petitioner are still undergoing
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he
preliminary investigation by a special panel of
had “strong and serious doubts about the
prosecutors in the office of the respondent
legality and constitutionality of her
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has
proclamation as president”, but saying he
been made by the petitioner that the minds of
would give up his office to avoid being an
the members of this special panel have already
been infected by bias because of the pervasive Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc.
prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the (Maxicare) vs. Estrada
special panel has yet to come out with it’s
Facts:
findings and the Court cannot second guess
whether its recommendation will be Maxicare is a domestic corporation
unfavorable to the petitioner. engaged in selling health insurance plans
whose Chairman Dr. Roberto K. Macasaet,
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Theory of
Chief Operating Officer Virgilio del Valle, and
Derivative Prejudice; The Court can not adopt
Sales/Marketing Manager Josephine Cabrera
former President Estrada’s theory of derivative
were impleaded as defendants-appellants. On
prejudice, i.e., that the prejudice of the
September 15, 1990, Maxicare allegedly
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates—the
engaged the services of Carmela Estrada who
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure gives
was doing business under the name of Cara
investigating prosecutors the independence to
Health Services to promote and sell the
make their own findings and recommendations
prepaid group practice health care delivery
albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.—
program called MAXICARE Plan with the
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by
position of Independent Account Executive.
the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of
Maxicare formally appointed Estrada as its
the news reports referred to by the petitioner
“General Agent,” evidenced by a letter-
cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this
agreement dated February 16, 1991. The letter
Court especially in light of the denials of the
agreement provided for plaintiff-appellee’s
respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged
Estrada’s compensation in the form of
prejudice and the presumption of good faith
commission. Maxicare alleged that it followed a
and regularity in the performance of official
“franchising system” in dealing with its agents
duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt
whereby an agent had to first secure
the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner,
permission from Maxicare to list a prospective
i.e., that the prejudice of respondent
company as client. Estrada alleged that it did
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth,
apply with Maxicare for the MERALCO account
our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give
and other accounts, and in fact, its franchise to
investigating prosecutors the independence to
solicit corporate accounts, MERALCO account
make their own findings and recommendations
included, was renewed on February 11, 1991.
albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.
Plaintiff-appellee Estrada submitted proposals
They can be reversed but they can not be
and made representations to the officers of
compelled to change their recommendations
MERALCO regarding the MAXICARE Plan but
nor can they be compelled to prosecute cases
when MERALCO decided to subscribe to the
which they believe deserve dismissal. In other
MAXICARE Plan, Maxicare directly negotiated
words, investigating prosecutors should not be
with MERALCO regarding the terms and
treated like unthinking slot machines.
conditions of the agreement and left plaintiff-
Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
appellee Estrada out of the discussions on the
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
terms and conditions.
and the latter believes that the finding of

probable cause against him is the result of
Issue: Whether Estrada is entitled to the
bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it
commission despite her admission that the
before the proper court.
negotiation between her and MERALCO failed.

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVEN?
Held:
The statement in Annex “F” amounted to UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION V

an admission, provides a contrary answer to THE COURT OF APPEALS
Maxicare’s ridiculous contention. We intoned
G.R. No. L-29155
therein that in spite of the presence of judicial
admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court
is still given leeway to consider other evidence
presented. As provided for in Section 4 of Rule FACTS: On February 14, 1961 Magdalo V.
129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that Francisco, Sr. and Victoriano V. Francisco filed
a judicial admission is conclusive upon the with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
party making it and does not require proof against, the Universal Food Corporation, an
admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown action for rescission of a contract entitled "Bill
that the admission was made through palpable of Assignment." The plaintiffs prayed the court
mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such to adjudge the defendant as without any right
to the use of the Mafran trademark and
admission was in fact made. The latter
formula, and order the latter to restore to them
exception allows one to contradict an
the said right of user; to order the defendant to
admission by denying that he made such an pay Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. his unpaid
admission. For instance, if a party invokes an salary from December 1, 1960, as well as
“admission” by an adverse party, but cites the damages in the sum of P40,000, and to pay
admission “out of context,” then the one the costs of suit. 1
making the admission may show that he made
no “such” admission, or that his admission was The defendant filed its answer containing
taken out of context. This may be interpreted admissions and denials. Paragraph 3 thereof
as to mean “not in the sense in which the "admits the allegations contained in paragraph
admission is made to appear.” That is the 3 of plaintiffs' complaint." The answer further
reason for the modifier “such.” alleged that the defendant had complied with
all the terms and conditions of the Bill of
In this case, the letter, although part of Assignment and, consequently, the plaintiffs
Estrada’s Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an are not entitled to rescission thereof; that the
plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. was not
admission of the statements contained therein,
dismissed from the service as permanent chief
especially since the bone of contention relates
chemist of the corporation as he is still its chief
to Estrada’s entitlement to commissions for the chemist; and, by way of special defenses, that
sale of health plans she claims to have the aforesaid plaintiff is estopped from
brokered. It is more than obvious from the questioning.
entirety of the records that Estrada has
unequivocally and consistently declared that ISSUE:
her involvement as broker is the proximate
cause which consummated the sale between HELD: The petitioner contends that the Court
Meralco and Maxicare. Moreover, Section 34, of Appeals erred in ordering the corporation to
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires the return to the respondents the trademark and
purpose for which the evidence is offered to be formula for Mafran sauce, when both the
specified. Undeniably, the letter was attached decision of the appellate court and that of the
to the Complaint, and offered in evidence, to lower court state that the corporation is not
demonstrate Maxicare’s bad faith and ill will aware nor is in possession of the formula for
Mafran sauce, and the respondent patentee
towards Estrada.
admittedly never gave the same to the
corporation.
According to the petitioner these findings would to her house. When the group arrived at Eden's
render it impossible to carry out the order to house, at about 4:30 p.m., Roland Tacipit was already
return the formula to the respondent patentee. there with Eden's brother, Elmer Molina, the latter
being a friend and co-worker of the accused.
The petitioner's predicament is According to the complainant, as she was about to
understandable. Article 1385 of the new Civil leave the Molina house, the accused restrained her,
Code provides that rescission creates the held her left hand and her notebooks and told her
obligation to return the things which were the friends to go ahead.
object of the contract. But that as it may, it is a On the other hand, defense witness Elmer Molina
logical inference from the appellate court's alleged that the complainant and the accused were
decision that what was meant to be returned to sweethearts. They left the house together, with their
hands over each other's shoulders.
the respondent patentee is not the formula The respondent allegedly raped the victim. After that,
itself, but only its use and the right to such use. the victim immediately said such incident to his
Thus, the respondents in their complaint for relatives who immediately report to the barangay and
rescission specifically and particularly pray, police.
among others, that the petitioner corporation
be adjudged as "without any right to use said Issue:
trademark and formula." Whether or not the evidence presented is sufficient to
convict the respondent.
The appealed decision is reversed. The Bill of Ruling:
Assignment is hereby rescinded, and the In reviewing the evidence of this case, this Court was
defendant corporation is ordered to return and guided by the three (3) settled principles in reviewing
restore to the plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, rape cases, namely, (1) an accusation for rape can be
Sr. the right to the use of his Mafran sauce made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
trademark and formula, subject-matter of the difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
Bill of Assignment, and to this end the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
defendant corporation and all its assigns and involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
successors are hereby permanently enjoined, scrutinized with extreme caution; (3) the evidence for
effective immediately, from using in any the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits,
manner the said Mafran sauce trademark and and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
formula. The defendant corporation shall also weakness of the evidence for the defense. On these
pay to Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. his monthly bases, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed.
There is present in this case clear, convincing and
salary of P300 from December 1, 1960, until
competent physical and testimonial evidence to
the date of finality of this judgment, inclusive, support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
the total amount due to him to earn legal against the accused. The testimony of complainant
interest from the date of the finality of this OneliaPamittan, was found bythe trial court to be
judgment until it shall have been fully paid, plus replete with details, negating the probability of
attorney's fees in the amount of P500, with fabrication. Although the trial court did not accord
costs against the defendant corporation." As credence to that part of her testimony relating to how
she ended up leaving the Molina household with the
thus modified, the said judgment is affirmed,
accused, the same did not militate against the
with costs against the petitioner corporation. credibility of the complainant as a prosecution
witness.
People vs. Tacipit, As far as alleged inconsistencies in her testimony are
242 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995 concerned, this Court has ruled time and again that a
few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
Facts: testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details,
OneliaPamittan, a 17-year old high school student at and not in actuality touching upon the basic aspects
the time of the commission of the offense. She had a of the whys and wherefores of the crime, do not
friend, Eden Molina, who lived about two (2) impair their credibility. This is especially true in the
kilometers from the school. crime of rape where the victim cannot be expected to
In the afternoon of January 3, 1991, Eden invited remember with accuracy the details of her humiliating
some of her friends, including the complainant, over experience. At best, this Court relies upon the fact
that the trial court found the complainant to be a EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

credible witness. vs.
Moreover, considering that the accused and the RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of
complainant are at most acquaintances, there Manila, respondent.
appears to be no motive on the part of the
complainant to testify against the accused which FACTS:
could render suspect her testimony in court. It is clear
that her only intent was to seek redress for the EmeteriaVillaflor and FlorentinoSouingco are charged
injustice committed against her by appellant—a with the crime of adultery.
married man. As held in People v. Guibao, “No
woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an the court ordered the defendant EmeteriaVillaflor, nor
examination of herself by being subjected to a public become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to
trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to the examination of one or two competent doctors to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.” determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused
For one, although there was an absence of external refused to obey the order on the ground that such
injuries on the body of the complainant, the clothes examination of her person was a violation of the
worn by her at the time of the offense speak well of constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.
the use of force and the presence of a struggle. As Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and
the trial court noted: “Her T-shirt was torn which was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
corroborates her testimony that it was forcibly she should permit the medical examination required
removed. It also proves that she offered resistance to by the court.
the criminal advances of the accused. Her shorts, like
her panty, had blood stains. Her panty was detached ISSUE:
from her shorts. Her bra was torn, also denoting that it
was forcibly removed. These physicalevidence x xx whether the compelling of a woman to permit her
are consistent only with the force and compulsion body to be examined by physicians to determine if
applied on her; they prove she offered resistance and she is pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine
her defloration was against her will.” Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal
The actuations of the complainant subsequent to the Procedure
commission of the crime are likewise consistent with
her allegations of rape. Her immediate revelation of RULING:
the incident to her uncle upon arrival as well as her
swift recourse to the barangay Captain and the police Perhaps the best way to test the correctness of our
authorities are not acts of a woman savoring an illicit position is to go back once more to elements and
tryst but that of a maiden seeking retribution for the ponder on what is the prime purpose of a criminal
outrage committed against her. trial. As we view it, the object of having criminal laws
Thus, the accused’s reliance on the defense that he is to purgue the community of persons who violate the
and the complainant were lovers is unfounded. But laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men.
even if it were true, such relationship would not give Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and
the accused the license to deflower the complainant constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to
against her will, and will not exonerate him from the protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No rule is
criminal charge for rape. Furthermore, there is nothing intemended to be so rigid as to embarrass the
in the testimonies of either the complainant or even administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain
the accused himself which could indicate any sort of the truth. No accused person should be afraid of the
special relationship between the two. The alleged use of any method which will tend to establish the
proof of such relationship, the ring with complainant’s truth. For instance, under the facts before us, to use
name engraved on it, does not even fit the fingers of torture to make the defendant admit her guilt might
the complainant. Their actuations with respect to each only result in including her to tell a falsehood. But no
other before, during and even after the commission of evidence of physical facts can for any substantial
the crime were consistent with the contention of the reason be held to be detrimental to the accused
complainant that they are nothing more than except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order
acquaintances. The evidence of the prosecution, to acquit a guilty person.
therefore, completely negates the existence of any
relationship between the accused and the The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular
complainant. inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided.
Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its
corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as identifications, we have applied the totality of
cases arise. circumstances test enunciated in the case of People
vs. Teehankee which lists the following factors: x xx
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the
request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention
the person of the defendant by physicians was at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
understood as subject to the limitations herein demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5)
the length of time between the crime and the
mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
corpus prayed for is hereby denied
identification process.
In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, an NBI agent

PEOPLE VS. AMESTUZO, G.R. NO. 104383, JULY first pointed the accused to the witnesses after which
12, 2001 the latter identified the accused. The Court held that
such identification was doubtful as the same was not
spontaneous and independent as there was improper
FACTS
suggestion coming from the NBI agent. We ruled that
a “show-up” or the presentation of a single suspect to
The incident happened in Kalookan City at a witness for purposes of identification is seriously
Lacsamana’s residence. The six (6 ) armed male flawed as it “constitutes the most grossly suggestive
persons (two (2) of them were Amestuzo and Bagas) identification procedure now or ever used by the
ransacked and took all monies, jewelries, shoes, police.”
jackets, colored television and imported wine.
Likewise, aforesaid accused ate the foods found by
them in their kitchen. After ransacking the room, two G.R. No. L-27606 July 30, 1976
(2) of the accused, one (1) of them is Amestuzo,
brought Estrella Rolago inside her room and was THE PEOPLE OF THE
raped by Amestuzo. Bagas likewise sexually PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
assaulted and ravished Fe Catanyag. vs.
DOMICIANO
The trial court rendered judgment convicting BERAME alias DOMING, defendant-appellant.
all the accused. From the judgment of conviction by
the trial court, only herein accused-appellant Bagas
appealed to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on Facts:
(1) the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to
be represented by counsel during his identification, It was about 6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966,
(2) the trial court's error in giving due weight to that an assailant suddenly shot Quirico Maningo,
the open court identification of him which was then seated on a chair facing the main door of the
based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court
sala of his rented house in Rizal Street, Suba
identification, and (3) the trial court's improper
rejection of his defense of alibi. District Danao City. His adopted son Danilo
Maningo, was seated one meter away from his right
ISSUE side. Several successive shots were fired at Quirico
Maningo. He saw his father, Quirico Maningo,
Whether the out of court identification was slump to the floor, wounded, with blood on his neck
proper.
and breast. He looked towards the main door where
RULING
the shots came from and saw the accused holding a .
38 caliber revolver. He was easily Identifiable, as
No. there was a "big light" at the main door of the
house. Appellant was standing on a bright spot as he
We agree that complainants’ out-of-court fired his gun several times at Quirico Maningo.
identification of accused-appellant was seriously When the firing ceased, the witness ran towards the
flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court
main door of the house and saw two persons, one of
them being the accuse Berame scampering away.
Quirico Maningo, the victim, was rushed to the the right size. It did fit appellant’s right foot. That
Danao City General Hospital, but he was dead on was demonstrative evidence of the most persuasive
arrival. The appealed decision did likewise note that kind.
later that same evening, the PC Provincial Then, too, there was a statement made by one of the
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary with a original co-accused, Anastacio Montinola, on his
Sergeant Armando Alfoja started the investigation being captured after the gunplay where he was
of the killing of Quirico Maningo. In a swampy area wounded, it turned out, mortally. He admitted his
at the back of the hospital near the cemetery of participation in the killing of Maningo and pointed
Danao City, where it was suspected one of the to appellant as one of his companions. While not
alleged assailants was hiding, they saw footprints amounting to a dying declaration, the lower court
and recovered a rubber shoe. Appellant was considered it as part of the res gestae, and rightly
required at the trial to put it on. It turned out that it so.
corresponded exactly with his right foot. Moreover, Whether specific statements are admissible as part
appellant took flight after the killing and hid himself of the res gestae is a matter within the sound
He did not surrender until almost a month later, on discretion of the trial court, the determination of
May 8, 1966. There was in addition the statement which is ordinarily conclusive upon appeal, in the
from one of those accused in the original absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Here again,
information, Anastacio Montinola. As one of the there cannot possible be any abuse of discretion.
suspects, he was pursued by the police authorities. That much is clear.
When cornered, instead of surrendering, he decided
to shoot it out. He was hit, it turned out, mortally.
He admitted then and there that he was one of the CITIBANK V SABENIANO
killers of Quirico Maningo, and his companions
were a certain Doming and one Erning. He made FACTS:
the admission anew at the Southern Islands Hospital
Petitioner Citibank is a banking corporation duly
when he was further questioned. authorized under the laws of the USA to do
commercial banking activities n the Philippines.
Issue: Sabeniano was a client of both Petitioners Citibank
Whether the rubber shoe left by someone leaving in and FNCB Finance. Respondent filed a complaint
a hurry near scene of crime fitted foot of accused- against petitioners claiming to have substantial
appellant is demonstrative evidence deposits, the proceeds of which were supposedly
deposited automatically and directly to respondent’s
account with the petitioner Citibank and that allegedly
Held: petitioner refused to despite repeated demands.
This is a case, therefore, where the trial, court, after Petitioner alleged that respondent obtained several
hearing and observing the witnesses testify, and loans from the former and in default, Citibank
exercised its right to set-off respondent’s outstanding
weighing what was said by them, did choose to loans with her deposits and money. RTC declared the
believe the prosecution rather than the defense. For act illegal, null and void and ordered the petitioner to
such a finding to be overturned there must be a refund the amount plus interest, ordering Sabeniano,
showing that it did overlook a material fact or on the other hand to pay Citibank her indebtedness.
circumstance or did misinterpret its significance. CA affirmed the decision entirely in favor of the
respondent.
The appealed decision, moreover, finds impressive
support from circumstances that point unerringly to
appellant’s guilt. They simply cannot be explained ISSUE:
away. That could be the reason why his counsel did Petitioner Citibank was able to establish by
not even bother to do so. As noted in the decision, a preponderance of evidence the existence of
rubber shoe left in a swampy area by someone respondents loans.
leaving in a hurry the scene of the crime was just
HELD: their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer

of evidence.
This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by
the Court of Appeals summarily dismissing the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners based On 16 November 2004, public respondent
on its broad and indiscriminate application of the best judge issued the assailed order denying the
evidence rule. admission and excluding from the records some of
the petitioner’s Exhibits.
In general, the best evidence rule requires that the
highest available degree of proof must be Petitioner attempted to justify the admission of
produced. Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies
contents of a document are best proved by the offered are equivalent to the original of the document"
production of the document itself, [113] to the exclusion on the basis of the Electronic Evidence.
of any secondary or substitutionary evidence. [114]
ISSUE
The best evidence rule has been made part of the
revised Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3. Whether such Exhibits are Electronic
Evidence.
the best evidence rule applies only when the subject
of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The RULING
scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the No. An “electronic document” refers to
best evidence rule applies only when the content of information or the representation of information,
such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where data, figures, symbols or other models of written
the issue is only as to whether such document was expression, described or however represented, by
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances which a right is established or an obligation
relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
evidence is likewise admissible without need for
documents and any printout, readable by sight or
accounting for the original.
other means which accurately reflects the electronic
data message or electronic document. The rules use
the word “information” to define an electronic
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. CODILLA, document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
G.R. NO. 170491, APRIL 4, 2007 processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This
would suggest that an electronic document is relevant
FACTS only in terms of the information contained therein,
similar to any other document which is presented in
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel evidence as proof of its contents. However, what
of foreign registry owned and operated by private differentiates an electronic document from a paper-
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped based document is the manner by which the
and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which information is processed; clearly, the information
was then moored at the Cebu International Port. contained in an electronic document is received,
Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private
produced electronically.
respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged
damages caused on petitioner’s power barges. A perusal of the information contained in the
photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures
trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before of the persons who purportedly signed the
the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of documents, may be recorded or produced
Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as
Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed
information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. been made for the document in the proper place or
Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner
paper printouts were produced through an insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
electronic process, then these photocopies are evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on made in accordance with the exceptions as
Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if enumerated under the above quoted rule.
not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court
Having thus declared that the offered photocopies a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered
are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is by petitioner as documentary evidence.
consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.
G.R. No. 109293 August 18, 1993
No error can be ascribed to the court a quo in
denying admission and excluding from the records HOME INSURANCE
petitioner’s Exhibits “A,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “H” and its sub-
CORPORATION, petitioner,
markings, “I,” “J” and its sub-markings, “K,” “L,” “M”
vs.
and its sub-markings, “N” and its sub-markings, “O,”
“P” and its submarkings, “Q” and its sub-markings,
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER
and “R.” The trial court was correct in rejecting 7th DIVISION and MABUHAY BROKERAGE
these photocopies as they violate the best CO., INC., respondents.
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative
value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Facts:
Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and
modern technique of electronic copying, the best Filipro Phil. now known as Nestle Phil., was the
evidence rule was designed to guard against consignee of two hydraulic engines shipped on
incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of April 25, 1979, by INREDECO from the United
altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But States on the M/S Oriental Satesman. The cargo
the modern justification for the rule has expanded arrived in Manila on May 17, 1979, on board the
from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that M/S Pacific Conveyor. It was turned over to E.
writings occupy a central position in the law. The
Razon Arrastre, which retained custody until July
importance of the precise terms of writings in the
20, 1979. The cargo was later hauled by Mabuhay
world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human
memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the
Brokerage Co. to its warehouse, where it stayed
hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the until July 26, 1979. On this date it was delivered to
concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. the consignee.
When the original document has been lost, or When the skidded plywood cases were opened by
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, the consignee, one of the engines was found to be
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause damaged. Its fan cover was broken and misaligned
of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
and its cap deformed. The consignee refused to
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
accept the unit.
contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror
of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the Nestle subsequently filed a claim against E. Razon,
predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the Mabuhay, the Port Authority, and its insurer, the
original without bad faith on the part of the Home Insurance Corporation, for P49,170.00.
proponent/offeror which can be shown by When the other companies denied liability, Home
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of Insurance paid the claim and was issued a
destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must subrogation receipt for $6,070.00. 1
prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise
a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of Mabuhay alone was sued by Home Insurance for
the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a the recovery of the amount it had paid to Nestle.
diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has Mabuhay again denied liability. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment

dismissing the complaint. LIM TANHU V RAMOLETE
Issue:
DI NAPAKITA MARRIAGE CERT!!! SO, HEARSAY
Whether there is a valid subrogation despite non LANG TESTIMONY NG BISHOP AND NUNEZ. BEST
presentation of the insurance contract EVIDENCE/DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IS THE
PRODUCTION OF THE MARRIAGE CERT, PWEDE
Held: NAMAN YUNG TESTIMONY NG WITNESS KASO
DAPAT MAEXPLAIN BAKIT WALA YUNG MARRIAGE
No. Appellant had failed to establish a valid CERT. HEART HEART!
subrogation, which could not be presumed, and to
prove the amount Home had paid to Nestle. There
was no evidence either of what happened to the
damaged engine, which still retained value despite FACTS: Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, Alfonso Ng Sua
its defects. The contract is necessary to know the and Antonio Lim Tanhu were partners in the
extent of the rights and obligations of the parties. commercial partnership of Glory Commercial
Company with Tee Hoon as the manager.
The insurance contract has not been presented. It
may be assumed for the sake of argument that the
subrogation receipt may nevertheless be used to When Tee Hoon died, Tan Put, claiming to be the
establish the relationship between the petitioner and widow, filed a complaint against spouses Antonio
Lim Tanhu and DyOchay. Later, the complaint
the consignee and the amount paid to settle the
included Lim Tanhu’s son Lim TeckChuan, as well
claim. But that is all the document can do. By itself as the spouses Alfonso Ng Sua and Co Oyo, and
alone, the subrogation receipt is not sufficient to their son Eng Chong Leonardo.
prove the petitioner's claim holding the respondent
liable for the damage to the engine.
Tan Put claims in her complaint that after Tee
As a mere subrogee of Nestle, Home can exercise Hoon died, there was no liquidation of the
only such rights against the parties handling the company assets made and that she owns one
cargo as were granted to Nestle under the insurance third of the company shares. However, Lim
contract. The insurance contract would have clearly Tanhu, Ng Sua, Lim TeckChuan, and Eng Chong
indicated the scope of the coverage but there is no Leonardo continued to manage the company and
evidence of this. It cannot simply be supposed that used the company funds to acquire lands and
buildings in several areas. Allegedly, the
the hauling was included in the coverage; it is
defendants also used the company assets to
possible that the coverage ended with the arrastre. organize another corporation known as Glory
In other words, then rights transferred to Home by Commercial, Inc.
Nestle — still assuming there was a valid
subrogation — might not include the right to sue
Mabuhay. Subsequently, Tan Put amended her complaint
and added other averments. According to Tan
The best evidence of the insurance contract was its Put, she had asked the defendants to liquidate
original copy, which was presumably in the the business of the defunct partnership including
possession of Home itself. Failure to present this real estate investments in Hong Kong. The
original (or even a copy of it), for reasons the Court defendants did not make good in their promise to
liquidate the said properties, and instead,
cannot comprehend, must prove fatal to this
induced her to execute a quitclaim of all her
petition. The petitioner could be excused from
rights and interests in the same. After the
presenting the original of the insurance contract quitclaim was executed, Lim Tanhu allegedly
only if there was proof that this had been lost. offered to pay her P65,000 and issued a receipt
to her bearing the said amount. She signed the
receipt but was not given a copy of it and had not for its non-production is first presented to the
received the said money. When she eventually court.
made a formal demand for the accounting and
liquidation of the partnership company’s assets, In the case at bar, the purported
the defendants refused and stated that they will certification issued by a Mons. Jose M.
not give her share. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent
Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore,
competent evidence, there being absolutely
no showing as to unavailability of the
Lim Tanhu, et. al.: The amended complaint marriage contract and, indeed, as to the
(2nd paragraph) should not be admitted as there authenticity of the signature of said
were material modifications of the causes of certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a
action previously alleged. second assistant provincial fiscal not being
authorized by law, since it is not part of the
functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as
CFI: The judge allowed the amendment and said the bishop did not testify, the same is
hearsay.
that the present action is for accounting of real
and personal properties as well as for the
recovery of the same with damages. The Now, as against such flimsy evidence of plaintiff,
amended complaint only alleged facts that the court had before it, two documents of great
merely amplified the material averments weight belying the pretended marriage. We refer
constituting the cause of action in the original to (1) Exhibit LL, the income tax return of the
complain deceased Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan indicating that
the name of his wife was Ang Sick Tin and (2) the
quitclaim, Annex A of the answer, wherein
plaintiff Tan Put stated that she had been living
---Trial continued with the deceased without benefit of marriage
The defendants assert that Tan Put was not Tee and that she was his "common-law wife". Surely,
Hoon’s legitimate wife as the real Mrs. Tee Hoon, these two documents are far more reliable than
AngSiok Tin, is in Hong Kong. They also denied all the evidence of the plaintiff put together.
the allegations of fraud and claimed that proper
liquidation had been regularly made of the Of course, Exhibit LL is what might be termed as
business of the partnership and Tee Hoon pre-trial evidence. But it is evidence offered to
regularly received his share until his death. After the judge himself, not to the clerk of court, and
which, the partnership was dissolved and his should have at least moved him to ask plaintiff to
supposed share were all given to AngSiok and explain if not rebut it before jumping to the
their children. conclusion regarding her alleged marriage to the
deceased, Po Chuan. And in regard to the
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff Tan Put is married quitclaim containing the admission of a common-
to Tee Hoon? law relationship only, it is to be observed that His
Honor found that "defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng
HELD: No. Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the Sua had the plaintiff execute a quitclaim where
declaration of the contracting parties that they they gave plaintiff the amount of P25,000 as her
take each other as husband and wife "shall be set share in the capital and profits of the business of
forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as Glory Commercial Co. which was engaged in the
well as by their witnesses and the person hardware business", without making mention of
solemnizing the marriage. any evidence of fraud and misrepresentation in
its execution, thereby indicating either that no
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage evidence to prove that allegation of the plaintiff
must be an authentic copy of the marriage
had been presented by her or that whatever
contract. While a marriage may also be proved by
evidence was actually offered did not produce
other competent evidence, the absence of the
persuasion upon the court. Stated differently,
contract must first be satisfactorily explained.
Surely, the certification of the person who since the existence of the quitclaim has been
allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible duly established without any circumstance to
evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of detract from its legal import, the court should
the contract or of any other satisfactory reason have held that plaintiff was bound by her
admission therein that she was the common-law On July 16, 1963, defendant filed his answer to the
wife only of Po Chuan and what is more, that she complaint denying any liability to plaintiff. Since
had already renounced for valuable consideration dispute involves money claims, it required the
whatever claim she might have relative to the
services of an accountant. The Commissioner
partnership Glory Commercial Co.
rejected plaintiff’s claims which were not actually
The certification of the Local Civil Registrar
supported by the original of the bills of lading
of Cebu City and a similar certification of notwithstanding the fact that duplicate original of
the Apostolic Prefect of the Philippine the said documents and other secondary evidence
Independent Church, Parish of Sto. Niño, such as the ship cargo manifests have been
Cebu City, that their respective official presented as evidence.
records do not show any marriage between
Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan and Tan Put, Issue:
neither of which certifications have been Whether a carbon copy of a document be used as an
impugned by respondent until now, it
evidence
stands to reason that plaintiff's claim of
marriage is really unfounded.
Held:
Yes. Where the original bill of lading has been lost
or destroyed, evidence of freightage due may be
G.R. No. L-27134 February 28, 1986 taken from a carbon copy thereof and the ship’s
cargo manifest. The respondent Court correctly held
COMPANIA MARITIMA, plaintiff-appellant, defendant liable because the same actually
vs. represented freight charges based on the carbon
JOSE C. LIMSON, defendant-appellant. originals of the ship’s copy of the bills of lading
where Limson appeared as consignee and those
Facts: based on the ship’s cargo manifests, where
defendant appeared as consignee.
On October 8, 1962, plaintiff Compania Maritima
The ship’s copies of the bills of lading and the cargo
filed a complaint against defendant Jose C. Limson
manifests were substantiated by other supporting
for collection of the sum of P44,701.54 representing
documents which were found after the report of the
the balance of defendant's unpaid accounts for
Commissioner from among the records salvaged
passage and freight on shipments of hogs, cattle and
from the San Nicolas bodega fire or which were
carabaos abroad plaintiff's vessel from various ports
found among the records kept on plaintiff’s terminal
of Visayas and Mindanao for the period from
office. Said documents were presented in lieu of
October 1957 to February 1961. Attached to said
corresponding original of the consignee’s copy of
complaint was the statement of account supporting
bill of lading which could not be submitted to the
plaintiff's claim for unpaid passage and freight.
Commissioner nor presented as plaintiff’s evidence
Defendant filed a motion for bill of particulars
to the Court because they were lost or destroyed
asking that plaintiff attach to the complaint the bills
during the remodelling of plaintiff’s office building
of lading referred to in said statement of account in
or during the fire at plaintiff’s bodega at San
order to enable defendant to answer plaintiff's
Nicolas where they were brought for
complaint. Plaintiff opposed said motion. The Court
safekeeping. All said documents were presented as
however ordered plaintiff to attach photostat copies
evidence to prove that all the freight charges for the
of the bills of lading upon which the statement of
shipments evidence thereby were duly earned by
account was based. Plaintiff's motion for
plaintiff and were properly debited in defendant’s
reconsideration of said order was denied by the
charge account. The practice was that when the
Court but upon motion of plaintiff said order was
originals of the bills of lading could not be
modified to allow plaintiff to attach duplicate
surrendered because they have not yet been
originals of the bills of lading instead of photostat
received by the consignee, the delivery of the cargo
copies thereof.
was nevertheless authorized and a delivery receipt
was prepared on the basis of the ship’s cargo The petitioner contends that the exhibits in
manifests or the ship’s copy of the bills of lading. question are the best evidence of the libel, the
This only shows that the ship’s cargo manifests or subject matter of the information, and should
therefore be admitted; while the respondents
the ship’s copy of the bills of lading can be accepted
maintain that, inasmuch as the libelous articles
as evidence of shipments made by defendant since were not quoted in the information,. said
he was allowed to accept delivery of said shipments evidence cannot (be admitted without amending
even without presented his copy of the bill of the information. The prosecution asked for an
lading. amendment to the information, but the court
denied the petition on the ground that it would
Rule 130, Secs. 5,6,7 in relation to Rule 132, Sec. impair the rights of the defendant, holding that
24 and 25 the omission of the libelous article in the original
was fatal to the prosecution.
FISCAL OF PAMPANGA VS. REYES AND ISSUE: Whether the exhibits A, B,C and D are
GUEVARRA admissible?
HELD: Yes. The general rules regarding the

admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases
FACTS: The petitioner prays for a writ of of libel or slander. The evidence must be
mandamus to compel the respondent judge to relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule
admit Exhibits A, B, C, and D, as evidence for the of procedure which requires the production of the
prosecution in criminal cases Nos. 4501 and 4502 best evidence, is applicable to the present case.
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the
libelous article was published, and its translation,
constitute the best evidence of the libel charged.
Fiscal of Pampanga filed two informations for libel The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an
against Andres Guevarra. The informations article published in it.
alleged that defendant Guevarra with malicious
intent published an article, a squib in verse, of
which a translation in Spanish was included The respondent judge undoubtedly has discretion
therein, intended to impeach the honesty, to admit or reject the evidence offered by the
integrity and reputation of Clemente Dayrit and fiscal; but in the instant case his refusal to admit
of Mariano Nepomuceno. such evidence amounts to an abuse of that
discretion, which may be controlled by this court
by means of mandamus proceedings.
The defendant demurred on the ground of
duplicity of informations, he having published LAZATIN VS.CAMPOS, G.R. NO. L-43955-56, JULY
only one libelous article in the IngMagumasid. 30, 1979
The court overruled the demurrer.
FACTS
The fiscal attempted to present as evidence for Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic
the prosecution, the Exhibits A, B, C, and D, will providing for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks
which are copies of the IngMagumasid containing to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a
the libelous article with the innuendo, another legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her
article in the vernacular Spanish. Counsel for the late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta.
defendant objected to this evidence, which Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin. Respondents
objection was sustained by the court. filed a petition to probate the will. After having learned
that the safety box was opened, petitioner's son,
Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the probate court,
claiming that the deceased had executed a will
subsequent to that submitted for probate and evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his
demanding its production. lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir,
Petitioner Renato to Lazatin alias Renato Sta. and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the
Clara filed a motion to intervene in the estate of child resided with the deceased, as a member of his
Margarita de Asis as an adopted child, on the basis of family, from infancy until he attained his majority, is
an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin (brother of not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor
the deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, husband of does the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed,
Margarita), the petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of
educated, recognized and referred to one like
Dr. Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This
petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish
affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner was
adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his wife adoption of the child. Withal, the attempts of petitioner
Margarita de Asis. to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of
deceased do not discharge the mandatory
During the hearing, Renato presented no presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The
decree of adoption in his favor. Instead, he attempted thrust of petitioner’s evidence is rather to establish his
to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an
had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; adopted child—which statuts of an admitted
he had been supported by them until their death; illegitimate child was the very basis of his petition for
formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr.
compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" Lazatin, as above stated.
when the deceased spouses refused to give consent
to his marriage to his present wife; that at first, he and Secondary evidence is nonetheless
his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de Asis, admissible where the records of adoption proceedings
father of Margarita, but a few months later, they were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
transferred to the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, introduction of such secondary evidence, the
Manila, owned by the deceased spouses, where they proponent must establish the former existence of the
continuously resided up to the present. instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows:
Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this
Photographs were also intended to be order may be changed if necessary in the discretion
presented by petitioner, e.g., photograph of Irma
of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a
Veloso where she addressed herself as sister of
predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed
petitioner; photograph of deceased Margarita de Asis
and petitioner when he was a boy; document showing lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under
that petitioners real name is "Renato Lazatin." all the circumstances of the particular case. As earlier
pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former
Respondent court first reserved its ruling existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent
when petitioner could not present evidence on the loss or destruction. Secondary proof may only be
issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court introduced if it has first been established that such
discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is
file memoranda on the question of the admissibility of indispensable. Petitioner’s supposed adoption was
the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner. only testified to by him and is allegedly to be testified
to by a brother of the deceased Mariano H. Lazatin or
ISSUE others who have witnessed that the deceases
spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption
Whether Lazatin was judicially adopted by the was really made, the records thereof should have
deceased base on the evidence he presented. existed and the same presented at the hearing or
subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of
RULING loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case,
adduced. Assuming the mere fact that the deceased
No. spouses treated petitioner as their child does not
justify the conclusion that petitioner had been in fact
The absence of proof of such order of judicially adopted by the spouses nor does it
adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, constitute admissible proof of adoption.
cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child
has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been We do not discount though that declarations
treated as a child to establish such adoption. Even in regard to pedigree, although hearsay, are admitted
on the principle that they are natural expressions of According to private respondent, she entrusted the
persons who must know the truth. Pedigree testimony administration of the lot and building to petitioner
is admitted because it is the best that the nature of Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in
the case admits and because greater evil might arise Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that
from the rejection of such proof than from its the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it.
admission. But, in proving an adoption, there is a
Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said
better proof available and it should be produced. The
premises. Hence unlawful detainer case was filed.
whereabouts of the child’s family and circulation of the
jurisdiction in which they resided and investigation in
those courts where adoption are usually granted Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July
would surely produce an adoption order, if indeed 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po bought the said
there was an order. Besides, since the point in favor parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale was
of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written
history or pedigree is its reliability, it has been set in Chinese with the letter head "Sincere Trading
forth as a condition upon which such evidence is Co." (Exh. "B").
received that it emanate from a source within the
family. Pursuant to this view, before a declaration of a It was further alleged that petitioner Ong Ching Po
deceased person can be admitted to prove pedigree, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his
or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the
of blood or affinity to the family in question, or a same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to private
branch thereof, must ordinarily be established by
respondent in 1947. On December 12 1985,
competent evidence. Section 33 of Rule 130 states:
petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy Ong and David
“The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in Ong filed an action for reconveyance and damages
respect to the pedigree of another person related to against private respondent an on July 26, 1986,
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence private respondent filed an action for quieting of
where it occurred before the controversy, and the title against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife,
relationship between the two persons is shown by petitioner Yu Siok Lian. The case was consolidated.
evidence other than such act or declaration. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
private respondent. CA affirmed.
ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID
ONG and JIMMY ONG, petitioners, Issue:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD Whether CA erred in giving full faith and credit to
PARIAN, respondents. the evidence presented by the private respondents
than the evidence presented by the petitioner
Facts:
Held:
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of
land located at Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to No. There is no document showing the
private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong
Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Ching Po as trustor and private respondent as
Po, died in January 1983; while petitioner Ong trustee. Not even Exhibit “B” can be considered as
Ching Po died in October 1986. The said sale was such a document because private respondent, the
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in registered owner of the property subject of said
English. Subsequently, the document was registered “deed of sale,” was not a party thereto. The oral
with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which issued testimony to prove the existence of the express trust
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated will not suffice. Under Article 1443 of the Civil
September 2, 1947 in the name of private Code of the Philippines, “No express trust
respondent. concerning an immovable or any interest therein
may be proved by parole evidence.”
Secondary evidence is admissible when the returning the amount of P165.00 and the amounts
original documents were actually lost or destroyed. paid by the spouses in concept of land tax ... "
But prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former Later petitioner contended that she had validly
existence of the document. The correct order of repurchased the lot in question in 1945, petitioner
proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; filed, on 16 January 1969, in the Court of First
contents. This order may be changed if necessary in Instance of Leyte, Branch IX, Tacloban City, a
the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 Complaint (Civil Case No. B-110), against Paciente
SCRA 602 [1993]). Cordero and his wife Nicetas Altera, Ramon Conde
The due execution of the document may be and his wife Catalina T. Conde, and Casimira
established by the person or persons who executed Pasagui Pio Altera having died in 1966), for
it; by the person before whom its execution was quieting of title to real property and declaration of
acknowledged; or by any person who was present ownership.
and saw it executed or who after its execution, saw
it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to Petitioner's evidence is that Paciente Cordero signed
whom the parties to the instrument had previously the Memorandum of Repurchase in representation
confessed the execution thereof (De Vera v. of his father-in-law Pio Altera, who was seriously
Aguilar, supra). sick on that occasion, and of his mother-in-law who
was in Manila at the time, and that Cordero received
the repurchase price of P165.00. Private
respondents claimed that such signature was just to
DOMINGA CONDE, petitioner, show that there no objection as to the right to
vs. repurchase. Lower court favored the private
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent which was affirmed by the CA.
MANILA PACIENTE CORDERO, together
with his wife, NICETAS ALTERA, RAMON Issue:
CONDE, together with his wife, CATALINA T.
CONDE, respondents. Whether right to repurchase was exercised
Facts: Held:
On 7 April 1938. Margarita Conde, Bernardo Conde Yes.There is nothing in the document of repurchase
and the petitioner Dominga Conde, as heirs of to show that Paciente Cordero had signed the same
Santiago Conde, sold with right of repurchase, merely to indicate that he had no objection to
within ten (10) years from said date, a parcel of petitioner’s right of repurchase. Besides, he would
agricultural land located in Maghubas Burauen have had no personality to object. To uphold his
Leyte, (Lot 840), with an approximate area of one oral testimony on that point, would be a departure
(1) hectare, to Casimira Pasagui, married to Pio from the parol evidence rule and would defeat the
Altera (hereinafter referred to as the Alteras), for purpose for which the doctrine is intended. “x x x
P165.00. The "Pacto de Retro Sale" further The purpose of the rule is to give stability to written
provided... (4) if at the end of 10 years the said land agreements, and to remove the temptation and
is not repurchased, a new agreement shall be made possibility of perjury, which would be afforded if
between the parties and in no case title and parol evidence was admissible.”
ownership shall be vested in the hand of the party of
the SECOND PART (the Alteras). (Exhibit "B") In sum, although the contending parties were legally
wanting in their respective actuations, the
Subsequently, the Cadastral Court of Leyte repurchase by petitioner is supported by the
adjudicated Lot No. 840 to the Alteras "subject to admissions at the pre-trial that petitioner has been in
the right of redemption by Dominga Conde, within possession since the year 1945, the date of the deed
ten (10) years counting from April 7, 1983, after of repurchase, and has been paying land taxes
thereon since then. The imperatives of substantial “3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No.
justice, and the equitable principle of laches brought 243273) remains with the defendants (private
about by private respondents' inaction and neglect respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows
proof that all the following requirements have
for 24 years, loom in petitioner's favor.
been met:
Private respondents Ramon Conde and Catalina 1. (i)Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his
Conde, to whom Pio Altera sold the disputed right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
2. (ii)Plaintiff will submit to the defendants
property in 1965, assuming that there was, indeed,
the approved plan for the segregation:
such a sale, cannot be said to be purchasers in good
faith. OCT No. 534 in the name of the Alteras 3. (iii)Plaintiff will put up a strong wall
specifically contained the condition that it was between his property and that of
defendants’ lot to segregate his right of
subject to the right of repurchase within 10 years way;
from 1938. Although the ten-year period had lapsed
in 1965 and there was no annotation of any 4. (iv)Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax
repurchase by petitioner, neither had the title been and all other expenses that may be
incurred by reason of sale. x xx.”
cleared of that encumbrance. The purchasers were
put on notice that some other person could have a During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes,
right to or interest in the property. It behooved a former judge, orally testified that the sale was
Ramon Conde and Catalina Conde to have looked subject to the above conditions,7 although such
into the right of redemption inscribed on the title, condition were not incorporated in the deeds of
and particularly the matter of possession, which, as sale. Despite petitioner’s timely objections on the
also admitted by them at the pre-trial, had been with ground that the introduction of said oral
petitioner since 1945. conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule,
the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and
eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this
ORTAÑEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
petition.
FACTS: Private respondents sold to petitioner

two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City
for a consideration of P35,000.00 and ISSUE:Whether oral conditions precedent to a
P20,000.00, respectively. contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent
on such conditions are admissible?
Private respondents received the payments for

the lots, but failed to deliver the titles to HELD:No. The parol evidence herein introduced
petitioner. The petitioner demanded from the is inadmissible. First, private respondents’ oral
private respondent the delivery of said titles. testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from
Private respondents, however, refused on the a party who has an interest in the outcome of the
ground that the title of the first lot is in the case, depending exclusively on human memory,
possession of another person, and petitioner’s is not as reliable as written or documentary
acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously
certain conditions. unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks
of a uniform language. Thus, under the general
rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents when the terms of an agreement were reduced to
for specific performance before the RTC. In their writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all
answer with counterclaim private respondents the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such
merely alleged the existence of the following oral terms can be admitted other than the contents
conditions, which were never reflected in the thereof. Considering that the written deeds of
deeds of sale:6 sale were the only repository of the truth,
whatever is not found in said instruments must commercial paper which does not bear the signature
have been waived and abandoned by the parties. of x xx attesting witnesses,” parol evidence may
Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even “overcome” the contents of the promissory note. The
make an inference that the sale was subject to first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states:
any condition. As a contract, it is the law between “When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
the parties. to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without
terms other than the contents of the written
any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much
agreement.” Clearly, the rule does not specify that the
less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
written agreement be a public document.
What is required is the agreement be in writing as the
rule is in fact founded on “long experience that written
Their case is covered by the general rule that evidence is so much more certain and accurate than
the contents of the writing are the only repository that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would
of the terms of the agreement. Considering that be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of
private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to
(and former judge) he was “supposed to be control and vary the stronger and to show that the
steeped in legal knowledge and practices” and parties intended a different contract from that
was “expected to know the consequences” of his expressed in the writing signed by them.” Thus, for
signing a deed of absolute sale. Had he given an the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract
iota’s attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would need not be in any particular form, or be signed by
have incorporated important stipulations that the both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other
transfer of title to said lots were conditional. instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be
varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually

in the right direction towards proving that he and his
Inciong, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only
257 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996 considering that, where a parol contemporaneous
agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the
Facts: written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence.
Inciong signed a promissory note in the amount of However, fraud must be established by clear and
P50,000.00 which he signed with Naybe and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of
Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding themselves evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner’s
jointly and severally liable to PBCom, Cagayan de attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was
Oro City branch. The promissory note was due on evidenced only by his own uncorroborated and,
May 5, 1983. expectedly, self-serving testimony.
Said due date expired without the promissors having
paid their obligation. Consequently, on November 14,
1983 and on June 8, 1984, PBCom sent Inciong
telegrams demanding payment thereof. On December
11, 1984 private respondent also sent by registered
mail a final letter of demand to Naybe. Since both LUCIO R. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
obligors did not respond to the demands made, APPEALS AND CONRADO Q. SALONGA,
private respondent filed on January 24, 1986 a
complaint for collection of the sum of P50,000.00
against the three obligors. Facts:
The private respondent ConradoSalonga filed a
Issue: complaint for collection and damages against
Whether or not parol evidence rule applies to the said petitioner Lucio Cruz ** in the Regional Trial Court of
promissory note. Lucena City alleging that in the course of their
business transactions of buying and selling fish, the
Ruling: petitioner borrowed from him an amount of
Nor is there merit in petitioner’s assertion that since P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt
the promissory note “is not a public deed with the
formalities prescribed by law but x xx a mere
Cruz denied having contracted any loan from gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can only
Salonga. By way of special defense, he alleged that be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction
he was a lessee of several hectares of a fishpond between the parties and an acknowledgment of the
owned by NemesioYabut and that sometime in May receipt of money executed by the petitioner for the
1982, he entered into an agreement with Salonga private respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this
whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in nature, as Wigmore observed is not covered by the
certain areas of the fishpond from May 1982 to parol evidence rule.
August 15, 1982. They also agreed that immediately
thereafter, Salonga would sublease (bubuwisan) the
same fishpond for a period of one year. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and that of the
Regional Trial Court of Laguna AFFIRMED, with the
Issue: modification that the private respondent shall pay the
petitioner the sum of P3,084.00 instead of P3,054.00,
The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred
plus costs.
in (1) disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and
"I" despite the fact that these documents fall under the
exceptions provided for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court and thereby in (2) making a sweeping
conclusion that the transaction effected between the G.R. No. L-1709 June 8, 1948
private respondent and petitioner is one of contract of
loan and not a contract of lease. ASCENCION ICUTANIM, petitioner,
Ruling: vs.
FERNANDO HERNANDEZ, Judge of First Instance
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court of Capiz, and DEMETRIO VINSON, Provincial
provides: 1 Fiscal, respondents.
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, Facts:
it is to be considered as containing all such terms,
and therefore, there can be, between the parties and Petitioner is charged with parricide for having killed his
their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms child of tender age. At the trial, the prosecution called to
of the agreement other than the contents of the the witness stand his wife who is the mother of the
writing, except in the following cases: deceased child. Petitioner objected to his wife testifying
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its against him. The trial court overruled the objection, on
failure to express the true intent and agreement of the the ground that the crime committed is against her; and
parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue for that reason the rule invoked does not apply (section
by the pleadings; 26 [d], Rule 123).
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. Complaining that the overruling of the objection is not
The term "agreement" includes wills.
only against the law but also constitutes excess of
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when jurisdiction and a grave abuse of discretion, petitioner
the parties have reduced their agreement to writing seeks in this Court the annulment of said order and a
they have made such writing the only repository and writ directing the respondent court to refrain from giving
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the it effect until it hear from this Court as to what it should
writing must be understood to have been waived or
do in the premises.
abandoned. 2
The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Issue:
Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of
a document embodying the terms of an agreement, Whether petitioner’s claim to annul order is proper
but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It Held:
is only a receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4,
1982, the petitioner received from the private NO. Appeal, and not certiorari, is the proper remedy for
respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could the correction of any error as to the competency of a
have not been intended by the parties to be the sole witness committed by an inferior court in the course of
memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact,
the trial.
Exhibit D does not even mention the transaction that
Petitioner Jose Carandang was the caretaker of

G.R. No. 94549 August 9, 1993 private respondent Consuelo D. Pandy’s 1.5
hectare of coconut land situated at Puting-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Buhangin, San Juan, Batangas. He had a house
vs. inside the landholding. He also owned a parcel of
land adjoining it. On February 21, 1963
RICKY SUETA, accused-appellant. respondent Pandy filed a verified petition (CAR
Case No. 866) for ejectment and damages in the
Facts: Court of Agrarian Relations of San Pablo City
alleging that petitioner, in gross violation of the
The sworn complaint initiated by the girl's grandmother terms and conditions agreed upon between him
and guardian, Fedelina A. Tan, and the corresponding and the landowner, had stubbornly refused and
information signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Victor failed to clear the land of bushes and grasses, to
C. Posadas, both of which were filed before the said trial take proper care of the coconut land and
court on January 5, 1990, charged that on December 30, improvements thereon, and to perform the
1990, appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had necessary work in accordance with the customs
carnal knowledge of Goldie Ruth T. Fuentes in Roxas and proven practices in the locality; that
petitioner had been feeding his hogs and
City. 1
chickens with coconuts from the landholding; that
he gathered nuts and sold copra without notifying
Appellant was apprehended by elements of the Roxas
the respondent; and praying that petitioner be
City Police Force a few hours after the incident at the dismissed as caretaker of the landholding and be
place where the rape allegedly took place. Although no ordered to pay as damages the sum of P370.00,
bail was recommended by the prosecution for his plus attorney’s fees
temporary release, appellant nonetheless prayed that he
"be granted bail in the amount of P40,000.00." The trial
court consequently set the application for hearing on
January 15, 1990, with the stipulation that the evidence
adduced therein would be considered part of the Did the trial court commit a grave abuse of
evidence in the trial on the merits. 2 discretion when it rendered its decision
based on respondent’s evidence on the
Issue: ground that said evidence was self-serving?
Whether contention of the accused meritorious

Self-serving evidence; Interested party’s
Held: testimony in court not self-serving.
Evidence; Defense of denial not supported by clear and

convincing evidence.—The defense of denial, when not
The law itself provides that a party or any
supported by clear and convincing evidence, deserves no
other person interested in the outcome of a case
weight in law. It cannot be given greater evidentiary may testify (Section 18, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who The testimony of an interested witness, this Court
testify on affirmative matters, for as between positive has said, should not be rejected on the ground of
and categorical testimony which bears the earmarks of bias alone, and must be judged on its own merits,
truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the and if such testimony is clear and convincing and
former is generally held to prevail. Further, in the not destroyed by other evidence on record, it
absence of evidence to indicate that the prosecution may be believed (U.S. vs. Mante, 27 Phil. 134,
witnesses were moved by improper motives, the 138). Neither can said testimony be said to be
presumption is that they were not so moved and their self-serving. This Court has said that self-serving
testimony should accordingly be entitled to full credit. evidence is an evidence made by a party out of
court at one time; it does not include a party’s
CARANDANG V CABATUANDO testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, L-21724, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA At any rate, that the accident could not be avoided
861, 865–866). because the victim was so close to the truck when he,
as alleged by appellant, suddenly darted across the
street, does not exculpate the accused, since the
WILLIAM ADDENBROOK Y BARKER, petitioner, latter was driving at excessive speed.
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, The fact that a pedestrian came into the path
of the car suddenly and so close that the
driver could not stop and avoid striking him
will not excuse the driver, where the car was
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the being driven at an unreasonable rate of speed
Court of Appeals affirming a conviction by the Court of under the circumstances. (5 Am. Jur. p. 612,
First Instance of Manila for homicide through reckless sec. 195).
imprudence upon the petitioner William Addenbrook Y
Barker. While the general rule is that a driver is not held
accountable just because he failed to take the wisest
. about 3:15 in the afternoon of 9 January 1960, the choice in a sudden emergency, the rule does not
front bumper of the Stanvac Service Truck with Plate apply where the emergency is of the driver's own
No. 2740, Manila, 960, while travelling southward creation or devising.
along Marquez de Comillas being driven then by
accused William Addenbrook, and in front of House The other assigned errors raise questions of fact and
No. 1010, came into contact with the body of a credibility which this Court is not at liberty to revise.
pedestrian WenceslaoRisaldo with the result that the
latter fell and was taken to the Philippine General We, therefore, find no error in the appealed decision,
Hospital by accused and his helper in the truck and the same is hereby affirmed. Costs against
named AmandoValeriano, but was dead on arrival, it appellant, William Addenbrook y Barker. So ordered.
having been found that he had received abrasions on
the left forehead, and contusions with lacerations on
the face, left arm, right thigh, knee joints, and right
buttocks and waist and fracture of the skull, Exh. B,
so that the Fiscal filed the present criminal case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence against accused PEOPLE V ESPANOLA
resulting in his conviction. .
FACTS:
about November 16, 1991, in the City of Iligan,
ISSUE: Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who were all
Appellant insists that such conclusion is error, and under the influence of drugs (Marijuana), conspiring
assails the credibility and competency of witness and confederating together and mutually helping each
Guzman. other with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
with abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
RULING: stab and hit one Jessette Tarroza, thereby inflicting
upon the said Jessette Tarroza some physical
The Court of Appeals gave no credence to the claim injuries.
that the deceased suddenly darted from behind the
parked car. Neither did the trial court do so, The prosecution also presented Joel Gonzales
considering the lack of corroboration of petitioner's who turned state witness. On the basis of the
version, and the circumstance that the victim, being a demeanor of Gonzales and the manner he answered
grown-up man, and not a child, would not have the questions, the trial court gathered the impression
ignored the noise of the oncoming vehicle, there that he was mentally retarded.[26] Gonzales did not
being no reason shown for his disregarding the know how to read and write. [27] In any event, he was
obvious danger. able to testify that on the night of November 16, 1991,
he went to Baybay, Camague, Iligan City, to witness a
dance. His companions were "Beroy", "Jimmy" and
"Cocoy". He identified Jeoffrey Abello as "Beroy", coherent enough to shed light on the guilt or
Christopher Espanola as "Cocoy" or "Langga" innocence of the accused.
and Jimmy Paquingan as "Jimmy".
At the dance, they drank one (1) bottle of
Tanduay and smoked one (1) stick of marijuana
each. After the dance, he and his three (3) People vs Hayag, G.R. No. L-38635 November 17,
companions proceeded to Bacayo. While on their 1980 (please read the full case, crim case siya, pinakita
way, they met a woman whom Beroy, Cocoy and lang rules sa deafmute)
Jimmy followed. They brought the woman to a nipa
hut and slept ("gidulgan") right beside the woman. FACTS
When asked who killed the victim on the night of Hayag raped Esperanza, a deafmute. Esperanza told
November 16, 1991, at Kilumco, Camague, Iligan Virginia, her sister that Hayag raped her.
City, he answered "sila", referring to herein
appellants. He further testified that Beroy slashed the The prosecution labored under the handicap that it could
neck of Jessette Tarroza, Langga slashed her breast, prove the alleged rape only through the sign language of
and Paquingan stabbed her at the back. The victim the victim, Esperanza. The victim's sister, Virginia, who
resisted by scratching her attackers. [28] After she died, has communicated with her since childhood by means of
they carried her to a bushy area and all of them sign language, was the sole available witness who could
sexually molested her. Beroy was first; Gonzales was make known to her the questions on direct and cross-
second; Cocoy was third and Jeoffrey was the examination and could articulate her alleged answers for
the record.
last. Gonzales likewise identified the T-shirt worn by
Jeoffrey Abello that night as "That one Mercy." He
Because there was no means of checking the
declared that the brownish discoloration on the T-shirt correctness and veracity of Virginia's interpretation and
was caused by the blood of Jessette Tarroza because she herself believed that Esperanza was raped
by Hayag, it is not surprising that the defense counsel
vehemently objected to Virginia's role as interpreter. The
ISSUE: defense regarded her as biased and as lacking the cold
neutrality of a third person acting as interpreter.
Disqualification of witness
ISSUE
RULING:
Whether Virginia correctly and credibly interpreted and
Same; Witnesses; Mental Retardates; A mental verbalized the sign language of Esperanza as meaning
retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a that Hayag raped Esperanza.
witness.—Appellants also assail the testimony of
Gonzales on the ground of his alleged mental RULING
incapacity. Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that
“except as provided in the next succeeding section, all No. This is not a case of a teenage girl being raped by a
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make strong and robust adult. This is a case of a thirty-two-
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.” year-old farm girl who was allegedly forced to have
Section 21, inter alia, disqualifies as witnesses, “those carnal intercourse by a fifty-year-old man. Her story does
whose mental condition, at the time of their production not contain details as to how she repelled Hayag's
attempts to ravish her. And that story was not
for examination, is such that they are incapable of
recounted by her directly in her own words but was
intelligently making known their perception to others.” made known by means of sign language which was
A mental retardate is not therefore, per se, interpreted by her sister. The trustworthiness of that
disqualified from being a witness. As long as his interpretation is doubtful.
senses can perceive facts and if he can convey his
perceptions in court, he can be a witness. In the case The defense objected to such interpretation. The
at bar, we find that Gonzales had a tendency to be probability of error or fabrication in such a case is very
repetitious and at times had to be asked leading manifest. As observed by Justice Villa-Real, that is a
questions, but he was not unintelligible to be beyond dangerous procedure for ascertaining the truth
especially in a case where the liberty of an accused is at
understanding. He was clear and unyielding in
stake (People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, 390). The court
identifying the appellants as the perpetrators of the and the accused have no means of checking the
crime. On the whole, his account of the crime was accuracy of the verbalization made by the interpreter
who is herself interested in sending the accused to interpreter who communicates with the witness by
prison. means of signs. The qualifications of a particular person
to act as an interpreter for a deaf-mute rests largely in
In People vs. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539, the accused was the discretion of the trial court (98 C.J.S. 25).
charged with having raped his fifteen-year-old step-
daughter, a deaf-mute The trial was held in the house, The other statements of the procedure for taking the
called "Country Home;" where the accused brought the sign-language of a deaf-mute are quoted below:
girl. She testified in sign language which was interpreted The modern and generally accepted rule is to the effect
by a teacher in the school for deaf-mutes. The accused that deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they
was convicted on the basis of such testimony. have sufficient knowledge to understand and appreciate
the sanctity of an oath and comprehend the facts as to
In People vs. Sasota, 52 Phil. 281, the accussed was which they wish to speak, and are capable of
also charged with having raped a fourteen-year-old deaf- communicating their Ideas with respect thereto
mute. She testified with the assistance of an instructor in (Annotation, 9 ALR 482).
the school for deaf-mutes. Her testimony was
corroborated by her seven-year-old sister who was If deaf-mutes have sufficient understanding to
present when the outrage was committed. comprehend facts about which they undertake to speak,
Seven days after the alleged rape, the victim, Rufina and appreciate the sanctity of an oath, they may give
Barbuco, submitted to a medical examination. The evidence by signs, or through an interpreter or in writing,
doctor introjudo su especulum en la parte genital de ella and such testimony, through an interpreter, is not
y dicha Rufina sintio' dolor por la introduccion de dicho hearsay (Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR
instrumento". The accused was convicted of rape. 480).
But in People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, a homicide case, It has been said that a court has the inherent power to
the testimony of a deaf-mute, an alleged eyewitness, as elicit testimony from a competent deaf-mute by
interpreted by a teacher from the school for deaf-mutes, whatsoever means necessary to the end to be obtained,
who did not teach the witness (the latter never having and that the manner in which the examination of a deaf-
studied in such school) was not given credence. (See mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated
People vs. Nava, CA 40 O.G. 4327 and People vs. and controlled by the trial court in its discretion.
Tejano, CA-G.R. No. 21954-R, May 25, 1959, 7 Velayo's
Digest 724. As to a deaf-mute convicted of robbery, see However, it has also been said that the best method
People vs. Nazario, 97 Phil. 990.) should be adopted. And there is authority to the effect
Rules regarding communication with a deaf-mute. — At that the method adopted will not be reviewed by an
the outset, it is relevant to state the jurisprudential rules appellate court in the absence of a showing that the
for verbalizing the perceptions of a deaf-mute. complaining party was in some way injured by reason of
'Although in ancient times the rule was otherwise, deaf- the particular method adopted.
mutes are now generally accepted as competent In fact it has been said that, in the absence of a showing
witnesses. In any given case a showing must be made as to what constituted the best method of taking a deaf-
that the witness has a system of communication, and if mute's testimony, it will be presumed on appeal that the
he has and he is otherwise competent, his testimony will trial court adopted the best method.
be received" (81 Am. Jur. 2nd 116).
As is stated in the authorities approved in Bugg vs.
The modern rule is to the effect that deaf and dumb Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR 480, the general rule
persons are not incompetent as witnesses merely is that deaf-mutes who are competent to testify may give
because they are deaf and dumb if they are able to evidence by signs, or through an interpreter, or in
communicate the facts by a method which their infirmity writing.
leaves available to them, and are of sufficient mental
capacity to observe the matters as to which they will More specifically it has been held that a deaf-mute who
testify and to appreciate the obligation of an oath; but can read and write may testify through that medium.
where the person is not so educated as it is possible to Thus, in Ritchey vs. People (1896), 23 Colo 314, 47
make him understand the questions which are put to him Pac. 272, a deaf-mute was examined by submitting to
he is not competent (97 C.J.S. 454). him written questions, to which he replied in writing,
which questions and answers were then read to the jury.
The method to be employed in eliciting the testimony of
a deaf-mute should be that which is best suited to attain And the general rule is that the evidence of a deaf-mute
the desired end, the particular method of examination who can be communicated with by signs may be taken
resting largely in the discretion of the trial court. Thus, a through an interpreter who understands such signs and
deaf and dumb witness may be examined by means of can interpret them to the court.
written questions to which he gives written answers, or And it has been held that it is permissible to take the
he may be examined through the medium of an testimony of a deaf-mute through an interpreter by signs
notwithstanding the evidence could have been written. The conflict arises in the answer which was given to
At least where there is no showing that the interpretation that question. The defendant in the present case,
by signs is not the better method. according to some of the witnesses, declared that it
belonged to her. Her husband, Felix Ricablanca,
And especially where it appears that the witness is
according to some witnesses, declared that he was
capable of relating the facts "correctly" by signs, but,
while able to read and write, can only communicate the owner of the house and was responsible for
Ideas imperfectly' by writing. And it is not necessary that everything that was found within it. The policemen, at
the witness be able to read and write. However, it has that moment, evidently believed that the opium
been said that it would seem to be better in the case of a belonged to the husband, Felix Ricablanca, for the
deaf and dumb witness who can read and write to reason that they arrested him and took him to the
conduct his examination in writing. pueblo, and later filed a complaint against him for a
With respect to the conducting of the examination of a violation of the Opium Law .He was later brought to
deaf-mute itself, it has been held that the allowing of
trial and was acquitted.
leading questions is in the discretion of the court. This
discretion was said to arise out of the fact that 'there is Issue:
always more or less difficulty in eliciting testimony' where
the witness is a deaf-mute Marital disqualification
Ruling;
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. It will be noted that said action prohibits a husband
TERESA CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant. from giving testimony against his wife without her
consent, except in a civil action between husband and
wife, and in a criminal action when the crime was
Facts; committed by one against the other. The present is
not a civil action between husband and wife, neither it
The defendant was charged with a violation of the is a criminal action where the crime was committed by
Opium Law. The complaint alleged that she had in her one against the other. It would seem to clear,
possession and under her control a quantity of opium. therefore, that the testimony of the husband is not
She was arrested, arraigned, pleaded not guilty, tried, admissible if the wife objected. The testimony of the
found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of P300 and husband should not have been admitted.
costs.
There still another objection to the admissibility of the
Upon the question of fact, she alleges that the lower testimony of the husband. His testimony was not
court committed an error in deciding that the evidence given in the present case. It was a copy of his
adduced during the trial of the cause was sufficient to declaration given in another case, in which he was the
show that she was guilty of the crime charged beyond defendant and in which he was charged with the
a reasonable doubt. illegal possession of the opium in question. It will be
remembered that at the time the opium was found in
It appears from the evidence that on the night of the the house of the defendant, the husband of the
2nd of December, 1913, several policemen went to present defendant was arrested; that later a complaint
the house of the defendant, where she was living with was presented against him. During the trial he
her husband, Felix Ricablanca. Upon arriving there, testified in his own behalf. It was the testimony given
they obtained permission to enter and immediately in that case which was presented as proof in the
proceeded to make a search of the premises for present case. He was not called as a witness. His
opium. While there is some dispute concerning the testimony is not only not admissible under the
fact, we believe the proof shows that the defendant, provisions above quoted of section 383, but it is not
during the time the policemen were searching the admissible under the Philippine Bill.
house, went to a bed located in the house, after being
so ordered by her husband, and took from beneath a At the common law the rule was that husband and
pillow a small can of opium, said to contain about 7½ wife could not testify for or against each other in any
criminal proceedings, except in the prosecution of one
grams of opium, and attempted to throw it away. At
for criminal injury to the other. The common-law rule
that moment the policemen took possession of the
has been adopted in practically all of the States of the
can. There is some conflict in the proof as to just what United States. The rule is based upon considerations
took place at that moment. That the policemen of public policy growing out of the marital relation. To
inquired to whom the opium belonged is not denied. allow one to testify for or against the other would be to
subject him or her to great temptation to commit Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which
perjury and to endanger the harmony and confidence provides merely that the wife cannot be examined "for or
of the marital relation. The cases supporting the rule against her husband without his consent," it is further
are innumerable. argued that "when husband and wife are parties to an
action, there is no reason why either may not be
examined as a witness for or against himself or herself
alone," and his or her testimony could operate only
against himself or herself.
Even if such view were generally acceptable as an

exception to the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it
LEZAMA VS. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. L-25643 June 27, would be inapplicable in this case where the main
1968 charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a
third person, and the evident purpose of examination of
“When the interest of the husband and wife are the wife is to prove that charge.
necessarily interrelated, the wife or husband may invoke
the marital disqualification rule.” This rule carries with it two purposes: 1. a
disqualification and 2. a privilege not to testify against
Facts: the other.
Jose Dineros filed an action against the decision of the
CFI which decided in favor of Lezama. His complaint SCRA
alleged that due to Lezama’s mismanagement, the Evidence; Husband and wife; Rule that a husband
company was placed under the receivership of Dineros. cannot be examined for or against his wife; Scope of its
During the receivership, Roque brought an action for application; Reason for the rule; Case at bar.—A
collection of the amount he lent to the company. The husband cannot be examined for or against his wife
summons was not served to the receiver but to Lezama. without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
Dineros claimed that due to collusion between Lezamas, husband without his consent, except in a civil case by
Roque was able to obtain judgment by default against one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
the company. committed by one against the other (Sec. 20 [b], Rule
130, Rules of Court). This provision and rule deals with
Dineros asked the court to issue a subpoena for two different matters which rest on different grounds of
PaquitaLezama because he claimed that the loan from policy: the disqualification of husband and wife to testify
Roque is fictitious and that Paquita was the secretary in each other’s behalf, as well as their privilege not to
and the person who knew about the negotiations for the testify against each other. The fundamental theory of the
said loan and is knowledgeable about the records in the common law is said to be that relationship of the
company book. spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the
disqualification. Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled
The Lezamas were charged with fraudulent conspiracy. “Disqualification by reason of x x x relationship.”
On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons

Issue: has been offered (see U.S. v. Concepcion, 31 Phil. 182;
and People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694) for the privilege,
Can a wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party the true explanation which is after all the simplest
witness concerning her participation in the alleged fraud (Wigmore, sec. 2227 at 212) and which constitutes the
without violating Section 20 (b) of Rule 130? real and sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the
privilege, “is the natural repugnance in every fair-minded
person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means
Ruling: of the other’s condemnation and to subjecting the culprit
to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of
No. The interests of husband and wife in this case are his intimate life partner (Id., sec. 2228, at 217).
necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the wife's
own interests would tend to show the existence of In the case at bar where the wife is a co-defendant in a
collusive fraud between the spouses and would then suit charging fraud against the spouses, can the wife be
work havoc upon their common defense that the loan compelled to testify as an adverse party witness
was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the concerning her participation in the alleged fraud without
wife, in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may violating section 20(b) of Rule 130? Even in those
unwittingly testify in a manner entirely disparaging to the jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be subjected to
interests of the husband. examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness
when both spouses are parties to the action, either the
interests of the spouses are separate or separable, or
the spouse offerred as a witness is merely a formal or loans obtained. This was objected to by the
nominal party (97 C.J.S. 477). Section 6 of Rule 132 counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a),
(Rule on Direct Examination of unwilling or hostile Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the
witnesses) is a mere concession, for the sake of trial court allowed the witness to continue, but
discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or upon a written motion to disqualify on the same
the wif e f rom becoming the means of the other’s basis, the trial court declared Laura and Jose
condemnation. The said rule of discovery should
Cervantes disqualified from testifying in the case.
therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope as to
allow examination of one’s spouse in a situation where Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion
this natural repugnance obtains. for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case
to another Branch.” This was denied. Petitioners
then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial,
GUERRERRO V ST CLAIRES and the trial court judge issued an order stating
that petitioners “are deemed to have waived
FACTS their right to further present or formally offer
their evidence in court” as a consequence of
The disputed lot was formerly owned
their non-appearance.
by Andres Guerrero, father of
the petitioners. Andres physically possessed and Petitioners filed a “Manifestation” that
cultivated the land through a tenancy agreement. they did not waive their rights to present
Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’
occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. They
sister, Cristina Guerrero, who was to enjoy added that they reserved such right upon the
the owner’s share in the produce of the decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari which
land. After the death of Andres in 1943, Cristina they were preparing to file.
continued as trustee of the deceased.
Despite this, the trial court rendered
Petitioners alleged that the land was a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros,
surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the even ordering the petitioners to pay damages in
name of Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then, the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed
at about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the by the Court of Appeals.
land was titled in the name of their cousin,
Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale ISSUES
of Land” dated 1948 purportedly executed by
Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose
their Aunt Cristina. They further alleged that
Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs
testifying in the case and their testimonies
of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his
excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”?
application of the registration of the land in his
favor. Whether the exclusion of petitioners’
evidence and their preclusion from presenting
Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor
further proof was correctly sustained by the CA?
of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the
petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold RULING
the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a
partnership constituted by them. Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties
in the present case, and neither is they assignors
According to the complaint, the Deed of of the parties nor persons in whose behalf a case
Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose
and that the subsequent deeds of sale were testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish
likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the that it was not Cristina who owned the disputed
defendants allegedly knew that the property land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel,
belonged to Andres Guerrero. and that Cristina merely mortgaged the property
to Manuel.
During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter
of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the The present case is not a claim or demand
petitioners. She testified that the money used for against the estate of the deceased Manuel
the illness of her mother was obtained from Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the
Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the executors or administrators or representatives of
such deceased. They are being sued as claimants and signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-
of ownership in their individual capacities of the fact of Villanueva
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate
of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead man’s rule is the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein
clearly inapplicable. defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no
3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields
Aside from the disqualified witnesses,
nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente, to pay the latter
other witnesses testified and it was error to hold
that the testimonial evidence should have been actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P
formally offered, or that without such offer, such 81,204.48, representing 15% of the total gross
evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial income of field no. 3 for crop-years 1950-51 to 1958-
evidence is affected by calling the witness to the 59, and such other amounts as may be due from said
stand and letting him testify before the court field for the crop years subsequent to crop-year 1958-
upon appropriate questions. 59, until the field is delivered to Vicente, and to pay
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs.
The trial court rendered its decision solely on the Therein defendant Goñi was relieved of any civil
basis of defendants’ evidence and without regard liability for damages, either personally or as
to the proofs that petitioner has presented. administrator of the estate.
Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and
their preclusion from presenting further proof was
incorrect.
Issue:
Admissibility in evidence of private respondent
Vicente's testimony.
GONI V CA
FACTS:
The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Ruling:

Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally nder ordinary circumstances, private respondent
owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de Vicente 8 would be disqualified by reason of interest
Filipinas [TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring
Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of
purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship
have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which
the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell provides as follows:
Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was
later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Allegedly Section 20. Disqualification by reason
because TABACALERA did not agree to the of interest or relationship.-The
transaction between Villanueva and Villegas, without following persons cannot testify as to
a guaranty private respondent Gaspar Vicente stood matters in which they are interested,
as guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. directly or indirectly, as herein
The guarantee was embodied in a document enumerated:
denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de Cuenta." 1
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a
Either because the amount realized from the case, or persons in whose behalf a
transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell case is prosecuted, against an
short of the purchase price of the three haciendas, or executor or administrator or other
in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by private representative of a deceased person,
respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or or against a person of unsound mind,
promised to sell to the latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of upon a claim or demand against the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of estate of such deceased person or
P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing against such person of unsound mind,
cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such shares of stock as evidence by the certificate, and as
deceased person or before such recorded in the corporate books
person became of unsound mind.
ISSUE:
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against Whether chuidian is the owner
the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving RULING:
party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon
terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving Evidence; “Dead man’s statute.”—In the instant case,
testimony. 9 It is designed to close the lips of the party the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that
plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the effect that
defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private
the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the
fictitious claims against the deceased. 10 estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the
of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted
had been distributed to them, remains within the to pay the same which never happened. The case
ambit of the protection. The reason is that the was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late
defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon,
the deceased, not only because they succeeded to
Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is
the decedent's right by descent or operation of law,
clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is
but more importantly because they are so placed in
litigation that they are called on to defend which they not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not
have obtained from the deceased and make the filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it
defense which the deceased might have made if filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the
living, or to establish a claim which deceased might records show that the private respondent never
have been interested to establish, if living. objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards
the true nature of his transaction with the late elder
Chuidian. The petitioner’s testimony was subject to
cross-examination by the private respon-dent’s
RAZON V IAC counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner’s
testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a),
FACTS; Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent
is deemed to have waived the rule.
E. Razon, Inc. was organized by Enrique Razon.
Some of its nominal incorporators withdrew, thus
Razon distributed their shares to some of his friends, US vs. Antipolo, 37 Phil 726
which included Juan t CHUIDUAB, to whom he
transferred 1500 shares of stoKD. It was agreed Facts:The appellant, Dalmacio Antipolo was prosecuted
between the two that !huidian was only given the in the CFI of Batangas for the murder od one Fortunato
option to buy the said shares, but Razon would be the Dinal. The trial court prosecuted him of homicide and
owner. THE SAID certificate was issued by the from that he has appealed. One of the errors assigned is
based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit
Corporation in the name of !huidian, covering the
Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man the appellant is
1500 shares of stocK. The said transfer was also accused of having murdered to testify on behalf of the
recorded in the corporate booKSs of the !orporation. defense concerning certain alleged dying declaration.
The said certificate, however, was held by Razon,
who delivered it to the philippine bANK of Commerce. The fiscal objected to the admissibility of the testimony
Chuidian thereafter died, and his administrator filed of the witness. He asserted that the witness, being the
an action to recover the certificate of shares of stock widow of the deceased, is not competent to testify under
from Razon, representing chudian’s shareholdings in the rules of procedurein either civil or criminal case,
unless it be with the consent of her husband and
the corporation. The CFI declared Razon as the
because he is dead, he cannot give permission.
owner of the said shares. The IAC however reversed,
and ruled that chuidian was the owner of the said Issue: Whether or not the widow of the deceased is a
competent witness due to the husband-and-wife
privilege the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila

nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the
Ruling:Yes, the widow of the accused is a competent ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due
witness in a prosecution for homicide to testify on behalf to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the
of the defense or prosecution regarding dying
wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July 1979, the decree
declarations to her by the deceased concerning the
cause of death. was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2
The purpose of the rule is to protect the accused against Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First
statements made in confidence engendered by the Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II,
marital statuz. A dying declaration of the husband to the issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the
wife is in no sense confidential as it is intended to be conjugal partnership.
communicated to others after death.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994 court. 3 In his petition, he cited the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner, denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or
vs. irrelevant." 4
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN,
JR., respondents. At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness
stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Facts: Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was
objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being privileged communication between physician and
presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation
for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence,
incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-
husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter
the physician who prepared the report. submitted a Statement for the Record asserting among
others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity'
Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged communication to annul their marriage, such ground being completely
between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her false, fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before
husband from disclosing the contents of the report. After leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their
failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, separation, Ma. Paz also authorized and instructed her
she is now before us on a petition for review counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim
on certiorari. even during her absence.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Held:

Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul Evidence; Privileged Communication; Physician-
Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced Patient Relationship; Requisites in order that the
three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and privilege may be successfully invoked.—Requisites in
Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a)
relationship between the couple developed into a stormy the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person
one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c)
effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally such person acquired the information while he was
separated in fact. attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d)
the information was necessary to enable him to act in
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. (formerly character) of the patient.”
On 2 November 1978, presenting the report among Same; Same; Same; The person against whom the
others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is the ACCRA performed legal services for clients, with
patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a document the incidental services where its members acted
executed by medical practitioners. His testimony cannot as stockholders. In the process, members of
have the force and effect of the testimony of the ACCRA acquired information relative to assets of
physician who examined the patient and executed the clients and their personal and business
report.—In the instant case, the person against whom the circumstances. PCGG excluded Raul Roco from
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to the complaint as party-defendant because of his
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a document principals for whom he acted as nominee-
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, stockholder in the companies involved.
this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution
denying the exclusion of ACCRA members in the
complaint as party-defendants. MR denied. PETs
Neither can his testimony be considered a contend: that the exclusion of Roco as party-
circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony defendant grants him a favourable treatment, on
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge
physician who examined the patient and executed the the identity of his client, giving him an advantage
report. over ACCRA members; that lawyers are
prohibited from revealing the identity of their
Same; Same; Same; In failing to object to the principal.
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel
waived his right to make such objection and,
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.—
Issue : W/N privileged communication between
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to
atty and client may be asserted in refusing to
the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it
disclose the name of ACCRA’s clients?
was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court
dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged
communications but never questioned the testimony as
hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to
the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel Held: Yes. PET’s inclusion as co-defendants is
waived his right to make such objection and, merely being used as leverage to compel them to
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted. name their clients and consequently to enable
Courts; Lawyers; Appeals; Counsels should PCGG to nail these clients -> thus PCGG has no
exercise prudence in appealing lower court rulings and valid cause of action against PETs and should
raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the exclude them from the complaint. An atty is more
resolution of cases.—If all lawyers are allowed to appeal than a mere agent or servant because he
every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of possesses special powers of trust and confidence
trial and include in their appeals depthless issues, there reposed on him by his client. If the price of
will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self-
courts will forever be clogged with inconsequential incrimination, then the flow of information would
be curtailed, thereby rendering the right to
cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in
counsel practically nugatory. An effective lawyer-
appealing lower court rulings and raise only legitimate
client relationship is largely dependent upon the
issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases.
degree of confidence which exists between
lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful
REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN exchange and flow of information. General rule: a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client.
Facts: PCGG field a case against Eduardo
Cojuangco Jr. for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
Among the defendants were the ACCRA Law Firm Exception:
and Raul Roco, also a part of ACCRA. Case
alleged that Cojuangco and defendants conspired 1. client identity is privileged where a strong
in setting up through the use of coco levy funds probability exists that revealing the client’s name
numerous banks; that ACCRA acted as dummies.
would implicate that client in the very activity Duration of privilege: exists not only during
which he sought the lawyer’s advice. relationship but extends even after termination.
PCGG failed to show that Roco actually revealed
2. the content of any client communication to a identity of clients.
lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem on which PCGG failed to show that Roco was treated
the client seeks legal assistance. as a species apart from the rest of ACCRA lawyers
-> no substantial distinctions between him and
3. where the nature of the atty-client relationship ACCRA; violates equal protection clause.
has been previously disclosed and it is the
identity which is intended to be confidential, the
identity of the client has been held to be
privileged. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V.
HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET,
The instant case falls under exceptions:
disclosure of client’s name would lead to
Facts:
establish said client’s connection with the very
fact in issue of the case. Link between the alleged
criminal offense and the legal advice/service Through the special civil action for certiorari at
sought duly established: clients consulted the bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution
PETs regarding structure, framework and set-up of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on
of corporations. In turn, PETs gave professional
December 22, 1993, which denied petitioners motion
for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet
advice in the form of, among others, deeds of
to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of
assignment covering client’s shareholdings.
March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration
Preparation of documents part of PET’s legal
of its preceding disposition.[1]
service to clients.
The records show that during the dates material
to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of
Thus PETs have legitimate fear that identifying Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal
their clients would implicate them in the very Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario
activity for which legal advice had been sought. in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
Revelation of client’s name would provide successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del
Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at
necessary link for the prosecution to build its
present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a
case.
practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in
several instances pertinent to the criminal charges
involved in the present recourse.
Where a client thinks he might have previously
The same records also represent that sometime in
committed something illegal and consults atty
1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over
about it -> falls within the exception. Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land
But where client seeks services of an atty for Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and,
pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original
illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go
certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which
around the law to commit illegal activities -> not is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusandel
covered by privilege. Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an
action[2] for the cancellation of respondent Paredes
Purpose of privilege: to avoid fishing patent and certificate of title since the land had been
expedition by the prosecution. There are designated and reserved as a school site in the
alternative sources of information available to aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court
prosecutor w/c do not depend on utilizing rendered judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after
defendant’s counsel as source. finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same
through fraudulent misrepresentations in his
application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as
counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, communicated by the client to the attorney by other
upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang means.[23]
Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted
thereon, an information for perjury[5] was filed against Nor can it be pretended that during the entire
respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. process, considering their past and existing relations as
[6]
On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for
however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to which such falsified documents were prepared, no word
move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the
alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this
terminated.[7] In this criminal case, respondent Paredes conclusion is the undisputed fact that said documents
was likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as
annexes to the motion for reconsideration in the
counsel.
preliminary investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan.[24] Also, the acts and words of the parties
Issue: during the period when the documents were being
falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes
(1) whether or not the projected testimony of respondent would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed
Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the him to witness the same except under conditions of
attorney-client privilege; secrecy and confidence.
Rulling:
As already stated, respondent US V CHING PO

Sandiganbayanruled that due to the lawyer-client
relationship which existed between herein respondents FACTS:
Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the
facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters It appears by the record that the defendant in this
must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as cause was tried an convicted before the municipal
client, to respondent Sansaet, as his court of the city of Manila in a certain cause entitled
lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it "The City of Manila vs. Ching Po et al.," wherein
further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a Ching Po was charged, together with others, "with
witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. visiting and being house where opium was kept and
without the latters consent.[21] used upon the person," in violation of Ordinance No.
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney- 152 of the said city of Manila ; that said defendant,
client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts toge with his co-defendants appealed said cause to
thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein the Court of First Inst of the city of Manila; that upon
constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer the trial of said appeal in the Court of First Instance
understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep on November 3,1911, the defendant herein testify a
aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases. certain amount of opium (18 grams) and an opium
pipe found by the police at No. 26 QalleChica, Manila,
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a
where said defendant lived, belong him and was in his
confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791- possession and under his, control; that upon the said
93 for falsification before respondent court, and this may cause No. 7949 in the Court of First Instance said
reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused Ching Po was acquitted; that immediately succeeding
and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that said trial and acquittal in said No. 7949, the complaint
Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the in the present cause was presented and the
falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as defendant re-arrested and charged "with having in his
eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal possession and wader, his control the same opium
statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and pipe" referred to and testi to by him in the former
and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the trial; that at the time of arraignment, a plea former
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to any jeopardy was presented by the defendant and
communication, without distinction or qualification.[22] overruled and due exception taken and that
thereafter the prosecution was permitted the trial
In the American jurisdiction from which our present
evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode by court, in spite of the objection of said defendant, to
which a confidential communication shall be made by a introduced evidence in this cause the testimony of
client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to the defendant upon his trial in former cause to the
verbal or written communications made by the client to effect, as above stated, that he was the owner and i
his attorney but extends as well to information possession of said opium and pipe.
ISSUE: that it is fair presume that they correspond with the

truth, and it is his fault if the not.
That the trial court erred in receiving as evidence
against the defendant the testimony given by him
upon his trial in a certain other cause in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, No. 7949, entitled
City of Manila vs. Ching Po et al.," over the objection
of the defendant. Yshmael v hasim
Facts:
RULING:
The complaint in the present case sets forth two
With reference to the second assignment of error, to causes of action. For its first cause of action the
wit, that the trial erred in receiving the testimony of the plaintiff alleges, in substance, that the defendant
defendant, given in a former ca evidence against him Nageeb T. Hashim on September 21, 1916, executed
in this cause and basing his conviction thereon, i be a chattel mortgage in favor of said plaintiff for the sum
said, again adopting the statement of facts of the of P13,160.87, with interest at 8 per cent per annum,
appellant in his brief, that "it appears from the record the mortgage falling due on September 21, 1917; that
herein (evidence, pp, 20 and 2 that the undersigned the said defendant having failed to make payment in
attorney (the attorney for the defendant in both ca accordance with the terms agreed upon, the chattel
advised the defendant, prior to the trial of cause No. mortgage was f oreclosed and the mortgage property
7949, that he show testify in said cause that he was sold by the sheriff on January 15, 1921; that the
the lessee of the house No. 26 Call Chica, and that proceeds of the sale amounted to the sum of P2,100
he lived there, and that the opium found on the only, thus leaving a balance of P11,060.87, which,
upper floor of said house belonged to him and was in with the corresponding interest at the rate of 8 per
his possession and custody that such evidence, so cent per annum from September 21, 1916, until
far from prejudicing him, should have the effect January 9, 1925, now amounts to the sum of
freeing him from the charge therein made against P19,134.32, for which amount judgment is prayed.
him. We have, therefor the express admission of the For the second cause of action, the plaintiff
defendant in cause No. 7949, given in ope court, alleges that the defendant Nageeb T. Hashim has
that he was the owner of the opium with which he is been indebted in the sum of P14,646.47 to the
charged of having in his possession in the present Hashim Commercial & Trading Company, Ltd., a
case. The fact that this admission was made by the limited copartnership, organized under the laws of the
defendant was clearly proved during the trial of the Philippine Islands and that, for good and valuable
present case by witnesses who heard it. No attempt consideration, the said Hashim Commercial & Trading
was made to show that the fact was not exactly as Company, Ltd., assigned the amount due it on said
confessed by the defendant. indebtedness to the plaintiff on October 3, 1921,
together with its other bills receivable, fixtures, cash
on hand in banks, and its entire stock of goods; that
the plaintiff has in vain demanded payment from the
With reference to the admissibility of the admissions defendants and now asks judgment against them for
and declarations o defendant charged with a crime, said sum of P14,060.47. The plaintiff also prayed for a
the rule seems to be that the declaration made by a writ of attachment of the property of the defendants,
defendant or by a third party, by his authority, if which prayer was granted.
relevant, admissible against him. If the defendant has
made statements constitute an admission of the facts
Issue:
charged in the complaint, or relevant to the charges in
the complaint they are admissible against him. The defendant offered in evidence testimony given in
(Commonweal vs. Sanborn, 116 Mass., 61; People an earlier case by members of the plaintiff
vs. Bosworth, 64 Hun People vs. Cassidy, 133 N. Y.,
612; State vs. Behrman, 114 N. C., 797.) Held:
That if such testimony contained admissions against
The foregoing rule is based upon the presumption
that no man would declare anything against himself, interest by the parties to the action or their agents, it
unless such declarations were true. acts, conduct, would have been admissible without the laying of' a
and declarations, wherever made, provided they be foundation and without the witnesses having testified
voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason in the case at bar; but the purpose of the offer of the
testimony was evidently to impeach the testimony of binding, there being no showing that it was reached
the same witnesses in the present case and, if so, a arbitrarily. Our own evaluation thereof yields no cause
foundation should have been laid by calling the for the application of the exception to the settled rule.
attention of the witnesses to the former statements so
Same; Same; Motive; Absence of evidence as to
as to give them opportunity to explain before the
an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the
statements were offered in evidence. conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit.—lf there was any bias, it
should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant
because of esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow that
People vs. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624, January 26, 1995 sentiment to compromise his official and public duty as a
peace officer. It is settled that the absence of evidence
FACTS as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the
conclusion that none existed and that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an accused
Agapito Lorenzo and accused Dolores Lorenzo were had nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the
spouses. PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman of his natural order of events and of human nature and against
own Station who immediately surrendered to Police the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness
Eclipse a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told to falsely testify against the accused.
him, "I killed my husband". Same; Same; Extrajudicial Confessions; Under
Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, what must be
The two proceeded to where the victim was. In the corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the
presence and within the hearing of said barangay testimony of the person to whom the confession is
official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm made, and the corroborative evidence required is that of
surrendering because I killed my husband". the corpus delicti.—Nor is there merit to the claim that
Isabelo Liban’s testimony must corroborate Eclipse’s
The defense painted another picture of the incident. It's testimony or the confession of the appellant since
theory is that it was not Policewoman Lorenzo but a without such corroboration Eclipse’s testimony would
certain Robert Santos who killed Agapito. have no probative value. This theory could only be a
product of a misunderstanding of Section 3, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court which provides: “SEC. 3. Extrajudicial
ISSUE confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.—An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not
RULING be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated
by evidence of corpus delicti.” Note that what must be
Evidence; Witnesses; When the issue is the corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the
witnesses’ credibility, appellate courts will generally not testimony of the person to whom the confession is
disturb the findings of the trial court.—The pith of the made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the
assigned errors and the focus of the appellant’s testimony of another person who heard the confession
arguments is the issue of the witnesses’ credibility. It is a but the evidence of corpus delicti.
wellentrenched rule that when such is the issue,
appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of Same; Same; In determining the value and
the trial court considering that the latter is in a better credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not
position to decide the question, having heard the numbered.—Except when expressly required by law, the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment testimony of a single person, if credible and positive and
and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of the accused
facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. In
considered, might affect the result of the case. The trial determining the value and credibility of evidence,
court has the singular opportunity to observe and witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.
consider certain potent aids in understanding and Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Corpus
weighing the testimony of witnesses, such as the Delicti, “Explained.—As to the corroborative evidence
emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice of the of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not question
witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these its presence because she knows that it has been
are not incorporated into the record, the appellate court overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti is
cannot avail of them and must therefore rely on the good the body (material substance) upon which a crime has
judgment of the trial court. The appellant has not been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or
convinced us that the trial court plainly overlooked the charred remains of a house burned down. In a
proved facts or circumstances which, if considered, may derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a
affect the result of this case. We thus accept its crime was committed. It is made up of two elements: (a)
assessment of the evidence as correct and consider it that a certain result has been proved, for example a man
has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that

some person is criminally responsible for the act. Same; Same; Parricide; “Admissions” and
“Confessions,” Distinguished.—We do not, however,
Same; Same; Elements of Corpus Delicti; Sec. 3, agree with the trial court’s characterization of the
Rule 133 does not mean that every element of the crime appellant’s declaration that she killed her husband as
must be clearly established by independent confession an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It is
apart from the confession—it means merely that there clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of
should be some evidence tending to show the Court that there is a distinction between
commission of the crime apart from the confession.— an admission and a confession. These sections read as
Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not mean follows: “SEC. 26. Admission of a party.—The act,
that every element of the crime charged must be clearly declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
established by independent evidence apart from the may be given in evidence against him. * * * SEC.
confession. It means merely that there should be some 33. Confession.—The declaration of an accused
evidence tending to show the commission of the crime acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any
apart from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were evidence against him.” In a confession, there is an
necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in
evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused
such confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt
need not, independently of the confession, establish of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the
the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. offense with which he is charged.
Same; Same; Same; An admissible confession or
Same; Same; Minor inconsistencies do not affect admission which has been duly proved shifts to the
the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to accused the burden of evidence to disprove, by strong
strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.—Since evidence, that he made the admission, or admitting it,
the corroboration of Isabelo Liban’s testimony was that he is not guilty of the crime.—Nevertheless, whether
unnecessary, we need not discuss its intrinsic merits, it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible
more especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a- against the appellant and, having been duly proved,
vis the testimony of Eclipse which inconsistencies we, together with the other facts and circumstances, the
nevertheless, find to be on minor matters. Minor burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to
inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the
on the contrary, they may even tend to strengthen rather admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not
than weaken their credibility because they erase any guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown, the trial
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. court characterized her story as “palpably a put-up
scenario .... [A] story which runs against the grain of
Same; Same; The presumption that “evidence ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails common
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced” does sense.” The five reasons enumerated by it to support
not apply when the testimony of the witness not this conclusion are founded on or are inferred from facts
produced would only be corroborative, or when the said duly established by the prosecution or are otherwise
witness is available to the defense.—The claim of solidly based on common experience, logic, and
suppression of evidence has no merit. The testimony of common sense.
the other policeman whom Eclipse requested to get a
vehicle could only be corroborative in some respects but Same; Same; Same; The testimony of the
not of the fact of the surrender of the blood-stained bolo accused is not credible where he has adopted an
and fan knife and of the appellant’s telling Eclipse that attitude of indifference relative to the crime he is
she killed her husband since it was not explicitly shown accused of and where he failed to inform the police
that he was with Eclipse at the precise time of the authorities and the fiscal during the investigation that it
surrender. The prosecutor and the defense counsel was not he but somebody else who committed the
asked no further questions of Eclipse to elicit more on crime.—The appellant’s failure to assert, at any part of
the presence of the other policeman. In any event, even the entire event, from the time she went with Eclipse to
if the latter were present, his testimony would only be the police station up to the time she was committed to
corroborative. Furthermore, it has never been shown jail and even thereafter until she took the witness stand,
that the said policeman was not available to the defense. that it was not she who killed her husband only serves to
The presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of reinforce and strengthen this Court’s respect for the trial
the Rules of Court that “evidence willfully suppressed court’s finding that her story that “it was not she but
would be adverse if produced” does not apply when the Robert Santos who did her husband in,” is “shot.” We
testimony of the witness not produced would only be find it incredible that a peace officer and a wife of the
corroborative, or when the said witness is available to victim would not forthwith denounce or reveal the identity
the defense because then the evidence would have the of the assailant if it were true that it was not she who
same weight against one party as against the other. killed her husband, This Court has held that the
testimony of the accused is not credible where he has Shingko received while DRACOR counterclaimed for
adopted an attitude of indifference relative to the crime
he is accused of and where he failed to inform the police the commission of the sales made by CMS with the
authorities and the fiscal during the investigation that it Japanese firms.
was not he but somebody else who committed the
murder.
Same; Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; An
accused could be convicted based on circumstantial
evidence where the circumstances constitute an ISSUE:
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused to the exclusion of w/n DRACOR is entitled to its commissions from the
all others as the guilty person.—Even granting for the sales made by CMS to Japanese firms
sake of argument that the appellant only surrendered a
blood-stained bolo and a fan knife but did not admit that
she killed her husband, we find in this case several
circumstances whose concordant combination and
cumulative effect point to the appellant, to the exclusion
HELD:
of all others, as the guilty party. These circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the appellant, to the
The principal may revoke a contract of agency at will,
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The
requirements then of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of and such revocation may be express, or implied, and
Court on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to may be availed of even if the period fixed in the contract
convict the appellant are present.
of agency as not yet expired. As the principal has this
absolute right to revoke the agency, the agent can not
CMS LOGGING V CA
object thereto; neither may he claim damages arising
from such revocation, unless it is shown that such was
FACTS: done in order to evade the payment of agent's
commission. During the existence of the contract of
Petitioner CMS is a forest concessionaire engaged in the agency, DRACOR admitted that CMS sold its logs
logging business, while private respondent DRACOR is directly to several Japanese firms. This act constituted an
engaged in the business of exporting and selling logs and implied revocation of the contract of agency under
lumber. On August 28, 1957, CMS and DRACOR Article 1924 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art.
entered into a contract of agency whereby the former 1924 The agency is revoked if the principal directly
appointed the latter as its exclusive export and sales manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing
agent for all logs that the former may produce, for a directly with third persons. DRACOR is not entitled to
period of five (5) years. commission since it was revoked by CMS when they
CMS was able to sell through DRACOR a total of transacted directly with the Japanese firms
77,264,672 board feet of logs in Japan, from September
20, 1957 to April 4, 1962. Six months prior the end of
their agreement, CMS found out that DRACOR was
using Shingko Trading to sell their logs and earned
commission for it. CMS claimed that it was a violation
of their agreement since DRACOR already received 5%
commission and is no longer entitled to the additional
commission to Shinko. After the discovery, CMS
NDC v Womens com
directly transacted with Japanese firms without the aid if
DRACOR. CMS sued DRACOR for the commission Facts:
On April 27, 1960, respondent Gertrudes Lucas Vda.

de Raymundo filed a claim for workmen’s
compensation for the death of her husband, Luis
Raymundo, on January 23, 1954. la a complaint
before Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of
Labor, she averred that her husband was employed at
the National Development Co., petitioner in this case,
for more than 12 years, his last designation being
machine tender in the Finishing Department; that as
machine tender, Luis Raymundo’s work consisted of
lifting heavy loads, pushing a wagon loaded with dyed
and wet cloth and mixing chemicals for use in dyeing
and printing textiles and that because of strenuous
work done mostly at night and because of exposure to
sudden changes in temperature, her husband began
to lose weight, complained of headaches and chest
pains and later spat blood. On account of poor health,
Luis Raymundo retired from the service of petitioner
on May 6, 1953; eight months after (on January 23,
1954), he died of pulmonary tuberculosis,
Issue:
Self-serving evidence; Workmen’s compensation;
Ruling;
Evidence; Claimant may testify in workmen’s
compensation case.—The right of a claimant to be
present at the hearing of his claim for workmen’s
compensation includes the right to testify in his own
behalf. While a party’s interest may to some extent
affect his credibility, his interest alone is not a ground
for disregarding his testimony. Self-serving evidence
is evidence made by a party out of court at one time;
it does not include a party’s testimony as a witness in
court. It is excluded on the same ground as any
hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for
cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the
consideration that its admission would open the door
to fraud and fabrication of evidence. On the other
hand, a party’s testimony in court is sworn and affords
the other party -the opportunity for cross-examination.
People v Sope (1946)  Her testimony is inconsistent and contradict

each other. The CFI convicted them on the basis
Self-serving evidence / J. Jaranilla of her lone testimony
FACTS:  By what she testified, it should have been
bribery not robbery!
Dimalanta, Sope and Cruz were charged with robbery.
(1st information against Sope and Cruz; 2 nd information
OSG CONTENDS: repeated negotiations for the
on Dimalanta as co-conspirator. CFI tried the case
dropping of the case is an admission on the part of the
jointly) The CFI found them guilty.
conspirator Dimalanta.
ISSUE: WoN they were guilty beyond reasonable

The testimony of Juliana Chan stated that: doubt? YES!
When she was on her way home at 6pm, a calesa DISPOSITIVE: Conviction.
stopped in front of her
Contradictions and inconsistencies of the principal
From the calesa, came down Sope and Cruz witness are not serious enough to affect her credibility
 Sope pointed a revolver at her The trial judge had opportunity to observe her
 Cruz poked a hard object at her back demeaner while on the stand and gave it full weight and
Dimalanta remained in the calesa credit as against those of the appellants
Cruz ordered her to board the rig of the calesa while It was duly established that their lawyers managed to
Sope stayed behind. negotiate the dropping of the case by paying the
Cruz and Dimalanta pretended to be peace officers amount allegedly taken from her
and that she was found violation the law – unlawfully Admission by conduct in this case:
dealing in US Army goods (they were pointing at her The repeated offer of a conspirator constitutes a strong
back for such indication) indication and an implied admission of guilt of said
conspirator and the 2 accused in this case.
They stopped at “Victory Cafe” – Dimalanta and Cruz
asked her to have coffee with them, yet still threatening
her to give them money Re: It is not bribery, it is robbery! Prosecutor was
right in charging the accused of Robbery.
She gave P200
They pretended to be peace officers and employed
She reported the incident so the 3 of them were
threats and intimidation to obtain P200  this is
arrested
obviously robbery
She claims that Dimalanta’s lawyer (Atty. VEGA)
Although it seems true what the appellants testified
offered to settle the case by paying back P200 on the
that Juliana Chua was carrying a bundle containing
condition that she would not testify against Dimalanta
contraband and for fear of discovery her husband ran
because she did not really see him among those who
held her up anyway. She turned this down. away and did not come back, there was no evidence
regarding said contraband other than the testimony of
Atty. RESURECION (also in behalf of Dimalanta) the accused WHICH IS NOT POSITIVE NOR CONVINCING.
managed to pay her P120
Re: Self-serving testimonies
Dimalanta did not appeal. Such testimony coming as it does from the accused who
Sope and Cruz appealed contending: naturally want to exculpate themselves, cannot be
regarded as free from bias and desire to so intensify the
Their guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not details thereof as to suit their case.
proven The disappearance of the husband does nothing to
 That she was actually carrying contraband items unfavorable to the prosecution because he might have
and for fear of discovery, her husband fled the gone to a policeman
scene and did not come back for her (the SC, in
the ratio, seem to connote that they testified this SCRA
during the trial)
The testimony of the offended party is quite reasonable,
and the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe
her demeanor while on the stand gave it full weight and

credit as against those of the appellants. Moreover, it
has been repeatedly held by this court that the testimony HELD: Whatever may have been the proof
of a single witness which satisfies the court in a given required by the legislation prior to the Civil Code,
case is sufficient to convict. and that required by it, which requirements were
not put into force, it is a fact that in Act No. 190,
by which the courts must be governed, there
exists the presumption of law that a man and
woman who are living together as husband and
wife have entered into a legal contract of
SISON V AMBALADA marriage. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 334, No. 28.)
LACK or RECORD.—The mere absence of the

FACTS: Julian Ambalada and ModestaAfable lived record of the marriage in the books of the church
together as husband and wife from 1870 until July in which the marriage took place does not
30, 1886, when ModestaAfable died. During their destroy that presumption, when the husband
union, as Ambalada himself testified at the trial, himself acknowledges, and so testifies at the
eight children were born to them, of whom Maria trial, that he and the woman to whom he was
Ambalada alone survived her mother. This Maria united from 1870 to July 30, 1886, lived
married Sancho Sison on September 19, 1890, continuously as husband and wife, and were
having three children, Vicente, Maria regarded as such by their own parents and by
Consolación, and Conrado, all surnamed Sison. public opinion, it being publicly known -in the
town in which they lived that said woman was his
lawful wife, sharing in all his titles; and when they
had during this existence as husband and wife
These three grandchildren of eight legitimate children, who were regarded by
Ambalada and Af able have instituted the everybody as their children.
present suit against Julian Ambalada
seeking liquidation of the estate EVIDENCE.—The legal presumption is further
belonging to the conjugal partnership corroborated by competent parol evidence, which
between Julian Ambalada and ModestaAf in the present case isunanimous and supports the
able, and partition of the property claim with reference to the performance of the
constituting it, so that to them might be marriage and to other points regarding the fact,
not the least of which are acts of the husband
adjudicated the half of its products
himself, who in various documents stated that he
belonging to the portion of the spouse was married during the time he lived with the
who died first, ModestaAfable. For this woman and an element of proof exists in writing
purpose the plaintiffs enumerate in their in various public and official instruments.
complaint six parcels of land as
constituting the conjugal partnership
property mentioned.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
The defendant Julian Ambalada denies the vs.
existence of the conjugal partnership he is said to THE HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of
have had with ModestaAfable, to whom, he avers, First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, and
he was never legally married. He acknowledges JUAN CONSUNJI and ALFONSO PANGANIBAN,
in his written answer that he had had by
ModestaAfable among other children (four FACTS;
altogether enumerated in the instrument) Maria
Ambalada, who, he says was born on September In an amended information filed by the City Attorney
11, 1875, and died on November 12, 1902, of Quezon City on March 22, 1955, Juan Consunji,
leaving the plaintiffs as her sole descendants. Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is
still unknown, were charged with having conspired
together in the murder of one Jose Ramos (Criminal
Case No. Q-1637 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City). Trial of the case started on May 3,
1955, and in several hearings the prosecution had details. After all, the confessions are not before us
been presenting its evidence. During the progress of and have not even been formally offered in evidence
the trial on May 18, 1955, while the prosecution was for any purpose. Suffice it to say that the lower Court
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of should have allowed such confessions to be given in
the National Bureau of Investigation, in connection evidence at least as against the parties who made
with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession them, and admit the same conditionally to establish
(allegedly made before him) by defendant Juan conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance
Consunji to the witness, counsel for the other to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its
defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general disposal to prove the charges. At any rate, in the final
objection to any evidence on such confession on the determination and consideration of the case, the trial
ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent Court should be able to distinguish the admissible
as against the other accused Panganiban. The Court from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the
below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected rules of evidence, should be excluded.
to, but on an altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in
confessions of defendants Juan Consunji and Alfonso criminal cases where questions arise as to
Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the
without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the charges, from which the People can no longer
ISSUE: appeal.
the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion

in ordering the complete exclusion of the
prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of
the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial
when the ruling was made.
RULING;
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to PEOPLE V PARAGSA

the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½
against him. year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes. The information
alleged that victim was alone in her house when the
SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an Benben entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife,
accused expressly acknowledging the truth of forced her to lie in bed and there they had
his guilt as to the offense charged, may be intercourse. The deed was interrupted when her aunt
given in evidence against him. Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house.
Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, accused exiting the house when she came
even if Consunji's confession may not be competent knocking. The victim did not reveal what happened to
as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay her until 6 days after the incident.
as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them
without the conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession of Consunji was,
nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the Accused interposed the “Sweetheart
declarant's own guilt (U. S. vs. Vega, 43 Phil. 41; defense”. Defense claims in effect that there was no
People vs. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People vs. Buan, 64 force or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita
Phil. 296), and should have been admitted as such. saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather
consensual sexual intercourse. Accused also
We see no need for the present to discuss the presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed
question of the admissibility of the individual sweethearts.
extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for
the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them
through the identity of the confessions in essential
The CFI convicted Benben. CA affirmed the PEOPLE VS. YATCO

conviction.
Facts:
1. Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and

another whose identity is still unknown, were
ISSUE:
charged with having conspired together in the
murder of one Jose Ramos.
The main issue boils down to the question of who is
2. During the progress of the trial, counsel for the
more credible, the defense or the prosecution? Thus,
whether or not the evidence justifies a conviction. defendant Panganiban interposed a general
objection to any evidence on such confession
made by defendant consunji on the ground that
it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as
against the other accused Panganiban.
HELD:
3. The lower court ordered the exclusion of the
objected evidence but on a different ground
NO. A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the
which is “the prosecution could not be permitted
prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and
to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan
inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove
court noted the absence of intimidation considering conspiracy between them, without prior proof of
that the act took place in the daytime, in her house such conspiracy by a number of definite acts,
where she is surrounded by her neighbors. The conditions, and circumstances”.
victim could also have revealed the same the very 4. OSG filed a petition for cetiorari before the SC
moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who for the review and annulment of the lower
asked her what the accused did to her upon entering Court's order completely excluding any evidence
the house immediately after the intercourse took on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused
place and not 3 days after. Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban without
prior proof of conspiracy.
Issue #1: WON the lower court is correct in

Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter excluding the prosecutions’s evidence (extra-judicial
of the allegation that the victim and accused were confession by Consunji)?
sweethearts. They did not bother to rebut the
testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the No. We believe that the lower Court committed a grave
effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of
sweethearts; and that they had had two previous the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of
the accused Juan Consunji at the stage of the trial when
sexual communications previously. As to this silence,
the ruling was made.
the Supreme Court explained:
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to
the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an
accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence
against him.
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as SEC. 14. Confession. — The declaration of an accused
an implied admission of the truth … is applicable in expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the
criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.
understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even
interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in if Consunji's confession may not be competent as
respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to
he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without
answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the
and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. evidence of the declarant's own guilt and should be
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in admitted.
the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the Rule on admissibility
facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
be safely construed as an admission of the truth of objections to its materiality or technical objections to the
such assertion. form of the questions should be avoided. In a case of
any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance,
in the early stages of the development of the proof, to
know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or
not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may objection is known and not reasonably made, the
as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power,
of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected on its own motion, to disregard the evidence.
later. At any rate, in the final determination and
consideration of the case, the trial Court should be able
to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and
reject what, under the rules of evidence, should be
excluded. There is greater reason to adhere to such PEOPLE V SALVADOR
policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the
unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the FACTS:Alfredo C. Mabuhay and his girlfriend, as
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of they were conversing, two male persons
the charges, from which the People can no longer approached them. One of them—later identified
appeal. as accused-appellant Edgardo Salvador—held
Issue #2: WON section 12 of Rule 123 is applicable
Susan and pushed her to the ground in a lying
in the case at bar?
No. The rule cited by the Court below in support of its position, while the other—later identified as
exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule accused Ricardo Manosca—did the same to
123, providing that the act or declaration of a conspirator Alfredo. Manosca then announced that it was a
relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may hold-up as both men poked knives at their
be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the victims. Alfredo readily gave his wallet to
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or Manosca. Susan, who was being held by
declaration. Manifestly, the rule refers to statements Salvador, offered some resistance out of fear.
made by one conspirator during the pendency of the
unlawful enterprises("during its existence") and in
furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had Thereafter, Some construction workers in the
been brought to an end. vicinity rescued Alfredo who told them that he
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the and his girlfriend were attacked and robbed. The
confessions to prove conspiracy between the two workers summoned the police who arrived shortly
accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, and brought Alfredo to the OspitalngMaynila for
the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape treatment of his wounds. The peace officers told
recordings) had not yet even been identified, much less Alfredo that his girlfriend was already dead.
formally offered in evidence. For all we know, the
prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of
conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before
their confessions are formally offered in evidence. The accused-appellant and his co-accused
Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also Ricardo Manosca, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
applies to the confessions in question, it was premature of the special complex crime of robbery with
for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on homicide and physical injuries.
the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy.
Issue #3: WON the court has the power to disregard
evidence? (Related to the topic Objections)
The court does not have the said power.
The exclusion of the proferred confessions was not ISSUE: whether the trial court committed a
made on the basis of the objection interposed by reversible error in finding that there was
Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different conspiracy between the accused-appellant and
ground, which the Court issued motu proprio.
his co-accused.
Panganiban's counsel objected to Consunji's confession
as evidence of the guilt of the other accused
Panganiban, on the ground that it was hearsay as to the
latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on this objection,
put up its own objection to the confessions — that it
could not be admitted to prove conspiracy between HELD: Criminal Law; Conspiracy; When
Consunji and Panganiban without prior evidence of such one is considered a party to a
conspiracy by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, conspiracy.—One is considered a party to
circumstances, etc. and completely excluded the
confessions on that ground. By so doing, the Court a conspiracy when he intentionally
overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege participates in an act or deed with a view
to the furtherance of common design and is there anything in article 1227, or elsewhere, which
purpose. There must be unity of purpose prohibits the introduction of the testimony of attesting
and unity in the execution of the unlawful witnesses, or other persons who may be present
when a private document is executed, to prove that
objective. Mere knowledge, the act was accomplished upon the date stated
acquiescense, or approval of the act, therein to be date of its execution? We are of the
without cooperation or agreement to opinion that such testimony is admissible, even as
cooperate, is not enough. Moreover, against third parties.
conspiracy implies concept of design but
not participation in every detail of The argument against the validity of the conveyance
execution. from Juan Llenos to EladioAlpuerto is based on two
propositions, namely: (1) that said conveyance must,
under the second paragraph of article 1297, in
Same; Same; Liability ofthe connection with article 1227, of the Civil Code, be
conspirator.—When the conspiracy to presumed to be fraudulent; and (2) that furthermore
commit the crime of robbery was the transaction is shown by the evidence to have
conclusively shown by the concerted acts been fraudulent in fact.
of the accused, and homicide was
committed as a consequence thereof all Ruling:
those who participated are liable as
The trial court permitted plaintiff to produce witnesses
principals in the robbery with homicide,
for the purpose of proving that the private documents
although they did not actually take part relied upon by him were in fact executed and
in the homicide, unless it appears that delivered upon the dates therein recited and that
they attempted to prevent the killing. plaintiff went into possession under them, and upon
The question as to who actually robbed that evidence made finding in accordance with
or who actually killed is of no moment, plaintiff's contentions, and held that the right to take
since all of them would be held over the purchase retracto existed. The defendant
appealed to the supreme court of Spain, and argued
accountable for the crime of robbery with that by its ruling the Audiencia had disregarded article
homicide. 1227 of the Civil Code, the specific contention being
that as against persons who are not parties to them
private documents must be treated as though their
existence commenced only from the date upon which
they are made of public record
ELADIO ALPUERTO v. JOSE PEREZ PASTOR +
Clearly articles 1225 and 1227 should be construed in
Facts: such manner as to harmonize with each other and to
give effect, so far as possible, to the legislative intent
The three parcels of real property which constitute the expressed in each; and the only interpretation of
subject matter of the contention in this case formerly article 1227 which can be adopted consistently with
belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested the meaning of article 1225 is that the rule announced
parties in this action claim title under him, the plaintiff in article 1227 has reference exclusively to the
as party in possession under a contract of sale with situation where there is no accredited evidence before
pacto de retro, and the defendant as purchaser at a the court, independent of the recitals of the document
public sale under an execution directed against itself, showing the date upon which it was in fact
Llenos. The plaintiff, EladioAlpuerto, asks the court to executed.
make a declaration against the defendant, Jose Perez
Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner It has been settled in many decisions that a document
thereof in full and absolute dominion. He also prays which originates as a private document and never
that the sale of the property effected by the sheriff, rises above that status will, under article 1225, be
Manuel Roa, to said defendant be declared null. given full effect as such. (Samson vs. Salvilla and
Sierra, 12 Phil. Rep., 497, 505; Taguinot vs.
Issue: Municipality of Tanay, 9 Phil. Rep., 396, 401;
Guillermo vs. Matienzo, 8 Phil. Rep., 368, 372;
Irureta, Goyena vs. Tambunting, 1 Phil. Rep., 490,
493.) It follows that article 1227 does not, as against

the signatory parties and their successors in interest,
postpone the operation of an instrument, proved as a The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that
private document, if it is shown by competent the land in question was formerly included in the Gran
evidence that it was in fact executed upon the date Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged
recited therein as the date of its execution. If this were to the city. This particular testimony is at variance with
not true, the result would be that a person having the testimonies of Wison and Timoteo who testified
rights under an instrument, provable as a private that the land belonged to the Central Government (not
document, might lose those rights by reason of the the city). His testimony was based on what he had
happening of some one of the occurrences mentioned learned from the oldest residents of that section of the
in article 1227. The contrary conclusion is evidently city and was introduced by the City of Manila
the proper one, that is, that if a party has rights under apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was
an instrument, provable as a private document, and it generally considered the owner of the land drawing
is so proved, it will prevail from the true and proven
from this fact the presumption of actual ownership
date of its execution with all the effect attributable to it
under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil
under article 1225.
Procedure (now Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court).
The expression "third parties" (terceros) as used in
article 1227, evidently means persons who have not
intervened in the execution of the document. It has
been so interpreted by the supreme court of Spain Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Villegas is
and by this court. (Lao Simbieng vs. Palencia, 18 Phil. admissible as proof of “common reputation.”
Rep., 325, 328; Easton vs. E. Diaz & Co. and Sheriff
of Albay, 32 Phil. Rep., 181; decision of the supreme
court of Spain of April 16, 1910, already cited.)
Ruling: No.Villegas testimony is merely hearsay.
Manresa is therefore in error in supposing that it has
the more limited meaning of persons who have not
intervened in the execution of the document and are
neither heirs nor successors in interest of those who Since it consisted of what he had learned from
signed the same. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. some of the old residents of Manila, it was hearsay as
501.) to the court since those who said it were not
produced. Such testimony does not constitute the
In the case now before us the two witnesses “common reputation” referred to in the section
examined with reference to the execution of the mentioned. “Common reputation” as used in that
document in question testify that it was originally section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The
executed and delivered on July 13,1912, the date testimony of Villegas is not sufficient to establish the
stated upon its face. For the purpose of disposing of presumption referred to. Furthermore, this witness
this branch of the case without further discussion, we stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been
provisionally accept this statement as true and partitioned between the municipality and the Central
deduce the conclusion that the presumption stated in
Government, share and share alike, and that the
paragraph 2 of article-1297 of the Civil Code is not
Central Government (not the city) retained Calles
applicable.
Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely
the streets on which the property abuts.
City of manila v del Rosario
Facts: This is action to recover possession of two

parcels of land located in Calles Clavel and People vs. Gaddi
Barcelona, district of Tondo, filed by the City of Manila
against its present occupant, Jacinto del Rosario. The 170 SCRA 649 (1989)
plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral
Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge)
evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony John
Wilson, Eduardo Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera
Roco, Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the
city attorney. Facts: Nerio Gaddi was charged with murder for the
death of one Augusto Esguerra. The prosecution’s
version of the facts (which was the version believed by Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant,
the court) show that in the afternoon of December 11, who probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted
1981, at San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay
Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and the rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows
victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of his own personal knowledge; that is, he was testifying
of the following day, appellent told Ernesto Guzman that to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed
he killed Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet Augusto Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant’s
located in the backyard of Guzman. Guzman advised statement.
appellant to surrender to the police. Guzman went to the
police and reported what appellant told him. On
December 12, 1981, the appellant was arrested. (In this case, it should also be noted that the
Appellant voluntarily surrendered and told the police appellant was not convicted based only on the
that he killed the victim and that he buried the body. prosecution witness’ testimony but also on the presence
The appellant led the police to where the body is buried. of other circumstantial evidence proved.)
Patrolman Patriarca noted the statements of Guzman and
Gaddi and took down the confession of appeallant. In
his defense, Gaddi points to Guzman as the perpetrator
of the crime and that he was only forced by the latter to
admit the crime. The court convicted the appellant of Estrada vs. Desierto
the crime charged. In this appeal, appellant disputes the 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of the
prosecution witness Guzman as a basis for his convition. Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge)
He claims that Ernesto Guzman’s testimony on Gaddi’s
confession of the crime to him cannot be given credence
for being hearsay. Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court’s resolution in GR. No. 146710-15 and
Omnibus Motion in GR. 146738 of the Court’s
Decision of March 2, 2001.
Issue: Whether or not Guzman’s testimony is hearsay.
In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and

Ruling: No. This tribunal had previously declared that a argues the following issues:
confession constitutes evidence of the high order since it
is suported by the strong presumption that no person of
normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess 1. Whether petitioner resigned or should
to crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. be considered resigned as of Janury 20, 2001;
Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a 2. Whether the Anagara Diary is
crime can be presented in evidence without violating the inadmissible for being violative of the following
hearsay rule which only prohibits a witness from rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence,
authentication, admissions, and res inter
testifying as to those facts which he merely learned from aliosacta;
other persons but not as to those facts which he “knows 3. Whether reliance on newspaper
of his own knowledge;that is, which are derived from his accounts is violative of the hearsay rule.
own perception. Hence, while the testimony of a witness
regarding a statement made by another person, if
It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary
intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the
to determine the state of mind of the petitioner
statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if on the issue of his resignation violates the rule
the purpose of placing the statement in the record is against the admission of hearsay rule.
merely to establish the fact that the statement was made
or the tenor of such statement.
Ruling: We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the
Angara Diary is not an out of court statement.
The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the
cases at bar. Even assuming arguendo that the the armed forces withdrew its support from him
Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still as president and commander-in-chief. Thus,
its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate
Evidence is called hearsay when its probative President Pimentel to advise petitioner to
force depends, in whole or in part, on the consider the option of ‘dignified exit or
competency and reliability of some persons other resignation.” Petitioner did not object to the
than the witness by whom it is sought to produce suggested option but simply said he could never
it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay leave the country. Petitioner’s silence on this and
evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) other related suggestions can be taken as an
absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence admission by him.
of oath. Not all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge
body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by Petitioner also contends that the use of
courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res
necessity. A complete analysis of any hearsay inter aliosacta. The rule is expressed in section
problem requires that we further determine 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: “The
whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect declaration or omission of another, except as
examination of our rules of exclusion will show hereinafter provided.” Again, petition errs in his
that they do not cover admissions of a party and contention. The res inter aliosacta rule has
the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section several exceptions. One of them is provided in
26 of Rule 130 provides that “the act, Section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions
declaration, or omission of a party as to a by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary
relevant fact may be given in evidence against Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner.
him.” It has long been settled that these Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an
admissions are admissible even if they are agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the
hearsay. principal (petitioner).
That Angara Diary contains direct Moreover the ban on hearsay evidence
statements of petitioners which can be does not cover independently relevant
categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal statements. These are statements which are
for a snap presidential election where he would relevant independently of whether they are true
not be a candidate; his statement that he only or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those
wanted the five-day period promised by chief of statements which are the very facts in issue, and
Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would (2) those statements which are circumstantial
leave by Monday if the second envelope would be evidence of the facts in issue. The second class
opened by Monday and “pagodnaPagodnaako. include the following:
Ayokona, masyadonangmasakit. Pagodnaakosa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga.” Statements of a person showing
his state of mind, that is his mental condition,
knowledge belief, intention, ill will and other
emotions;
It is however argued that the Angara Diary x x x
is not the Diary of petitioner, hence, non-binding
on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of statements of a person from
adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a which an inference may be made as to the state
party’s reaction to a statement or action by of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief,
another person when it is reasonable to treat the motive, good or bad faith, etc. og the latter;
party’s reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person. The basis
As afore discussed, the Angara Diary
for admissibility of admissions made vicariously
contains statements of the petitioner which
is that arising from the ratification or adoption by
reflects his state of mind and are circumstantial
the party of the statement which the other
evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains
person had made. In the Angara Diary, the
statements of Secretary Angara from which we
options of the petitioner started to dwindle when
can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to
resign. They are admissible and they are not victim was engaged in the performance of the functions
covered by the rule on hearsay. of his office, as governor of the Province of Iloilo, at the
time when the crime was committed, and the
commission of the crime not being marked by any
US vs. GIL extenuating circumstance, the accused was properly
convicted of the crime of assassination, and the penalty
FACTS: described by law was properly imposed in its maximum
degree. The sentence of death imposed by the trial court
In the information, it charges the accused the should, therefore, be, and is hereby, affirmed, with costs
crime of assassination with treachery and deliberate of this instance against the appellant.
premeditation. The accused on the 27th day of
December, 1907 entered the office of Governor Benito
Lopez in the Building located in the City of Ilo-ilo. That
few minutes after his entry, a gun shots was heard.
meanwhile, the Governor was found wounded and People vs. Sabio
brought to the hospital. after few days, the Governor
102 SCRA 218 (1981)
died because of the shots obtained. While in the
Hospital, he told the Fiscal who was then present at that Dying Declaration (Exception to Hearsay)
time the circumstances of his death. The accused on the
other hand has different version. That accordingly, he
entered the office of the Governor on that very day to
acquire license for his revolver however, the governor Facts: Catalino Espina, 80 years old and owner of a
instead insulted him. That after shouting to him that he sari-sari store in Cebu, was found on the second floor of
was a son of a whore, he was driven by a anger. that the his home, wounded on the forehead, from which injury
governor tried to take the revolver which resulted to his he died 3 days later. Prosecution witness Jesusa Birondo
injuries while forcibly taking it from the accused. testified that around 5am that day, as she was preparing
to go to the seashore, she heard cries for help coming
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dying declaration contrary to
the testimony of the accused be given weight. from Espina’s house. When she looked outside her
window, she saw the accused, Rodulfo Sabio
RULING: (nicknamed “Papu”) coming out of the door of the store
Dying declarations have always been regarded
of Espina’s house. Another witness, Camilo Semilla,
as an exception to the general rule rejecting hearsay grandnephew of the victim, who lived at the latter since
evidence, on the general principle, as laid down by Lord childhood, testified that he left the victim’s home at
Baron Eyre, "That they are declarations made in around 4am to go fishing. Sometime later, he observed
extremity, when the party is at that point of death, and Sabio from 6 meters away, running past him and towards
when every hope of this world is gone; when every his (Sabio’s) home. Semilla observed that Sabio had his
motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced hands tucked inside his shirt while running. Minutes
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. A later, a certain Enok Calledo arrived and told Semilla to
situation so solemn and so awful as to be considered by go home because his grand-uncle was crying for help.
the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is
When Semilla arrived, he saw Espina lying wounded
imposed by a positive oath in a court of justice." That the
declarant was conscious of his impending death, and
upstairs and the latter was only able to speak when his
that he spoke with the prospect of "almost immediate head was raised. Semilla also observed that the tin can
dissolution" confronting him; that he understood the (called a “barrio”) containing the cash sales of the store
meaning and effect of his statement; and that he knew amounting to around 8 pesos was lying empty on the
he was addressing the law officers of the town and floor.
province wherein he lived, and informing them as to the
circumstances which led up to his death, are facts which
we think are sufficiently established by the evidence of
Espina asked Semilla to call for the police and
record.
Patrolmen Fuentes and Burgos responded. Upon arrival,
It appearing from the evidence of record that the Fuentes asked Espina questions about his wounding and
accused was guilty, as charged, of unlawfully taking the wrote the answers on torn calendar page. According to
life of Benito Lopez, and that the crime was committed Fuentes, in response to his questions, Espina identified
with treachery (alevosía) and with deliberate Papu Sabio as his assailant, the latter having attacked
premeditation (premeditación conocida), and that his him after demanding money. Fuentes then had Espina
thumbmark this “ante-mortem statement” with his own circumstances: the seriousness of injury to the victim’s
blood, there being no ink available. Fuentes and Burgos forehead, the profuse bleeding, the inability to speak
signed as witnesses. Espina was then brought to the unless his head was raised, the spontaneous answers to
hospital where he died 3 days later due to his head Fuentes’ questions, his subsequent demise from the
wounds. wounds. The fact that death did not ensue until 3 days
later does not alter its probative force since it is not an
indispensable requirement that the declarant expire
In his defense, Sabio testified that at the time of immediately after. It is the belief in impending death and
the supposed robbery and homicide, he was asleep at not the rapid succession of death in point of fact, that
home. Sabio also presented a certain Jacinto Mendez renders the dying declaration admissible.
who testified that he slept at the home of the accused the
night before and corroborated Sabio’s presence therein.
Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew to
fetch the police does not negative the victim’s feeling of
The RTC found Sabio guilty of Robbery with hopelessness of recovery. Rather, it emphasizes the
Homicide and sentenced him to death. realization that he had little time to disclose his assailant
to the authorities.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the RTC correctly convicted
Sabio of robbery with homicide. People vs. Toledo
2. Whether or not the Ante-mortem Statement of 51 PHIL 825 (1928)
Espina is admissible as evidence against Sabio
Declaration Against Interest (Exception to Hearsay)
Ruling:
Facts: Sisenado Holgado and Filomeno Morales had a
1. The Supreme Court ruled that only the crime of
dispute over parcels of land located in Pinamalayan,
homicide had been committed and sentenced him to 12-
Mindoro. One morning, the 2 men happened to me and
20 years of imprisonment. The evidence in support of
their argument was renewed. They agreed to engage in
robbery is circumstantial at best and does not establish
a bolo duel which resulted in the death of Morales.
beyond a reasonable doubt that Sabio had carried away Holgado, however, was seriously wounded and fled to
the money contained in the tin can. The consummation the neighboring house of Dalmacio Manlisic. He then
of robbery cannot be presumed from the circumstance proceeded to the municipal building where he made a
that the accused was seen running with his hands inside sworn statement before the municipal president that only
his shirt or that the tin can allegedly contained 8 pesos or there were the only 2 persons who fought. A month later,
that the house was in disarray. Holgado died of his wounds.
Nor can the dying declaration be admitted to

establish the robbery (part of which read: “Q: Who The querida of Morales, Justina Villanueva,
slashed and robbed you? A: Rodulfo Sabio”). The testified however that appellant Eugenio Toledo, one of
Holgado’s workers had intervened in the fight and dealt
admission of dying declarations has always been strictly
a mortal blow to Morales. Her testimony was partially
limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder, corroborated by a certain Justina Llave. Toledo denied
as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances having participated in the fight and stated that his only
of death. involvement was having met Holgado after the fight and
helping him get to the Manlisic residence. Toledo’s
counsel presented Exhibit 1, the affidavit of Holgado
2. The Ante-mortem Statement is admissible made at the municipal building after the fight. This
versus Sabio. The arguments of the defense are Exhibit however was ruled to be hearsay evidence and
hence, inadmissible.
unavailing. That the victim was under the consciousness
of impending death is strengthened by the following
Toledo was convicted of homicide by the trial Facts: Julieto Malaspina, together with his 3 friends,
court, which is the subject of this appeal. The counsel of was attending a benefit dance in Agusan Del Sur.
Toledo contends that Exhibit 1 should have been Appellant Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. called Malaspina, put
admitted into evidence. his arm around his shoulder, saying: “Before, I saw you
Issue: Whether or not the affidavit of the deceased with long hair but now you have short hair.” He then
Holgado is admissible as evidence. stabbed Malaspina with a hunting knife and fled. Before
Malaspina succumbed, he told his 3 companions that it
Ruling: The conviction is reversed and Toledo
was Alejandro Fuentes who stabbed him.
acquitted. The trial court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1
as a statement of fact against penal interest and had it
been received, its influence would have been felt by the
trial court. Alejandro was charged with murder qualified by
treachery. His defense was that of mistaken identity. He
Hearsay evidence is generally excluded by the courts.
claimed that it was actually his cousin, Zoilo Fuentes,
One of the recognized exceptions has been the
declarations of third parties contrary to their pecuniary or
Jr., alias “Jonie” who was the killer. He presented as
proprietary interest. Traditionally, this exception has evidence the testimony of his uncle, Felicisimo Fuentes.
been made only to apply to admissions against a Felicisimo testified that Zoilo had confessed to the
pecuniary or proprietary interest but not a penal interest. killing of Malaspina and even sought help in finding a
The Court however fails to see why a man will be lawyer. He further stated that upon learning of
presumed to tell the truth in the former instances and not Alejandro’s arrest, Zoilo immediately fled and could not
the latter. To limit the exception to statements against be found. Alejandro also presented the testimony of one
pecuniary interests and not criminal liability cannot be Station Commander P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde. The latter
justified on grounds of public policy. testified that after Alejandro was charged with murder,
The purpose of evidence is to get the truth. The reason Felicisimo approached him and relayed the confession of
for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial statements of Zoilo. Conde then personally went to the alleged home
another are not the best way of serving this purpose. In of Zoilo but he was informed that he had already fled.
other words, the great possibility of fabrication and
falsehood and the inability to prove such untruths
requires the doors to be closed to such evidence. So
The trial court convicted Alejandro of murder
long therefore as the declarant is available, his
extrajudicial statement should not be heard. which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Alejandro
appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower
courts erred in ruling that he was positively identified as
Where however, the declarant is dead or has the killer.
disappeared, his previous out-of-court statements are
the best evidence, if not inadmissible on other grounds.
But they cannot be rendered inadmissible by the mere Issue: Whether or not Alejandro Fuentes was indeed
fact that the declarant is unavailable. One fact that will positively identified as the killer of Malaspina.
satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was
against the declarant’s interest and this is because no
sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his
own detriment. Ruling: The conviction of Fuentes is affirmed.
It is true that declarations against interest are an

Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals exception to the hearsay rule. There are 3 essential
requisites for this exception: (a) that the declarant must
253 SCRA 430 (1996) not be able to testify; (b) that the declaration must
concern a matter of fact cognizable by the declarant; (c)
Declaration Against Interest (Exception to that the circumstances render it improbable that a motive
Hearsay) to falsify existed.
In this case, the alleged declaration against interest Gravador. They stated that Gravador’s true birth date is
attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an December 11, 1901.
exception to hearsay. The holding of the Court in People
vs. Toledo is inapplicable here. For all its attempts to
demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the traditional The Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
rejection of declarations against penal interest, the ruled that Gravador was born on December 11, 1901
Toledo case is remarkably different from the instant and ordered his reinstatement, back salaries and
damages amounting to P52,400. Respondent Eutiquio
case. First, Zoilo is the cousin of the accused and
Mamigo, the District Supervisor, appealed directly to the
Felicisimo is his uncle. The alleged confession is
Supreme Court. Mamigo contends that it was error on
patently untrustworthy because these two have every the part of the trial court to rely solely on post-war
motive to prevaricate. Second, the admission of such a records to determine petitioner’s true date of birth.
statement would be shocking to the sense of justice. According to respondent, these records were only
Assuming that Alejandro is acquitted and Zoilo manufactured since it was believed that the original pre-
subsequently captured and put to trial, there is nothing to war records had been lost or destroyed.
prevent the latter from repudiating the statement.
Legally, Zoilo cannot be bound to such a statement.
Third and most importantly, it has not been Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly relied on
demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no post-war records.
showing that he is either dead, mentally incapacitated or
physically incompetent. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable Ruling: Yes. The trial court committed no error in relying
under this Rule. The records show that the defense did on post-war records that reflected Gravador’s birth date
not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a as December 11, 1901.
witness. Indeed, an innocent declaration by the real
culprit should be admissible as evidence. But this can be
open to abuse as when the extrajudicial statement is not Although a person can have no personal
even authenticated, thereby increasing the probability of knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to
his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives
its fabrication. For this case, at least, the prudent course
and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family
is its exclusion. tradition. In his application for back pay filed with the
Department of Finance and when he asked the GSIS
and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of
Gravador v. Mamigo his birth, he repeatedly asserted that his birthday was on
December 11, 1901.
20 SCRA 742 (1967)
Pedigree
In the second place, the import of the
Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal declaration of petitioner’s brother, contained in a verified
of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, pleading in a cadastral survey way back in 1924, to the
Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not
advised by the Superintendent of Schools Angel be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased
Salazar, Jr., through Teodulfo Dayao, of his separation relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding
from the service on the ground that he had reached the pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section
compulsory retirement age of 65. The latter’s findings 33 (now section 39) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
were based on pre-war records which included
Gravador’s Employee’s Record Card that stated that he Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the
was born on November 26, 1897 (He was thus 66 years, date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of
8 months and 22 days old on record). family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem
motam of a deceased relative.
In a letter dated August 31, 1964, the petitioner
protested his forced retirement on the ground that the
date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December
11, 1901. Attached to this letter was the affidavit of
Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro Sienes who were their
Tison v. Court of Appeals
neighbors even during the lifetime of the parents of
276 SCRA 582 (1997) Code. The Trial Court granted the demurrer and
Pedigree dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the TC
ruling.
Facts: It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and
Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of the deceased
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. Teodora died on March 5,
1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was Issue: Whether or not petitioners failed to prove to
survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and establish their legitimacy and filiation to the deceased
herein petitioners. Hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Guerrero with evidence merely consisting of
Teodora Guerrero by right of representation. Upon the several documents and the testimony of Corazon Tison.
death of his wife, Martin executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating to himself,
allegedly as sole heir, a parcel of land with a house and Held: Yes. They have proved their filiation. TC and CA
apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, ruling are reversed and set aside.
Quezon City. On January 2, 1988, Martin sold the lot to
herein private respondent Teodora Domingo.
It is not debatable that the documentary evidence
adduced by petitioners, taken separately and
Martin Guerrero died on October 1988. independently of each other, are not per se sufficient
proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. However, both
Subsequently, petitioners filed for an action for courts failed to recognize the presumption of legitimacy.
There is no presumption more firmly established and
reconveyance claiming that they have a right to founded on sounder morality and reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are
inherit one half of the property. During the pre-trial
legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally as in an action
hearing, Corazon Tison was presented as the lone
for reconveyance. The presumption consequently
witness and she offered the following evidence to continues to operate in favor of petitioners.
prove their filiation to their father and their aunt:

The primary proof to be considered in
baptismal certificates, death certificates, and ascertaining the relationship between the parties is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
certificates of destroyed records of births of Teodora Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime
in 1946, categorically declared that the former is
Dezoller and their father Hermogenes Dezoller, a Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an
family picture, affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
exception to the hearsay rule under Section 39, Rule 130
Meliton Sitjar, marriage certificates of Martin and of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
Teodora, among other documents shown. Tison also testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person
whose pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that such
testified as to her filiation Tedorora. Private relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration be made ante
respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the litem moam, that is, not only before the commencement
of the suit involving the subject matter of the
ground that petitioners failed to prove their declaration, but before any controversy has arisen
thereon.
legitimate filiation under Article 172 of the Family
There is no dispute as the first, second and The defendants presented an entry in the
fourth requirements. As to the third requirement, where notebook of Ramon Viademonte Jr. which showed
the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative that true name of Rosa Matilde Viademonte was Rosa
common to both claimant and declarant – not from the Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents in
declarant himself or the declarant’s estate – the September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may the plaintiff, Joaquin de Inchausti testified that one
not be proved by the declaration itself, but this day he was assured by his half brother Ramon
requirement does not apply where it is sought to reach Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his
the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to sister but a mere protégée and that her true name
was Rosa Matilde Robles and that on occasion the
establish a right through his declarations to the property
said brother showed him the certificate of birth of
of some other member of the family. Where a party
which Exhibit 6 is a copy, which he took from the
claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant,
parochial church.
the declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such
relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
Issue: Whether or not Joaquin de Inchausti’s
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such
testimony and the diary accounts of Ramon
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
Viademonte Jr. are admissible to prove the filiation of
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of Rosa Matilde Viademonte to Isabel Gonzales
justice.
Ruling: Yes.Evidence adduced at the trial to prove
the origin of the cause of action shows, in a manner
Ferrer v. De Inchausti which leaves no room for doubt, that Rosa was not a
legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales and it follows
38 Phil. 905 (1918) that her children have no right to a part of the
hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.
Family Tradition & Common Reputation
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is
Facts: Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer
now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti
filed a complaint praying for a declaration that Rosa
referring to the said deceased is admissible as
Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs herein,
evidence of family tradition, for they are members of
had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by
the same family and consequently the conclusion is
Isabel Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity
that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles
as the other four children of the latter namely, Ramon,
mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in
Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. The plaintiffs allege that
1952, in no manner could she be a legitimate
they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa Viademonte
daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel Gonzales,
and are entitled to receive the latter’s share, that is,
whose marriage was dissolved 1n 1936 by the death
one-fifth of the estate left by Isabel Gonzales. They
of the husband
allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez
Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the fruit
of their relationship. Isabel was then married Jose
Joaquin de Inchausti, father of defendants herein. In Re Mallare, A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974
Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish Facts

that Rosa Matilde Viademonte has been treated and
considered as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that Mallare’s father Esteban was the illegitimate child of
a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, and believed
on one occasion, the said Gonzales remarked that the
himself to be Chinese. Mallare became a lawyer, but his
father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez de admission to the bar was revoked because his
Viademonte. Also, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti citizenship was questionable.
dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following manner:
“To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa.” College Issue
records of the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were
shown to use establish filiation. Is Mallare a Filipino citizen?
Whether the declaration that a person was reputedly
born out of wedlock is admissible evidence of
illegitimacy.
Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to

Ruling the city. This particular testimony is at variance with the
testimonies of Wison and Timoteo who testified that the
The Supreme Court reversed the revocation after finding
that Esteban was a Filipino because his mother was not land belonged to the Central Government (not the city).
married to his Chinese father. Furthermore, when His testimony was based on what he had learned from
Mallare came of age, he registered as a voter and the oldest residents of that section of the city and was
exercised his right of suffrage. The Court considered introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the
these acts to be enough to show that Mallare had purpose of proving that the city was generally
elected Filipino citizenship, without needing any formal
considered the owner of the land drawing from this fact
declaration on his part.
the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11,
SCRA section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure (now
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court).
Civil procedure; Evidence; Declaration that a person
was reputedly born out of wedlock admissible evidence
of illegitimacy.—The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon,
who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Villegas is
residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, admissible as proof of “common reputation.”
were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a
Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and
that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of Ruling: No. Villegas testimony is merely hearsay.
wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible
evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare.
Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of
age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of Since it consisted of what he had learned from some of
whether a child was born alive. Unlike that of matters of the old residents of Manila, it was hearsay as to the court
pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed since those who said it were not produced. Such
from persons who are members of the family—the testimony does not constitute the “common reputation”
reason for the distinction is the public interest that is referred to in the section mentioned. “Common
taken in the question of the existence of marital reputation” as used in that section, is equivalent to
relations. The principle could not have been more true
universal reputation. The testimony of Villegas is not
than in a Philippine rural community where relationships
sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.
not in conformity with established conventions become
the subject of criticisms and public censure. Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle
Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality
and the Central Government, share and share alike, and
that the Central Government (not the city) retained
City of Manila v. Del Rosario
Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are
5 Phil. 227 (1905) precisely the streets on which the property abuts.
Common Reputation
People vs. Putian
Facts: This is action to recover possession of two 74 SCRA 133 (1976)

parcels of land located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona,
Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Res Gestae
district of Tondo, filed by the City of Manila against its
present occupant, Jacinto del Rosario. The plaintiff
introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the
latter consisted of the testimony John Wilson, Eduardo CFI convicting the accused of murdering
Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera Roco, Lorenzo del TeoduloPanimdim. On November 22, 1969, while
Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. the victim was attending a dance, he was
stabbed in the left groin. As a result, he died five
days later. Putian was charged and convicted of
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that murder on the basis of the testimony of the
doctor who treated the victim and of the
the land in question was formerly included in the Gran
policeman who arrested the accused and seized Putian, however, was convicted only of
from him the dagger allegedly used in the homicide since treachery was not proven.
stabbing and who took down the victim’s ante-
mortem statement identifying the accused as the
assailant. The trial court regarded the victim’s
ante-mortem statement as part of the res gestae
and not as a dying declaration since it was not
People vs. Lungayan
made under the consciousness of an impending
death. The victim was even able to go home after
the medical treatment without any assistance. 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
The appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling
that the statement be made part of the res Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Res Gestae
gestae because it was not spontaneous, being
made several hours after the incident. He claims
that the requisite that the declarant gave the
statement before he had time to devise or Facts: This appeal from the decision of the RTC arose
contrive was not present in this case. due to the complaint filed by Agripina Juan Vda. De
Garzota, then 52 years old and widow, charging the
accused of rape. At about 10 in the evening of
January 20, 1980, the complainant was already
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in
asleep inside the room at their market stall when the
ruling that the statement be made part of the res
accused, who was then the barangay captain,
gestae.
awakened her by entering her room after one of her
children opened the door for him. He invited her to
join him to observe the persons drinking wine in the
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the market because they are in violation of a barangay
trial court did not err in characterizing ordinance prohibiting drinking after 10 pm. She
Panimdim’s statement as part of the res gestae consented. While they were standing two meters
and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that away from the open door of the canteen, the accused
Putian is guilty of stabbing the victim. suddenly grabbed both of her hands and allegedly
pointed a gun at her after she shouted loudly (only
once). The accused then pulled her and she fell
hitting her head on the ground. When she regained
The res gestae rule embraces (a)
consciousness, she was dragged to a banana grove
spontaneous declarations and (b) verbal acts.
where she was allegedly raped which lasted for less
Panimdim’s statement was a spontaneous
than an hour. She only reached home at about 12
statement made after the commission of the
midnight and one of her daughters asked her what
felony. Although a declaration does not appear to
happened. She revealed that the accused abused her
have been made by the declarant under the
and when pressed for details, she just said that she
expectation of a sure and impending death, and, will just tell everything in the morning. She told her as
for the reason, is not admissible as a dying such and they then reported the incident. She was
declaration, yet if such declaration was made at also submitted for to a medical examination. Based
the time of, or immediately thereafter, the on the evidence presented, the accused was
commission of the crime, or at a time when the convicted. By way of rebuttal during appeal, the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence still accused emphasized the failure of the prosecution to
continued in the declarant’s mind, it is admissible establish involuntariness on the part of the victim.
as part of the res gestae.
Panimdim’sstaetement was given Issues:

sometime after the stabbing while he was
undergoing treatment at a medical clinic. He had 1. Whether or not the prosecution failed to
no time to concoct a falsehood or fabricate a establish the involuntariness of the victim.
malicious charge again Putian. No motive has
been shown as to why he would frame up Putian. 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in
considering the revelation of the complainant to her
daughter of what happened to her as part of the res tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and
gestae. Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in
Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to
Bali, it was again dishonored for the
reason that his card was blacklisted by
Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to
buy the tickets in cash.6 He further
claims that his humiliation caused by the
Ruling: denial of his card was aggravated when
Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlerstrying
1. Yes. The prosecution failed. The to use blacklisted cards.7 Aznar and his
circumstances of the case militated against the claim group returned to the Philippines.
of the complainant that force and intimidation was
employed by the accused. She should have declined Aznar filed a complaint for damages
the invitation. Going out alone with a man late in the
evening is not good taste nor safe. She was also not
against Citibank. To prove that Citibank
discreet because she did not even put any blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar
underwear. She also only shouted for help once when presented a computer print-out,
she could have done more and just ran. She also denominated as ON-LINE
offered no resistance nor struggle making the AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
consummation last for almost an hour. ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by
Ingtan Agency (Exh. “G”) with the
2. Yes. The RTC erred in considering the
signature of one VictrinaElnadoNubi
revelation as part of the res gestae. The Court
(Nubi)11 which shows that his card in
stressed that in order for the statement to be part of
the res gestae, it must not only be spontaneous but question was “DECL OVERLIMIT” or
also be made at a time when there was no declared over the limit.12
opportunity to concoct or develop a story. As the
Court observed, she did not go home immediately
after the incident. She took a walk and spent
sometime thinking of what to do. She had enough HELD: Aznar next invokes Section 43 of
time to make a decision of what will be the nature of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
her story. pertains to entries in the course of
business, to support Exh. “G.” Said
provision reads:
AZNAR V CITIBANK Sec. 43. Entries in the course of
business.—Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they
Emmanuel B. Aznar), a known refer, by a person deceased or unable to
businessman2 in Cebu, is a holder of a testify, who was in a position to know the
Preferred Master Credit Card. As he and facts therein stated, may be received
his wife, planned to take their two as prima facie evidence, if such person
grandchildren, , on an Asian tour, Aznar made the entries in his professional
made a total advance deposit of capacity or in the performance of duty
P485,000.00 with Citibank with the and in the ordinary or regular course of
intention of increasing his credit limit to business or duty.
P635,000.00.3 Under this rule, however, the following
conditions are required:
Aznar claims that when he presented
his Mastercard in some establishments in “1.the person who made the entry must be
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the dead, or unable to testify;
same was not honored.5 And when he
2.the entries were made at or near the time NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
of the transactions to which they refer; vs.
FY SONS, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
3.the entrant was in a position to know the
facts stated in the entries; Facts:
4.the entries were made in his professional Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the
capacity or in the performance of a duty, manufacture and distribution of all Nestle products
whether legal, contractual, moral or nationwide. Respondent, on the other hand, is a
religious; and corporation engaged in trading, marketing, selling and
distributing food items to restaurants and food service
5.the entries were made in the ordinary or outlets. On December 23, 1998, petitioner and
regular course of business or duty.”47 respondent entered into a distributorship agreement
(agreement) whereby petitioner would supply its
products for respondent to distribute to its food
service outlets. A deed of assignment was also
there appears on the computer print-out executed by respondent in favor of petitioner on
December 13, 1988, assigning the time deposit of a
the name of a certain certain CalixtoLaureano in the amount of P500,000 to
“VictrinaElnadoNubi” and a signature secure respondent’s credit purchases from petitioner.
purportedly belonging to her, and at the A special power of attorney was likewise executed by
left dorsal side were handwritten the Laureano authorizing the respondent to use the time
words “Sorry for the delay since the deposit as collateral.
records had to be retrieved. Regards.
Darryl Mario.” It is not clear therefore if it Respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner, alleging bad faith.
was Nubi who encoded the information
stated in the print-out and was the one HEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
who printed the same. The handwritten hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
annotation signed by a certain Darryl the defendant ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
Mario even suggests that it was Mario the following:
who printed the same and only handed
the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the 1. The amount of P1,000,000.00 as actual
entrant, required by the provision above damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason
of the unwarranted and illegal acts of the
mentioned, was therefore not
defendant in terminating the distributorship
established. Neither did petitioner agreement;
establish in what professional capacity
did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or 2. The amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary
whether the entries were made in the damages;
performance of their duty in the ordinary
or regular course of business or duty. 3. The amount of P100,000.00 as attorney’s
And even if Exh. “G” is admitted as fees;
evidence, it only shows that the use of
the credit card of petitioner was denied The plaintiff however, is hereby ordered to pay the
defendant the amount of P53,214,26 (sic) which
because it was already over the limit. amount has been established as the amount the
There is no allegation in the Complaint or defendant is entitled from the plaintiff.
evidence to show that there was gross
negligence on the part of Citibank in Appealed to CA
declaring that the credit card has been
used over the limit. Issue:
Held: Facts:
Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the

Petitioner contends that the testimony of Rayos was
store of Spouses Leones in La Union where she also
an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 43,
resided. The accused, Joseph Leones, was a member of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:14
the Leones family. One day, all the members of the
Dulay family went for a picnic. When the accused and
her sister went back to the house, they saw the condition
of Irene, who was then feeling very dizzy. The accused
Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, tried to give Irene medicine but the later refused so he
or near the time of the transactions to which they forced her to drink it. After drinking the medicine, Irene
refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who felt more dizzy. The accused took advantage of Irene’s
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may condition and succeeded in raping her. The stepmother
be received as prima facie evidence, if such person of the accused found Irene without any panty and
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the brought her to the hospital where she was examined by
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular a doctor.
course of business or duty.1avvphil.net
The medical examination conducted by Dr. Cayao

revealed the following
Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
1. healing lacerations of the hyment at 2 o’clock
and 10 o’clock
2. smear exam for sperm cell negative
The provision does not apply to this case because it 3. easily admit one finger with pain
does not involve entries made in the course of
business. Rayos testified on a statement of account Thereafter, the case for rape was filed against the
she prepared on the basis of invoices and delivery accused. The accused denied the charge imputed to him
orders which she, however, knew nothing about. She and set up the defense of alibi claiming that he was at
had no personal knowledge of the facts on which the the beach with his family at the time the alleged incident
accounts were based since, admittedly, she was not happened.
involved in the delivery of goods and was merely in
charge of the records and documents of all accounts
receivable as part of her duties as credit and
collection manager.15 She thus knew nothing of the RTC ruled that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
truth or falsity of the facts stated in the invoices and doubt of having committed the crime of rape and was
delivery orders, i.e., whether such deliveries were in sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. Hence the direct
fact made in the amounts and on the dates stated, or appeal to the SC.
whether they were actually received by respondent.
She was not even the credit and collection manager
during the period the agreement was in effect.16 This Issue/s:
can only mean that she merely obtained these
documents from another without any personal Whether or not the evidentiary value of the medical
knowledge of their contents. record presented by the government is sufficient to
warrant conviction
The foregoing shows that Rayos was incompetent to
testify on whether or not the invoices and delivery
orders turned over to her correctly reflected the Held:
details of the deliveries made. Thus, the CA correctly
disregarded her testimony. 1. No. Supreme Court ruled for the acquittal of the
accused. The clinical case record of Irene’s admission
and confinement at the hospital contain entries which
totally and completely belie the claim of the complainant
People vs. Leones that she was raped by the accused. The entry in the
medical record of Irene stated VAGINAL BLEEDING –
117 SCRA 382 (1982) HEALING LACERATED WIDE AT 2 o’clock and 10 o’
Official Records clock hymen. Assuming that the victim was raped
between 2 and 3 pm. Then the lacerations of the hymen accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with "Ramon
at 2 o’clock and 10 o’clock would not have been Doe" on the other. The fight was eventually broken up
described and indicated to be HEALING in the clinical when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and
case record. It would be described as LACERATION Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no
FLESH.
time were back with bladed weapons. They approached
Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and
simultaneously stabbed him, after which the assailants
The findings of healing laceration clearly indicates that
ran towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the
the defloration occurred SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE,
ground. He was then brought to Mary Johnson Hospital
which may have happened when Irene took a week-long
vacation to her hometown in Pugo La Union. where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The written entries in the clinical case record showing The accused on the other hand has a different
the date of her admission the hospital and her complaint version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog
of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of “healing attempted to box him but he parried his blow; Tonog
lacerated wide at 2 o’clock and 10 o’clock hymen” are continued walking but when he chanced upon Ramon he
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the said suddenly and without provocation boxed and kicked
entries having been made in official records by public Ramon; Ramon fought back but was subdued by his
officer of the Philippines in the performance of his duty
bigger assailant so the former ran towards the highway;
especially enjoined by law which is that of a physician in
when Tonog met a certain "Mando" he boxed the latter
a government hospital. [ Rule 130 sec. 38, Rules of
Court] who however fought back despite his (accused) warning
not to; at this moment he saw Ramon return with a bolo
on hand; he warned Ramon not to fight but his advice
The court also found that Irene never complained of went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand Ramon
being rape but that her vaginal bleeding was caused by struck Tonog on the belly; when "Mando" saw what
her menstruation. The court also observed that it is quite happened he ("Mando") pulled out his knife and also
abnormal and unheard of in human experience and stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon and "Mando" then
behavior that a man would have sexual intercourse with fled towards the highway.
a woman having her menstrual period.
The lower court did not believe the accused’s

The court acquitted the accused after it concluded that version and instead convicted him based on the
the evidence produced by the prosecution were not testimony of two prosecution witnesses Brenda Gonzales
persuasive to establish the guilt beyond reasonable
and Pio Ochobillo.
doubt of the accused.
Issue/s:
People vs. San Gabriel 1. Whether or not the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses are incredible and conflicting.
253 SCRA 84 (1996) 2. Whether or not the Advance Information
Sheet did not mention him at all and named only
Entries in the Official Record "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. In relation
thereto, was the Advance Information Sheet an
exception to hearsay rule, being entries made in the
official records?
Facts:
Held:
The evidence shows that on 26 November 1989,
at the vicinity of the North Harbor, Manila, a fistfight 1. No. RTC Decision was affirmed. Gonzales and
ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the Ochobillo testified in a direct and candid manner.
The court was not convinced that Gonzales would performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are
testify against accused-appellant for a crime so grave prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. But
simply because he owed her a measly sum of to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites
P300.00. Furthermore, the accused did not offer any must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
information regarding the person and circumstances officer or by another person specially enjoined by
of "Mando." Up to this date "Mando" remains a law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in
myth. Not a single witness was presented by the the performance of his duties or by such other
defense to prove who "Mando" was, nor even a hint person in the performance of a duty specially
of his personal circumstances. During the entire enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other
proceedings in the court below "Mando"was never person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
mentioned by the prosecution witnesses. Nobody stated, which must have been acquired by him
ever implicated him except the accused. personally or through official information.
2. Yes. As regards the Advance information sheet, The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute
which did not mention San Gabriel at all and named an exception to the hearsay rule, hence,
only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the
Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and document had no sufficient and personal knowledge
candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed
Entries in official records, as in the case of a police by him was acquired from Camba which therefore
blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts could not be categorized as official information
therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in because in order to be classified as such the persons
the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full who made the statements not only must have
credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have
sometimes from either partial suggestions or for the duty to give such statements for the record. In
want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to
which the witness may be unable to recall the give such statements. Hence, conviction was
connected collateral circumstances necessary for the affirmed.
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and
for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the
subject. It is understandable that the testimony
during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed
Tan vs. Court of Appeals
than the matters stated in the police blotter.
Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was 20 SCRA 54 (1967)
never formally offered by the defense during the
Prior Testimony
proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance
by the accused on the document must fail since the
court cannot consider any evidence, which has not
been formally offered. Facts:
Petitioners Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan
through their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad
Furthermore, the Advance Information Sheet was litem sued respondent Francisco Tan for
prepared by the police officer only after interviewing acknowledgment and support. However, after
Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then petitioners have presented their evidence, Celestina
could have compelled the attendance of Camba as a moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to parties have come to an amicable settlement and
present Camba on the part of the accused should prayed that the same be dismissed. She also
militate against his cause. subscribed to an affidavit stating that Tan “is not the
father of my said minor children named Carmelita and
Rodolfo but another person whose name I cannot
Entries in official records made in the performance divulge” and that she prepared said affidavit “to record
of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the
what is true and correct what misinterpretation may several children. Daldo by her own admission, had
arise in the future.” been a nursemaid (yaya) in the respondent’s
residence but for a short period of not less than one
year. Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo
RTC issued an order stating that dismissal of on September 11, 1944. The validity of the testimony
action with prejudice based on the ground that the of petitioner’s witnesses was downgraded by the
parties have already come to an amicable settlement affidavit of Celestina. In such affidavit, Daldo deposed
with the conformity of counsel. that petitioners were not fathered by Tan but by
another person whose name she could not divulge.
SC affirmed judgment of CA.
One year and eight months after dismissal of
the case, petitioners through their maternal
grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem MANLICLIC v. CALAUNAN
filed action for acknowledgment and support involving
the same parties, cause of action and subject matter. FACTS:Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner
RTC dismissed the case based on res judicata. Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-type jeep owned by
Petitioner moved to reconsider. RTC reconsidered respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
previous decision and declared petitioners to be the Mendoza.the two vehicles collided. The front right side of
illegitimate children of defendant and ordered the him the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right
to support minors in the amount of P200 a month, to
and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
be paid directly to Carmelita for herself and her extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and
younger brother, additional amount of P300 semi- stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
annually for matriculation expenses, and reimburse
Servillano P2,000 as his expenses in supporting By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed
petitioners as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently
Tan appealed to the CA, which reversed RTC on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for
decision and dismissed the complaint. damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.
Counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of

stenographic notes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in
ISSUE:
the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
1. Whether or not the testimonies made by available to testify in the civil case.
petitioner’s witnesses in the former case may be
admissible as evidence under Section 41 of Rule 130. ISSUE: WON the transcripts may be admitted in
evidence.
HELD: HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing

the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, 18Marcelo
1. No. The witnesses are available. They are Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be
not dead nor are they outside the Philippines. They admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply
just refused to testify. Thus, they do not come within with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
the legal purview of those “unable to testify.” of Court.
Petitioners also failed to avail court remedies to
secure their attendance. For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or
unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was
Petitioners tried to prove that Daldo and Tan
given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
lived together as husband and wife for more than 8 administrative, between the same parties or those
years. Carmelita and Rodolfo were allegedly fruits of representing the same interests; (c) the former case
such cohabitation. Respondent denies such and involved the same subject as that in the present case,
alleges that he is very much a married man with although on different causes of action; (d) the issue
testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony
party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in of Ganiban would be unfair.
the former case.22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of

all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a testimony
given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not People vs. Adoviso
being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no 309 SCRA 1 (1999)
opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said
case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against Opinion Rule
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The
cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not
parties to the criminal cases instituted against their Facts:
employees.23
At around 8:00 in the evening, Emeterio
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a Vasquez was preparing coffee as his wife was about to
party in said criminal case, the testimonies of the three retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already
witnesses are still admissible on the ground that gone to sleep in the papag. The wife has just finished
petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility. spreading the sleeping mats when she heard several
gunshots. Emeterio uttered that he was shot. Bonifacio,
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the
the spouses’ son, upon hearing the shots rushed to his
time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered
in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as parent’s house. He hid himself at dark portion a few
waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege meters from the house and saw Rufino being shot. He
which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to recognized Pablo Adoviso as one of the assailants. After
the evidence because it does not conform to the statute the assailants left, Bonifacio went to the municipal
is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming building to fetch a police inspector, brought the cop to
ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure the scene of the crime, and together, they took Emeterio
to object thereto, the same may be admitted and and Rufino to the hospital. Unfortunately, both did not
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein make it to the hospital alive.
asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient
to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be
considered and given the importance it deserves.25 Adoviso was charged with murder. He put up
alibi as defense. He claimed that he was at another place
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the drinking when the murder took place. He also offered in
TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent evidence the testimony a NBI polygraph examiner who
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in conducted a polygraph test on him. The report of the
the criminal case when the same were offered in examiner opined that Adoviso‘s polygram revealed that
evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the
“there were no specific reactions indicative of deception
testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by
both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even to pertinent questions relevant to the investigation of the
offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of crime.”
DonatoGaniban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI
argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s
witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in
the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the The trial court found Adoviso guilty.
testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal
case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its
cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the Issue/s:
testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the
criminal case should not be admitted and at the same 1. Whether or not the negative results of the
time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness polygraph test should be given weight to absolve the
for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow
accused of the crime.
admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
the foreclosure is void since she never voluntarily

executed the mortgage or surety agreement,
Held: never appeared before the notary public, never
received any proceeds from the loan, and was
1. The Supreme Court still found Adoviso
never a business associate of Kipte; Emmanuel’s
guilty. common-law wife, LudivinaRinnoces, asked
Avelina to sign some documents allegedly
pertaining to a loan from one Cerila de Leon;
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument Avelina signed these documents without reading
that simultaneously measures and records certain the same, as she is blind, and without knowing
physiological changes in the human body that are the contents thereof; allegedly to pay the account
believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee’s to Cerila; again, Avelina was not able to read or
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory know the contents of these documents.
behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person
who lies deliberately will have a rising blod pressure and
subconscious block in breathing which will be recored ISSUE: Whether opinion of expert witness
on the graph. However, American Courts almost necessary?
uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when
offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the HELD: NO!! Expert Witnesses; Blindness; The
guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whther the rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert
accused or the prosecutor seeks its introduction, for the witnesses applies only to such matters clearly
reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific within the domain of medical science, and not to
acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of matters that are within the common knowledge
ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different of mankind which may be testified to by anyone
in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Daniel, stating familiar with the facts; To prove whether one is
blind, it is not necessary to submit a medical
that much faith and credit must not be vested upon the
certificate attesting to the blindness or to require
lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this
an expert witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to
case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should
testify to such fact, since the fact of blindness
not apply to him.
can be determined through common knowledge
and by anyone with sufficient familiarity of such
fact.—The rule of evidence requiring the opinion
CHINA BANKING V CA of expert witnesses applies only to such matters
clearly within the domain of medical science, and
not to matters that are within the common
FACTS: The deceased AvelinaVda. de Piñero knowledge of mankind which may be testified to
(Avelina), herein respondents’ predecessor-in- by anyone familiar with the facts. Thus, to prove
interest, was the registered owner of two whether one is blind, it is not necessary to submit
adjoining parcels of land with improvements. a medical certificate attesting to the blindness or
Alfonso Kipte obtained a P1,200,000.00 loan from to require an expert witness, such as an
petitioner, secured by a promissory note and a ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, since the
real estate mortgage signed by Avelina over her fact of blindness can be determined through
properties. The mortgage was annotated on the common knowledge and by anyone with
titles. The loan was also secured by a surety sufficient familiarity of such fact. In this case,
agreement signed by Kipte as principal and by Avelina, then alive during the trial of the case,
Avelina as surety. Due to Kipte’s failure to pay his categorically testified and attested to her own
indebtedness, the mortgaged properties were blindness, a fact which even the trial court noted.
foreclosed and auction sale was scheduled. Thus,
Avelina and respondent Emmanuel Piñero filed
the complaint with the RTC, with Avelina denying THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
having signed the documents. vs.
SANTIAGO PINEDA
FACTS:
This appeal requires a construction and an and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose
application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and
the Pharmacy Law. to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more
than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in
Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is
pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be
store located at Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, established. It has been said that there is no better
city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some evidence of negligence than the frequency of
sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription accidents.
obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good
results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The
prescription read — "clorato de potasa — 120 gramos On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to
— en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a
Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular
prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the
papers marked, "Botica Pineda — Clorato potasa — trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere
120.00 — en seis papeles — para caballo — Sto. with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony
Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue,
belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
which he had asked for, put two of the packages in
water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another
Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to
package was mixed with water for another horse, but
circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the
was not used. The two horses, to which had been
inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the
given the preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos,
testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not
thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the
favored.
Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Peña and
Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found
that the packages contained not potassium chlorate Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which
but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the
two chemists also went to the drug store of the commission of another offense by the defendant
defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which
when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
(Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison;
potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses,
and found that death was the result of poisoning. People v. Irang119
GR No. 45179, March 30, 1937, Villareal, J.
A group of men attacked and robbed the house of Sps.

ISSUE:
Perfecto and Maximiniana. One of the men struck
Lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the Maximiana in the face with the butt of his gun and
chemist Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of ordered her to bring out money and jewelry. When she
potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, turned over the same, she saw that the man had
which substance proved on analysis to be barium pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid. The same night
chlorate. What the appellant is here relying on is the the house of Juana was also assaulted by a group of
maxim res inter alios acta. men and she also saw that one of the men had
pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid. Later, Maximiana
RULING:
identified accused Irang as the one who attacked and
s a general rule, the evidence of other offenses robbed her. Accused avers that his identity was not
committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But sufficiently established. SC ruled otherwise, giving
appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with credence to the testimony of Juana and said that while
certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in
the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is
attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue
otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify Identity of accused Irangestablished

defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged. Maximiana, whom accused Irang struck in the face with
the butt of his gun and of whom he demanded delivery of
FACTS her money and jewelry, scrutinized the latter’s face and
One night, seven individuals with white stripes upon their noticed that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left
faces, went to the house of Spouses Perfecto and eyelid.
Maximiniana.
One person of the group, armed with a gun, approached In the third group of men presented to her by the
Maximinana and struck her in the face with the butt of lieutenant, Maximiana immediately pointed at one who
his gun, making her lose consciousness momentarily. turned out to be accused Irang. The man pointed at
When she regained consciousness, she was ordered to protested but when she told him that it was he who had
bring out money and jewelry. struck her in the face with the butt of his gun, Irang
During the short space of time she was turning over the became silent.
money and jewelry, she looked at the man’s face and
saw that he had pockmarks1 and a scar on his left While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not
eyelid. admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
The same night the house of one Juana de la Cruz was admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it
assaulted by malefactors who had been firing shots tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the
before arriving at and going the house. robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at
All of them has white stripes upon their faces and Juana the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time
noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
on the left eyelidand was dressed in a maong-colored connected with the crime
suit. The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that
The matter was immediately reported to the police. her house, situated only about 100 meters from that of
Maximiano told Lieutenant Alejandre that the person Perfectos, was assaulted that same night by some
who attacked her and took her money was a man of malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that
regular statute, with a lean body, and pockmarked face. one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on
Lieutenant went in search of said individual. Having his left eyelid, who later turned out to be accused Irang,
arrested a groups of persons, he brought them to indirectly corroborates Maximiana’s testimony that
Maximiana’s house so that the latter might identify but the man of the same description was the one who
she did not find such man. went to her house and robbed her.
Later, another group was presented to her but neither Maximiana’s identification of the accused is likewise
could she find the man. corroborated by the latter’s own admission in his affidavit
Finally, another group was presented to her and in it she that on the night of the crime, he had been invited to
identified accused Benjamin Irang as the one who assault the house of Perfecto, which in fact they
struck her and took her money. assaulted although against his will.
Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang No evidence that the affidavit was not voluntarily
through his pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid. executed. Allegations of torture by the police not proven.
CFI convicted Irang of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide. DISPOSITIVE
Affirmed. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
ISSUES & HOLDING complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Whether or not identity of Irang as one of those who
assaulted the house of spouses Perfecto and Maximiana
was established conclusively beyond reasonable doubt-
YES
RATIO
1
a pitted scar or mark on the skin left by a pustule or pimple

Unedited Evidence CASE Digest 1

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EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST Page 1 of 88

FACTS: Villanueva and the Register of Deeds of

submitted by the parties at the trial of the case,

If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial,

The instant case falls under the aforestated

Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic

The rules on pleading speak of two (2)

FAR EAST MARBLE V CA

BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear

On the same date, BPI filed a motion for

A cause of action consists of three elements:

In fine, the finding of the trial court that

the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction

The Court finally finds that, contrary to the

their truthfulness, memory, and intelligence. In

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although

been entirely innocent or at least not directed EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE;

Back at the house, appellant Monforte dragged

In contrast, the testimony of appellants The foregoing doctrine squarely applies to

The statement in Annex “F” amounted to UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION V

that the trial court found the complainant to be a EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, an NBI agent

HELD: their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer

Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered judgment

HELD: Yes. The general rules regarding the

FACTS: Private respondents sold to petitioner

Private respondents received the payments for

By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually

Petitioner Jose Carandang was the caretaker of

Whether contention of the accused meritorious

Evidence; Defense of denial not supported by clear and

Even if such view were generally acceptable as an

On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons

The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Ruling:

privilege the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila

On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Held:

As already stated, respondent US V CHING PO

ISSUE: that it is fair presume that they correspond with the

has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that

On April 27, 1960, respondent Gertrudes Lucas Vda.

People v Sope (1946)  Her testimony is inconsistent and contradict

ISSUE: WoN they were guilty beyond reasonable

her demeanor while on the stand gave it full weight and

LACK or RECORD.—The mere absence of the

the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion

Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is specific as to PEOPLE V PARAGSA

The CFI convicted Benben. CA affirmed the PEOPLE VS. YATCO

1. Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and

Issue #1: WON the lower court is correct in

493.) It follows that article 1227 does not, as against

Facts: This is action to recover possession of two

In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and

Nor can the dying declaration be admitted to

It is true that declarations against interest are an

prove their filiation to their father and their aunt:

Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish Facts

Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to

Facts: This is action to recover possession of two 74 SCRA 133 (1976)

Panimdim’sstaetement was given Issues:

Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the

The medical examination conducted by Dr. Cayao

The lower court did not believe the accused’s