Second Division (G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018)

3/11/2020 [ G.R. No.
237355, November 21, 2018 ]
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. ANGEL
ANGELES Y ARIMBUYUTAN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before this Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by the accused-appellant Angel Angeles y
Arimbuyutan (accused-appellant) assailing the Decision[2] dated October 30, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08683, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated May 30,
2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 120 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. C-
90948 and C-90949, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,"[4] as amended.
The Facts
Two (2) Informations were filed against the accused-appellant in this case, the accusatory
portions of which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. C-90948
That on or about the 1st day of November, 2013 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell and deliver to PO1 ALDRIN ENGRACIA, who posed as buyer, Two (2) small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each later marked (ANGELES/ENGRACIA-
1(BUY BUST)w/signature) & (ANGELES/ENGRACIA-2(BUY
BUST)w/signature) containing METHAMPETHAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE
(Shabu) weighing 0.10 gram & 0.11 gram, which when subjected for laboratory
examination gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and knowing the same to be such.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Criminal Case No. C-90949
That on or about the 1st day of November 2013 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use
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METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), knowing the same to be

such, and when subjected to drug test and confirmatory examination, gave
POSITIVE result to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
both a dangerous drugs (sic), in gross violation of the above cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both offenses. Thereafter, pre-trial
and joint trial on the cases ensued.[7] The prosecution's version, as summarized in its Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellee,[8] is as follows:
On October 31, 2013, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, PO1 Engracia, per
instruction of the Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task
Group, Caloocan City Police Station (SAID-SOTG, CCPS), contacted through a
mobile phone an informant at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City to confirm the text
message of a concerned citizen as regards the illegal-drug selling activity of an alias
"Panget" at Talipapa, Barangay 164, Baesa, Caloocan City.
Immediately, said informant went to the office of the SAID-SOTG, CCPS and
confirmed to PO1 Engracia that alias "Panget" was indeed engaged in selling illegal
drugs. Thus, a buy-bust team headed by PO2 Gilbert Gammad and composed of PO1
Engracia, PO2 Gagarin, SPO1 Alberto Valentino and PO1 Joseph Inocencio was
formed for the apprehension of alias "Panget".
On November 1, 2013, at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the buy-bust team

submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) a Pre-Operation
Report and a Coordination Form. A briefing for the buy-bust operation was then
conducted.
During the briefing, PO1 Engracia was tasked to act as poseur-buyer and was
provided with a marked Five Hundred Peso (Php500.00) bill, with serial number
RT468072, as buy-bust money. PO1 Engracia marked the same with "AE" on the left
side thereof. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, together with the informant, went to
Talipapa, Barangay 164, Baesa, Caloocan City for a final briefing. Thereat, the
informant left the buy-bust team to know the exact location of alias "Panget". After a
while, the informant returned and accompanied PO1 Engracia to the exact location
of alias "Panget". The other members of the buy-bust team followed.
Upon arrival at Road 11, GSIS Village, Talipapa, Barangay 164, Baesa, Caloocan
City, the informant and PO1 Engracia approached a male person, who was later
identified as appellant Angel Angeles. The informant said to appellant, "Pare,
kukuha itong kumpare ko." Appellant answered, "Ilan?" Thus, POl Engracia
answered, "Limang Daan lang brod, " and handed to appellant the buy-bust money.
Afterwards, appellant said, "Sandali lang, " left and entered an alley. After a while,
appellant returned and handed to PO1 Engracia two (2) plastic sachets, containing
white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, in exchange for the money that
PO1 Engracia gave him.
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PO1 Engracia then touched his nape as a pre-arranged signal that the sale was
already consummated. Upon seeing the other members of the buy-bust team
approaching, PO1 Engracia held appellant and introduced himself as a police officer.
Thereafter, PO1 Engracia recovered the buy-bust money from the right pocket of the
long pants of appellant. When the other operatives arrived, PO1 Engracia marked the
two (2) plastic sachets bought from appellant with "(ANGELES/ENGRACIA-1
(BUY BUST)" & "ANGELES/ENGRACIA-2 (BUY BUST)" and affixed his
signatures thereon. PO2 Gagarin informed appellant of his violation and
Constitutional Rights. Subsequently, appellant, the subject evidence and the buy-bust
money were brought to the Office of the SAID-SOTG, CCPS.
At the said office, PO1 Engracia turned over the appellant, the buy-bust money and
the subject evidence to the duty investigator, PO1 Pascual. An inventory of the
confiscated items was then conducted. In the course of the turn-over and inventory,
PO1 Engracia was given an Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and was made to
sign the Chain of Custody Form and Physical Inventory of Evidence Form.
Photographs of the appellant and the subject evidence were likewise taken.
Thereafter, PO1 Pascual placed the subject evidence in a self-sealing plastic sachet,
which he marked with "SAID-SOTG EVIDENCE 11-01-13" and signed it.
Thereafter, PO1 Pascual brought appellant and the subject evidence to the NPD-
CLO for drug test and laboratory examination, respectively. Said examinations
yielded positive results for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
otherwise known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.[9]
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:
Angeles vehemently denied the accusations against him. He claimed that at around
4:00 in the afternoon of November 1, 2013, he was sleeping when five (5) armed
men suddenly entered his house at No. 12, 11 Talipapa, Caloocan City. Upon
confirming that he is "Angel Angeles", two (2) men frisked him and accused him of
being "one of those who sell shabu". Afterwards, Angeles was brought outside of his
room while one (1) of the armed men took his pouch containing P200.00-bill,
tweezer, and lighter. He was taken to the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special
Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG) of Caloocan City where he was frisked anew
and shown money and shabu. He voluntarily submitted himself to medical
examination.[10]
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated May 30, 2016[11] the RTC convicted the accused-
appellant of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds that:
(1) In Criminal Case No. C-90948, accused Angel Angeles y Arimbuyutan,

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
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Drugs Act of 2002, and imposes upon him the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, taking into account the enactment of Republic Act No.
9346, and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(PHP500,000.00).
(2) In Criminal Case No. C-90949, accused Angel Angeles y Arimbuyutan,

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, and imposes upon him the penalty of six (06) months
rehabilitation in a government rehabilitation center to be effected during the
service of his prison term.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[12]
The RTC ruled that the evidence on record was sufficient to pronounce a verdict of conviction
against the accused-appellant.[13] It held that the prosecution was able to establish all the
elements of the crimes charged. As to the charge of sale of dangerous drugs, the RTC stated that
the prosecution was able to establish (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, viz., the poseur-
buyer PO1 Aldrin Engracia (PO1 Engracia), and the accused-appellant as the seller, with the
two heat-sealed plastic sachets containing shabu as the object of the sale; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the receipt of the payment.[14]
The RTC also recognized that nothing in the records indicates that the procedure for the conduct
of the required physical inventory, outlined in Section 21, RA 9165, was complied with. Despite
recognizing this, however, it stated that the non-compliance, by itself, did not invalidate the
seizure of the dangerous drugs. The RTC held that despite the non-compliance, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were nevertheless preserved. It reasoned that it was
incumbent upon the defense to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome the presumption of regularity extended to the police officers – which burden the
defense failed to discharge.[15]
The RTC likewise convicted the accused-appellant on the charge for violation of Section 15 of
RA 9165, or for use of dangerous drugs. It noted that the elements of a violation of Section 15,
namely: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to a drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that the accused used a dangerous drug, were all complied with.[16]
Aggrieved, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the questioned Decision[17] dated October 30, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of
the accused-appellant, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crimes
charged. Particular to the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the CA upheld the finding
that the prosecution was able to establish (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the
object, and the consideration of the sale; (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
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therefor.[18] The CA gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to establish the
integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized.
As regards compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, the CA held that the defense's failure to
question the police officers, on cross-examination, regarding their alleged non-compliance with
Section 21, amounts to a waiver and thus could no longer be a ground for his acquittal. The CA
added that even if it were to consider the supposed non-compliance, the result would
nevertheless remain the same because
this slight infraction or nominal deviation would not exonerate him from liability.
The court is not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the
procedural requirements. What is important is to ensure the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized item as this would determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused.[19]
In a similar way, the CA also upheld the accused-appellant's conviction for violation of Section
15 of RA 9165, for the same reason that the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of
the crime charged.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue
For resolution of the Court is the issue of whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crimes charged.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious. The Court acquits the accused-appellant for failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused-appellant was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal use of dangerous
drugs, defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 15 of RA 9165, respectively. With regard to
the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, in order for a person to be convicted of the said
crime, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.[20]
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.[21] While it is true
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors,[22] the law nevertheless also requires strict
compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In contrast to the CA's pronouncement, therefore, the Court should look into whether the police
officers involved in each case adhered to the step-by-step procedure outlined in Section 21 of
RA 9165.
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This is because, in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any
prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court
for destruction.[23] The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated
or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the
identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to
make a finding of guilt.[24]
In this connection, Section 21, RA 9165,[25] the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the
integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized
items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) and
the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This must be so because with
the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the
use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or
grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial
hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse
is great.[26]
Section 21, RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical inventory of
the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the
place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as
the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team.[27] In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should
already be physically present at the time of apprehension — a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its
nature, a planned activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and
bring with them the said witnesses.
It is true, as pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, that there are cases where the Court had
ruled that the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21 of RA 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void
and invalid. However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily
prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
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evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.[28] The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.[29]
In the present case, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and
apprehension and even during the conduct of the inventory. As PO1 Engracia, the poseur-buyer
himself, testified only on the buy-bust team's prior coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) without any mention of the three required witnesses:
Q You mentioned that you used Php500.00 peso bill, is that correct?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And is it not a fact that you placed only the markings after you arrested the
accused, Mr. Witness?
A No, Ma'am. I marked it during our meeting when I was designated to act as
poseur buyer, Ma'am.
Q You did not coordinate prior to this alleged buy-bust operation, is that
correct?
A We have coordinated with the PDEA, Ma'am.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
The absence of the required witnesses was likewise acknowledged by both the RTC[31] and the
CA,[32] with both courts justifying the non-compliance as a matter that did not affect the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. As the RTC pertinently reasoned:
In these cases, although nothing appears in the records that the conduct of the
required physical inventory of the subject evidence and the taking of a photograph
thereof were made in the presence of an elected public official and a representative
of the National Prosecution Service, under the same proviso, non-compliance with
the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid
such seizure of and custody over the said item, for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the same are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
[33]
The prosecution did not present any other witness who offered a version different from the
above. In fact, in their Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, the police officers themselves impliedly
admitted to committing the following irregularities: (1) conducting the inventory in the police
station, instead at the place of the arrest, without offering an explanation as to why it was not
practicable that the same be done immediately at the place of the arrest; and (2) conducting the
inventory without any of the required witnesses, namely a representative from the DOJ, a media
representative, and an elective official.[34] In this regard, there was also no explanation as to
why none of the three required witness was present in the buy-bust operation conducted against
Angeles. The prosecution did not also address the issue in their pleadings, and the RTC and the
CA instead had to rely only on the presumption that police officers performed their functions in
the regular manner to support accused-appellant's conviction.
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It bears emphasis that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and
inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence
serves an essential purpose. In People v. Tomawis,[35] the Court elucidated on the purpose of the
law in mandating the presence of the required witnesses as follows:
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office
is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of
the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People vs. Mendoza[36], without
the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of
switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the subject sachet[s] that were evidence of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.[37]
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory
but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in
which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the
time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity,
and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted,
the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of
frame-up as the witnesses would be able testify that the buy-bust operation and
inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section
21 of RA 9165.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the
three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place
of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the
buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the
law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation
of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest;
such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that
they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and
confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."[38] (Emphasis in the
original)
It is important to point out that the apprehending team in this case had more than ample time to
comply with the requirements established by law. By its own version of the facts, as previously
narrated, it received the information from its confidential informant at 5:00 p.m. on October 31,
2013, and it executed the buy-bust operation at 3:00 p.m. the following day. It thus had around
22 hours to secure the attendance of the required witnesses. It even had time, as PO1 Engracia
himself testified, to coordinate with the PDEA before the operation was actually conducted.[39]
The officers, therefore, could have complied with the requirements of the law had they intended
to. However, the apprehending officers in this case did not exert even the slightest of efforts to
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secure the attendance of any of the three required witnesses. Worse, neither the police officers
nor the prosecution – during the trial – offered any explanation for the deviation from the law.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving its compliance with Section
21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-compliance. As the
Court held in the recent case of People v. Lim:[40]
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the
physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to
reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected
official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault
of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with
arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the
law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.[41] (Underscoring added, emphasis
omitted)
In People v. Umipang[42] the Court dealt with the same issue where the police officers involved
did not show any genuine effort to secure the attendance of the required witnesses before the
buy-bust operation was executed. In the said case, the Court held:
Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the
marking of the seized items does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. However, we take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF
did not even attempt to contact the barangay chairperson or any member of the
barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted other elected public
officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch
with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable
reason for failing to do so — especially considering that it had sufficient time from
the moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the time
of his arrest.
Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the
apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section
21 (1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable —
without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed
to look for other representatives, given the circumstances — is to be regarded as
a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
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enumerated under Section 21 (1) of R.A. 9165, or that there was a justifiable
ground for failing to do so.[43] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this connection, it was error for both the RTC and the CA to convict the accused-appellant by
relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties supposedly extended in
favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot
overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.[44] Otherwise, a mere
rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.[45] As
the Court, in People v. Catalan,[46] reminded the lower courts:
Both lower courts favored the members of the buy-bust team with the presumption
of regularity in the performance of their duty, mainly because the accused did not
show that they had ill motive behind his entrapment.
We hold that both lower courts committed gross error in relying on the presumption
of regularity.
Presuming that the members of the buy-bust team regularly performed their duty
was patently bereft of any factual and legal basis. We remind the lower courts that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not prevail over
the stronger presumption of innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise, the
constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent would be held
subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Where,
like here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even overcome the
presumption of innocence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
could not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly
presumed in favor of the policemen because the records were replete with
indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of
performance by a police officer must be inferred only from an established basic
fact, not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is the established basic
fact that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any hint
of irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting the accused and
thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of
regularity of performance in their favor.[47] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's
blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. What further
militates against according the apprehending officers in this case the presumption of regularity
is the fact that even the pertinent internal anti-drug operation procedures then in force were not
followed. Under the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual,[48] the conduct
of buy-bust operations requires the following:
Anti-Drug Operational Procedures
Chapter V. Specific Rules
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B. Conduct of Operation: (As far as practicable, all operations must be officer led)
1. Buy-Bust Operation - in the conduct of buy-bust operation, the following are the
procedures to be observed:
a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;

b. Alertness and security shall at all times be observed:
c. Actual and timely coordination with the nearest PNP territorial units must be
made;
d. Area security and dragnet or pursuit operation must be provided:
e. Use of necessary and reasonable force only in case of suspect's resistance:
f. If buy-bust money is dusted with ultra violet powder make sure that suspect gel
hold of the same and his palm/s contaminated with the powder before giving
the pre-arranged signal and arresting the suspects;
g. In pre-positioning of the team members, the designated arresting elements
must clearly and actually observe the negotiation/transaction between suspect
and the poseur-buyer;
h. Arrest suspect in a defensive manner anticipating possible resistance with the
use of deadly weapons which maybe concealed in his body, vehicle or in a
place within arms reach;
i. After lawful arrest, search the body and vehicle, if any, of the suspect for other
concealed evidence or deadly weapon;
j. Appraise suspect of his constitutional rights loudly and clearly after having
been secured with handcuffs;
k. Take actual inventory of the seized evidence by means of weighing and/or
physical counting, as the case may be;
l. Prepare a detailed receipt of the confiscated evidence for issuance to the
possessor (suspect) thereof;
m. The seizing officer (normally the poseur-buyer) and the evidence
custodian must mark the evidence with their initials and also indicate the
date, time and place the evidence was confiscated/seized;
n. Take photographs of the evidence while in the process of taking the
inventory, especially during weighing, and if possible under existing
conditions, the registered weight of the evidence on the scale must be
focused by the camera; and
o. Only the evidence custodian shall secure and preserve the evidence in an
evidence bag or in appropriate container and thereafter deliver the same to the
PNP CLG for laboratory examination.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has ruled in People v. Zheng Bai Hui[50] that it will not presume to set an a priori
basis what detailed acts police authorities might credibly undertake and carry out in their
entrapment operations. However, given the police operational procedures and the fact that buy-
bust is a planned operation, it strains credulity why the buy-bust team could not have ensured
the presence of the required witnesses pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked,
photographed and inventoried the seized items according to the procedures in their own
operations manual.
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
At this juncture, it is well to point out that the CA grievously erred in holding that the defense's
failure to ask probing questions, on cross-examination, to the police officers regarding their
compliance with Section 21 amounts to a waiver. This is erroneous for it overlooks the long-
standing legal tenet that the starting point of every criminal prosecution is that the accused has
the constitutional right to be presumed innocent.[51] This presumption of innocence is
overturned only when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof in criminal cases; has
proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;[52] and has proven that each and every
element of the crime charged in the information warrants a finding of guilt for that crime or for
any other crime necessarily included therein.[53] Differently stated, there must exist no
reasonable doubt as to the existence of each and every element of the crime to sustain a
conviction.
It is worth emphasizing that this burden of proof never shifts. Indeed, the accused need not
present a single piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not discharged its onus. The
accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, in particular, the prosecution therefore always has the
burden of proving compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21. As the Court stressed
in People v. Andaya:[54]
We should remind ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the
crimes they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If
the imputation of ill motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them,
then that would be the end of our dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from false
arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that there have been in the past
many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that should heighten
our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.
Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our
citizenry just because the lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the
regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but
a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and time-consuming
task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials and
functionaries of the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the much
stronger and much firmer presumption of innocence in favor of every person
whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on the
strength of a false accusation of committing some crime.[55] (Emphasis supplied)
To stress, the accused can rely on his right to be presumed innocent. It is thus immaterial, in this
case or in any other cases involving dangerous drugs, whether the defense asked probing
questions to the police officers as to their compliance with Section 21. This is so simply because
it bears no burden to do the same, as the duty to put forth the said evidence rests solely on the
prosecution.
The Court emphasizes that while it is laudable that police officers exert earnest efforts in
catching drug pushers, they must always be advised to do so within the bounds of the law.[56]
Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of
switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that
were evidence herein of the corpus delicti. Thus, this adversely affected the trustworthiness of
the incrimination of the accused-appellant. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses
would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.[57]
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these

requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective, however,
the prosecution must first (1) recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers and (2) be
able to justify the same.[58] In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried
to justify, its deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.
Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused-appellant as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised.[59] As the Court explained in People v. Reyes:[60]
Under the last paragraph of Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, a
saving mechanism has been provided to ensure that not every case of non-
compliance with the procedures for the preservation of the chain of custody will
irretrievably prejudice the Prosecution's case against the accused. To warrant the
application of this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must recognize
the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain them. Such justification or
explanation would be the basis for applying the saving mechanism. Yet, the
Prosecution did not concede such lapses, and did not even tender any token
justification or explanation for them. The failure to justify or explain underscored
the doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti.
With the chain of custody having been compromised, the accused deserves acquittal.
[61] (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's
deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, the accused-appellant
must perforce be acquitted as regards the charge of violation of Section 5, RA 9165.
With the acquittal of the accused-appellant in relation to the charge of violation of Section 5,
RA 9165, it follows then that he should likewise be acquitted as to the charge of violation of
Section 15, RA 9165.
The case for violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed because the accused-appellant was
found positive for use of methamphetamine hydrochloride after he was subjected to a drug test
following his arrest. This was done in compliance with Section 38, RA 9165 which states:
SECTION 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders.

— Subject to Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory

examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, if the apprehending or
arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person apprehended or
arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward
manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the
results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged within
fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in
any accredited analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry equipment or some such modern and accepted method, if confirmed
the same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has used dangerous drugs,
which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions
of this Act: Provided, That a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for
it to be valid in a court of law. (Emphasis supplied)
The accused-appellant was thus subjected to a drug test as a result of his apprehension which,
as already illustrated, was conducted in violation of Section 21, RA 9165 – a rule that is a
matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.[62]
Section 21, RA 9165 is a statutory exclusionary rule of evidence, bearing in mind that, under the
Rules of Court, "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by
the law or these rules."[63]
The results of the drug test cannot thus be used against the accused-appellant for it is
considered, under the law, as "fruit of the poisonous tree." In the case of People v. Alicando,[64]
it was explained thus:
According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from
it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect
result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule
is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained.[65] (Emphasis supplied)
Applied in the present case, since the apprehension of the accused-appellant by the police
officers was illegal for non-compliance with the procedure provided by Section 21, RA 9165, it
therefore follows that the drug test conducted on him was likewise illegal for it is an indirect
result of his arrest. Otherwise stated, if the accused-appellant was not arrested in the first place,
he would not have been subjected to a drug test because Section 38 refers to "any person
apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act." As the accused-appellant
was not proved to have violated any of the provisions of RA 9165, then the drug test conducted
on him has no leg to stand on. The accused-appellant must perforce be also acquitted of the
charge of violating Section 15, RA 9165.
As a reminder, the Court exhorts the prosecutors to diligently discharge their onus to prove
compliance with the provisions of Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, which is fundamental in preserving the integrity and evidentiary value
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
of the corpus delicti. To the mind of the Court, the procedure outlined in Section 21 is
straightforward and easy to comply with. In the presentation of evidence to prove compliance
therewith, the prosecutors are enjoined to recognize any deviation from the prescribed
procedure and provide the explanation therefor as dictated by available evidence. Compliance
with Section 21 being integral to every conviction, the appellate court, this Court included, is at
liberty to review the records of the case to satisfy itself that the required proof has been adduced
by the prosecution whether the accused has raised, before the trial or appellate court, any issue
of non-compliance. If deviations are observed and no justifiable reasons are provided, the
conviction must be overturned, and the innocence of the accused affirmed.[66]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated October 30, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08683 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Angel Angeles y Arimbuyutan
is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged on the ground of reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another
cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The said Superintendent is ORDERED to
REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has
taken.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr.,[*] JJ., concur.
[*] Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.
[1] See Notice of Appeal dated November 10, 2017; rollo, pp. 16-17.
[2]
Id. at 2-15. Penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales with Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaampao and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier concurring.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 41-54. Penned by Judge Aurelio R. Ralar, Jr.
[4]
Titled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 7, 2002.
[5] Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 3.
[6] Records, p. 20; rollo, p. 3.
[7] Rollo, pp. 3-4.
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
[8] CA rollo, pp. 76-94.
[9] CA rollo, pp. 78-81.
[10] Rollo, p. 7.
[11] Supra note 3.
[12] CA rollo, p. 54.
[13] Id. at 49.
[14] Id. at 50-51.
[15] Id. at 52-53.
[16] Id. at 53.
[17] Supra note 2.
[18] Rollo, p. 10.
[19] Id. at 13.
[20] People v. Opiana, 750 Phil. 140, 147 (2015).
[21] People v. Guzon, 719 Phil. 441, 450-451 (2013).
[22] People v. Mantalaba, 669 Phil. 461, 471 (2013).
[23] People v. Guzon, supra note 21 at 451, citing People v. Dumaplin, 700 Phil. 737 (2012).
[24] Id., citing People v. Remigio, 700 Phil. 452 (2012).
[25] The said section reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. -
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
[26] People v. Santos, 562 Phil. 458, 471 (2007), citing People v. Tan, 401 Phil. 259, 273 (2000)
[27] IRR of RA 9165. Art. II, Sec. 21 (a).
[28] People v. Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017, p. 17.
[29]People v. Dela Victoria, G.R. No. 233325, April 16, 2018, p. 6; People v. Descalso, G.R.
No. 230065, March 14, 2018, p. 8; People v. Año, G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018, p. 6;
People v. Lumaya, G.R No. 231983, March 7, 2018, p. 8; People v. Magsano, G.R. No. 231050,
February 28, 2018, p. 1; People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018, p. 6; People v.
Manansala, G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018, p. 7; People v. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January
31, 2018, p. 9; People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018, p. 7; People v.
Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018, p. 7; People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January
29, 2018, p. 7; People v. Alvaro, G.R. No. 225596, January 10,2018 p. 7; People v. Almorfe, 631
Phil. 51, 60 (2010).
[30] TSN dated September 30, 2014, p. 10.
[31] CA rollo, p. 52.
[32] Rollo, p. 13.
[33] CA rollo, p. 52.
[34] Id. at 80.
[35] G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018.
[36] 736 Phil. 749 (2014).
[37] Id. at 764.
[38] People v. Tomawis, supra note 35 at 11-12.
[39] Supra note 30.
[40] G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018.
[41] Id., citing People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018, p. 17.
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
[42] 686 Phil. 1024 (2012).
[43] Id. at 1052-1053.
[44] People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 770 (2014).
[45] People v. Catalan, 699 Phil. 603, 621 (2012).
[46] 699 Phil. 603 (2012).
[47] Id. at 621.
[48]Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual, PNPM-D-O-3-1-99 [NG], the

precursor anti-illegal drug operations manual prior to the 2010 and 2014 AIDSOTF Manual.
[49] Id.
[50] 393 Phil. 68, 133 (2000).
[51]CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2): "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved x x x."
[52] The Rules of Court provides that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. (Rule 133, Sec. 2)
[53] See People v. Belocura, 693 Phil. 476, 503-504 (2012).
[54] 745 Phil. 237 (2014).
[55] Id. at 250-251.
[56] People v. Ramos, 791 Phil. 162, 175 (2016).
[57] People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 764 (2014).
[58] See People v. Alagarme, 754 Phil. 449, 461 (2015).
[59] See People v. Sumili, 753 Phil. 342, 350 (2015).
[60] 797 Phil. 671 (2016).
[61] Id. at 690.
3/11/2020 [ G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018 ]
[62] People v. Año, supra note 29 at 7.
[63] RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Sec. 3.
[64] 321 Phil. 656 (1995).
[65] Id. at 690.
[66] See People v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018, p. 10.
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Second Division (G.R. No. 237355, November 21, 2018)

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3/11/2020 [ G.R. No.

237355, November 21, 2018 ]

Criminal Case No. C-90948

Criminal Case No. C-90949

METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), knowing the same to be

On November 1, 2013, at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the buy-bust team

Ruling of the RTC

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds that:

(1) In Criminal Case No. C-90948, accused Angel Angeles y Arimbuyutan,

(2) In Criminal Case No. C-90949, accused Angel Angeles y Arimbuyutan,

Aggrieved, the accused-appellant appealed to the CA.

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Court's Ruling

This must be so because with

Anti-Drug Operational Procedures

Chapter V. Specific Rules

a. Record time of jump-off in unit's logbook;

Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these

SECTION 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders.

violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory

[3] CA rollo, pp. 41-54. Penned by Judge Aurelio R. Ralar, Jr.

[5] Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 3.

[6] Records, p. 20; rollo, p. 3.

[7] Rollo, pp. 3-4.

[8] CA rollo, pp. 76-94.

[9] CA rollo, pp. 78-81.

[11] Supra note 3.

[12] CA rollo, p. 54.

[13] Id. at 49.

[14] Id. at 50-51.

[15] Id. at 52-53.

[16] Id. at 53.

[17] Supra note 2.

[18] Rollo, p. 10.

[19] Id. at 13.

[20] People v. Opiana, 750 Phil. 140, 147 (2015).

[21] People v. Guzon, 719 Phil. 441, 450-451 (2013).

[22] People v. Mantalaba, 669 Phil. 461, 471 (2013).

[24] Id., citing People v. Remigio, 700 Phil. 452 (2012).

[25] The said section reads as follows:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

[27] IRR of RA 9165. Art. II, Sec. 21 (a).

[28] People v. Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017, p. 17.

[30] TSN dated September 30, 2014, p. 10.

[31] CA rollo, p. 52.

[32] Rollo, p. 13.

[33] CA rollo, p. 52.

[34] Id. at 80.

[35] G.R. No. 228890, April 18, 2018.

[36] 736 Phil. 749 (2014).

[37] Id. at 764.

[38] People v. Tomawis, supra note 35 at 11-12.

[39] Supra note 30.

[40] G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018.

[42] 686 Phil. 1024 (2012).

[43] Id. at 1052-1053.

[44] People v. Mendoza, 736 Phil. 749, 770 (2014).

[45] People v. Catalan, 699 Phil. 603, 621 (2012).

[46] 699 Phil. 603 (2012).

[47] Id. at 621.

[48]Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual, PNPM-D-O-3-1-99 [NG], the

[50] 393 Phil. 68, 133 (2000).