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MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ v. BAZ, JR.

G.R. 105746, 2 December 1996

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio
Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. By virtue of
Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-
o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the
technical dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez. While conceding that the
disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of Jimenez, in its answer,
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the
Municipality of Sinacaban.

This agreement, which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis


Occidental in its Resolution No. 77 dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common
boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board
declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution
approving the agreement between the parties was void since the Board had no power to
alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being vested in
Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The
Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. On March 20,
1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC of
Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and
its Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government,
Budget and Management, and the Executive Secretary.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No 171, dated November 22, 1988,


Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of territories based on the technical description in E.O.
No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against
the Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed
area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an
agreement it which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its
Resolution No. 77.

In its decision dated October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the
disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the
agreement between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to
alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in
Congress. The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30,
1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14. February 10, 1992,
the petition was denied.

Judgment is declared a STATUS QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban


shall continue to exist and operate as a regular municipality; declaring the decision
dated October 11, 1989 as null and void, the same not being in accordance with the
boundaries provided for in Executive Order No. 258; dismissing the petition for lack of
merit, without pronouncement as to costs and damages.

The RTC’s decision also enunciated that the Commissioners are ordered to
conduct the relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban and to submit their report
from the completion of the said relocation survey. The RTC, inter alia, further held that
Sinacaban is a de facto corporation. On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied by the RTC. Hence this
petition for review of the decision of the RTC which affirmed the legal existence of the
Sinacaban and ordering the relocation of its boundary for the purpose of determining
whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim

2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the
creation of new municipalities.

RULING:

1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim.

The preliminary issue concerns


the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exists, then it has
standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot .
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as
a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the
creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore
the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of
Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such by executive order is
later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can
no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto
municipal corporation where its legal existence has been recognized and
acquiesced publicly and officially; A quo warranto suit against a corporation for
forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the act
complained of was done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16
years, yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned.
Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and
only because it had laid claim to an area that is apparently desired for its
revenue.

The State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized
Sinacaban’s corporate existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal
circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had
earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it
regarding their common boundary. The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de
jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Sec. 442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in
the creation of Sinacaban since it states that: Municipalities existing as of the
date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances/executive orders and which have their respective set of municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth
be regular municipalities.

2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in
the creation of new municipalities.

Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de


facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite
requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities
created for the first time under the Constitution – it cannot be applied to
municipalities created before. 3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban
comprises only the barrios (now barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is
that “Sinacaban contains” those barrios. The reason for this is that the technical
description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipality’s territory, is
controlling.

The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of
determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which
municipality the barangays in question belong. Any alteration of boundaries that
is not in accordance with the law is not the carrying into effect of the law but its
amendment – and a resolution of a provincial Board declaring certain barrios part
of one or another municipality that is contrary to the technical description of the
territory of the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the
territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing
Sinacaban’s claim.

In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be


elevated to the RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly
brought to the RTC for review the Decision and Resolution of the Provincial
Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983, the governing law when
the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs. 118-
119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160). Jimenez’s contention that the RTC failed to decide
the case “within 1 yr from the start of the proceedings” as required by Sec. 79 of
the LGC of 1983 and the 90-day period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the
Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. Failure of a
court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it of its
jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible
administrative sanction

DOCTRINE:

1. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., the Court considered


the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation
which was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez
v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation
of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the
ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the
executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality
was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal
circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives.

Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure
character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), Section 442(d) of which
provides that

: "Municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or


executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities."

2. As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power of provincial boards to settle


boundary disputes is "of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities." It is a power "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to
implementing the law creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of
boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not
the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment.

3. Sec. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How settled. — Disputes as to


jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided by
the provincial boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are situated,
after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard.
From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the
municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of the
Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios
in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the
provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an agreement if
possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the
Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final.

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