Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
 
FIRST DIVISION
 
HO WAI PANG,   G.R. No. 176229
Petitioner,    
     
    Present:
     
    CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus -   LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
    BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
    VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
     
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,   Promulgated:
Respondent.   October 19, 2011
     
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DECISION
 
 
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
 
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called Miranda
Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such
investigation.[1] The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.[2]
 
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April
6, 1995 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal
Case No. 91-1592, finding him and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue,
[5] Wu Hing Sum, Tin San Mao[6] and Kin San Ho[7] guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 15, Article III[8] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA
Resolution[9] denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
 
Factual Antecedents

On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight
No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).Among the
passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At the arrival
area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration Form
to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express
Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From
the first traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and
chocolate boxes which she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate
boxes which were almost of the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she
took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she
saw inside was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus
immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs
Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the
police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing
with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
 
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and
further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three
chocolate boxes. Next was petitioners bag which contains nothing except for personal effects.
Cinco, however, recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane
belong to him. Wu Hing Sums bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the
baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar
chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six
accused.
 
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco pertaining
to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test on the white
crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline Re-
Agent Test.[10] The result of his examination[11] of the white crystalline substance yielded
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were
bundled together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.

The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over to the
Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is
31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[12] Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No.
6425 only as against petitioner and his five co-accused.
 
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against
petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-
1591 to 97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation[13] which the
trial court granted. The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among
the accused and this resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information[14] under Criminal
Case No. 91-1592 and to the withdrawal of the other Informations.[15] The Amended
Information reads:
 
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the
country without lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or less,
of METHAMPHETAMINEHYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as SHABU, a
regulated drug.
 
CONTRARY TO LAW.[16]
 
 
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged,[17] all the accused testified almost identically,
invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge about the
transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were provided
by the travel agency.
 
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
 
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] finding all the accused guilty of violating
Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, DANGEROUS DRUG ACT OF 1972 as amended,
the decretal portion of which reads:
 
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA WANG,
CHAN CHIT YUE, HO WAI PANG, WU HING SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN SAN HO
(HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425, as amended for having conspired to transport into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of
methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic] RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being imposed pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability to the accused though retroactively for
having a less stricter penalty than that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. 6425.
The fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No. 6425 it being more
favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE
DEPORTATION AFTER SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed
since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.
 
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @ SONNY
WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
 
SO ORDERED.[19]
 
 
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records were
forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995.[20] Later, all the accused except for
petitioner, filed on separate dates their respective withdrawal of appeal.[21] This Court, after
being satisfied that the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their
action, granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18,
1997.[22] Per Entry of Judgment, [23] said Resolution became final and executory on July 7,
1997. Consequently, petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.
 
Petitioner filed his Brief[24] on April 6, 1998 while the brief[25] for the respondent People of
the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998 through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). Per Resolution[26] dated August 30, 2004, this Court referred the appeal to the CA for
proper disposition and determination pursuant to this Courts ruling in People v. Mateo.[27]
 
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 
On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While
conceding that petitioners constitutional right to counsel during the custodial investigation was
indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to
warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he was deprived of his
constitutional and statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts
ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
 
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] which the CA denied in its
Resolution[29] dated January 16, 2007.
 
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
 
I
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION BOTH BY THE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI
INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
 
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT
THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
 
 
 
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A
CONSPIRACY.
 
  
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS
TO OVERTURN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO PETITIONER
BY THE CONSTITUTION.[30]
 
 
 
OUR RULING
 
 
The petition lacks merit.
 
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as
evidence only confessions and admissions of the
accused as against himself.
 
 
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was
not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his
choice. Hence, petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such
investigation.
 
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial
questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under
Section 12[31] of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact
that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and
admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,[32] the Court
categorically ruled that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only
the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise
excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.
 
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from him
as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention
and subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner
and his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v.
Buluran,[33] [a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant
and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Hence, petitioners claim that the trial court erred
in not excluding evidence taken during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
 
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Courts ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming[34] to
exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance in the facts, the case
of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The disparity is clear from the
evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their
respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied
heavily on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic
bags. The Court construed the accuseds act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit
admission of the crime charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda
rights when they affixed their signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for
having been obtained in violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused,
the trial court also gave credence to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it
presumed to have performed his duties in regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment
of conviction, the Court noted that said examiners testimony was not corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses.
 
On the other hand, petitioners conviction in the present case was on the strength of his having
been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into the country and not on the basis of any
confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct, positive and
credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire
incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime. As the Court held in People v Dela Cruz,[35] [n]o rule exists which requires a
testimony to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. x x x Thus, it is not at all uncommon to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of
corroboration, where such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such a
case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction.
 
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case when
there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own
unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
 
Petitioner was not denied of his right to
confrontation.
 
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent provision of Section
14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to
confrontation, viz:
 
Section 14. x x x
 
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
 
 
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses
testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what the witnesses would testify to
would enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it
by cross-examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
 
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his
accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is
petitioners call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could
not do so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that
petitioner was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such
examination suffices as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against him.
 
We agree with the OSG.
 
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the
prosecutions evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an
interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced
him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-
examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is
essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the
prosecution. In People v. Libo-on,[36] the Court held:
 
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the
person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must
be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of
confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for
cross-examination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been
accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-examination.
 
 
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioners constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him was not impaired.
 
Conspiracy among the accused was duly established.
 
 
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial courts finding of conspiracy which was
quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein
reproduce with approval:
 
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude
conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually established by
direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that there are enough
circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be
denied that the accused somehow have known each other prior to their [departure] in Hong
Kong for Manila. Although Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the accused prior to the
incident in NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified him as the one who assisted him in the
 supposed tour in the Philippines to the extent of directly dealing with the travel agency and [that]
Law Ka Wang was the one who received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be
place[d] in a bag provided for by the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to
accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in a restaurant
in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to accused Chan Chit
Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way can lead to the presumption
that they have the capability to enter into a conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances
confiscated from the six accused were contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost
the same weight all contained in their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the trial
prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have been
perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy with all the accused
assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each other in order to ensure its success.[37]
 
 
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
 
Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony.[38] [C]onspiracy which determines
criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance
between or among the participants to a crime.[39] It need not be shown that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design.[40] The
assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr.[41] Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his
co-accuseds collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
 
Petitioners guilt was proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
 
 
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling
bag when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who
took charge in ascribing upon him the possession of the two chocolate boxes.
 
Petitioners contentions fail to persuade.
 
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared that
she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioners bag.
[42]Nonetheless, she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two
chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were still at the counter. This sufficiently
explained why Cinco did not find any chocolate boxes from petitioners bag when they were at
the ICU.[43] To us, this slight clash in Cincos statements neither dilute her credibility nor the
veracity of her testimony.
 
The trial courts words on this matter when it resolved petitioners Demurrer to Evidence in its
Order[44] of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus
 
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to command
conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda Cinco is either conjectural
or hearsay and definitely missed its mark in incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she
even testified that she found nothing inside the hand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49,
TSN, June 3, 1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting
Unit (ICU). However, the same Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express lane in going
to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying with her four (4) chocolate
boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun Mau and the other two retrieved from the
luggage of herein movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that at
the ICU, Ho Wai Pangs bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992), but she
nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof, pointing to Ho Wai Pang.
Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts from the personal perception of the
witness and out of her personal knowledge. Neither is it conjectural.[45]
 
 
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony
is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.[46] Also, where there is nothing in
the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely
implicate the accused, identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no
evidence or anything to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was
moved by any improper motive, hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
 
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is convinced
that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so
eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the
very act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast,
the evidence for the defense consists mainly of denials.
 
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering that
his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of
transporting a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense
under a special law. As such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense
punished and same suffices to validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the
act so punished regardless of criminal intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has
not presented any plausible proof to successfully rebut the evidence for the prosecution. It is
basic that affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted
easily overrides negative testimony.[47]
 
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging petitioner
guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu into the country in violation
of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
 
Penalty
 
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we find the
same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time of the
commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683.[48] The decree provided that for violation of said
Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00
to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659[49] further introduced
new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 to reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million. On the other hand,
Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new
penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the
dangerous drugs involved.
 
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua under R.A.
No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given
retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less
stricter punishment.
 
We agree. In People v. Doroja,[50] we held:
 
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the
amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original provisions of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x x.
 
 

And, since reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and considering the
rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive
effect,[51] the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. Consequently, the
Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount
of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.
 

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16,

SO ORDERED.