In re: Rafael C. Climaco 108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Adm. Case No. 134-J. January 21, 1974.* In re: Rafael C. Climaco IN RE: THE HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST agreement. I am not, at this stage, prepared, to go along, however, INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH I, SILAY CITY. with the last clause in the dispositive portion of our resolution with its Judges; Elements of unjust judgment.—ln order that a judge may be “warning that repetition of the same may constrain Us to impose a more held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be severe sanction. I view with a certain degree of misgiving, perhaps not shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law altogether justified, the warning as to the more severe penalty to be or is not supported by evidence, and the same was made with conscious inflicted in case of a repetition of such offense thus made in the and deliberate intent to do an injustice. dispositive portion of the opinion for, to my mind, it could, in some way Same; Elements of inexcusable negligence in rendering an unjust however slight, limit the freedom of a future Court to deal with such a judgment.—To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust situation if and when it occurs. judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without TEEHANKEE, J., separate opinion: malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence, and care which the law is entitled to exact in the Evidence; Judicial notice; Ocular inspection; Ex-parte ocular rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inspection by judge is improper.—The ex-parte ocular inspection inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained conducted by respondent judge alone without notice to nor the presence by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the of the parties and after the case had already been submitted for legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such decision was improperly made and may not be sanctioned. If he had injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even entertained doubts that he wished to clear up after the trial had already though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in terminated, he should have ordered motu propio the reopening of the the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and trial for the purpose, with due notice to the parties for their participation indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. therein is essential to due process. Attorneys; Duty of counsel to uphold the dignity of the court by not using offensive languages.—A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS in the Supreme Court. “like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. which he owes fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of RESOLUTION justice.” It bears emphasis that the use in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or containing offensive personalities serves no ANTONIO, J.: useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt. In a verified complaint filed on October 15, 1968 by Acting City Fiscal FERNANDO, J., concurring. Norberto L. Zulueta, of Cadiz, Negros Occidental, and Eva Mabug-at, widow of the deceased Norberto Tongoy, respondent is charged with Same; Warning against erring attorney might restrict future court gross malfeasance in office, gross ignorance of the law, and for action.—In addition to exonerating respondent judge of the charges filed knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. against him by the city fiscal, the resolution of this Court would censure The aforecited charges stemmed from the order of the respondent the complainant for the use of offensive and abusive language. On both dated September 5, 1968 and his decision acquitting accused Carlos grounds, I am fully in Caramonte promulgated on September 21, 1968, in Criminal Case No. _______________ 690, entitled “People of the Philippines versus Isabelo Montemayor, et al.,” for Robbery in Band with Homicide. * EN BANC. 109 VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974 109 110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In re: Rafael C. Climaco In re: Rafael C. Climaco In the Resolution of this Court dated October 22, 1968, the complaint “The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice was given due course, and respondent was required to file an answer to that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a the complaint within ten (10) days from notice thereof, and after the large fishing industry operating in the Visayas; that the said compound filing of respondent’s answer, the case was referred on December 17, is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall 1968 to the Hon. Nicasio Yatco, Associate Justice of the Court of Ap- in Cadiz; and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated. peals, for investigation and report. On April 11, 1968, after conducting SO the requisite investigation thereon, the investigator submitted his ORDERED.” Report recommending the exone-ration of respondent. Thereafter, or more particularly, on September 21, 1968, respondent It appears from the record that Acting City Fiscal Nor-berto L. promulgated his decision in the case acquitting Carlos Caramonte. Zulueta, of Cadiz, Negros Occidental, filed a charge for Robbery in Band Subsequently, Acting City Fiscal Zulueta appealed the with Homicide against thirteen (13) persons as principals, seven (7) aforementioned decision to this Court; and when required to comment persons as accomplices, and two (2) persons as accessories, with the on said appeal, Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now an Associate Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in Criminal Case No. 690. Justice of this Court, submitted his comment on November 28, 1968 to The case was assigned to Branch I, Silay City, presided over by the the effect that the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of respondent. Out of the 13 persons charged as principals for the crime, acquittal in view of the constitutional protection against double only Carlos Caramonte was arrested and tried (the six other alleged jeopardy, and made the observation that “While the validity of the principals, including Isabelo Montemayor, remained at large), while of ocular inspection conducted by the lower court is open to doubt, the the persons charged as accomplices and accessories, the case with unvarnished fact remains that the judgment of acquittal was not respect to them was dismissed at the instance of the prosecution or with premised solely on the results of said ocular inspection, as erroneously its conformity, in the following manner: contended by the prosecutor. A cursory perusal of the decision will at (a) Before arraignment:— once show that said acquittal was predicated on other well-con-sidered facts and circumstances so thoroughly discussed by the lower court in Jorge Canonoyo its decision and the least of those was its observation arising from the (b After arraignment:— ocular inspection.” ) On January 30, 1969, this Court, through Justice Fernando, Agustin Cañete promulgated its Resolution dismissing the appeal (G.R. No. L-29599). In the meantime, on October 15, 1968, the aforementioned complaint Rosendo Cañete against respondent was instituted as aforestated. Arsenio Luyao In his Report, the investigator stated: Elias Giducos “Under the first indictment, complainants bewail as gross malfeasance Pedro Layon in office and gross ignorance of the law, the following behaviour of the Antonio Placencia respondent Judge in the case: (c) Accused Luciano Salinas was discharged from the inf ormation and utilized ‘I. GROSS MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE as state witness; and and (d Accused Honorato de Sales, Paulino Quijano, Cristeta Jimenez, Constancio GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW ) Pangahin, Julio Elmo, Primitivo Mata, and Rene Fernandez before the 111 Amended Inf ormation of April 26, 1968, were dropped. VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974 111 After the case was submitted for decision, respondent issued an order, In re: Rafael C. Climaco dated September 5, 1968, which reads as follows: ‘After both parties submitted their respective Memorandum attached 110 herewith as Annexes ‘C’ and ‘D’, Criminal Case No. 690 for ‘Robbery in Band with Homicide’ was closed and submitted for Decision on July 1, concrete proof that respondent Judge did conduct a ‘secret ocular 1968. inspection’ of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz as seriously charge by ‘About one and a half (1-1/2) months thereafter, or at about 3:00 the complainants. In fact, the lone witness presented by the o’clock in the afternoon of Sunday, 11 August 1968, respondent judge complainants in this case did not even make an insinuation supporting made a secret ocular inspection of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz. such serious allegation of said complainants. The fact is, from the order Without anybody to guide him, he visited the places which he thought of September 5, 1968, the respondent Judge took judicial notice ‘that erroneously were the scene of the robbery where the Chief of Police was the Mateo ChuaAntonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large killed by the Montemayor gang at about 11:00 o’clock of the dark night fishing industry operating in the Visayas; that the said compound is only of December 31, 1967. It should be noted that Cadiz City is 65 kms. about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall in away from Bacolod City, the capital of the province. Because of that Cadiz; and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well populated.’ undeniably biased ocular inspection, the honorable trial judge, who is Nowhere therefrom could it be deduced that respondent Judge took reputed to be brilliant, issued a reckleas, extremely senseless and stupid judicial notice of these facts by virtue of an ocular inspection he order dated 5 September 1968, to wit: conducted on the date alleged by the complainants. ‘The parties are notified that the Court intends to take judicial notice “In any event, there is likewise nothing in the record to support the that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a charge of the complainants that the order of September 5, 1968, was large fishing industry operating in the Visayas; that the said compound made by the respondent Judge as the sole basis for the acquittal of is only about 500 meters away from the Police Station and the City Hall Carlos Caramonte. In fact, the decision of the respondent Judge shows in Cadiz; and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated. that in rendering a judgment of acquittal in the case before him, said ‘SO ORDERED.’ — respondent entertained serious doubts as to the guilt of Caramonte which Order, as any student of law would tell you, is null and void, and because of the failure of anyone — in the Chua and in the Uy illegal per se. Why respondent Honorable Judge went out of his way to households, the security guards, the policemen who engaged the gather those immaterial and ‘fabricated’ evidence in favor of the robbers in battle — to identify Caramonte as one of the participants in accused is shocking to the conscience. To say the least, it is gross the alleged crime. Thus, the decision pertinently reads: ignorance of the law. Why did respondent judge show his hand ‘Is Caramonte guilty? unnecessarily and prematurely? Perhaps, a psychologist or a psychiatrist ‘In spite of the admission of Caramonte’s Exh. C and the damaging would explain that the Order of September 5th is that of an anguished inferences derived from his staying away from the ceremony when the mind; an Order issued by a Judge who for the first time had to violate his newly-elected officials of Bantayan were inducted into office, there is oath of office; by a judge who, due to political pressure and against his doubt in the mind of the Court as to his actual participation in the bold will and better judgment, had to acquit councilor Carlos Caramonte of raid on Cadiz City on December 31, 1967, because of the failure of the municipality of Bantayan, province of Cebu. Like an amateur anyone — the adults and the children in the Chua and in the Uy murderer respondent judge left telltale clues all around. A murderer, households, the security guards, the policemen who engaged the however, may have a strong motive. But what of a judge who knowingly robbers in battle — to say on the stand that Caramonte was indeed one commits a ‘revolting injustice’ or through gross ignorance of the law?’ of the robbers. 112 113 112 sSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974 113 In re: Rafael C. Climaco In re: Rafael C. Climaco “It could be gleaned from a careful perusal of the complaint that ‘The Uy spouses and Mateo Chua all took the stand.They and the other complainants bemoaned the fact that the respondent Judge conducted a members of the household were tiedup by the robbers, who then ‘secret ocular inspection’ of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz at about ransacked the two houses forabout an hour. Thereafter, some of them 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of Sunday, August 11, 1968, without were taken tothe seashore to prevent the police from firing on the anybody to guide him, much less in the presence of the prosecution and retreating robbers: concluded that such alleged secret ocular inspection was the basis of ‘Mateo Chua said at the trial: the Order of September 5, 1968. A painstaking scrutiny of the records as ‘Q —At about 9:30 in the evening of Dec. 31, 1967, where were you? well as the evidence presented by the parties does not show any A —I was in my house. A —My son untied me after the men left. Q —Do you remember anything unusual that happened that evening in your Court — house? This witness did not identify any of the accused? A —Yes, sir. Fiscal — Q A—Several men, pirates, came up my house and broke No, Your Honor. Q —Please tell the Court what happened? into my house. ‘On her part, Mrs. Ong Sy San (wife of Uy) related on the witness stand Q —About what time did you notice those pirates forced themselves inside that: your residence? Q —Please tell the Court what unusual thing happened that evening in your A —Between 9:30 and 10:00 that evening. house? Q —What was the first thing you noticed when the pirates as you said arrived? A —The robbers broke into our house. A —I was about to sleep when they came up, three of them went straight up Q —More or less, how many robbers broke into your house that evening of my house. Dec. 31, 1967? Q —How many floors has your house? A —About four or five. A —Two floors. Q —Were they armed? xx xx xx xx xx A —Yes, sir. ‘Q —What did the robbers do when they came up your house? xx xx xx xx xx A —They hogtied me and made me lie flat on the floor face down. Q —After the four or five persons fired their shots inside your house, what Q —At that time were not your family inside your house? did they do? A —Yes, sir, my children and my wife. A —We were downstairs when they broke into our house, using the axe at the Q —What did the robbers do with your wife and children? door and then after entering the first floor they went up. A —Because I was hogtied and was lying flat on the floor face down, I cannot xx xx xx xx xx tell what did they do to my wife and children. Q —Can you identify any of the robbers that came up your house from among Q —What did the robbers do in your house? the accused in the courtroom? A —They ransacked my house. A —I cannot, because I was frightened, I did not have a chance to look at Q —How many minutes did the armed robbers stay in your house? them. A —Almost one hour. ‘The bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness. Why could no one in the Chua and Uy households say that Carlos Caramonte was one xx xx xx xx xx of the team of robbers? 114 ‘The police battled with the raiders from a distance of about 60 11 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED meters, according to Patrolman Armando Maravilla. Two security guards 4 employed by Uy (Placencia and Giducos) remained with the besieged In re: Rafael C. Climaco families thruout the raid. ‘Security Guard Elias Giducos gave this testimony: Q —After nearly one hour, did the robbers who came up your house leave? 115 A —I don’t know because I was lying flat on the floor. VOL. 55, 115 Q —How did they come out, you cannot tell? JANUARY A —No, sir. 21, 1974 Q —Who untied you that evening? In re: Rafael C. Climaco Q —So what did you do after that? Q —At about 10:00 o’clock of that same evening of December 31, A —Because there was a policeman there, we asked him where our 1967, do you remember if there was anything unusual that companion security guard was. happened? Q —And what was his answer? A —Yes, sir. A —The policeman informed us that he did not report for duty and Q —What was that which happened? that it was Guarino who re- A —At about that time we heard a voice of a man and woman and 116 they asked us where we were guarding. 11 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q —What did you answer? 6 A —At that time we were on duty at the gate of the house of Mateo In re: Rafael C. Climaco Chua and then we heard the voice of a man and a woman. ported for duty that evening. Q —After you heard those voices of a man and a woman, what xx xx xx xx xx happened? Q —When you went down, what happened? A —Then we were told not to go to the seashore because there A —When I went down, Antonio Uy saw me so he reprimanded me. He said, were armed men. ‘Why are you walking there? Come up.’ Q —What did you do after hearing that? Q —And then you obeyed his order? You came up? A —My companion Antonio Placencia called me because he was A —Yes, sir. the one who had talked to those persons. He told me not to go to xx xx xx xx xx the seashore because there were armed men there. Q —What did Kaya Uy do when he heard the news? Q —What did you do after that? A —Our employer Antonio Uy told us not to resist. He said, ‘If they want to A —My companion also suggested that we better call the Police get something, just allow them to get it.’ Department by telephone because that was already 10:50 in the Q —What happened after that? evening. A —Because we were there with him, we went to his office to hide. Q —Were you able to call the Police Department by telephone ? Q —Did you notice anything while you were hiding there? A —We went to the house of Erning Tan because there is a A —Yes, sir, we heard something. telephone there connected with the Police Department and the Q —What did you hear? stand is also at the window overlooking the Caltex Station. So A —We heard several shots. Antonio Placencia told me to call the Police Department and tell xx xx xx xx xx them that there are armed men in the seas hore. Q —After the shots lasted, where did you go? Q —What did you do after that? A —After the shooting stopped, the mother of Antonio Uy came to him and A —Then we saw Erning Tan entered his store to use the telephone informed Mr. Uy that his wife was brought along by the armed men. and then we saw Antonio (Kaya) Uy on the other side so we Q —What did Mr. Uy do because you were there. went to him and told him that there were armed men in the A —He went down and returned to his own house. seashore and Antonio Uy told us. ‘If anything happen don’t Q —When Mr. Uy went down and returned to his own house, what did you resist because my children might be hit.' do? xx xx xx xx xx A —I followed him. Q —Where did you go? paucity of proof that respondent Judge has acted partially, or maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily or oppressively. A —To his house and I called the rest of the guards. Q —Were you able to reach his house? xx xx xx xx xx A —Yes, sir. — which indicates that many people in the compound must or could have In issuing the order of Sept. 5, 1968, respondent Judge as stated in seen some or all of the robbers — and yet no one could say that his answer, was guided by the Model Code of Evidence cited by Chief Caramonte was one of them. Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court. Whether in taking ‘The Court takes notice that the Uy Chua compound is the hub of a judicial notice of the facts stated in the order of September 5, 1968, large fishing industry, and is located barely 500 meters from the Cadiz respondent Judge erred or not, it is believed, this is not the proper forum police station and City Hall, Also that, there are many houses in the to dwell on the matter. Since this is an administrative case against him neighborhood. Under the circumstances, the failure of anyone — the the controlling factor should be the circumstances surrounding the members of the Chua and Uy households, the security issuance of such order — whether in doing so the respondent Judge was 117 arbitrary, corrupt, partial, or oppressive, As heretofore stated, the VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974 117 undersigned finds no proof beyond reasonable doubt along that line. In re: Rafael C. Climaco 118 guards and other employees of the fishing business, the police, the 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED neighbors—to perceive the presence of Caramonte at the time of the In re: Rafael C. Climaco attack raises doubts as to his participation therein.’ (Decision, pp. 12- “Furthermore, it appears from the record that the Office of the City 16). Fiscal received a copy of the Order of September 5, 1968 on September “Be that as it may, under Section 173 of the Revised Administrative 13, 1968. If it were true as alleged by the complainants that the Code, the grounds for removal of a judge of first instance are (1) serious issuance of such order was illegal and that the matters taken judicial misconduct and (2) inefficiency. For serious misconduct to exist, there notice of therein were wrong, it behooves upon Fiscal Zulueta, as the must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of prosecutor of the case, to seek for the reconsideration of such order and were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in at the same time to invite the attention of the court to the alleged persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. (In re Impeachment of errors, if there were any. But as the records show, the prosecution in the Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212). In the case at bar, there has been said case did not take any steps — from September 13 to September 21, no proof that in issuing the order of September 5, 1968 (Exh. B), and in or a span of eight days — to protect the interests of the State against rendering a judgment of acquittal the respondent Judge was inspired by what complainants herein term to be an ‘illegality.’ Of course, the a dishonest or corrupt intention which prompted him to violate the law complainants herein lean on the argument that — or to disregard well-known legal rules. In fact, in spite of the biting ‘Fiscal Zulueta — language of the complainants in their complaint and in their ‘Because if I do that, Your Honor, respondent Judge memorandum, they admit that the respondent Judge is not dishonest as would realize his mistake which we believe malicious.’ (p. far as they know. Of course, there has been an insinuation that 29, t.s.n.). ‘respondent Judge prostituted this Court and acquitted, obviously in bad It may be pertinent to state at this juncture, that this attitude of the faith, Councilor Caramonte of Bantayan, province of Cebu, in all prosecution in Criminal Case No. 690 does not appear to be likelihood because of the dirty hands of power politics.’ Inasmuch as commendable. A prosecutor should lay before the court fairly and fully proceedings against judges as the case at bar, have been said to be every fact and circumstance known to him to exist, without regard to governed by the rules of law applicable to penal cases, the charges whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt (In re accused (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 123) and to this may be Horrilleno, supra), and it is incumbent upon the complainants to prove added without regard to any personal conviction or presumption of what their case not by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a reasonable the Judge may do or is disposed to do. Prosecuting officers are doubt, and in this venture, it is believed they failed. There is, indeed, a ‘presumed to be men learned in the law, of a high character, and to perform their duties impartially and with but one object in view, that being that justice may be meted out to all violators of the law and that enemistad, el odio o cualquiera otra pasión bastarda y corrompida. Esta no innocent man be punished (Malcolm, p. 124). In the pursuit of that es la prevaricación verdadera.”1 solemn obligation, therefore, personal conviction should be ignored lest To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust it may lead to a sacrifice of the purpose sought to be achieved. judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be Fortunately, in Criminal Case No. 690, the very witness of the shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted without complainants, affirmed the correctness of the matters taken judicial malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that notice of by the respondent Judge. Thus, Mr. Agustin Javier, lone witness diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the for the complainants, testified — rendering of any public service. 2 Negligence and ignorance are ‘Atty. Aquino — inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. 3 Inexcusable mistake only exists in the Q —When Fiscal Zulueta on September 13, 1968 showed you that order of legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such Judge Climaco wherein he stated that he was taking judicial notice that the injustice which can- Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is a hub of a large fishing _______________ industry operating in the Visayas; that said compound is only around five 1 hundred (500) meters from the City Hall in Cadiz and that the neighborhood Viada, IV Codigo Penal 1926 Ed., pp. 305-306. 2 Groizard, 4 El Codigo Penal Español, 1912 Ed. is well lighted 3 Decisions of Supreme Court of Spain, March 28, 1911 and April 24, 119 1912. VOL. 55, JANUARY 119 120 21, 1974 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In re: Rafael C. Climaco In re: Rafael C. Climaco and well populated, after reading that order did you not be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is a make any comment to Fiscal Zulueta? misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable A —No, sir. manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.1 Q —But the statements here in the order are true? It is also well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise A —Yes, you mean the ‘Uy-Chua Compound’? his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally, for any error he Q —I mean the statements in the order are true? commits, provided he acts in good faith. From a review of the record, We find that the decision of respondent A —Yes, sir. (pp. 64-65, t.s.n.)’ ” contains clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. We The charges impute upon respondent (a) dereliction of duty or cannot conclude on the basis thereof that respondent has knowingly misconduct in office (prevaricación), which contemplates the rendition of rendered an unjust judgment, much less could it be held that an unjust judgment knowingly, and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly respondent in the performance of his duty has failed to observe the unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance. diligence, prudence and care required by law.4 In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an As noted in the aforecited report, the Acting City Fiscal of Cadiz had unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is employed offensive and abusive language in his complaint and unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and memorandum. It bears emphasis that the use in pleadings of language the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an disrespectful to the court or containing offensive personalities serves no injustice. “Es tan preciso,” commented Viada, “que la falta se cometa useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt. 5 a sabiendas, esto es, con malicia, con voluntad reflexiva, que en cada We must repeat what this Court thru Justice Sanchez stated in an de uno de estos articulos vemos consignada dicha expresion para que earlier case:6 por nadie y en ningun caso se confunda la falta de justicia producida por “A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, ‘like the court itself, an ignorancia, la preocupación o el error, con la que solo inspira la instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.’ (People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855.). His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, ‘not to promote might yield the impression that to do so is to magnify a trifling distrust in the administration of justice.’ (In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602.). difference. That risk, if so it is, I take if only to give expression to a point Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine of view not infused with too great a significance, I must admit, but the judicial edifice ‘is disastrous to the continuity of government and to possessed, in my way of thinking, of an implication that did preclude a the attainment of the liberties of the people.’ (Malcolm, Legal and full and complete acceptance Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160.). 122 ________________ 122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 4 In re: Rafael C. Climaco Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, February 19, 1891. 5 Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil., 724. of what is set forth in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court. 6 Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, L-11071, January 9, Hence this brief concurrence. 1972, 31 SCRA 1, 16-17, 19. In addition to exonerating respondent Judge of the charges filed against him by another city fiscal, Norberto L. Zulueta of Capiz, the 121 resolution of this Court would censure the complainant for the use of VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974 121 offensive and abusive language. On both grounds, I am fully in In re: Rafael C. Climaco agreement. I am not, at this stage, prepared to go along, however, with Thus has it been said of a lawyer that ‘[a]s an officer of the court, it is the last clause in the dispositive portion of our resolution with its his own and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that “warning that repetition of the same may constrain Us to impose a more high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper severe sanction.”1 It is not that such a penalty would be inappropriate. administration of justice.’ ” (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 530.). Certainly, a proper sense of decorum, not to say the degree of civility x x x It has been said that ‘[a] lawyer’s language should be dignified in expected of a dignitary like a city fiscal, ought to have cautioned against keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.’ (5 Martin, op. cit., p. resort to what Dean Pound aptly termed epithetical jurisprudence. To 97.). It is Sotto’s duty as a member of the Bar ‘[t]o abstain from all paraphrase the then Chief Justice Bengzon in Lagumbay v. offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or Comelec,2 the employment of intemperate language serves no purpose reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the but to detract from the force of the argument. That is to put at its cause with which he is charged.’ (Section 20 (f), Rule 138, Rules of mildest a well-deserved reproach to such a propensity. A member of the Court).” bar who has given vent to such expressions of ill will, not to say We have analyzed the facts, and there is nothing on the basis thereof malevolence, betrays gross disrespect not only to the adverse party, but which would in any manner justify their inclusion in the pleadings. also to this Tribunal. That is not all there is to the matter though. I view WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby exonerated of the with a certain degree of misgiving, perhaps not altogether justified, the aforestated charges. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. Zulueta, of Cadiz City, warning as to the more severe penalty to be inflicted in case of a is, nevertheless, censured for his use of offensive and abusive language repetition of such offense thus made in the dispositive portion of the in the complaint and other pleadings filed with this Court, with a warning opinion for, to my mind, it could, in some way, however slight, limit the that repetition of the same may constrain Us to impose a more severe freedom of a future Court to deal with such a situation if and when it sanction. occurs. It is only in that sense that I am unable to join the rest of my Makalintal, colleagues in yielding complete and unconditional assent to the highly C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur. persuasive and otherwise impeccable opinion of Justice Antonio. Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur in a separate opinion. SEPARATE OPINION Barredo, Makasiar and Aquino, JJ., took no part. TEEHANKEE, J.: FERNANDO, J., concurring: I concur in the result of the main opinion of Mr. Justice The high quality of craftsmanship that is so typical of the work of Justice _____________ Antonio is once again in evidence. What is more, his opinion for the Court is so well-researched and so thorough that to add a few words 1 Adm. Case No. 134-J. In re: Rafael C. Climaco 2 L-25444, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 175. closed matter, although the prosecutor-complainant could cite the fear 123 and terror under which the victims-witnesses were held by the notorious VOL. 55, JANUARY 21, 1974 123 band of pirates who hogtied them and made them lie on the floor face In re: Rafael C. Climaco down. They had previously ordered their security guards to offer no Antonio, which exonerates respondent judge of the charges, since a resistance “because (their) children might be hit” and the wife of one of judicial officer required to exercise his judgment or discretion who in the them (Mr. Uy) was brought along by the armed men as a hostage. 2 process acquits an accused on grounds of reasonable doubt in view of The purpose of this brief opinion is merely to avoid any undue his non-identification by the prosecution witnesses (notwithstanding his inference of approval or sanction of the ex-parte ocular inspection admission and “the damaging inferences derived from his staying away conducted by respondent judge. As noted by then Solicitor General, now (as a newly elected councilor) from the ceremony (on January 1, 1968) Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his comment 3 “the validity of the when the newly-elected officials of Bantayan (Cebu) were inducted into ocular inspection conducted by the lower court is open to doubt.” office” as he was charged with participation in the pirate raid in Cadiz Indeed, such ex parte ocular inspection conducted by respondent City on the night of December 31, 1967, as noted by respondent judge judge alone without notice to nor the presence of the parties him self in his decision) 1 may not be held liable criminally or and after the case had already been submitted for decision was administratively for any error of judgment that he may commit, absent improperly made and may not be sanctioned. If he had entertained any showing of bad faith, corruption, malice, a deliberate intent to doubts that he wished to clear up after the trial had already terminated, violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules and he should have ordered motu proprio the reopening of the trial for the principles. purpose, with due notice to the parties for their participation therein is Respondent judge based his acquittal verdict on the stated premises essential to due process. that “(T)he bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness. Why As succinctly restated by Chief Justice Moran, “(T)he inspection or could no one in the Chua and Uy households say that Carlos Caramonte view outside the courtroom should be made in the presence of the was one of the team of robbers” and followed this up with a statement parties or at least with previous notice to them in order that they may of judicial notice that “the Uy Chua compound is the hub of a large show the object to be viewed. Such inspection or view is a part of the fishing industry, and is located barely 500 meters from the Cadiz police trial, inasmuch as evidence is thereby being received, which is expressly station and City Hall. Also that there are many houses in the authorized by law. The parties are entitled to be present at any stage of neighborhood. Under the circumstances, the failure of anyone — the the trial, and consequently they are entitled to be at least notified of the members of the Chua and Uy households, the security guards and other time and place set for the view. It is an error for the judge to go alone to employees of the fishing business, the police, the neighbors — to the land in question, or to the place where the crime was committed and perceive the presence of Caramonte at the time of the attack raises take a view, without previous knowledge or consent of the doubts as to his participation therein.” parties, inspected the place of collision, and in his decision stated that Such taking of judicial notice in turn was the result of an ex- after having viewed the place, he parte ocular inspection conducted by himself alone without notice to nor _______________ the presence of the parties on August 11, 1968, over a month after the 2 hearings had been closed and the case submitted for decision on July 1, At pages 7-10, main opinion. 3 1968 and is the main target of the present complaint. At page 3, main, opinion. In view of the result reached, respondent judge’s verdict of acquittal 125 on the ground of non-identification is now a VOL, 55, JANUARY 21, 1974 125 _____________ In re: Rafael C. Climaco 1 was convinced that the testimony of one of the witnesses was At page 6, main opinion. incredible.”4 124 As was aptly held by the appellate court in setting aside such ex- 124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED parte ocular inspection conducted by a trial judge “(W)e know of no rule of law or practice which authorizes a trial judge, after a cause had been submitted to him for determination, to search of his own motion and without the consent of the parties for extrinsic testimony and circumstances, and apply what he may learn in this way to corroborate the testimony upon one side or to cast discredit on the testimony of the adverse party.”5 Respondent exonerated. Notes.—Use of Intemperate or Disrespectful Language. —Where an attorney representing one of the parties to litigation employs intemperate language in hearings or in pleadings, the remedy is to cite him for contempt or take other administrative measures; not being, personally, a party to the action, he cannot be subject to a counterclaim by reason of what he says or does in his representative capacity. (De Borja vs. De Borja, L-6622, July 31, 1957.) Statements of an attorney for plaintiff and appellant in an action against a surety company regarding tactics of the surety company and its unjustified delay in paying the claim, though strongly worded, did not require censure or finding him in contempt of the Supreme Court where the statements in question appeared to be justified from the record and by expressed sentiments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Philippine Surety & Insurance Co. vs. Royal Oil Products, Inc., L- 9981, October 31, 1957.
LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE
See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume one, page 826 on Evidence.
______________ 4 5 Moran’s Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 81, emphasis supplied. 5 Idem, at p. 82, quoting from Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. vs. Ward Auction Co. 47 Colo. 446, cited in Balon vs. Moreno, 57 Phil. 60, 69. 126 126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In re: Rafael C. Climaco See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume two, page 1044 on Judges; and page 1054 on Judgment. Batacan, D. Fl., Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1973 Edition.