Jose Vera v Jose Avelino

Ponente: Bengzon

FACTS:
The Commission on Elections submitted on May 1946 to the President and the
Congress . . . a report regarding the recent national elections.

It stated that due to acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces e.g. Pampanga,
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in the said regions did not reflect the
accurate number of votes.

During the session on May 25, a resolution, referring to the COMELEC report, was
approved that Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn, nor seated in
Senate.

The 3 were among the 16 candidates for Senators who received the highest number of
votes. They have been proclaimed by COMELEC. The electoral protest had been filed
at the Electoral Tribunal.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action (Preliminary Injunction) against the

other Senators who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them
to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties.

Respondents assert the validity of the Pendatun resolution.

ISSUE:
WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case.
WON the Senate has exceeded its powers.
WON it was respondents’ legally inescapable duty to permit petitioners to take their seats.
 WON respondents can be called to account for their votes regarding the assailed resolution.

RULING:
Petition was dismissed.

HELD:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the Senate or
Legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political
in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts

P SC D
Supreme Court has 1. SC said they have no jurisdiction.
jurisdiction over the case. *Due to the separation of powers, the Court has no actual jurisdiction over the
case. It had already established this in Alejandrino v. Quezon. It is however
alleged that the ruling in Angara v Electoral Commission modified this doctrine;
this is not true as the Court specifically cited Alejandrino in Angara to justify
their lack of jurisdiction over that case, as well as this one.

--“To prevent candidates from taking oath and becoming a member of the
Senate is a legislative function. The Courts don’t have power to reinstate that
member.”
--For SC to order the Legislature to reinstate its member would be judicial
predominance, and this is a violation of the separation of powers. This will be
usurpation of the Judiciary of the Legislative branch.

In Alejandrino v Quezon, SC can’t issue mandamus and injunction to Senate

nullify Alejandrino’s suspension on the reason of separation of powers.
“Mandamus cannot lie against the legislative body. . . “

Angara v Electoral Commission did not modify A v Q doctrine. Here, SC said

that it had jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission, but it didn’t require the
SC to issue a prohibition on the Senate.

*SC said: Judiciary is not the repository of all political and social issues

*SC also don’t find provision in the Constitution which outlaws the step taken by
the Senate i.e. preventing P to assume office. The Resolution was within
Senate’s powers.

2. Writ of Prohibition prayed by petitioners cannot be granted.

*Under the law, prohibition refers to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, exercising judicial or ministerial functions.
*The Senate’s function is legislative in nature, so the writ of prohibition is not
applicable.

Senate has exceeded its 3. SC said Senate has not exceeded its powers
powers. *The Senate has the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and
that member’s right to participate in its deliberations.
--The assignment of contests regarding elections to the Electoral Tribunal
does not negate this power.

*SC said that the Senate has powers under Art. VI, Sec.10 (3) of the 1935
Constitution to set its own rules for its proceedings, and it exercises this power
to promulgate orders to maintain its prestige and dignity. It could be said to
have done this in this case in order to make sure that these Senators really
were elected properly
 *Each House of the Philippine Legislature always has the power to defer oath-
taking of any member who has been lodged with a protest.
Basis: SC looked at discussions of the Constitutional Convention
--The minutes showed that instead of transferring all the powers of the
House or Senate to the Electoral Commission as the “sole judge of the
election, returns,” it was given only jurisdiction on “all election CONTESTS.”
--Composition is 3 Justices of SC, 6 members chosen by National Assembly.
--Final provision in the Constitution states: “There shall be an Electoral
Commission . . . and shall be the sole judge of all election contests. . . “

3a. Justices in the Electoral Tribunals

*The designation of several justices to the Electoral Tribunal did not disqualify
them in the litigation.

3b. Doubt and Presumption

*SC said it is presumed that the Senate has acted within its Constitutional
powers. Rule 123, Sec 69, ROC

In US v Weed, it was decided “It is a general principle to presume that public

officers act correctly until the contrary is shown.”

*SC said that mere possibility of abuse of the Senate of its power is no
conclusion that there is abuse of power.

P assert that it was 4. Alleged Duty of the Respondents

respondents’s duty to permit *SC said that Sec 12, CA 725 only applies if the proclamation had been clear
P to assume office in the and clean.
Senate. *It does not imply that if a member is disqualified, then the Senate cannot deny
his admission.
Sec 12, CA 725
“The candidates for Member
of the HoR and Senate who
have been proclaimed by
COMELEC shall assume
office . . . “
Respondents can be called 5. Parliamentary Privileges
to account for their votes *SC said that respondent Senators, in their votes for the resolution, are
regarding the assailed protected by Sec 15, Art VI of the Constitution – “for any speech or debate in
resolution. Congress, Senators and Congressmen shall not be questioned in any other
place.”

--US Supreme Court has interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a
vote or the presentation of a resolution. – Kilbourn v Thompson
--Congressional immunity’s purpose is not to protect members against
prosecution, but to support the rights of the people and execute their
 functions without fear of prosecution.

Other Opinions
Hilado concurring: It is clear that what are involved in the case are political rights and political questions, where the remedy of injunction is not applicable for those
purposes.

Tuason concurring and dissenting:

*The Senate overstepped its boundaries when it issued the Pendatun Resolution. It trespassed on a territory entirely reserved for the Electoral Tribunal.

Electoral Tribunal is supreme, absolute, and exclusive in its jurisdiction being the sole judge of all election contests, after having been lodged with the power. Its
seeing all election contests implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly

Perfecto dissenting:
*From Sec 11, Art VI of the Consti, it is evident that the power to judge “all election contests” solely is lodged exclusively on the Electoral Tribunal. By the Pendatun
Resolution which respondents encroached on and usurped the power of the Electoral Tribunal. The Pendatun Resolution is null and void.

Perfecto added: Two former members of the Constitutional Convention declared resolution invalid. Framers are in a better position to interpret the Consti.

Facts of the Case:

The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason
of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the
accurate feedback of the local electorate.

During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who
had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn,
nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.

Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats
and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

Issues of the Case:

Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the
protests lodged against their elections.

Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of
the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and
therefore not under the juridical review of the courts

The case is therefore dismissed

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; MANDAMUS; LEGISLATIVE BODY NOT COMPELLABLE BY, TO PERFORM LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS.—
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of purely legislative duties.

2.ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVISE LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—The judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary
and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO ANNUL LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT.—In proper cases and with appropriate parties, this court may annul any legislative
enactment that fails to observe the constitutional limitations.
4.ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY NOT REPOSITORY OF REMEDIES FOR ALL POLIT-ICAL OR SOCIAL WRONGS.—The judiciary is not the respository of remedies for all
political or social ills.
5.ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION; SCOPE OF.—Prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial.
As the respondents exercise legislative functions, the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.
6.ID.; ID.; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; AUTHORITY OF; FUNCTIONS OF ASSEMBLY ON ELECTION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS.—The Constitutional
Convention circumscribed the authority of the Electoral Tribunal to "contests" relating to the election, etc., and did not intend to give it all the functions of the Assembly on
the subject of election and qualifications of its members.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The House or Senate retains the authority to defer the oath-taking of any of its members, pending an election contest.
8.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any
member and the latter's right to participate in its deliberations.
9.ID.; ID.; CONGRESS; EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations, as are found
in the Republic's Constitution.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; SENATE; POWER TO ADOPT RULES FOR ITS PROCEEDINGS.—The Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, has the constitutional power
to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by legislative practice the power to promulgate such orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its
dignity.
11.ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT; JUSTICES DESIGNATED TO ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL NOT DISQUALIFIED IN CASE AT BAR.—The designation of several justices to
the electoral tribunals did not disqualify them in this litigation.
12.ID.; ID.; LEGISLATURE; PRESUMPTION THAT IT ACTED WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS.—It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its
constitutional powers.
13.ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION OF CONSTITUTION; WEIGHT OF PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.—The proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention are less conclusive of the proper construction of the constitution than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute.
14.ID.; ID.; CONGRESS; DUTY OF PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES TO ASSUME OFFICE AND ATTEND SESSION.—Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 725 is
addressed to the individual member of Congress, imposes on him the obligation to come to Manila, and join his colleagues in regular session, and does not imply that if,
for any reason, he is disqualified, the House is powerless to postpone his admission.
15.ID.; ID.; ID.; IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS FOR SPEECH OR DEBATE; GIVING OF VOTE OR PRESENTATION OF RESOLUTION INCLUDED.—The constitutional
provision that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, Senators and Congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place," includes the giving of a vote or the
presen-tation of a resolution.
Per PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
16.CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; EXCLUSIVE POWER TO JUDGE ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS,
AND QUALIFICATIONS OF SENATORS AND REPRESENTATIVES.—The power to judge "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of senators
and representatives, is exclusively lodged in the respective Electoral Tribunal, the exclusivity being emphasized by the use of the word "sole" by the drafters of the
Constitution.
17.ID.; CONSTITUTION; CO-AUTHORS IN BETTER POSITION TO CONSTRUE.—The co-authors of the fundamental law are in a better position to construe the very
document in which they have infused the ideas which boild in their minds, and gave a definite form to their own conviction and decisions.
18.In.; SENATE; "QUORUM" TO DO BUSINESS.—To do business, the Senate, being composed of 24 members, needs the presence of at least 13 senators. "A smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members," but not in exercising any other power, such as the adoption of the Pendatun
Resolution.
19.CRIMINAL LAW; FAILURE TO DISCHARGE ELECTIVE OFFICE; PENALTY.—If senators should fail to discharge the duties of their respective offices, they will incur
criminal responsibility and may be punished, according to the Revised Penal Code, with arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos or both.
20.ID. ; VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY ; PENALTY.-—No one may prevent senators from performing the duties of their office, such as attending the
meetings of the Senate or of any of its committees or subcommittees, or from expressing their opinions or casting their votes, without being criminally guilty of a violation
of parliamentary immunity, a criminal offense punished by the Penal Code with prisión mayor.
21.CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; SENATE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS AND PROCLAMATION CONCLUSIVE AS TO
RlGHT OF CANDIDATES PROCLAIMED TO SEAT IN SENATE.—The petitioners' credentials consisting of the certificate of canvass and proclamation of election issued
by the Commission on Elections, are conclusive as to their right to their seats in the Senate.
22.ID.; ELECTORAL COMMISSION; POWER OF; EXTENT.—The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
23.ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS; VULGAR NOTION OF.—The vulgar notion of separation of powers appears to be simple, rudimentary, and clear-cut. As a
consequence, the principle of separation of powers creates in the mind of the ignorant or uninitiated the images of the different departments of government as individual
units, each one existing independently, all alone by itself, completely disconnected from the remaining all others. The picture in their mental panorama offers, in effect,
the appearance of each department as a complete government by itself. Each governmental department appears to be a veritable state in the general set up of the
Philippine state, like the autonomous kingdoms and princedoms of the maharajahs of India.
24.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION OF.—The only acceptable conception of the principle of separation of powers within our democracy is the constitutional
one. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive
under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check
that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a
check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointment of certain officers; and the concurrence of
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established,,. to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
25.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; WHOLE GOVERNMENT AS A UNIT.—The idea of unity is fundamental in. the Constitution. The whole government must be viewed as a unit, and all
departments and other government organs, agencies and instrumentalities as parts of that unit in the same way as the head, the hands, and the heart are parts of a
human body. As a matter of fact, there is no government power vested exclusively in any authority, office, or government agency. To understand well the true meaning of
the principle of separation of powers, it is necessary to remember and pay special attention to the fact that the idea of separation refers, not to departments, organs, or
other government agencies, but to powers exercised. The things separated are not the subject of the powers, but the functions to be performed. It means division of
functions, but not of officials or organs which Will perform them. It is analogous to the economic principle of division of labor practised in a factory where multiple
manufacturing processes are performed to produce a finished article.
26.ID.; ID.; ID.; SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; POWER TO JUDGE. ELECTORAL CONTESTS AND TO SUSPEND IN RELATION THERETO; CASE AT BAR.—
From the facts of the case, it is evident that respondents encroached upon, invaded, and usurped the ancillary power to suspend petitioners in relation to the power to
judge electoral contests concerning senators, a power which the Constitution specifically assigns to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, exclusive of all other departments,
agencies, or organs of government. The power of suspension is accessory, adjective, complementary, and" ancillary to the substantial power to judge said electoral
contests. The accessory must follow the principal; the adjective, the substantive; the complementary, the complemented.
27.ID.; SENATE; POWER TO SUSPEND MEMBERS, LACK OF.—The Senate lacks the power of suspension, not only as ancillary remedy in senatorial election
contests, but even in the exercise of the Senate judicial power to punish its members for disorderly conduct.
28.ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION TO DECIDE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OR NULLITY OF SENATE RESOLUTION.—The
principle of separation of powers can not be invoked to deny the Supreme Court jurisdiction in this case, because to decide the question of validity or nullity of the
Pendatun Resolution, of whether petitioners are illegally deprived of their constitutional rights and privileges as senators of the Philippines, of whether respondents must
or must not be enjoined by injunction or prohibition from illegally and unconstitutionally trampling.upon the constitutional and legal rights of petitioners, is a function
judicial in nature and, not having been assigned by the Constitution to other department of government, is logically within the province of courts of justice, including the
Supreme Court.
29.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER TO DECLARE LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.—If the law enacted is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has the power to declare it so and deny
effect to the same.
30.ID.; ID.; ID.; ANGARA vs. ELECTORAL COMMISSION (63 PHIL., 139), PARALLEL WITH CASE AT BAR.—The facts and legal issues in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil., 139), are in exact parallel with those in the case at bar. Since the decision in that case has been written, the question as to the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide controversies such as the present one and to grant redress for or against parties like those included in this litigation, has been
unmistakably and definitely settled in this jurisdiction.
31.CONTEMPT; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO PUNISH SENATORS FOR CONTEMPT.—Should the respondent senators disobey any order of the Supreme Court,
they may be punished for contempt.
32.CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ELECTION CONTESTS; SCOPE UNDER CONSTITUTION.—The election contests mentioned in section
11 of Article VI of the Constitution include contests "relating to qualifications" of the respective members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
33.ID.; CONSTITUTION; CHARACTER OF.—The Constitution of the Philippines is both a grant and a limitation of powers of Government decreed by our people, on
whom sovereignty resides and from whom all government authority emanates.
34.ID.; CONGRESS; LEGISLATIVE POWER NOT VESTED IN ANY BRANCH ALONE.—The legislative power is vested in Congress, composed of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, and not in any of its branches alone.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Preliminary injunction.

The acts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Jose W. Diokno and Antonio Barredo for petitioners.

Vicente J, Francisco and Solicitor General Tañada for respondents.

J. Antonio Araneta of the Lawyers' Guild as amicus curisæ. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, No. L-543 August 31, 1946
G.R. No. 4349           September 24, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant.

Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.

1.HARBOR RULES.—Rules for local navigation prescribed by the collector of a port as harbor master pursuant to statutory authority may be
sustained as not an undue exercise of a delegated legislative power.

2.ID.—A rule for prohibiting the moving of heavily laden boats in the Pasig River otherwise than by steam or other adequate power is valid the statute
declares the violation of the rule a misdemeanor.

3.ID.; PENALTY.—Quære as to a statute which authorizes the collector to make a rule not only particularizing the offensive acts but also declaring the
penalties for its violation.

4.DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is the exercise of a legislative power which can not be
delegated to a subordinate authority.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. (No. 3085. April 24, 1907.)

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court

Ortigas & Fisher, for appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for appellee. UNITED STATES VS. BARRIAS., 11 Phil. 327, No. 4349 September 24, 1908

TRACEY, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular
Collector of Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 1 After a demurrer to the complaint of the
lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without
steam, sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other
adequate power.

Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:

 For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the
discretion of the court.

In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and,
second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting
an illegal delegation of legislative power.

The Attorney-General does not seek to sustain the conviction but joins with the counsel for the defense in asking for the discharge of the prisoner on the first
ground stated by the defense, that the rule of the Collector cited was unauthorized and illegal, expressly passing over the other question of the delegation of
legislative power.

By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other
exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5
and 8 read as follows:

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules
and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the
Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment
for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in
this section or by both.

Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming
within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she
was navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of Manila. This spot is near the mouth of the river, the docks whereof are used for the
purpose of taking on and discharging freight, and we entertain no doubt that it was in right sense a part of the harbor, without having recourse to the definition of
paragraph 8 of Customs Administrative Circular No. 136, which reads as follows:

The limits of a harbor for the purpose of licensing vessels as herein prescribed (for the lighterage and harbor business) shall be considered to include its
confluent navigable rivers and lakes, which are navigable during any season of the year.

The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region
and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are
in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power.

The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs
Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to
"fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.
This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to
any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted
can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional
limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United
States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect
improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor
was declared not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for
the use of canals. (U.S. vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his
rules was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to
designate and stamps on oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):

The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used
was a mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. . . .

In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and counsel the power to make pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon
et al., 135 Mass. 175).

In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners
can not impose a penalty under statues authorizing them to do so, the court saying:

Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay,
the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.

Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary
that we should pass on the questions discussed in the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not material,
as we have frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.

We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section Act No. 1136.

So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby
convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.