Alvizo M3 Civil Procedure Caseassign Number 4
Alvizo M3 Civil Procedure Caseassign Number 4
Alvizo
Civil Procedure M3
April 13, 2020
ii. Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 and is the
acknowledged natural child of Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), former governor
of the said province, and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased
iii. He averred that while his parents did not marry each other, he has been
known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has been using
the said surname in all of his official and legal documents
iv. In support of his petition, he also presented a copy of his birth certificate
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan,
Catanduanes showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full
name
2. A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2)
sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named
in the petition, and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested
or affected parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial
correction of an entry in the civil registry should implead as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have
or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
4. Similarly, in Republic v. Uy, the Court nullified the trial court's order
to correct respondent's entry for the latter's failure to implead and
notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her parents and
siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections sought.
8. In Republic v. CA, the Court held that the proceedings of the trial
court were null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the petitioners
therein failed to implead the civil registrar, an indispensable party,
in the petition for correction of entry, viz.:
ii. In August 1992, Rodolfo Lasay, the incumbent barangay captain of barangay
Gimaloto of the municipality of Sorsogon and an aspirant for the position of
president of the ABC of the said municipality, filed with the RTC against the
SB of Sorsogon a petition for declaratory relief and injunction
iii. He claims that the term of office of Galarosa as an ex officio member of the
SB of Sorsogon is coterminous with that, of the said SB which expired on
June 30, 1992; hence there was a need for the new election of an ABC
representative. Lasay prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining the SB of
Sorsogon from recognizing Galarosa as an ex officio member and for the
holding in abeyance of GALAROSA's salaries
iv. The SB of Sorsogon asked for the dismissal of the petition because (a) Lasay
has no legal right to file the petition, it being is based on pure speculative
rights, and (b) the petition is premature since the resolution of the issues
raised may still be the subject of rules and regulations to implement Sec.
494 of the Code
v. RTC granted the injunction declaring that Galarosa can no longer serve after
the expiration of the term. Unable to accept the decision, GALAROSA filed
this petition which we have decided to treat as one for certiorari under Rule
65
vi. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its comment. While not explicitly
saying so, it asked the SC to grant the petition and to set aside the
challenged decision because there respondent Judge should have dismissed
the action on the ground that Galarosa who was to be directly affected by
the petition of LASAY, was not named a party-respondent; in view of this
"non-joinder of proper party," respondent Judge should have dismissed the
petition outright pursuant to Section 5, Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court
5. That decision must be set aside for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since an
indispensable party, GALAROSA was not effectively impleaded and
recognized as a party in the case and given the opportunity to file a
responsive pleading
ii. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26537 was issued in the name of Marciana
de Dios who later mortgaged the land to Kaluyagan Rural Bank in San Carlos
City, Pangasinan.
iii. Thereafter, a petition for the settlement of the estate of Augusta Lozano was
filed by the plaintiffs in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. On
November 18, 1965, plaintiffs through the administrator filed an inventory
which included said lot Q
iv. De Dios sold lot Q to defendant Ignacio Ballesteros and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 63171 was later transferred in his name
v. Plaintiffs filed an action for reconveyance against De Dios in Civil Case No. D-
1953, alleging that the estate of Augusto Lozano is the absolute owner of
Lots Q, O and B. On June 8, 1967, the court rendered a default decision in
favor of the plaintiffs. However, the judgment was not satisfied on the
ground that De Dios was insolvent and did not have any registered property
4. We believe that the point of the appellee was well taken by the
court and We therefore conclude that the defendant-appellee was
correctly considered as an indispensable party, ergo, the court
cannot rule that said party is bound by the previous decision in favor
of the appellants
iii. In defense, DPDCI alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was
“a mere preparatory draft”. HLURB rendered its decision in favor of
petitioners. DPDCI filed with the CA its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
on the ground that HLURB acted without or beyond its jurisdiction.
iv. The CA ruled that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
petitioners as the controversy did not fall within the scope of the
administrative agency’s authority
ii. The Complaint did not implead as parties the concerned corporation, some
of the transferees, transferors and other parties involved in the assailed
transactions. People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. (People's Broadcasting) is a
private corporation authorized to operate, own, maintain, install, and
construct radio and television stations in the Philippines
iv. Even as it tracked the movements of shares, Sycip Gorres Velayo and Co.
declined to give a categorical statement on equity ownership as People's
Broadcasting's corporate records were incomplete. On June 23, 2003,
v. Marcelino, Jr., Ma. Elena, and Raul Muyco filed before the Regional Trial
Court a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and Sale
of Shares in People's Broadcasting Service, Inc. and All Posterior
Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages against Diamel
Corporation, Rogelio, Sr., Imelda Florete, Margaret Florete, and Rogelio
Florete, Jr.
vi. The Marcelino, Jr. Group seeks to nullify the following transactions on the
shares of stock of People's Broadcasting, as noted in the report of Sycip
Gorres Velayo and Co.The Rogelio, Sr. Group filed their Answer with
compulsory counterclaim
vii. The Regional Trial Court issued a Decision (which it called a "Placitum")
dismissing the Marcelino, Jr. Group's Complaint. It ruled that the
Marcelino, Jr. Group did not have a cause of action against the Rogelio, Sr.
Group. It also ruled that indispensable parties were not joined in their
Complaint
viii. The Regional Trial Court granted Rogelio, Sr.' compulsory counterclaim for
moral and exemplary damages amounting to P25,000,000.00 and
P5,000,000.00, respectively, reasoning that Rogelio, Sr. suffered from the
besmirching of his personal and commercial reputation. The Court of
Appeals denied the Marcelino, Jr. Group's Petition and affirmed the trial
court Decision
ii. However, Andigan did not turn over the new TCTs to Magrare, Palcat and
Bayombong, and the latter were unaware of the subdivision. Andigan
mortgaged the same three lots to petitioner and the latter came into
possession of the owner's duplicate copies of 3 TCTs. Magrare, Palcat and
Bayombong registered their respective adverse claims on 3 TCTs.
iii. RTC directed that spouses Andigan to surrender or deliver to the Register of
Deeds for Antique the owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs. Spouses
Andigan through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal but was dismissed
3. Since he was already dead at the time the case was filed by
petitioner, the heirs of Bayombong stand in his stead not only as
parties in interest, but indispensable parties. Without the heirs of
Bayombong to represent the interest of Bayombong, there can be
no complete determination of all the issues presented by petitioner.
ii. In this case the court ruled that it is impossible to determine with certainty
which estate would be least prejudiced by the establishment of an
easement for petitioner until these parties have been heard. Any decision
holding them liable to bear the easement would not be binding on them
since they are not parties to this action
iii. Private respondents contend that a third-party complaint is not the proper
mode of joining other property owners in the suit because those owners
have no legal tie with the owners of the estate sought to be burdened with
the easement (herein private respondents) so as to make them liable to the
latter for "contribution, indemnity, and subrogation,
iv. As provided in Rule 6, § 12 (now § 11) of the Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 12. Third party complaint. A third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim
ii. Private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 59, a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the
petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante
iii. The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president,
filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of
the principal obligations. According to them, Christian had no cause of
action because the three promissory notes were not yet due and
demandable
iv. In due course and after hearing, the trial court rendered a decision5 on 5
May 2000 declaring the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and
14 March 1997 as already due and demandable and that the interest on the
loans had been reduced by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. It then
ordered the petitioner corporation to pay Christian the amount of $100,000
representing the principal obligation covered by the promissory notes
v. The TC held that when the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none
of the promissory notes was due and demandable. As of this date however,
the first and the second promissory notes have already matured. Hence,
payment is already due
vi. Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint
which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented
without objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the
time he filed the instant complaint, as defendants' obligation are not yet due
and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the first two
promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the
obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due and
demandable
6. It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet
accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of
action while the case is pending.16 Such an action is prematurely
brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which should be
dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the
defendant. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person
should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for
complaints which are immature
ii. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
inasmuch as it alleged a cause of action for forcible entry, which occurred
within one year before the complaint was filed, the Court of First Instance
had no jurisdiction over the case. it should be filed the proper inferior court
iii. Without awaiting the resolution of that motion, Celestina Gumabay filed an
amended complaint wherein she alleged that the defendants claimed to be
the owners of the land. She transformed her forcible entry action into an
action to quiet title
iv. The lower court in its order of March 26, 1960 admitted the amended
complaint, ordered the defendants to answer it, and denied the motion to
dismiss
v. At the ex parte hearing, Celestina testified that the land in question was
donated to her by her father at the time of her marriage; that her father had
possessed that land since she was a child (she was forty-eight years old in
1960 when she testified); that the land was cultivated by his tenants, Mateo
Luyun and the latter's two sons; that the land was planted to corn and
tobacco; that on August 5, 1959 the defendants entered the land and
harvested the corn crop over the opposition of her tenants; that the
defendants harvested five carts of corn and took four rolls of barbed wire,
and that the defendants persisted in working on the land
vi. The lower court in its decision declared Celestina Gumabay the owner of the
land and ordered the defendants to vacate it, restore its possession to her,
and to pay her damages
vii. The defendants contend that the lower court erred in not dismissing the
original complaint, in admitting the amended complaint, in assuming that it
acquired jurisdiction over their persons on the basis of the amended
complaint even without service of new summons, in declaring them in
default, and in not granting them relief from the judgment by default
ii. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case because there is no allegation in the complaint
that he was illegally withholding the possession of the property even if there
is a request in the prayer that he be ordered to vacate the premises and
restore its possession to plaintiff
iii. Before action therein could be taken, plaintiff filed an amended complaint
wherein he included the requisite allegations which would cure the defect
pointed out by defendant.
iv. Defendant filed an opposition to the admission of the amended complaint
alleging that, not having acquired jurisdiction over the original complaint,
the court "had neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion
for admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such
amendment since it is elementary that the court must first acquire
jurisdiction in order to validly act therein."
v. The court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the opposition to the
amended complaint, and thereafter allowed plaintiff to present his
evidence. Defendant did not participate in the hearing upon his belief that
the court had no jurisdiction over the case. And on the strength of the
evidence presented the court rendered judgment ordering defendant to
restore the property to plaintiff and to pay him the sum
iii. Respondent Muyot opposed said motion to dismiss alleging that, as the
decisions relied upon therein were rendered by courts that had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the same did not constitute res
judicata; that his causes of action were not barred by the statute of
limitations because the legal period provided for in Section 7-A of
Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended by Republic Act No. 1993, was
interrupted when he filed a case with the Department of Labor
iv. Petitioner filed its answer denying respondent's claim for overtime and
Sunday and holiday services pay. Among other affirmative defenses it
reasserted its contention that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case
vi. The court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration hence the present
original action for Certiorari, and Prohibition filed by Campos Rueda
Corporation, to annul the respondent court's orders
3. Obviously, the purpose of the amendment was to make his case fall
within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. This attempt is in our
opinion, of no avail
ii. It was approved by the Bureau of Customs. However, the customs personnel
still boarded the vessel when it docked on the suspicion that it was the
hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that its cargo
would be smuggled into the country. The vessel and its cargo were seized
iii. A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of
Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd of Thailand. While
seizure proceedings were ongoing, three typhoons hit La Union, and the
vessel ran aground and was abandoned. A salvage agreement was entered
into with the respondent Duraproof Services to secure and repair the vessel
iv. The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud.
However, the Customs Commissioner declined to issue a clearance and even
forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A decision was decreed for the forfeiture
and sale of the cargo in favor of the government. Seeking to enforce its
preferred lien, the Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the RTC of Manila attacking the actions of the Bureau.
PPA, Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils. were are named as
respondents.
vi. Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents and
their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be served upon the
alien respondents who had no representatives in the country. The cases
against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds of litis
pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to declare them
in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents in
default. There was no record that these motions were acted upon
ix. It was granted by the CA. Furthermore, it was able to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents to prevent them from
interfering in the transfer of the vessel and its cargo from the PPA
compound
5. Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under
its jurisdiction, the trial court dispensed with the service on
petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments of the
petition. But the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid.
Thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Not having been validly served summons, it would be legally
impossible to declare petitioner to be in default. A default judgment
cannot affect the rights of a party who was never declared in default