ASSIGNMENT

CRIMINAL LAW 2
TOPICS REPORT & CASE DIGESTS
(Article 204 – 250)

Submitted by:
WILLY C. DUMPIT
First Year – LLB

Submitted to:
JUDGE EDILU HAYAG
Professor
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. Any judge who shall knowingly
render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be
punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Elements:

1) Offender is a Judge
2) he renders Judgment in a case submitted to him
3) The Judgment is unjust
4) Judge knows the Judgment is Unjust

Unjust Judgment: One which is contrary to law or is not supported by

evidence or both
Judgment must be rendered knowingly: Must be made deliberately and
maliciously
Source of unjust Judgment:
* Error
* ill-will
* bribery

Does not apply to members of a collegiate court: Art 204 refers to

Judgments submitted to the offender for Judgment, in Collegiate courts,
Judgment is rendered not by a sole Judge but by multiple Justices after
consultation and deliberation.

US vs. GACUTAN
GR No. L-9600, 1 Oct. 1914

FACTS:

        On July 20, 1912, Elias Pagulayan was charged before justice of the peace
Eugenio Gacutan of Solana, Cagayan with the theft of a horse belonging to Pascua;
that on or about July 31, 1912, Gacutan promised Pascua that, in consideration of
the delivery to him of a female carabao worth P80 he would decide the case against
Pagulayan regardless of the evidence; that said carabao was delivered in pursuance
of that agreement; that Gacutan, fulfilling his promise, did on August 12, 1912,
convict Pagulayan of the crime of larceny and sentence him to six months'
imprisonment, to pay the costs, and to indemnify Pascua in the sum of P50, the
value of the horse alleged to have been stolen; that the sentence imposed was not
executed for the reason that on August 23, 1912, Gacutan transferred the cause to
the Court of First Instance, the same not being within his jurisdiction.

On 2 Oct. 1913, Gacutan was convicted of bribery in CFI Cagayan for

accepting the carabao as a bribe in consideration of the agreement.
ISSUE:

        Whether or not Gacutan can be convicted in violation of Art. 347, rendering an

unjust decision?

HELD:

        No.  The Court ruled that the evidences whether Gacutan rendered an unjust or
just decision.  Neither does the Court know if such decision had been executed or
not.  It does not appear that the accused knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment even if we concede that the judgment was unjust.  The mere fact
that the court may not have had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action
does not necessarily establish the fact that his judgment was unjust.  He may
have been honestly mistaken with respect to his jurisdiction.  In fact, this
seems to have been precisely the case, for, on being informed of the
existence of the law depriving his court of jurisdiction in such cases, he
immediately set aside his judgment of conviction and sent the case to the CFI
for trial.

Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. Any judge who, by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor2 and
temporary special disqualification.

Elements:

1) Offender is a Judge
2) That he renders a Judgment in a case submitted to him for decision
3) That the Judgment is manifestly Unjust
4) This is due to inexcusable negligence or ignorance

What is manifestly unjust judgment?

- It is so manisfestly contrary to law, that even a person having a meager
knowledge of the law cannot doubt the injustice.

Abuse of discretion or mere error of judgment, not punishable.

- Mere error of judgment cannot serve as basis for a charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, where there is no proof or even allegation of
bad faith, or ill motive, or improper consideration.
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. Any judge who shall knowingly render
an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period4 and suspension;5 but if he shall have acted by
reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or
decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.

Elements:

1) Offender is a Judge
2) Performs any of the following acts:
3) knowingly renders an unjust interlocutory order or decree
4) renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through
negligence or ignorance

Interlocutory order: It is an order issued by the court between the

commencement and the end of a suit and which decides some point or
matter. It is not a final decision.

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

vs.
YARD CREW UNION
GR Nos. L-16292-94, Oct 31, 1960

FACTS:

On March 7, 1955, the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad

Company, hereinafter called Kapisanan, filed a petition (Case No. 237-MC), praying
that it be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent in the Manila Railroad Company,
A decision was promulgated by the respondent Court finding three unions
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining, to wit: (1) The unit of locomotive
drivers, firemen, assistant firemen and motormen-otherwise known as the engine
crew unit: (2) the unit of conductors, assistant conductors, unit agents, assistant
route agents and train posters, otherwise known as the train crew unit, and (3) the
unit of all the rest of the company personnel, except the supervisors, temporary
employees, the members of the Auditing Department, the members of the security
guard and professional and technical employees, referred to by the respondent court
as the unit of the rest of the employees.
To these 3 units, the following unions were respectively certified as the
exclusive bargaining agents: (1) The Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudantes y
Motormen; (2) Union de Empleados de Trenes (conductors); and (3) the Kapisanan
Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company.
After the decision had become final, Manila Railroad Yard Crew Union, prayed that it
be defined as a separate unit;
The Kapisanan and the Company opposed the separation of the said three
units arguing that the Kapisanan had been duly certified as the collective bargaining
agent in the unit of all of the rest of the employees and it had entered into a collective
bargaining agreement.
Appellate Court Decision:
The Court ordered a plebiscite to be conducted among the employees in the
three proposed groups, namely: the Engineering Department, the Station Employees
and the Yard Crew Personnel. The employee in the proposed groups minus the
supervisors, temporary employees, members of the Auditing Department, members
of the security group, professionals and technical employees, shall vote, in a secret
ballot to be conducted by this Court, on the question of whether or not they desire to
be separated from the unit of the rest of the employees being represented by the
Kapisanan. The respondent Court also declared that the collective bargaining
agreement could not be a bar to another certification election because one of its
signatories, the Kapisanan President, Vicente K. Olazo, was a supervisor:

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appealed orders interlocutory in nature?

HELD:

The test in determining whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is

"Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final" (Moran's Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., Vol. I, p. 41). Having in view the avowed purpose of the
orders in question, as heretofore exposed, one should not stretch his imagination far
to see that they are clearly interlocutory, as they leave something more to be done in
the trial court and do not decide one way or the other the petitions of the respondent
unions. We are, therefore, constrained to hold, as we do hereby hold, that the
present appeals or petitions for review by certiorari, are not authorized by law and
should be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 44, Rules of Court). There is, moreover,
nothing, under the facts obtaining in these cases and the law on the subject, which
would warrant this Court to declare the orders under consideration, illegal.
Art. 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period7 shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of
malicious delay in the administration of justice.
Elements:

1) Offender is a Judge
2) There is a proceeding in Court
3) offender delays the administration of Justice
4) Such delay is Malicious, meaning it is caused with deliberate intent to inflict
damage

Mere delay without malice is not a felony under this article.

- Mere delay without malice in holding trials or rendering judgments does not
necessarily bring the judge within the operation of this law.

Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. The penalty of

prision correccional in its minimum period8 and suspension9 shall be imposed upon
any public officers or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office,
shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of
the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.

Acts Punishable:
1) Maliciously refraining from prosecuting violators of the law
2) Maliciously tolerating the commission of offenses.
Elements:

1) Offender is a public officer who has a duty to prosecute or cause prosecution

of offenses
2) There is dereliction of his duties, meaning he knows that a crime is to be
committed but tolerates the commission
3) Offender acts with malice and deliberate intent to favor the violator.

Crime must be proved before conviction for dereliction.

- The crime committed by the law-violator must be proved first. If the guilt of the
law-violator is not proved, the person charged with dereliction of duty under this
article is not liable. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, supra)

Not applicable to revenue officers.

 - Officers, agents or employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue who, having
knowledge or information of a violation of the Internal Revenue Law, fail to report
such knowledge or information to their superiors, shall be punished under that
law, not under this provision.

Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. Revelation of secrets. In

addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period,10 or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, by any
malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance,
shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in
his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any attorney-atlaw or solicitor
(procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having
received confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the
defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first
client.

Acts punished:
1. Causing damage to his client by any malicious breach of professional duty
or by inexcusable negligence or ignorance. (There must be damage)
2. Revealing any of the secrets of his client learned by him in his professional
capacity (Damage is not necessary)
3. Undertaking the defense of the opposing party in the same case without
consent of his first client, after having undertaken the defense of said first
client or after having received confidential information (If the first client
Consents, there is no crime)

There is no solicitor or procurador judicial under the Rules of Court.

- A procurador judicial is a person who had some practical knowledge of law

and procedure, but not a lawyer, and was permitted to represent a party in a
case before an inferior court.

- Under the Rules of Court, in the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend or with the
aid of an attorney. (Sec. 34, Rule 138)
Art. 210. Direct bribery. Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods11 and a fine of not less than the value of
the gift and not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
Elements:

1) Offender is a public officer within the scope of Art 203

2) Offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another
3) Such is accepted by the public officer
a. with a view to committing some crime
b. In consideration of an act which is not a crime, but the act must be
unjust
c. to refrain from doing something which is his duty to do
4) The act which the offender agrees to perform is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

Applies to any person performing Public Duties

Gift is either:
1) Offered by a private person or
2) Solicited by a public officer

Gift must have value: The thing offered must be capable of pecuniary
estimation.

Manipon vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986

FACTS:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the
Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979 directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his
deputy to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-
79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and to make a return
within thirty (30) days from said date. The labor arbiter's decision ordered Harry
Dominguez, a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay
Longog Tabek and the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with
interest, as the balance of their work contract. 
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to
the Commercial Bank and Trust branch [Comtrust] in Baguio City garnishing the
bank accounts of Dominguez. On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's
help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the
money could not be withdrawn.
 However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the
National Intelligence and Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon told
Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so they will have something for the
New Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the
garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet
at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to
NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to
entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a
Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then
authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder. 
Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979,
Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned. Manipon showed up with two companions,
named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and Baltazar Pacis. Manipon delivered his
letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. Then Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip
for P2,500.00. As soon as Dominguez received the money from the teller, he took
out P300.00 therefrom added it to the P 700.00 in marked bills and handed the total
amount of P l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked
over to his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down
Session Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized the
P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and thereafter brought them to
Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was subjected to an ultraviolet light test and
found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification
relative to the money recovered, he refused to give any statement. He filed his
sheriff's return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Manipon of direct bribery,
in not giving credence to the defense theory that there was novation of the money
judgment and in admitting illegally-obtained evidence?
HELD:
It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was
the deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio assigned to
implement the execution order issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also
not disputed that Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust
and that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after which he received P l,000.00
from Dominguez.
It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez
on December 28, 1979 was not a bribe but a payment in partial satisfaction of the
judgment under execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Longog Tabek
had agreed.
In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the prosecution
witnesses have acquitted themselves welt The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving
weight and credence to their version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt
for the crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. The penalties of arresto mayor," suspension in its
minimum and medium periods,15 and public censure shall be imposed upon any
public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.

Elements:

1) Offender is a Public Officer

2) Offender Accepts Gifts
3) Gifts are by reason of his office

Gift is usually given to the public officer.

- It is an anticipation of future favor from the public officer.

A public officer should not accept any gift offered to him

- Such gift is offered in anticipation of future favor from him. Such gift received
now will in the future corrupt him or make him omit the performance of his
official duty.

Formilleza vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 75160 March 18, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner was the personnel supervisor of the NIA in Tacloban City. Her
duties include processing of appointment papers of employees. She was charged for
her alleged refusal to attend to the appointment apapers of a certain Mrs. Mutia, a
coterminous employee. Mrs. Mutia testified that petitioner asked from her some
money as consideration. Attempts to entrap petitioner ensued. After the money had
been delivered and received, pictures were taken. The petitioner was arrested by the
soldiers despite her objections.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioner was properly convicted of the crime of indirect
bribery?

HELD:
No. As defined in Art. 211 of RPC is that the public officer concerned must
have accepted the gift or material consideration. Mere physical receipt
unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance is not sufficient of indirect bribery.
In the case at bar, there was no picture showing petitioner in the process of
appropriating or keeping money after it handed to her.

Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement
and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty of death. (As added by Republic Act No. 7659).
Elements:
1. Offender is a public officer entrusted with law enforcement.
2. Offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or death
3. Offender refrains from arresting or prosecuting the offender in consideration of
any promise, gift or present.

Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. The same penalties imposed upon the
officer corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed
upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises or given the gifts or
presents as described in the preceding articles.
Elements:
1) Offender makes offers or promises or gives gifts or presents to a public
officer.
2) Offer or promises are made or the gifts and presents given to a public
officer will make the officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The offender in corruption of public officer is the giver of gift or offer or

of promise.
Bribery is usually proved by evidence acquired in entrapment.

RA 1379. AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS
THEREFOR.
Section 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or employee" means any person holding
any public office or employment by virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any
office or employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or controlled corporation or enterprise.

(b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities which the
respondent has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his
becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof) already pertaining to him when he
qualified for public office or employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the
respondent's spouse. It shall not include:

1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the
name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.

2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or
after the effectivity of this Act.

3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the
court that the donation is lawful.

Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer
to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there
has been committed a violation of this Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, shall file, in the name
and on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where said
public officer or employee resides or holds office, a petition for a writ commanding said officer or employee to
show cause why the property aforesaid, or any part thereof, should not be declared property of the
State: Provided, That no such petition shall be filed within one year before any general election or within three
months before any special election.

The resignation, dismissal or separation of the officer or employee from his office or employment in the
Government or in the Government-owned or controlled corporation shall not be a bar to the filing of the
petition: Provided, however, That the right to file such petition shall prescribe after four years from the date of
the resignation, dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the office or employee concerned, except
as to those who have ceased to hold office within ten years prior to the approval of this Act, in which case the
proceedings shall prescribe after four years from the approval hereof.

Section 3. The petition. The petition shall contain the following information:

(a) The name and address of the respondent.

(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has
previously held.

(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices
and employments.

(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately
acquired property, and

(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully
acquired property during his incumbency.
Section 4. Period for the answer. The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days within which to present his
answer.

Section 5. Hearing. The Court shall set a date for a hearing, which may be open to the public, and during which
the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has
acquired the property in question.

Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State: Provided, That no
judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any
special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.

Section 7. Appeal. The parties may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance as provided in the
Rules of Court for appeals in civil cases.

Section 8. Protection against self-incrimination. Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused
from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other
records on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to
incriminate him or subject him to prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for or on
account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that such
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false testimony
committed in so testifying or from administrative proceedings.

Section 9. Immunity. The Solicitor General may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who
testifies to the unlawful manner in which the respondent has acquired any of the property in question in cases
where such testimony is necessary to prove violations of this Act.

Section 10. Effect of record of title. The fact that any real property has been recorded in the Registry of
Property or office of the Register of Deeds in the name of the respondent or of any person mentioned in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) of section one hereof shall not prevent the rendering of the judgment
referred to in section six of this Act.

Section 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actions cannot
be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect of any property unlawfully acquired by him.

Section 12. Penalties. Any public officer or employee who shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or
convey any unlawfully acquired property shall be repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine. The same repression
shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.

Section 13. Separability of provisions. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other persons
or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Section 14. Effective date. This Act shall take effect on its approval, and shall apply not only to property
thereafter unlawfully acquired but also to property unlawfully acquired before the effective date of this Act.

Approved: June 18, 1955

Morfe vs Mutuc
G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968
FACTS:

 The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
- Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his
assumption of office “and within the month of January of every year
thereafter”, as well as upon termination of his position, shall prepare
and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed
and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of
the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year”.
 Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission
“within the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn
statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search
and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination.
 Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
- Acceptance of public position - voluntary assumption of obligation
- Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest
of general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a
legitimate exercise of police power.
 CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of
the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause

ISSUES:
 
Whether or not the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is:
1. An oppressive exercise of police power;
2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity of public officials.

HELD:

1. Presumption of validity
 Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement
for employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and liabilities
upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut the
presumption of validity.
 “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but
where the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of
Manila)
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process
Clause
 “inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
  The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the
limits of its domain  (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
 Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to
regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the
protection of due process.
 It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to
protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he
considers as an infringement of his liberty.
 Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due
process is observed.
 The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action
must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
 “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed
the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such
sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so
upon assuming office…There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of
police power.”
1. Right to privacy
 Right to be let alone
 “It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of
information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be
denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the
objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection
of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of position
he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in
subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of personal and family
expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would
be a private sphere.”
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
 The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does
not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.
1. Right against self-incrimination
 We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s
conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
 Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken,
mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.

PLUNDER (Republic Act No. 7080)            

AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Definition of Terms - As used in this Act, the term -

a) Public Officer means any person holding any public office in the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election or contract.

b) Government includes the National Government, and any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

c) Person includes any natural or juridical person, unless the context indicates otherwise.

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.

See Section 2 As amended by  Section 12 of RA No.7659

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five
million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life
imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any person who
participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall
be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State.

Section 3. Competent Court - Until otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Section 4. Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

Section 5. Suspension and Loss of Benefits - Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.

Section 6. Prescription of Crimes - The crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
However, the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or from
their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

Section 7. Separability of Provisions - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Section 8. Scope - This Act shall not apply to or affect pending prosecutions or proceedings, or those which
may be instituted under Executive Order No. 1, issued and promulgated on February 28, 1986.

Section 9. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette
and in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: July 12, 1991

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the
said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the
fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this,
the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language
of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition
of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny
him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in
its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.

Art. 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period,1 or
a fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both.

Acts Punishable under art 213:

1) By entering into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or
making use of any other scheme, to defraud the Government, in dealing with
any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the making of contracts or the
adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property or funds
2) By demanding directly or indirectly the payment of sums different from or
larger than those authorized by law in collection of taxes, licenses, fees and
other imposts
3) By failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law for any sum of
money collected by him officially, in the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and
other imposts.
 4) By collecting or receiving directly or indirectly, by way of payment or
otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law in
the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts.
Elements of Paragraph 1
1) Offender is a public officer
2) He takes advantage of his office
3) He entered into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or
made use of any other scheme with regard to 1) furnishing supplies 2)
making of contracts or 3) adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to
public property or funds
4) Accused intends to defraud the Philippine Government
Elements of illegal Exactions
1) Offender is a public officer entrusted with the collection of taxes
2) He is guilty of either:
1) demanding directly or indirectly the payment of sums different from or
larger than those authorized by law in collection of taxes, licenses, fees and
other imposts,
2) failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law for any sum of
money collected by him officially, in the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and
other imposts or
3) collecting or receiving directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise,
things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law in the
collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts.

Ganaden vs Bolasco
G.R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016

FACTS:
● Soledad Ganaden, stenographer of CFI Zambales, charged Deputy
Provincial Sheriff Gregorio Bolasco with the ff

○ Dishonesty by demanding P13.00 as sheriff's fee in civil

case No. 711-0, entitled "Carmen Flores vs. Leonardo Frondarina," but
issuing therefor a receipt for a lesser amount; and by issuing a private
receipt for P50.00 to plaintiff Paulino Padua for the service of a writ of
execution but failed to make a return of said writ; and

○ Misconduct by delaying the service of summons upon

Paulita Esteban, defendant in a civil case, and entrusting its service to
her nephew, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing, Jr.
 ● Respondent said

○ That an Atty Leano entrusted P12.60 to resp for Sheriff’s

fees in Flores vs Frondarina, but when the summons was issued it
turned out that the fees were only P4.20 considering that the
defendants were married and they lived in Olongapo and not in
Zambales as said by Atty Leano. So resp returned the excess to Atty
Leano with an official receipt for the fee. The Floreses never
complained

○ That the complainant could have only overheard the

telephone convo about the summons upon Paulita Esteban, because
she was not in her residence at the time. Nobody complained here
either

○ That resp merely received P50.00 as a deposit in the

Padua vs Punzalan case upon Mr Padua’s request so that Padua could
save the time and expense which he will otherwise incur in coming
back to the Office of the Provincial Sheriff at Olongapo City and in
going to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zambales at Iba, for the
sole purpose of paying the necessary expenses for the service of the
Writ of Execution issued in the aforementioned case such as the
Registration of Levy, should there be properties levied upon, Guard
Fees and other incidental expenses since he (Padua) was and still is
an employee at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay

○ That aforementioned P50.00 was never misappropriated

for the benefit of the respondent, and that Padua never complained

● During the formal investigation, complainant admitted she had no

personal or direct knowledge and that her goal in complaining was so that the
proper authority could find out the truth

The Investigating District Judge of CFI Zambales recommended the case be

dismissed since complainant had no direct and personal knowledge of
respondent's irregular actuations and that the interested parties mentioned by
her, allegedly complaining against respondent, failed to appear and support
the charges.

ISSUE:

W/N Investigating District Judge erred in recommending to dismiss the case?

HELD:
 ● Ruling: The ff facts are undisputed
○ In the Flores case, respondent received the P12.60 amount before the
summons to be served were delivered to him for service, in spite of the
standing instruction from the clerk of court and the provincial sheriff not
to accept any payment if no official receipts are available. Respondent
did not issue the official receipt even after he had received on February
5 or 6, 1971, the booklet of official receipts
○ In the Padua case, responded received the P50.00 using a private
receipt instead of the CORRESPONDING OFFICIAL RECEIPT
● Respondent committed illegal exaction penalized by paragraph 2(b) of Article
213 of the Revised Penal Code for failure to issue receipts for money
collected by him officially.
● Respondent likewise violated Section 113 of Article III, Chapter V of the
National Accounting and Auditing Manual, providing that no payment of any
nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an
official receipt in acknowledgment thereof.
● The acts and/or omissions of respondent are patent violation of law. They
disturb the ethics of public life and vitiate the integrity of the court personnel
as well as the court itself. Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity.
● Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 6, promulgated on September 27, 1972,
provides for the immediate removal or dismissal of a respondent under any of
the following circumstances, among others, which is present in this case,
namely: (a) when the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; and
(b) when respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there
is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
○ Respondent’s history shows he was repeatedly charged with delay in
service of summons and execution of decisions
○ Also repeatedly charged with abuse of authority and ignorance in the
execution of a writ of prelim injunction
HOWEVER, no proof of violation in the Esteban case.

● WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT IS HEREBY FOUND GUILTY OF

DISHONESTY, OR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF
THE SERVICE, AND IS ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT HEREOF.

Art. 214. Other frauds. In addition to the penalties prescribed in the provisions of
Chapter Six, Title Ten, Book Two of this Code, the penalty of temporary special
disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification2 shall be
imposed upon any public officer who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
commit any of the frauds or deceits enumerated in said provisions.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
 3. That he commits any of the frauds or deceits enumerated in Arts. 315 to
318.

US vs Dacuycuy
G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989

On the 14th of December, 1906, the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of said province accusing Justo Dacuycuy of the
crime of estafa, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That in the month of February, 1906, the said accused, being a public official and
taking advantage of his office of councilor for the municipality of Bacarra, Province of
Ilocos Norte, then and there willfully and feloniously received the sum of P39 from
the residents of his district named Angelo Jose, Julian Nacuray, Gabriel Galamay,
Alipio Galviso, Silverio Jose, Vicente Gervasio, Pedro Dumingsil, Julian Rivera,
Atanasio Perito, Martin Vea, Martin Jose, Juan Sina, Cirilo Ramil, Simon Jose,
Alejandro Salacup, Estanislao Galamay, Castor Vea, Ignacio Salacup, Bernardo
Edralin, Luis Jose, Cosme Ramoran, Pedro Garcia, Eugenio Aquino, Ciriaco
Bolosan, Eugenio Nacuray, Juan Nacuray, Casimiro Pascua, Segundo Galamay,
Gabino Galamay, Isidoro Ramo, Tomas Galisinao, Domingo Butac, Catalino Acoba,
Bonifacio Mercado, Procopio Galviso, Leon Ramoran, Juan Butac, Tomas Butac,
and Cesario Gapusan, for the purpose of investing the money in cedulas, and,
notwithstanding several requests made of him, he failed to invest said sum in
cedulas or return the same to the owners thereof, and misapplied it and converted it
to his own use to the prejudice of the above-named individuals. Said facts constitute
the crime defined and punished under article 399 in connection with article 535, No.
5, of the Penal Code, committed within the jurisdiction of this Court of First Instance.
All contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library

Proceedings having been instituted by virtue of the foregoing complaint, judgment

was rendered by the court on the 4th of February, 1907, sentencing the accused to
the penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor, to suffer the accessory
penalties, to indemnify 23 individuals residing in the barrio of Oangagan, town of
Bacarra of said province, in the sum of P46, at the rate of P2 each, and in the case
of insolvency to suffer the subsidiary imprisonment of one day for every 12 1/2
pesetas unpaid, to temporary special disqualification from public office during ten
years and one day, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. From this sentence the
accused has appealed.

At the time when Justo Dacuycuy was enjoying a vacation at the barrio of
Oangagan, town of Bacarra, in the early part of February, 1906, the 39 individuals
whose names appear in the complaint, upon being informed through the accused
that cedulas had been received at the municipality, delivered to him the sum of P39,
asking him to obtain an equal number of cedulas, one for each of them, so as to
save them from having to travel the long distance to the town, inasmuch as he had,
as councilor, done the same thing in former years. The accused, however, after
receiving the money, limited himself to taking out 16 cedulas for as many taxpayers,
and appropriated the balance of P23, and, notwithstanding the repeated requests
made by the 23 taxpayers who were still without cedulas, he failed to either obtain
them or return the money, telling them not to worry, as they would eventually receive
their cedulas. The term fixed by law for the payment of the cedula tax elapsed, and
the aforesaid 23 residents were obliged to take out their respective cedulas with a
surcharge on account of the delay, each of them paying the cost thereof.

After Silverio Jose, one of the injured parties, had testified in the case, it was agreed
between the provincial fiscal and the counsel for the accused that, if all the other
witnesses who handed their money to the accused for the purchase of a cedula were
to give evidence, their declaration would conform to that made by the only witness
who testified in the case.

In his testimony the accused confessed to having received from several residents of
the barrio on the 2d of February, 1906, the said sum of P39 to purchase an equal
number of cedulas, but denied that he had gone over to the said barrio in order to
collect taxes, and further stated that he was there enjoying a vacation when the
residents handed him the money for the purchase of their respective cedulas, but
that he was unable to get the cedulas because at the municipal treasury one person
was not permitted to take out a cedula for another. The accused, however,
afterwards managed to obtain 16 cedulas for as many individuals, and appropriated
the remaining P23 which belonged to 23 taxpayers who had to purchase and pay for
their respective cedulas with the surcharge incurred on the account of the expiration
of the time fixed by law. When the accused was unable to refund the money he had
appropriated he advised the persons interested to procure money with which to
purchase cedulas and agreed to pay the same later on.

Probably in order to avoid a repetition by the other witnesses of the testimony given
by Silverio Jose, the only witness who testified for the prosecution, following the
practice in civil cases, a compromise was entered into by the parties. The law,
however, does not authorize this practice in criminal proceedings, but considering
that the testimony of the sole witness is fully corroborated by the declaration of the
accused, who confessed to having received the said sum to be invested in cedulas,
of which he only obtained 16, and then kept the P23 remaining, to the prejudice of
the 23 taxpayers, who had to procure them with a surcharge and again to pay for
them, one is convinced that Justo Dacuycuy committed the crime of estafa defined
and punished under articles 534 and 535, No. 5, of the Penal Code.

Notwithstanding the fact that the accused pleaded not guilty, his culpability as the
convicted author of said crime has been fully established, his exculpatory allegation
that at the municipal treasury one person was not permitted to obtain a cedula for
another being inadmissible, in view of the fact that he secured 16 cedulas, and even
if it were true it would never under any consideration justify his appropriating the sum
of P23 to the detriment of the injured parties.
Whenever a public official commits a crime outside of the exercise of his functions,
doing acts which are not connected with the duties of his office, he should be
punished with the penalty provided by law for the private individual who violates its
provisions, without taking into account the official character with which the accused
is invested.

The accused was a councilor of the municipality at the time when the crime was
committed, although undoubtedly it was not in his province nor did it form a part of
his official duties to collect the cedula tax. If because he inspired them with
confidence it was an easy matter for him to collect from the said 39 residents the
P39 for the purchase of cedulas in view of his character of councilor, this
circumstance constitutes in this case one of the elements of the crime of estafa,
since he took advantage thereof in consummating the crime; but, considering that he
committed the crime as a private individual, it is not proper to impose on him the
penalty provided by article 399 of the code for public officers, because he received
said amount not in the exercise of his functions as councilor, though he abused the
confidence of the said 39 taxpayers; hence the accused should be punished as a
private individual, guilty of the crime of estafa, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium degrees, imposed in the medium period on account of the
amount misappropriated, because in the commission of the crime neither an
aggravating not a mitigating circumstance is present.

Therefore, in view of the considerations above set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be reversed and Justo Dacuycuy sentenced to the
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of
article 61, to make restitution of the sum of P46 to the 23 persons prejudiced, at the
rate of P2 to each of them, and in the case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs in both instances. So ordered.

Art. 215. Prohibited transactions. The penalty of prision correccional in its

minimum period3 or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be
imposed upon any appointive public officer who, during his incumbency, shall directly
or indirectly become interested in any transaction of exchange or speculation within
the territory subject to his jurisdiction.

Elements:
1. That the offender is an appointive public officer.
2. That he becomes interested, directly or indirectly, in any transaction of
exchange or speculation.

Art. 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. The penalty of

arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period,4 or
a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon a public
officer who, directly or indirectly, shall become interested in any contract or business
in which it is his official duty to intervene.
This provision is applicable to experts, arbitrators and private accountants who, in
like manner, shall take part in any contract or transaction connected with the estate
or property in appraisal, distribution, or adjudication of which they shall have acted,
and to the guardians and executors with respect to the property belonging to their
wards or estate.

Who are liable for possession of prohibited interest?

1) Public officer who directly or indirectly became interested in any contract or
business when it was his duty to intervene
2) Experts, arbitrators and private accountants who in like manner took part in
any contract or transaction connected with the estate or property in the
appraisal, distribution or adjudication of which they acted
3) Guardians and executors with respect to the property belonging to their
wards or the estate.

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property — Presumption of

malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

Elements:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he
was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.

People v. Sendaydiego
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978

FACTS:

In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is

that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in
conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware
store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an
accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the
road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23. The provincial voucher in these
cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE"
the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed
by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's
representative. The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed
paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated
therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily
incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is
not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects. Paragraph 2 is a
certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer. Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for
pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is
signed by the provincial treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in
Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, certifying that the voucher
has been pre-audited and signed by the auditor. Paragraph 5 is a certification signed
by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's
certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable
as shown in the summary hereof. " It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs
two part of the voucher.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of falsicification of public
documents and six crimes of malversation?

HELD:

Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes
of malversation. In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to
the following penalties: For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P,
Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of
prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional
medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos. For the
malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify
the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-
33252). For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No.
11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23351, L-33254). For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher
No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9)
years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh.
R), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum,
as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For the
malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as
maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan
in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For the malversation of the
sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). In the service of the twelve penalties meted to
Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum
penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36)
years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533). The maximum
duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art.
70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil.
530 and 69 Phil. 58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23. Samson and the said estate are solitarily
liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay
one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.

Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. — Any public officer,
whether in the service or separated therefrom by resignation or any other cause,
who is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Insular Auditor (now
Commission on Audit), or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of
two months after such accounts should be rendered, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period/ or by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or
both.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated
therefrom.
2. That he must be an accountable officer for public tunds or property.
 3. That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the
Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor.
4. That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts phould
ho rendered.

Art. 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before

leaving the country. — Any public officer who unlawfully leaves or attempts to
leave the Philippine Islands without securing a certificate from the Insular Auditor
(now Commission on Audit), showing that his accounts have been finally settled,
shall be punished by arresto mayor,7 or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or
both.
Elements:
(a) That the offender is a public officer.
(b) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property.
(c) That he must have unlawfully left (or be on the point of leaving) the
Philippines without securing from the Commission on Audit a certificate
showing that his accounts have been finally settled.

Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. — Any public officer who shall
apply any public funds or property under his administration to any public use other
than that for which such funds or property were appropriated by law or ordinance
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period8 or a fine
ranging from one-half to the total value of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such
misapplication, any damage or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public
service. In either case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special
disqualification.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That there is public fund or property under his administration.
3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or
ordinance.
4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such
fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance.

Estino v. People
G.R. Nos. 163957-58, April 7, 2009

FACTS: 
Estino acted as Governor of Sulu from July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999.
Pescadera, on the other hand, was the Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during Estino’s
stint as Acting Governor. In 1999, an audit of the disbursement vouchers and
payrolls for the period starting July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 was conducted in
the Provincial Government of Sulu. The COA Special Audit Report stated that there
were anomalies in  the payment of salary differentials, allowances, and benefits,
among others. Pursuant to such findings, three informations were filed by the
Ombudsman against Estino and Ernesto Pescadera. The said charges involve
malversation of public funds under Art.  217  of  the Revised Penal  Code  and  two
violations of  Sec. 3 (e)  of  R.A.  3019. The Sandiganbayan, in  the consolidated
criminal  cases,  convicted  both  Estino  and  Pescadera for  violation  of  Section
3(e)  of  R.A. 3019  for failure to  pay  the  Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu but acquitted
them as to the other charge for the same violation. As to the  charge  of
malversation  of  public funds,  the  Sandiganbayan  exonerated  Estino  but
convicted Pescadera for failure to remit the GSIS contributions of the provincial
government employees. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial which were denied in the
Sandiganbayan Resolution. Petitioners insist that there is enough evidence to show
that the RATA provided for in the 1998 reenacted budget was paid for the period
January to May 1999. They presented to the Sandiganbayan a Certification dated
May 11, 2002 issued by the Provincial Auditor, stating that the RATA for the period
January to May 1999 was paid to the officials entitled to it and that the GSIS
premiums pertaining to prior years were also settled by the Provincial Government of
Sulu.They also submitted sworn statements of the provincial officials entitled to
RATA, stating that they were paid such allowance from January to May 1999 and
that they did not have any complaint to its alleged nonpayment. They also submitted
99 certified true copies of the Disbursement Vouchers showing the payment of the
RATA from January to May 1999 provided for in the 1998 reenacted budget.

Issue:
Whether or not a remand of the case to the Sandiganbayan for new trial is
proper

Held:
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a
judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered
and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly
not newly discovered, it appears that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its
production during trial was unnecessary. In their Supplemental Motion and/or Motion
for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented the evidence of payment
of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was the
nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the
1998 reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were
precluded from presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the
RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget because the prosecution’s evidence was
confined to alleged nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget. In this instance,
we are inclined to give a more lenient interpretation of Rule 121, Sec. 2 on new trial
in view of the special circumstances sufficient to cast doubt as to the truth of the
charges against petitioners. The situation of the petitioners is peculiar, since they
were precluded from presenting exculpatory evidence during trial upon the honest
belief that they were being tried for nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget.
This belief was based on no less than the testimony of the prosecution’s lone
witness, COA Auditor Mona Balabaran. (Estino and Pescadera vs. People,  G.R.
Nos. 163957-58, April 7, 2009)

Art. 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. Any public officer
under obligation to make payment from Government funds in his possession, who
shall fail to make such payment, shall be punished by arresto mayori0 and a fine of
from 5 to 25 per cent of the sum which he failed to pay.

Elements:
a. That the public officer has Government funds in his possession.
b. That he is under obligation to make payment from such funds.
c. That he fails to make the payment maliciously.

Art. 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this
chapter shall apply to private individuals who in any capacity whatever, have charge
of any insular (now national), provincial, or municipal funds, revenues, or property or
to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized, or deposited
by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.

Private individuals who may be liable under Arts. 217 to 221.

1. Private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any
national, provincial or municipal funds, revenue, or property.
2. Administrator or depository of funds or property, attached, seized or
deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private
individual.

Braza v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013
FACTS:

The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for the 12th ASEAN Leaders
Summit scheduled in December 2006. In preparation for this international diplomatic
event with the province of Cebu as the designated venue, the DPWH identified
projects relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and installation of
traffic safety devices and lighting facilities. The then Acting Secretary of the DPWH,
Hermogenes E. Ebdane, approved the resort to alternative modes of procurement
for the implementation of these projects due to the proximity of the ASEAN Summit.
One of the ASEAN Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the installation of
street lighting systems along the perimeters of the Cebu International Convention
Center in Mandaue City and the ceremonial routes of the Summit to upgrade the
appearance of the convention areas and to improve night-time visibility for security
purposes. Four (4) out of eleven (11) street lighting projects were awarded to
FABMIK Construction and Equipment Supply Company, Inc. (FABMIK).

Three other projects were bidded out only on November 28, 2006 or less than two
(2) weeks before the scheduled start of the Summit. Thereafter, the DPWH and
FABMIK executed a Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) whereby FABMIK obliged
itself to implement the projects at its own expense and the DPWH to guarantee the
payment of the work accomplished. FABMIK was able to complete the projects
within the deadline of ten (10) days utilizing its own resources and credit facilities.
The schedule of the international event, however, was moved by the national
organizers to January 9-15, 2007 due to typhoon Seniang which struck Cebu for
several days.

After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and
Corruption Prevention Office(PACPO), Ombudsman Visayas, alleging that the
ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. A panel composing of three
investigators conducted a fact-finding investigation to determine the veracity of the
accusation. Braza, being the president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the
respondents. On March 16, 2007, the Ombudsman directed the DBM and the DPWH
to cease and desist from releasing or disbursing funds for the projects in question.

On August 14, 2008, the motions for reinvestigation filed by Arturo Radaza
(Radaza), the Mayor of Lapu-lapuCity, and the DPWH officials were denied by the
Sandiganbayan for lack of merit. Consequently, they moved for the reconsideration
of said resolution. On August 27, 2008, Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation
anchored on the following grounds: (1) the import documents relied upon by the
OMB-Visayas were spurious and falsified; (2) constituted new evidence, if
considered, would overturn the finding of probable cause; and (3) the finding of
overpricing was bereft of factual and legal basis as the same was not substantiated
by any independent canvass of prevailing market prices of the subject lampposts. He
prayed for the suspension of the proceedings of the case pending such
reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan treated Braza's motion as his motion for
reconsideration of its August 14, 2008 Resolution.

On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
admitting the Amended Information, denying Braza's plea for dismissal of the
criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Brazawould not be placed in double
jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second information because his
previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that even if he was regularly
arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because the second information
charged an offense different from, and which did not include or was necessarily
included in, the original offense charged. Lastly, it found that the delay in the
reinvestigation proceedings could not be characterized as vexatious, capricious or
oppressive and that it could not be attributed to the prosecution.

On November 6, 2009, Braza moved for reconsideration with alternative motion to

quash the information reiterating his arguments that his right against double jeopardy
was violated and, thus, warranting the dismissal of the criminal case with prejudice.
In the alternative, Braza moved for the quashal of the second information vigorously
asserting that the same was fatally defective for failure to allege any actual, specified
and quantifiable injury sustained by the government as required by law for indictment
under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and that the charge of overpricing was unfounded.
On October 22, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution
stating, among others, the denial of Braza's Motion to Quash the information. The
anti-graft court ruled that the Amended Information was sufficient in substance as to
inform the accused of the nature and causes of accusations against them. Further, it
held that the specifics sought to be alleged in the Amended Information were
evidentiary in nature which could be properly presented during the trial on the merits.
Braza was effectively discharged from the first Information upon the filing of the
second Information but said discharge was without prejudice to, and would not
preclude, his prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
Sandiganbayan, however, deemed it proper that a new preliminary investigation be
conducted under the new charge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not double jeopardy has already set in basis of Braza "not guilty"
plea in the first Information and, thus, he can no longer be prosecuted under the
second Information.

HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit. It is Braza stance that his constitutional right
under the double jeopardy clause bars further proceedings in Case No. SB-08-CRM-
0275. He asserts that his arraignment under the first information was simple and
unconditional and, thus, an arraignment under the second information would put him
in double jeopardy. His argument cannot stand scrutiny. While it is true that the
practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional"
arraignment of the accused is not specifically sanctioned by the Revised Internal
Rules of the Procedure of theSandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Procedure,
this Court had tangentially recognized such practice inPeople v. Espinosa, provided
that the alleged conditions attached to the arraignment should be "unmistakable,
express, informed and enlightened." The Court further required that the conditions
must be expressly stated in the order disposing of arraignment; otherwise, it should
be deemed simple and unconditional. A careful perusal of the record in the case at
bench would reveal that the arraignment of Braza under the first information was
conditional in nature as it was a mere accommodation in his favor to enable him to
travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia
in case he would abscond. TheSandiganbayan's June 6, 2008 Order clearly and
unequivocally states that the conditions for Braza'sarraignment as well as his travel
abroad, that is, that if the Information would be amended, he shall waive his
constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy and shall allow himself to
be arraigned on the amended information without losing his right to question the
same. It appeared that these conditions were duly explained to Braza and his lawyer
by the anti-graft court. He was afforded time to confer and consult his lawyer.
Thereafter, he voluntarily submitted himself to such conditional arraignment and
entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
Petition for certitiorari Denied.

Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. Any public officer who shall
consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he had in his custody or charge, a prisoner, either detention prisoner
or prisoner by final judgment.
3. That such prisoner escaped from his custody.
4. That he was in connivance with the prisoner in the latter's escape.

Art. 224. Evasion through negligence. If the evasion of the prisoner shall have
taken place through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or
custody of the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period5 and
temporary special disqualification.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either
detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment.
3. That such prisoner escapes through his negligence.

Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988
FACTS:
Alfredo Rodillas Y Bondoc is a Patrolman of the Integrated National Police
Force of Caloocan City. He was directed by his superior to escort detention prisoner
ZenaidaSacris before the CFICaloocan City to face a trial for an alleged Violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After the trial, he allowedthe prisoner and her
husband to have lunch as they were already very hungry. He even allowed Zenaida
to use the comfort room without first inspecting first the comfort room as he reasoned
that there were many females going in and out therein. After ten minutes elapsed,the
prisoner still did not come out from the comfort room. Rodillas became suspicious
and entered the CR. To his surprise, he found Zenaida no longer inside the comfort
room. He noticed that the window of said place was not provided with window
grills.The policeman did not immediately report the escape of the prisoner as he tried
to find her first in her residence in Nueva Ecija. Thereafter, he was charged with the
crime of Evasion through Negligence penalized under Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of such crime.
According to Rodillas, the Sandiganbayan erred in their decision because the
element of negligence resulting in the escape of detention prisoner was not
sufficiently proven.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodillas was negligent in his duty to guard the prisoner.
HELD:
YES, he was negligent.The negligence referred to in the Revised Penal Code
is such definite laxity which amounts to a deliberate non-performance of duty on the
part of the guard. It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to
take necessary precautions to assure the absence of any means of escape. A failure
to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite laxity or negligence
amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty.
In the first place, the escape would not have materialized if he had
immediately escorted the prisoner back to jail after the hearing.As a police officer
who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation
from his duty was clearly a violation of the regulations.Indeed, it is evident that
Rodillas acted negligently and beyond the scope of his authority when he permitted
his charge to create situation which led to her escape.
The actions or plans of the prisoner and her companions should have aroused
the suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.Rodillas however allowed the
prisoner to enterthecomfort room without first establishing for himself that there was
no window or door allowing the possibility of escape. The defense that he did not
follow the prisoner inside the comfort room to avoid commotion, he being a male, is a
lame excuse. There is nothing wrong in asking the ladies for permission so he could
check the comfort room first to insure that the prisoner cannot escape. This was
patent negligence and incredible naivette on the part of the police officer punishable
under ART. 224, RPC.
Art. 225. Escape of prisoner under the custody of a person not a public officer.
Any private person to whom the conveyance or custody of a prisoner or person
under arrest shall have been confided, who shall commit any of the offenses
mentioned in the two preceding articles, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed for the public officer.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a private person.
2. That the conveyance or custody of a prisoner or person under arrest is
confided to him.
3. That the prisoner or person under arrest escapes.
4. That the offender consents to the escape of the prisoner or person under
arrest, or that the escape takes place through his negligence.

Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. Any public officer

who shall remove, destroy, or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to
him.
Elements:
1. That the offender be a public officer.
2. That he abstracts, destroys or conceals documents or papers.
3. That the said documents or papers should have been entrusted to such
public officer by reason of his office.
4. That damage, whether serious or not, to a third party or to the public
interest should have been caused.

Tioco v. Camacho
G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986

FACTS:

Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the

late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father
of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.

Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her

niece ToribiaTiocowhich were later inherited by her husband Eustacio Dizon and
two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother
of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho).

In 1928, BalbinoTioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by

his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren
Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon.

On 1937, Faustino Dizon (prepositus) died intestate, single and without

issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the subject seven (7) parcels of
land to his father, EustacioDizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said
property subject to a reservatroncal. On June 14, 1965, EustacioDizon died
intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho.

Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho claims the other half of the said

seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reservatroncal imposed
thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on
intestate succession; but the plaintiffs oppose her said claim because they claim
three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which
interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of
the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Camacho (niece of the prepositus) excluded the plaintiffs (aunt and

uncles of the prepositus) in inheriting over the reservable property despite the
fact that they are all reservatarios.

RULING:

YES. The Court held that defendant-appellant DalisayTongko-Camacho is entitled to

the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs- appellees.

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on

intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they
are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although
they are related to him within the same degree as the latter.

Art. 227. Officer breaking seal. Any public officer charged with the custody of
papers or property sealed by proper authority, who shall break the seals or permit
them to be broken, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods,10 temporary special disqualification,11 and a fine not
exceeding 2,000 pesos.

Elements:

1. That the offender is a public officer.

2. That he is charged with the custody of papers or property.
3. That these papers or property are sealed by proper authority.
4. That he breaks the seals or permits them to be broken.
Art. 228. Opening of closed documents. Any public officer not included in the
provisions of the next preceding article who, without proper authority, shall open or
shall permit to be opened any closed papers, documents or objects entrusted to his
custody, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor,12 temporary special
disqualification13 and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.

Elements:

1. That the offender is a public officer.

2. That any closed papers, documents, or objects are entrusted to his
custody.
3. That he opens or permits to be opened said closed papers, documents or
objects.
4. That he does not have proper authority.

Art. 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. — Any public officer who shall reveal
any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver
papers or copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be
published, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods,14 perpetual special disqualification, and a fine not exceeding
2,000 pesos if the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall
have caused serious damage to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of
prision correccional in its minimum period,19 temporary special disqualification,16
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

Acts Punishable:

1) By revealing any secrets known to the offending public officer by reason of

his official capacity.
2) Delivering wrongfully papers or copies of papers of which he may have
charge and which should not be published

Elements of Act number 1

a) That the offender is a public officer
b) He knows of a secret by reason of his official capacity
c) He reveals such secret without authority or justifiable reasons.
d) That damage, great or small be caused to the public interest
Elements of Act number 2
a) that offender is a public officer
b) that he has charge of papers
c) those papers should not be published
d) he delivers those papers or copies thereof to a third person
 e) that the delivery is wrongful
f) Damage be caused to public interest

Art. 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual. Any public officer
to whom the secrets of any private individual shall become known by reason of his
office who shall reveal such secrets, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor" and
a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he knows of the secrets of a private individual by reason of his office.
3. That he reveals such secrets without authority or justifiable reason. Art.

Art. 231. Open disobedience. — Any judicial or executive officer who shall openly
refuse to execute the judgment, decision or order of any superior authority made
within the scope of the jurisdiction of the latter and issued with all the legal
formalities, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period,1 temporary special disqualification in its
maximum period,2 and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a judicial or executive officer.
2. That there is a judgment, decision or order of a superior authority.
3. That such judgment, decision or order was made within the scope of the
jurisdiction of the superior authority and issued with all the legal formalities.
4. That the offender without any legal justification openly refuses to execute
the said judgment, decision or order, which he is duty bound to obey. (2 Viada
575)

Art. 232. Disobedience to order of superior officer, when said order was
suspended by inferior officer. Any public officer who, having for any reason
suspended the execution of the orders of his superiors, shall disobey such superiors
after the latter have disapproved the suspension, shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods3 and perpetual special
disqualification.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That an order is issued by his superior for execution.
 3. That he has for any reason suspended the execution of such order.
4. That his superior disapproves the suspension of the execution of the order.
5. That the offender disobeys his superior despite the disapproval of the
suspension.

Art. 233. Refusal of assistance. — The penalties of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period,4 perpetual special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, shall be imposed upon a
public officer who, upon demand from competent authority, shall fail to lend his
cooperation towards the administration of justice or other public service, if such
failure shall result in serious damage to the public interest, or to a third party;
otherwise, arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods5 and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That a competent authority demands from the offender that he lend his
cooperation towards the administration of justice or other public service.
3. That the offender fails to do so maliciously.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JESUS CASTRO

August 16, 2010

FACTS:

Roman Cruz owns a trucking business known as Romy’s Freight Services.

Cruz hired appellant Jesus Castro as a tinsmith-mechanic. Cruz then promoted
Castro to the position of shop supervisor whose duties included
purchasing spare parts during emergencies, receiving deliveries of spare parts, and
supervising the mechanics. As shop supervisor, Castro had access to the storeroom.
In March, July and August of 1993, Cruz purchased truck spare parts. In December
1993, he conducted an inventory of the spare parts in the storeroom and discovered
missing spare parts all of which were valued at P64, 000. Subsequently, Cruz
discovered that Castro had authorized the hauling of two truckloads of cement
without Castro remitting the overhauling fee. Remembering the spare parts lost in
1993, Cruz spoke with Torres again and asked about the spare parts Castro had
supplied to him. This time, Torres divulged that Castro supplied him in 1993 the
said spare parts that were lost in Cruz‘s shop which Torres‘ business
associate Romeo Inso delivered to Rosita Crispin, an operator and part-owner of a
―Greenland‖ bus. For his part, Castro, admitting having sold spare parts to Rosita
through Inso and Torres but claiming that the same did not come from Cruz’s
storeroom. Castro claimed that said items came from the shop of Angel Boleyley, a
licensed contractor of the Department of Public Works and Highways. Cruz filed a
complaint-affidavit charging Castro for qualified theft. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
found Castro guilty of qualified theft. Castro appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA affirmed Castro’s conviction but increased the penalty of imposed upon
Castro.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Castro is guilty of qualified theft

HELD:

The Court at once notes that the trial court found that the spare parts delivered by
appellant to Inso did ―correspond to the alleged missing spare parts. ―Correspond
does not mean ―the same. It means to ―match or ―compare closely. Cruz himself
admitted this when on cross examination he stated that the missing spare parts
―matched what appellant had sold to Torres and Inso as described by them. Cruz in
fact additionally admitted also during cross-examination that the missing spare parts
were not unique and were readily available in the market. Given the length of time
that had elapsed between the date of purchase (March, July and August 1993) of
the spare parts, and the discovery of their loss (December 1993), the lack of claim
that those spare parts were not used on broken down trucks that were repaired in
March, July and August 1993, the lack of concrete proof that the missing spare parts
and those eventually sold to Rosita were the same, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to satisfy the conditions for circumstantial evidence to suffice to
prove its case against Castro. In fine, the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of
prima facie proving Castro’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of evidence
did not thus even shift to the defense. Such notwithstanding, Castro by his evidence,
proved that, contrary to the trial court’s observation, he sourced the spare parts
which were delivered to Torres and Inso from Boleyley who corroborated Castro’s
claim that he purchased spare parts from him on or about the time that Castro
claimed. And Castro proved too, and this was corroborated by Viloria, that it was
“only when there was a defective spare part that has to be replaced” that a new one
would be bought by Castro, who would give the newly bought ones to the mechanics
which they would “immediately” install in the motor or engine of Cruz’s trucks to
replace the destroyed spare parts; and that there were no spare parts stored in the
bodega of Cruz. That Cruz executed a complaint-affidavit charging Castro which
resulted in the filing of the Information in a criminal case because Castro had priorly
filed a case for illegal dismissal against him, as theorized by the defense, is thus not
far-fetched. Cruz himself admitted that a complaint for illegal dismissal had been
priorly filed. In fine, contrary to the trial court’s decision, the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Castro is guilty of the crime charged. The
appellate court’s affirmance of the trial court’s decision must thus fail.

Art. 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. The penalty of arresto mayor* or a
fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who,
having been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without legal
motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.
Elements:
 1. That the offender is elected by popular election to a public office.
2. That he refuses to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.
3. That there is no legal motive for such refusal to be sworn in or to discharge
the duties of said office.

Art. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of prision correccional in its

medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period,7 in addition to his liability for
the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall overdo himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or
detention prisoner under his charge by the imposition of punishments not authorized
by the regulations, or by inflicting such punishments in a cruel and humiliating
manner.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he has under his charge a prisoner or detention prisoner.
3. That he maltreats such prisoner in either of the following manners:

PEOPLE v. ARTURO PUNZALAN

GR No. 199892, 2012-12-10

FACTS:
The crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder. Seaman 1 Class
(SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members
of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training
Command (NETC) at Zambales. at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went
to the "All-in-One" Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the
evening, they transferred to a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they. Continued
their drinking session.a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant
ensued regarding a flickering light bulb inside "Aquarius." When SN1 Bacosa
suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang ilaw") appellant who must have
misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa's statement belligerently reacted
asking, "Sinong papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa's statement was directed at
him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang
apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly
angry, mumbling unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table. To avoid
further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave and return to the NETC camp.
Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate to give the sentries some
barbecue before proceeding to follow their companions. Soon after the navy
personnel passed by the sentry gate,... flagged down a rushing and zigzagging
maroon Nissan van. The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant,
who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago
ang mga 'yan!," while pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel's group.
Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped
away while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga 'yan!" an speed away towards the camp
and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the... walking navy personnel
prompting him to exclaim "chief, binangga ang tropa!" When they were hit by the
vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown away towards a
grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness. SN1 Duclayna
lying motionless on the ground. Members of the local police soon arrived at the
scene of the crime found the bloodied lifeless body of SN1 Andal lying on the side of
the road. When they asked appellant why he ran over the navy personnel, he simply
answered that he was drunk directly caused the death of Andal and Duclayna. In his
defense, appellant testified that in the evening... he was drinking... at the "Aquarius"
videoke bar. When he sang, the navy personnel who were also inside the bar
laughed at him as he was out of tune. Informed that the navy personnel would like to
make peace with him. He went back inside the bar and approached the navy
personnel appellant offered his hand but Bacosa suddenly punched appellant's right
ear. To avoid further altercation, appellant left the bar went home driving his van they
passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at the van. When he alighted and
inspected the vehicle, he saw that one of the headlights was broken. Thereafter, he
saw SN1 Bacosa and another man approaching him so he went back inside the van
but the duo boxed him repeatedly on his... shoulder through the van's open window.
When he saw the four other navy personnel coming towards him, he accelerated the
van. RTC found appellant guilty appellant claimed he may not be held criminally
liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury,... His act of increasing
his vehicle's speed was reasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two
men whose four companions were also approaching.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated
murder?

HELD:
The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime
contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: Appellant was animated
by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of
stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through
the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the
same time, constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and
SN1 Domingo. The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies
as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to
death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive
penalty.

Art. 236. Anticipation of duties of a public office. Any person who shall assume
the performance of the duties and powers of any public office or employment without
first being sworn in or having given the bond required by law, shall be suspended
from such office or employment until he shall have complied with the respective
formalities and shall be fined from 200 to 500 pesos.
Elements:
1. That the offender is entitled to hold a public office or employment, either by
election or appointment.
2. That the law requires that he should first be sworn in and/or should first
give a bond.
3. That he assumes the performance of the duties and powers of such office.
4. That he has not taken his oath of office and/or given the bond required by
law.

Art. 237. Prolonging performance of duties and powers. Any public officer who
shall continue to exercise the duties and powers of his office, employment, or
commission, beyond the period provided by law, regulations or special provisions
applicable to the case, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its
minimum period,10 special temporary disqualification in its minimum period11 and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

Elements:
1. That the offender is holding a public office.
2. That the period provided by law, regulations or special provisions for
holding such office, has already expired.
3. That he continues to exercise the duties and powers of such office.

Art. 238. Abandonment of office or position. Any public officer who, before the
acceptance of his resignation, shall abandon his office to the detriment of the public
service, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he formally resigns from his position.
3. That his resignation has not yet been accepted.
4. That he abandons his office to the detriment of the public service.

Art. 239. Usurpation of legislative powers. The penalties of prision correccional in

its minimum period,15 temporary special disqualification, and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos, shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall encroach upon the
powers of the legislative branch of the Government, either by making general rules
or regulations beyond the scope of his authority, or by attempting to repeal a law or
suspending the execution thereof.
Elements:
1. That the offender is an executive or judicial officer.
 2. That he (a) makes general rules or regulations beyond the scope of his
authority, or (b) attempts to repeal a law or (c) suspends the execution
thereof.

Art. 240. Usurpation of executive functions. — Any judge who shall assume any
power pertaining to the executive authorities, or shall obstruct the latter in the lawful
exercise of their powers, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a judge.
2. That he (a) assumes a power pertaining to the executive authorities, or (b)
obstructs the executive authorities in the lawful exercise of their powers.

Art. 241. Usurpation of judicial functions. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period18 shall be imposed
upon any officer of the executive branch of the Government who shall assume
judicial powers or shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision rendered by
any judge within his jurisdiction.

Elements:
1. That the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the Government.
2. That he (a) assumes judicial powers, or (b) obstructs the execution of any
order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.

Art. 242. Disobeying request for disqualification. — Any public officer who,
before the question of jurisdiction is decided, shall continue any proceeding after
having been lawfully required to refrain from so doing, shall be punished by arresto
mayor19 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That a proceeding is pending before such public officer.
3. That there is a question brought before the proper authority regarding his
jurisdiction, which is not yet decided.
4. That he has been lawfully required to refrain from continuing the
proceeding.
5. That he continues the proceeding.

Art. 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority. Any
executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority
with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor™ and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos.

Elements:
1. That the offender is an executive officer.
2. That he addresses any order or suggestion to any judicial authority.
3. That the order or suggestion relates to any case or business coming within
he exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice.

Art. 244. Unlawful appointments. Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate
or appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor21 and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer.
2. That he nominates or appoints a person to a public office.
3. That such person lacks the legal qualifications therefor.
4. That the offender knows that his nominee or appointee lacks the
qualifications at the time he made the nomination or appointment.

Art. 245. Abuses against chastity — Penalties. — The penalties of prision

correccional in its medium and maximum periods22 and temporary special
disqualification23 shall be imposed.

Elements of the offense:

a. That the offender is a public officer.
b. That he solicits or makes immoral or indecent advances to a woman.
c. That such woman must be —
(1) interested in matters pending before the offender for decision, or with
respect to which he is required to submit a report to or consult with a superior
officer; or
(2) under the custody of the offender who is a warden or other public officer
directly charged with the care and custody of prisoners or persons under
arrest; or
(3) the wife, daughter, sister or relative within the same degree by affinity of t
he person in the custody of the offender.
Note: The mother of the person in the custody of the offender is not included.

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death.1 (As amended by RA. No. 7659)

Elements:

1. That a person is killed.

2. That the deceased is killed by the accused.
 3. That the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse, of the accused.

PEOPLE vs. GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel
and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her.
Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled
and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death
of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self
defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death. On
automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa
and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic
Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at
the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’
reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman
syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman
syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial
court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman
syndrome” as constituting self-defense?

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with
the “battered woman syndrome”. A battered woman has been defined as a woman
“who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a
man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman,
the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and
she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.” More graphically,
the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,”
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. The Court,
however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven
to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the
batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force
in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under
the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established. The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of
violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at
least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle. In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule
that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must
concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent
danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to
bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life
or safety. The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and
obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that
these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. The first circumstance arose
from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-
spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted
in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. As to
the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of
mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover
her normal equanimity.

Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Requisites:
1. That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his
daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both, of them or inflicts upon any or both of them
any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse.

PEOPLE vs. CORTEZ

G.R. No. 187257, August 08, 2017

FACTS: 

This case resolves the 16,500 Workers' Solicitous Motion for Reconsideration
filed by respondents National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union
(NECU) and the National Power Corporation Employees and Workers Union
(NEWU)
A Petition for Mandamus was filed by NECU and NEWU with Branch 84, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, praying that the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR)
be ordered to release the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Amelioration (AA)
allegedly withheld from them from July 1, 1989 to March 19, 1999. NECU and
NEWU believed that they were among the government employees whose COLA and
AA were not factually integrated into their basic salary upon the implementation of
Republic Act No. 6758. The trial court granted their Petition and awarded a total of
P6,496,055,339.98 as alleged back COLA and AA with P704,777,508.60 as legal
interest. A Writ of Execution was issued. The Office of the Solicitor General and the
Secretary of Budget and Management separately filed Petitions for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court to nullify the trial court's issuances. On February 7, 2017, the Court
rendered a Decision granting the Petitions for Certiorari. The Supreme Court held,
among others, that respondents NECU's and NEWU's COLA and AA for the period
July 1, 1989 to March 19, 1999 were already factually integrated into their basic
salaries, by virtue of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 and Memorandum Order
No. 198, series of 1994. In a motion to reconsider, NECU and NEWU insist that law,
jurisprudence, and evidence support their contention that their COLA and AA were
deducted from their salaries from July 1, 1989 to March 19, 1999.  In particular, they
distinguish NAPOCOR workers into three (3) categories. The first category includes
workers already employed when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect and whose COLA
and AA were integrated into their basic salaries only up to 1993. The second
category covers those hired after Republic Act No. 6758 took effect and whose
COLA and AA were allegedly deducted from 1989 to 1999. The third category
consists of employees hired after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7648 and whose
COLA and AA were allegedly deducted from 1994 to 1999.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not NECU and NEWU attempt to sway the Court by-insisting that
those hired after Republic Act No. 6758 took effect have never received their COLA
and AA and that these allowances were deducted from their basic pay?

HELD: 

NECU and NEWU are wrong. The Court clarified that those who were already
receiving COLA and AA as of July 1, 1989, but whose receipt was discontinued due
to the issuance of DBM-CCC No. 10, were entitled to receive such allowances during
the period of the Circular's ineffectivity, or from July 1,1989 to March 16,1999. The
same factual premise was present in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System, wherein this Court reiterated that those already receiving COLA as of July 1,
1989 were entitled to its payment from 1989 to 1999. In neither of these cases did
this Court suggest that the compensation of the employees after the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 6758 would be increased with the addition of the COLA and AA. If
the total compensation package were the same, then clearly the COLA or AA, or
both were factually integrated. Republic Act No. 6758 remained effective during the
period of ineffectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Thus, the COLA and AA of NAPOCOR
officers and employees were integrated into the standardized salaries effective July
1, 1989 pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, which provides: Section
12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. - All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances;
subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels
and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel
stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified
herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the
standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation,
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not
integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee
paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic
salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National Government.
Those who were hired after the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758, or after
July 1, 1989, did not receive a lesser compensation package than those who were
hired before July 1, 1989. To emphasize, respondents NECU's and NEWU's COLA
and AA were integrated into their basic salary by virtue of Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 6758. Section 12 has never been ineffective or rendered unconstitutional. Thus,
all allowances not covered by the exceptions to Section 12 are presumed to have
been integrated into the basic standardized pay. The receipt of a transition allowance
is not proof that only those who were hired before July 1, 1989 received their COLA
and AA. As this Court explained in its February 7, 2017 Decision, the transition
allowance was given only to comply with the non-diminution clause of the law. It was
never meant as an additional compensation to the standardized pay. The Court
likewise clarified that upon the implementation of Republic Act No. 7648, NAPOCOR
workers were covered by a new compensation plan. All prior questions on the non-
publication of Department of Budget and Management Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 would no longer apply to the determination of whether COLA and AA
were withheld. Furthermore, the new compensation plan under Republic Act No.
7648 already incorporated all benefits previously integrated, including the COLA and
AA. The alleged "Exhibit C" presented by respondents NECU and NEWU as
evidence to prove that the COLA and AA were factually deducted from their basic
pay is unmeritorious. It appears to be a collection list submitted before the Regional
Trial Court in compliance with the Writ of Execution dated March 23, 2009. The list
specifies names of employees, a computation of their alleged entitlements to their
COLA and AA, and deductions for attorney's fees and docket fees. However, these
computations were made only after the trial court had ruled in their favor. This Court
has already ruled that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the
judgment award. Thus, these computations do not prove conclusively that
respondents NECU's and NEWU's COLA and AA were withheld from July 1, 1989 to
March 19, 1999. Respondents NECU and NEWU, all 16,500 of them, were in a
position to submit to this Court any pay slip or Notice of Position Allocation and
Salary Adjustment showing an actual deduction of the COLA and AA from July 1,
1989 to March 19, 1999. They have failed to do so. As it stands, respondents NECU
and NEWU have failed to prove that their COLA and AA were factually deducted
from their basic pay. Interestingly, while the 16,500 Workers' Solicitous Motion for
Reconsideration was pending, two (2) motions were filed by the law firm of Angara
Abella Concepcion Regala & Cruz (ACCRA), formally entering its appearance as
lead counsel on behalf of respondents NECU and NEWU.[33] These motions were
an Entry of Appearance with Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court and Time to File
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The ACCRA pleadings do not
contain a conforme from respondents NECU and NEWU or a withdrawal of
appearance from their counsel, Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit. It also appears from
ACCRA'S affidavits of service that there were no copies furnished to Atty. Galit or to
respondents NECU and NEWU. While motions for reconsideration are not among
the pleadings required to be verified,[36] this circumstance is highly unusual,
especially considering that the grant of a motion for reconsideration in this case may
result in a more than P7 billion judgment award. Nonetheless, in view of the denial of
the 16,500 Workers' Solicitous Motion for Reconsideration, this Court finds that it is
no longer necessary to pass upon ACCRA'S pleadings.

Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death3 if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

Elements of murder:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

PEOPLE vs. FILOMENO CAMANO

GR Nos. L-36662-63, 1982-07-30

FACTS:
In the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of Camarines Sur,
between the hours of four and five o'clock in the afternoon, accused had been
drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo while the
latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost infront of the store of one
Socorro Buates. Pascua, sustained two mortal wounds for which he died
instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio A. Tan, Municipal Health Officer, of
Sagñay, Camarines Sur, in his Autopsy Report NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON
AUTOPSY.
The bloody incident was not preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the
victims and the accused three years prior to this incident, the two victims had a
misunderstanding with the accused while fishing along Sagñay River. During this
occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo Pascua to tow his fishing
boat with the motor boat owned by Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused
by both.
From this time on, the accused begrudged the two, and entertained personal
resentment against them on several occasions, the accused was seen at the same
table with Godofredo Pascua drinking liquor, the friendly attitude towards Pascua,
seems to be merely artificial than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor
whom he openly detested no less than ten attempts were made by Amado Payago,
a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were refused.
Instead, defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge Marian Buenaflor to
a fight, and announce his evil intention to kill them after killing the two victims, he
returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo
Avila, Juan Chavez, and Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by said peace officers for
him to surrender. He revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden by him
under the table of his house. Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and recovered
the... weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to the thief of Police was
still stained with human blood from the base of the handle to the point of the blade...
when asked as to who was the owner of said bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He
also admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. However,
when he was asked to sign a statement, he refused. Filomeno Camano was
charged, under two (2) separate informations, with the crime of murder attended by
evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases
were tried jointly.
The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-
defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. He also denied holding a grudge
against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. He said that while they were
drinking, they had a heated discussion, and because they were drunk, it resulted in a
fist fight, which they had soon forgotten.
His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970, he was
fishing in the open sea. He went ashore at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning and was
met by Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had a big catch, demanded a
percentage for the fishery commission. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep and
awoke at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon.[3] He ate his... dinner[4] and prepared
to go out to sea again. While he was standing in the yard of his house, Mariano
Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua, Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas Carable,
Abelardo Bolaye, Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were drinking at the
store of Socorro Buates, went to him and Godofredo Pascua, without any
provocation whatsoever, boxed him BOLOING HAHAHAHAHAHAHA boloing. When
I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was able to take hold
of his hands and I was able to grab the bolo. After I have taken the bolo from
Godofredo Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the ground and the rest of the group
except Mariano Buenaflor run away after seeing that Godofredo Pascua fell already
on the ground. Trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused The claim
of self-defense does not find support in the evidence presented are mere fictions of a
desperate man without evidentiary support.
His testimony on these points, and that of his cousin Nemesio Camano are simply
incredible not only because they... are inherently improbable in themselves, but also
because of their clear inconsistencies on contradictions against each other and yet
he did not suffer any physical injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. The
falsity their concocted story is so apparent and self-evident to need further
elucidation. Notwithstanding that many people witnessed the incidents, having
occurred in broad daylight, and that the accused had more sufficient time to look for
witnesses among his friends, relatives, and neighbors in the barrio, during the long
period that this case has been pending trial since February 17, 1970, that he could
not get any witness to testify in his favor, other than his lone witness, Nemesio
Camano Ang drama
For the bitter conclusions herein reached, is based on the compelling and irresistible
facts born out by the evidence of record found... after sleepless night of study that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged committed with
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and intoxication no mitigating circumstance.
In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and the
cause of their deaths are not disputed. Counsel, de oficio merely claims that the
accused is guilty of homicide only in each case, and not murder.

ISSUE:
Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts of the
accused, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses, are all indicative of a "spur-of-
the-moment" decision and action.
Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the commission
of the crime. Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength, which the lower court appreciated in fixing the penalty, is
absorbed in treachery. Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of
intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. If at all,
intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because it
affected accused's mental faculties such that it diminished his capacity to know the
injustice of his acts and to comprehend fully the consequences of his acts. counsel
claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the cases at bar.

HELD:
The contention is well taken in the instant case, it cannot be stated that the
killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to
how and when the plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time had
elapsed before the plan was carried out. Trial court merely concluded that the killing
of Pascua and Buenaflor was premeditated because "the accused has been nursing
the evil design to kill both the victims since three years prior to the occurrence of the
incident. The incident referred to, however, does not establish the time when the
appellant decided to commit the crime. If ever, the aforementioned incident merely
established the motive for the killing of the two victims.
The autopsy report, showed that the point of entry of the stab wound inflicted
upon Pascua was three (3) inches long and three (3) inches below the left armpit, a
little bit posteriorly or toward the hinder end of the body; and the point of exit was the
right chest, one (1) inch lateral to the right nipple with a one (1) inch opening. If the
deceased was stabbed while he was facing his assailant,the entrance wound would
have been in the front part of the body, and its exit wound, if any, would be at the
back. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor
intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if
habitual or intentional. A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive
use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is
unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. The records of these cases do
not show that the appellant was given to excessive use of intoxicating drinks
although he used to get drunk every now and then. The intoxication of the appellant
not being habitual, and considering that the said appellant was in a state of
intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the alternative circumstance
of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating circumstance. The contention is
without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive.
 The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano
guilty of Murder in each of the two cases. The offense being attended by the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to
offset it, the imposable penalty is the... minimum of that provided by law or 17 years,
4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as...
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in
each case.

Art. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246,
shall kill another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by
reclusion temporal.

Elements:

(1) That a person was killed;

(2) That the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
(3) That the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed;
(4) That the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.

PEOPLE vs. FERNANDO PUGAY Y BALCITA

GR No. 74324, 1988-11-17

FACTS:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY Y
BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON Y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of
MURDER poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and
with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the
whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda. Crime was
committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means
employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the
crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of
the body of Bayani Miranda. "CONTRARY TO LAW". Trial court rendered a decision
finding both accused guilty of the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the
accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong, The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay
were friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept
together. Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a comic book
with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several
companions arrived. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of
wood. The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando
Silangcruz and other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene
of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the
persons around spontaneously pointed... to Pugay and Samson as the authors
thereof.

ISSUE:
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the
accused Pugay with respect to the accused Samson.

HELD:
We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the reversal of
the decision of the court a quo to be without merit. He accused Pugay admitted in his
statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that
the contents thereof was water... and then the accused Samson set the deceased on
fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw
Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire.
Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of
eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense. Here is nothing in the records
showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of
the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or
Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear
that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each
of them is liable only for the act committed by him. Having taken the can from under
the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body
of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging
smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring
the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undersirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless
imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the
liquid poured on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance
for he would not have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were
otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it can be conceded that as part of their
fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act,
however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the
victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a
felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as
what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of
the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing
any qualifying circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of
homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-
indicated. Costs against the accused-appellants.

Art. 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. The courts, in
view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated
crime or parricide, murder, or homicide, denned and penalized in the preceding
articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under the
provisions of Article 50.

Courts may impose a penalty two degrees lower for frustrated parricide,
murder or homicide.

The court may impose a penalty lower by one degree than that imposed
under Art. 50.

Art. 50 provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon
the principal in a frustrated felony.

Hence, the court can impose a penalty two degrees lower, in view of the
facts of the case.
This is permissive, not mandatory.