Montemayor vs. Bermejo

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VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 403

Montemayor vs. Bermejo, Jr.
*
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535. March 12, 2004.
DR. CONRADO T. MONTEMAYOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE JUAN O.

BERMEJO, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila, respondent.
Courts; Judges; Judgments; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Forcible Entry; Unlawful

Detainer; Courts are only given a period of 30 days to render judgment in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, reckoned from receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers of the parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, not from the
issuance of the order by the judge deeming the case submitted for resolution.—Section 11,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a period of 30 days for the court to render
judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This period shall be counted
from the receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for
filing the same. Section 11, Rule 70 echoes Section 10 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure which governs unlawful detainer cases, among others. The latter provision
similarly mandates the resolution of such cases within 30 days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
Clearly, the reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment
should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the
parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, as provided by the
Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the judge deeming the case submitted for
resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by
himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by the
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The failure to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable, constitutes gross inefficiency and is a ground for the imposition of
administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge.—Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to administer justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of the same Code
admonishes all judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. The failure to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable, constitutes gross inefficiency and is a ground for the imposition of
administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions; Motion Days; While the Rules of Court requires
all motions to be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-
working day, in the afternoon of the next working day, the same Rules provides an
exception for motions requiring imme-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
404
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
diate action; If a judge does not share the view that a particular motion constitutes
an exception to the rule that motions be heard on Friday afternoons, he could simply set
the motion for hearing on the next motion day.—The respondent Judge, however, can
only offer feeble excuses for his inaction on the plaintiffs’ Motions for Execution. He
claims that the first Motion for Executionprayed that hearing be set on a date that was
not a motion day. Judge Bermejo forgets that while the Rules of Court requires all
motions to be scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017139a323c3f554be0d003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
day, in the afternoon of the next working day, the same Rules provides an exception for
motions requiring immediate action. Perhaps, as a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in
an unlawful detainer case is immediately executory, the plaintiffs believed that their
motion came under the exception. However, if the respondent Judge did not share this
view, he could have simply set the motion for hearing on the next motion day. Instead,
he untenably ignored the motion.
Same; Same; A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the
records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact—there is no
justification for missing records save fortuitous events.—These circumstances may lead a
sophisticated mind to conclude one of two things. One, the registry receipts are indeed
missing from the records but Judge Bermejo is denying it to cover up such loss. This
conclusion is buttressed by the odd fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr.
Montemayor’s allegations, the respondent Judge has not offered in these administrative
proceedings any evidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard
of keeping records is evidence of incompetence and lack of professionalism. The Court
has held that: A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records
of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events . . . This Court reiterates that judges must adopt
a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. Two, Judge Bermejo is
suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in which case, he is not only guilty of
dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions but, worse, bias in favor of the
defendant. On such receipts hinge the answer to Dr. Montemayor’s question: Did the
defendant file her Notice of Appeal on time? A negative answer would have dire
consequences for the defendant since it would preclude any stay in the execution of the
adverse judgment.
Same; Same; Ejectment; The supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for
the perfection of the appeal.—In this case, Judge Bermejo did not order the immediate
execution of the Judgment. On the contrary, he even ordered defendant to file a
supersedeas bond, which, in any event,
405
VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 405
should have been posted within the period to file an appeal. In Chua v. Court of
Appeals, the Court declared: As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an
ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him
arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate
execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending, the foregoing provision
requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal;
(2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which
become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply
with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the
defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the
immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing
of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not
perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for
the perfection of the appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]
Same; Same; Same; Actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer involve
perturbation of social order which must be resolved as promptly as possible and,
accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delay
should carefully be avoided.—Actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer involve
perturbation of social order which must be resolved as promptly as possible and,
accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delay
should carefully be avoided. This rule lost all significance in the plaintiffs’ unlawful
detainer case. Not only did they suffer delay in the resolution of the action and in the
execution of the decision in their favor, but likewise delay in the appeal process.
Same; Same; Same; Bias and Partiality; A judge, by countenancing, permitting, and
even creating the many delays in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the
Rules of Court and the Rule on Summary Procedure, puts in question his partiality.—
The Court is not prepared to rule that Judge Bermejo is guilty of the loss of the registry
receipts proving the date of receipt by the defendant’s counsel of the notice of judgment
in the absence of the records of Civil Case No. 171824-CV before us. Neither is the Court
quick to hold respondent Judge guilty of bias and prejudice in the absence of any
showing that his acts stem from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the
merits on some basis other than what the respondent Judge learned from his
participation in the case. Judge Bermejo claims that he was moved by good faith and the
interest of justice, particularly in granting the defendant her motion for extension to
post a supersedeas bond, considering that the bond was ready for signing anyway. The
Court is inclined to give respondent Judge the benefit of the
406
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
doubt, especially in light of his Judgment in the unlawful detainer case, which was
in favor of the plaintiffs. However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the
many delays in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and
the Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality. It
bears reminding him that a judge must at all times not only be impartial but maintain
the appearance of impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a
judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Delay in Rendition of

Judgment and Impropriety.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The 1 instant administrative case traces its roots from an unlawful detainer
case filed by Benjamin and Desmond T. Montemayor 2
against Lolita Marco.
The case was raffled to Metropolitan Trial Court Judge, Hon. Juan O.
Bermejo, Jr. (Judge Bermejo), the respondent herein.
The records reveal that the pre-trial conference was held on May 20, 2002.
Finding no possibility of settlement, Judge Bermejo issued a Pre-Trial Order of
even date defining the issues submitted for decision and the stipulations agreed
upon, and directing the parties to submit their respective position papers
within 10 days from receipt
3
of the Order, after which, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs submitted their Position Paper on June 13, 2002.
More than a month later, they filed a Motion for Early Resolution dated July
30, 2002. The defendant, on the other hand, submitted her Position Paperonly
on August 14, 2002.
_______________
1 CivilCase No. 171824-CV.
2 Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch III.
3 Rollo, p. 36.
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VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 407

The plaintiffs then filed another Motion for Early Resolution on September 6,

2002. Acting on this motion, Judge Bermejo issued an Order dated September
23, 2002 declaring the case submitted for decision.

On October 10, 2002, Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
Copies thereof were sent by registered mail to the parties and their respective
counsels on October 16, 2002.
On December 12, 2002, the plaintiffs filed their first Motion for
Execution and set the same for hearing on December 16, 2002.
However, the motion was not included in the court calendar because
December 16, 2002 apparently was not a motion day.
On December 20, 2002, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ filed a Second Motion for Execution dated
December 26, 2002 and set the same for hearing on January 3, 2003.
Concomitantly, Dr. Conrado T. Montemayor (Dr. Montemayor), the
complainant herein and the plaintiffs’ attorney-in-fact, also filed on December
26, 2002 a Motion to Require Defendant’s
4
Counsel to Inform the Court the Date
He Received a Copy of the Judgment and set the same for hearing on January 3,
2003. Judge Bermejo
5
did not act on either motion.
In his Order dated January 6, 2003, the respondent Judge gave due course
to the defendant’s appeal and required the latter to post a supersedeas bond in
the amount of P587,500.00 within 10 days from receipt thereof.
On January 21, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their Third Motion for
Execution. On the same day, Dr. Montemayor filed a Second Motion to Require
Defendant’s6 Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the
Judgment. Both motions were heard on January 31, 2003, during which, Judge
Bermejo directed the plaintiffs to submit to the court an Affidavit of Service to
the defendant of the pending motions. 7
Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed a Compliance and Manifestation on
February 4, 2003 stating, among other things, that the defendant was served
copies of the Motion for Execution, on December
_______________
4 Id., at p. 22.
5 Id., at p. 18.
6 Id., at p. 24.
7 Id., at pp. 59-62.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

12, 2002; Second Motion for Execution, on December 26, 2002; Motion to
Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of
the Judgment, on December 26, 2002; Third Motion for Execution, on January
21, 2003; Second Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the
Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment, on January 22, 2003;
and Compliance and Manifestation, on February 3, 2003.
The plaintiffs also filed on February 24, 2003 an Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve
All Pending Incidents of even date. Resolving this motion, Judge Bermejo
issued an Orderdated March 12, 2003, stating that the Motion for
Execution dated December 12, 2002, was not resolved because the day it was
set for hearing, i.e., December 16, 2002, was not a motion day and because
there was no proof that the defendant had already received a copy of
the Judgment dated October 10, 2002. Further, the Second Motion for
Execution dated December 26, 2002, was not acted upon considering the Notice
of Appeal filed by the defendant and the court’s own Order dated January 6,
2003, requiring the former to post a supersedeas bond. Anent the Motion to
the Judgment, the same was not acted upon because the court was then
conducting a semestral inventory of its pending cases. Finally, the Third
Motion for Execution dated January 31, 2003 was deemed submitted for
resolution.
On April 24, 2003, the defendant filed an Urgent Motion for Extension8 dated
April 23, 2003 claiming that she only had until April 21, 2003 within which to
post a supersedeas bond and praying for an extension of 10 days,9
or until May
1, 2003, to post the bond. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the respondent
Judge granted the motion and gave the defendant until May 5, 2003 within
which to post a supersedeas bond.
Upon the
10
defendant’s posting of a supersedeas bond, Judge Bermejo issued
an Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit
the entire records of the case to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings in connection with the defendant’s appeal.
_______________
8 Id., at p. 19.
9 Id., at p. 21.
10 Id., at p. 27.
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VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 409

Incensed by the foregoing proceedings, Dr. Montemayor filed with the Office of
the Court
11
Administrator (OCA) the instant Administrative
Complaint charging Judge Bermejo with gross incompetence and inefficiency,
gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and/or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In the instant complaint, Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge
failed to decide the case within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court). He alleges that Judge
Bermejo “did not bother to check defendant’s preposterous claim that she
received a copy of the Judgment only on December 5, 2002, even if it12 was
released more than forty-five (45) days earlier on October 16, 2002.” He
stresses that even if the defendant received a copy of the Judgment on
December 5, 2002, still, Judge Bermejo should have reckoned the period to
appeal from the time the defendant’s counsel received a copy of
the Judgment and not when the defendant received it herself. What is more,
the registry return card showing the date the defendant’s counsel received a
copy of the Judgmentwas missing from the records.
Dr. Montemayor adds that the Order dated January 6, 2003 giving due
course to the defendant’s appeal and requiring the latter to post a supersedeas
bond within 10 days from receipt thereof was 13
released by registered mail more
than one month later on February 11, 2003, and personal service thereof was
made on April 9, 2003, or more than three months after the issuance thereof.
The motive for the belated service was purportedly to give the defendant more
time to post a supersedeas bond. Dr. Montemayor also faults the respondent
Judge for granting the defendant’s Urgent Motion for Extension to post a
supersedeas bond in violation of Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three (3) Motions for
Execution and two (2) Motions to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the
Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment.
Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of
the records of the case to the appellate court within
_______________
11 Id., at p. 1.
12 Id., at p. 2.
13 Id., at p. 2.
410

15 days from the perfection of the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of

the Rules of Court. According to him, it was only after the respondent Judge
received the defendant’s supersedeas bond that the former issued
the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch14

Clerk of Court to transmit
the records of the case to the appellate court.
Required to comment, Judge Bermejo vigorously disputes Dr. Montemayor’s
allegations. 15
In his Comments dated August 11, 2003, he explains that he did not act on
the plaintiffs’ Motion for Early Resolution dated July 30, 2002 because there
was yet no proof that the defendant already received the Order of May 20, 2002
requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers, the affidavits
of their witnesses and other documentary evidence. Indeed, after the defendant
filed her Position Paper on August 14, 2002, he issued an Orderon September
23, 2002 declaring the case submitted for decision. Hence,
the Judgment rendered on October 10, 2002 was well within the prescribed
period of 30 days under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (Rule on
Summary Procedure).
Judge Bermejo says that he did not act on the first Motion for
Execution because the court had not yet received the registry return receipts of
the service of judgment at that time. Furthermore, December 16, 2002, the
hearing date the plaintiffs requested, was not a motion day. He also did not act
upon the Second Motion for Execution and the Motion to Require Defendant’s
Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment both
filed on December 26, 2002 because at that time, the court was conducting a
semestral inventory of pending cases, and also because the defendant had
already filed a Notice of Appealon December 20, 2002.
Judge Bermejo denies that he did not act on the Third Motion for
Execution and the Second Motion to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the
Court the Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment which were set for hearing
on January 31, 2003. He claims that he issued an Order on the same date
requiring Dr. Montemayor to submit to the court an Affidavit of Service of said
motions on the defendant. He further claims that he even advised Dr.
_______________
14 Id., at p. 27.
15 Id., at p. 31.
411
VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 411

Montemayor’s counsel in open court to find out the registry receipt number of
the registered mail containing the court’s Judgment addressed to the
defendant’s counsel to enable Dr. Montemayor to secure a certification from the
Philippine Postal Office regarding the date the defendant’s counsel received a
copy of the Judgment. In any event, the respondent Judge asserts that he
resolved the plaintiffs’ Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve All Pending Incidents in
the Order dated March 12, 2003.
Judge Bermejo also denies that the registry return card indicating the date
the defendant’s counsel received a copy of the Judgment was missing from the
records. He says that at the time the defendant filed her Notice of Appeal,the
court had not yet received the registry return card.
Respondent Judge admits that he gave due course to the Notice of Appeal of
the defendant in an Order dated January 6, 2003 and required the latter to
post a supersedeas bond within 10 days from receipt of the same. He alleges
that to ensure that the defendant would receive a copy of the Order, he even
required the Sheriff to personally serve it to the defendant, and ordered
another copy to be sent by registered mail. The respective counsels of the
parties were also furnished copies of the said Orderboth by personal service
and by registered mail. The Judge does not deny, however, that when Dr.
Montemayor filed the Compliance and Manifestation on February 4, 2003, the
court was still waiting for the defendant to post a supersedeas bond.
Judge Bermejo rationalizes the granting of the defendant’s Urgent Motion
for Extension of time to post a supersedeas bond since the bond had already
been processed and was ready for signature, but the signatories and approving
officials of the bonding company were not available because of the Lenten
season. He maintains that the said motion for extension is not a prohibited
pleading under the Rules of Court, and that the granting thereof was made in
good faith and in the interest of justice.
He further denies that he prevented the transmittal of the records of the
case to the appellate court. Given that the defendant had not yet posted the
supersedeas bond, and there was no proof to convince him that the latter had
already received a copy of the Order requiring her to file the bond, the court
could not transmit the records.
412

In his Reply dated August 21, 2003, Dr. Montemayor points out that copies of
the Judgment were sent to the parties by registered mail on October 16, 2002,
as certified by the Branch16 Clerk of Court, and not on October 11, 2002, as
claimed by Judge Bermejo.
He also disputes the respondent Judge’s claim that he did not act on the
first Motion for Execution because there was yet no proof of receipt of
the Judgment by the defendant’s counsel. Dr. Montemayor highlights the fact
that the first Motion for Execution was already pending at the time the Notice
of Appeal was filed. He also notes that while Judge Bermejo required the
plaintiffs to submit an Affidavit of Service relative to the Second Motion to
the Judgment, he did not require the same of the defendant when she filed
her Notice of Appeal.Finally, Dr. Montemayor denies that Judge Bermejo
resolved all pending incidents in the Order dated March 12, 2003, because the
Judge did not act on the plaintiffs’ Third Motion for Execution.
On September 11, 2003, the respondent Judge filed a Rejoinder maintaining
that Judgment was rendered well within the 30-day period required under the
Rule on Summary Procedure. Thereafter, he filed a Manifestationasking that
the present administrative case be submitted for resolution without further
argument from the parties.
In his Reply to Rejoinder, Dr. Montemayor submits a Certification from the
Manila Central Post Office stating that the defendant received
17
the mail matter
containing a copy of the Judgment on October
18
17, 2002. Another Certification
from the Makati Central Post Office stating that the defendant’s counsel
received a copy of the Judgment on October 18, 2002, Dr. Montemayor claims,
contradicts Judge Bermejo’s allegation that the court received no proof that the
defendant’s counsel had received a copy of the Judgment.
Required to evaluate the complaint, the OCA submitted its Report and
Recommendation on November 11, 2003 finding merit in the complaint and
recommending that Judge Bermejo be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for
failing to decide the case within the period fixed by law.
_______________
16 Id., at p. 77.
17 Id., at p. 96, Annex “S”-Reply to Rejoinder.
18 Id., at p. 97, Annex “T”-Reply to Rejoinder.
413
VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 413

The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition
of judgment. In essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case
submitted for resolution was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of
judgment on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period.
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a period of 30 days for the
court to render judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This
period shall be counted from the receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same.
Section 11, Rule 70 echoes Section 10 of the Rule on 19
Summary Procedure
which governs unlawful detainer cases, among others. The latter provision
similarly mandates the resolution of such cases within 30 days after receipt of
the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
the same.
Clearly, the reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition
of judgment should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers of the parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, as
provided by the Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the judge deeming
the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by
the judge. A judge cannot by himself choose 20
to prolong the period for deciding
cases beyond that authorized by the law.
The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge
Bermejo’s Order requiring them to submit their respective affidavits and
position papers. Assuming, however, that the court received the
defendant’s Position Paper on August 14, 2002, as respondent Judge claims,
judgment should have been rendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the
decision was dated October 10, 2002, or nearly a month after the lapse of the
mandatory period for rendition of judgment and almost two months from the
receipt of the defendant’s Position Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of
delay and, thus, administratively liable.
_______________
19 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Sec. 1.
20 Saceda v. Gestopa, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1303, December 13, 2001, 372 SCRA 192.
414

Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to administer justice
without delay. Rule 3.05 of the same Code admonishes all judges to dispose of
the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The
failure to decide a21case within the required period is not excusable, constitutes
gross inefficiency and is a ground22 for the imposition of administrative
sanctions against the defaulting judge.
Delay in the rendition of judgment, however, is the least of Judge Bermejo’s
administrative transgressions.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, states: “If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless
an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and
executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing
down to the time of the judgment appealed from . . . .” The judgment is
executed immediately in favor of the plaintiff, as a23 matter of right, to prevent
further damage arising from the loss of possession.
The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feeble excuses for his inaction
on the plaintiffs’ Motions for Execution. He claims that the first Motion for
Executionprayed that hearing be set on a date that was not a motion day.
Judge Bermejo forgets that while the Rules of Court requires all motions to be
scheduled for hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day,
in the afternoon of the next working day,24
the same Rules provides an exception
for motions requiring immediate action. Perhaps, as a judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case is immediately executory, the plaintiffs
believed that their motion came under the exception. However, if the
respondent Judge did not share this view, he could have simply set the motion
for hearing on the next motion day. Instead, he untenably ignored the motion.
_______________
21 Farrales v. Camarista, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 84.
22 Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, A.M. No. RTJ-88-170, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 482.
23 San Manuel Wood Products, Inc. v. Judge Tupas, 319 Phil. 594; 249 SCRA 466 (1995).
24 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 15, SEC. 7.
415
VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 415

Judge Bermejo also rationalizes his failure to act on the motion on the ground
that there was no proof yet that the defendant’s counsel had received notice of
the Judgment. In this connection, Dr. Montemayor alleges that the registry
return card indicating the defense counsel’s notice of judgment is missing from
the records, a charge that respondent Judge vehemently denies. By doing so, he
placed himself in a Catch-22. His denial exposes his liability, as the succeeding
discussion shows.
Copies of the Judgment were transmitted to the parties on October 16, 2002
by registered mail. The plaintiffs filed their first Motion for
Execution almost two months later on December 12, 2002. The fact that the
registry receipts of the service of judgment had not yet returned at this point
would have been cause for apprehension for any responsible judge. Yet Judge
Bermejo has not conveyed any semblance of anxiety. He did not inquire from,
nor inform, the Clerk of Court about the absence of the receipts two months
after copies of the Judgment were sent to the parties. Instead, he found the
lack of registry receipts a convenient reason for tarrying on the motion.
Questioning the timeliness of the defendant’s Notice of Appeal, Dr.
Montemayor subsequently filed two separate motions to require the defense
counsel to inform the court of the date of his receipt of a copy of
the Judgment. This is a strange request since that fact could have been easily
verified from the registry return receipts, if indeed they were extant from the
records. But Judge Bermejo did not act on either motion. Stranger still, he
admits to advising Dr. Montemayor to secure the registry receipt number of the
notice of judgment to the defendant’s counsel to establish the latter’s date of
receipt when, to repeat, all the respondent Judge had to do was look into the
records.
These circumstances may lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two
things.
One, the registry receipts are indeed missing from the records but Judge
Bermejo is denying it to cover up such loss. This conclusion is buttressed by the
odd fact that, despite the seriousness of Dr. Montemayor’s allegations, the
respondent Judge has not offered in these administrative proceedings any
evidence of the existence of the registry receipts. An obvious disregard of
keeping records is evidence of incompetence and lack of professionalism. The
Court has held that:
416

A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases
and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing
records save fortuitous events . . . This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system
of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient
recording and filing system in his court because he is25 after all the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions.
Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in

which case, he is not only guilty of dragging his feet in the resolution of the
motions but, worse, bias in favor of the defendant. On such receipts hinge the
answer to Dr. Montemayor’s question: Did the defendant file her Notice of
Appeal on time? A negative answer would have dire consequences for the
defendant since it would preclude any stay in the execution of the adverse
judgment.
Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a

flimsy justification for his inaction on Dr. Montemayor’s Second Motion for
Execution. According to the respondent Judge, the court was undertaking its
semestral inventory when the motion was filed. Even if the Court were to
admit the adequacy of this obvious pretext, Judge Bermejo, at the very least,
should have set the motion for hearing on the next motion day after the
inventory. But again, he disregarded the second motion.
Next, under Section 19, Rule 70, supra, in case the defendant does not file
any supersedeas bond or did not make any monthly deposit, the plaintiff would
be entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution 26
of the inferior
court’s judgment. In such a case the execution is mandatory. In Fernandez v.
Español, the Court held:
_______________
25 Beso v. Judge Daguman, 380 Phil. 544; 323 SCRA 566 (2000), citing Sabitsana v.
Villamor, 202 SCRA 435 (1991); Bernardo v. Judge Amelita A. Fabros, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189, 12
May 1999, 307 SCRA 28; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, 279
SCRA 267(1997); Office of the Court Administrator v. RTC Judge Amelita DK Benedicto, 296 SCRA
62 (1998); Mamamayan ng Zapote I, Bacoor, Cavite v. Balderian, 265 SCRA 360 (1996); Celino v.
Abrogar, 245 SCRA 304(1995).
26 De Laureano v. Adil, G.R. No. L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 148; Philippine Holding Corp.
v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-55972, May 13,
417
VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 417

. . . . Considering these principles, respondent judge should simply have ascertained

from the records the allegations in complainant’s motion for execution and, on that
basis, resolved the motion. Had she done this, she could not have failed to notice that
the defendant had not given a supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution of the
judgment and had not paid the current rents as they fell due. The defendant’s failure to
comply with these requisites entitled the complainant to the immediate
27
execution of the
judgment. The court’s duty was simply to order such execution.
In this case, Judge Bermejo did not order the immediate execution of
the Judgment. On the contrary, he even ordered defendant to file a
supersedeas bond, which, in any event, should have 28
been posted within the
period to file an appeal. In Chua v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss
of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said
judgment while the appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the
following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a
supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during
the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these
conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court
in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the defendant-appellant
perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of
the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond
will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily
then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the
appeal. [Emphasis supplied.]
The records show that on January 6, 2003, Judge Bermejo granted the
defendant 10 days from receipt of the Ordergiving due course to the Notice of
Appeal to post a supersedeas bond. Assuming that the defendant received a
copy of the Judgment only on
_______________
1981, 104 SCRA 401; Hualam Construction and Dev’t. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85466,
October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 612.
27 Fernandez v. Español, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1150, April 15, 1998, 289 SCRA 1.
28 G.R. No. 113886, February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA 437.
418

December 5, 2002, the period granted was way beyond the 15-day period for
perfecting an appeal.
More than three months after, the defendant filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension alleging that “she had until April 21, 2003 to file29
her supersedeas
bond” and asking for 10 more days to post the same. How service of
the Orderof January 6, 2003 took so long was not sufficiently explained. 30
Moreover, the Urgent Motion for Extension was filed only on April 24, 200331 or
three days after her alleged last day to post the bond on April 21, 2003, in
violation of the rule that motions for extension 32
must be filed prior to the
expiration of the period sought to be extended. Compounding the erroneous
admission of said motion for extension, Judge Bermejo, on the same day, issued
an Order allowing the defendant an additional extension of 15 days, more
than the 10 days she initially asked for, and in further violation of the rule
enunciated in Chua, supra. In the meantime, the transmittal to the appellate
court of the case’s records was deferred to await the posting of the supersedeas
bond.
Actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer involve perturbation of social
order which must be resolved as promptly as possible and, accordingly,
technicalities or details of 33procedure which may cause unnecessary delay
should carefully be avoided. This rule lost all significance in the plaintiffs’
unlawful detainer case. Not only did they suffer delay in the resolution of the
action and in the execution of the decision in their favor, but likewise delay in
the appeal process.
The Court is not prepared to rule that Judge Bermejo is guilty of the loss of
the registry receipts proving the date of receipt by the
_______________
29 Supra, note 3 at p. 19.
30 Id.,at p. 68, Annex “O” of Respondent Judge.
31 Ibid.
32 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57079, September
29, 1989, 178 SCRA 94, citing Galima, et al. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-21046, January 31, 1966, 16
SCRA 140 and Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-32682, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 664.
33 Torno v. Intermediate Appellate Court, L-72622, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA 742; De Papa v.
Camacho, G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 281.
419
VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 419

defendant’s counsel of the notice of judgment in the absence of the records

of Civil Case No. 171824-CV before us.
Neither is the Court quick to hold respondent Judge guilty of bias and
prejudice in the absence of any showing that his acts stem from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other
than 34 what the respondent Judge learned from his participation in the
case. Judge Bermejo claims that he was moved by good faith and the interest
of justice, particularly in granting the defendant her motion for extension to
post a supersedeas bond, considering that the bond was ready for signing
anyway. The Court is inclined to give respondent Judge the benefit of the
doubt, especially in light of his Judgment in the unlawful detainer case, which
was in favor of the plaintiffs.
However, by countenancing, permitting, and even creating the many delays
in obvious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the
Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Bermejo has put in question his partiality.
It bears reminding him that a judge must35at all times not only be impartial but
maintain the appearance of impartiality. Thus, under Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as

damaging to36public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias
or prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr., of
Branch 3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila guilty of delay in the
rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is
also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is
fined the amount of P10,000.00.
_______________
34 Soriano v. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, August 31, 2000, 339 SCRA 366.
35 Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 69.
36 Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC, Br. 54, Manila, of an Accused in a Non-Bailable
Offense, A.M. No. 00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001, 367 SCRA 285.
420

Ebero vs. Camposano
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Actg. Chairman), Austria-Martinezand Callejo, Sr.,

JJ., concur.
Puno (Chairman), J., concur.
Respondent meted a P5,000 fine for delay in the rendition of judgment and
impropriety.
Notes.—When the opinion of counsel is at its variance with that of the

judge, the former cannot use it as an excuse to hurl imputations of unfairness
and partiality in the absence of clear and convincing proof. (Cea vs. Paguio, 397
SCRA 494 [2003])
Judges are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is essential manifestation of reality. (Pascual vs. Bonifacio, 398
SCRA 695 [2003])
——o0o——
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VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 403

DR. CONRADO T. MONTEMAYOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE JUAN O.

Courts; Judges; Judgments; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Forcible Entry; Unlawful

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Montemayor vs. Bermejo, Jr.

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 405

Montemayor vs. Bermejo, Jr.

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Montemayor vs. Bermejo, Jr.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Delay in Rendition of

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 407

The plaintiffs then filed another Motion for Early Resolution on September 6,

23, 2002 declaring the case submitted for decision.

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 409

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

15 days from the perfection of the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of

the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch14

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 411

412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 413

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 415

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Two, Judge Bermejo is suppressing proof of the registry return receipts, in

Other circumstances support the theory of bias. Judge Bermejo provides a

v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-55972, May 13,

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 417

. . . . Considering these principles, respondent judge should simply have ascertained

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Camacho, G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 281.

VOL. 425, MARCH 12, 2004 419

defendant’s counsel of the notice of judgment in the absence of the records

and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as

Offense, A.M. No. 00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001, 367 SCRA 285.

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Quisumbing (Actg. Chairman), Austria-Martinezand Callejo, Sr.,

Notes.—When the opinion of counsel is at its variance with that of the

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