SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL.

, suing in his long as due process is observed, the alleged nullity of a

behalf and for the benefit of all other persons having legislative act can only be shown if in fact there is such a
common or general interest with him in accordance denial. The liberty to contract, associated with business
with Sec. 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court, Petitioners- activities may be subjected in the interest of the general
Appellants, v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION welfare under the police power, to restrictions varied in
and ADMINISTRATOR OF ECONOMIC character and wide ranging in scope as long as due
COORDINATION, Respondents-Appellees. process is observed. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
enactment of the law and the State, in order to promote
Alafriz Law Offices for Petitioners-Appellants. the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,
with property and with business and occupations.
The Government Corporation Counsel and Solicitor Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of
General for Respondents-Appellees. restraints and burdens to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the State. These considerations
SYLLABUS constitute more than sufficient justification for statutes
curtailing liberty enjoyed by business enterprises
whether conducted by natural or juridical persons to
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES;
satisfy the needs of public welfare.
SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE; PURPOSE. — The
constitutional provision Article VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 that "no
5. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; PROPERTY RIGHTS;
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
LIMITATIONS. — Property rights find shelter in specific
than one subject which shall be expressed in its title" is
constitutional provisions, one of which is the due process
aimed at evils of the so- called omnibus bills and log-
clause. But the framers of the Constitution saw to it that
rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or
the fundamental law, passed at a time of surging unrest
unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is
and dissatisfaction and in midst of fear that constitutional
limited to a particular matter, lawmakers and the people
democracy, owing to its commitment to claims of
should be informed of the subject of the proposed
property could not cope with the problems of poverty and
legislative measures. This provision thus precludes the
misery, would not be impotent to take necessary
insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision
remedial measures.
not germane to the subject matter of the bill.

6. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION LIMITING NET PROFITS TO

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE. — This constitutional requirement
12% OF INVESTMENT; R.A. 3043. — The due process
is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough
objection that the power conferred by R.A. 3043 limiting
reasonably to include the general object which the
the net profits of franchise holders to 12% annually of
statute seeks to effect without expressing each and
investment plus 2 months operating expenses has
every means necessary for its accomplishment. Mere
confiscatory effects, has a ring of futility as this Court
details need not be set forth. Congress is not required to
has upheld such a figure as against the claim that it was
make the title of the act a complete index of its contents.
too generous to a public utility. Moreover, in the absence
The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating
of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory
to its subject finding expression in its title.
effect of the provision in question there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3043; every statute has in its favor.
AMENDATORY LAW. — Republic Act No. 3043 entitled
"An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. 120,
as amended by Republic Act No. 2641" empowering the
National Power Corporation to require as a condition that 7. ID.; POLICE POWER; WELFARE STATE CONCEPT.
a franchise holder receiving at least 50% of its electric — The welfare state concept is not alien to the
power and energy from it to realize a net profit of not philosophy of our Constitution. It is implicit in quite a few
more than 12% annually of its investments plus two- of its provisions. There is the clause on the promotion of
month operating expenses and to renew all existing social justice to ensure the well-being and economic
contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric security of all the people, as well as the pledge of
power and energy so as to give effect to the Act, is not protection to labor with specific authority to regulate the
violative of the constitutional requirement that a bill relations between landowners and tenants and between
cannot embrace more than one subject to be expressed labor and capital. This particularized concern for the
in its title or by virtue of its alleged failure to observe the rights of working men in industry and agriculture cannot
due process criterion. Since the law amends a section or preclude attention to and concern for the rights of
part of a statute, it suffices if reference is made to the consumers who are the objects of solicitude in the
legislation to be amended, there being no need to state present legislation. Police power as an attribute to
the precise nature of the amendment. promote the common weal would be diluted considerably
of its reach and effectiveness if on the mere plea that the
4. ID.; FREEDOM TO CONTRACT; RESTRICTIONS. — liberty to contract would be restricted, the questioned
In the face of a constitutional provision that allows statute is characterized as denial of due process.
deprivation of liberty, including the liberty of contract, as
8. ID.; IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS; LEGISLATION rider referred to above, which, in the opinion of
AFFECTING RIGHTS UNDER EXISTING petitioners, transgressed the constitutional provision on
CONTRACTS. — The application of R.A. 3043 to the subject matter and title of bills as well as the due
contracts already in existence does not infringe the process clause.8 Mention was then made of the National
constitutional prohibition against any law impairing the Power Corporation approving a rate increase of at least
obligation of contract. This enactment under the police 17.5%, the effectivity of which, was at first deferred to
power of the state being remedial in nature, the non- November 1, 1962, then subsequently to January 15,
applicability thereof to existing conditions would be self- 1963, with the threat that in case petitioners would fail to
defeating. sign the revised contract providing for the increased rate,
respondent National Power Corporation would then
FERNANDO, J.: cease "to supply, distribute and service electric power
and energy to them."9
This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the
lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power That would be, in the opinion of petitioners, violative of
and Development Company, both franchise holders of their rights, proceeding from legislation suffering from
electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section constitutional infirmities.10 A declaration of
of an amendatory act,1 empowering respondent National unconstitutionality was therefore sought by them. It was
Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of prayed: "(1) To give due course to this petition; (2) To
electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least issue a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting of
50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as the requisite bond, enjoining respondent NPC from
a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a carrying or prosecuting its threat to enforce the
net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its provisions of the rider or Section 3 of Republic Act No.
investments plus two-month operating expenses." 3043 ... in the manner stated in paragraph 18 of this
Respondent, under such provision, could likewise petition until this Honorable Court shall have finally
"renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for decided or disposed, by final judgment, of the issues
the supply of electric power and energy," so that the raised in this petition; (3) After due hearing, to declare
provisions of the Act could be given effect. 2 This the rider or Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 null and
statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, void for being illegal and unconstitutional, and to issue a
being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision permanent injunction requiring respondent NPC to
requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, refrain from enforcing or implementing the provisions of
cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be the same law."11
expressed in its title,3 as well as the due process
guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being Soon after, petitioner Philippine Power and Development
infringed upon. The lower court sustained its validity. We Company moved that insofar as it was concerned, the
sustain the lower court in this appeal. case be dismissed, which motion was granted by the
lower court on January 25, 1963. 12 The sole petitioner is
In the petition for declaratory relief, after the usual therefore Santiago P. Alalayan, suing in his behalf and
allegations as to parties, it was stated that respondent for the benefit of all other persons having common or
National Power Corporation "has for some years now general interest with him. Respondent National Power
been, and still is, by virtue of similar, valid and existing Corporation filed an opposition on February 15, 1963,
contracts entered into by it with one hundred and thirty opposing the issuance of a writ for preliminary
seven (137) natural persons and corporations distributed injunction.13 On March 21, 1963, the lower court,
all over the country, supplying, distributing, servicing and considering that there was "no sufficient ground for the
selling electric power and energy at fixed rites schedules issuance of the writ for preliminary injunction," denied
to the latter who have for some years now been and still the same.14
are, legally engaged in resupplying, redistributing,
reservicing and reselling the said electric power and There was in the answer, dated March 29, 1963, an
energy to individual customers within the coverage of admission of the main facts alleged, with a denial of the
their respective franchises."4 Petitioners are included legal conclusion which petitioner would deduce
among the said 197 natural persons and entities. 5 Then, therefrom, respondent National Power Corporation
reference was made to the particular contracts upholding the validity of the challenged provision. Then,
petitioners entered into with respondent, the contracts to came a partial stipulation of facts submitted on October
continue indefinitely unless and until either party would 1, 1964, consisting of a resolution of the Philippine
give to the other two years previous notice in writing of Electric Plant Owners Association to take the necessary
its intention to terminate the same. 6After which, it was steps to stop respondent National Power Corporation
noted that on June 18, 1960, an act authorizing the from enforcing its announced increase, samples of
increase of the capital stock of the National Power contracts between electric plant operators on the one
Corporation to P100 million took effect. 7 A year later, on hand and respondent National Power Corporation on the
June 17, 1961, it was alleged that the challenged other, the contract with petitioner Alalayan, dated May
legislation became a law, purportedly to increase further 26, 1956, showing that he did purchase and take power
the authorized capital stock, but including the alleged and energy as follows: "Sixty (60) kilowatts and of not
less than 140,000 kilowatt-hours in any contract year at required to make the title of the act a complete index of
the rate of P120.00 per kilowatt per year" payable in its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an
twelve equal monthly installments, "plus an energy act relating to its subject finding expression in its
charge of P0.013 per kilowatt hour, payable on the basis title.18 More specifically, if the law amends a section or
of monthly delivery"; a letter of June 22, 1962 of part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the
respondent National Power Corporation to petitioner legislation to be amended, there being no need to state
approving his 17.5% rate increase of power so that the precise nature of the amendment.19
beginning July 1, 1962, the demand charge would be
P10.00 per kilowatt per month and the energy charge It was in 1938, in Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai
would be P0.02 per kilowatt hour; a letter of August 15, Bank,20 where, for the first time after the inauguration of
1962, wherein respondent National Power Corporation the Commonwealth, this Court passed upon a provision
notified petitioner that it deferred the effectivity of the of that character. We held there that the Reorganization
new rates, but it will be enforced on November 1, 1962; Law,21providing for the mode in which the total annual
a letter of June 25, 1963 enforcing respondent National expenses of the Bureau of Banking could be reimbursed
Power Corporation deferring once again the effectivity of through assessment levied upon all banking institutions
the new rates until January 1, 1964; as well as the subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner was not
congressional transcripts on House Bill No. 5377 and violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the
Senate Bill No. 613, now Republic Act No. 3043.15 previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously
dissented, his view being that while the main subject of
In an order of November 5, 1964, the lower court gave the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not
the parties a period of twenty days within which to deal with reorganization but with taxation. This case
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. After of Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank  was
the submission thereof, the lower court, in a decision of decided by a bare majority of four justices against three.
January 30, 1965, sustained the validity and Thereafter, it would appear that the constitutional
constitutionality of the challenged provision. Hence, this requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in
appeal. the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos,
and not the strict test as desired by the minority headed
As was set forth earlier, this appeal cannot prosper. We by Justice Laurel.
share the view of the lower court that the provision in
question cannot be impugned either on the ground of its Such a trend is made manifest in the cases beginning
being violative of the constitutional requirement that a bill with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 22 up to and
cannot embrace more than one subject to be expressed including Felwa v. Salas,23 a 1966 decision, the opinion
in its title or by virtue of its alleged failure to satisfy the coming from Chief Justice Concepcion. There is nothing
due process criterion. in Lidasan v. Commission on Elections,24 where a
statute25 was annulled on this ground, to indicate the
1. We consider first the objection that the statute in contrary. As aptly expressed by Justice Sanchez: "Of
question is violative of the constitutional provision that no course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
than one subject which shall be expressed in [its] title ... precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
"16This provision is similar to those found in many contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
enactments.17 Where the subject of a bill is limited to a nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a or fraud upon the legislators."
provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to We thus hold that there is no violation of the
is such a rider. constitutional provision which requires that any bill
enacted into law shall embrace only one subject to be
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above expressed in the title thereof.
constitutional provision as to cripple or impede proper
legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable 2. Nor is petitioner anymore successful in his plea for the
and not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient nullification of the challenged provision on the ground of
that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to his being deprived of the liberty to contract without due
include the general object which the statute seeks to process of law.
effect without expressing each and every end and
means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere It is to be admitted of course that property rights find
details need not be set forth. The legislature is not shelter in specific constitutional provisions, one of which
is the due process clause. It is equally certain that our Laurel explains why such an argument was far from
fundamental law framed at a time of "surging unrest and persuasive. Thus: "In enacting said law, therefore, the
dissatisfaction",26 when there was the fear expressed in National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
many quarters that a constitutional democracy, in view of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a
its commitment to the claims of property, would not be desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the
able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty and least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then,
misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
not susceptible to the indictment that the government state in order to promote the general welfare may
therein established is impotent to take the necessary interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
remedial measures. The framers saw to that. The business and occupations. Persons and property may be
welfare state concept is not alien to the philosophy of our subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
Constitution.27 It is implicit in quite a few of its provisions. to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
It suffices to mention two. the state ... "38 The above doctrine, valid then and
equally valid now, constituted more than sufficient
There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to justification for statutes curtailing the liberty enjoyed by
ensure the well-being and economic security of all the business enterprises, whether conducted by natural or
people,28 as well as the pledge of protection to labor with juridical persons, to satisfy the needs of public welfare.
the specific authority to regulate the relations between
landowners and tenants and between labor and So it continues to be under the Republic. This Court has
capital.29 This particularized reference to the rights of invariably given the seal of approval to statutes intended
working men whether in industry and agriculture to improve the lot of tenants,39 who thereafter were given
certainly cannot preclude attention to and concern for the option to transform their relationship with landowners
the rights of consumers, who are the objects of solicitude to one of lease, which grant of authority was sustained in
in the legislation now complained of. The police power 1964.40 Retail trade was nationalized, the measure
as an attribute to promote the common weal would be receiving judicial approval as against due process
diluted considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on objection,41 a decision foreshadowed earlier with the
the mere plea that the liberty to contract would be favorable action taken on legislation granting preference
restricted, the statute complained of may be to Filipino citizens in the lease of public market stalls. 42 It
characterized as a denial of due process. The right to is easily understandable why the regulation of practice of
property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable medicine;43 limitation of the hours of labor;44 imposition of
extreme. price control;45requirement of separation pay for one
month46 as well as a social security scheme 47 cannot be
It is understandable though why business enterprises, impugned as unconstitutional. While not exhaustive, the
not unnaturally evincing lack of enthusiasm for police above decisions manifest in no certain terms the
power legislation that affect them adversely and restrict inherent difficulty of assailing regulatory legislation
their profits could predicate alleged violation of their based on alleged denial of due process.
rights on the due process clause, which as interpreted
by them is a bar to regulatory measures. Invariably, the It would thus appear that unless this Court is prepared to
response from this Court, from the time the Constitution overturn a doctrine so firmly adhered to in a number of
was enacted, has been far from sympathetic. Thus, cases notable for the unanimity of their response to an
during the Commonwealth, we sustained legislation objection similar to the one here raised, petitioner
providing for collective bargaining,30 security of Alalayan cannot prevail. Certainly, this Court is not
tenure,31 minimum wages,32 compulsory arbitration,33 and prepared to take that step. For in the face of a
tenancy regulation.34 Neither did the objections as to the constitutional provision that allows deprivation of liberty,
validity of measures regulating the issuance of including liberty of contract, as long as due process is
securities35 and public services36 prevail. observed, the alleged nullity of a legislative act of this
character can only be shown if in fact there is such a
For it is to be remembered that the liberty relied upon is denial. The relevant question then is, what does due
not freedom of the mind, which occupies a preferred process require?
position, nor freedom of the person, but the liberty to
contract, associated with business activities, which, as The holding of this Court in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
has been so repeatedly announced, may be subjected, Motel Operators Asso. v. City Mayor,48 sheds some light.
in the interest of the general welfare under the police Thus: "There is no controlling and precise definition of
power, to restrictions varied in character and wide due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
ranging in scope as long as due process is observed. In governmental action should conform in order that
Calalang v. Williams,37 this Court found no objection to deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
an enactment limiting the use of and traffic in the case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
national roads and streets as against the assertion that which must exist both as a procedural and as
the exercise of such an authority amounted to an substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or
unlawful interference with legitimate business and any governmental action for that matter, from the
abridgment of personal liberty. The opinion by Justice imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, crops on a 50-50 basis and therefore must have
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, intended to regulate the same. There was thus no
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To impairment of an obligation of contract, such an
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to enactment under the police power being remedial in
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of nature, the non-applicability of which to existing
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is conditions would be self-defeating in character.54
thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp.,55 Justice Barrera,
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the speaking for the Court, took note of the contention "that
sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those as the contracts of employment were entered into at a
strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of time when there was no law granting the workers said
whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from right, the application as to them of the subsequent
considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] enactment restoring the same right constitutes an
traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow impairment of their contractual obligations." Then he,
or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to made clear why the Court was of a contrary view as, "the
time, place and circumstances," decisions based on constitutional guaranty of non-impairment ... is limited by
such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of interest of public health, safe, morals and general
due process are not to be treated narrowly or welfare." Thus was reaffirmed what previously had been
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." . announced as the rule. Such a doctrine was reiterated
early this year in Philippine American Life Insurance Co.
The due process objection is sought to be bolstered by v. Auditor General,56 where this Court found no objection
an allegation that such power conferred in the to the applicability of the Margin Law, 57 even if it be
challenged legislation to limit the net profits to "12% assumed that a reinsurance treaty was already in
annually of [petitioner's] investments plus two-month existence and had imposed the corresponding obligation
operating expenses" has a confiscatory aspect. This on the parties prior to its enactment.
argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, in Manila
Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission,49 this Court in This is not to say that in each and every case the
an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a invocation of the protection of the non-impairment clause
figure as against the contention that it was rather too would be unavailing once the legislation complained of is
generous to the public utility. To speak of it as shown to be an exercise of the police power. Otherwise,
confiscatory then is to employ the language by that would render nugatory the constitutional guarantee
hyperbole. Moreover, in the absence any evidence to of non-impairment, and for that matter both the equal
demonstrate the alleged confiscatory effect of the protection and due process clauses which equally serve
provision in question, there would be no basis for its to protect property rights. Here, as in other cases where
nullification, in view of the well-known presumption of governmental authority may trench upon property rights,
validity that every statute has in its favor.50 the process of balancing, adjustment or harmonization is
called for.
In the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion
for yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the Rutter v. Esteban58 lends support to such an approach.
legislation assailed contravenes the due process In that leading case, the continued operation and
clause. 1äwphï1.ñët enforcement of the Moratorium Act 59 which allowed an
eight-year period of grace for the payment of pre-war
3. While not explicitly avowed by petitioner, there is the obligations on the part of debtors who suffered as a
intimation that to apply the challenged legislation to consequence of World War II was, in a 1953 decision,
contracts then in existence would be an infringement of held "unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
the constitutional prohibition against any law impairing prolonged a minute longer" for being violative of the
the obligation of contracts.51 No such fear need be constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the
entertained. A citation from a 1940 decision of this Court, obligation of the contracts "and, therefore, ... should be
in Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service declared null and void and without effect." 60 As of the
Commission,52 is particularly relevant. In the language of date of its enactment in 1948, the police power could be
Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court: "Upon the other relied upon to sustain its validity, in view of the serious
hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public economic condition faced by the country upon liberation
utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police and the state of penury that then afflicted a greater
power, are applicable not only to those public utilities portion of the Filipino people. By 1953 however, the
coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to Moratorium Act could be rightfully considered as an
those already, existence established and in infringement of the non-impairment clause, as the
operation."53 Such a doctrine was followed in the case of economy had in the meanwhile considerably changed
a tenancy legislation, the Congress undoubtedly having for the better.
in mind and not having failed to take notice "of the
existence of contracts" which stipulated a division of the
 6
There is no clearer instance then of the process of  Ibid, pars. 6, 7 and 8, pp. 4-6.
harmonization and balancing which is incumbent upon
the judiciary to undertake whenever a regulatory 7
Ibid, par. 9, pp. 6-8.
measure under the police power is assailed as violative
of constitucess or equal protection, all of which are 8
Ibid, par. 10, pp. 8-9.
intended to safeguard property rights. Three leading
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Home 9
Ibid, pars. 11, 12 and 13, pp. 9-11.
Building & Loan Astional guarantees, whether of non-
impairment, due prosociation v. Blaisdell,61 Nebbia v. 10
Ibid, pars. 15, 16, 17 and 18, pp. 12-18.
New York,62 and Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Co.,63 speak similarly. 11
Ibid, p. 25.

Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the non- 12

Ibid, pp. 143-144.
impairment clause by petitioner and the process of
adjustment or harmonization be undertaken to ascertain 13
Ibid, pp. 161-172.
whether the applicability of the statutory provision
assailed to existing contracts would run counter to such 14
a guarantee, still the same conclusion emerges. There is Ibid, p. 229.
a failure to make out a case for its invalidity.
15
Ibid, pp. 243-248.
WHEREFORE, there being no showing that Section 3 of 16
Republic Act No. 3043 is unconstitutional, the decision of Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1, Constitution of the Philippines.
the lower court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed. With
17
costs against petitioner Alalayan. Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 66 Phil. 483
(1938) .
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, 18
People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535 (1947) .
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
19
People v. Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536 (1925).
Footnotes
20
1 66 Phil. 483.
 Section 3, Republic Act No. 3043, approved June 17,
1961, entitled "An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act
21
Numbered One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act No. 4007.
Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One."
22
73 Phil. 288 (1941).
2
 Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 reads thus;
23
 L-26511, October 29, 1966. The other cases that may be
"SEC. 3. The National Power Corporation is hereby cited follows People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535 (1947); Nuval v.
authorized to represent and transact for the benefit and in de la Fuente, 92 Phil. 1074 (1953); Ichong v. Hernandez,
behalf of the public consumers, and it shall in any contract 101 Phil. 1155 (1957); Cordero v. Cabatuando, L-14542,
for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder require Oct. 31, 1962; Phil. Air Lines Employees Asso. v. Phil. Air
as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least Lines, Inc., L-18559, June 30, 1964; Municipality of Jose
fifty percent of its electric power and energy from the Panganiban v. Shell Co., L-18349, July 30, 1966.
National Power Corporation, shall not realize a net profit of
more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus 24
 L-28089, October 25, 1967.
two-month operating expenses. The National Power
Corporation shall renew all existing contracts with franchise 25
 Act No. 4790.
holder for the supply of electric power and energy, in order
to give effect to the provisions hereof. In the event that the
26
net profit as verified by the Public Service Commission  The phrase is Justice Laurel's, appearing in his concurring
should exceed the said twelve percent, the public Service opinion in Ang Tibay v. Court, cited with approval in
Commission shall order such excess to be returned pro Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court, 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
rata  to the customers either in cash or as credit for future
electric bills." 27
 Cf. "Private property does not constitute for anyone an
absolute and unconditioned right. .. All men are equal in
3
 Article VI, Section 21, par. 1, Constitution of the their right to a decent life... It is not a system of justice where
Philippines. The constitutional provision reads thus: "No bill one man is very wealthy and another very poor. Where such
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than a situation exists on a national scale, it becomes a matter of
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." social justice... [In the Philippines, while] a few have far
more than they need, the vast majority lack even the barest
4 essentials of life." Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Hierarchy,
 Petition, Record on Appeal, par. 4, pp. 3-4.
May 1, 1968.
5
 Ibid, par. 5, p. 4.
28 52
Art. 11, Sec. 5, Constitution of the Philippines. 70 Phil. 221 (.1940).

29 53
Art. XIV, Sec. 6, id. Ibid, p. 232.

30 54
Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco Employees' Union Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950).
(1939) 68 Phil. 541.
55
L-14785, November 29, 1960.
31
Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485
(1940). 56
L-19255, January 18, 1968.
32
International Hardwood and Veneer Company v. The 57
Republic Act No. 2609.
Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940).
58
33
93 Phil. 68 (1953).
Antamok Goldfields Mining Company v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 70 Phil. 340 (1940). 59
Republic Act No. 342.
34
Tapang v. Court of Industrial Relations, 72 Phil. 79 (1941). 60
93 Phil. 68, 82 (1953).
35
People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939). 61
290 US 398 (1934).
36
Pangasinan Trans. Co., Inc. v. Public Service Com., 70 62
Phil. 221 (1940). 291 US 502 (1934).

63
37
70 Phil. 726 (1940). 294 US 240 (1935).

38
  Ibid, p. 733.

39
Camacho v. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848
(1948); Ongsiaco v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950).

40
De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-19555, May
29, 1964. Cf. Del Rosario v. De los Santos, L-20589-90,
March 21, 1968.

41
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).

42
Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, 83 Phil. 242 (1949).

43
People v. Ventura, L-15079, Jan. 31, 1962.

44
Phil. Air Lines Employees' Asso. v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., L-
18559, June 30, 1964.

45
People v. Chu Chi, 92 Phil. 977 (1953).

46
Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., L-14785, Nov. 29, 1960.

47
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security
Com., L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961. Cf. Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968.

48
L-24693, July 31, 1967. See also Morfe v. Mutuc, L-20387,
January 31, 1968.

49
L-24762, Nov. 14, 1966.

50
Cf. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Asso. v. City
Mayor, L-24693, July 31, 1967.

51
Art. III, Sec. 1, Par. 11 of the Constitution provides "No law
impairing the obligations of contracts shall be passed.