FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003.]

ISABELITA S. LAHOM , petitioner, vs . JOSE MELVIN SIBULO

(previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM") , respondent.

Romeo A. Tablizo for petitioner.

Vicente B. De Lima and Senen C. Lirag for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner Isabelita S. Lahom and her late husband legally adopted respondent Jose Melvin
Sibulo. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name
"Jose Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom." However, in view of respondent's insensible
attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner,
the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive
to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein
petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his ling of a civil case for partition
against petitioner. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. Respondent moved for the
dismissal of the petition, contending principally that petitioner had no cause of action in
view of the provisions of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act). The statute deleted from
the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Petitioner asseverated, by
way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e.,
to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the Family Code. The trial court dismissed
the petition. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court af rmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition for rescission of
adoption led by petitioner. The Court held the action for rescission of the adoption
decree could no longer be pursued having been initiated by petitioner months after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552. By then, the said law had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. The Court also noted that while R.A. No. 8552 has unquali edly withdrawn from
an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remained, nevertheless, the bounden
duty of the Court to apply the law. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter while
barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; CONCEPT OF

VESTED RIGHT. — The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process that expresses a present xed interest which in right reason and
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 natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations
created after the right has become vested. Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or xed and
irrefutable.
2. CIVIL LAW; DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT (R.A. 8852); ACTION FOR RESCISSION OF
ADOPTION DECREE COULD NO LONGER BE PURSUED HAVING BEEN INITIATED AFTER
R.A. 8552 HAD COME INTO FORCE; CASE AT BAR. — It was months after the effectivity of
R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner led an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552
had come into force, no longer could be pursued. DaECST

3. ID.; ID.; A PERSON HAS NO VESTED RIGHT AGAINST STATUTORY PRIVILEGES AND A
RIGHT OF ACTION GIVEN BY STATUTE MAY BE TAKEN AWAY AT ANYTIME BEFORE IT
HAS BEEN EXERCISED. — Even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside
the adoption is subject to the ve-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and
that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not
ful ll the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally
innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it
has been exercised.
4. ID.; ID.; WHILE R.A. NO. 8552 HAS UNQUALIFIEDLY WITHDRAWN FROM AN ADOPTER A
CONSEQUENTIAL RIGHT TO RESCIND THE ADOPTION DECREE EVEN IN CASES WHERE
THE ADOPTION MIGHT CLEARLY TURN OUT TO BE UNDESIRABLE, IT REMAINS,
NEVERTHELESS, THE BOUNDEN DUTY OF THE COURT TO APPLY THE LAW; DURA LEX
SED LEX WOULD BE THE HACKNEYED TRUISM THAT THOSE CAUGHT IN THE LAW HAVE
TO LIVE WITH IT. — While R.A. No. 8552 has unquali edly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might
clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to
apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law
have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
bene ts otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

DECISION

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 VITUG , J : p

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children.
The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as
their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of
the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom
fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to le a
petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that
made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In
keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose
Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred —
"7. That . . . despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of
petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was
prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon
petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.

"xxx xxx xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of
the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978
until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his
practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
"xxx xxx xxx

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her
household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern
from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to
see her once a year.

"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in
Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times
when petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but
respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards
petitioner which is not expected of a son.

"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and
nieces whenever they would nd time to visit her, respondent alleging that they
were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and
uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered
wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption
is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and
her late husband, clearly shown by his recent ling of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for
partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
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 respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the
child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there
is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation," 1

Prior to the institution of the case, speci cally on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted
from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee,
with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of
age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on
any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical
and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code." (italics supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in
view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of
opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to
cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 348 2 of the Civil Code and Article 192 3 of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A.
No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court
in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the suf ciency of the facts
alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court
could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De
Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter
to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the
face of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the
provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of
argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted
on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed
by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal
grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more
than ve (5) years, prior to the ling of the instant petition on December 1, 1999,
hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of
Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered
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 dismissed." 4

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner
raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or
rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject.
In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family. 5 The
continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters
relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention
about the rights of the adopted. 6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an
effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption. 7
It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the
welfare of the child became a paramount concern. 8 Spain itself which previously
disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption
which, subsequently, was to nd its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and
introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the
interests of the child an overriding consideration. 9 In the early part of the century just
passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights
of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 1 0 followed by
the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child, 1 1 were written instruments that
would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the
Philippines 1 2 of 1950 on adoption, later modi ed by the Child and Youth Welfare Code 1 3
and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, 1 4 gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the
Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention,
accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured
these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it af rmed the legitimate
status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to
annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case,
both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due
process 1 5 that expresses a present xed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action; 1 6 it includes not only legal or equitable title to
the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations created after the
right has become vested. 1 7 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, 1 8 absolute, unconditional, and perfect 1 9 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 2 0 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was led by Zenaida
C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential
Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After
the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending on appeal, the
Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the
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 husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be
dismissed for having been led by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the
husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action . The petition to
adopt Jason, having been led with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to le the petition, without being joined by her husband,
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller, 2 1 spouses Claude and
Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple
led a petition to formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their
care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After
the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code
was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding
the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should
be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed .
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner led an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, 2 2 had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code
to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court
should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated
by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the ve-year bar rule under Rule 100 2 3 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not ful ll the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a
person has no vested right in statutory privileges. 2 4 While adoption has often been
referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. 2 5 It is a privilege that is
governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. 2 6 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of
an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. 2 7
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it
has been exercised. 2 8

While R.A. No. 8552 has unquali edly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura
lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It
is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain bene ts otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. cCTESa

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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 Davide, Jr., C .J ., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 25-26.

2. Art. 348. The adopter may petition the court for revocation of the adoption in any of these
cases:
(1) If the adopted person has attempted against the life of the adopter;
(2) When the adopted minor has abandoned the home of the adopter for more than three years;
(3) When by other acts the adopted person has definitely repudiated the adoption. (n)

3. Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any
of the following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting a ground for disinheriting a descendant;
or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one
year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption. (41a, P.D. No. 603)
4. Rollo, pp. 33-34.

5. The Law of Adoption, Morton L. Leavy & Rey Weinbey, 4th Edition (1979).
6. The Law on Adoption and Surrogate Parenting, Irving J. Sloan (1988).
7. Ibid., p. 7.
8. Id. The earliest adoption statute was reported in Mississippi in 1846. In 1850, Texas and
Vermont, USA passed their general adoption statutes, followed by Massachusetts and
New York in 1851.
9. A Comparative Study of the Adoption Law under the Spanish Civil Code and the Code of Civil
Procedure, 4 Phil. L.J. 313-323 (1918).
10. United Nation General Assembly, Resolution dated 10 December 1948.
11. United Nation General Assembly/44/49 (1989).
12. Presidential Decree No. 386.
13. Presidential Decree No. 603 (10 June 1975), as amended by P.D. No. 1175 (15 August
1977).
14. Executive Order 209 (03 August 1988).

15. 16 CJS citing City of Los Angeles vs. Oliver, 283 P. 298, 102 Cal. App. 299.
16. Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr. G.R. No. L-46729, 19 November 1982 (118 SCRA 492).
17. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, p. 651.
18. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, No. L-7231, 28 March 1956 (98 Phil. 711)
quoting Pearsall vs. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U.S. 646.
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 19. Reyes vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, 29 March 1999 (305 SCRA 512) as cited
in Bernabe vs. Alejo, G.R. No. 140500, 21 January 2002 (374 SCRA 180).
20. G.R. No. 92326, 24 January 1992 (205 SCRA 356).
21. G.R. No. 125932, 21 April 1999 (306 SCRA 183).

22. Section 26. Repealing Clause. — Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, or modified, or amended accordingly.
23. SEC. 5. Time within which to le petition . — A minor or other incapacitated person must le
the petition for rescission or revocation of adoption within the ve years following his
majority, or if he was incompetent at the time of the adoption, within the ve (5) years
following the recovery from such incompetency.

The adopter must also le the petition to set aside the adoption within ve (5) years from the
time the cause or causes giving rise to the rescission or revocation of the same took
place. (italics supplied)
24. Id. at 24, citing Brearly School vs. Ward, 210 NY 358, 40 LRA NS. 1215; also, Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. p. 546.
25. Martin vs. Putman (Miss) 427 So 2d 1373; There is no right of adoption. It is the extension
of a privilege. Eggleston vs. Landrum, 210 Miss 645, 50 So 2d 364, 23 ALR2d 696.
26. Browder vs. Harmeyer (Ind App) as cited in AmJur, 2d, Vol. 2.
27. Adoption has also been characterized as a status created by the state acting as parens
patriae, the sovereign parent. Douglas vs. Harrelson (Ala App) 454 So 2d 984.
28. 16 CJS citing Robinsons vs. Mchugh, 291 P. 330, 158 Wash. 157.

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