Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Zaldivar v. Gonzalez
Zaldivar v. Gonzalez
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM : p
The Solicitor general led a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we
required the petitioner to submit a Reply 1 0 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar led with the Court a Motion to Cite in
Contempt 1 1 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of
respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the ling of the information against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain
allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R.
No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a
news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue
of the "Philippine Daily Globe."
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order ' heightens the people's
apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the
people have been thinking that only the small fry can get it while big shes go
scot-free.'
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft
cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations
because the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from
Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from
investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any
complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
Gonzalez said that while some cases against local against local o cials
during election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a
right of every citizen to be informed of the character of the candidate, who should
be subject to scrutiny."(Emphasis supplied)
On 27 April 1988 , the Court rendered its Decision 1 3 (per curiam) in the
Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
"WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions led by petitioner Zaldivar and
hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations led against him in the
Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez ro cease and desist from conducting
investigations and ling criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED."
A Motion for Reconsideration 1 4 was led by respondent Gonzalez the next day,
28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits
of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue
raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court . . .
and he was asked to 'go slow' on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;'"
2. That he "was approached and asked to 'refrain' from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the
Court; '" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against
(two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 1 5 which he claimed
were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceding for cases pending
before this o ce (i. e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the
above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days
carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof.
On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated
Petitions:
"G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.);
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc.). —
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently led with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus
Motion for Extension and Inhibition 1 6 alleging, among other things: that the above
quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that
presumption [of innocence] against him;" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold
neutrality [of an impartial judge]' is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4
members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial
sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that
the four (4) Members of the Court identi ed and referred to there by him inhibit
themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 may 1988, 1 7 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, 1 8 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 1 9 denied the
Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made " nal and
immediately executory."
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, 2 0 dated 23 May
1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, 2 1 dated 20 May 1988;
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 2 2 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition, and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under
Rule 139-B, 2 3 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A"; 2 4 an anonymous letter
dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court" and addressed to respondent);
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier,
respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and
Comment 2 8 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt
and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading
as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance. 2 9 A
second explanation called "Compliance," 3 0 with annexes, was also submitted by
respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline o cers
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
of the court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as
regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority
to regulate the practice itself of law. 3 1 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate,
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. 3 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial
o cers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner
with a case before the Court. 3 3 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its
own protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice,
" "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant." 3 4
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases
like that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader that the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed
both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 3 5
Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority
over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the
respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court
over lawyers. 3 6 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but
corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers is not merely
a professional but also an o cer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in
the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any
act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the
exercise of disciplinary action against him and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt or to the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the
Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time.
Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez rst sought to get some members of
the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself
from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility
for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that
respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become
incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well
as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding. Respondent's
contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 3 7 then Associate (later Chief)
Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following
lucid manner:
"xxx xxx xxx
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim
any bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in
accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of o ce. It also appears to
the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to
abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially
where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for
further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In
any case, respondents had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense
is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements
give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of
speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic
policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was
saying in his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above
statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements
attributed to him are substantially correct. 3 9
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, rstly, that the Supreme Court
deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam
Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision
according to respondent Gonzales, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court
against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot
claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to
stop respondent from investigating cases against "some of (the) proteges or friends
(of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate
the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May
1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez' Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated
Zaldivar case. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free
intellectually to accept or not accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam
Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however,
obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the
Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of
administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its
Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and
had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for
positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is
very di cult to imagine a more serious affront to, or greater outrage upon, the honor
and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statements is also totally baseless.
Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his
continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September
1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus led against him in these
consolidated Petitions, 4 0 that is more than seven (7) months before the Court
rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the
Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases led against
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that
on 24 November 1987, upon the ling of a second Petition for Certiorari for Prohibition
by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the
decision nally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue
pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the
Supreme Court is that they have improperly "pressured" him to render decisions
favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two
(2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless,
as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3)
members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the
consolidated Petitions) will show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not
pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to
the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have made in
order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the rst
accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong
decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure"
from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by
respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause
among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from
prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discriminating
between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the
other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or a rming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad
light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also
suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondents, nally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed
judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'"
The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements
made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly
was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and
willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics,
as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due
process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court
as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had
respondent undertaken to examine the records of the two(2) judges and the
attorney he later identi ed in one of his Explanations he would have discovered
that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to
explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 4 1 He would have also
found that there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the
disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to
strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate
to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not,
always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 4 2 that the essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support' of one's defense. 4 3 "To be heard"
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 4 4
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why
he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline
for making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he
asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following
allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the
contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of
the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in
the language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;" (b) That
"the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of
an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the
contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;"
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and
prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing
in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with,
perhaps passion and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom
by the entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration,
does not have con dence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he
" nds it extremely di cult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can
still act with unbiased demeanor towards him; and
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for
making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the
following statements:
". . . Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to
correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a
life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up deficiencies." (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law
saying:
". . . Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft,
corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as
justi cation for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already
assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged
existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government,
We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt , the grafters and those
allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del
Mar's logic. . .
xxx xxx xxx
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No.
45604-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one speci c issue.
We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's nding
and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court
exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The
intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats
to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the
resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for said tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
court of the land when on the imsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted
with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the
case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will
choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for
them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to
respect the courts of justice and its o cers as a fealty for the stability of our
democratic institutions.": (60 SCRA at 242-247; emphasis supplied)
2. I n Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel , 4 6 four (4) members of the
bar, acting as counsels for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by
this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for
Reconsideration:
"d. ' . . .; and the Supreme Court has overlooked the applicable law due to
the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.' (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. '. . . Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a
gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by
vulturous executives to cover and excuse losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud . . . and it is thus di cult, in the light of our upbringing
and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner.' (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968)." (31 SCRA at 6)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and led a
fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the
following paragraphs:
"4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled
case — which condition is prohibited by the new Rules of Court - Section 1, Rule
51, and we quote" '
'Justices; who may take part. — . . . Only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication . . .' This requirement is especially signi cant in the present instance
because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was
absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
In his motion to inhibit, his rst paragraph categorizes our decision of July
31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then
charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced
and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a
reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of
this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice
president of the favored party who is the chief bene ciary of the decision, and
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, 'a signi cant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31 1968
was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any
judicial authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should rst apply to itself.' He
puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known
to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro 'would be
less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause
or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not
free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of con dence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country,
'although the process has already begun.'
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar
to lawyers. And yet, this Court nds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3
(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of
contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The Motion contained an express threat to take the case to the
World Court and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this
Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More
speci cally, the motion announced that MacArthur 'will inevitably . . . raise the
graft and corruption of [the] Philippine government o cials in the bidding of May
12, 1965 . . . to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and bene ts to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fty million dollars
annually . . .'
This is a clear attempt to in uence or bend the mind of this Court to decide
the case in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal
and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes
that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And
yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as threat
to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard
explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome
of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield
to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice." (31
SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition,
'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he
earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become
responsible to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will
purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or denied
resolutions.'" (31 SCRA at 565-566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him. His explanation which in part read:
"xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and con dence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certi cate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as
to when we must end our self-sacri ce. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and con dence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter." (31 SCRA at
572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undigni ed and cynical" and rejected. The Court
inde nitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding through Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas v. Cruz , 4 7 counsel, whose Petition for Certiorari was dismissed by
this Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
"The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of
this Honorable Court dated April 20, 1965 on the ground that it constitutes a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
violation of Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very
Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
. . . The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected
by all means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and
gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the
rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways
of the cave-men! We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again,
killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of
Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times! But
justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy
on the face of the earth.'" (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court
and required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken
against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the
killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts.
The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory
and the above statements contumacious:
". . . The expressions contained in the motion fore reconsideration . . . are
plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. . . That such
treats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading led in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided(Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil,. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal , L-9785,
September 19, 1956; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the
guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
580 —
'Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his
cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an o cer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice.'
It is right and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights
of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of
the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)" (14
SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
In nding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith his invocation of
the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring to show why he should not
be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said —
"To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately 'so many blunders and injustices,' that is to say, that it
has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the
part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in may cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the con dence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippine is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their con dence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the bar and an o cer of the courts Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which he owes delity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to
the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation." (82 Phil. at 601-602;
emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our
case law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court
punished for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made
statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court
has in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Country is compelled to hold that the statements here made by
respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decisions in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed
their oath of o ce, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute
the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements ever clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration
of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact
outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the ling of a
complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent
members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the
appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as
an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of quali ed
privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within
the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which
are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
". . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are
indispensable to a free society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary
through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press." 5 0
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following:
"The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused
with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons
are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if
such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate
accounts of con dential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the
courts." 5 1 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the
Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers
who are, rst and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice
to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right
of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 5 2
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an
officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect
to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial
power in the government of the republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court" and "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice " 5 3 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the
rulings of this court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out
by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting:
"But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
de, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action."
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of
their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has
criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment
and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct
or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural
and plain import of his words and acts. 5 5 It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to
point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited
no repentance. 5 6
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the
judiciary has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for
Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and
ampli ed that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the rst place, proof of
actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a
nding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.
Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned this Court after careful review of
the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this
Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he
is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a
particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to
prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial
institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to
such institutions might not be quanti able at a given moment in time but damage there
will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and
countered. The level of trust and con dence of the general public in the courts,
including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high
level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggest that punishment for contempt is not the
proper remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse
to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this
Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an
exclusive remedy. Moreover, where as in the instant case, it is not only the individual
members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 5 7
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of
court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an o cer of the court and member of
the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law inde nitely and until further others from this Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman,
the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
4. Id., p. 39.
5. Id., p. 48.
6. Id., pp. 57-58, Information.
17. A Constancia was also led by respondent on this day arguing the merits of his motion and
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
31. Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 138, Sections 27, 28 and 29,
Revised Rules Court.
32. Rule 71, Section 3(d) Revised Rules of Court; Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136
SCRA 112 (1985); Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1 (1971); Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241 (1967); Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58
Phil. 271 (1953);In re Vicente Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567 (1923); In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916).
33. In Re Kelly supra; In Re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); In Re
Vicente Pelaez, supra; Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, supra; and In Re Vicente
Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
34. Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra; Andres vs. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802 (1984);
Montalban vs. Canonoy , supra; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, supra; Herras
Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 630 (1946).
35. See Section 3(a), (c) and (d), Rule 71 and Section 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court.
36. The same rule obtains in other jurisdictions, E.g., In re Isserman, 87 A. 2d 903 (1951) cert.
denied Isserman v. Ethics Committee Of Essex County Bar Assn., 345 U.S. 927, 97 L.Ed.
1357 (1953):
" . . . The right or power of suspension or disbarment is different and distinct from the
power to punish for contempt, and the exercise of the power to punish for contempt
does not prevent disbarment."
37. 31 SCRA 564 (1970).
38. 31 SCRA at 598-602. The same contention was made and rejected or disregarded in e.g., De
Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 99 Phil. 907 (1956).
39. Answer with Explanation and Comment, Annex "A," pp. 7-10.
40. The question was raised by petitioner Zaldivar even earlier, on 27 August 1987, before the
Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Quash in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12177.
41. See Prudential Bank v. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia, Adm. Case No.
2756, prom. November 12, 1987; Consolidated Bank v. Hon. Dionisio M. Capistrano, etc.,
Adm. matter No. R-66-RTJ, prom. March 18 1988.
44. Juanita Yap Say et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G. R. No. 73451, March 28, 1988.
45. 60 SCRA 234 (1974).
46. 31 SCRA 1 (1970).