1. In 1981, Lagon and Hooven Comalco Industries entered into contracts where Hooven agreed to sell and install aluminum materials in Lagon's building for P104,870. Lagon paid P48,000 in advance. In 1987, Hooven sued Lagon for unpaid money.
2. At the request of both parties, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the building in 1987 to determine if materials were delivered and installed. The trial court relied on the inspection in its decision.
3. The Court of Appeals overturned the decision, finding the trial court erred in relying solely on the 1987 inspection because installation began in 1981, and the building was altered by 1987. The Supreme Court disagreed
1. In 1981, Lagon and Hooven Comalco Industries entered into contracts where Hooven agreed to sell and install aluminum materials in Lagon's building for P104,870. Lagon paid P48,000 in advance. In 1987, Hooven sued Lagon for unpaid money.
2. At the request of both parties, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the building in 1987 to determine if materials were delivered and installed. The trial court relied on the inspection in its decision.
3. The Court of Appeals overturned the decision, finding the trial court erred in relying solely on the 1987 inspection because installation began in 1981, and the building was altered by 1987. The Supreme Court disagreed
1. In 1981, Lagon and Hooven Comalco Industries entered into contracts where Hooven agreed to sell and install aluminum materials in Lagon's building for P104,870. Lagon paid P48,000 in advance. In 1987, Hooven sued Lagon for unpaid money.
2. At the request of both parties, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the building in 1987 to determine if materials were delivered and installed. The trial court relied on the inspection in its decision.
3. The Court of Appeals overturned the decision, finding the trial court erred in relying solely on the 1987 inspection because installation began in 1981, and the building was altered by 1987. The Supreme Court disagreed
FACTS: Sometime in April 1981 Lagon and Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc. entered into two (2) contracts, both denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00 HOOVEN agreed to sell and install various aluminum materials in Lagons commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Upon execution of the contracts, Lagon paid HOOVEN P48,00.00 in advance. On 24 February 1987 respondent HOOVEN commenced an action for sum of money with damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner Lagon before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. On 9 October 1987, upon request of both parties, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of Lagons commercial building to determine whether the items alleged in the complaint and appearing in the invoices and delivery receipts had been delivered and installed on the premises. In due course the trial court rendered a decision partly on the basis of the result of the ocular inspection. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision of 28 April 1997, the appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court and resolved the case in favor of HOOVEN. It held that the trial court erred in relying solely on the results of the ocular inspection since the delivery and installation of the materials in question started as early as 1981, while the ocular inspection was conducted only in 1987 or six (6) years later, after the entire mezzanine was altered and the whole building renovated. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 28 April 1997. ISSUE: WON The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court could not rely on the results of the ocular inspection conducted HELD: The court decided on the affirmative. The ocular inspection was made by the judge himself, at the request of both petitioner and respondent, for the exclusive purpose of determining whether the materials subject of this case were actually delivered and installed. There is therefore no basis to give little evidentiary value on the results of the ocular inspection, as the Court of Appeals would, and charge the trial court with error for relying thereon. It is now rather late for any of the parties to disclaim them, especially when they are not in his or its favor. Furthermore, a cursory reading of the decision of the court a quo will at once show that it was not premised solely on the results of the ocular inspection but was likewise predicated on other evidence presented by the parties and well-considered facts and circumstances discussed by the trial court in its ratio decidendi. We cannot ignore the factual findings of the trial court, which must carry great weight in the evaluation of evidentiary facts, and in the absence of any indication showing grave error committed by trial court, the appellate court is bound to respect such findings of fact.