Virsa Singh V Punjab
Virsa Singh V Punjab
Appellants:Virsa Singh
Vs.
Respondent:The State of Punjab
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.B. Gajendragadkar, Syed Jaffer Imam and Vivian Bose, JJ.
Case Note:
(1)Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 300, Exception 4, 302 and 304, Part I--
Murder--Culpable homicide not amounting to murder but with intention--
Conviction and sentence for murder--Whether sustainable? -- Held, no--
Occurrence took place in course of sudden quarrel--Exception 4 to Section 300
attracted--Conviction under Section 302 altered to one under Section 304,
Part I--Custodial sentence of 10 years to suffice.(2)Evidence Act, 1872--
Sections 3 and 9--Appreciation of evidence--Witness being close relative --
Testimony of such witness cannot be discarded on ground that he is partisan
witness.(3)Evidence Act, 1872--Sections 3 and 9--Appreciation of evidence--
Ocular account found credible and trustworthy--Medical opinion pointing to
alternative possibilities--Cannot be accepted as conclusive.
JUDGMENT
Vivian Bose, J.
1. The appellant Virsa Singh has been sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302
of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh. He was granted special
leave to appeal by this Court but the leave is limited to
"the question that on the finding accepted by the Punjab High Court what
offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner."
2. The appellant was tried with five others under Sections 302/149, 324/149 and
323/149 Indian Penal Code. He was also charged individually under s. 302.
3. The others were acquitted of the murder charge by the first Court but were
convicted under Sections 326, 324 and 323 read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code. On
appeal to the High Court they were all acquitted.
4. The appellant was convicted by the first Court under s. 302 and his conviction and
sentence were upheld by the High Court.
5. There was only one injury on Khem Singh and both Courts are agreed that the
6. "a punctured wound 2 x 1/2" transverse in direction on the left side of the
abdominal wall in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal.
8. The incident occurred about 8 p.m. on July 13, 1955. Khem Singh died about 5 p.m.
the following day.
10. "an oblique incised stitched wound 2 1/2" on the lower part of left 8 side
of belly, 1 3/4" above the left inguinal ligament. The injury was through
whole thickness of the abdominal wall. Peritonitis was present and there was
digested food in that cavity. Flakes of pus were sticking round the small
intestines and there were six cuts...... at various places, and digested food
was flowing out from three cuts."
11. The doctor side that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature.
12. The learned Sessions Judge found that the appellant was 21 or 22 years old and
side -
"When the common object of the assembly seems to have been to cause
grievous hurts only, I do not suppose Virsa Singh actually had the intention
to cause the death of Khem Singh, but by a rash and silly act he gave a
rather forceful blow, which ultimately caused his death. Peritonitis also
supervened and that hastened the death of Khem Singh. But for that Khem
Singh may perhaps not have died or may have lived a little longer."
13. Basing on those facts, he said that the case fell under s. 300, 3rdly and so he
convicted under s. 302, Indian Penal Code.
14. The learned High Court Judges considered that "the whole affair was sudden and
occurred on a chance meeting." But they accepted the finding that the appellant
inflicted the injury on Khem Singh and accepted the medical testimony that the blow
was a fatal one.
15. It was argued with much circumlocution that the facts set out above do not
disclose an offence of murder because the prosecution has not proved that there was
an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. Section 300, 3rdly was quoted :
"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death."
16. It was said that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to
17. This is a favourite argument in this kind of case but fallacious. If there is an
intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event, the "thirdly" would be
unnecessary became the act would fall under the first part of the section, namely -
"If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing
death."
18. In our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective
to the offender :
"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person."
19. It must, of course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of
the injury must be established, that is to say, whether the injury is on the leg or the
arm or the stomach, how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs were cut and so
forth. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction :
to that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question of intention,
that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention too
cause the bodily injury that is found to be present.
20. Once that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause -
21. The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section, namely, the
infliction of bodily injury with the intention to inflict it, that is to say, if the
circumstances justify an inference that a man's intention was only to inflict a blow on
the lower part of the leg, or some lesser blow, and it can be shown that the blow
landed in the region of the heart by accident, then, though an injury to the heart is
shown to be present, the intention to inflict an injury in that region, or of that nature,
is not proved. In that case, the first part of the clause does not come into play. But
once it is proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be
present, then the earlier part of the clause we are now examining -
In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have
been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for
example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous
sport, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to
To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it
can bring a case under s. 300, "3rdly";
22. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.
23. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective
investigations.
24. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular
bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some
other kind of injury was intended.
25. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further
and.
26. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of
the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to
do with the intention of the offender.
27. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the
burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly. It
does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that
there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between
the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind
will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually
found to be proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is
whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting
injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim
that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face
the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced
that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.
28. We were referred to a decision of Lord Goddard in R. v. Steane (1947) 1 All E.R.
813, 816 where the learned Chief Justice says that where a particular intent must be
laid and charged, that particular intent must be proved. Of course it must, and of
course it must be proved by the prosecution. The only question here is, what is the
extent and nature of the intent that s. 300, 3rdly requires, and how is it to be proved?
29. The learned counsel for the appellant next relied on a presage where the learned
Chief Justice says that :
30. We agree that that is also the law in India. But so is this. We quote a few
sentences earlier from the same learned judgment :
"No doubt, if the prosecution prove and act the natural consequences of
which would be a certain result and no evidence or explanation is given,
then a jury may, on a proper direction, find that the prisoner is guilty of
doing the act with intent alleged."
31. That is exactly the position here. No evidence or explanation is given about why
the appellant thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that or
penetrated the bowels and three coils of the intestines came out of the would and that
digested food oozed out from cuts in three places. In the absence of evidence, or
reasonable explanation, that the prisoner did not intend to stab in the stomach with
degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far into the body, or to indicate that his act
was regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise, it would be perverse to
conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. Once that intend is
established (and no other conclusion is reasonably possible in this case, and in any
case it is a question of fact), the rest is a matter for objective determination from the
medical and other evidence about the nature and seriousness of the injury.
32. The learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Emperor v. Sardarkhan
Jaridkhan (1917) I.L.R. 41 Bom 23, 29 where Beaman J., says that -
33. It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of