Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Republic of The Philippines Manila Third Division: Supreme Court
Republic of The Philippines Manila Third Division: Supreme Court
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue of whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may resolve the
issue of ownership of the property involved in an unlawful detainer case has been
discussed by this Court in a number of cases, the more recent of which is that of Hilario
v. Court of Appeals.1 Jurisprudence on the matter has in fact been reflected in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure under Rule 70, to wit:
In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, petitioners paid private respondent's indebtedness with
the bank. However, private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver
possession of the premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year
period from April 13, 1992. Almost six months later since the execution of the
instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners caused the registration of the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register of Deeds. Simultaneously,
they obtained a new title, TCT No. 67990, consistent with the fact that they are the
new owners of the property.4 Sometime in July 1993, they paid the real estate
taxes on the property for which they were issued Tax Declarations Nos. C-061-
02815 and C-061-02816.5
In its answer to the complaint, private respondent raised the issue of ownership
over the property. It impugned petitioners' right to eject, alleging that petitioners
had no cause of action against it because it was merely a mortgagee of the
property. It argued that when the parties executed the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, its real intention was to forge an equitable mortgage
and not a sale. It pointed out three circumstances indicative of an equitable
mortgage, namely: inadequacy of the purchase price, continued possession by
private respondent of the premises, and petitioners' retention of a portion of the
purchase price.
On March 24, 1995, the MTC7 decided the case in favor of petitioners. It ruled that
petitioners are the owners of the Gilmore property on account of the following
pieces of evidence: (a) TCT No. 67990; (b) petitioners' payment to the China
Banking Corporation of P8,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage entered into
between private respondent and said bank; (c) payment of real estate taxes for
1993, and (d) Tax Declaration No. 02816 in petitioners' names. The MTC further
held that private respondent's possession of the premises was merely tolerated
by petitioners and because it refused to vacate the premises despite demand to
do so, then its possession of the same premises had become illegal. Thus, the
MTC decreed as follows:
SO ORDERED.8
On April 25, 1995, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 219, of Quezon City that docketed it as Civil Case No. Q-95-23697.
Private respondent stressed in its appeal that it was not unlawfully withholding
possession of the premises from petitioners because the latter's basis for
evicting it was the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that did not reflect
the true intention of the parties to enter into an equitable mortgage. Clearly in
pursuance of that allegation, private respondent filed a motion questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain its appeal. On the other hand, petitioners filed
a motion for the immediate execution of the appealed decision. The RTC granted
the motion on September 21, 1995 and the corresponding writ of execution was
issued on September 25, 1995. The following day, the sheriff served upon private
respondent the writ of execution and a notice to vacate the premises within five
(5) days from receipt thereof.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of its appeal, private respondent filed an action
for reformation of instrument with the RTC. It was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
95-24927 and assigned to Branch 227.
On December 12, 1995, private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners and RTC Branch 219. It assailed the September 21,
1995 order granting the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, the writ of
execution and the notice to vacate served upon private respondent (CA-G.R. SP-
39227).
On December 13, 1995, RTC Branch 21910 rendered the decision affirming in toto
that of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Stating that in ejectment proceedings, the
only issue for resolution is who is entitled to physical or material possession of
the premises involved, RTC Branch 219 held that
On that same date, December 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining RTC Branch 219 from enforcing the writ of execution
and the notice to vacate the premises and on January 15, 1996, the same court
granted private respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the implementation of both the writ of execution pending appeal and
the decision of RTC Branch 219.
Around six months later or on July 2, 1996, RTC Branch 22712 issued an order
declaring private respondent non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial and,
therefore, dismissing the action for reformation of instrument in Civil Case No. Q-
95-24927. Private respondent, not having sought reconsideration of said order,
the same court issued a resolution on August 15, 1996 directing the entry of
judgment in the case.13 The Clerk of Court accordingly issued the final entry of
judgment thereon. 14
In the meantime, on July 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein
questioned Decision.15 It set aside the December 13, 1995 decision of RTC
Branch 219 and declared as null and void for want of jurisdiction, the March 24,
1995 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41. It made
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from
implementing the decision of RTC Branch 219, the writ of execution and the
notice to vacate. In so holding, the Court of Appeals said:
It is quite evident that, upon the pleadings, the dispute between the
parties extended beyond the ordinary issues in ejectment cases. The
resolution of the dispute hinged on the question of ownership and
for that reason was not cognizable by the MTC. (See: General
Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Castelo, 13 SCRA 652 (1965).
Respondent judge was not unaware of the pendency of the action for
reformation. However, despite such knowledge, he proceeded to
discuss the merits of the appeal and rendered judgment in favor of
respondents on the basis of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage which was precisely the subject of the action for
reformation pending before another branch of the court. Prudence
dictated that respondent judge should have refused to be drawn into
a discussion as to the merits of the respective contentions of the
parties and deferred to the action of the court before whom the issue
was directly raised for resolution.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari where petitioners raise the
following assigned errors allegedly committed by respondent Court of Appeals:
I.
II.
III.
Petitioners argue that the precedent laid down in Ching v. Malaya 17 relied upon
by the Court of Appeals, was based on the old law, Republic Act No. 296
(Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended, which vested in the city courts original
jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer proceedings and the
corresponding power to receive evidence upon the question of ownership for the
only purpose of determining the character and extent of possession. 18 They
claim that since the original complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on April 13,
1992, then the applicable law should have been Section 33 (2) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). That law vests in the city
courts exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases and the corresponding power to receive evidence upon questions of
ownership and to resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue of
possession. 19
The history of the law vesting Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts with
jurisdiction over ejectment cases has invariably revolved upon the assumption
that the question of ownership may be considered only if necessary for the
determination of the issue as to who of the parties shall have the right to possess
the property in litigation. 20 Thus, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
Section 88 vested municipal and city courts with authority to "receive evidence
upon the question of title therein, whatever may be the value of the property,
solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention." Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 that was enacted on
June 21, 1969, provided that city courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
Courts of First Instance over "ejection cases where the question of ownership is
brought in issue in the pleadings" and that the issue of ownership shall be
"resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession." Expounding on that
provision of law, in Pelaez v. Reyes, 21 this Court said:
Upon the approval on August 14, 1981 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, however, the power of inferior courts,
including city courts, to resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases was modified. Resolution of the issue of ownership
became subject to the qualification that it shall be only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. In effect, therefore, the city courts lost the
jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership per se that was theretofore
concurrent with the then Courts of First Instance. Thus, Section 33 of B.P. Blg.
129 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No.
296 which merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence upon
the question of title solely for the purpose of determining the extent
and character of possession and damages for detention, which
thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to the effect that if
it appears during the trial that the principal issue relates to the
ownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession
which may be involved necessarily depends upon the result of the
inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or city
courts is lost and the action should be dismissed. With the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now
retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if the question of
possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of
ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of
ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the issues of
ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will
not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer on jurisdictional grounds.
Another development in the law has emphasized the fact that inferior courts shall
not lose jurisdiction over ejectment cases solely because the issue of ownership
is interwoven with the issue of possession. Under the 1983 Rules on Summary
Procedure, as amended by a resolution of this Court that took effect on
November 15, 1991, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases shall be tried
pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, regardless of whether or
not the issue of ownership of the subject property is alleged by a party. 23 In
other words, even if there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership, such fact
will not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over ejectment
cases 24 that shall be tried summarily.
When the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded, thereby amending Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, by virtue of Republic Act No. 7691 that took effect on April 15, 1994, the
jurisdiction of said courts over ejectment cases was retained. Thus, in Hilario v.
Court of Appeals this Court said:
In other words, inferior courts are now "conditionally vested with adjudicatory
power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment
suit." 25 These courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as an
incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary for a
proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Considering the
difficulties that are usually encountered by inferior courts as regards the extent of
their power in determining the issue of ownership, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of
Appeals, the Court set out guidelines to be observed in the implementation of the
law which, as stated at the outset, has recently been restated in the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The guidelines pertinent to this case state:
x x x x x x x x x
5. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the
question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior
court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as
to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same
vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a
determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of
title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is
premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues.
This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is
to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession
only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land
or building. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioners clearly intended recovery of possession over the
Gilmore property. They alleged in their complaint for unlawful detainer that their
claim for possession is buttressed by the execution of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, a copy of which was attached as Annex "A" to the
complaint and by the issuance of TCT No. 67990 that evidenced the transfer of
ownership over the property. 27 Because metropolitan trial courts are authorized
to look into the ownership of the property in controversy in ejectment cases, it
behooved MTC Branch 41 to examine the bases for petitioners' claim of
ownership that entailed interpretation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage.
However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage that embodies the agreement of the parties that possession of the
Gilmore property and its improvements shall remain with the vendor that was
obliged to transfer possession only after the expiration of one year, 28 MTC
Branch 41 apparently did not examine the terms of the deed of sale. Instead, it
erroneously held that the issue of whether or not the document was in fact an
equitable mortgage "should not be properly raised in this case." Had it examined
the terms of the deed of sale, which, after all is considered part of the allegations
of the complaint having been annexed thereto, that court would have found that,
even on its face, the document was actually one of equitable mortgage and not of
sale. The inferior court appears to have forgotten that all documents attached to a
complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied under
oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need
of introducing evidence thereon. 29
Art. 1602 of the Civil Code provides that a contract shall be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage by the presence of any of the following:
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase
price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real
intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
Art. 1604 of the same Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602 "shall also
apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale." The presence of even one
of the circumstances in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as
one of equitable mortgage. 30 The explicit provision of Article 1602 that "any" of
those circumstances would suffice to construe a contract of sale to be one of
equitable mortgage is in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least
transmission of property rights.
(sgd.)
ROSA
NA
FLOR
ES
Corpo
rate
Secre
tary
(SGD.)
That under the agreement the private respondent as vendor shall remain in
possession of the property for only one year, did not detract from the fact that
possession of the property, an indicium of ownership, was retained by private
respondent as the alleged vendor. That period of time may be deemed as actually
the time allotted to private respondent for fulfilling its part of the agreement by
paying its indebtedness to petitioners. This may be gleaned from paragraph (f)
that states that "full title and possession" of the property "shall vest upon the
VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions
herein set forth.
Paragraph (f) of the contract also evidences the fact that the agreed "purchase
price" of fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00) was not handed over by
petitioners to private respondent upon the execution of the agreement. Only
P5,400,000.00 was given by petitioners to private respondent, as the balance
thereof was to be dependent upon the private respondent's satisfaction of its
mortgage obligation to China Banking Corporation. Notably, the MTC found that
petitioners gave private respondent the amount of P8,500,000.00 that should be
paid to the bank to cover the latter's obligation, thereby leaving the amount of
P100,000.00 (P5,400,000.00 + P8,500,000.00 = P13,900,000.00) of the "purchase
price" still unpaid and in the hands of petitioners, the alleged "vendees."
Hence, two of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are manifest in the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, namely: (a) the vendor would remain
in possession of the property (no. 2), and (b) the vendees retained a part of the
purchase price (no. 4). On its face, therefore, the document subject of
controversy, is actually a contract of equitable mortgage.
The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not binding as to its nature.
The decisive factor in evaluating such an agreement is the intention of the
parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract, but by
their conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after
executing the agreement. 32 Private respondent's possession over the property
was not denied by petitioners as in fact it was the basis for their complaint for
unlawful detainer.
Neither does the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in petitioners' favor
import conclusive evidence of ownership or that the agreement between the
parties was one of sale. 33 In Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide, this Court said:
A closer look into the allegations of the complaint would therefore show that
petitioners failed to make out a case for unlawful detainer. By the allegations in
the complaint, private respondent as a mortgagor had the right to posses the
property. A mortgage is a real right constituted to secure an obligation upon real
property or rights therein to satisfy with the proceeds of the sale thereof such
obligation when the same becomes due and has not been paid or fulfilled. 35 The
mortgagor generally retains possession of the mortgaged property 36 because by
mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but
ownership thereof is not parted with. 37 In case of the debtor's nonpayment of the
debt secured by the mortgage, the only right of the mortgagee is to foreclose the
mortgage and have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding
indebtedness. The mortgagor's default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee
the ownership of the encumbered property, for any such effect is against public
policy. 38 Even if the property is sold at a foreclosure sale, only upon expiration
of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his
right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold become consolidated in the
purchaser. 39
In fine, had the MTC exercised its bounden duty to study the complaint, it would
have dismissed the same for lack of cause of action upon a provisional ruling on
the issue of ownership based on the allegations and annexes of the complaint.
Or, exercising caution in handling the case, considering petitioners' bare
allegations of ownership, it should have required the filing of an answer to the
complaint and, having been alerted by the adverse claim of ownership over the
same property, summarily looked into the issue of ownership over the property.
As this Court declared in Hilario v. Court of Appeals:
Private respondent's action for reformation of instrument was in fact a step in the
right direction. However, its failure to pursue that action 41 did not imply that
private respondent had no other remedy under the law as regards the issue of
ownership over the Gilmore property. There are other legal remedies that either
party could have availed of. Some of these remedies, such as an action for
quieting of title, have been held to coexist with actions for unlawful detainer. 42
There is a policy against multiplicity of suits but under the circumstances, only
the institution of proper proceedings could settle the controversy between the
parties in a definitive manner.
Hence, although the Court of Appeals resolved the appeal under the
misconception that the action for reformation of instrument was still viable, it
correctly held that the controversy between the parties was beyond the ordinary
issues in an ejectment case. Because of the opposing claims of the parties as to
the true agreement between them, the issue of ownership was in a sense a
prejudicial question that needed determination before the ejectment case should
have been filed. To reiterate, a decision reached in the ejectment case in favor of
any of the parties would have nonetheless spawned litigation on the issue of
ownership. At any rate, proceedings would have been facilitated had the inferior
courts made even a provisional ruling on such issue.
After the parties had filed their respective memoranda before this Court, private
respondent filed an urgent motion to cite petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her
husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt of court. 43 The motion was
founded on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who resided at the contested
property, deriving his right to do so from private respondent corporation that is
owned by his family. Gonzales alleged that on September 20, 1997, petitioner
Flaminiano and her husband entered the property through craftiness and
intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men knocked at the gate.
When the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate for pedestrians
tentatively, the two men told him that they would like to visit Gonzales' mother
who was ailing.
Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened the
gate for twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an L-300 van to enter. When Gonzales
went outside the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) trucks
entering the driveway. The person he asked regarding the presence of those
people inside the property turned out to be the brother of petitioner Flaminiano.
That person said, "Kami ang may-ari dito. Matagal na kaming nagtitiis, kayo ang
dapat sa labas." After Gonzales had told him that the property was still under
litigation before this Court, the man said, "Walang Supreme Court — Supreme
Court." When Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the
premises, to order the people to leave, she said, "Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa
amin ito. Maglalagay ako ng tao diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng
pakiusap." When a power generator was brought inside the property and
Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out because the noise it would create would
disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales, petitioner Flaminiano said, "Walang
awa-awa sa akin." Atty. Flaminiano butted in and, referring to Gonzales' mother,
said, "Ialis mo na, matanda na pala." When Gonzales prevented the switching on
of some lights in the house due to faulty wiring, Atty. Flaminiano suggested,
"Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance pa kayo 5 million, madali lang 'yan.
Short circuit." Since the Flaminianos and their crew were not about to leave the
property, Gonzales called up his brother, Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and informed
him of what happened. However, instead of confining themselves in the driveway,
the Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in food.
Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who had just
been discharged from the hospital. However, the Flaminianos stayed until the
next day, September 22, 1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other fixtures in
the house. Gonzales took pictures of Flaminiano and his companions. When Atty.
Flaminiano arrived, he confronted Gonzales and told him, "Hindi ako natatakot
kahit kanino ka pa mag-report, kahit pa sa Supreme Court, gusto ko nga mag-
reklamo kayo para matapos ang kaso. Sa September 25, may shooting dito,
gagawin ko ang gusto ko dito." 44
The affidavits of Renato C. Mola, driver of Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and that of
Luis R. Fernandez, houseboy of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales, as well as the xerox copy of
the sworn statement dated September 21, 1997 of Pria B. Gonzales before the
Philippine National Police in Camp Crame where she filed a complaint against
Atty. Flaminiano for the illegal entry into teir house, support the affidavit of Dr.
Gonzales.
In its supplemental motion 45 to cite petitioner Flaminiano and her husband, Atty.
Flaminiano, in contempt of court, private respondent alleged that the Flaminianos
committed additional contumacious acts in preventing another member of the
family, Mrs. Cipriana Gonzales, from entering the property. In her affidavit, Mrs.
Gonzales said that the Flaminianos and their people used "the whole house,
except the bedrooms, for their filming activities." 46
In their comment on the motion for contempt, petitioners noticeably did not
controvert the facts set forth by private respondent in said motion. Instead, it
reasserted its claim of ownership over the property as evidenced by TCT No.
67990. They alleged that they had mortgaged the property to the Far East Bank
and Trust Company in the amount of thirty million pesos (P30,000,000.00) for
which they are paying a monthly interest of around P675,000.00 "without enjoying
the material possession of the subject property which has been unlawfully and
unjustly detained by private respondent for the last four (4) years as it was used
as the residence of the members of the family of its President ANTONIO B.
GONZALES without the said private respondent paying rentals thereon for the
period from January 1995 up to October 5, 1997 when the said property was
voluntarily vacated by the members of the President (sic) of respondent
corporation, ANTONIO B. GONZALES, who has since then been a fugitive from
justice having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public document and has succeeded in evading his sentence."
They averred that Tadeo Gonzales erroneously claimed that the rights of
ownership and possession over the property are still under litigation because
"the issue of ownership is no longer involved in this litigation when the complaint
for reformation of instrument with annulment of sale and title filed by private
respondent" was dismissed with finality by reason of non-suit. Hence, they
claimed that they "now stand to be the unquestionable registered and lawful
owners of the property subject of controversy" and that the July 24, 1996
Decision of the Court of Appeals "has already lost its virtuality and legal efficacy
with the occurrence of a 'supervening event' which is a superior cause
superseding the basis of the judgment" in CA-G.R. No. 39227 of respondent
court.
They informed the Court that they are now leasing the property to PANRUPP from
October 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998. They alleged, however, that the property
is in a "deplorable state of decay and deterioration" that they saw the need "to act
swiftly and decisively to prevent further destruction" of the property where they
"invested millions of pesos of their life-time savings to acquire the same." Hence,
they sought the assistance of barangay officials in Barangay Mariana, New Manila
who helped them effect "the peaceful entry into the property of the petitioners
without the use of strategy, force and intimidation contrary to what was alleged"
in the motion for contempt. They "peacefully took over" possession of the
property on September 20, 1997 but allowed the immediate members of the family
of private respondent's president to stay on. The family finally agreed to vacate
the premises on October 5, 1997 "upon the offer of the petitioners to shoulder
partially the expenses for the hospitalization of the ailing mother at the St. Luke
General Hospital where she was brought by an ambulance accompanied by a
doctor" at petitioners' expense.
Petitioners questioned the issuance by this Court of the TRO on October 13,
1997, asserting that when it was issued, there were "no more acts to restrain the
illegal occupants of the subject property (as they) had already peacefully vacated
the premises on October 5, 1997 or more than a week after the said TRO was
issued by the Third Division" of this Court. They prayed that the motion for
contempt be denied for lack of merit and that the TRO issued be lifted and set
aside "for the act or acts sought to be restrained have already been done and
have become a fait accompli before the issuance of the TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER on October 13, 1997." 50
As earlier discussed, petitioners' claim that the dismissal of the action for
reformation of instrument for non-suit had written finis to the issue of ownership
over the Gilmore property is totally unfounded in law. Petitioners should be
reminded that the instant petition stemmed from an unlawful detainer case, the
issue of which is merely possession of the property in question. The issue of
ownership has not been definitively resolved for the provisional determination of
that issue that should have been done by the MTC at the earliest possible time,
would only be for the purpose of determining who has the superior right to
possess the property. Inasmuch as this Court has resolved that the rightful
possessor should have been private respondent and its representatives and
agents, the TRO issued by this Court on October 13, 1997 should not be lifted.
That the TRO was issued days before private respondent left the property is
immaterial. What is in question here is lawful possession of the property, not
possession on the basis of self-proclaimed ownership of the property. For their
part, petitioners should cease and desist from further exercising possession of
the same property which possession, in the first place, does not legally belong to
them.
The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as
alleged by private respondent through Tadeo Gonzales is deplorably high-
handed. On an erroneous assumption that she had been legally vested with
ownership of the properly, she took steps prior to the present proceedings by
illegally taking control and possession of the same property in litigation. Her act
of entering the property in defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.
Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her husband,
Eduardo Flaminiano, a lawyer 51 whose actuations as an officer of the court
should be beyond reproach. His contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore
property without the consent of its occupants and in contravention of the existing
writ or preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals and making
utterances showing disrespect for the law and this Court, are certainly
unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his
comment on the motion for contempt that petitioners "peacefully" took over the
property. Nonetheless, such "peaceful" take-over cannot justify defiance of the
writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force. Notably, he did not
comment on nor categorically deny that he committed the contumacious acts
alleged by private respondent. Through his acts, Atty. Flaminiano has flouted his
duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting "activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." 52
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and
the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to
the filing by either party of an action regarding the ownership of the property
involved. The temporary restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is hereby
made permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to turn over
possession of the property to private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
3 Ibid., p. 172.
4 Ibid., p. 278.
5 Ibid., p. 158.
8 Rollo, p. 60.
11 Rollo, p. 64.
13 Rollo, p. 65.
14 Ibid., p. 66.
18 Rollo, p. 23.
19 Ibid., p. 19.
25 Ibid at p. 1003.
30 Oleo v. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 328, 338 (1995) citing Lizares v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98282, September 6, 1993, 226 SCRA 112.
32 Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102557, July 30, 1996, 260
SCRA 10.
34 Supra at p. 783.
36 Ibid., p. 254.
38 Guanzon v. Hon. Argel, 144 Phil. 418, 423 (1970) citing Art. 2088 of
the Civil Code.
43 Rollo, p. 200.
45 Ibid., p. 221.
46 Ibid., pp. 226-228.
47 Ibid., p. 232.
48 Ibid., p. 251.
49 Ibid., p. 253.
52 Rule 1.02.