Crisostomo vs.

CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)

FACTS: Crisostomo was appointed the President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the President
of the Philippines. During his incumbency, two administrative charges were filed against him for illegal use of
government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct,
nepotism and dishonesty before the Office of the President.

Likewise, he was also charged with violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act with the Tanodbayan. As
such, he was preventively suspended and Dr. Mateo was designated as the officer-in-charge in his place.
Meanwhile, Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341 converting PCC into PUP with Mateo as President. Crisostomo was
later acquitted and his administrative charges were dismissed.

ISSUE: Did PD 1314 abolish PCC?

HELD:

PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the PCC into what is now PUP. What took place was a change in the
academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence, the change in its name, the
expansion of its curriculum offerings and changes in its structure and organization.

As a general rule, when the purpose of the lawmaking authority is to abolish the office and create a new one, he
says so. In the instant case, PD 1314 merely states that PCC is converted into the PUP. In addition, the law does
not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being “transferred” to the PUP but only
that they “stand transferred” to it. “Stand transferred” simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC
were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution.

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

GR No. L-57883 March 12 1982 

FACTS:

De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing
BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of
the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be
considered separated from the judiciary.  It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of
this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored
and disregarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the
Constitution.

RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What is
important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a
non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Viola vs. Alunan III

G.R. No. 115844.  August 15, 1997

FACTS:

Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of the Art III, Sec.1-2 of the
Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers
insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice presidents and for auditors for the National
Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.

He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493 which mentions as
elective positions only those of the president, vice president, and five members of the board of directors in each
chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels and thus the
implementing rules expand the numbers in the LGC in violation of the principle that implementing rules and
regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid.

RULING:

Yes. The creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the LGC which in fact requires – and not
merely authorizes – the board of directors to “create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter”. To begin with, the creation of these positions was actually made in the Constitution
and By-laws of the Liga ng mga barangay which was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly.

There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices in the
executive management.

While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs of the
chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create additional
positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
metropolitan political subdivision levels.  Otherwise the National Liga would be no different from the local
chapters.  The fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters
but to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.

Petition dismissed.

BIRAOGO VS PTC

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body
as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can
do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They
argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.
1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of
the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed
and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A.
No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because
it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct
injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is
governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is
entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and
the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President
granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he
can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There
is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount
that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for
the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate
all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform
to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs COURT OF APPEALS

171 SCRA 348

Status and Characteristics

Meaning of Administrative Agency

FACTS: On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil
Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans
Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries
Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman
Enterprises.

The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of
Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of
Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise
the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search
warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M.
Castro are all dated March 12, 1985.

Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the
implementation of the search warrants in question. On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its
challenged Orders, and held:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159,
160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender
immediately all the personal properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by virtue of the
aforementioned search warrants. On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.

On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to
contest, on certiorari, the twin Orders of the lower court. In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court
held:

Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute
foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-
judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare
the search warrants in question null and void. Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General
the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is appealable to the Office of the President.

On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily of
whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer' countenanced by
the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure. The Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion,
reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20,
1988, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express powers and
functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No.
1883." "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which are decidedly
quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation on the charges of foreign
exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among others, and
depending upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding information in court of
Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations effective August 26, 1984,
petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication ."

The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, was of the opinion that "the grant of quasi-judicial powers to
petitioner did not diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a law and, if
necessary to declare one unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts do
not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two other coordinate branches of the government, but
solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law in every case which come before them."

In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolutions above-mentioned, the
respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction,"

ISSUE: Whether or not The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in
rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction

RULING: No. This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question is the
Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and its subsequent
countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search and seizure, for the reason that
the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not
vested with such a jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows
indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection,
precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review.

As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first
place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than
the higher tribunals, the Court of Appeals and this Court.

A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court of law and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making."

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless
its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become
executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise
quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called
upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone
by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

The Court sees nothing in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1936 (except with respect to the Task Force's
powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial
responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is
simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court,
meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate
authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not
prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not
the fiscal.

If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-
equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate
its standing at par with the said court.

In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of
jurisdiction by the court a quo.

RATIO: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court of law and other
than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making
CHREA vs.CHR

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these
special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification
scheme among selected positions in the Commission.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional
source of funding for said staffing modification.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval,
but the then DBM secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region
Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected
owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file
employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional
Office.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-
Central Office denied the same.

CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld
the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is
within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions
in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are
disallowed.

1.  RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall
establish andadminister a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.

The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or
conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.

2.  The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence
as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits
received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized
and irregular

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation
and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation
and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the
Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system
established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.

(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of
its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and
deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action
taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s compensation
system “conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be
sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to
the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the
preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National
Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of
more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and
position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative
proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of
positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from
now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.

Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies
including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency.

From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class
of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit
cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal
autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom
to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its
needs may require from time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, 23 it is understood that it is only
the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.

We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR,
did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement
organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices
enjoying fiscal autonomy

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices
accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant
of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization
Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-

Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade,
and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their
personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.

5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 “that
the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws.”26

NOTES:

1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no official
written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there
anything in the records to show that its president has the authority to sue the CHR.

On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner,
which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of
positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization
of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s upgrading scheme, if
found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission’s savings or that portion of its budgetary pie
otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank
and file, are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s personality
to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our
hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in
the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of “providing equal pay
for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made a
determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR
lacks legal rationalization.

The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which
the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “no organizational unit or
changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President.” Here, the DBM
discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office
in the CHR. Anent CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and
four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this
would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.

1. Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board vs. Commissioner Fe Barin of Energy
Regulatory Commission
Facts: RA 9136, known as EPIRA (for electric Power Industry Reform Act) was enacted on June 8, 2009 and took
effect on June 26, 2009. Sec. 38 of RA 9136 provides for the abolition of the ERB (Energy Regulatory Board) and
creation of ERC (Energy Regulatory Commission).

At the time of filing the petition, the ERC was composed of:

1. Commissioner Fe Barin

2. Dept. Commissioners Carlos Alindada, Leticia Ibay, Oliver Butalid and Mary Anne Colayco

 Commissioners assumed office on Aug. 15, 2009

Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A portion of the guidelines
reflects the Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the ERC employees vis-à-vis Civil Service rules.

Nov. 5, 2005, KERB sent a letter to the commissioners stating their objection to the commissioner’s stand that Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application in the selection and placement of the ERC
employees.

Contention:

KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the ERB’s character, it merely changed the ERB
name to ERC and expanded functions and objectives.

Commissioner Barin replied to KERB, the creation of a placement committee is no longer necessary because there
is already a prescribed set of guidelines for recruitment of personnel.

KERB filed a petition to enjoin Termination of Petitioners ERB employees

Issue: 1. W/N Sec. 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional?

2. W/N Commissioners of the ERC were correct in disregarding and considering merely suppletory in character the
protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the ERB employees.

Held:

 All laws enjoy the presumption of Constitutionality. To justify the nullification of law, there must be a clear and
convincing breach of the constitution.

 Power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature. “The power to create an office carries with it
the power to abolish. Pres. Aquino, then exercisingly her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing EO
172 on May 8, 1987.

 The question whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent.

 Sec. 38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB

 ERC indeed assumed the functions of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded functions which are
intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.

Ruling: Impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure DOES NOT arise in the abolition of an
office.

There is no occupant in an abolished office, where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak.

Petition is DISMISSED.