III.

POLICE INVESTIGATION validity of the confession substantiates the conclusion that the sworn statement is constitutionally
suspect and invalid. In relation to this, we stress that the right to counsel refers
to competent and independent lawyers preferably chosen by the accused persons themselves. This
G.R. No. 130189. June 25, 1999. Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have the opportunity to determine the competence and the
independence of the NBI-procured lawyer because, despite the denial of the accused that he was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO R. MULETA, accused- assisted by counsel, the prosecution failed to present Atty. Daquiz.
appellant. Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial investigation
the practice of issuing “invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with an offense they are
Criminal Law; Custodial Investigation; Extrajudicial Confessions; Confessions extracted without suspected to have committed.—Based on the prosecution’s own evidence, the accused was already
the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.—The appellant claims that “it is not singled out as the perpetrator of the crime. The supposed “invitation” by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino was in
true that [he] had executed an extrajudicial confession.” As correctly pointed out by the solicitor reality a custodial investigation targeting the accused for the purpose of procuring a confession.
general, however, the appellant actually admits to the execution of the said confession, albeit without Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial investigation the practice of issuing
the assistance of counsel. But unlike the solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such “invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with an offense they are suspected to have
“ambivalence only indicates the unreliability of [appellant’s] claim.” Indeed, confessions extracted committed. Under the present factual milieu, Domingo Muleta should have been accorded the right to
without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law. counsel (and all the constitutional rights of the accused), from the time that he was brought to the NBI
office in Manila.
Same; Same; Same; A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is
obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.—To be acceptable, Same; Same; Same; The suspect’s waiver of his rights, in order to be valid, should be in a
extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not language that clearly manifest his desire to do so.—Even if we were to assume that the appellant was
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the following rights of persons under assisted by counsel when he waived his rights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty.
custodial investigation: to remain silent, to have independent and competent counsel preferably of their Daquiz was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this question: “Gusto mo bang talikdan
own choice, to be provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon?” To this, the appellant replied:
counsel during the investigation, to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights, “Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na
and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and will be used against pamangkin ko.” To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required.
them in court. Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the
implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a language that clearly
Same; Same; Same; The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during custodial manifested his desire to do so. The part of the sworn statement in which the accused “waived” his
investigation refers to an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected rights referred to them as “mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon” and “iyon”—words
individual, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights.—The right to be informed of that were utterly vague and insufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirements. As presented, the
one’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers to an effective communication between prosecution would have us refer to the first part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were a
the investigating officer and the suspected individual, with the purpose of making the footnote saying “Please see first part.” Such stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of
latter understand these rights. Understanding would mean that the information transmitted was rights cherished and enshrined in our basic law.
effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the Constitution does not merely require the
investigating officers to “inform” the person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be Same; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites for Conviction.—The rule is that “x x x in the
“informed.” absence of direct proof, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such
conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
Same; Same; Same; Terse and perfunctory statements imply a superficial reading of the rights from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
of the accused.—The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict requirements such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
mandated by the Constitution. Such “terse and perfunctory statements” implied a superficial reading of
the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of whether he understood what was read Same; Witnesses; Affidavits; An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and
to him. This Court will not subscribe to such manner of “informing” the accused of his constitutional subjected to cross-examination.—Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination, the
rights. We have stated this then, and we reiterate it now: “[The] stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in appellant consistently denied that he worked in the place where the victim’s body was found. Also, the
practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of ‘legal prosecution failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and that he went
form’ or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with the court ‘Opo’ as the home on April 30, 1993. All it could present was the testimony of NBI Agent Ely Tolentino, who merely
answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and testified on what appellant’s co-workers related to him: that appellant left work earlier. This is clearly
artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do not help the prosecution’s case, since they themselves
part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is were not presented during the trial. An affidavit is hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and
missing.” subjected to cross-examination. Besides, the appellant’s wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically
that her husband was with her at home on April 29 and 30, 1993. The appellant himself steadfastly
Same; Same; Same; We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility affirmed this during his cross-examination.
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.—As
observed by this Court in People v. Lucero, “[w]e have constitutionalized the right to counsel because Same; Presumption of Innocence; Suspicion or accusation is not synonymous with guilt.—The
of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a appellant’s rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his testimony, due to his
suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible.” This Court has perceived failure to take care of his niece. This was corroborated by the testimony of Danilo Delgado.
consistently held, without equivocation, that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said during the wake were ambiguous. “Patawarin mo
done in the presence of counsel. The failure of the prosecution to present Atty. Daquiz to testify on the
ako Charito” could have meant that the appellant was blaming himself for being unable to protect the Domingo R. Muleta appeals the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
victim. “Ikaw kasi lumaban pa” could have connoted frustration with what he imagined could have Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. 3264-M-93, finding him guilty of the complex crime of rape
saved the life of his niece. “Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na” also shows the appellant blaming with homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
himself for being inutile, indicating his desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit
anything, it is this: it places the appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. The Information, dated October 1, 1993 and signed by Prosecution Attorney Emmanuel
Y. Velasco, charged appellant as follows:
Same; Same; The prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, “That on April 30, 1993, between the hours of 12:05 past midnight to 2:00 in the
not on the weakness of the defense.—We have always considered alibi inherently weak, because it morning, at a house in Malolos, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
can be either easily fabricated or difficult to disprove. However, we have consistently held that the Court, accused DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had
prosecution must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, not on the weakness of carnal knowledge of a woman in the person of Charito M. Delgado without her consent,
the defense: “True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecution’s evidence in this case. by using force and intimidation and while the latter was unconscious; and thereafter
x x x Indeed, it is when the evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more accused Domingo Muleta y Rocero by reason or on occasion of the said rape incident,
obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that taking advantage of his superior strength, stab[bed] Charito M. Delgado in the neck and
conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.” at the back causing the instantaneous death of the latter.”

Same; Same; In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt—the freedom of the Upon arraignment on December 10, 1993, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
accused is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.—
This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia. “In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous After trial, the lower court rendered its assailed August 15, 1997 Judgment, the
with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for dispositive portion of which reads:
conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused Domingo R. Muleta guilty
State, both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of [r]ape with [h]omicide and hereby
circumstance favoring the accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. “The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim Charito
The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense Delgado death indemnity of P50,000.00, actual damages of P44,000.00, exemplary
charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be damages of P20,000.00 and moral damages of P20,000.00.
freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.” “No pronouncement as to costs.”
Same; Rule of Law; The Court is saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law
which they have sworn to defend and uphold—a mockery of the law must not be allowed to sully the Hence, this appeal.
country’s quest for peace and order.—In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not
commit the offense charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to present credible The Facts 
and admissible evidence of appellant’s guilt. The strongest evidence of the prosecution is the Version of the Prosecution
extrajudicial confession of appellant. But the Constitution is clear—a confession obtained in violation of The facts, as viewed by the prosecution, are summarized in the Appellee’s Brief  thus:
the rights of an accused cannot be used as evidence. Without Muleta’s confession, the other pieces of “On April 15, 1993, nineteen-year-old Charito Delgado, a native of Oriental Mindoro,
circumstantial evidence lose their significance. Had the National Bureau of Investigation followed the went to Manila to find work. Once in Manila, Charito proceeded to 1347 Banaba Street,
law in extracting appellant’s admission of guilt, perhaps—just perhaps—the result of this case would Moriones, Tondo, Manila, where her uncle, Ruben Delgado lived. There, she stayed
have been different. The Court is saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law which they with her sister Marissa. Shortly thereafter, Charito landed a job as a saleslady at the Ali
have sworn to defend and uphold. A mockery of the law—which was manifestly perpetrated in this case Mall, in Cubao, Quezon City.
—must not be allowed to sully the country’s quest for peace and order. “In the afternoon of April 29, 1993, Charito left Tondo, Manila and moved to
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, bringing with her some of her sister’s baggage. She,
however, returned to Tondo, Manila to pick up their remaining baggage. It was the last
time she was seen alive by her relatives.
PANGANIBAN, J.: “On April 30, 1993, Charito’s lifeless body was found naked in Mojon, Malolos,
Bulacan, tied to a post with the use of a pair of pants and both her hands were tied with
An extra-judicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights is
a bra. Charito’s body bore five (5) stab wounds, three (3) in the left side of her neck and
inadmissible in evidence. During custodial investigation, suspects have the rights, among two (2) at her back.
others, (1) to remain silent, (2) to have an independent and competent counsel, (3) to be “The initial investigation on Charito’s death was conducted by the police in Malolos,
provided with such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be assisted by one in case of Bulacan but the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, later took over and the
waiver, which should be in writing, of the foregoing; and (5) to be informed of all such rights case was assigned to NBI Agent Ely Tolentino on May 19, 1993.
and of the fact that anything he says can and will be used against him. Where the remaining “Based on Tolentino’s investigation, appellant is Charito’s uncle, [appellant] being
pieces of evidence are insufficient to determine guilt with moral certainty, the appellant is the brother of Charito’s mother, Milagros Delgado; that on April 29 and 30, 1993,
entitled to an acquittal. A conviction must rest on the strength of the admissible evidence of appellant was working at the Loadstar Shipping Lines located at Pier 16, North Harbor,
Tondo, Manila; that on April 29, 1993, appellant left his work at 9:30 in the evening; that
the prosecution, not on the weakness or insufficiency of the defense.
appellant reported for work on April 30, 1993 at 8:00 in the evening; that according to
The Case
 appellant’s wife, he left for work on April 29, 1993 but returned only in the morning of “First, the accused is familiar with the place VOP Compound, Bo. Mojon, Malolos,
April 30, 1993. Bulacan, where the crime was committed and where the body of the victim was found;
“On September 19, 1993, Tolentino went to appellant’s house in Oriental Mindoro “Second, the accused left his place of work at around 9:30 in the evening of April
and requested appellant to go with him to the NBI, Manila for investigation. Appellant 29, 1993;
readily obliged. Danilo Delgado, Charito’s paternal uncle, accompanied Tolentino and “Third, the accused did not go home in the evening of April 29, 1993 but went home
appellant to Manila. only in the morning of April 30, 1993;
“During his custodial investigation on September 19, 1993, appellant was assisted “Fourth, that during the wake of Charito, the accused went wild and hysterical and
by counsel, Atty. Deborah [D]aquis, with address at Room 401, D & D Building, Pedro uttered these words: ‘Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako,
Gil and San Marcelino Street, Manila. There, he admitted having raped and later killed mabuti pang mamatay na.’;
Charito Delgado. “Fifth, the accused admitted in his sworn statement, that he uttered these words;
“Another prosecution witness, Danilo Delgado, testified that during the wake of “Sixth, the accused admitted that he drank chlorox and was brought to the Fatima
Charito Delgado on May 13, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, appellant became Hospital for treatment; and
hysterical, crying, shaking his head and muttering: ‘Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw kasi “Seventh, the sworn statement executed by the accused contains details of the
lumaban pa, nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na.’ manner in which the crime was committed which only he could have known.”
“Delgado saw appellant drink a bottle of ‘chlorux,’ after which he fell to the ground.
Appellant was brought to the Fatima Hospital.” (citations omitted) In upholding the validity of the extrajudicial confession, the lower court further ruled:
“The contention of the accused that his extrajudicial confession [was] inadmissible
Version of the Defense because it was obtained through force and without the assistance of counsel is
The appellant, on the other hand, submits the following as the facts of the case: untenable. Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the
“x x x [T]he defense presented the accused himself [Domingo Muleta] who testified that contrary is proved. In th[is] case, the presumption has not been overcome. The
he was not the one who committed the crime [he was] being charged [with]; that he was narration contained in the sworn statement bespeaks spontan[ei]ty and truth. Not only is
just unscrupulously picked up by the NBI and forced to admit the crime in question; that the [confession of the accused] replete with details only he could have supplied, but the
on April 30, 1993, he was in their rented house at Camias St., Magsaysay, Tondo, circumstances surrounding its execution belie his claim. Indubitably established is the
Manila; that on that day, he left the house at 5:30 in the afternoon and went to the house fact that accused was assisted by Atty. Deborah Daquis who even signed the
where Charito Delgado was then residing; that he learned from his sister Milagros statement; that before accused made his extrajudicial confession he was first asked if
Delgado that the latter’s daughter Charito transferred to another house and she was he was amenable to the services of Atty. Daquis to which query he answered
then missing; that he reported the matter to the police authorities; first, to the PNP affirmatively. Finally, while accused recited a litany of alleged acts of maltreatment, no
Headquarters in Tondo; second, to the PNP Headquarters at U.N. Avenue; and third, to medical certificate had been shown to prove that he did suffer inhuman treatment. Nor
the PNP Headquarters situated at Caloocan; that on May 8, 1993, he found the body of was there any proof that he even initiated the filing of an administrative or criminal
Charito Delgado already lying in state at Valenzuela, Metro, Manila; that he learned complaint against his alleged tormentors. Neither did accused present any eyewitness
from his sister Milagros that her body was found somewhere in Malolos; that he was to the alleged torture. In short, his allegation, obviously self-serving, hardly deserves
working in the Load Star Shipping as a welder on a contractual basis; that from April to consideration. Noteworthy too, is the fact that he did not repudiate said confession at
May, 1993, he was applying to another company because Load Star Shipping closed the earliest opportunity and did so only during trial, thus indicating that his repudiation
shop; that on September 19, 1993, he was picked up by the NBI at Banos Gloria, [was] only a lastditch effort to avoid the consequences of the crime.
Oriental Mindoro; that he was brought at Taft Avenue; that he was tortured; that aside “The court upholds the admissibility of accused’s extrajudicial confession which, by
from boxing and kicking him, [they] brought [him] to a secluded place; that he was itself, is sufficient basis for his conviction.
blindfolded; that he was told to lie down on his back, his feet were tied and water was “The rule is, a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by
poured on his nose; that he was forced to sign a document which he was not able to the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly
read, that he was forced to sign the document because he [could] no longer bear the confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
torture; that he did not have a lawyer at that time; that the NBI agent’s name is Ely “Finally, accused’s defense of denial and alibi cannot negate his culpability because
Tolentino who testified earlier in this case; that he knows that the reason why he was these are not supported by any credible evidence other than his bare assertion.
accused of raping his niece is that he gave an information about a woman he saw in the Additionally, there was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of the
room of his brother-in-law Rolando Delgado. prosecution witnesses that might have led them to give fabricated testimony against the
“x x x [T]hat the last time he [accused] visited his niece in her residence in Moriones accused.”  (citations omitted)
was April 26, 1993; that Marissa was present when he visited Charito Delgado; that he
used to work at Lawang Bato, Bagbaguin, Valenzuela, Bulacan; that he did not work in Assignment of Error
Malolos; that when he saw the cadaver of Charito, he was so sad about her condition, Appellant presents this lone assignment of error:
that he [could] no longer recall what he did because of his anger. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
“x x x Emelinda Muleta testified that her husband, the accused-appellant, never left EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION AND IN THE PROCESS DISREGARDING THE
the house in Tondo, Manila in the evening of April 29, 1993.” DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.”

Ruling of the Trial Court A reading of the Appellant’s Brief, however, yields the following issues to be resolved: (1)
Despite the absence of an eyewitness, the trial court held that the circumstantial evidence in the validity and admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant, (2) the
this case was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant. In so holding, it referred to the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
following as sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict: doubt, and (3) alibi as a defense.
 that the information transmitted was effectively received and comprehended. Hence, the
This Court’s Ruling Constitution does not merely require the investigating officers to “inform” the person under
The appeal is meritorious. The extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible, and the investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be “informed.”
remaining circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sorely insufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution’s purported compliance with this requisite appears in the following
portion of the extrajudicial confession:
First Issue:  Validity of Extrajudicial Confession “SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI DOMINGO MULETA y ROCERO NA IBINIGAY KAY
NBI AGENT ELY T. TOLENTINO DITO SA TANGGAPAN NG NBI, ANTI-ORGANIZED
The appellant claims that “it is not true that [he] had executed an extrajudicial confession.” CRIME DIVISION NGAYONG IKA-19 NG SETYEMBRE, 1993 SA HARAP NG ILANG
SAKSI.
As correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, however, the appellant actually admits to
x------------------------------------------------------------------------x
the execution of the said confession, albeit without the assistance of counsel. But unlike the 01. TANONG: Bago kita tanungin hinggil sa pagkamatay ni CHARITO DELGADO y
solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such “ambivalence only indicates the MULETA ay nais ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan na itinatadhana ng ating
unreliability of [appellant’s] claim.” Indeed, confessions extracted without the assistance of saligang batas, at ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law. 01.Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at huwag sumagot sa mga katanungan sa iyo
sa imbestigasyong ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional 02.Ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng abogado na sarili mong pili, pero kung wala
requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in kang ikakaya ay bibigyan ka namin ng abogado para matulungan ka sa imbestigasyong
ito[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ang karapatan mong ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
violation of any of the following rights of persons under custodial investigation: to remain
03.Ang lahat ng bagay na sasabihin mo sa imbestigasyong ito ay maaaring gamitin
silent, to have independent and competent counsel preferably of their own choice, to be laban sa iyo sa alinmang hukuman[.] Nauunawaan mo ba ito? (Sgd. Domingo Muleta)
provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be assisted by such counsel Matapos na malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan ikaw ay nakahanda pa ring
during the investigation, to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these magbigay ng pahayag?
rights, and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say can and SAGOT: Nakahanda po akong sabihin lahat ng totoo.
will be used against them in court. In People v. Santos, we held: 02 T: Ikaw ba ay may abogado na
“A confession is not admissible unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was . matatawagan ngayon na sarili mong
obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III pili?
thereof, provides:   S: Wala po.
‘(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have 03 T: Nais mo bang bigyan ka namin ng
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and . abogado?
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford   S: Opo.
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be 04 T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty.
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. . Deborah Z. Daquiz isang abogada
x x x     x x x     x x x na pribado na handang asistihan at
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 tulungan ka sa imbestigasyong ito.
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.’ Gusto mo bang tawagin natin siya
“If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is bago natin ituloy ang pagbibigay mo
subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely—without coercion, ng pahayag?
intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with   S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz
the normal experience of mankind. was called first and the statement
“A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high taking was temporarily stopped until
order because no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately confess to be after her arrival).
the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. Otherwise, it is 05 T: Ngayong naririto na si Atty.
disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary rule.” (citations . DEBORAH DAQUIZ, ikaw ba ay nais
omitted) pa ring magbigay ng salaysay na
bukal sa iyong kalooban?
Flagrantly violated in the present case were the appellant’s right to be informed of his rights   S: Opo.
06 T: Atty. Daquiz: Gusto mo bang
under custodial investigation, his right to counsel, as well as his right to have said counsel
. talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na
present during the waiver of his rights under custodial investigation. ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating
Konstitusyon?
The Right to Be Apprised of Constitutional Rights   S: Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil
The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during custodial investigation refers to gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang
an effective communication between the investigating officer and the suspected individual, pangyayari kay CHARITO
with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights. Understanding would mean DELGADO na pamangkin ko. (Sgd.
Domingo Muleta)
 x x x     x x x     x x x Q If the request of Atty. Daquis was the following day[,]
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of September, 1993 at the meaning September 20, are you saying that the
Office of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Divsion, NBI Building, Taft Avenue, Manila and I statement of Muleta was given the following day[,] on
hereby certify that I have personally examined the herein Affiant and found him to have September 20?
fully read and understood the contents of his statement containing three (3) pages and A September 19, I started taking the statement. I think
that he executed the same out of his own volition. I just finished the question the following day I
(Sgd.) Atty. ARTEMIO M. SACAGUING  continued. [sic]
Chief AOCD    x x x     x x x     x x x”  [Emphasis ours]
(By Authority of Rep. Act 157)
x x x     x x x     x x x” (emphasis ours) Atty. Quintana amplified this point on cross-examination:
“x x x     x x x     x x x
The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the strict requirements mandated Q In the direct examination, you claimed that the accused
by the Constitution. Such “terse and perfunctory statements” implied a superficial reading of Domingo Muleta gave his statement and made a
the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of whether he understood what confession?
was read to him. This Court will not subscribe to such manner of “informing” the accused of A Yes, madam.
Q You also claimed that you started taking the statement of
his constitutional rights. We have stated this then, and we reiterate it now:
Domingo Muleta, the accused, without the presence of
“[The] stereotyped ‘advice’ appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which
counsel?
are later repudiated has assumed the nature of ‘legal form’ or model. Police
A No, madam. I took his statement in the presence of Atty.
investigators either automatically type it together with the curt ‘Opo’ as the answer
Daquis.
or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious,
Q In the direct examination on May 27, 1994, page 81, last
fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
paragraph and I quote: ‘A. September 19, I started taking
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
the statement. I think I just finished the question the
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.” (emphasis supplied)
following day I continued.’ Now, do you want to change
now your answer that you took the accused’ [sic]
The Right to Counsel statement with the presence of counsel?
The prosecution contends that this constitutional requirement was satisfied because A No, madam. Although I started to take his statement on
appellant executed the confession with the assistance and in the presence of Atty. Deborah the night of September 19, I continued it when Atty.
Daquiz. The participation of the counsel was described in the confession in this manner: Daquiz arrived x x x the following morning wherein the
“x x x     x x x     x x x accused conferred with the accused, madam. [sic]
Q But, [is it] not true that on the night of September 19,
04. T: Gusto naming ipakilala sa iyo si Atty. 1993 you started taking the statement of the accused
Deborah Z. Daquiz, isang abogada na without the presence of Atty. Daquiz and only continued
pribado na handang asisti han at tulungan the same on the early morning of September 20, 1993
ka sa imbestigasyong ito. Gusto mo bang when Atty. Daquiz arrived?
tawagin natin siya bago natin ituloy ang A Yes, madam.
pagbibigay mo ng pahayag? Q Don’t you know that as a police officer NBI a[t] that, that
  S: Opo. (At this juncture, Atty. Daquiz was before a suspected person can give his statement, a
called first and the statement taking was counsel must be present at all times?
temporarily stopped until after her arrival). A Yes, madam.
    x x x     x x x     x x x”   x x x     x x x     x x x” (emphasis ours)

However, the testimony of Tolentino, the investigating NBI agent, clearly contradicts the Despite Agent Tolentino’s claim that the confession of the accused started to be taken on
claim of the prosecution. The agent testified: September 19, 1993 and continued the next day, the sworn statement itself clearly showed
  “x x x     x x x     x x x
that what began on the 19th of September ended on the same day. According to
Q Did you inform her [Atty. Deborah Daquiz] x x x
thr[ough] the phone x x x why you were soliciting her the jurat, the extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to on September 19, 1993.
assistance? The importance of the jurat must be stressed. In People v. Relucio, we observed:
A Yes[,] sir. We told her that we have a subject to “At this point, it must be noted that Exhibit 2-A, the statement which Padrones claimed
confess what he [did,] will you kindly assist him in above to have been admittedly taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 but, supposedly
this investigation[?] signed by him later and not on the same day before Judge Vicencio as he had
Q What was the response of Atty. Daquis? previously stated, bears the following heading:
A She [asked] me [if it] could x x x be made the ‘SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY NI MIGUEL PADRONES y ESPEJO SA
following day. PAGTATANONG NI P/CPL J. S. VILORIA DITO SA HIMPILAN NG PULISYA NG
Q What was you[r] answer? KABANATUAN NGAYONG IKA-19 NG OKTUBRE 1972 SA GANAP NA IKA 5:15 NG
A It is up to you, I said. HAPON . . .’
 and ends with the following jurat: appellant replied: “Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari
‘NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa aking harap ngayong ika 20 ng Oktubre 1972, dito kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko.”
sa Lunsod ng Kabanatuan.’
With the dates October 19 and 20 thus appearing in this statements, how could
To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution clearly and strictly required.
there be any proximity to the truth in the assertion of Padrones that his statement was
first taken by Viloria on October 5, 1972 and that it was signed by him before Fiscal del Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and
Rosario on October 9, 1972 and that it was the very statement he had been referring to the implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a
earlier as having been signed by him before Judge Vicencio?” (emphasis in the original) language that clearly manifested his desire to do so. The part of the sworn statement in
which the accused “waived” his rights referred to them as “mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa
We note that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the same date: September 19, iyo ng ating Konstitusyon” and “iyon”—words that were utterly vague and insufficient to
1993. It is thus daylight clear that the purported sworn statement of the appellant was satisfy the Constitutional requirements. As presented, the prosecution would have us refer
prepared prior to the arrival of his NBI-procured counsel. In other words, the sworn to the first part of the sworn statement for guidance, as if it were a footnote saying “Please
statement was executed and completed on September 19, 1993, while Atty. Daquiz arrived see first part.” Such stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of rights
only the following day, September 20, 1993. Thus, when the appellant executed and cherished and enshrined in our basic law.
completed his purported extrajudicial confession on September 19, 1993, he
was not assisted by counsel. Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether appellant would like to waive
his rights. This was odd, because she had been called to assist appellant in making his
As observed by this Court in People v. Lucero, “[w]e have constitutionalized the right to confession, not his waiver. Atty. Daquiz made no effort to determine whether the accused
counsel because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in was treated well, or if he understood his rights. Such perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt
extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render falls short of constitutional requirements.
them inadmissible.” This Court has consistently held, without equivocation, that no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in the presence of counsel. The failure of Second Issue:  Sufficiency of Evidence for the Prosecution
the prosecution to present Atty. Daquiz to testify on the validity of the confession
substantiates the conclusion that the sworn statement is constitutionally suspect and invalid. Having ruled the alleged confession as unconstitutional and inadmissible, we now
In relation to this, we stress that the right to counsel refers determine whether the other pieces of evidence—all circumstantial in nature—would be
to competent and independent lawyers preferably chosen by the accused persons sufficient to overturn yet another constitutional right: to be presumed innocent unless
themselves. This Court, as well as the court a quo, did not have the opportunity to otherwise proven.
determine the competence and the independence of the NBI-procured lawyer because,
despite the denial of the accused that he was assisted by counsel, the prosecution failed to The rule is that “x x x in the absence of direct proof, conviction may be based on
present Atty. Daquiz. circumstantial evidence, but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
Based on the prosecution’s own evidence, the accused was already singled out as the derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
perpetrator of the crime. The supposed “invitation” by NBI Agent Ely Tolentino was in reality conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
a custodial investigation targeting the accused for the purpose of procuring a confession.
Republic Act 7438 includes as an integral part of custodial investigation the practice of Here, the solicitor general, as well as the trial court, posits that the conviction of the
issuing “invitations” to persons being investigated in connection with an offense they appellant was sufficiently warranted by the aggregate of the following circumstantial
are suspected to have committed. Under the present factual milieu, Domingo Muleta should evidence:
have been accorded the right to counsel (and all the constitutional rights of the accused), 1.The appellant was familiar with the place where the crime was perpetrated.
from the time that he was brought to the NBI office in Manila. 2.The appellant left work around 9:30 on the evening of April 29, 1993 and did not return
home until the morning of April 30, 1993.
3.The appellant, during the victim’s wake, became hysterical and allegedly
No Valid Waiver uttered: “Patawarin mo ako Chato, ikaw kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya ako, mabuti pang
The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated by the fact that appellant mamatay na,” after which he drank “chlorox.”
exercised no satisfactory waiver of his rights. As stated in our earlier discussions, since he
was not assisted by a lawyer when the waiver was made, there was no valid waiver to We do not agree. At the outset, we stress that a careful review of the records of this case
speak of. reveals that these pieces of circumstantial evidence were controverted by the defense and,
even more important, they were not sufficiently established.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant was assisted by counsel
when he waived his rights, the waiver itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty. Daquiz Despite the efforts of the fiscal during cross-examination, the appellant consistently
was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this question: “Gusto mo bang denied that he worked in the place where the victim’s body was found. Also, the prosecution
talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon?” To this, the failed to prove that he was at work around 9:30 p.m. on April 29, 1993 and that he went
home on April 30, 1993. All it could present was the testimony of NBI Agent Ely Tolentino,
who merely testified on what appellant’s co-workers related to him: that appellant left work must convict the accused based on the strength of its own case, not on the weakness of the
earlier. This is clearly hearsay. The affidavits of these co-workers do not help the defense:
prosecution’s case, since they themselves were not presented during the trial. An affidavit is “True, alibi is a weak defense. But then, so also is the prosecution’s evidence in this
hearsay if the affiant is not presented in court and subjected to cross-examination. Besides, case. x x x Indeed, it is when the evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution
the appellant’s wife, Emelinda Muleta, stated categorically that her husband was with her at is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness
of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.”
home on April 29 and 30, 1993. The appellant himself steadfastly affirmed this during his
(emphasis supplied)
cross-examination.
Presumption of Innocence
The appellant’s rather strange behavior during the wake was, according to his
“Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
testimony, due to his perceived failure to take care of his niece. This was corroborated by
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the
the testimony of Danilo Delgado. Moreover, the defense claims that the words he said
absence of his defense, for any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s
during the wake were ambiguous. “Patawarin mo ako Charito” could have meant that the
case and not on the weakness of the defense.” Here, without the confession of the
appellant was blaming himself for being unable to protect the victim. “Ikaw kasi lumaban
appellant, the presumption of innocence prevails.
pa” could have connoted frustration with what he imagined could have saved the life of his
niece. “Nakakahiya ako, mabuting mamatay na” also shows the appellant blaming himself
This principle is well-articulated in People v. Mejia. “In our jurisdiction accusation is not
for being inutile, indicating his desire to take his own worthless life. If these words merit
synonymous with guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit[ed] only if the requisite
anything, it is this: it places the appellant under suspicion. But suspicion or accusation is not
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the
synonymous with guilt.
most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary, independent
of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the accused’s
Most importantly, even if we were to assume that all the foregoing were proven, they
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against the accused must survive the
are still not enough to establish an unbroken chain leading inexorably to the guilt of the
test of reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
appellant. That the appellant could have been familiar with the place where the body was
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the
found did not legally prove anything. That he left work at 9:30 p.m. on April 29 1993 did not
offense charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the
necessarily mean he was at the scene of the crime. So many other possible conclusions
accused’s right to be freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.”
could be made regarding this circumstance. As for his statements during the wake, they are
ambiguous.
One final note. In acquitting appellant, the Court is not saying that he did not commit the
offense charged. We are only saying that the prosecution failed to present credible
We have said that “[i]n the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be
and admissible evidence of appellant’s guilt. The strongest evidence of the prosecution is
established by circumstantial evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of
the extrajudicial confession of appellant. But the Constitution is clear—a confession
moral certainty. When inadequate and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot
obtained in violation of the rights of an accused cannot be used as evidence. Without
sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the state’s evidence does not constitute an
Muleta’s confession, the other pieces of circumstantial evidence lose their significance. Had
unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused, the
the National Bureau of Investigation followed the law in extracting appellant’s admission of
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is entitled to an acquittal.”
guilt, perhaps—just perhaps—the result of this case would have been different. The Court is
Thus, in People v. Bato, the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented there—those
saddened that law enforcement agents transgress the law which they have sworn to defend
showing that the accused brothers invited the victim (and his son) for a drink, suddenly tied
and uphold. A mockery of the law—which was manifestly perpetrated in this case—must not
his hands and took him away; after which his body was recovered from the river the next
be allowed to sully the country’s quest for peace and order.
day—were ruled to be inadequate to sustain a conviction based on guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is hereby
REVERSED and VACATED. Appellant Domingo R. Muleta is hereby ACQUITTED for
In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented acquires significance only when
insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to
taken together with the appellant’s confession. The pattern of the tapestry, which the
cause the release of appellant forthwith, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another
prosecution would want us to see, is bound by only a single thread—the confession of the
cause; and to inform the Court of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement,
appellant. Due to constitutional infirmity, that one strand has been cut, and thus the pattern
within ten days from notice. No costs.
disintegrates. The tapestry becomes an unreadable puzzle.
SO ORDERED.
     
Third Issue: Alibi as a Defense
Note.—A signed admission (“pagpapatunay”) by the accused which was obtained in
violation of his rights under custodial investigation is not admissible in evidence. (People vs.
True, we have always considered alibi inherently weak, because it can be either easily
fabricated or difficult to disprove. However, we have consistently held that the prosecution Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995] ——o0o——
 consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
G.R. No. 174471. January 12, 2016 crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by
  the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JERRY PEPINO  y RUERAS and
procedure. Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward’s out-of-court identification to be
PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, respondents. reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward’s office, they initially
pretended to be customers, and even asked about the products that were for sale. The three had told
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Illegal Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; The illegal Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino “pulled out a gun” instead. After Pepino’s companion
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient had taken the money from the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go
complaint after a trial free from error.—It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the down to the parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward —
matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely before and after the gun had been pointed at him — to view the faces of the three persons who entered
raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. As we held in People v. his office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during the
Samson, 244 SCRA 146 (1995): [A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the four days that he was detained.
manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of “not guilty” and by participating in the trial. At is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed.
any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment —Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. As the Court held
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on in People v. Esoy, 617 SCRA 552 (2010): It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a
record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest crime is to strive to look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the
after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her. lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness’s memory. Experience dictates that
precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can
Criminal Law; Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention; Elements of.—The elements of remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time. While this
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no compelling circumstance in this case
are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner that would warrant its non-application.
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or Same; Criminal Procedure; Custodial Investigations; Police Lineups; Right to Counsel; Custodial
detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, stage.—The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion
if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of
detention is also of no moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present. confessions or admissions from the accused. Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation.
Same; Kidnapping; For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from As a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
going home.—It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel
person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any manner. For there attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual in a police lineup.
deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses;  Out-of-Court Identification; Totality of Circumstances circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during
Test; In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.—Conspiracy exists
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the design or purpose. Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.—In People v. Teehankee, Jr., may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with
249 SCRA 54 (1995), the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more
determine the admissibility of such identifications in this manner: Out-of-court identification is conducted persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
by the police in various ways. It is done thru show ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the Same; Penalties; Death Penalty; With the passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, entitled “An
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on June 24, 2006),
a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of- the death penalty may no longer be imposed. The Supreme Court (SC) sentenced Gomez to the
court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.—Article he could ask for ransom for his (Edward’s) liberty. Edward told Pepino to negotiate with his
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the death penalty when the wife, but the latter insisted on talking to his father.
kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum
At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward’s father and
of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity. In the present case, the demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward’s father told the kidnappers that he
malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for Edward’s release. The CA thus correctly did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with Jocelyn who eventually agreed to
affirmed the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty on Pepino and Gomez. With the passage of a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told Jocelyn to pack the money into two packages
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines” and to drop these at a convenience store in front of McDonald’s at Mindanao Avenue. They
(signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence further demanded that Edward’s vehicle be used to bring the money.
Gomez to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-
SC. The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought the
favorable to him.
agreed amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao Avenue as instructed. That
Same; Kidnapping for Ransom; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; In the evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, and drove
case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Supreme around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward that he could remove his blindfold
Court (SC) set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death after five minutes. When Edward removed his blindfold, he found himself inside his own car
penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil parked at the UP Diliman Campus. He drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita
indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus Ang See, a known anti-crime crusader.
needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.—In
the case of People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) informed Edward that they
the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not
had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting
for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00
as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez,
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn and one Mario Galgo. Jocelyn likewise identified Pepino.
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Resolution
until fully paid. Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented
Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo Jadloc and P/Sr. Insp.
Narciso Quano (mentioned as “Qano” in some parts of the record).

BRION, J.: Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house in Cebu
  City on December 7, 1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered their house looking
This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino)  and Preciosa Gomez (Gomez) for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of arrest, one of the men pointed a
assailing the June 16, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men then hit him with the butt of an armalite and
02026. punched him. The men also took Pepino’s wristwatch and wallet, as well as Zeny’s bag and
watch. Some of the armed men searched the second floor of the house, and found a .45
Antecedents caliber gun. The armed men brought Zeny and Pepino outside their house where Zeny saw
  Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino already handcuffed. The armed men brought them to the
The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men and a Cebu City Police Headquarters before bringing them to the NBI Headquarters in Manila.
woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Parañaque The following day, Jerry, Renato, and Larex were brought to the Department of Justice
City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive them, one of the (DOJ). Zeny, on the other hand, was released after being detained at the NBI for three (3)
men, eventually identified as Pepino, pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, days.
Edward told Pepino that the money was inside the cashier’s box. Pepino and the other man
looted the cashier’s box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them. From the Reynaldo’s testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:
hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as “Joselyn” in some parts of the record), Edward’s wife, x x x On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez to his
saw Pepino take her husband.  She went to the adjoining room upon Edward’s instructions. brother’s sister-in-law who happens to work in a recruitment agency. While they were
inside the latter’s house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, they heard a
noise at the gate. When he peeped through the window, he saw two (2) motorcycles
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other men were
and two (2) Vannette vans. Shortly thereafter, someone kicked the back door and
waiting inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front passenger seat. The several armed men emerged therefrom and announced their arrest.  When he asked
abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward’s eyes and made him wear sunglasses. them if they had any warrant, they replied: “Walang warrant, warrant. Walang
After travelling for two and a half hours, they arrived at an apartment in Quezon City. The search, search.” They were then hogtied and made to lie face down. Five (5) of them
abductors removed the tape from Edward’s eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained then went upstairs and seized his personal belongings together with his briefcase which
his legs. Pepino approached Edward and asked for the phone number of his father so that contained P45,000.00, documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45 caliber
 pistol as well as his license and permit to carry the same. No receipts were issued for The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty that the
their personal effects which were confiscated. They were subsequently brought to Camp RTC imposed. We referred the case to the CA for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling
Crame and subjected to torture. The following day, they were brought to the Department in People v. Mateo.
of Justice and a case for kidnapping was filed against him. Upon reinvestigation,
however, he was discharged from the Information and the court dismissed the case
against him. In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision
  with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages were increased
SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile witnesses. from P300,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively.

Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo Arugay The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection to the
dispatched a team to Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case. The team illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the information before entering
immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at Calle Rojo, Lahug, their plea, and when they participated at the trial.
Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex Pepino with guns tucked in
their waists. When the team approached them, the two men ran inside their house. The The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain a
team went after them and on entering the house, they saw Jerry in possession of a .45 common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.
caliber gun. The team arrested Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then brought them to the NBI
Headquarters in Manila. While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent motion
to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted. Only Gomez’s appeal is now pending
Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest before us.
members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50, Marikina
Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced themselves as police In her brief and supplemental brief, Gomez maintained that it was impossible for Edward
officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the occupants of the house refused to to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he (Edward) was blindfolded.
open the ground floor door. During their search at the second floor, the operatives found an She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that she had conspired with the other
armalite and a .45 caliber gun. The members of the team handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo, accused.
and then brought them to Camp Crame.
Gomez further claimed that Edward’s identification of her during trial “may have been
The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, Jessie preconditioned x x x by suggestive identification” made at the police lineup. She further
Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan, Luisito “Tata” Adulfo, Henriso Batijon (a.k.a. Dodoy argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer proper due to the enactment of
Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with kidnapping for ransom and serious Republic Act No. 9346.
illegal detention before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 259, Parañaque City.
Reynaldo was subsequently discharged after reinvestigation. Only Pepino, Gomez, and The Court’s Ruling
Batijon were arraigned; their other co-accused remained at large.  
We affirm Gomez’s conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of kidnapping and awarded indemnities.
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) and
sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC also ordered them to pay Edward Illegality of the Arrest
P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted from him; P50,000.00 as moral damages;  
and P50,000 as exemplary damages. The trial court acquitted Batijon for insufficiency of We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality
evidence. of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC’s jurisdiction over her person. Thus,
Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless arrest.
The  RTC  held that  Edward  positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the
persons who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who consequently It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition
detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he was released inside the by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before
UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The RTC added that Jocelyn he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. As we held in People v.
corroborated Edward’s testimony on material points. It also pointed out that Edward Samson:
[A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest
identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup conducted inside the NBI compound,
as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court.
although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of “not guilty” and
The RTC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning the by participating in the trial.
validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas.  
 At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO, WHEN
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, ASKED HER NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA GOMEZ)
the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the x x x x
Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out his gun?
guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is much too late in the day to
A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.
complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused  Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated
had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of those words?
conviction had been rendered against her. A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the cashier and
told him to get it.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier’s box?
  A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.
a. Elements of kidnapping proved Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next?
A: I told them why should I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and was forced
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
to go down.
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he x x x x
kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.
of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than x x x x
three (3) days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr. Witness?
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.
or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of x x x x
Q: Who was at the passenger’s front seat of the car?
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
A: It was Preciosa Gomez.
immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of x x x x
extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no moment and the crime is  
qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their other co-
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is present. accused brought him to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him there for four (4) days;
and demanded ransom from his (Edward’s) family.
All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively
identified Gomez and Pepino — both private individuals — as among the three persons who It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a
entered his office and pretended to be Kilton Motors’ customers. He further declared that person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty in any
Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against his will. To directly quote from manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going
the records: home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitable
ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:
proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.
Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?
EDWARD TAN:
A: I was kidnapped. Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward’s testimony on the following points: Pepino
x x x x poked a handgun at Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton; Pepino and his
Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated? companion brought him downstairs and out of the building, and made him board a car; and
A: At around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who entered the the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for Edward’s release.
office of Kilton Motors and pretended to be customers.
Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to? Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn
A: Two men and a woman.
credible and convincing. We affirm the credibility accorded by the trial court (and affirmed by
Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?
A: They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they pulled out the CA) to these prosecution witnesses, in the absence of any showing that this factual
a gun. finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is nothing in the records that would put the
Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said? testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn under suspicion. We recall that Edward had close
A: Only one, sir. contacts with Pepino at Kilton Motors and at the safe house. He also saw Gomez (a) seated
Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled out a gun at the front seat of the getaway Toyota Corolla vehicle; (b) at the safe house in Quezon
is in court? City; and (c) inside the car before the kidnappers released him.
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION, SECOND ROW
WHO, WHEN ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED JERRY PEPINO)
Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking away
Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton Motors
Office and you pointed to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can you look around her husband.
the courtroom and tell us if any of the two others are in court?
 In People v. Pavillare, the Court found the testimonies of the private complainant Edward, he was able to take a good look at the occupants of the car when he was about to
Sukhjinder Singh and his cousin, Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and convincing, and be released.
reasoned out as follows:
Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to remember On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino as the
their faces. The complainant had close contact with the kidnappers when he was person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs, and who brought him
abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on the amount of the outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that she was very near when Pepino
ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him when
was taking away her husband; and that she could not forget Pepino’s face. For accuracy,
he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period that the complainant was in close
contact with his abductors was sufficient for him to have a recollection of their physical we quote from the records:
appearance. Complainant admitted in court that he would recognize his abductors if he ATTY. CORONEL:
sees them again and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your husband,
the malefactors as he remembers him as the one who blocked his way, beat him up, if you see this person again, would you be able to identify him?
haggled with the complainant’s cousin and received the ransom money. x x x It bears JOCELYN SY TAN:
repeating that the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given A: Yes, sir.  
utmost respect and as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to is here
opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of the witness in court. today?
A: Yes, sir.
 
Q: Can you point to him?
b. Admissibility of Identification A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO
We find no merit in Gomez’s claim that Edward’s identification of her during WHEN ASKED HIS NAME ANSWERED AS JERRY PEPINO)
trial might  have been preconditioned by the “suggestive identification” made during the Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his name as
police lineup. Jerry Pepino, what role did he play in the kidnapping of your husband?
A: Siya po bale ‘yong nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,  the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court x x x x
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identifications in this ATTY. ESTRUCO:
Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?
manner:
JOCELYN SY TAN:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.
thru show ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
 Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect
Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of
A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.
and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
Q: You are very sure?
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’
A: Yes, sir.  Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of
x x x x 
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of  
time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward’s and Jocelyn’s attention
identification procedure. from the incident. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any distraction that could
  have disrupted the witnesses’ attention at the time of the incident.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward’s out-of-court identification to
be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward’s Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to
office, they initially pretended to be customers, and even asked about the products that see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed.
were for sale. The three had told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino “pulled out As the Court held in People v. Esoy:
a gun” instead. After Pepino’s companion had taken the money from the cashier’s box, the It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look
malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the parked car. From this at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the offense is
perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward — before and after the
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness’s memory. Experience
gun had been pointed at him — to view the faces of the three persons who entered his dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before
office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him “[a]t least once a day” during their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
the four days that he was detained. criminals at any given time.
 
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green Toyota While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no compelling
Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from Edward’s eyes when they circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-application.
arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he saw there was Gomez. According to
 Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was not A: Yes, sir.
suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled x x x x
to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have been ideal if Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I
correct?
there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two, or if there had been
A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first
a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and pinpointed na heto ang mukha at saka sinabi na ‘yan si Jerry Pepino.
two females in the lineup did not render the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that x x x x 
the police had supplied or even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the  
suspected perpetrators. These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any suggestiveness
on the part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no evidence that they had supplied or
The following exchanges at the trial during Edward’s cross- examination prove this even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn that the appellants were the kidnappers.
point:
ATTY. ESTURCO: We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an accused
Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain room?
when the out-of-court identification is fatally flawed. In these cases, however, it had been
EDWARD TAN:
A: Yes, sir. clearly shown that the identification procedure was suggestive.
Q: With a glass window? One way?
A: No, sir. In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police
Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers? suggested the identity of the accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda and his
A: Yes, sir. co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. According to the
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped you, you Court, “there was impermissible suggestion because the photographs were only of
conferred with the NBI agents? appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two accused.”
A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.
Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: Yes, sir. Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo since only a
Q: What is the name of the NBI agent? lone photograph was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus held that the
A: I cannot remember, sir. appellant’s in-court identification proceeded from, and was influenced by, impermissible
Q: And how many were lined up? suggestions in the earlier photographic identification.
A: Seven, sir.
Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven? The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not lead to a
A: No, sir. conclusion that witnesses’ identification was erroneous. The lack of a prior description of the
  kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together with other members of Edward’s
We also note that Jocelyn’s and Edward’s out-of-court identifications were made on the family), for reasons not made known in the records, opted to negotiate with the kidnappers,
same day. While Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances surrounding this out-of- instead of immediately seeking police assistance. If members of Edward’s family had
court identification showed that the whole identification process at the NBI was not refused to cooperate with the police, their refusal could have been due to their desire not to
suggestive. To directly quote from the records: compromise Edward’s safety. In the same manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to
ATTY. ESTURCO:
report the matter to Teresita Ang See, and not to the police.
Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?
JOCELYN TAN:
A: They were in front of us. Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in this case
Q: Without any cover? should not in any way taint the identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.
A: None, sir.  
Q: Without any glass cover? c. The Right to Counsel 
A: See-through glass window. The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest
Q: One-way mirror? coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel
A: Not one way, see-through.
attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were
already instructed by the NBI what to do and was told who are the persons questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.
to be lined up?
A: No, sir. Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled
x x x x out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police
Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that it was lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by
Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell? the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face. attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?
identification in a police lineup.
 Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara is instructive: Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the agreement may
x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so- be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police lineup is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez, and
invoked at this stage. another man entered Edward’s office, and initially pretended to be customers; the three told
Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino pulled out a gun. After Pepino’s companion
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were among took the money from the cashier’s box, the malefactors handcuffed him and forced him to
those already presented to the media as kidnapping suspects  by the DOJ a day before go down to the parked car; Gomez sat at the front passenger seat of the car which brought
the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants were already the focus of the Edward to a safe house in Quezon City; the abductors removed the tape from Edward’s
police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial investigation when the out-of- eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs upon arrival at the safe house; the
court identification was conducted. abductors negotiated with Edward’s family who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom
to be delivered by the family driver using Edward’s own car; and after four days, three men
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for having and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, drove around for 30 minutes, and
been tainted by an irregular out-of-court identification in a police lineup. They left him inside his own car at the UP Diliman campus.
focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants’ arrests.
The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during, and
Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various media after the kidnapping constitute undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-accused conspired
fora that reported the presentation of the kidnapping suspects to the media is not for the with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward and detain him illegally
Court to speculate on. The records merely show that when defense counsel, Atty. Caesar in order to demand ransom for his release.   
Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination whether she was aware that there were
several kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Metro Manila, the latter answered that she “can read The Proper Penalty
in the newspapers.”50 At no time did Jocelyn or Edward ever mention that they saw the  
appellants from the news reports in print or on television.   Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the
death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of extorting
At any rate, the appellants’ respective convictions in this case were based on ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in
an independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or
out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We reiterate that the RTC and the consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a
CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be positive and credible, and that payment that releases one from captivity.
there was no showing that their factual findings had been arrived at arbitrarily. The in-court
identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have attended the police lineup. In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for
Edward’s release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC’s imposition of the death penalty
As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme: on Pepino and Gomez.
Even assuming arguendo the appellants’ out-of-court identification was defective,
their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
We emphasize that the “inadmissibility of a police lineup identification x x x should not of Death Penalty in the Philippines” (signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.” We also may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to the  penalty of reclusion
stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution
perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.
eyewitnesses during the trial.
 
The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is
It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by the
more favorable to him.
prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did not even testify for their respective defenses.
 
The Awarded Indemnities
d. The Presence of Conspiracy 
 
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
In the case of People v. Gambao  (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty
evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during
if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.  
(2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the
public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Resolution until fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to

We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the amount of
ransom demanded and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm the CA’s award of
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRMthe challenged June 16,
2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02026 with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of P100,000.00 as
moral damages;
(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
(4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court’s Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—There is no law or police regulation requiring a police lineup for proper identification in
every case. Even if there was no police lineup, there could still be proper and reliable identification as
long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. (People vs.
Macapanas, 620 SCRA 54 [2010])

It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty — for there to be
kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. (People vs. Anticamara, 651
SCRA 489 [2011]) 
 
——o0o——
 G.R. No. 205412. September 9, 2015
  In an Information dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRIAN GUTING y  TOMAS, appellant was charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed as follows:
accused-appellant. That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel
St., Poblacion B, Camiling, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; To justify a conviction upon circumstantial Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to
as to the criminal liability of the accused.—To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly
criminal liability of the accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner and form in the execution
when circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus: SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when thereof which tender directly and specially to insure its commission without danger to
sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one the person of said accused, the result of which attack was that said victim received
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination multiple stab wounds on his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.
of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.  
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
Criminal Law; Parricide; Elements of.—Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) crime charged. Thereafter, pretrial and trial on the merits ensued.
the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies.
of the accused. The key element in Parricide — other than the fact of killing — is the relationship of the
offender to the victim. All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-
appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant’s birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC, Police Officer (PO)1 Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30,
establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora. 2005, at around 5:00 o’clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of
the Camiling Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed
Same; Same; Penalties; The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties weapon in his hand, suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his
of reclusion perpetua to death.—The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties father. Hearing accused-appellant’s statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed
of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no weapon from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition.
aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-
appellant was proper.
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre’s testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-
Same; Damages; Death Occurs Due to a Crime; When death occurs due to a crime, the appellant suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife.
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual Accused-appellant proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. asked who killed accused-appellant’s father. Accused-appellant answered, “Sinaksak ko po
—We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!” PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Eliseo Hermosado
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. (Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose Guting (Jose),
accusedappellant’s father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers informed
Same; Same; Loss of Earning Capacity; To be able to claim damages for loss of earning
capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony.—To be Flora Guting (Flora), Jose’s wife (also accused-appellant’s mother), who was still in the
able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of documentary evidence, market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora’s other son (accused-appellant’s
there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the minimum brother), who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1
wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, Macusi, SPO2 Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had
no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning witnessed the crime, but no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. house and saw Jose’s lifeless body with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately,
Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their respective Sinumpaang Salaysay  and filed
a case for Parricide against accused-appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
  On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court PO1 Torre for safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision dated June 24, kill his father. Neither did accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he
2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. used in stabbing Jose. All that accused-appellant said was, “Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko!
06-93, finding accused-appellant Adrian Guting y  Tomas guilty of the crime of Parricide Napatay ko na po!”  PO1 Macusi also admitted that he did not request for the examination of
under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. the knife because it was clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed
away by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he did not put THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
into writing accused-appellant’s admission that he killed his father, and PO1 Macusi GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
explained that it escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he was carried PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.
away by the fast flow of events.
 
We find no merit in accused-appellant’s appeal.
Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by
accused-appellant, their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi,
appellant’s surrender from the police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared
without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in
that she spent for the wake and burial of Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had
blatant violation of his constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
been earning around P200.00 a day at the time of his death.
Constitution.
Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose’s
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
body. Dr. Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck,
mandate that:
thorax, abdomen, and extremities. Jose’s internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
wounds, resulting in his instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also showed several pictures of shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
Jose’s body which were taken before he conducted the autopsy. and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense. except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x x x x
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
Parricide based on his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
accused-appellant’s admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the  
prosecution was still able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken The “investigation” in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the brutal killing of his father. pertains to “custodial investigation.” Custodial investigation commences when a person is
The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads: taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under
WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect’s participation
reasonable doubt of the offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised therein and which tend to elicit an admission. As we expounded in People v. Marra:
Penal Code, as amended and hereby sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
Perpetua. officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general
as civil indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
amount of P30,000.00 as temperate damages. is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends
  itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (Citation
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as omitted)
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23,  
2012, decreeing thus: Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial investigation when he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1
Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68 convicting herein accused-appellant Macusi that he stabbed his father to death. Accused-appellant’s verbal confession was so
Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the spontaneously and voluntarily given and was not elicited through questioning by the police
Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-appellant who killed his father,
  but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-appellant’s initial declaration that his
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually committed
assignment of errors he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit: the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his father’s killing.
I Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in front of
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody.
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.
  Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy, where we held
II that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. The
APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
situation of accused-appellants in Cabintoy  is not similar to that of accused-appellant
 
III herein. The accused-appellants in Cabintoy, when they executed their extrajudicial
confessions without assistance of counsel, were already suspects under custodial
investigation by the San Mateo Police for robbery with homicide committed against a taxi Accused-appellant’s confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial
driver. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own volition, approached unsuspecting evidence.
police officers standing in front of the police station with a knife in his hand and readily
confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested and subjected to To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances
custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession. Hence, herein must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the
accused-appellant’s confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in accused. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when
violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus:
Constitution. The present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed into SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient.—Circumstantial evidence is
evidence the uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under the sufficient for conviction if:
following circumstances: (a) There is more than one circumstance;
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant’s (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has (c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
“operational supervision and control” over the local police and may arguably be deemed reasonable doubt.
a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of  
the Constitution. However, appellant’s confession to the mayor was not made in The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant been satisfied in this case given the following circumstantial evidence:
at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself 1. On or about 4:50 o’clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was
who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The stabbed to death.
mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant 2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police
talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his Station and surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to
uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been the police authorities of the said police station.
held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a 3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in appease his responding mother. “It has always been said that criminal case are
an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. primarily about human nature.” Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or death of his father to his grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to human nature.
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of 4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to object to his continued detention.
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant’s
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
  reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
Moreover, accused-appellant’s verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death guilty person. The incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by
made to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police circumstantial evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the
officers, falls under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “[t]he prosecution’s witnesses. We will not disturb but shall accord the highest respect to the
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, it
him.” This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the
himself, unless it is true. Accused-appellant’s declaration is admissible for being part of trial.
the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites concur: (1) the principal act, Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant Art. 246. Parricide.—Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his
and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are present in this case. spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his perpetua to death.
father’s death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only  
a few minutes after and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence, Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
before he had the opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
the rain and the knife in his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who the accused. The key element in Parricide — other than the fact of killing — is the
were standing in front of the Police Station, to confess to stabbing his father to death. The relationship of the offender to the victim. All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the
police officers who immediately went to the house of Jose, accused-appellant’s father, victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. Accused-appellant’s birth certificate,
found Jose’s lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab wounds. As res gestae, which was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused-appellant was the legitimate
accused-appellant’s spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against him. son of Jose and Flora.
 minimum wage rate for non-agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for
The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to Region III. We take judicial notice that there is no documentary evidence available to
death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no aggravating establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle driver. We thus compute the award of
circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused- damages for the loss of Jose’s earning capacity as follows:
appellant was proper.

We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto  for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages;
(3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.

Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded to the heirs of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each.25 The temperate
damages awarded by the RTC in the amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to
P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest jurisprudence. It is fitting to additionally award
exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00 considering the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of relationship. Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for
damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the until fully paid.
testimony of his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our pronouncements
in People v. Verde that: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04596,
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the finding accused-appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
deceased Francisco Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.Accused-appellant is
evidence to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the
does not preclude recovery of said damages. The testimony of the victim’s wife, Delia amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco Gealon sufficiently
establishes the basis for making such an award. It was established that Francisco
temperate damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P316,455.00 as
Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his death in 1991. His average income was compensation for loss of earning capacity. All monetary awards for damages shall be
P200.00 a day. Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until
adopted in several cases decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be they are fully paid.
calculated as follows: SO ORDERED.

Notes.—In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. (People vs. Paycana, Jr., 551 SCRA 657
[2008])

Jurisprudence, however, has established the following formula for computing compensation for
loss of earning capacity: net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80-age at time of death) x (gross annual income
– reasonable and necessary living expenses], and pegged reasonable and necessary reasonable
expenses at 50% of earnings in the absence of contrary evidence. (People vs. Tambis, 560 SCRA343
[2008])
 
——o0o——
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the nonavailability of
documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken
of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the
victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.

In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a
daily wage of P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50
 G.R. No. 208404. February 24, 2016 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. This being the case, accused-appellant Devincio says, the
  RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment over his person. He also claims that there was no showing
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.  VICENTE LUGNASIN and that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the time of his arrest and his rights under Sections 2
and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during investigation. As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out,
DEVINCIO GUERRERO, accused-appellants.
that accused-appellant Devincio raised none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial.
These issues were raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling
Criminal Law; Kidnapping for Ransom; Elements of.—In prosecuting a case involving the crime of the Court of Appeals and quote below Miclat, Jr. v. People, 656 SCRA 539 (2011), on this Court’s
of Kidnapping for Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was treatment of an accused’s belated allegation of the illegality of his warrantless arrest: At the outset, it is
a private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
(iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. A Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner
painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements were proven in is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
the criminal case on review. The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
crime and both the accused-appellants’ culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused- move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection
appellants Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private individual, involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Cordero’s positive identification of both accused-appellants — as two of several men who abducted him the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In the
from the gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, who chained him to a present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity
bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days, and, which deprivation of of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is
his liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom from his family — collectively establish the crime deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
of kidnapping for ransom as the actions of both the accused-appellants were certain and clear, and jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
their intent was explicit and made known to Cordero himself. cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Citations omitted) The
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; When the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who failed to raise their
fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial and posited their defenses
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless arrests. They are deemed to have waived
respect if not conclusive effect.—This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants’ arguments casting their right to question their arrests.
doubt on Cordero’s positive identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-
explained, when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This holds
truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Without any clear showing that the trial court LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of  
weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed. For review is the January 23, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02971, which affirmed with modification the March 24, 2003 Decision of the
Same; Same; Out-of-Court Identification; Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600,
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
entitled “People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin, Tito Lugnasin, Excelso Lugnasin,
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons Elmer Madrid, Rogelio Baldaba and Devincio Guerrero,”  wherein accusedappellants
lined up for the purpose.—The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court Vicente Lugnasin (Vicente) and Devincio Guerrero (Devincio) were found guilty beyond
identification made by Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test. People v. reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court
identification: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show- On October 15, 1999, the Department of Justice filed an Information against Vicente,
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru Devincio and four other individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso B. Lugnasin
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru (Excelso), Elmer A. Madrid (Elmer), Rogelio D. Baldaba (Rogelio), and five other
lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
unidentified individuals: John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, George Doe, and James Doe,
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial
of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the for the crime of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider That on or about April 20, 1999 in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this
the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) Honorable Court accused VICENTE LUGNASIN, TITO LUGNASIN, EXCELSO
the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the LUGNASIN, ELMER MADRID, ROGELIO BALDABA, DEVINCIO GUERRERO, and
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time other persons whose identities ha[ve] not yet been ascertained, while conspiring,
between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. conniving and confederating with one another, did then and there with criminal and
malicious intent, with the use of force, threat and intimidation, with firearms, take and
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Illegal Arrests; An accused is estopped from assailing carry away the person of Nicassius Cordero, to the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of
any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information Batangas, detaining him thereat, depriving Nicassius Cordero of his liberty, against his
against him on this ground before arraignment.—Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his free will and consent, for the purpose of extorting ransom money for his safe release
warrantless arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless arrests enumerated in from detention said demand for the payment of ransom money was made on the
 relatives of Nicassius Cordero, and the same was release[d] in the evening of April 24,  
1999 along the South Luzon Expressway. On March 24, 2003, the RTC, resolving the lone issue of “whether [or not] Cordero’s
  identification of Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero as among his kidnappers is
When arraigned on November 5, 2001, accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not guilty to reliable,”6promulgated its Decision, finding both accused-appellants guilty beyond
the crime charged. Accused-appellant Devincio likewise pleaded not guilty when he was reasonable doubt of the crime charged, to wit:
arraigned on March 6, 2002. Both accused-appellants made no stipulation during their WHEREFORE, finding the accused Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero guilty
respective pretrial conferences except for their identities and the jurisdiction of the court. beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom described and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
The nine other accused remain at large. No. 7659 in conspiracy with each other and other Does, the Court hereby sentences
them to each suffer the penalty of Death and to indemnify jointly and severally the
private complainant Nicassius Cordero the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The facts succinctly synthesized by the RTC are as follows:
The prosecution’s lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was The warrants of arrest issued against the other accused remain.
abducted while opening the garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the
late evening of April 20, 1999 by three armed men. He identified Devincio Guerrero as In convicting the accused-appellants, the RTC found Cordero to be a careful, truthful,
the man with a 38 cal. revolver who came from his left side and pushed him inside the and candid witness, whose story was supported by the evidence submitted. It added that
car. The man who came from his right side and identified later as Tito Lugnasin drove this was in contrast to the accused-appellants’ bare denial of their participation in the
the car with Elmer Madrid riding at the back. After divesting him of his P5,000.00 cash kidnapping. The RTC also pointed out that Cordero was able to identify both accused-
and asking some questions, he realized he was being kidnapped for ransom. appellants as he saw their faces before he was blindfolded.
Repeatedly, he declared that he was not a rich man. Along Libis, another cohort, Celso
Lugnasin, rode with them until they reached the South Superhi[gh]way and after paying
the toll fee, they drove on for about fifteen minutes and stopped just behind an owner- Ruling of the Court of Appeals
type jeepney before they switched places. The jeepney driver introduced himself as  
Commander and drove the car. [Cordero] saw Commander’s face. He was later On January 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the accused-appellants’ conviction
identified as Vicente Lugnasin. After driving for some minutes more, they alighted, with modification as to the penalty. The falloof the Decision reads:
[Cordero’s] abductors placed the car’s sunvisor around his face and ordered him to walk WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are
barefooted towards a small house. [Cordero] was kept there for four days, while they hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
negotiated with Saleena, his sister-in-law for the ransom money. On the fourth day, The Decision dated March 24, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon
Commander was already angry and threatened to finish him off. He was eventually City, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-87600, is MODIFIED in that the penalty of death
released, without ransom money being paid. imposed upon appellants is AMENDED to Reclusion Perpetua, without the
Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmariñas, Quezon City denied the possibility of parole.
accusation, saying he only saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of Justice  
and Cordero could not even identify him. He recounted that on May 14, 1999[,] while The Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom were
preparing for the town fiesta celebration, policemen came to his residence and arrested established by the prosecution through its lone witness, Cordero, whose credible testimony
him and his brother Tito [and] cousin Excelsio for alleged involvement in a robbery case.
should be accorded great weight. It also ruled that Cordero’s identification of his abductors
They were tortured, then put on display for media men to feast on and for alleged
victims to identify. After posting bail, he was later arrested for illegal possession of conformed to the stringent guidelines of out-of-court identification, contrary to accused-
firearms. He was also charged with two other cases, a bank robbery and the Mercury appellant Devincio’s assertion that it was marked with suggestiveness.
Bank robbery, both pending before the sala of Judge Jose Mendoza.
Devincio Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any As regards accused-appellant Devincio’s argument that his warrantless arrest was
involvement in the kidnap[ping] of Cordero. He swears he saw him for the first time only illegal since it did not fall under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended,
in the courtroom. He recalled that nearing Holy Week in 2002[,] five uniformed the Court of Appeals held that accused-appellant Devincio’s right to question his arrest and
policemen arrested him without a warrant in Lucena City, where he used to buy smoked subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed waived due to his failure to raise
fish to sell. He was transferred to Camp Karingal before being detained at the QC Jail,
such argument before his arraignment.
where he is detained up to the present. On May 14, 1999[,] he was a sponsor at a
baptism of the child of his kumpadre in Bgy. Luzviminda, Dasmariñas, Cavite. On his
way home, he was accosted by police officers while urinating along the roadside. He Addressing accused-appellant Devincio’s claim that his rights under Republic Act No.
was detained first at the Cavite City Jail then at the Trece Martires jail. He saw Vicente 7438, entitled “An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under
Lugnasin only at the Quezon City Jail. Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating
  Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof” were violated, the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals also made a finding that accused-appellant Vicente made known pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial confession or
their intentions when he asked Cordero about his work, family, and a contact person, and admission for such allegation.
told him that they would be demanding 30 Million Pesos as ransom for his release.
 
Ruling of the RTC
 Finally, in light of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
penalty, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty from Death to reclusion perpetua without subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.  
the possibility of parole.  
From the aforequoted provision, in prosecuting a case involving the crime of Kidnapping
Both accused-appellants are now before this Court praying for a reversal of their for Ransom, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (i) the accused was a
conviction on the same arguments upon which their appeal to the Court of Appeals were private person; (ii) he kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or
anchored. her liberty; (iii) the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (iv) the victim was kidnapped or
  detained for ransom.
Issues
Accused-appellant Devincio assigned the following errors in his Appellant’s Brief: A painstaking review of the present case clearly shows that all the aforestated elements
I were proven in the criminal case on review.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS. The testimony of Cordero sufficiently established the commission of the crime and both
II the accused-appellants’ culpability. He positively identified in and out of court accused-
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY
appellants Vicente and Devincio as two of his abductors. As the kidnap victim, a private
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENCE OF SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE]
IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE APPELLANT AS ONE individual, Cordero’s positive identification of both accused-appellants — as two of several
OF HIS ABDUCTORS. men who abducted him from the gate of his house, who brought him to a hut somewhere in
III the south, who chained him to a bed, who essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING [DEVINCIO]’S cause for four days, and, which deprivation of his liberty was for the purpose of extorting
WARRANTLESS ARREST AS ILLEGAL. ransom from his family — collectively establish the crime of kidnapping for ransom as the
IV actions of both the accused-appellants were certain and clear, and their intent was explicit
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT [DEVINCIO]’S and made known to Cordero himself.  
RIGHTS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS
OF PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING Identification of the Accused-Appellants.
OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) WERE  
VIOLATED. This Court cannot sustain both accused-appellants’ arguments casting doubt on
  Cordero’s positive identification of their participation in the commission of the crime. As oft-
Accused-appellant Vicente, for his part, posed a lone error: explained, when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [VICENTE] DESPITE its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if
DOUBT. not conclusive effect. This holds truer if such findings are affirmed by the appellate court.
Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked,
Ruling of this Court  misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule
This Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the assailed judgment of conviction. should not be disturbed.

Elements of Kidnapping for Ransom established. Herein, there is nothing far-fetched or incredible in Cordero’s testimony. Both accused-
  appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for Cordero to recognize them, as
The accused-appellants were charged and convicted under Article 267 of the Revised in fact, Cordero had the unhindered view of his captors’ faces before he was even
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz.: blindfolded. Therefore, Cordero’s eyewitness account deserves full faith and credit.
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.—Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
But accused-appellant Devincio avers that the length of time, which has elapsed from
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. the time Cordero was released, up to the time he identified his abductors would have
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. already affected his memory, such that the possibility of error in his identification of the
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person abductors could not be discounted. He also insists that Cordero’s “subsequent identification
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. of [him] in open court should be disregarded since the initial identification was seriously
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is flawed, i.e., it was characterized by suggestiveness.”
any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for On the other hand, accused-appellant Vicente argues that although denial is an
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
inherently weak defense, it assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength
circumstances above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
when the prosecution’s evidence, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author
of the crime, is feeble, doubtful, inconclusive, or unreliable. He says that Cordero’s the features and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is
identification of his abductors was questionable due to the circumstances during his committed. x x x. All too often, the face of the assailant and his body movements create
abduction and detention, i.e., it was dark when he was abducted, he was instructed to go a lasting impression on the victim’s mind and cannot thus be easily erased from his
memory.
down on the floor of the vehicle and not to look at his kidnappers, he was blindfolded, and
 
his eyeglasses were removed.
Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his
kidnappers. He saw both accused-appellants’ faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it
With the foregoing, both accused-appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying on
cannot be said that the length of time between the crime and the identification of the
Cordero’s identification of them as two of his abductors as it was doubtful and unreliable.
accused-appellants, which was only 26 days, had any effect on Cordero’s memory, to
render his positive identification flawed.
This Court disagrees.
Accused-appellant Devincio’s contention that Cordero’s out-of-court identification was
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found the out-of-court identification
marked by suggestiveness must similarly fail for his failure to support it by solid evidence.
made by Cordero to have satisfied the totality of circumstances test.
The only reason he gave for such argument was Cordero’s knowledge that the persons who
were being investigated in connection with a robbery case were included in the police or
People v. Teehankee, Jr. is instructive on the rules and test for a valid out-of-court
photographic lineup. However, that is not enough to strike down Cordero’s identification for
identification:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru being tainted. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was on point when it quoted this
show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for Court’s ruling in People v. Villena as follows:
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to Eyewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an
identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect accused. Identification of an accused through mug shots is one of the established
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court procedures in pinning down criminals. However, to avoid charges of impermissible
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the suggestion, there should be nothing in the photograph that would focus attention
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the on a single person. x x x. (Citation omitted)
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying  
on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of As the OSG averred, the photographs shown to Cordero contained nothing to suggest
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ whom he should pick and identify as his abductors. Cordero testified as follows:
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of
Cordero They asked me to see a lineup
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of and I said I was still very afraid of them so they
time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the showed me different photographs and asked if
identification procedure. (Citation omitted) I co[u]ld identify who my abductors were and
    from a series of photos, I was able to identify
Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house due to Vicente Lugnasin, Celso Lugna sin, Elmer
the light emanating from the pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe how these men Madrid, Guerrero and I could not yet identify
de Chaves but I saw him there walking around.
approached him, the kind of firearms they were carrying, how the men acted where they
 
passed, where he was taken, and even the sounds he heard. Cordero’s testimonies were
replete with detailed descriptions of how he was abducted and who abducted him. To top it
But assuming for the sake of argument that Cordero’s out-of-court identification was
all, he was confident that he could identify his abductors, as he did at the Criminal
improper, it will have no bearing on the conviction of the accused-appellants. We have ruled
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp Pantaleon Garcia, Imus, Cavite,22and in
as follows:
open court.
[I]t is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification and that, even assuming that an
This Court notes with approval the observation of the RTC, viz.: out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the subsequent identification in
Cordero gave a detailed narration of his abduction that fateful night of April 20, court cured any flaw that may have attended it. x x x. (Citation omitted)
1999. We observed his demeanor, his reactions to questions asked of him. He was a
careful witness, truthful and candid. At times, we noted that he was in tears at the
Cordero’s in-court identification was made with certainty when he pointed to both
painful recollection of the horror he went through. His story was supported by the
accused-appellants in court when he was asked to identify them from among the people
evidence submitted.
inside the courtroom.  
And as the Court of Appeals said, “Cordero was endeavoring to remember faces and
It is apparent in the case at bar that Cordero was able to categorically, candidly, and
incidents and etch these in his memory.” In People v. Martinez, we held:
Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take positively identify both accused-appellants as two of his abductors both outside and inside
place, it is natural for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court the court. Thus, his identification of the accused is worthy of credence and weight. This
has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see Court, in People v. Cenahonon said:
 An affirmative testimony merits greater weight than a negative one, especially when admission. In fact, the records show that appellant Cielito Buluran opted to
the former comes from a credible witness. Categorical and positive identification of an remain silent during custodial investigation. Any allegation of violation of rights
accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the witness testifying on the during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
matter, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving evidence extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing basis of their conviction. (Citation omitted)
evidence. (Citation omitted)  
Damages Awarded
As to the Alleged Illegality of Accused-appellant Devincio Guerrero’s Warrantless The RTC awarded Cordero Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
Arrest and the Violation of His Rights Under Republic Act No. 7438. However, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to modify such
  award as follows:
Accused-appellant Devincio insists that his warrantless 1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
arrest was illegal for not falling under the permissible warrantless arrests enumerated in 2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31This being the case, accused-appellant Devincio 3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
says, the RTC had no jurisdiction to render judgment over his person. He also claims that  
there was no showing that he was informed of his Constitutional rights at the time of his “The award of exemplary damages is justified, the lowering of the penalty to reclusion
arrest and his rights under Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 7438 during investigation.32 perpetua in view of the prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty notwithstanding, it
not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that a
As the Court of Appeals has already pointed out, that accused-appellant Devincio raised qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
none of these issues anytime during the course of his trial. These issues were raised for the kidnapping.”
first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and quote below Miclat, Jr.  v. People33 on this Court’s treatment of an accused’s belated The accused-appellants shall be jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded
allegation of the illegality of his warrantless arrest: in favor of Cordero. In addition, these amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of percent (6%) per annum, to earn from the date of the finality of this Court’s Decision until
his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial fully paid.37
of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in C.A.-
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02971 finding accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom under
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  without eligibility of parole
In the present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio
raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the Guerrero are ordered to pay Nicassius Cordero the following:
proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived 1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying 2. P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting 3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
The foregoing amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum,
It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. (Citations omitted)
to earn from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
 
SO ORDERED.
The foregoing ruling squarely applies to accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente who
failed to raise their allegations before their arraignment. They actively participated in the trial
Notes.—Even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect was
and posited their defenses without mentioning the alleged illegality of their warrantless cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the ‘inadmissibility of a police lineup
arrests. They are deemed to have waived their right to question their arrests. identification should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.’
(People vs. Manigo, 714 SCRA 551 [2014])
As regards accused-appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under Republic Act
No. 7438 were violated, we likewise uphold the following ruling of the Court of Appeals: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
With respect to appellant Devincio’s argument that his rights under RA 7438 were where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
violated while he was under custodial investigation, aside from his barefaced claim, he shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups
has offered no evidence to sustain such claim; and appellant Devincio (or appellant where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. (People vs.
Vicente, for that matter) has not executed an extrajudicial confession or admission for, Dandanon, 771 SCRA 483 [2015])
as stated in People v. Buluran and Valenzuela:   
There is no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused during
custodial investigation since neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or ——o0o——