VI. Possession the petitioners’ father claimed the land.

the petitioners’ father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of
owner—public, peaceful, and uninterrupted—had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore
she herself, after her father’s demise, declared and paid realty taxes, for the disputed land. Tax
G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000 receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual
possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEÑA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO,
petitioners, vs. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. Same; Same; Same; In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.—Tax declarations and
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Before a private document offered as authentic receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie
can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first; Requisites proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence
before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man’s of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
Statute.—Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due prove ownership.
execution and authenticity must be proved first. And before a document is admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man’s Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the Same; Same; Same; Ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation.—The
declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is
by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element
contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by
motive to falsify. prescription or adverse possession.

Same; Same; Same; A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is

available to testify as a witness.—In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent,
who is still alive and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration PANGANIBAN, J.:
against interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. Such Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or possession of
declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent
the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of actual
statement.
possession of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership. By
Same; Same; Circumstances under which a document can be considered ancient.—An acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of owner—public, adverse,
ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and peaceful and uninterrupted—may be converted to ownership. On the other hand,
(3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on its face appear mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
to be genuine.
The Case
Same; Same; An affidavit does not automatically become a public document just Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999 Decision of the
because it contains a notarial jurat; By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.—
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The assailed Decision disposed as
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit
does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. follows:
Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was “WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court appealed from
transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered
of acquiring ownership. declaring x x x Honorata Mendoza Bolante the rightful owner and possessor of
the parcel of land which is the subject of this appeal.”
Civil Law; Property; Ownership; Possession; Possession cannot be acquired through
force or violence; To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still The Facts
deemed the legal possessor.—We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad,
petitioners did not lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force Binangonan, Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered
or violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027. The undisputed antecedents of this case are
the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
character, may recover such possession. “The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Ownership of immovable property is acquired [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930.
by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years.—Ownership of immovable property is [Petitioners] were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested
father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza.
for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers, [Respondent] is the present occupant of
with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza,
disputed lot for their livelihood. another brother of [petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the]
ownership of the land.
Same; Same; Same; Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when “During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the following facts:
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for
ownership through prescription.—Respondent’s possession was not disturbed until 1953 when
 ‘1)The land subject of the case was formerly declared for taxation “2.x x x [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession,
purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now coupled with x x x exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985,
declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. which are evidence of the best kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title
‘2)The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land subject of instant of ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor.”
case.
‘3)[Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza while the The Court’s Ruling
[respondent] is the only daughter of Sinforoso Mendoza. The Petition has no merit.
‘4)Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were] brothers, now
deceased.
‘5)During the cadastral survey of the property on October 15, 1979 there First Issue: Admissibility of the Affidavit
was already a dispute between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel
Mendoza, brother of [petitioners]. Petitioners dispute the CA’s ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence of their
‘6)[Respondent was] occupying the property in question. father’s ownership of the disputed land, because the “affiant was not placed on the
‘The only issue involved [was] who [was] the lawful owner and possessor of the witness stand.” They contend that it was unnecessary to present a witness to
land subject of the case.’ establish the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration against
“After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of [petitioners], the respondent’s interest and was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest,
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
it was an exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy document, it
‘Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
for the [petitioners] and against the [respondent]: was admissible in evidence. And because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was
‘1.Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad, Binangonan, Rizal a self-authenticating ancient document.
covered by tax declaration no. 26-0027 in the name of Margarito
Mendoza belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] herein; We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court’s ruling:
‘2.Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject of the case and “While it is true that the affidavit was signed and subscribed before a notary
deliver possession thereof to the heirs of Margarito Mendoza. public, the general rule is that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence,
‘3.Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the [petitioners] in the sum of unless affiants are placed on the witness stand (People’s Bank and Trust
P10,000.00, as actual damages. Company vs. Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best
‘4.Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs.’” evidence, if affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court of
Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit was not sufficiently
Ruling of the Court of Appeals established. The notary public or others who saw that the document was signed
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due or at least [could] confirm its recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert
testimony or competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the
execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not
questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the genuineness of her
been sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed signature and that of her mother x x x. [Respondent] testified that her mother was
the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent an illiterate and as far as she knew her mother could not write because she had
witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures. not attended school (p. 7, ibid.). Her testimony was corroborated by Ma. Sales
Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent’s] mother was illiterate.”
The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of
respondent and her mother. The former testified that the latter, never having attended The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as
school, could neither read nor write. Respondent also said that she had never been authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
called “Leonor,” which was how she was referred to in the affidavit. proved first. And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
under the Dead Man’s Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead,
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners’ tax insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the
receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same
of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the
respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil existence of any motive to falsify.
Code.
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive
Hence, this Petition. and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against
interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. Such
Issues declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, the petitioners allege inconsistent statement.
that the CA committed these reversible errors:
“1.x x x [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception to the general rule that The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient
an affidavit is classified as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody,
witness stand; and and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on
its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how
the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject proved her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent argues that she was
affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just title since she possessed it in
formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity. the concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to
show or prove such title.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus,
an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains The respondent’s contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil
a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. That is, one who is
ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito disturbed in one’s possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the
Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership. means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and
possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established
Second Issue: Preference of Possession in one of the ways provided by law.

The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the
the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.
possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that
she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through’
Civil Code. possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed
through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with
legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside
To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the the disputed lot for their livelihood.
legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its
character, may recover such possession. Respondent’s possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners’
father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the owner—public, peaceful, and uninterrupted —had already ripened into ownership.
respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter Furthermore she herself, after her father’s demise, declared and paid realty taxes for
also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners’ father and the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when
brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim
possession of the land. for ownership through prescription.

Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent’s In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did
father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners’ father (Margarito), as evidenced not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner,
possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse
respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot. possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932- ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for
1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid its realty thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire
taxes beginning 1952. When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
by the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being
tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent. We cannot sustain the petitioner’s contention that their ownership of the disputed
land was established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the
because, benefiting from her father’s tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire
has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners’ to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder’s adverse claim against the state and
father acquired joint possession only in 1952. other interested parties.

Third Issue: Possession of Better Right However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that “actual and physical coupled with property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse
the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985” possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In
sum, the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Note.—While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of

ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, they are strong
evidence of ownership. (Heirs of Segunda Maningding vs. Court of Appeals, 276
SCRA 601 [1997])

——o0o——
 G.R. No. 221071. January 18, 2017.* Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules
  of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, petitioners, vs. YOLANDA VIDA P. preliminary injunction, filed by Eddie E. Dizon (Eddie) and Bryan James R. Dizon
BELTRAN, respondent. (Bryan) (collectively, the petitioners) to challenge the Decision rendered on January
23, 2015 and Resolution issued on September 7, 2015 by the Court of Appeals (CA)
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Execution Pending Appeal; The Supreme Court (SC) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 05256-MIN. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision
took pains at length to explain that this provision (regarding immediate execution of the reads:
judgment of inferior courts in cases of unlawful detainer) can be availed of only if no question of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
title is involved and the ownership or the right to the possession of the property is an admitted 13 June 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, is
fact.—In Laurel, et al. v. Hon. Abalos, et al., 30 SCRA 281 (1969), therein respondent filed an REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 11 November 2011 of the
action for reformation of the deed of sale against therein petitioners pending the appeal of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
unlawful detainer case before the RTC. The RTC thereafter denied therein petitioners’ motion for 21[,]755-A-10, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
the issuance of a writ of execution relative to the MTCC judgment, and required therein 14, is hereby ORDERED to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of the
respondent to post a supersedeas bond. According to the Court, the peculiar environmental MTCC Decision dated 11 November 2011.
circumstances obtaining in the case justify the non-immediate execution of the MTCC’s SO ORDERED.
judgment pending appeal. The Court further expounded as follows: [T]his Court took pains at  
length to explain that this provision (regarding immediate execution of the judgment of inferior
The assailed resolution denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
courts in cases of unlawful detainer) can be availed of only if no question of title is involved and
the ownership or the right to the possession of the property is an admitted fact.  
Antecedents
Civil Law; Possession; Torrens System; The person who has a Torrens Title over a land  
is entitled to possession thereof.—In Consolacion D. Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo v. Eddie started working as a seafarer in the 1980s. He has two children, namely,
Engracia D. Singson, 764 SCRA 620 (2015), where there were similar allegations of forgery and Bryan and James Christopher R. Dizon (James).
the issue of ownership was raised in the ejectment case, the Court pronounced: In arriving at its
pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim of ownership, which both parties raised. Eddie and Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Verona) (collectively, the Spouses
While the procedure taken is allowed — under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Dizon) got married on March 8, 1995. Verona was a housewife. She and her mother,
Procedure, the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of possession
— the CA nonetheless committed serious and patent error in concluding that based solely on together with Bryan and James, resided in the house erected on a 240-square-meter
respondent’s TCT No. 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of lot (disputed property) at No. 42 Mahogany Street, Nova Tierra Subdivision, Lanang,
the subject property and thus entitled to possession thereof — pursuant to the principle that “the Davao City. The disputed property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
person who has Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.” Such provisional No. T-351707 issued in 2002. The registered owners were “[Verona], married to
determination of ownership should have been resolved in petitioners’ favor. [Eddie].”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Ownership; The issue of In 2008, Verona filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a
ownership cannot be disregarded in the unlawful detainer case.—In the instant petition, Vida
petition for the issuance of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders against
impliedly admits the irregularity of the Deed’s notarization as both of the vendors were not
personally present. Consequently, due execution can no longer be presumed. Besides, the Eddie and James.
extant circumstances surrounding the controversy constitute preponderant evidence suggesting
that forgery was committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of documents On April 9, 2008, the Spouses Dizon entered into a Compromise Agreement,
and a civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor found whereby they contemplated selling the disputed property in the amount of not less
probable cause to indict Vida for falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership cannot be than P4,000,000.00, which price shall be increased by P100,000.00 for every
disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though that while the RTC aptly succeeding year until the same is finally sold. They would thereafter equally divide the
resolved the issue of ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall not be determinative of the proceeds from the sale.
outcome of the two other cases filed by Eddie against Vida.
 
Civil Law; Obligations; A creditor cannot resort to procedural shortcuts to collect in kind for On September 27, 2009, Eddie left the Philippines to work onboard a ship.
sums of money owed by a debtor.—The Court observes that the MTCC ruling, which the CA
affirmed, is based partly on equitable grounds. Notably, the MTCC referred to Verona’s medical Sometime in October of 2009, Verona was confined at the Adventist Hospital in
expenses of P1,085,540.21, which Vida had shouldered. The Court commiserates with Vida, if Bangkal, Davao City. She was transferred to Ricardo Limso Medical Center on
indeed she remains unpaid by Eddie for Verona’s medical and burial expenses. However, a November 30, 2009. She died on December 8, 2009 due to cardio-respiratory arrest,
creditor cannot resort to procedural shortcuts to collect in kind for sums of money owed by a with “leukonoid reaction secondary to sepsis or malignancy (occult)” as antecedent
debtor. cause.

Eddie claimed that he was unaware of Verona’s hospital confinement. On

December 9, 2009, his brother Jun Dizon (Jun), called him through the telephone and
REYES, J.: informed him about Verona’s death. Eddie intended to promptly return to the
 
Philippines before Verona’s burial. Hence, he advised Jun to ask Verona’s relatives to P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and cost of suit. Vida was, however, ordered to pay
wait for his arrival. therein defendants P414,459.78 as remaining balance relative to the sale.

It took a while before Eddie’s employer finally permitted him to go home. Verona The MTCC rationalized as follows:
was already buried before Eddie’s arrival on December 21, 2009. The claim of [the petitioners] as to the falsity of the sale is a collateral attack
on the generated title itself, which can only be impugned in a direct proceeding
Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed), dated December 1, 2009, litigated for that matter. The fact that [Eddie] pre-signed the [Deed] prior to the
death of [Verona], in the presence of counsels[,] which remained unrebutted[,]
was shown to Eddie. Its subject was the disputed property conveyed to herein
was in fact giving consent to the act of disposing the property to answer for any
respondent, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran (Vida), for P1,500,000.00. exigency or impending situation that will arise later[,] which may or may not be
entirely connected with the medical requirements of his ailing spouse[,] whose
Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona’s signatures health condition at that time of the execution [of the Deed] ha[d] apparently
thereat were forgeries. started to deteriorate. Records show [that] [Vida] incurred a hefty sum of One
Million Eighty-Five Thousand Five Hundred and Forty pesos and twenty-one
In January of 2010, Eddie filed two complaints against Vida. One was a civil case centavos (P1,085,540.21) for both medical and burial expenses of the deceased
for nullification of the Deed, and for payment of damages and attorney’s fees. The of which [Eddie] failed to support in violation of the Civil Code on the rights and,
[sic] obligation of the husband and wife to render mutual support.
other was a criminal complaint for falsification of public document. He also caused the
x x x x
annotation of a notice of lis pendens upon TCT No. T-351707. While evidences were presented to prove the existence of fraud in the
execution of the instrument[,] the same cannot be appreciated in this summary
On April 6, 2010, TCT No. T-351707 was cancelled, and in its place, TCT No. T- action for want of jurisdiction.
146-2010002236 was issued in Vida’s name. Eddie belatedly discovered about the x x x [A] notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
foregoing fact sometime in May 2010 after Davao Light and Power Company cut off with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary
the electrical connection purportedly upon the advice of the new owner of the public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. x x x.
disputed property. x x x x
x x x The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not defendants unlawfully
 
withheld the property sold to [Vida.]
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities x x x x
  While it is true that defendants herein filed both civil and criminal cases for
In June of 2010, Vida filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of the Nullification of the [Deed] and Falsification alleging forgeries, the issues
Davao City an action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, James and their therein are entirely different from this ejectment case. The criminal case, [sic]
unnamed relatives, house helpers and acquaintances residing in the disputed only proves the existence of probable cause to determine criminal culpability.
property. The nullification tackles the validity or invalidity of the sale on grounds of falsity.
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale, title
or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property
Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of the disputed property. While the
x x x.
Deed evidencing the conveyance in her favor was executed on December 1, 2009, x x x x
Eddie pre-signed the same on April 9, 2008 before he left to work abroad. The x x x [C]onsidering the conjugal nature of the property and the subsequent
Spouses Dizon’s respective lawyers witnessed the signing. After Verona’s death, dissolution of the conjugal partnership upon the death of [Verona] on December
Vida tolerated the petitioners’ stay in the disputed property. On May 18, 2010, Vida 08, 2009, with the execution of conveyance in favor of [Vida], this Court deemed
sent a formal letter requiring the petitioners to vacate the disputed property, but to no it equitable and just for [Vida], to return to [Eddie], [sic] the remaining balance of
avail. the sale representing the net amount less the total actual medical and burial
expenses of [Verona] from the proceeds of the sale, in the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED, FOURTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED, FIFTY-NINE PESOS
The petitioners sought the dismissal of Vida’s complaint arguing that at the time
AND SEVENTY-NINE centavos (P414,459.79) in the absence of evidence to
the Deed was executed, Verona was already unconscious. Eddie, on the other hand, that effect and for reasons of equity.
could not have signed the Deed as well since he left the Philippines on September  
27, 2009 and returned only on December 21, 2009. Further, Verona’s signature Ruling of the RTC
appearing on the Deed was distinctly different from those she had affixed in her  
petition for the issuance of a temporary protection order and Compromise Agreement, The petitioners filed an appeal before the RTC. During its pendency, Vida filed a
dated March 26, 2008 and April 9, 2008, respectively. Besides, the purchase price of motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. On June 13, 2012, the RTC reversed
P1,500,000.00 was not in accord with the Spouses Dizon’s agreement to sell the the MTCC ruling, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer and denied Vida’s
disputed property for not less than P4,000,000.00. motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The RTC explained that:
Under Republic Act No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
On November 11, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision directing the petitioners Trial Courts, [MTCCs], Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
and their codefendants to turn over to Vida the possession of the disputed property, amending Batas Pambansa [Blg.] 129, otherwise known as the “Judiciary
and pay P1,000.00 monthly rent from July 12, 2010 until the said property is vacated, Reorganization Act of 1980,[”] paragraph 2, of Section 33 therein provides that
 the court of first level has “x-x-Exclusive Original jurisdiction over cases of x x x thereby depriving [Vida] of the enjoyment thereof. And fourth, [Vida]
forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, that when, in such cases, the instituted the complaint dated 03 June 2010 for unlawful detainer within one (1)
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the year from demand to vacate the premises. x x x.
question of possession cannot he resolved without deciding the issue of x x x x
ownership[, the latter] shall be resolved only to determine the issue of x x x While the said [Deed] was questioned by [the petitioners] for being a
possession[.][”] x x x nullity in a separate case, yet, it should be emphasized that the determination of
In the pleadings of the [petitioners] filed before the court a quo, and even in the validity or the nullity of the [Deed] should be properly threshed out in that
their memorandum on appeal, they vigorously raise[d] the question of ownership separate proceeding and not in the summary action for unlawful detainer. x x x.
of [Vida] based on the alleged notarized [Deed] signed by [Eddie] in favor of x x x x
[Vida] where the latter derived her so-called ownership over the subject x x x Nothing is more settled than the rule that “[i]n an unlawful detainer
premises[.] Truly indeed upon examination by any sensible man[,] it would reveal case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the
that the signature[s] of [the Spouses Dizon] appearing at the bottom of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
alleged Deed [were] falsified x x x. Thus, a document challenged by a party in However, where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the
litigation as falsified may be proved without resorting to an opinion of handwriting issue of ownership in order to determine who has the right to possess the
experts. x x x. property. The Court stresses, however, that this adjudication is only an initial
In another case[,] the Supreme Court held that: “x-x-A finding of forgery does determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession,
not entirely depend on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although it is the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower court’s
useful[,] the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would
of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny by comparing the alleged not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signatures of the person property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the
whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. x x x subject matter of a separate case for annulment of [the Deed] filed by [the
This court x x x took occasion in comparing and examining the signature of petitioners].
[Verona] in the [Deed] x x x vis-à-vis her signature appearing in the compromise x x x [T]he RTC[,] in resolving the issue of possession in the unlawful
agreement executed [with Eddie] x x x[.] [The comparison] lucidly showed that detainer case[,] has not only provisionally passed upon the issue of ownership of
the signatures of [Verona] [were] x x x very different from each other and [the the [disputed] property but it in fact made a determinative and conclusive finding
differences are] detectable by a human eye. x x x. on the ownership thereof, contrary to the settled rule that in [an] unlawful detainer
x x x x case, the only issue to be resolve[d] by the court is the physical or material
Another thing that caught the curiosity of this court is the stipulation possession of the property involved x x x.
contained in the compromise agreement x x x wherein [the Spouses Dizon] x x x [W]hile the Court may make provisional determination of ownership in
agreed x x x that the “x-x-net selling price of the said conjugal property should be order to determine who between [Vida] and [the petitioners] had the better right
sold not lower than FOUR MILLION (P4,000,000.00) PESOS for the year 2008 to possess the property, yet, the court is proscribed from making a conclusive
x x x.” finding on this issue. x x x [T]he RTC has already made a preemptive finding on
x x x x the validity or invalidity of the document, [but] the resolution thereof properly
x x x [T]here was never proof adduced that the compromise agreement pertains to a separate proceeding pending before it in a separate case. x x x.
adverted to was rescinded or modified by the [Spouses Dizon]. To the view of  x x x x
this Court[,] the consideration of the said [Deed] x x x has an indicia of fraud x x x x x x [T]his Court agrees with the contention of [Vida] that the RTC’s
[and] the signature[s] of the [Spouses Dizon] as falsified. [A] [f]alsified document pronouncement that the signatures in the [Deed] were forged and [Vida’s] title
cannot give right or ownership to a party who uses it. issued pursuant thereto is void is a collateral attack on [Vida’s] title which violates
x x x x the [principle of] indefeasibility of the Torrens title. x x x
x x x To justify an action for unlawful detainer[,] the permission or x x x x
tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession[.]-x-x- Verily, unless and until [Vida’s] title over the [disputed] property is annulled in
x- Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid a separate proceeding instituted by [the petitioners], the same is valid and [Vida]
cause for unlawful detainer, the [MTCC] had no jurisdiction over the case. x x x.3 has the right to possess the subject property, being an attribute of her ownership
Emphasis and underlining in the original) over it. x x x.
 x x x x
Ruling of the CA x x x [T]o stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment
  proceedings, the defendant-appellant must: (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a
supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the
Vida assailed the foregoing via a petition for review, which the CA granted in the
pendency of the appeal.
herein assailed decision and resolution. The CA’s reasons are cited below: x x x [T]he supersedeas bond was paid by [the petitioners] only on 02 May
[Vida] was able to sufficiently allege and consequently established the requisites 2012. x x x [T]he bond filed by [the petitioners] in order to stay the immediate
of unlawful detainer. execution of the MTCC Decision was filed out of time as it was not filed within the
First, [Vida] alleged that she is the registered owner of the [disputed] period to appeal.
property and she merely tolerated the continuous possession of the [petitioners] x x x [T]he failure of the [petitioners] in this case to comply with any of the
[of] the [disputed] property after she purchased it and had it titled in her conditions provided under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is a ground
name. Second, [the petitioners’] possession became illegal upon notice by [Vida] for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
to [the petitioners] of the termination of the [petitioners’] right of possession as being “ministerial and imperative.” x x x.
shown by the Notice to Vacate dated 18 May 2010 sent by [Vida’s] counsel to
[the petitioners]. Third, [the petitioners] refused to vacate the [disputed] property
 Thus, as the supersedeas bond was filed out of time or beyond the period to Deed are immaterial in a summary action for unlawful detainer. Allowing the foregoing
appeal, [Vida’s] motion for immediate execution should have been acted upon by claims to be litigated amounts to a collateral attack on Vida’s title.
the RTC and the writ of execution should have been issued as a matter of right.
(Citations omitted and italics in the original)
Vida also points out that the petitioners paid the supersedeas bond only on May
 
2, 2012, beyond the period to perfect an appeal.
The CA, through the herein assailed resolution, denied the petitioners’ motion for
 
reconsideration.
Ruling of the Court
 
 
Issues
On matters of procedure
 
 
The instant petition is anchored on the issues of whether or not:
While the petitioners explicitly raise only two substantive issues, in the body of the
(1) Vida has a cause of action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners
considering that the Deed she relied upon in filing her complaint was petition, they discuss procedural matters anent their payment of the supersedeas
falsified, hence, null; and bond and an alleged error on the part of the CA in concluding that the RTC should
(2) the RTC correctly ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, the MTCC can have issued a writ of execution relative to the MTCC’s decision in Vida’s favor.
resolve the issue of ownership.
  The petitioners admit that they posted the supersedeas bond beyond the period
In support thereof, the petitioners point out that relative to the falsification case to perfect an appeal, but claim that it was the MTCC, which belatedly fixed the
filed by Eddie against Vida, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor issued a amount. Pending the appeal they had filed before the RTC, they promptly posted the
Resolution, dated June 11, 2010, stating that no expert eye is needed to ascertain bond after the amount was determined by the MTCC.
that the signatures appearing in the Deed were different from the standard signatures
of the Spouses Dizon. Further, on September 20, 2010, another resolution41 was In Spouses Chua v. CA, the Court ruled that:
issued finding probable cause to indict Vida for the crime of falsification of public Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas
documents. Thereafter, the MTCC issued a Warrant of Arrest42 against Vida. bond. They could have computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have
held in Aylon v. Jugo and De Pablo that the supersedeas bond is equivalent to
the amount of rentals, damages and costs stated in the judgment.
The petitioners also insist that no Deed was executed conveying the disputed
 
property in Vida’s favor. When the Deed was purportedly executed on December 1,
If the cited case were to be applied, the petitioners’ failure to post the
2009, Verona was already unconscious, while Eddie was abroad. Having been
supersedeas bond within the allowable period shall result in the immediate execution
simulated, the Deed was void and inexistent. It produced no effect and cannot create,
of the MTCC judgment. Nonetheless, in City of Naga v. Hon. Asuncion, et al., the
modify or extinguish a juridical relation. Hence, Vida had no right to transfer the title in
Court has carved exceptions to immediate execution of judgment in ejectment
her name using the falsified Deed. Perforce, her complaint for unlawful detainer
cases, viz.:
against the petitioners had no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.
Petitioner herein invokes seasonably the exceptions to immediate execution
of judgments in ejectment cases cited in Hualam Construction and Dev’t. Corp.
Citing Spouses De Guzman v. Agbagala, the petitioners claim that the rule on v. Court of Appeals and Laurel v. Abalos, thus:
non-collateral attack of a Torrens title does not apply in a case where the title is void Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment)
from the start. An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes
susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral attack. the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the
execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the
Anent the belated posting of the supersedeas bond, the petitioners stress that court may stay immediate execution of the judgment. 
Noteworthy, the foregoing exceptions were made in reference to Section 8,
fault cannot be ascribed to them. They waited for the MTCC’s order approving and
Rule 70 of the old Rules of Court which has been substantially reproduced as
fixing the amount. When the order was finally issued, the petitioners were required to Section 19, Rule 7054 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, even if the
post the bond before the RTC and deposit the monthly rental as well. The petitioners appealing defendant was not able to file a supersedeas bond, and make periodic
complied before the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 13, 2012. deposits to the appellate court, immediate execution of the MTC decision is not
proper where the circumstances of the case fall under any of the above
As counterclaims, the petitioners impute malice and bad faith against Vida in filing mentioned exceptions. x x x. (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
the complaint for unlawful detainer. The petitioners, thus, pray for the award of  
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00 In Laurel, et al. v. Hon. Abalos, et al., therein respondent filed an action for
as attorney’s fees, and P2,000.00 for each appearance of their counsel. reformation of the deed of sale against therein petitioners pending the appeal of the
unlawful detainer case before the RTC. The RTC thereafter denied therein petitioners’
In Vida’s Comment,47 she argues that the petitioners’ claim of forgery is yet to be motion for the issuance of a writ of execution relative to the MTCC judgment, and
proven in court by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Having been notarized, required therein respondent to post a supersedeas bond. According to the Court, the
the Deed enjoys the presumption of due execution, and shall remain valid unless peculiar environmental circumstances obtaining in the case justify the non-immediate
annulled in a proper proceeding. Besides, the allegations of forgery and nullity of the
execution of the MTCC’s judgment pending appeal. The Court further expounded as Hence, the CA erred in declaring that the RTC improperly denied Vida’s motion for
follows: the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.
[T]his Court took pains at length to explain that this provision (regarding  
immediate execution of the judgment of inferior courts in cases of unlawful On substantive issues
detainer) can be availed of only if no question of title is involved and the  
ownership or the right to the possession of the property is an admitted fact.
Being interrelated, the two substantive issues raised shall be discussed jointly.
Through Mr. Justice Labrador, this Court said in De los Reyes v. Castro, et al.:
. . . . The provision for the immediate execution of a judgment of the Essentially, the petitioners allege that the MTCC should have dismissed Vida’s
justice of the peace court in actions of unlawful detainer under Section 8 complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of basis as the Deed she relied upon is
of Rule 72 of the [old] Rules of Court, is not applicable to an action of falsified and void. It is also claimed that the CA erred in not upholding the RTC’s
detainer like the present, where there is no immediate urgency for the ruling that the latter can take cognizance of the issue of ownership in an unlawful
execution because it is not justified by the circumstances. This view is detainer case.
based on the history of the action of forcible entry. This action originated
in the English common law where it was originally in the form of a The Court finds merit in the petitioners’ arguments.
criminal proceeding whereby lands or properties seized through the use
 
of force could immediately be returned. x x x.
It is the opinion of the writer that inasmuch as the property now In Consolacion D. Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo v. Engracia D. Singson,
subject of litigation was originally sold only with right to repurchase to the where there were similar allegations of forgery and the issue of ownership was raised
plaintiff, so that the plaintiff was not really and originally the owner and in the ejectment case, the Court pronounced:
possessor of the property, and since there are reasonable grounds to In arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim of
believe that the contract entered into between them was not one of lease ownership, which both parties raised. While the procedure taken is allowed —
but one of loan with mortgage of the property, the right of the plaintiff to under Section 16, Rule 7060 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the issue of
the immediate possession of the property is not apparent, clear or ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of possession — the CA
conclusive, and neither should his right to the immediate execution of the nonetheless committed serious and patent error in concluding that based solely
property [be] allowed until opportunity to settle the question of ownership on respondent’s TCT No. 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the
is had. In other words, the writer of the opinion holds that while Section 8 singular owner of the subject property and thus entitled to possession thereof  —
of Rule 72 is applicable also in cases of unlawful detainer, the immediate pursuant to the principle that “the person who has Torrens Title over a land is
execution it provides for may be availed of only if no question of title is entitled to possession thereof.” Such provisional determination of ownership
involved and the ownership and the right to the possession of the should have been resolved in petitioners’ favor.
property is an admitted fact. When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed by
x x x x the parties thereto and notarized on June 6, 2006, it is perfectly obvious that the
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring signatures of the vendors therein, Macario and Felicidad, were forged. They
about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution could not have signed the same, because both were by then, long deceased:
inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it Macario died on February 22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away on September
is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate 14, 1997. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so, it is
execution of the judgment. “equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or
The assertion by Laput of “ownership” of the house she is occupying, the extinguish a juridical relation.”
appeal pending in the [CA] from the decision in Civil Case 1517 which declared And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title over the
null and void from the beginning the deed of sale in favor of the petitioners, the subject property, she nonetheless acquired no right or title in her favor by virtue
latter’s unexplained silence in the face of the manifestation filed by Laput of the null and void June 6, 2006 deed. “Verily, when the instrument presented is
informing this Court of the supervening occurrences, and their failure to submit forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the
their comment as required by this Court, are strong and sufficient additional registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in
reasons, cumulatively, to justify the dismissal of the present petition. (Citations, the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property.”
emphasis and italics omitted, and underlining ours) x x x x
  Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is
By analogy, in the unlawful detainer case from which the instant petition arose, concerned, the registration of the property in said person’s name would
not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate
Eddie was originally a co-owner of the disputed property, and he remains in
of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
possession thereof. Vida, on the other, is not even a resident of Davao City. indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to
Moreover, prior to Vida’s filing of the unlawful detainer case, Eddie had already perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith
instituted actions for nullification of the Deed and falsification of public documents. must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be
The Office of the Davao City Prosecutor had likewise made a preliminary an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud,
determination of probable cause that forgery was committed. Eddie, thus, insists that notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive
no valid conveyance was made by Verona to Vida. In the mind of the Court, the notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if
foregoing are persuasive reasons justifying the non-immediate execution of the the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the
land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
MTCC judgment despite the petitioners’ belated posting of the supersedeas bond.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same
remained in the name of the original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad.
 Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain surrounding the controversy constitute preponderant evidence suggesting that forgery
co-owners — by succession — of the subject property. As such, petitioners may was committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of documents and
exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession a civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor found
whether de facto or de jure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from
probable cause to indict Vida for falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership
this right through an action for ejectment. 
With the Court’s determination that respondent’s title is null and void, the cannot be disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though that
matter of direct or collateral attack is a foregone conclusion as well. “An action to while the RTC aptly resolved the issue of ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall
declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as not be determinative of the outcome of the two other cases filed by Eddie against
well as to collateral, attack”; petitioners were not precluded from questioning the Vida.
validity of respondent’s title in the ejectment case. (Citations and emphasis  
omitted and underlining ours) Other matters
   
In the case at bar, when the Deed was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie The Court observes that the MTCC ruling, which the CA affirmed, is based partly
claimed that he was abroad while Verona was already unconscious. Vida did not on equitable grounds. Notably, the MTCC referred to Verona’s medical expenses of
directly refute these allegations and instead pointed out that the Deed was presigned P1,085,540.21, which Vida had shouldered. The Court commiserates with Vida, if
in April of 2008. The foregoing circumstances reduced the Deed into the category of a indeed she remains unpaid by Eddie for Verona’s medical and burial expenses.
private instrument as can be drawn from the Court’s discussion in Adelaida Meneses However, a creditor cannot resort to procedural shortcuts to collect in kind for sums of
(deceased) v. Venturozo, viz.: money owed by a debtor.
As notarized documents, [Deeds] carry evidentiary weight conferred upon
them with respect to their due execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity
In sum, the Court agrees with the RTC that the dismissal of Vida’s complaint for
which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to
exclude all controversy as to falsity. The presumptions that attach to notarized unlawful detainer is in order.
documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the
notarization was regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution,
public character and reduce it to a private instrument. Consequently, when there dated January 23, 2015 and September 7, 2015, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 05256-MIN, are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 13, 2012
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 34,450-2012,
the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence . is REINSTATED. Consequently, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran’s complaint for unlawful
(Citations omitted and underlining ours)
detainer is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Further, in Dela Rama, et al. v. Papa, et al., the Court elucidated that:
Papas[’] admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, bear legal
Notes.—Execution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the appeal on the
significance. With respect to deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the
merits, for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to equity in case the
difference between a public document and a private document is the
executed judgment is reversed on appeal. (O. Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation vs. Tan, 691
acknowledgment in the former that the parties acknowledging the document
SCRA 410 [2013])
appear before the notary public and specifically manifest under oath that they are
the persons who executed it, and acknowledge that the same are their free act
Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease — including the authority to order
and deed. x x x
execution pending appeal — the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to
x x x x
the appellate court. (Villareal vs. People, 743 SCRA 351 [2014])
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only
so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot  
ascribe that conclusion at bar to the deed of sale. Respondent failed to confirm
before the RTC that he had actually appeared before the notary public, a bare
——o0o——
minimum requirement under Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not  ipso
facto void the deed of sale. However, it eliminates the presumptions that are
carried by notarized public documents and subject the deed of sale to a different
level of scrutiny than that relied on by the [CA]. This consequence is with
precedent. In Tigno v. Sps. Aquino, where the public document in question had
been notarized by a judge who had no authority to do so, the Court dispensed
with the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to duly
notarized documents, and instead applied preponderance of evidence as the
measure to test the validity of that document. (Citations omitted and underlining
ours)
 
In the instant petition, Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of the Deed’s
notarization as both of the vendors were not personally present. Consequently, due
execution can no longer be presumed. Besides, the extant circumstances
 G.R. No. 173021. October 20, 2010. Same; Same; Same; Same; Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification
of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis
DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.—Given that a registration
proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of
AGUSTIN KITMA, represented by EUGENE KITMA, petitioners, vs. MARGARITA
ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is
SEMON DONG-E, respondent. ownership. “For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
Appeals; Words and Phrases; “Questions of Law,” and “Questions of Fact,” Explained; It interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari.—Since it raises founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in
essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that only the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless
questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari. There is a question of law when of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.” The third element
there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be
without having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis
of facts being admitted. The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor
the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent had of the certification case.
proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners’ claims. Their factual findings, supported as
they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect. Jurisdiction; Laches; Pleadings and Practice; As a rule, an objection over subject-matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings, but the existence of laches will prevent
Land Titles; Ownership; In the ordinary course of things, people will not go to great a party from raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction.—As a rule, an objection over subject-matter
lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a real property, unless they have jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be
reason to believe that they have an interest over the same.—In any case, even if petitioners’ waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law,
arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint. An exception to this rule has been carved
of respondent’s father are well-taken, it will not suffice to defeat respondent’s claim over the by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968), the Court
subject property. Even without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondent’s claims of prior possession ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction.
and ownership were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary and Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
testimonial evidence. We agree with the trial court’s observation that, in the ordinary course of to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption
a real property, unless they have reason to believe that they have an interest over the same. that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.” Wisely, some
cases have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the
Same; Same; Prescription; Possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted—acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of
acquisitive prescription.—Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we
cannot accept petitioners’ claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had
occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission, they DEL CASTILLO, J.:
cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the
repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every opportunity to raise
of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner, such said objection, but fails to do so, even on appeal.
as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has This is a Petition for Review assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of
been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006 Resolution which
by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription. Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED
Same; Same; Indigenous People; Ancestral Lands; The titling of ancestral lands is for the for lack of merit and the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial
purpose of “officially establishing” one’s land as an ancestral land—just like a registration Court of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto.
proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only SO ORDERED.”
recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his
predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time immemorial.—The application for Factual antecedents
issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel
proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one’s claim to a particular land and is also in of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The
rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of “officially establishing” one’s land as an property is located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel
ancestral land. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest
of land with an area of 186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual
ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the
applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to
immemorial. recover its possession from petitioners.
 According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-e (Margarita), her family’s Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by
ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid, It was pointed out that the Deed
grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was inherited by his children, of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-ap’s children, failed to include two—Rita
who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which Bocahan and Stewart Sito. Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and
included Lot No. 1. On the same year, they declared the property for taxation Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded
purposes in the name of “The Heirs of Ap-ap.” The 1964 tax declaration bears a from the quitclaim.
notation that reads: “Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May
10, 1922 per true of same presented.” According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and
openly in possession of the land and who introduced improvements thereon. They
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of also corroborated Delfin and Agustin’s allegation that the real owners of the property
Quitclaim on February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margarita’s are the heirs of Joaquin Smith.
father).
In order to debunk petitioners’ claim that the Smiths owned the subject property,
Sometime between 1976 and 1978,  Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management
Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a Office denying the Smiths’ application for recognition of the subject property as part of
portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families. They were allowed to erect their ancestral land. The resolution explains that the application had to be denied
their houses, introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis because the Smiths did not “possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property
and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin x x x. The actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose
Lamsis (Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of improvements are visible are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs.”
Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied
5,000 square meters thereof. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the To bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as
acts of their first cousins. evidence an unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on
Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially partitioned the (DENR), acting favorably on her and her siblings’ ancestral land claim over a portion
property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. Since of the 186,090-square meter property. The said resolution states:
then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and occupied and “The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein
improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first
her first cousins’ occupation of portions of the same lot. declared for taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the
applicant’s grandfather Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was reconstructed in
1965 after the original got lost during the war. These tax declarations were
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba, Benguet, considering that the
expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. Delfin land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said municipality. That upon
allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the tax declaration in their
Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessor’s office of Baguio.
(Jose). The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, Psu-198317 duly approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the
name of Ap-Ap (one name). In 1964, the same land was the subject of a petition
possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1
filed by Gilbert Semon, as petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was docketed as Civil of Baguio in the reopening of Judicial Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO
Case No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch 59. The complaint prayed for the annulment Record No. 211 for the registration and the issuance of Certificate of Title of said
of the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the land. The land registration case was however overtaken by the decision of the
property which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita. Margarita claimed Supreme Court declaring such judicial proceedings null and void because the
that, as they are her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a courts of law have no jurisdiction.
portion of Lot No. 1, provided that she retains the power to choose such portion. It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the
time of the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and
including the present, the herein applicants by themselves and through their
Petitioners denied Margarita’s claims of ownership and possession over Lot No.
predecessor-in-interest have been in exclusive, continuous, and material
1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of possession and occupation of the said parcel of land mentioned above under
Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case). The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin claim of ownership, devoting the same for residential and agricultural purposes.
and Agustin’s parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also Found are the residential houses of the applicants as well as those of their close
presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their relatives, while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and banana, and
respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents. seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are permanent stone and earthen
fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets.
 On the matter of the applicant[s’] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is indications of the respondent’s and her predecessors’ interest over the property. The
no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, court opined that while these pieces of documentary evidence were not conclusive
particularly the Ibaloi tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one proof of actual possession, they lend credence to respondent’s claim because, “in the
name) who lived along the Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap,
ordinary course of things, persons will not execute legal documents dealing with real
married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap,
married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, property, unless they believe, and have the basis to believe, that they have an
Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father Semon, as it is the interest in the property subject of the legal documents x x x.”
customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to substantiate the allegations
to state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the of the petitioners that they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the
sole heir in 1964, by way of a “Deed of Quitclaim” executed by the heirs in his subject property. Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard
favor. As to the respective share of the applicants[’] co-heirs, the same was and Jose both admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the
properly adjudicated in 1989 with the execution of an “Extrajudicial Settlement/
Bureau of Lands because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property.
Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights.”
With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application Petitioner Agustin’s Townsite Sales Application over the property was held in
No. Bg-L-066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by us in our Resolution abeyance because of respondent’s own claim, which was eventually favorably
dated November 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by reason of considered by the CSTFAL.
previous conveyances in favor of third parties, the same were likewise excluded
resulting in the reduction of the area originally applied from ONE HUNDRED The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, more or less “WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
to ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO of the [respondent] and against the [petitioners]—
(110,342) SQUARE METERS, more or less. (1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the
Considering the foregoing developments, we find no legal and procedural [petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and
obstacle in giving due course to the instant application. void;
Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of (2)  Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard
Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently
Semon, be granted [and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued occupying that is within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and
to the herein applicants by the Secretary, Department of Environment and to surrender possession thereof to the [respondent];
Natural Resources, Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional (3) To pay [respondent] attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and
Executive Director, DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City. The area of (4) To pay the costs of suit.
the claim stated herein above is however subject to the outcome of the final SO ORDERED.”
survey to be forthwith executed.
Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.” It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial court.
Nevetheless, the trial court issued an Order allowing the petitioners’ Notice of Appeal.
The resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that
the signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Republic Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was whether the trial court erred in
The IPRA removed the authority of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim ruling in favor of respondent in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on
certificates and transferred the same to the National Commission on Indigenous preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the respondent was able to discharge
Peoples (NCIP). The Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her documentary
Semon was transferred to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative Region, La Trinidad, evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her witnesses.
Benguet and re-docketed as Case No. 05-RHO-CAR-03. The petitioners filed their
protest in the said case before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their testimonies that are
resolution. insufficient to overcome respondent’s documentary evidence.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the adverse decision but the same was
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found denied.
that it preponderates in favor of respondent’s long-time possession of and claim of
ownership over the subject property. The survey plan of the subject property in the Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to show that the CA
name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations committed any reversible error. Upon petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the
thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim that her petition was reinstated in the Court’s January 15, 2007 Resolution.
family and their predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property
to the exclusion of others. The court likewise gave credence to the documentary Petitioners’ arguments
evidence of the transfer of the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondent’s father Petitioners assign as error the CA’s appreciation of the evidence already affirmed
and, eventually to respondent herself. The series of transfers of the property were and considered by the trial court. They maintain that the change in the presiding
judges who heard and decided their case resulted in the appreciation of what would initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.” The courts should
otherwise be inadmissible evidence. Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their stand aside in order to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.
petition from the general rule that a trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. Respondent’s arguments
Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit any reversible error in
To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of affirming the trial court’s decision. The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to
respondent, they assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They frustrate the speedy administration of justice.
maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and
lacks the parties’ and witnesses’ signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45
was never authenticated by the notary public in court and no reasons were proferred petition. Thus, the appreciation and consideration of the factual issues are no longer
regarding the existence, loss, and contents of the original copy. Under the best reviewable.
evidence rule, the Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and should have
been disregarded by the court. The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in the petition before this
Court. It was never raised before the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists
Respondent did not prove that she and her husband possessed the subject that petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial court’s jurisdiction
property since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted over the case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals, respondent argues that the
possessing and cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject property. jurisdictional issue should have been raised at the appellate level at the very least so
as to avail of the doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to respondent’s muniments of the case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal.
ownership, such as the tax declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these
are not indubitable proofs of respondent’s ownership over the subject property given Respondent maintains that there is no room for the application of litis
that there are other claimants to the land (who are not parties to this case) who also pendentia because the issues in the application for ancestral land claim are different
possess a survey plan over the subject property. from the issue in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the
Government, as grantor, will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent over a
Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property as the present public alienable land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the trial court is
possessors thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code which ownership, possession, and right to recover the real property.
presume good faith possession on the part of the possessor and puts the burden on
the plaintiff in an action to recover to prove her superior title. Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of
forum-shopping is also bereft of merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will
Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject property by the not amount to res judicata in the instant case.
operation of acquisitive prescription. They posit that they have been in possession of
a public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of owners for more Issues
than 30 years. Respondent’s assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by The petitioners present the following issues for our consideration:
tolerance is unsubstantiated. 1. Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and
circumstances in affirming the trial court’s decision;
Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action should be dismissed for 2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription;
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the
lack of jurisdiction in light of the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and
effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the that the complaint was instituted;
NCIP. They assert that the customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province 4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the ancestral land claim
should be applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371, pending before the NCIP should take precedence over the reivindicatory action.
which states: “When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve the dispute.” Our Ruling
Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and circumstances in affirming
In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion reivindicatoria is held to be the trial court’s decision
vested in the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the
reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia. They likewise argue that NCIP Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her
has primary jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere claims of ownership and possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners
“when the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring now argue that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In the Court to review the evidence of both parties, despite the CA’s finding that the trial
cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot court committed no error in appreciating the evidence presented during trial. Hence,
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is petitioners seek a review of questions of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule
45 petition. A question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. “Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how
accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the long performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.” In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act of
repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can
Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to
dismissed for it is settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly before
by certiorari. There is a question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the
certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without having to re-examine operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained.
the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted.  The instant case does not present a compelling reason to deviate from the Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on
foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree that respondent Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over the reivindicatory action
had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners’ claims. Their factual
findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect. The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending
before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official
In any case, even if petitioners’ arguments attacking the authenticity and recognition of one’s claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of
admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of respondent’s father are ancestral lands is for the purpose of “officially establishing” one’s land as an ancestral
well-taken, it will not suffice to defeat respondent’s claim over the subject property. land. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest
Even without the Deed of Quitclaim, respondent’s claims of prior possession and ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested
ownership were adequately supported and corroborated by her other documentary in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the
and testimonial evidence. We agree with the trial court’s observation that, in the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case:
ordinary course of things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal “It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a
documents and pay realty taxes over a real property, unless they have reason to certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not
believe that they have an interest over the same. create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of
The fact that respondent’s documents traverse several decades, from the 1960s ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will
to the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never abandoned their right to then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective
the property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same. evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court
to resolve the said issue. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, respondent’s version of how the petitioners came to occupy the
property coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The Likewise apropos is the following explanation:
only difference is that petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of “The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did
the Smith family, while respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system
permission to petitioners. Given the context under which the parties’ respective does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership x x x If the [respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they
statements were made, the Court is inclined to believe the respondent’s version, as
should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely
both the trial and appellate courts have concluded, since her version is corroborated to have the land registered under their respective names. x x x Certificates of title
by the documentary evidence. do not establish ownership.” (Emphasis supplied)

Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it
is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely
Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by prescription, we cannot adjudicated) that the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file
accept petitioners’ claim of acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they a reconveyance case and have the title transferred to his name.
had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this
admission, they cannot claim that they have acquired the property by prescription Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands)
unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a
ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. “For litis pendentia to be a ground
uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of
petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
the other party. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful,  would amount to res judicata in the other At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in
case.” The third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead
not constitute res judicata  or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not
reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA
reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case. into consideration.

Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners’ When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised
contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that “forum the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.” conducted by petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the
cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR,
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of
RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution
was instituted favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus
officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial court’s
For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial jurisdiction.
court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity of
the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the
the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous trial court’s appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom.
cultural communities and indigenous peoples. In their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL’s resolution as having been
rendered functus officio by the enactment of IPRA. But nowhere did petitioners assail
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time the trial court’s ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or
vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the
the time of the filing of the complaint. trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the
merits, after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate
of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a courts—that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the
party from raising the court’s lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the “failure or litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by allowed.
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ theory about the effect of IPRA is
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.” Wisely, correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches
some cases have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional from raising their jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.
cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The
In Tijam,  the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its
court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case  SO ORDERED.
reached the appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their
Notes.—Before Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA [R.A. No. 8371]), the right of
pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the appellate court’s adverse decision
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous People (ICCs/IPs) to recover their ancestral
that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a land was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 410, which declared ancestral lands of
motion for reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled national cultural communities as alienable and disposable, and E.O. No. 561, which created the
that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). (Alcantara vs. Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, 560 SCRA 753 [2008])
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the
presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam  was barred by laches for When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. (Puse vs. Delos Santos-Puse, 615 SCRA
Court. 500 [2010])
——o0o——