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Labor Law Relations Case Digest
Labor Law Relations Case Digest
— in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by
BEBIANO M. BAÑEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA and ORO MARKETING, labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.
INC., Respondents.
That a regular court may only have jurisdiction over cases involving torts, malicious
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former
employee or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior employment contract.
DOCTRINE: By the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations" Article 217
should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against its Having lost the right to appeal on grounds of untimeliness, the decision in the labor case stands
dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with the as a final judgment on the merits, and the instant action for damages cannot take the place of
fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case. This is, of such lost appeal. Respondent court clearly do not have jurisdiction over private respondent’s
course, to distinguish from cases of actions for damages where the employer-employee complaint for damages.
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of
obligation. Thus, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld where the damages, claimed for G.R. No. L-65377 May 28, 1984
were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when the claimant seeks to MOLAVE MOTOR SALES, INC., petitioner/plantiff, vs. HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, Presiding
recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in enforcement of a prior Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch XLIV and PEDRO GEMENIANO,
employment contract. respondents/defendant.
FACTS: Petitioner was the sales operations manager of private respondent in its branch in TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF REGULAR COURTS
Iligan City. The respondent "indefinitely suspended" petitioner and the latter filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the NLRC in Iligan City. The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have DOCTRINE: that the regular court has jurisdiction over cases involving monies loaned, the cost of
been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, repair jobs made on his personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him.
and of backwages and attorney’s fees.
FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles in Dagupan
On November 13, 1995, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the Regional City. The respondent was, or is, the sales manager of petitioner.
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Stating that the damages alleged is that there was a lost of
profits and earnings due to petitioner’s abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager, Alleging that DEFENDANT was a former employee, PLAINTIFF had sued him for payment of
having been otherwise preoccupied by his unauthorized installment sale scheme; and the accounts. That during his incumbency the defendant caused and without authority from the
equivalent to the value of private respondent’s property and supplies which petitioner used in plaintiff incurred accounts with the remaining balances in the total sum of P33,890.38
conducting his "business". excluding interests, arising from the purchases of vehicles and parts, repair jobs of his personal
cars, cash advances, and faithful reproductions of the Vehicle Invoice, Debit Memos, Deed of
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. He interposed in the court below that Absolute Sale, Repair Orders, Charge Invoices, Vouchers, Promissory Notes, Acknowledgement
the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely Letter and Statement of Account.
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 217(a), paragraph 4 of the
Labor Code and is barred by reason of the final judgment in the labor case. He accused private At the pre-trial conference, the DEFENDANT raised the question of jurisdiction of the Court
respondent of splitting causes of action, stating that the latter could very well have included the stating that PLAINTIFF's complaint arose out of employer-employee relationship, and he
instant claim for damages in its counterclaim before the Labor Arbiter. He also pointed out that subsequently moved for dismissal. It was then when respondent Judge dismissed the case
the civil action of private respondent is an act of forum-shopping and was merely resorted to finding that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from employer-employee
after a failure to obtain a favorable decision with the NLRC. relationship and that jurisdiction belonged to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
The motion to dismiss was denied. The court has jurisdiction since the damages does not ask ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover damages as redress
for defendant’s breach of his contractual obligation to plaintiff who was damaged and HELD: The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case.
prejudiced. The Court believes that there was a breach of a contractual obligation, which is
intrinsically a civil dispute. ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days
ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case. after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
HELD: The trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original
and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations
2. Those that ( involve) WORKERS MAY FILE INVOLVING wages, hours of work and other terms prosecution and/or disposition thereof against private respondents Philippine Casino
and conditions of employment; Operators Corporation (PCOC) and Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC).
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of Acting on the Manifestation/Motion, the NLRC First Division granted the motion and ordered
wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.
appropriate agreement, except claims for employees compensation, social security, and
maternity benefits; Respondents PCOC and PSSC filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC First Division
granted the motion, set aside the Order for having been issued without legal basis, and denied
4. Cases involving household services; and
with finality the petitioner's Manifestation/Motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
5. CASES ARISING FROM ANY VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 265 OF THIS CODE, INCLUDING likewise denied.
QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE LEGALITY OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court asserting that the NLRC First Division
6. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the mandate of G.R. No. 85922. The CA
Code]. dismissed the petition for certiorari.
But, the plaintiff had sued for monies loaned to defendant, the cost of repair jobs made on his ISSUE: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
personal cars, and for the purchase price of vehicles and parts sold to him. Those accounts have
no relevance to the Labor Code. The cause of action was one under the civil laws, and it does HELD: The resolution of the case at bar hinges on the intended meaning of the Third Division of
not breach any provision of the Labor Code or the contract of employment of DEFENDANT. the Court when the Resolution in G.R. No. 85922, viz:
Hence, the civil courts, not the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC, should have jurisdiction.
x x x Any petitions brought against private companies will have to be brought before the
G.R. No. 141020 June 12, 2008 appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor and Employment.
CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO
OPERATORS CORPORATION (PCOC) and PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES CORPORATION (PSSC), Petitioner considers the foregoing statement as a legal mandate warranting the remand of the
respondents. consolidated labor cases to the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for further proceedings against
respondents PCOC and PSSC.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF THE NLRC
We do not agree.
DOCTRINE: Corporations with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission and not the Labor Department." P.D. 1869, Section 18, specifically prohibits formation of unions among casino employees and
exempts them from the coverage of Labor Code provisions. Under the new Constitution, they
FACTS: The series of events which ultimately led to the filing of the petition at bar started with
may now form unions but subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in offices and
the consolidated cases filed by the petitioner labor union with the Arbitration Branch of the
corporations governed by the Civil Service Law.
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction over the
respondents therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine
Corporations with original charter "fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC).
and not the Labor Department." The Court stated further that P.D. 1869 exempts casino
On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission en banc issued a Resolution dismissing the separate employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and although the employees are
appeals filed by the petitioner on the ground that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over PAGCOR. empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these are "subject to the laws passed to
regulate unions in offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law."
Petitioner then elevated the case to this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari. Third
Division of the Court dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioner to show grave abuse of It is the Civil Service Commission, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the employer-
discretion on the part of the NLRC. employee problems in PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality in a Hence, petitioner cannot merely view a portion of the Resolution in isolation for the purpose of
Resolution. The Resolution states that, “…Any petitions brought against private companies will asserting its position. The Resolution already ruled on the NLRC's lack of jurisdiction over all
have to be brought before the appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor and the respondents in the case - PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC.
Employment.”
Based solely on that statement, petitioner filed a Manifestation/Motion with the NLRC praying
that the records of the consolidated cases be remanded to the Arbitration Branch for proper
G.R. No. 162419 July 10, 2007 Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent. Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer- moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
employee relationships.
Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for
FACTS: In 1998, Paul Santiago signed a new contract of employment with CF Sharp Crew overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Mgmt., Inc., with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a monthly salary of
US$515.00, overtime pay and other benefits. Santiago was to be deployed on board the "MSV G.R. No. 176085 February 8, 2012
Seaspread". A week before the scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, CF FEDERICO S. ROBOSA, ROLANDO E. PANDY, NOEL D. ROXAS, ALEXANDER ANGELES,
Sharp‘s Vice President, sent a fax to the captain of "MSV Seaspread telling the latter that he VERONICA GUTIERREZ, FERNANDO EMBAT, and NANETTE H. PINTO, Petitioners, vs.
received calls from various individuals about the possibility that Santiago may jump ship in NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division), CHEMO-TECHNISCHE
Canada like his brother did before him. Santiago was thus told that he would not be leaving for MANUFACTURING, INC. and its responsible officials led by FRANKLIN R. DE LUZURIAGA,
Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some and PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
future date.
TOPIC: CONTEMPT POWERS OF THE NLRC
Consequently, Santiago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees
against CF Sharp and its foreign principal. In defense, CF Sharp contends that there is no DOCTRINE: Under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because under the POEA empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or indirect
Standard Contract, the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the contempt.
seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire. In the absence of an employer-
employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and FACTS: Petitioners were rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische
attorney‘s fees should be dismissed as the NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the same. Manufacturing, Inc. (CTMI), the manufacturer and distributor of Wella products. They were
officers and members of the CTMI Employees Union-DFA (union). Sometime in the first
LA RULING: The labor arbiter held respondent liable semester of 1991, the union filed a petition for certification election at CTMI.
NLRC RULING: (NLRC) ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between On July 15, 1991, CTMI issued two memoranda, which were considered as union busting acts
petitioner and respondent because under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the constituting unfair labor practice by the union. Thus, the union asked for the withdrawal and
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the deferment of CTMIs directives. CTMI ignored the request. Instead, it issued on July 23, 1991 a
employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or notice of termination of employment to the sales drivers, due to the abolition of the sales driver
seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer- positions.
employee relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and
attorneys fees should be dismissed. The union and its affected members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice, with a claim for damages, against private respondents CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other
CA RULING: It agreed with the NLRCs finding that petitioners non-deployment was a valid CTMI officers. The union also moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
exercise of respondents management prerogative. temporary restraining order.
ISSUES: Whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC issued a TRO, directing CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other company executives to cease
and desist from dismissing any member of the union and from implementing the July 23, 1991
HELD: YES. memorandum terminating the services of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them
if the dismissals have been effected.
Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent,
the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRCs August 23, 1991 resolution. They
labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the unions petition for preliminary injunction.
of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that: The NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction. The respondents moved for
reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsible
CTMI officers in contempt of court.
in damages worth several hundred thousand pesos when he improperly disposed of the cut
Private respondent De Luzuriaga argued that they were charged with indirect contempt which grass and other waste materials into the ponds drainage system. Petitioner sent a written
may be initiated only in the appropriate regional trial court, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 71 of notice to Abion, requiring him to explain what happened, otherwise, disciplinary action would
the Rules of Court. He posits that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over an indirect contempt be taken against him. He refused to receive the notice and give an explanation, according to
charge. He thus argues that the petitioners improperly brought the contempt charge before the petitioner. Consequently, the company terminated his services. He acknowledged receipt of a
NLRC. written notice of dismissal, with his separation pay.
ISSUES: Whether the NLRC have contempt powers Pea and Abion filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal that were later consolidated. Both
claimed that their termination from service was due to petitioners suspicion that they were the
HELD: YES. leaders in a plan to form a union to compete and replace the existing management-dominated
union.
Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending
party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with LA RULING: The labor arbiter dismissed their complaints on the ground that the grievance
law. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or machinery in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had not yet been exhausted. Private
amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The respondents availed of the grievance process, but later on refiled the case before the NLRC in
Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect Region IV. They alleged lack of sympathy on petitioners part to engage in conciliation
contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. proceedings.
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect NLRC RULING: NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s decision.
contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only when there is no
law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the CA RULING: The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC resolution with
labor arbiter or the Commission is empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or some modifications, thus: 1) The private respondents can not be reinstated, due to their
parties in direct or indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought acceptance of the separation pay offered by the petitioner; 2) The private respondents are
the indirect contempt charges against the respondents before the NLRC. entitled to their full back wages; and, 3) The amount of the separation pay received by private
respondents from petitioner shall not be deducted from their full back wages.
G.R. No. 142244 November 18, 2002
ATLAS FARMS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME O. ISSUES: Whether the LA and NLRC have jurisdiction over the case
DELA PEÑA and MARCIAL I. ABION, respondents.
HELD: YES.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER
Coming to the merits of the petition, the NLRC found that petitioner did not comply with the
DOCTRINE: Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation or enforcement stage, requirements of a valid dismissal. For a dismissal to be valid, the employer must show that: (1)
it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or brought to voluntary the employee was accorded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for any of the valid
arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged violation of the causes provided for by law. No evidence was shown that private respondents refused, as
employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter. alleged, to receive the notices requiring them to show cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against them. Without proof of notice, private respondents who were subsequently
FACTS: Private respondent Jaime O. dela Pea was employed as a veterinary aide by petitioner. dismissed without hearing were also deprived of a chance to air their side at the level of the
He was among several employees terminated in July 1989. On July 8, 1989, he was re-hired by grievance machinery. Given the fact of dismissal, it can be said that the cases were effectively
petitioner and given the additional job of feedmill operator. He was instructed to train selected removed from the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, thus placing them within the
workers to operate the feedmill. jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Where the dispute is just in the interpretation, implementation
or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up in the CBA, or
In 1993, Pea was allegedly caught urinating and defecating on company premises not intended brought to voluntary arbitration. But, where there was already actual termination, with alleged
for the purpose. The farm manager of petitioner issued a formal notice directing him to explain violation of the employees rights, it is already cognizable by the labor arbiter.
within 24 hours why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Pea refused, however,
to receive the formal notice. He never bothered to explain. Thus, a notice of termination with G.R. No. 197763, December 07, 2015
payment of his monetary benefits was sent to him. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MR. NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO, AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA,
Petitioners, v. JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM, Respondent.
Co-respondent Marcial I. Abion was a carpenter/mason and a maintenance man whose
employment by petitioner. Allegedly, he caused the clogging of the fishpond drainage resulting G.R. No. 197836
JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM, Petitioner, v. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., MR. NAPOLEON L. Decision which, among others, ordered the reinstatement of complainant, up to the date of
NAZARENO, AND MR. RICKY P. ISLA, Respondent. finality of the Commission’s resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
TOPIC: REINSTATEMENT CA RULING: Upheld NLRC. Reaffirmed the prevailing principle that even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
DOCTRINE: Even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee until reversal by the higher court.
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
ISSUE: a) Whether Smart is obligated to pay Solidum’s salaries and benefits, computed from the
FACTS: Smart hired respondent Solidum as Department Head for Smart Buddy Activation. date when respondents received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision which ordered the
Smart Buddy Activation is under the Product Marketing Group which is headed by Isla. reinstatement of complainant, up to the date of finality of the Commission’s resolution
reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision?
Isla gave Solidum a memorandum informing him of alleged acts of dishonesty, directing him to
explain why his employment should not be terminated, and placing him under preventive b) When did the May 29, 2009 NLRC decision become Final and Executory?
suspension without pay for 30 days.
HELD:
On Solidum submitted his written explanation in response to the notice. Isla gave Solidum a
memorandum informing him of a modified set of alleged acts of dishonesty, directing him to a) Yes. In Bago v. NLRC, the Court held that employees are entitled to their accrued
explain why his employment should not be terminated, extending his preventive suspension by salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses until the NLRC’s reversal of the
10 days, and inviting him to an administrative investigation. labor arbiter’s order of reinstatement becomes final and executory, as shown on the
entry of judgment.
Isla gave Solidum a memorandum terminating his employment “for fraud or willful breach of
trust, falsification, misrepresentation, conflict of interest, serious misconduct and dishonesty- b) August 10, 2009. Rule VII, Sec. 14 of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
related offenses.” Solidum filed against Smart a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal provides: “The executive clerk or deputy executive clerk shall consider the decision ,
suspension, non-payment of salaries, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. resolution or order as final and executory after sixty (60) days from date of mailing in
the absence of return cards, certifications from the post office, or other proof of
The Labor Arbiter found that Solidum’s preventive suspension and dismissal were illegal and service to parties.” Since the May 29, 2009 Decision was mailed on 11 June 2009 and
that he was entitled to full back wages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. LA in the absence of return cards, the decision became final and executory on 10 August
ordered Solidum’s reinstatement. 2009.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff to collect from petitioners G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
Solidum’s accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses. Said Labor Arbiter ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
issued seven other alias writs of execution ordering the sheriff to collect from petitioners and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
Solidum’s accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses.
TOPIC: APPEAL
On January 26, 2009, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision and dismissed for lack of
merit Solidum’s complaint. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on May DOCTRINE: all petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
29, 2009. Solidum filed with the Labor Arbiter an ex-parte motion praying that an alias writ of doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
execution be issued directing the sheriff to collect from petitioners Solidum’s accrued salaries,
allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses. FACTS: Respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
LA RULING: LA denied the ex-parte motion because “the recent decision of the NLRC reversing executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll.
the Decision of this Office prevents any future issuance of any writ of execution on the On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating
reinstatement aspect” P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.
NLRC RULING: Reversed the LA ruling. Since Smart failed to reinstate Solidum, it held that
pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, relative to the reinstatement aspect of LA RULING: in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, respondents are obligated to pay complainant’s salaries and between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
benefits, computed from the date when respondents received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s
Respondent appealed to the NLRC. Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
NLRC RULING: NLRC set aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this
arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC. Thus, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since
petitioner files a Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court. this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court may decide the case decided by the NLRC appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
HELD: Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of
appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently G.R. No. 143813 July 7, 2003
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been KING INTEGRATED SECURITY SERVICES, INC., and/or MINA KING, petitioners, vs. GALO S.
provided for. GATAN, respondent.
Under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the TOPIC: WRIT OF EXECUTION
NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely
provides that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the DOCTRINE: Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of
answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar the court or tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not appealable.
days from receipt thereof by the parties.
FACTS: Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal deduction and
Now, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a underpayment of wages against petitioners.
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary LA RULING: Respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant herein his wage differential in
period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for the total amount of P184,780.30.
finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of
the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for NLRC RULING: Modifying the Labor Arbiter’s Decision by deleting the amount representing
certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary respondent’s wage differential pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that
period under Rule 65. all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise, they shall be forever barred.
Appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was
that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
Having become final and executory, the Labor Arbiter issued an order directing the issuance of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" could have been a lapsus plumae because
a writ of execution. From this order, petitioners interposed an appeal to the NLRC, but it was
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
dismissed. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, is that the special
civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed with modification the Resolutions of the
expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
NLRC.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the HELD: YES.
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Despite the fact that what is being assailed is the NLRC Resolution ordering the issuance of a
Important note from the SC: writ of execution, still the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition for certiorari and
evaluated the parties’ evidence. Clearly, the Court of Appeals overstepped its jurisdiction.
We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Once a decision or resolution becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court ISSUE: Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby
or tribunal to order its execution. Such order, we repeat, is not appealable. foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.
HELD: While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are
inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their
G.R. No. 193484 January 18, 2012 legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's
HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Considering the
CORPORATION, Respondent. petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court
finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
TOPIC: QUITCLAIMS
The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and educated with a college
DOCTRINE: Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked into performing an act against his will. As no
was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties proof was presented that the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception,
and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. misrepresentation, the same is valid and binding. The petitioner is estopped from questioning
the said quitclaim and cannot renege after accepting the benefits thereunder. This Court will
FACTS: The petitioner started working for respondent Philcomsat as an accountant in the never satisfy itself with surmises, conjectures or speculations for the purpose of giving
latter's Finance Department. On August 15, 2001 or after thirty-four (34) years of service, the imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt to abdicate from his obligations under a valid and
petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for retirement was approved, effective binding release and waiver.
September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to one and
a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner was G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992
Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of ₱274,805.00. PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY.
The petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor, following his ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL
receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of ₱9,439,327.91. CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT CHECKERS AND
WORKERS UNION (APCWU), Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA
Almost three years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits, DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and PORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU),
claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is ₱14,015,055.00 and the ₱9,439,327.91 Nominal Private Respondents, respondents.
he received from Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which
is more than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void. TOPIC: CERTIFICATION ELECTION
LA RULING: Directed Philcomsat to pay him the amount of ₱4,575,727.09 and ₱274,805.00, DOCTRINE: The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on
representing the balance of his retirement benefits and salary. That the consideration the crucial question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a
supporting the subject quitclaim unconscionable. collective bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests.
NLRC RULING: NLRC granted Philcomsat’s appeal and reversed and set aside Labor Arbiter’s FACTS: The collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers
Decision. The NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for unpaid retirement benefits and and Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other
salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he executed following his receipt unions were seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were
from Philcomsat of the amount of ₱9,439,327.91, which constitutes the full settlement of all his already plotting their moves.
claims against Philcomsat.
March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA) filed a petition for
According to the NLRC, the petitioner failed to allege, much less, adduce evidence that certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining
Philcomsat employed means to vitiate his consent to the quitclaim. The petitioner is well- unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition. April 2, 1990, herein
educated, a licensed accountant and was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President prior to his petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention. Still
retirement; he cannot therefore claim that he signed the quitclaim without understanding the another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and
consequences and implications thereof. Labor Union (PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11,
1990, or thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.
Having willingly signed the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he is already estopped from
questioning the same. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not
comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules,
quoted in part as follows: “In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the
where the majority status of the incumbent collective bargaining union is questioned through a crucial question of who shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a
verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall immediately order collective bargaining agreement that will best protect and promote their interests. It is essential
the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60) days of that there be no collusion against this objective between an unscrupulous management and a
the collective bargaining agreement and supported by the written consent of at least twenty- union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that the hopes of
five percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after labor be not frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval
the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) and support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the
requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition, otherwise the petition shall be workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the
dismissed.” suppression of the voice of the workers through the prissy observance of technical rules that
will exalt procedure over substantial justice.
APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent
signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order G.R. No. 211145
dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions. SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD rep. by its President, ALFIE ALIPIO,
Petitioner vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES AND
PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing that Article 256 of the CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. (HHIC-PIDL.),, Respondents
Labor Code did not require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the
petition for certification election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. TOPIC: RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed DOCTRINE: Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers' association belongs to
PWUP's appeal. workers themselves.
Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, FACTS: Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard (Samahan) filed an application for
which was concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a registration of its name with DOLE. Ncluded is the list of names of a total of 120 officers and
majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and members, signatures of the attendees of the meeting, copy of their Constitution and by-laws.
subsequently registered with the DOLE. The DOLE issued the corresponding certificate of registration.
ISSUES: Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of DOLE Undersecretary Respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin) prayed for
the cancellation of registration of Samahan on the ground that its members do not fall under
HELD: YES. In line with the policy, the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous any of the times of workers enumerated in Art 249.
submission of the 25% consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election
should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of the legitimate representative of Hanjin claimed that one third (1/3) of the members of the association had definite employers
the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it and that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and those without
seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be given only definite employers may form a workers' association. Hanjin also claimed that Samahan
a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election misrepresented itself when Samahan made it appear that its members where all qualified to
within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a become members of the worker’s association. Samahan did not respond to the pleading hence
certification election, subject to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable the DOLE Regional Director cancelled the certificate of registration.
period from such filing.
The BLR granted Samahan’s appeal and reversed the ruling of the Regional Director. The ruling
It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent made mention of the name of Samahan which uses the word “sa” rather than “ng” meaning
signatures, but that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. Hardin Shipyard was a location and do not pertain to the corporation.
There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the On Motion for Reconsideration, the BLR affirmed its decision but instructed Samahan to
part of public respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because remove “Hanjin Shipyard” from the name.
the consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of
majority representation thus remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings above- On Appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the decision of BLR ruling that since 57/120 were
quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding actually working in Hanjin, Samahan misrepresented itself in its preamble which created the
of a certification election. impression that all its members were employees of Hanjin. Butat any rate, removing “Hanjin
Shipyard” from the name would not prejudice or impair the right to self-organization because it
could adopt other appropriate names.
ISSUE: G.R. No. 152322 February 15, 2005
(1) Whether Samahan can form a worker’s association of employees. ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, SALVADOR G. BLANCIA, ROSEMARIE DE
(2) Whether Removing “Hanjin Shipyard” from the name by reason of the company’s property LUMBAN, FELICITAS F. RAMOS, MIGUEL TEAÑO, JAIME BAUTISTA and FIDEL ACERO, as
right over the company name “Hanjin” is proper. Officers of the University of the East Employees’ Association, petitioners, vs. BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS-DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
HELD: (1) More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism. Workers, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, RODEL E. DALUPAN, EFREN J.
however, can also form and join a workers' association as well as labor-management councils. DE OCAMPO, PROCESO TOTTO, JR., ELIZABETH ALARCA, ELVIRA S. MANALO, and
Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of all workers to self-organization. This is
RICARDO UY, respondents.
imbued in Section 3, Article XIII and Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and in
relation thereto to Article 3 of the Labor Code. TOPIC: CONSENT ELECTION
A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for collective DOCTRINE: An election should not be done if said election was perceptibly done to hinder any
bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, while a workers' association is an organization of resolution or decision that would be made by BLR-DOLE.
workers formed for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose
other than collective bargaining. Many associations or groups of employees, or even FACTS: Private respondents are members of the University of the East Employees’ Association
combinations of only several persons, may qualify as a labor organization yet fall short of (UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each received a Memorandum from the UEEA charging
constituting a labor union. While every labor union is a labor organization, not every labor them with spreading false rumors and creating disinformation among the members of the said
organization is a labor union. The difference is one of organization, composition and operation. association. They were given seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memorandum to submit
The existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation of their Answer. Private respondents denied the allegations.
workers' association.
Failure to answer once again the Memorandum, Ernesto Verceles, in his capacity as president of
Right to choose whether to form or join a union or workers' association belongs to workers the association, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel Dalupan, et al., that their membership
themselves. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to in the association has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof.
refuse or refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be Verceles said he was acting upon the disciplinary committee’s finding of a prima facie case
denied the exercise of a right granted by law and no one should be compelled to exercise such a
against them.
conferred right. There is no provision in the Labor Code that states that employees with
definite employers may form, join or assist unions only. On 01 December 1997, a complaint for illegal suspension, willful and unlawful violation of
UEEA constitution and by-laws, refusal to render financial and other reports, deliberate refusal
Furthermore, the position that Samahan's members cannot form the association because they
to call general and special meetings, illegal holdover of terms and damages was filed by the
are not covered by the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249) is incorrect. There is nothing
respondents against herein petitioners before the Department of Labor and Employment,
in the Article 243 which provides that workers, with definite employers, cannot form or join a
workers' association for mutual aid and protection. Thus, the Court agrees with Samahan's National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR).
argument that the right to form a workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant,
The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and
intermittent and itinerant workers. Furthermore, the Court concludes that misrepresentation,
Employment. During the pendency of this appeal an election of officers was held by the UEEA.
to be a ground for the cancellation of the certificate of registration, must be done maliciously
and deliberately. The appeal, however, was dismissed for lack of merit
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners with the BLR-DOLE, but was denied.
(2) Yes it is proper. As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak of the use of
A special civil action for certiorari was thereafter filed before the Court of Appeals citing grave
name by a workers' association, the Court refers to the Corporation Code, which governs the
names of juridical persons. The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. But, it was dismissed.
registration of a corporate name which is "identical or deceptively or confusingly similar" to ISSUE: (a) Whether it is reversible error for the court of appeals to hold the election as invalid
that of any existing corporation or which is "patently deceptive" or "patently confusing" or
and a nullity
"contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance of fraud upon the public which would have
occasion to deal with the entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the
reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations. For the same HELD: This issue arose from the fact that the original decision of the DOLE-NCR ordering
reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its petitioners, among other things, to "immediately hold/conduct an election of officers . . ."
name as it could give the wrong impression that all of its members are employed by Hanjin. Petitioners appealed from the DOLE-NCR decision to the BLR-DOLE. During the pendency of the
Hence the SC reinstated the decision of BLR as modified by its November 28, 2011 Resolution appeal, however, an election of officers was held. Subsequently, the BLR-DOLE affirmed the
decision of the DOLE-NCR, but with the pronouncement that ". . . the supposed election On January 22, 2007, SITEL posted a notice of vacancy for respondent’s position, and on
conducted is null and void and cannot produce legal effects adverse to appellants." February 12, 2007, he received a Notice of Termination. These events prompted him to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal; non-payment of overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, service
We cannot hold the election valid as this would make us condone an iniquitous act. Said incentive leave pay; full backwages; damages; and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter
election was perceptibly done to hinder any resolution or decision that would be made by BLR- against herein petitioners SITEL and its officers.
DOLE. The Regional Director indeed ordered the immediate holding of an election. The records
show that the petitioners questioned this order of the Regional Director before the BLR-DOLE LA RULING: in favor of respondent by declaring him illegally dismissed and ordering
by way of appeal, and yet, they conducted the election, allegedly because it was due under petitioners to pay his full backwages and, in lieu of reinstatement, his separation pay. The LA
Republic Act No. 6715. Why this was done by the petitioners escapes us. But as rightfully further awarded respondent’s money claims upon finding that he was not occupying a
observed by the BLR-DOLE: managerial position.
. . . Indeed, it is obvious that the general membership meeting and election of officers was done NLRC RULING: reversed and set aside the decision of the LA by dismissing the complaint for
purposely to pre-empt our resolution of this case and, more importantly, the participation of lack of merit on the ground that respondent’s employment was terminated for a just cause. The
appellees in the election. This cannot be tolerated NLRC failed to discuss the money claims.
G.R. No. 186070 April 11, 2011 CA RULING: affirmed the NLRC’s finding that there was no illegal dismissal. Anent the money
CLIENTLOGIC PHILPPINES, INC. (now known as SITEL), JOSEPH VELASQUEZ, IRENE ROA, claims, however, the CA concurred with the LA’s ruling
and RODNEY SPIRES, Petitioners, vs. BENEDICT CASTRO, Respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is a member of managerial staff
TOPIC: MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
HELD: Employees are considered occupying managerial positions if they meet all of the
DOCTRINE: A "coach" is a team supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer complaints following conditions, namely:
which could not be dealt with by call center agents, and if a call center agent could not meet the
needs of a customer, he passes the customer’s call to the "coach." Clearly, (respondent) is not a 1) Their primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which they are employed
managerial employee as defined by law. or of a department or subdivision thereof;
FACTS: Respondent was employed by petitioner as a call center agent for its Bell South 2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;
Account. After six months, he was promoted to the "Mentor" position, and thereafter to the
"Coach" position. A "Coach" is a team supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer 3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions
complaints which cannot be resolved by call center agents. In June 2006, he was transferred to and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of
the Dot Green Account. status of other employees are given particular weight.
During respondent’s stint at the Dot Green Account, respondent noticed that some of the call They are considered as officers or members of a managerial staff if they perform the following
center agents under him would often make excuses to leave their work stations. Their most duties and responsibilities:
common excuse was that they would visit the company’s medical clinic. To verify that they
were not using the clinic as an alibi to cut their work hours, respondent sent an e-mail to the 1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management of
clinic’s personnel requesting for the details of the agents’ alleged medical consultation. His policies of their employer;
request was denied on the ground that medical records of employees are highly confidential
and can only be disclosed in cases involving health issues, and not to be used to build any 2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
disciplinary case against them.
3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty
Respondent received a notice requiring him to explain why he should not be penalized for: (1) consists of management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or
violating Green Dot Company’s Policy and Procedure for Direct Deposit Bank Info Request (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring
when he accessed a customer’s online account and then gave the latter’s routing and reference special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general supervision, special
numbers for direct deposit; and (2) gravely abusing his discretion when he requested for the assignment and tasks.
medical records of his team members. Respondent did not deny the infractions imputed against
him. Respondent’s duties do not fall under any of the categories enumerated above. His work is not
directly related to management policies. Even the circumstances shown by the instant case
reveal that respondent does not regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment.
Petitioners submitted a list of the responsibilities of "HR Manager/Supervisor" and "Division
Manager/Department Manager/Supervisors" but these do not pertain to respondent who does HELD: In order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an
not have any of the said positions. He was just a team Supervisor and not HR or Department employee under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act
Supervisor. or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important
and required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent. In the
As a coach or team supervisor, respondent’s main duty was to deal with customer complaints instant case, petitioners-employees of Promm-Gem may have committed an error of judgment
which could not be handled or solved by call center agents. If the members of his team could in claiming to be employees of P&G, but it cannot be said that they were motivated by any
not meet the needs of a customer, they passed the customer’s call to respondent. wrongful intent in doing so. As such, we find them guilty of only simple misconduct for assailing
G.R. No. 160506 June 6, 2011 the integrity of Promm-Gem as a legitimate and independent promotion firm. A misconduct
JOEB M. ALIVIADO, et. al, Petitioners, vs. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS., INC., and PROMM- which is not serious or grave, as that existing in the instant case, cannot be a valid basis for
GEM INC., Respondents. dismissing an employee.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL Meanwhile, loss of trust and confidence, as a ground for dismissal, must be based on the willful
breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Ordinary breach will not suffice. A
DOCTRINE: An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
their monetary equivalent from the time the compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement. Loss of trust and confidence, as a cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact
that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or of trust and confidence. As
FACTS: Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G from various dates, allegedly starting as such, he must be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as custody, handling or
early as 1982 or as late as June 1991, to either May 5, 1992 or March 11, 1993. They all care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. And, in order to constitute a just
individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS for periods of more cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and must show that the
or less five months at a time. They were assigned at different outlets, supermarkets and stores employee is unfit to continue to work for the employer. In the instant case, the petitioners-
where they handled all the products of P&G. They received their wages from Promm-Gem or employees of Promm-Gem have not been shown to be occupying positions of responsibility or
SAPS. SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for of trust and confidence. Neither is there any evidence to show that they are unfit to continue to
reasons such as habitual absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day-off without prior notice. P&G work as merchandisers for Promm-Gem.
is principally engaged in the manufacture and production of different consumer and health
products, which it sells on a wholesale basis to various supermarkets and distributors.8 To Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered into contracts with entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of
Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products. allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time the compensation
was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. Hence, all the petitioners, having been
In December 1991, petitioners filed a complaint10 against P&G for regularization, service illegally dismissed are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and with full
incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. The complaint was later amended11 to back wages and other benefits from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time of their
include the matter of their subsequent dismissal. actual reinstatement.
LA RULING: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and ruled that there was no employer- G.R. No. 128632 August 5, 1999
employee relationship between petitioners and P&G. He found that the selection and MSF TIRE AND RUBBER, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILTREAD TIRE
engagement of the petitioners, the payment of their wages, the power of dismissal and control WORKERS' UNION, respondents.
with respect to the means and methods by which their work was accomplished, were all done
and exercised by Promm-Gem/SAPS. He further found that Promm-Gem and SAPS were TOPIC: INNOCENT BYSTANDER RULE
legitimate independent job contractors.
DOCTRINE: The corporate fiction may be disregarded where it is used to defeat public
NLRC RULING: The appeal of complainants is DISMISSED. convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or where the corporation is used as a
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the November 19, mere alter-ego or business conduit, it is not these standards but those of the "innocent bystander"
1998 Resolution. rule.
CA RULING: Affirmed the decision of the NLRC FACTS: Respondent Union filed a notice of strike in the NCMB charging (Phildtread) with unfair
labor practice. Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtread’s plant.
ISSUES: Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed
Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment;
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration. and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private
respondent’s personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an
During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of Agreement injunctive writ.
with Siam Tyre whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new company, herein
petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land G.R. No. 179652 6 March 2012
on which the plant was located would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be PEOPLES BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) v. THE SECRETARY OF
owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE
REGION VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN
Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant. As the Velasco, Jr., J.:
respondent Union refused petitioner’s request, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with
damages before the RTC. Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITER
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
DOCTRINE: If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that
Petitioner asserts that its status as an “innocent bystander” with respect to the labor dispute
there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the
between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts.
exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter,
under the “innocent bystander” rule
under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other
HELD: In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through
terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the “innocent bystander” rule as follows:
complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship,
the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the
questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be
curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. FACTS: Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor and
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as Employment (DOLE), for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13th month
an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or localize pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment
the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. The DOLE Regional Director found
those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims.
connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be
regulated at the instance of third parties or “innocent bystanders” if it appears that the When the matter was brought before the CA it was held that PBS was accorded due process as it
inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they had been given the opportunity to be heard, and that the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over
have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an the matter, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the
invasion of their rights. power of the DOLE Secretary under Art. 128(b) of the Code had been repealed by Republic Act
No. (RA) 7730.
Thus, an “innocent bystander,” who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court it is
entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, However, the SC found that there was no employer-employee relationship between PBS and
therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof. and private respo. It was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence
of an employer-employee relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the dispute. We find visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA
that the “negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction” between Philtread, as vendor, 7730. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in
and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This was the interpretation of
petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was the Court of the clause in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists in Art.
not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. 128(b).
On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of
From this Decision, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed a Motion for Clarification of
Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of the
Decision. The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the
Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were subject plant
DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an
is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory;
employer-employee relationship. The DOLE also sought the same clarification.
ISSUE: Is the NLRC the sole body with jurisdiction to determine the existence of an employer- DOCTRINE: The fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking employees to
employee relationship? describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation,
and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
HELD: NO. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary
finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say that the DOLE FACTS: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive
would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of an employer-employee bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-
relationship, or that should the existence of the employer-employee relationship be disputed, commission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta.
the DOLE would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine Rosa, Laguna plant.
whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or
not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its
by RA 7730. terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company
discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from
The determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be
the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA
respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by RA 7730
meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their
would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of disputing
work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa
the employer-employee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC.
were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of
If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse
cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction ensued.
only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon
review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place. On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a “Notice of
Strike” with the NCMB.
It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship need not necessarily result in an affirmative finding. The The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the
DOLE may well make the determination that no employer-employee relationship exists, thus Company’s premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front
divesting itself of jurisdiction over the case. It must not be precluded from being able to reach perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the
its own conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by the SC. Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel
were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift.
To recapitulate, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5)
provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the DOLE that hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production
there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.
exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the
jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a “Petition to Declare Strike Illegal”
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter,
under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and ISSUE: Whether the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.
exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other
terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a HELD: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the
complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee relationship, concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA,
the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however, may still be the Court ruled that “the fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking
questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.”
G.R. Nos. 164302-03 January 24, 2007
SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, DONRICO V. SEBASTIAN, EULOGIO
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually
G. BATINO, SAMUEL A. ATANQUE, MANOLO C. ZABALJAUREGUI, DIONISIO TENORIO,
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a
EDWIN P. RELLORES, LUIS B. NATIVIDAD, MYRNA PETINGCO, FELICIANO TOLENTINO,
labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
RODOLFO A. AMANTE, JR., CIPRIANO C. BELLO, RONALDO T. ESPINO, EFREN GALAN, and
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
JUN CARMELITO SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,
peaceable persuasion.
Respondent.
The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the
TOPIC: STRIKE
company’s premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity
which already affected the company’s operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a Thus, a union officer may be declared to have lost his employment status if he knowingly
strike. participates in an illegal strike and in this case, the strike is declared illegal by the court because
the means employed by the union are illegal.
For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor
Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended G.R. No. 114974 June 16, 2004
date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE), petitioner, vs.
of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a The Honorable MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, respondents.
seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a
union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners TOPIC: BLUE SKY BARGAINING and INTERFERENCE
totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.
DOCTRINE: The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining.
These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to
strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that
and embarked on their illegal strike. the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-
organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in
CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/OR EDWIN CHUA v. BUKLOD connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed.
NG MANGGAGAWA SA CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
FACTS: Before the commencement of the negotiation for the new CBA between the bank and
the Union, the Union, through Divinagracia, suggested to the Bank’s Human Resource Manager
TOPIC: ILLEGAL STRIKE and head of the negotiating panel, Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded
from the negotiating team. The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno(head of the negotiating team
DOCTRINE: A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and a worker who for the bank) suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., the President of the National
knowingly participates in the commission of an illegal strike are deemed to have lost their Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to which the Union was affiliated, be excluded
employment status. from the Union’s negotiating panel. However, Umali was retained as a member thereof. There
was deadlock in the negotiations. Both parties alleged ULP. Bank alleged that the Union violated
FACTS: Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation (the union), a
its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering that the
legitimate labor organization, is the recognized bargaining agent of Chuayuco Steel
filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed. Union alleged
Manufacturing Corporation (the corporation) of which its co-petitioner Edwin Chua is the
unfair labor practice when the bank allegedly interfered with the Union’s choice of negotiator.
President.
It argued that, Diokno’s suggestion that the negotiation be limited as a “family affair” was
In the election of the union officers, Camilo Lenizo (Lenizo) emerged as President. The tantamount to suggesting that Federation President Jose Umali, Jr. be excluded from the Union’s
corporation however refused to recognize the newly elected officers for the reason that there is negotiating panel. It further argued that, damage or injury to the public interest need not be
an intra-union conflict between the factions of Lenizo and Romeo Ibanez, the former acting present in order for unfair labor practice to prosper. The Union also contended that the Bank
union president. merely went through the motions of collective bargaining without the intent to reach an
agreement.
The union staged a strike which causes illegal acts that intimidated and harassed the
corporation and non-striking employees. The strikers use physical violence and harass those ISSUE: (1) Whether there was interference;
employees who are not on their side by shouting and threatening them not to go to work (2) Whether the bank committed “surface bargaining”
anymore. The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and thus, some of the members who
participated in the mass action lost their employment status. HELD: (1) NONE. Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when
an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-
ISSUE: Whether some of the employees who participated in the strike should be reinstated organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes
without loss of seniority rights the right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its
negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of negotiators a representative of the
HELD: Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code states that any union officer who knowingly
Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer adopted the said act to yield adverse effects
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates in the
on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status.
employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is
committed.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence
is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant TOPIC: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at
bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude DOCTRINE: Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that
Umali from the Union’s negotiating panel. the employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with
the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme
The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made constitutes unfair labor practice.
by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred that the Bank
consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise of the right to self- FACTS: Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that around the first week of May, 1991, she and
organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially considering that such was her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotel's management
undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation and simultaneously with to sign an instrument attesting to the latter's compliance with minimum wage and other labor
Divinagracia’s suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded from its negotiating panel. The standard provisions of law.
records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining process, with the inclusion of
Umali in the Union’s negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The complaint was Petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City Prosecutor's Office to swear to the
made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993. veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. The affidavit was
nevertheless submitted on the same day to the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought. The accusation occurred after the Employment in Baguio City.
arguments and differences over the economic provisions became heated and the parties had
become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to involve personalities. As the public After she refused to proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office petitioner avers that she was
respondent noted, passions may rise, and as a result, suggestions given under less adversarial ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove
situations may be colored with unintended meanings. Such is what appears to have happened her belongings from the hotel premises.
in this case.
She thereafter reluctantly filed a leave of absence from her job which was denied by
(2) NO. Surface bargaining is defined as “going through the motions of negotiating” without any management. When she attempted to return to work on May 10, 1991, the hotel's cashier
legal intent to reach an agreement.” The Union alleges that the Bank violated its duty to informed her that she should not report to work and, instead, continue with her unofficial leave
bargain; hence, committed ULP under Article 248(g) when it engaged in surface bargaining. It of absence. Consequently, on May 13, 1991, three days after her attempt to return to work,
alleged that the Bank just went through the motions of bargaining without any intent of petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National
reaching an agreement, as evident in the Bank’s counter-proposals. It explained that of the 34 Labor Relations Commission. In addition to her complaint for illegal dismissal, she alleged
economic provisions it made, the Bank only made 6 economic counterproposals. Further, as underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month
borne by the minutes of the meetings, the Bank, after indicating the economic provisions it had pay, night differential and other benefits.
rejected, accepted, retained or were open for discussion, refused to make a list of items it
agreed to include in the economic package. Respondent alleged before Labor Arbiter that petitioner "surreptitiously left her job without
notice to the management” and that she actually abandoned her work. He maintained that there
The minutes of meetings from March 12, 1993 to June 15, 1993 do not show that the Bank had was no basis for the money claims for underpayment and other benefits as these were paid in
any intention of violating its duty to bargain with the Union. Records show that after the Union the form of facilities to petitioner and the hotel's other employee. In a supplemental answer
sent its proposal to the Bank on February 17, 1993, the latter replied with a list of its counter- submitted eleven months after the original complaint for illegal dismissal was filed, respondent
proposals on February 24, 1993. Thereafter, meetings were set for the settlement of their raised a new ground, loss of confidence, which was supported by a criminal complaint for
differences. The minutes of the meetings show that both the Bank and the Union exchanged Qualified Theft he filed before the prosecutor's office of the City of Baguio against petitioner on
economic and non-economic proposals and counter-proposals. The Union has not been able to July 4, 1991.
show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to
show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences LA RULING: Dismissed the petitioner's complaint on the ground of loss of confidence.
between it and the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a
deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain “does not compel either NLRC RULING: Affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” Hence, the parties’ failure to
agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain. Unsatisfied, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. The Solicitor General rejects private respondent's principal claims and
G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997 defenses and urges this Court to set aside the public respondent's assailed resolution.
NORMA MABEZA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER
NG/HOTEL SUPREME, respondents. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of petitioner constitutes unfair labor practice.
The Union notified respondents of the audit results and asked them to explain the
HELD: YES. discrepancies in writing.
Unfair labor practice on the part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has On October 6, 2001, in a meeting called by the Union, respondents explained their side. Braza
exerted pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employee's right denied any wrongdoing and instead asked that the investigation be addressed to Castueras,
to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. who was the Union Treasurer at that time. With regard to his unpaid loans, Braza claimed he
had been paying through monthly salary deductions. With regard to the Union expenses which
Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the were without receipts, Braza explained that these were legitimate expenses for which receipts
employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with were not issued. He explained that though there were no receipts for these expenses, these
the act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme were supported by vouchers and itemized as expenses. Regarding his unpaid and unliquidated
constitutes unfair labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers cash advances amounting to almost PhP 20,000, Braza explained that these were not actual
to seek better terms and conditions of employment through concerted action. cash advances but payments to a certain Ricardo Ricafrente who had loaned PhP 200,000 to the
Union. Pizarro claimed his salaries were regularly deducted to pay his loan and he did not know
Article 248 of the Labor Code paragraph (f) makes it an unfair labor practice "to dismiss, why these remained unpaid in the records. Nonetheless, he likewise agreed to continuous
discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being salary deductions until all his accountabilities were paid. Castueras also denied any
about to give testimony." wrongdoing and claimed that the irregular entries in the records were unintentional and were
due to inadvertence because of his voluminous work load. He offered that his unpaid personal
For refusing to cooperate with the private respondent's scheme, petitioner was obviously held loan of PhP 27,500 also be deducted from his salary until the loans were fully paid. Despite
up as an example to all of the hotel's employees, that they could only cause trouble to their explanations, respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras were expelled from the Union
management at great personal inconvenience. Implicit in the act of petitioner's termination and and were furnished individual letters of expulsion for malversation of Union funds.
the subsequent filing of charges against her was the warning that they would not only be
deprived of their means of livelihood, but also possibly, their personal liberty. On October 18, 2001, the Union, invoking the Security Clause of the CBA, demanded that the
Club should dismiss respondents in view of their expulsion from the Union. Respondents
More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by the Pizarro, their dismissal from the Club in an illegal dismissal complaint filed with the NLRC,
petitioner were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for National Capital Region Arbitration Branch.
the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between
the two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose. Considering, therefore, that LA RULING: Ruled in favor of the Club, and found that there was justifiable cause in terminating
hotel workers are required to work different shifts and are expected to be available at various said respondents. He dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such
as the private respondent's hotel. NLRC RULING: Ruled that there was no justifiable cause for the termination of respondents
Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras. According to the NLRC, said respondents' expulsion from the
G.R. No. 170287 February 14, 2008 Union was illegal since the DOLE had not yet made any definitive ruling on their liability
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS regarding the administration of the Union's funds.
COMMISSION, ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES UNION,
CHRISTOPHER PIZARRO, MICHAEL BRAZA, and NOLASCO CASTUERAS, respondents. Aggrieved by the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC, the Club filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals.
TOPIC: SECURITY CLAUSE
CA RULING: Denied the petition and uphold the Decision of the NLRC.
DOCTRINE: Termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is
recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether the three respondents were illegally dismissed
FACTS: Petitioner Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Club) is a domestic non-profit corporation with HELD: NO. Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the following
principal office at Country Club Drive, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Respondent Alabang grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized causes under Art. 283; (3) termination
Country Club Independent Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the due to disease under Art. 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Art.
Club's rank-and-file employees. 285.
In July 2001, an election was held and a new set of officers was elected. Soon thereafter, the Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the
new officers conducted an audit of the Union funds. They discovered some irregularly recorded union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA on Union security contains the
entries, unaccounted expenses and disbursements, and uncollected loans from the Union funds. provisions on the Union shop and maintenance of membership shop. There is union shop when
all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition
for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees ISSUE: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-
who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become judicial entities
members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until
they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. HELD: It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a
Termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor
recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. This practice strengthens the union and prevents arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
disunity in the bargaining unit within the duration of the CBA. that matter. The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "the
award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10)
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," while the
employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; "decision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the employee from the decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the
union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the CBA's decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the
union security provision. decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
The language of Art. II of the CBA that the Union members must maintain their membership in Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than
good standing as a condition sine qua non for their continued employment with the Club is not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari in effect equating the
unequivocal. It is also clear that upon demand by the Union and after due process, the Club shall voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is
terminate the employment of a regular rank-and-file employee who may be found liable for a illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.
number of offenses, one of which is malversation of Union funds.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
ARBITRATOR, respondents. the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
TOPIC: JURISDICTION Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
DOCTRINE: In a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power
FACTS: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact
resolve the issue of whether the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion. exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It
will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised
December 1-15, 1994. The Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions
18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by
Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
filed by LDB.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. commissions enumerated therein.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must
Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same. be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this
Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper
disposition. ISSUE: (1) Whether the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward
(2) Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the dispute
G.R. No. 174316 June 23, 2009
TEODORICO S. MIRANDA, JR., Petitioner, vs. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. (ATI) and COURT OF HELD: A cursory look at the responsibilities of a shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is
APPEALS, Respondents. a position within the union, and not within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the
union in a shop, department, or plant and serves as representative of the union, charged with
TOPIC: INTERNAL UNION DISPUTE negotiating and adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the
employer. He is the representative of the union members in a building or other
DOCTRINE: Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor workplace. His duties include collection of dues, recruitment of new members and initial
Relations and the Labor Relations Division jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or negotiations for the settlement of grievances. The shop steward is responsible for receiving
intra-union conflicts. complaints and grievances of the employees and for bringing these complaints to the
immediate supervisor of the employee concerned. If the grievance is not settled
FACTS: Petitioner was employed by respondent ATI in 1991 as Checker I. He also became a through the efforts of the shop steward, it is referred to the grievance committee.
member of the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union. The petitioner, who was then the
Vice President of the union, was appointed to the position of Shop Steward which is a union It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the
position under the payroll of the company. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the determination of the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a
union and ATI provided for the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the provision of the CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the
union members, upon the recommendation of the union president. The Shop Steward is a field appropriate authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the
representative of both the company and the union and acts as an independent arbiter of continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace
all complaints brought to his attention. among the employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden with
awesome responsibilities. Since the Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy
Roger P. Silva, the President of APCWU, wrote a letter to the petitioner regarding the recall of surrounding his recall from his position as Shop Steward becomes a dispute within the union.
his designation as the union Shop Steward. The union president explained that the petitioner
was recalled as union Shop Steward due to loss of trust and confidence in him, pursuant to the An "Internal Union Dispute" or intra-union conflict refers to a conflict within or
“Agreement Amending the Marina Port Services, Inc.- APCWU CBA.” The letter further stated inside a labor union. It includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or
that the petitioner refused to heed the union president’s reminders concerning his “chronic disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including
absenteeism” that “is hurting the interest of the Union members as they are left with no any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the
responsible union officer when summoned for investigation concerning alleged infractions of Code. Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor Relations
company rules.” and the Labor Relations Division jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or intra-
union conflicts.
Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the grievance committee issued its report
recommending to ATI the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward and for his reversion to his The actions of the petitioner bolster the conclusion that his grievances were directed against
former position of Checker I, in accordance with the CBA. The petitioner questioned his the union and not the respondent company, making the dispute an intra-union dispute. The
recall as union Shop Steward, and the union president, Roger P. Silva, issued a letter first Complaints filed by the petitioner were against the union and the Union President for
which reasoned that the petitioner’s recall as Shop Steward was pursuant to Section 13 of the illegal recall of his designation as Shop Steward. A Complaint was then filed before the DOLE
Agreement Amending the MPSI-APCWU CBA, amending Section 2, Article V of the MPSI-APCWU Med-Arbiter praying for reinstatement to union Shop Steward and for the award of the salary
CBA which required that the term of office of the Shop Steward shall be based on trust and differential while he was allegedly illegally demoted. But the money claims could not be
confidence and favorable recommendation of the duly elected president of the Union. brought before the union since the salaries of the petitioner were paid by the
respondent company; thus, a Complaint for illegal demotion amounting to constructive
The petitioner argues that he is entitled to claim reinstatement as Shop Steward as well as the dismissal was filed before the Labor Arbiter, against the union, union president and this time
payment of his backwages pending the respondent’s appeal. He further contends that the Court including respondent company and the president of the company.
of Appeals erred in dismissing his consolidated petitions which prayed for the
enforcement of his reinstatement as Shop Steward for being moot and academic. Notwithstanding the determination of the Med-Arbiter, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Labor, that the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward,
The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals which is binding on this Court, the petitioner could not be reinstated to the position of
relied on substantial evidence in arriving at their decision that the consolidated Shop Steward because his eventual separation from respondent ATI made reinstatement
petitions are already moot and academic in view of the previous reinstatement of the unfeasible. Employment with respondent ATI and membership in the union are required in
petitioner to Checker I and his retrenchment and separation from ATI since October 31, 2001. order to occupy the position of Shop Steward. But the petitioner is neither a member of the
union nor employed with respondent ATI. He was already retrenched from respondent ATI On April 17, 1988, the local union held a general membership meeting. Several union members
since October 21, 2001, and his retrenchment was finally settled through the execution of a Quit failed to attend the meeting, prompting the Executive Board to create a committee tasked to
Claim and Release which was executed before the Second Division of the NLRC in NLRC CA No. investigate the non-attendance of several union members in the said assembly.
032809-02. The Quit Claim and Release provides that in consideration of the receipt ofP367,
500.00, the petitioner discharges respondent ATI and its officers from any claims arising from On June 27, 1988, the local union wrote respondent company a letter requesting it to deduct the
his retrenchment, without prejudice to the present labor case filed by the petitioner. union fines from the wages/salaries of those union members who failed to attend the general
membership meeting. However, respondent company sent a reply to petitioner union's request
It may seem that the outcome of this case provides no relief for the petitioner despite his in a letter, stating that it cannot deduct fines from the employees' salary without going against
invalid removal from the position of union Shop Steward, but the reinstatement of the certain laws. The company suggested that the union refer the matter to the proper government
petitioner could not be forced into the present circumstances because the petitioner is no office for resolution in order to avoid placing the company in the middle of the issue.
longer employed by the respondent company.
The imposition of the fine became the subject of a bitter disagreement between the Federation
It is a fact that we cannot avoid and must consider in resolving this case. He was already and the local union culminating to the latter’s declaration of general autonomy from the former.
compensated for his retrenchment from ATI, and he released respondent ATI from any and all The federation asked the company to stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the
claims or liability with respect to his separation from employment due to retrenchment. To education funds. The company file a Complaint for Interpleader with a Petition for Declaratory
order the respondent company to reinstate the petitioner to his employment in ATI would Relief with the Med-Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment.
render the Quit Claim and Release nugatory. The events which have taken place during the
pendency of the case have rendered the present petition moot and academic. The federation called a meeting placing the local union under trusteeship and appointing an
administrator. Petitioner union officers received letters from the administrator requiring them
G.R. No. 113907 February 28, 2000 to explain why they should not be removed from the office and expelled from union
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP) et.al., membership. The officers were expelled from the federation. The federation advised the
petitioners vs. HON. CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation pursuant to
M. GREENFIELD (B), INC., SAUL TAWIL, CARLOS T. JAVELOSA, RENATO C. PUANGCO, the Union Security Clause in the CBA.
WINCEL LIGOT, MARCIANO HALOG, GODOFREDO PACENO, SR., GERVACIO CASILLANO,
LORENZO ITAOC, ATTY. GODOFREDO PACENO, JR., MARGARITO CABRERA, GAUDENCIO The Federation filed a notice of strike with the NCMB to compel the company to effect the
RACHO, SANTIAGO IBANEZ, AND RODRIGO AGUILING, respondents. immediate termination of the expelled union officers. Under the pressure of a strike, the
company terminated the 30 union officers from employment. The petitioners filed a notice of
TOPIC: NO STRKIKE, NO LOCK OUT PROVISION strike on the grounds of discrimination; interference; mass dismissal of union officers and shop
stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation ; and union busting. The petitioners prayed for the
DOCTRINE: A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in suspension of the effects of their termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition stating it
nature was an intra-union matter. Later, 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and officially declared a strike that
FACTS: The petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc., afternoon. The strike was attended by violence.
hereinafter referred to as the "local union", is an affiliate of the private respondent, United
Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), referred to as the "federation". ISSUE: 1. Whether there was illegal dismissal.
2. Whether the strike was illegal.
On September 12, 1986, a local union election was held under the auspices of the ULGWP 3. Whether petitioners can be deemed to have abandoned their work.
wherein the herein petitioner, Beda Magdalena Villanueva, and the other union officers were
proclaimed as winners. Minutes of the said election were duly filed with the Bureau of Labor HELD:
Relations on September 29, 1986. On March 21, 1987, a Petition for Impeachment was filed
with the national federation ULGWP by the defeated candidates in the aforementioned election. 1. Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeds from one main issue – the
On June 16, 1987, the federation conducted an audit of the local union funds. The investigation termination of several employees upon the demand of the federation pursuant to the
did not yield any unfavorable result and the local union officers were cleared of the charges of union security clause. Although the union security clause may be validly enforced,
anomaly in the custody, handling and disposition of the union funds. The 14 defeated such must comply with due process. In this case, petitioner union officers were
candidates filed a Petition for Impeachment/Expulsion of the local union officers with the expelled for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty to the federation. The company did
DOLE. However, the same was dismissed on March 2, 1988, by the Med-Arbiter for failure to not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and merely relied upon the federation’s
substantiate the charges and to present evidence in support of the allegations. allegations. The issue is not a purely intra-union matter as it was later on converted
into a termination dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work
without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing. Although it started as an intra-
union dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BLR, to remand the same to the
BLR would intolerably delay the case and the Labor Arbiter could rule upon it. As to The Secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration for his return to work order and
the act of disaffiliation by the local union; it is settled that a local union has the right to sternly warned striking employees to comply with its terms. Conciliation meetings were held
disaffiliate from its mother union in the absence of specific provisions in the but this proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that any return to work
federation’s constitution prohibiting such. There was no such provision in federation order should be unconditional.
ULGWP’s constitution.
The College manifested to respondent Secretary that the union continued to defy his return to
2. A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in work order. The College sent termination letters to individual strikers and filed a complaint for
nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not illegal strike against the union.
required by law to grant. Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a
strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein The union moved for the enforcement of the return to work order before the Secretary. The
petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not Secretary issued an order directing reinstatement of striking union members and holding union
affect the strike. As to the violence, the parties agreed that the violence was not officers responsible for the violation of the return to work order and were correspondingly
attributed to the striking employees alone as the company itself hired men to pacify terminated. Both parties moved for the partial consideration of the return to work order.
the strikers. Such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike illegal.
ISSUE: Whether the striking union members that has been terminated for abandonment of
3. Respondents failed to prove that there was a clear intention on the part of the striking work after failing to comply with the return to work order of Secretary of Labor be reinstated.
employees to sever their employer-employee relationship. Although admittedly the
company sent three return to work notices to them, it has not been substantially HELD: NO.
proven that these notices were actually sent and received by the employees. As a The Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to
matter of fact, some employees deny that they ever received such notices. Others assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
alleged that they were refused entry to the company premises by the security guards industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily,
and were advised to secure a clearance from ULGWP and to sign a waiver. Some this authority to assume jurisdictional over the said labor dispute must include and extend to
employees who responded to the notice were allegedly told to wait for further notice all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter
from respondent company as there was lack of work. has exclusive jurisdiction.
Furthermore, this Court has ruled that an employee who took steps to protest his lay- This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) Labor Code provides that if a strike
off cannot be said to have abandoned his work. has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall immediately
return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately
G.R. No. 100158 June 2, 1992 effective and executory.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG- There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national
EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU, respondents. interest. The school is a duly registered educational institution of higher learning with more or
less 9,000 students. The on-going work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students
TOPIC: STRIKE and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all concerned. More important, it
is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual
DOCTRINE: Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return- and emotional well-being of the country’s youth.
to-work order may, consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately
FACTS: The Union and College initiated negotiations for a first ever CBA which resulted in a comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides
deadlock and prompted the union to file a notice of strike with the DOLE. that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Any worker or union
The union declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the College and public officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may,
respondent Sec. of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Instead of consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status.
returning to work, the union filed a motion for reconsideration of the return to work order.
There was willful disobedience not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that
The college sent individual letters to the striking employees requiring them to return to work. the union consisted mainly of teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-
In response union presented demands, the most important of which is the unconditional informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the union in
acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were rejected. this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some union officers
and members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by company offices, and plant premises; unlawfully blocked and obstructed all entrances and exits
the college enjoining the union officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990 points.
presented the workers an opportunity to return to work under the same terms and conditions
prior to the strike. Yet, the union decided to ignore the same. The college, correspondingly, had ISSUE: Whether the strike was illegal
every right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the return-to-work orders
issued by respondent secretary in order to protect the interests of its students who form part of HELD: YES.
the youth of the land.
As the Union itself alleges, there was normal, even high production [95% – 100% of production
plan in all lines] in the month of June 2001. In the month of July 2001, production at JIG Line 2
was 100% of plan from July 2 to 23 (covering only 5 working days), and at Metal Line,
production was from 88% to 142% of plan, for the first 3 weeks of July. But production fell by
at least 50% in the 4th week, the time when the CBA deadlock occurred and the 2nd strike
G.R. Nos. 158190-91 June 21, 2006 notice was filed. Neither is the Union’s claim that the forced leaves and suspension of workers
NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND were responsible for the disruption of production true. On the contrary, it was the lack of work-
EMPLOYMENT and BAGONG NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTOR PHILIPPINES, in progress due to slowdown and absenteeism which are responsible for the declaration of
INC. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU), Respondents. forced leave. Thus, the Union’s excuses do not hold sway on this Office.
TOPIC: STRIKE To be sure, the Union engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which they
were undertaken constitutes illegal strike. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the
DOCTRINE: An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in
mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during illegal strike in defiance of the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary
the strike.
The labor code provides that:
FACTS: There was a labor dispute triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock between Nissan Article 264. Prohibited Activities. No strike or lockout shall be declared after the assumption of
Motor and the Union resulting in the filing of 4 notices of strike with the National Conciliation jurisdiction by the Secretary or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for
and Mediation Board (NCMB). the strike or lockout. xxx. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
The first Notice of Strike- ground of alleged unfair labor practice, stemmed from the suspension strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: While the employer is authorized to
of about 140 company employees, following the disruptive protest action arising from the declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment,
employees’ demand for payment of the 2nd half of their 13th month pay; second strike- his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws
deadlock in collective bargaining involving a mix of economic and non-economic issues. a line and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers.
The DOLE, upon Nissan Motor’s petition, issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere
dispute. DOLE Secretary expressly enjoined any strike or lockout and directed the parties to participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the
cease and desist from committing any act that might exacerbate the situation, and for the Union strike. Except for the most serious causes affecting the business of the employer, our labor laws
to refrain from any slowdown and other similar activities that may disrupt company operations frown upon dismissal. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, an employee should not be
or bring its production to below its normal and usual levels. The Union filed a 3rd Notice of sanctioned with a consequence so severe. The members must be reinstated is because they
Strike on the ground of illegal lockout, illegal suspension, union busting. The DOLE ordered the were merely following the orders of their leaders and they did not abandon their work; no
3rd Notice of Strike be consolidated with the first two notice; Union filed a reiterative Urgent evidence was presented that they participated in illegal acts The responsibility of union
Petition to Suspend the Effects of Termination of union officers and members, now numbering officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore,
43. The Company filed its Position Paper. limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in
order.
Union filed a 4th Notice of Strike on grounds of alleged illegal dismissal of 18 union officials,
illegal lockout on account of the forced leave, coercion/intimidation, union busting and non- G.R. No. 215568, August 03, 2015
payment of salaries. The Acting DOLE Secretary ordered the 4th notice of strike to be RICHARD N. RIVERA, Petitioner, v. GENESIS TRANSPORT SERVICE, INC. AND RIZA A.
consolidate with the first 3 notices. Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure, MOISES, Respondents.
Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of NMPI, alleging that despite the injunctions
against any slowdown and strike, the Union went on actual strike, picketed and blocked the TOPIC: JUST CAUSES
DOCTRINE: "humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in the rational and objectively secular conception may at least be Bus conductors handle money. To this extent, their work may be analogous to that of tellers,
approximated." cashiers, and other similarly situated rank-and-file employees who occupy positions of trust
and confidence. However, even granting that the first requisite for termination of employment
FACTS: Rivera was employed by respondent Genesis Transport Service, Inc. beginning June on account of willful breach of trust has been satisfied, we find it improper to sustain the
2002 as a bus conductor, assigned to the Cubao-Baler, Aurora route. As part of the requisites for validity of the termination of petitioner's employment.
his employment, he was required to post a cash bond of P6, 000.00.
The records are bereft of evidence showing a pattern of discrepancies chargeable against
Villaseran, on May 25, 2010, he conducted a "man to man" inspection on the tickets held by the petitioner. Seen in the context of his many years of service to his employer and in the absence
passengers on board Bus No. 8286 who had transferred from Bus No. 1820 in San Fernando, of clear proof showing otherwise, the presumption should be that he has performed his
Pampanga. (Bus No. 1820 broke down.) In the course of his inspection, he noticed that Ticket functions faithfully and regularly. It can be assumed that he has issued the correct tickets and
No. 723374 VA had a written corrected amount of P394.00. However, the amount marked by given accurate amounts of change to the hundreds or even thousands of passengers that he
perforations made on the ticket, which was the amount originally indicated by the bus encountered throughout his tenure. It is more reasonable to assume that—except for a single
conductor, was only P198.00. Upon inquiring with the passenger holding the ticket, Villaseran error costing a loss of only P196.00—the company would have earned the correct expected
found out that the passenger paid P500.00 to Rivera, who gave her change in the amount of margins per passenger, per trip, and per bus that it allowed to travel.
P106.00. Subsequently, Villaseran conducted verification works with the Ticket Section of
Genesis' Cubao Main Office. Per his inquiries, the duplicate ticket surrendered by Rivera to Absent any other supporting evidence, the error in a single ticket issued by petitioner can
Genesis indicated only the unconnected amount of P198.00. It was also found that Rivera hardly be used to justify the inference that he has committed serious misconduct or has acted in
remitted only P198.00. a manner that runs afoul of his employer's trust. More so, petitioner cannot be taken to have
engaged in a series of acts evincing a pattern or a design to defraud his employer. Terminating
On July 20, 2010, Genesis served on Rivera a written notice informing him that a hearing of his his employment on these unfounded reasons is manifestly unjust.
case was set on July 23, 2010. Despite his explanations, Rivera's services were terminated
through a written notice dated July 30, 2010. Contending that this termination was arbitrary G.R. No. 164772 June 8, 2006
and not based on just causes for terminating employment, he filed the Complaint for illegal EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION (now known as EQUITABLE-PCI BANK), petitioner,
dismissal. vs. RICARDO SADAC, Respondent.
NLRC RULING: affirmed the Decision of Labor Arbiter denying the Rivera's Motion for DOCTRINE: Backwages are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or
Reconsideration. employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal
Thereafter, Rivera filed a Rule 65 Petition before the Court of Appeals. FACTS: Respondent Sadac was appointed Vice President of the Legal Department of petitioner
Bank effective 1 August 1981, and subsequently General Counsel thereof on 8 December 1981.
CA RULING: sustained the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations On 26 June 1989, nine lawyers of petitioner Bank’s Legal Department, in a letter-petition to the
Commission. The Court of Appeals denied Rivera's Motion for Reconsideration. Chairman of the Board of Directors, accused respondent Sadac of abusive conduct, inter alia,
and ultimately, petitioned for a change in leadership of the department. On the ground of lack of
ISSUE: Whether petitioner's employment was terminated for just cause by respondent. confidence in respondent Sadac, under the rules of client and lawyer relationship, petitioner
Bank instructed respondent Sadac to deliver all materials in his custody in all cases in which the
HELD: latter was appearing as its counsel of record. In reaction thereto, respondent Sadac requested
Our laws on labor, foremost of which is the Labor Code, are pieces of social legislation. They for a full hearing and formal investigation but the same remained unheeded. On 9 November
have been adopted pursuant to the constitutional recognition of "labor as a primary social 1989, respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against petitioner
economic force" and to the constitutional mandates for the state to "protect the rights of Bank and individual members of the Board of Directors thereof. After learning of the filing of
workers and promote their welfare" and for Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment the complaint, petitioner Bank terminated the services of respondent Sadac. Finally, on 10
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, and reduce August 1989, respondent Sadac was removed from his office and ordered disentitled to any
social, economic, and political inequalities." compensation and other benefits.
They are means for effecting social justice, i.e., the "humanization of laws and the equalization In a Decision dated 2 October 1990, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr., dismissed the
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in the rational and objectively secular complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC in its Resolution of 24 September 1991
conception may at least be approximated." reversed the Labor Arbiter and declared respondent Sadac’s dismissal as illegal.
DOCTRINE: Gross inefficiency falls within the purview of “other causes analogous to the
Petitioner Bank file via a Special Civil Action for Certiorari. But it held that respondent Sadac’s foregoing,” and constitutes therefore, just cause to terminate an employee.
dismissal was illegal. That the existence of the employer-employee relationship between
petitioner Bank and respondent Sadac had been duly established bringing the case within the FACTS: In 1978, Evangeline Santos was first hired as a full-time Spanish language teacher. She
coverage of the Labor Code. Respondent Sadac filed with the Labor Arbiter a Motion for was on leave of absence from 1992. Upon her return sometime in August 1993, only one class
Execution. Likewise, petitioner Bank filed a Manifestation and Motion14 praying that the award of Spanish was available for her to teach. Thus, for the school year 1993-1994, she agreed to
in favor of respondent Sadac be computed and that after payment is made, petitioner Bank be teach one class of Spanish and four other classes of Filipino. Since it was Santos’s first time to
ordered forever released from liability under said judgment. teach Filipino, the school’s administrators observed her classes for which the results will be
summarized in a Classroom Standards Evaluation Forms.
ISSUES: Whether the periodic general increases in basic salary be included in computing full
backwages for illegally dismissed employees October of 1993, the Assistant Principal observed Santos’s Filipino II class. It was noted that she
needs improvement in the following criteria: (1) uses effective questioning techniques; (2)
HELD: NO. Backwages are granted on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or punctual and time efficient; (3) states and enforces academic and classroom behavior
employee has lost due to his illegal dismissal; it is not private compensation or damages but is expectations in a positive manner; and (4) reinforces appropriate behavior.
awarded in furtherance and effectuation of the public objective of the Code. Backwages to be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee should not as a general rule be diminished or For the school years 1994-1995 (4 classes of Filipino), 1995-1996 (5 classes of Filipino), 1996-
reduced by the earnings derived by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. 1997 (5 classes of Filipino), she indicated that she did not prefer a change of teaching
assignment. At certain times, the Assistant Principal would observe Santos’s classes which
Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be inclusive of resulted to more or less the same observations that she needed improvements on as with the
allowance and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. The salary increase cannot be first observation. In 1996, her attention was called to the deficiencies in her planning and on
interpreted as either as an allowance or a benefit. Salary increases are not akin to allowances or the same year she was required to undergo remediation phase of the evaluation process
benefits and cannot be confused with either. Allowances and benefits are granted to the through a Professional Growth Plan. Since the implementation, there was a noticeable
employee apart or separate from the wage or salary. In contrast, salary increases are amounts improvement it yielded to a positive effect on her performance. But not long after, May of 1996,
which are added to the employee’s salary as an increment thereto for varied reasons deemed Santos was advised her Professional Growth Plan had been revised. Thereafter it seemed that
appropriate by the employer. the positive reviews of her performance were gradually replaced by renewed concerns on her
planning.
An unqualified award of backwages means that the employee is paid at the wage rate at the
time of his dismissal. And the court has declared that the base figure to be used in the A series of memorandums were sent calling Santos’s attention about the problem they
computation of backwages due to the employee should include not just the basic salary, but discovered and expressing frustration at her performance. As a result of which, a letter was
also the regular allowances that he had been receiving, such as the emergency living allowances sent directing her to explain in writing why her employment should not be terminated for her
and the 13th month pay mandated under the law. failure to meet the criteria for improvement and her substandard performance as a teacher. In
her reply, she said that the school forced her to teach Filipino, a subject which she had no
The term “backwages without qualification and deduction” means that the workers are to be preparation for. Thereafter, she was informed the school considered her letter as explanation
paid their backwages fixed as of the time of the dismissal or strike without deduction for their and it will also set a formal administrative investigation. According to the Minutes of the
earnings elsewhere during their layoff and without qualification of their wages as thus fixed; Administrative Investigation, what took place were clarifications as to the specific charge with
unqualified by any wage increases or other benefits that may have been received by their co- reference to the letter of explanation. The charge against Santos was gross inefficiency or
workers who are not dismissed or did not go on strike. Awards including salary differentials negligence in the performance of her assigned work. In consequence thereof, she was then told
are not allowed. The salary base properly used should, however, included not only the basic that her employment would cease effective June 7, 1997. Thereafter, a complaint was filed
salary but also the emergency cost of living allowance and also transportation allowances if the against the petitioner.
workers are entitled thereto.
ISSUES:
G.R. No. 167286 February 5, 2014 1. Whether Evangeline Santos was illegally dismissed.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL MANILA AND/OR BRIAN McCAULEY, Petitioners, vs. 2. Whether she is entitled to reinstatement or separation pay with backwages.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) AND MEMBERS
REPRESENTED BY RAQUEL DAVID CHING, PRESIDENT, EVANGELINE SANTOS, JOSELYN HELD:
RUCIO AND METHELYN FILLER, Respondents.
(1) The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expressly states that termination of employment
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL shall be in accordance with the Labor Code. Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate an employment for any of the ground mentioned in such section and
one of which is gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. Gross inefficiency falls DOCTRINE: A ‘floating status’ is lawful and not unusual for security guards employed in security
within the purview of “other causes analogous to the foregoing,” and constitutes therefore, just agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency with
cause to terminate an employee. “Gross inefficiency” is closely related to “gross neglect,” for third parties."
both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the
employer or to his business. As such, failure to prescribe such standards of work, or to fulfill FACTS: Respondent agency hired petitioner as security guard on November 20, 1996 and
reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just cause for dismissal. Thus, assigned him at the Naga Power Barge 102 of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Sigpit
the actuations of Santos complained of by the petitioners constituted gross and habitual neglect Load Ends, Lutopan, Toledo City.
of her duties.
For not wearing proper uniform while on duty as per report of Allan Alfafara (Alfafara) of the
For termination of employment based on just causes, the following are the requirements to NPC, petitioner was suspended for a month effective May 8, 2003.
constitute due process: (i) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to June 2, 2003, NPC informed respondent agency that it was no longer interested in petitioner’s
explain his side; (ii) a hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the services and thus requested for his replacement.
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him; (iii) a written notice of termination On June 17, 2003, petitioner requested respondent Arquiza to issue a certification in
served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, connection with his intended retirement effective that month. Thus, respondent Arquiza issued
grounds have been established to justify his termination. As such, in the instant case, the school the Certification11 dated June 25, 2003.
complied with all the requirements. After a thorough evaluation of Santos’s performance, the
school held a series of conferences and meetings with Santos, in order to improve her Five days later, petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
performance. On March 29, 1996, the school required Santos to undertake a Professional suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits against respondents.
Growth Plan. Thereafter, when the intervention of the school failed to yield any considerable
improvement on Santos, the Assistant Principal wrote her a letter on April 10, 1997, which Petitioner alleged that his suspension was without valid ground and effected without due
required her to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours why her employment should process, hence, illegal. He claimed that Alfafara’s report about his non-wearing of uniform was
not be terminated. On April 16, 1997, Santos was informed that the administrative investigation fabricated and ill-motivated because he declined Alfafara’s invitation to convert to their
would be conducted on April 23, 1997 where she would be given the opportunity to be heard. religion. In fact, the roving inspector who checked the attendance of guards on duty does not
On April 23, 1997, an administrative investigation was conducted wherein Santos appeared have any report showing his commission of any infraction. Petitioner averred that he was
with the assistance of ISAE President. In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the school informed suspended without being given the chance to explain his side.
Santos of its decision to terminate her employment on the ground of her failure to meet the
standards of the school, which as discussed was tantamount to gross inefficiency. Thus, she was Petitioner narrated that when he reported back to work after his one-month suspension, he
validly dismissed. was surprised to find out that he was already terminated from the service effective May 7, 2003
as shown by the June 25, 2003 Certification issued to him by respondent Arquiza. He then
(2) In view of the finding that Santos was validly dismissed from employment, she would not claimed to have been underpaid for services rendered and that he is entitled to holiday pay,
ordinarily be entitled to separation pay. An exception to this rule is when the court finds rest day pay, night shift differential, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, retirement
justification in applying the principle of social justice. In the instant case, the court finds benefits, damages and attorney’s fees.
equitable and proper the award of separation pay in favor of Santos in view of the length of her
service with the school prior to the events that led to the termination of her employment. To LA RULING: Petitioner was illegally dismissed from the service. He also found petitioner’s prior
recall, she was first employed by the school in 1978 as a Spanish language teacher and no other suspension illegal and granted him all his monetary claims except for underpayment of wages.
infraction or administrative case against her was filed by the school. Thus, an award of
separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service is awarded NLRC RULING: initially affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.
in favor of Santos on grounds of equity and social justice.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a
G.R. No.179326 July 31, 2013 Resolution. Hence, he sought recourse to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari.
LUCIANO P. CANEDO,* Petitioner, vs. KAMPILAN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.
and RAMONCITO L. ARQUIZA, Respondents. CA RULING: denied the Petition after it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC. CA concluded that petitioner was merely placed on temporary "off-detail" which is not
TOPIC: DISMISSAL equivalent to dismissal.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL HELD: YES. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for
causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of
workers, to wit: “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.” employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the
FACTS: Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application performance assessment.
for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a
one year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$ 15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to
employment contract. Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. on June 26, 1997. support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.
inefficiency. There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the
In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
standards against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from as to the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was
not clear.
Wacoal informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare for
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.
immediate repatriation." Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before
only earned a total of NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her termination. One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that
plane ticket to Manila. may cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must "inform the employee of the employer’s
decision." Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity of the Labor Code. NTRCI raised the requirement of at least six months of service a year for that
to be heard." year to be considered in the retirement pay computation.
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the LA RULING: Confirmed that the correct retirement pay of Zenaida M. Paz was Php12,487.50.
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees
and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary. NLRC RULING: Modified the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It likewise denied reconsideration.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas CA RULING: Dismissed the Petition and modified the National Labor Relations Commission's
Filipinos Act of1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or Decision in that "financial assistance is awarded to Zenaida Paz in the amount of P60, 356. 25
authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest
of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment Since the exact number of days petitioner Paz would have worked between May 18, 2003 until
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." she would turn 65 in 2005 could not be determined with specificity, this court thus awards full
backwages in the amount of P22,200.00 computed by multiplying P185.00 by 20 days, then by
Illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less than one three months, then by two years.
year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment There was no showing that respondent NTRCI complied with these due process requisites.
contracts. Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a Thus, consistent with jurisprudence, petitioner Paz should be awarded P30,000.00 as nominal
year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their salary for the unexpired portions of damages.
their contracts.
ISSUE: Whether an employee who was only 63 years old and was told that she was retired but
amended her complaint to include retirement can be considered as illegally dismissed from
service.
HELD: Petitioner Paz initially filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal seeking separation pay, but
later amended her Complaint into one for payment of retirement pay. Despite the amendment,
she maintained in her subsequent pleadings that she had been made to retire even before she
G.R. No. 199554 February 18, 2015 reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 under Article 287, as amended.
ZENAIDA PAZ, Petitioner, vs. NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING CO., INC., AND/OR ANGELO
ANG, Respondents. Petitioner Paz alleged that respondent NTRCI required her to report on March 18, 2003 for the
2003 tobacco season, but she suffered a mild stroke sometime in April. Nevertheless,
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL and/or RETIREMENT BENEFITS respondent NTRCI extended her employment contract until May 18, 2003 when she was
informed that she was retired under company policy.
DOCTRINE: In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, Since petitioner Paz was "unlearned and not knowledgeable in law, she just accepted such fact
but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory... retirement age, and waited to be paid her separation/retirement benefit as promised by NTRCI." Unfortunately,
who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to after a year of waiting, respondent NTRCI only offered her around ₱12,000.00 for all her
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a services since 1974.
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one... whole year.
Petitioner Paz’s amendment of her Complaint was not fatal to her cause of action for illegal
FACTS: On May 18, 2003, Paz was 63 years old when NTRCI informed her that she was dismissal. First, petitioner Paz never abandoned her argument that she had not reached the
considered retired under company policy. A year later, NTRCI told her she would receive P12, compulsory retirement age of 65 pursuant to Article 287, as amended, when respondent NTRCI
000.00 as retirement pay. made her retire on May 18, 2003. That the respondent NTRCI failed to prove a valid company
retirement policy, yet it required its workers to retire after they had reached the age of 60.
Paz, with two other complainants, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against NTRCI on
March 4, 2004. She amended her Complaint on April 27, 2004 into a Complaint for payment of "Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between the
retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees as P12, 000.00 seemed inadequate for her 29 employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his
years of service. or her employment with the former." Article 287, as amended, allows for optional retirement at
the age of at least 60 years old. Consequently, if "the intent to retire is not clearly established or
NTRCI countered that no Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existed between NTRCI and if the retirement is involuntary, it is to be treated as a discharge."
its workers. Thus, it computed the retirement pay of its seasonal workers based on Article 287
Paz never abandoned her argument of illegal dismissal despite the amendment of her
Complaint. This implied lack of intent to retire until she reached the compulsory age of 65. NLRC RULING: Dismissed Bello’s claim because records do show that complainant executed a
Thus, she should be considered as illegally dismissed from May 18, 2003 until she reached the voluntary resignation.
compulsory retirement age of 65 in 2005 and should be entitled to full backwages for this
period. Bello moved for a reconsideration, but the NLRC denied his motion. Bello then assailed the
dismissal of his complaint via petition for certiorari.
Since the exact number of days petitioner Paz would have worked between May 18, 2003 until
she would turn 65 in 2005 could not be determined with specificity, this court thus awards full CA RULING: finds Bello to have acquired the status of a regular employee although he had
backwages in the amount of ₱22,200.00 computed by multiplying 185.00 by 20 days, then by started as a project employee of DMCI by his having been employed as a mason who had
three months, then by two years. performed tasks that had been usually necessary and desirable in the business or trade of DMCI
continuously from February 1, 1990 to October 5, 1997; that his repeated re-hiring and the
G.R. No. 159371 July 29, 2013 continuing need for his services over a long span of time had undeniably made him a regular
D.M. CONSUNJI CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. ROGELIO P. BELLO, Respondent. employee; that DMCI’s compliance with the reportorial requirements under Policy Instruction
No. 20 could not preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee; that the cause of
TOPIC: VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION his dismissal after he had acquired the status of a regular employee – the completion of the
phase of work – could not be considered as a valid cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code;
DOCTRINE: We reiterate that it is axiomatic in labor law that the employer who interposes the and that his supposedly voluntary resignation could not be accorded faith after the ELA had
defense of voluntary resignation of the employee in an illegal dismissal case must prove by clear, concluded that the handwriting in the supposed resignation letter was "undeniably different
positive and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary; and that the employer from that of complainant," a fact "not rebutted by herein respondents.
cannot rely on the weakness of the defense of the employee. The requirement rests on the need to
resolve any doubt in favor of the working man. ISSUE: Whether private respondent was a regular employee; and Whether or not private
respondent was dismissed or voluntarily resigned.
FACTS: DMCI had employed the respondent as a mason without any interruption from
February 1, 1990 until October 10, 1997 at an hourly rate of ₱25.081. That he had been a very HELD: A project employee is, therefore, one who is hired for a specific project or undertaking,
diligent and devoted worker and had served DMCI as best as he could and without any and the completion or termination of such project or undertaking has been determined at the
complaints. He also never violated any company rules and that his job as a mason had been time of engagement of the employee. In the context of the law, Bello was a project employee of
necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of DMCI. He had been diagnosed to be DMCI at the beginning of their employer-employee relationship. The project employment
suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, thereby necessitating his leave of absence and upon his contract they then entered into clearly gave notice to him at the time of his engagement about
recovery, he had reported back to work, but DMCI had refused to accept him and had instead his employment being for a specific project or phase of work. He was also thereby notified of
handed to him a termination paper. He had been terminated due to "RSD" effective November the duration of the project, and the determinable completion date of the project.
5, 1997 and he did not know the meaning of "RSD" as the cause of his termination. The cause
had not been explained to him and he has not been given prior notice of his termination. Also, However, the history of Bello’s appointment and employment showed that he performed his
he had not been paid separation pay as mandated by law. That at that time of his dismissal, tasks as a mason in DMCI’s various constructions projects. That Bello acquired in time the
DMCI’s projects had not yet been completed and that even if he had been terminated due to an status of a regular employee by virtue of his continuous work as a mason of DMCI. The work of
authorized cause, he should have been given at least one month pay or at least one-half month a mason like him – a skilled workman working with stone or similar material – was really
pay for every year of service he had rendered, whichever was higher. related to building or constructing, and was undoubtedly a function necessary and desirable to
the business or trade of one engaged in the construction industry like DMCI. His being hired as
DMCI contended that Bello had only been a project employee, as borne out by his contract of a mason by DMCI in not one, but several of its projects revealed his necessity and desirability to
employment and appointment papers. That after his termination from employment, it had its construction business.
complied with the reportorial requirements of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) pursuant to the mandates of Policy Instruction No. 20, as revised by Department Order Lastly, DMCI claims that Bello voluntarily resigned from work. It presented his supposed
No. 19, series of 1993. His last project employment contract had been set to expire on October handwritten resignation letter to support the claim. However, Bello denied having resigned,
7, 1997, he had tendered his voluntary resignation on October 4, 1997 for health reasons that explaining that he had signed the letter because DMCI had made him believe that the letter was
had rendered him incapable of performing his job, per his resignation letter. for the purpose of extending his sick leave.
LA RULING: That respondent company DM Consunji, Inc., guilty of illegal dismissal and it is That the handwriting in the resignation letter was "undeniably different" from that of Bello
hereby ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights could not be ignored or shunted aside simply because she had no expertise to make such a
and to pay him full backwages reckoned from the time of his dismissal up to his actual determination.
reinstatement which as of this date is in the amount of ₱232,648,81.
We reiterate that it is axiomatic in labor law that the employer who interposes the defense of Aggrieved by the Decision of the NLRC, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with
voluntary resignation of the employee in an illegal dismissal case must prove by clear, positive the CA.
and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary; and that the employer cannot rely
on the weakness of the defense of the employee. The requirement rests on the need to resolve CA RULING: denying the petition and affirming the assailed decision of the NLRC.
any doubt in favor of the working man.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA. Petitioner file a
G.R. No. 152949 August 14, 2007 petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
AKLAN COLLEGE, INCORPORATED and MSGR. ADOLFO P. DEPRA, petitioners, vs.
RODOLFO P. GUARINO, respondent. ISSUES: Whether the termination of respondent as Acting Personnel Director is valid whether
respondent is entitled to security of tenure
TOPIC: SECURITY OF TENURE
HELD: YES. It is not disputed that respondent was appointed as Acting Personnel Director on
DOCTRINE: Provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code are not applicable to the present case November 26, 1990. He went on leave for one year from November 4, 1991 until November 4,
especially with respect to the issue of respondent's acquisition of security of tenure. It is settled 1992, after which he was no longer allowed to re-assume his administrative posts. Having
that questions respecting a private school teacher’s entitlement to security of tenure are governed assumed the position of Personnel Director in an acting capacity, respondent could not
by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and not the Labor Code. reasonably have expected that he had acquired security of tenure.
FACTS: In 1974, private respondent was appointed as Acting Dean of the Commerce and This Court has held that an acting appointment is merely temporary, or one which is good until
Secretarial Department. On November 26, 1990, he was again appointed by the petitioner as another appointment is made to take its place. And if another person is appointed, the
Acting Personnel Director, in addition to his duties as acting dean. His appointment as Acting temporary appointee should step out and cannot even dispute the validity of his successor’s
Personnel Director was in a temporary basis and until it is revoked by the President or Rector appointment. The undisturbed unanimity of cases is that one who holds a temporary
of the College. A year after, private respondent went on leave for one year from November 4, appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated anytime at the
1991 up to November 4, 1992. pleasure of the appointing power without need to show that it is for cause.
On October 20, 1992, private respondent wrote the petitioner through its Rector informing the Moreover, the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code are not applicable to the present case
latter of his intention of reassuming his positions with the petitioner college. However, in especially with respect to the issue of respondent's acquisition of security of tenure. It is settled
petitioner’s response, it informed private respondent that he cannot anymore reassume his that questions respecting a private school teacher’s entitlement to security of tenure are
former position as Acting Dean of the Commerce and Secretarial Department because he is not governed by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and not the Labor Code.
qualified for the position. Then, on November 10, 1992, petitioner formally informed private
respondent that the Board of Trustees of the petitioner college has decided not to allow him to As to respondent’s entitlement to separation pay, the settled rule is that separation pay is the
reassume his position as Acting Dean for the reason that he has not qualified to continue amount that an employee receives at the time of his severance from the service and is designed
holding the position and that the position of Acting Personnel director has already been filled to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is seeking another
up by a regular incumbent. employment. In the present case, while respondent was no longer allowed to return to his
positions as Acting Dean and Acting Personnel Director he was, nonetheless, retained as an
Hence, on November 11, 1992, private respondent filed the instant case for illegal dismissal instructor. Hence, he could not be deemed as separated from the service because his
against petitioner with the office of the Department of Labor in Kalibo, Aklan. employment as instructor remains.
LA RULING: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. G.R. No. 209499 January 28, 2015
MA. CHARITO C. GADIA, et.al, Petitioners, vs. SYKES ASIA, INC./ CHUCK SYKES/ MIKE
NLRC RULING: reversed the decision of LA. Respondents are hereby ordered to pay the HINDS/ MICHAEL HENDERSON, Respondents.
complainant separation pay for his discharge from the position of Dean of Commerce and
Secretarial Science, equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, a fraction of six TOPIC: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
months being considered one year. The respondents are further ordered to reinstate the
complainant in his position as personnel director with full backwages from the time his salaries DOCTRINE: At the outset, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
were withheld from him until his actual reinstatement, and as instructor without backwages. of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
The respondents are furthermore ordered to pay the complainant 10% of the monetary awards abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in
as attorney’s fees. Other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence. a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS: Sykes Asia is a corporation engaged in Business Process Outsourcing which provides
support to its international clients from various sectors by carrying on some of their In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its
operations, governed by service contracts that it enters with them. On September 2, 2003, Alltel findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This
Communications, Inc., a United States-based telecommunications firm, contracted Sykes Asia’s requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of
services to accommodate the needs and demands of Alltel clients for its postpaid and prepaid Court which provides that "in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact
services. Thus, on different dates, Sykes Asia hired petitioners as customer service may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
representatives, team leaders, and trainers for the Alltel Project. relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
Tested against these considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly granted respondents’
Services for the said project went on smoothly until Alltel sent two (2) letters to Sykes Asia certiorari petition before it, since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
dated August 7, 200914 and September 9, 2009 informing the latter that it was terminating all petitioners were regular employees of Sykes Asia when the latter had established by
support services provided by Sykes Asia related to the Alltel Project. In view of this substantial evidence that they were merely project-based.
development, Sykes Asia sent each of the petitioners end-of-life notices, informing them of their
dismissal from employment due to the termination of the Alltel Project. Article 294 (now, Article 195[280]) of the Labor Code provides that an employee is deemed
regular when he has been engaged to perform activities which are deemed usually necessary
Aggrieved, petitioners filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against respondents and desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except (i) where the employment
praying for reinstatement, backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
differential, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. In their complaints, petitioners been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or (ii) where the work or
alleged that their dismissal from service was unjust as the same was effected without services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment if for the duration of the
substantive and procedural due process. season.
LA RULING: LA ruled in favor of respondents, and accordingly, dismissed petitioners’ Accordingly, the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly
complaints for lack of merit. It found that petitioners are merely project-based employees, as characterized as project employees as distinguished from "regular employees," is whether or
their respective employment contracts indubitably provided for the duration and term of their not the employees were assigned to carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration
employment, as well as the specific project to which they were assigned. Dissatisfied, (and scope) of which were specified at the time they were engaged for that project. The project
petitioners appealed to the NLRC. could either be (i) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of
NLRC RULING: NLRC modified the LA Decision, ruling that petitioners are regular employees the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the
but were validly terminated due to redundancy. NLRC found that petitioners could not be other undertakings of the company; or (ii) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the
properly characterized as project-based employees, ratiocinating that while it was made known regular business of the corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the
to petitioners that their employment would be co-terminus to the Alltel Project, it was neither arbitrary use of the word "project" to prevent employees from attaining a regular status,
determined nor made known to petitioners, at the time of hiring, when the said project would employers claiming that their workers are project-based employees should not only prove that
end, be terminated, or be completed. the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but
also, that there was indeed a project.
CA RULING: CA annulled and set aside the ruling of the NLRC, and accordingly, reinstated that
of the LA. It held that a perusal of petitioners’ respective employment contracts readily shows Thus, for an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show compliance
that they were hired exclusively for the Alltel Project and that it was specifically stated therein with two (2) requisites, namely that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific
that their employment would be project-based. project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the time they
were engaged for such project.
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly granted respondents’ petition for certiorari and whether the
petitioners are project employees In this case, the Court held that Sykes was able to prove both requisites.
HELD: The petition is without merit. As regards the first requisite, it held that Sykes adequately informed the petitioners of their
employment status at the time of their engagement. As was shown by their respective
At the outset, it must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of employment contracts, they were hired for the Alltel Project and their positions were “project-
certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely based and as such is co-terminus to the project.”
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised
in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be As regards the second requisite, it held that “the duration of the undertaking begins and ends at
considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or determined or determinable times” which means capable of being determined or fixed. As such,
personal hostility, and must be as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty indicating in the contract that their employment is “co-termius with the project” is sufficient
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. compliance with this requisite.
NLRC RULING: affirming the Labor Arbiter and holding that respondent had acquired a
G.R. Nos. 196280 & 196286 April 2, 2014 permanent status. The last paragraph of Article 281 of the Labor Code provides that "an
UNIVERSIDAD DE STA. ISABEL, Petitioner, vs. MARVIN-JULIAN L. SAMBAJON, JR., employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
Respondent. employee." Based thereon, the complainant required permanent status on the first day of the
first semester of SY 2003-2004.
TOPIC: PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL
CA RULING: sustained the conclusion of the NLRC that respondent had already acquired
DOCTRINE: NLRC shall, in cases of perfected appeals, limit itself to reviewing those issues which permanent status when he was allowed to continue teaching after the expiration of his first
are raised on appeal. As a consequence thereof, any other issues which were not included in the appointment-contract on March 30, 2003.
appeal shall become final and executory.
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit religious educational institution in Naga City. ISSUES: Whether the NLRC correctly resolved an issue not raised in petitioners appeal
Petitioner hired Respondent as a full-time college faculty member with the rank of Assistant memorandum
Professor on probationary status, as evidenced by an Appointment Contract dated November 1,
2002, effective November 1, 2002 up to March 30, 2003. After the aforesaid contract expired, HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
petitioner continued to give teaching loads to respondent who remained a full-time faculty NLRC revised rules of procedure
member of the Department of Religious Education for the two semesters of school-year (SY)
2003-2004 (June 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004); and two semesters of SY 2004-2005 (June 2004 Section 4(d), Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which was in force at
to March 31, 2005). the time petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters decision, expressly provided that, on appeal,
the NLRC shall limit itself only to the specific issues that were elevated for review, to wit:
Sometime in June 2003, after respondent completed his course in Master of Arts in Education,
major in Guidance and Counseling, he submitted the corresponding Special Order from the Section 4. Requisites for perfection of appeal.
Commission on Higher Education, together with his credentials for the said master’s degree, to
the Human Resources Department of petitioner for the purpose of salary adjustment/increase. (d) Subject to the provisions of Article 218 of the Labor Code, once the appeal is perfected in
Subsequently, respondent’s salary was increased, as reflected in his pay slips starting October accordance with these Rules, the Commission shall limit itself to reviewing and deciding only
1-15, 2004. He was likewise re-ranked from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. the specific issues that were elevated on appeal.
In a letter dated October 15, 2004 addressed to the President of petitioner, respondent We have clarified that the clear import of the aforementioned procedural rule is that the NLRC
vigorously argued that his salary increase should be made effective as of June 2003 and shall, in cases of perfected appeals, limit itself to reviewing those issues which are raised on
demanded the payment of his salary differential. appeal. As a consequence thereof, any other issues which were not included in the appeal shall
become final and executory.
The school administration replied by explaining its policy on re-ranking of faculty members.
Please be informed that teachers in the Universidad are not re-ranked during their probationary In reviewing the Labor Arbiters finding of illegal dismissal, the NLRC concluded that
period. The Faculty Manual as revised for school year 2002-2003 provides (page 38) "Re-ranking respondent had already attained regular status after the expiration of his first appointment
is done every two years, hence the personnel hold their present rank for two years. Those contract as probationary employee. Such conclusion was but a logical result of the NLRCs own
undergoing probationary period and those on part-time basis of employment are not covered by interpretation of the law. Since petitioner elevated the questions of the validity of respondents
this provision." This provision is found also in the 2000-2001 Operations Manual. Your personnel dismissal and the applicable probationary period under the aforesaid regulations, the NLRC did
file shows that you were hired as a probationary teacher in the second semester of school year not gravely abuse its discretion in fully resolving the said issues.
2002-2003. By October 2004, you will be completing four (4) semesters (two school years) of
service. Even permanent teachers are re-ranked only every two years, and you are not even a There is no merit to this contention. The records show that the petitioners elevated the issues
permanent teacher. I am informed that you have been told several times and made to read the regarding the correctness of the award of damages, reinstatement with backpay, retirement
Provision in the Faculty Manual by the personnel office that you cannot be re-ranked because you benefits and the cost-saving bonus to the respondent Commission in their appeal. This opened
are still a probationary teacher. the said issues for review and any action taken thereon by the Commission was well within the
parameters of its jurisdiction.
Respondent insisted on his demand for retroactive pay. On February 26, 2005, respondent
received his letter of termination G.R. No. 195598 June 25, 2014
TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., TEEKA Y SHIPPING LIMITED and ALEX VERCHEZ,
LA RULING: ruled that there was no just or authorized cause in the termination of respondent’s Petitioners, vs. EXEQUIEL O. JARIN, Respondent.
probationary employment. Consequently, petitioner was found liable for illegal dismissal
TOPIC: SEAFERER BENEFITS
NLRC RULING: The NLRC considered Jarin’s rheumatoid arthritis as the cause of his disability
DOCTRINE: The provisions of POEA-SEC must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and while his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease was disregarded for it has nothing to do with
liberally in their favor because only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect. his muscular discomforts. The NLRC stated that while rheumatoid arthritis is disputably
presumed work-related pursuant to Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC, the petitioners,
FACTS: After passing the standard Pre-Employment Medical Examination, the petitioners hired however, were able to successfully overturn such presumption through the consistent medical
Jarin as Chief Cook on July 6, 2006 for a period of eight months with a basic monthly salary of reports of its designated physicians that such illness is not work-related. Their medical
US$722.40.3 Jarin was deployed on July 9, 2006 onboard M.T. Erik Spirit, a crude oil tanker. opinions bear greater evidentiary weight that the internet information presented by Jarin to
During the third week of February 2007, M.T. Erik Spirit was in Canada when Jarin complained prove that his illness has reasonable connection to his work. The NLRC also noted Jarin’s failure
of swelling in the joints of his two elbows. Jarin was taken to a Canadian hospital where he was to seek medical opinion from a physician of his choice to counter the company-designated
diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. Steroid-based medications were administered to him and physicians’ assessment.
they caused him the side effects of puffiness of the face and edema. However, Jarin was able to
complete his employment contract. He was repatriated on March 24, 2007. Jarin elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, Jarin immediately reported to the petitioners. On March CA RULING: CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the LA’s ruling. The CA found the petitioners
27,2007, he was referred to company-designated physician, Dr. Christine O. Bocek whose Post- liable for permanent and total disability benefits because Jarin was able to adduce substantial
Medical Report showed that Jarin has "moon facies and bipedal edema secondary to steroid evidence that the risk of contracting rheumatoid arthritis was increased by his exposure to the
intake, rheumatoid arthritis, resolving and upper respiratory tract infection." On April 12, 2007, working conditions in the vessel.
Jarin was referred to another company-designated physician at the Metropolitan Medical
Center. ISSUE: Whether Jarin’s disability or sickness is work related
After a series of medical management procedures, Dr. Dacanay opined in a medical report that HELD: Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, a work-related illness is "any sickness resulting to disability
Jarin’s rheumatoid arthritis was not work-related because it is" an auto-immune disease in or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions set
which joints, usually those of hands and feet, are symmetrically affected, resulting in swelling, therein satisfied."
pain and often eventual destruction of the joints interior." Jarin’s cushingnoid features was also
declared as not work-related since it is "secondary to prednisone intake as medical The Court has held, however, that the enumeration in Section 32-A does not preclude other
management for his rheumatoid arthritis." illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to
contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties. Concomitant
Without any knowledge of Dr. Balbon’s recommendation, Jarin received a call on September 10, with such presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence
2007 fromTeekay Phils. Directing him to report at Pandiman Phils., Inc. at Intramuros, Manila. that his working conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. It is
On the following day, Jarin went to Pandiman where he was informed that his illness is not not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or
work-related and that Teekay Phils. stopped paying for his medical treatments. Jarin asked for a partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the
medical report supporting such conclusion but he was not furnished any. seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted."
Jarin filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations In the case at bar, Jarin was able to prove that his rheumatoid arthritis was contracted out of his
Commission (NLRC) claiming US$60,000.00 as permanent total disability benefit, US$2,889.60 daily duties as Chief Cook onboard M.T. Erik Spirit. The narration of facts in his position paper
as sickness allowance for his incapacity to work for 120 days pursuant to the Philippine detailed the nature of his work as Chief Cook and the daily working conditions on sea duty. It is
Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract for Filipino Seafarers (POEA- well to note that in resolving disputes on disability benefits, the fundamental consideration has
SEC), US$10,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages and ten percent (10%) of the been that the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino
total monetary award as attorney’s fees. seamen in the pursuit of their employment onboard ocean-going vessels. As such, its provisions
must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor because only then
LA RULING: The seafarer’s clearance issued to Jarin stating that he is "unfit and no longer can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.
recommended for further sea duties" signifies his incapacity to work as a seaman. The
petitioners’ evidence was found inadequate to dispute the presumption that illnesses not listed G.R. No. 207010 February 18, 2015
in Section 3227 of the POEA-SEC are work-related. Thus, Jarin’s money claims were granted MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE. LIMITED, and JESUS
and he was awarded US$50,000.00 for suffering an illness categorized as Grade 1 Impediment AGBAYANI, Petitioners, vs. TORIBIO C. A VESTRUZ,* Respondent.
based on the Schedule of Disability Allowances of the POEA-SEC. He was also awarded
US$2,889.60 for failure of the petitioners to show payment of his 120-day sickness allowance. TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
DOCTRINE: Telefax transmission purportedly executed and signed by a person on board the attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the total award. All other money claims were denied for
vessel is insufficient evidence to prove the commission of the acts constituting the grounds for the lack of merit.
dismissal of two seafarers, being uncorroborated evidence.
Petitioner then move for petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner Maersk, on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner A.P. Moller, hired
Avestruz as Chief Cook on board the vessel M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six (6) months, ISSUE: Whether respondent was illegally dismissed
with a basic monthly salary of US$698.00.6 Avestruz boarded the vessel on May 4, 2011.
HELD: It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for
In the course of the weekly inspection of the vessel’s galley, Captain Woodward noticed that the a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. If the employer fails to meet this burden, the
cover of the garbage bin in the kitchen near the washing area was oily. As part of Avestruz’s job conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and, therefore, illegal. In order to
was to ensure the cleanliness of the galley, Captain Woodward called Avestruz and asked him to discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence, which is defined as that
stand near the garbage bin where the former took the latter’s right hand and swiped it on the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
oily cover of the garbage bin, telling Avestruz to feel it. Shocked, Avestruz remarked, "Sir if you conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures.
are looking for dirt, you can find it, the ship is big. Tell us if you want to clean and we will clean
it." Captain Woodward replied by shoving Avestruz’s chest, to which the latter complained and Petitioners presented as evidence the e-mails sent by Captain Woodward, both dated June 22,
said, "Don’t touch me," causing an argument to ensue between them. 2011, and time-stamped 10:07 a.m. and 11:40 a.m., respectively, which they claim chronicled
the relevant circumstances that eventually led to Avestruz’s dismissal.
Later that afternoon, Captain Woodward summoned and required Avestruz to state in writing
what transpired in the galley that morning. Avestruz complied and submitted his written The Court, however, finds these e-mails to be uncorroborated and self-serving, and therefore,
statement on that same day. On the very same day, Captain Woodward informed Avestruz that do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence as would sufficiently discharge the
he would be dismissed from service and be disembarked in India. On July 3,2011, Avestruz was burden of proving that Avestruz was legally dismissed. On the contrary, petitioners failed to
disembarked in Colombo, Sri Lanka and arrived in the Philippines on July 4, 2011. prove that he committed acts of insubordination which would warrant his dismissal.
Subsequently, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the unexpired portion of Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence
his contract, damages, and attorney’s fees against Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Jesus Agbayani, an of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is,
officer of Maersk. He alleged that no investigation or hearing was conducted nor was he given characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been
the chance to defend himself before he was dismissed, and that Captain Woodward failed to reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had
observe the provisions under Section 17 of the Philippine Overseas Employment been engaged to discharge.
Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) on disciplinary
procedures. Also, he averred that he was not given any notice stating the ground for his In this case, the contents of Captain Woodward’s e-mails do not establish that Avestruz’s
dismissal. conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude. The same
doctrine was enunciated in Pacific Maritime Services, Inc. v. Ranay, where the Court held that
In their defense, Maersk, A.P. Moller, and Agbayani (petitioners) claimed that during his stint on the telefax transmission purportedly executed and signed by a person on board the vessel is
the vessel, Avestruz failed to attend to his tasks, specifically to maintain the cleanliness of the insufficient evidence to prove the commission of the acts constituting the grounds for the
galley, which prompted Captain Woodward to issue weekly reminders. Unfortunately, despite dismissal of two seafarers, being uncorroborated evidence.
the reminders, Avestruz still failed to perform his duties properly.
G.R. No. 128003 July 26, 2000
LA RULING: dismissed Avestruz’s complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that he failed to RUBBERWORLD [PHILS.], INC., and JULIE YAO ONG, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
perform his duty of maintaining cleanliness in the galley, and that he also repeatedly failed to RELATIONS COMMISSION, AQUINO MAGSALIN, PEDRO MAÑIBO, RICARDO BORJA, ALICIA
obey the directives of his superior, which was tantamount to insubordination. M. SAN PEDRO AND FELOMENA B. TOLIN, respondents.
NLRC RULING: sustained the validity of Avestruz’s dismissal but found that petitioners failed to
observe the procedures laid down in Section 17 of the POEA-SEC. Avestruz moved for TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF NLRC
reconsideration but it was denied. Dissatisfied, he elevated the matter to the CA via petition for
certiorari. DOCTRINE: When NLRC proceeded to decide the case despite the SEC suspension order, the NLRC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction to hear and decide cases. As a consequence, any
CA RULING: CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the NLRC and instead, found Avestruz to resolution, decision or order that it rendered or issued without jurisdiction is a nullity.
have been illegally dismissed. Consequently, it directed petitioners to pay him, jointly and
severally, the full amount of his placement fee and deductions made, with interest at twelve FACTS: Petitioner Rubberworld, a corporation established in 1965, was engaged in
percent (12%) per annum, as well as his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract, and manufacturing footwear, bags and garments. Aquilino Magsalin, Pedro Manibo, Ricardo Borja,
Benjamin Camitan, Alicia M. San Pedro, and Felomena Tolin were employed as dispatcher, Thus, the labor case would defeat the purpose of an automatic stay. To rule otherwise would
warehouseman, issue monitor, foreman, jacks cementer and outer sole attacher, respectively. open the floodgates to numerous claims and would defeat the rescue efforts of the management
committee. Besides, even if an award is given to private respondents, the ruling could not be
On August 26, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a notice enforced as long as petitioner is under management committee.
of temporary shutdown of operations to take effect on September 26, 1994. Before the
effectivity date, however, Rubberworld was forced to prematurely shut down its operations. This finds ratiocination in that the power to hear and decide labor disputes is deemed
suspended when the Securities and Exchange Commission puts the corporation under
On November 11, 1994, private respondents filed with the National Labor Relations rehabilitation.
Commission a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation
pay. Thus, when NLRC proceeded to decide the case despite the SEC suspension order, the NLRC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction to hear and decide cases. As a consequence, any
On November 22, 1994, Rubberworld filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) resolution, decision or order that it rendered or issued without jurisdiction is a nullity.
a petition for declaration of suspension of payments with a proposed rehabilitation plan.
G.R. No. 191154 April 7, 2014
LA RULING: Respondents are hereby declared guilty of ILLEGAL SHUTDOWN and that SPI TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and LEA VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, vs. VICTORIA K. MAPUA,
respondents are ordered to pay complainants their separation pay equivalent to one (1) month Respondent.
pay for every year of service. Considering the malicious act of closing the business precipitately
without due regard to the rights of complainants, moral damages and exemplary damage in the TOPIC: DISMISSAL
sum of P 50,000.00 and P 30,000.00 respectively is hereby awarded for each of the
complainants. Finally 10 % of all sums owing to complainants is hereby adjudged as attorney's DOCTRINE: It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs. Also, change in
fees. the job title is not synonymous to a change in the functions. A position cannot be abolished by a
mere change of job title. In cases of redundancy, the management should adduce evidence and
Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) alleging abuse of prove that a position which was created in place of a previous one should pertain to functions
discretion and serious errors in the findings of facts of the labor arbiter. which are dissimilar and incongruous to the abolished office.
NLRC RULING: affirmed the decision with modification deleting the award for moral and FACTS: Victoria K. Mapua alleged that she was hired in 2003 by SPI Technologies, Inc. and was
exemplary damages. the Corporate Development’s Research/Business Intelligence Unit Head and Manager of the
company. Subsequently in August 2006, the then Vice President and Corporate Development
NLRC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Head, Peter Maquera hired Elizabeth Nolan as Mapua’s supervisor. Sometime in October 2006,
the hard disk on Mapua’s laptop crashed, causing her to lose files and data.
ISSUE: Whether the Department of Labor and Employment, the Labor Arbiter and the National
Labor Relations Commission may legally act on the claims of respondents despite the order of Nolan informed Mapua that she was realigning Mapua’s position to become a subordinate of co-
the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending all actions against a company under manager Sameer Raina due to her missing a work deadline. Nolan also disclosed that Mapua’s
rehabilitation by a management committee created by the Securities and Exchange colleagues were demotivated because she was "taking things easy while they were working
Commission. very hard," and that she was "frequently absent, under timing, and coming in late every time
Maquera goes on leave or on vacation."
HELD: Presidential Decree No. 902-A is clear that "all actions for claims against corporations,
partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, Mapua obtained a summary of her attendance for the last six months to prove that she did not
tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly." The law did not make any exception in have frequent absences or under time when Maquera would be on leave or vacation. When
favor of labor claims. shown to Nolan, she was merely told not to give the matter any more importance and to just
move on. Mapua noticed that her colleagues began to ostracize and avoid her. Nolan and Raina
"The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims is to enable the started giving out majority of her research work and other duties under Healthcare and Legal
management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free Division to the rank-and-file staff. Mapua lost about 95% of her work projects and job
from any judicial or extra judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 'rescue' responsibilities.
of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of
the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources would Mapua consulted these work problems with SPI’s Human Resource Director, Lea Villanueva
be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its (Villanueva), and asked if she can be transferred to another department within SPI.
restructuring and rehabilitation." Subsequently, Villanueva informed Mapua that there is an intra-office opening and that she
would schedule an exploratory interview for her. However, due to postponements not made by
Mapua, the interview did not materialize. Mapua allegedly saw the new table of organization of On the matter of separation pay, there is no question that SPI indeed offered separation pay to
the Corporate Development Division which would be renamed as the Marketing Division. The Mapua, but the offer must be accompanied with good faith in the abolishment of the redundant
new structure showed that Mapua’s level will be again downgraded because a new manager position and fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining the redundant position. It is
will be hired and positioned between her rank and Raina’s. insignificant that the amount offered to Mapua is higher than what the law requires because the
Court has previously noted that "a job is more than the salary that it carries. There is a
Raina informed Mapua over the phone that her position was considered redundant and that she psychological effect or a stigma in immediately finding one’s self laid off from work."
is terminated from employment effective immediately. Villanueva notified Mapua that she
should cease reporting for work the next day. Her laptop computer and company mobile phone G.R. No. 189456 April 2, 2014
were taken right away and her office phone ceased to function. CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE and CARMELITA ESPINO, Petitioners, vs. ROSALINDA M.
TORRES, Respondent.
Mapua filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal, claiming
reinstatement or if deemed impossible, for separation pay. TOPIC: DISMISSAL/ CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
The Labor arbiter rendered a decision stating that there was illegal dismissal. But the NLRC DOCTRINE: Academic dishonesty is the worst offense a teacher can make because teachers
reversed the said decision. While the CA on the other hand, reinstated LA’s decision and set caught committing academic dishonesty lose their credibility as educators and cease to be
aside the NLRC’s decision. Thus, SPI filed a petition for certiorari regarding the said decision. role models for their students. More so that under Chiang Kai Shek College Faculty Manual,
leaking and selling of test questions is classified as a grave offense punishable by
ISSUE: Whether Mapua was validly separated from service on the ground of redundancy? dismissal/termination.
FACTS: Petitioner Chiang Kai Shek College is a private educational institution that offers
HELD: NO. ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. – The employer
elementary to college education to the public. Individual petitioner Carmelita Espino is the
may also terminate the employment of any employee due to installation of labor-saving devices,
Vice-President of the school. Respondent had been employed as a grade school teacher of the
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
school from July 1970 until 31 May 2003. The manner of her severance from employment is the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
matter at hand.
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination
Respondent was accused of leaking a copy of a special quiz given to Grade 5 students of
due to installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
HEKASI. Petitioners came to know about the leakage from one of the teachers of HEKASI 5,
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1)
Aileen Benabese. Ms. Benabese narrated that after giving a special quiz, she borrowed the book
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
of one of her students, Aileen Regine M. Anduyan, for the purpose of making an answer key.
losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not
When she opened Aileen’s book, a piece of paper fell. Said paper turned out to be a copy of the
due to serious business losses and financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
same quiz she had just given and the same already contained answers.
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
Respondent had admitted to leaking a copy of the HEKASI 5 special quiz. She reluctantly made
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
the admission and apologized to Mrs. Koo when the latter confronted her. She admitted during
the 28 August 2002 hearing of executing two (2) contradictory statements. On 30 August 2002,
Anent the first requirement which is written notice served on both the employee and the DOLE
the Investigating Committee found respondent guilty of leaking a copy of the special quiz.
at least one month prior to the intended date of termination, SPI had discharged the burden of
According to petitioners, their Investigating Committee had actually decided to terminate
proving that it submitted a notice to the DOLE on March 21, 2007, stating therein that the
respondent and had in fact prepared a memorandum of termination, but respondent allegedly
effective date of termination is on April 21, 2007. It is, however, quite peculiar that two kinds of
pleaded for a change of punishment.
notices were served to Mapua. One termination letter stated that its date of effectivity is on the
same day, March 21, 2007. The other termination letter sent through mail to Mapua’s residence
Respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and illegal suspension with the Labor
stated that the effective date of her termination is on April 21, 2007.
Arbiter. She also sought payment of unpaid salary, backwages, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, damages and attorney’s fees.
Explaining the discrepancy, SPI alleged that the company served a notice to Mapua on March
21, 2007, which stated that the effective date of termination is on April 21, 2007. However she
LA RULING: dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter deemed
refused to acknowledge or accept the letter. Later on, Mapua requested for a copy of the said
respondent’s suspension coupled with petitioner’s allowance of respondent’s resignation at the
letter but due to inadvertence and oversight, a draft of the termination letter bearing a wrong
end of the school year as generous acts considering the offense committed. The Labor Arbiter
effectivity date was given to her. To correct the oversight, a copy of the original letter was sent
held that there was no constructive dismissal because respondent was not coerced nor
to her through mail.
pressured to write her resignation letter.
NLRC RULING: affirming the Labor Arbiter’s findings but ordering petitioners to pay
respondent separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service DOCTRINE: It is to be borne in mind that in termination cases, the burden of proving just and
on the grounds of equity and social justice. valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result
in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
CA RULING: reversed the NLRC Decision and Resolution. That petitioner did not voluntarily
resign but was constructively dismissed. The appellate court also foreclosed any interpretation FACTS: New Imus Lumber, managed by Fernando Ambio, is a retail store dealing in lumber. It
that respondent was validly dismissed for a just cause because respondent was already meted employed Sambat on January 15, 1980 and Sunga on June 14, 1980. For the work they rendered
the penalty of suspension without pay and forfeiture of her bonuses. The appellate court found in the store for six and a half days a week, Sambat and Sunga were provided with board and
it unjust to penalize respondent twice for the same offense. lodging for which reasonable amounts were deducted from their salaries. Sambat was paid
P50.00 a day while Sunga received P48.00 a day, inclusive of allowances.
ISSUE: Whether the school’s act of imposing the penalty of suspension instead of immediate
dismissal from service at the behest of the erring employee, in exchange for the employee’s Alleging that both employees had abandoned their jobs, Fernando Ambio, on September 4,
resignation at the end of the school year, constitutes constructive dismissal. 1984, reported to the Director of the Bureau of Working Conditions of the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) that Zosimo Sunga had not reported for work (AWOL) since
HELD: There is no constructive dismissal in this case. Resignation is the voluntary act of an August 15, 1984. On June 13, 1986, Ambio made the same report stating that Sambat had also
employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed been absent without leave starting May 13, 1986.
for the favor of employment, and opts to leave rather than stay employed. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office However, on June 26, 1986, Sambat and Sunga filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in
accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the Manila a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of the
overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation emergency cost of living allowance and the 13th month pay.
must be considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment. LA RULING: finds that the New Imus Lumber had illegally dismissed Sunga and Sambat and
ordering said employer to reinstate Sunga and Sambat with backwages "corresponding to six
As Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio emphasized, academic dishonesty is the worst offense a (6) months without deduction and qualifications" and to pay their wage differential for the
teacher can make because teachers caught committing academic dishonesty lose their years 1980, 1981 and 1982, and dismissing for lack of merit the rest of the money claims raised
credibility as educators and cease to be role models for their students. More so that under by Sunga and Sambat.
Chiang Kai Shek College Faculty Manual, leaking and selling of test questions is classified as a
grave offense punishable by dismissal/termination. The New Imus Lumber appealed to the NLRC.
There is constructive dismissal when there is cessation of work, because continued NLRC RULING: Taking note of the fact that it took Sunga two years from his dismissal to file the
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion complaint, found that Sunga had abandoned his job. It also held that the said two-year period
in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act indicated Sunga's lack of intention to resume his employment with the New Imus Lumber.
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, However, the NLRC ruled that Sunga should be given separation pay due to New Imus Lumber's
likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes non-compliance with the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 prescribing a 30-day written
so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to notice to the employee stating therein the grounds for his dismissal.
forego his continued employment.
With regard to Sambat, the NLRC held that since he questioned his dismissal about two months
There was here no discrimination committed by petitioners. While respondent did not tender after he was reported by his employer as being AWOL, and there being no evidence of a clear
her resignation wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own making did not give her any other intent to relinquish his employment, the presumption of illegal dismissal should prevail.
option. With due process, she was found to have committed the grave offense of leaking test
questions. Dismissal from employment was the justified equivalent penalty. Having realized Hence, New Imus Lumber instituted the instant petition for certiorari.
that, she asked for, and was granted, not just a deferred imposition of, but also an acceptable
cover for the penalty. ISSUE: Whether the respondents has been illegally dismissed.
G.R. No. 83631. April 30, 1993. HELD: YES. Affirmed the decision of the NLRC only insofar as it orders the reinstatement
NEW IMUS LUMBER and/or FERNANDO AMBIO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR of Carlito Sambat and the dismissal for lack of merit of all other monetary claims of
RELATIONS COMMISSION and ZOSIMO SUNGA, CARLITO SAMBAT, respondents. private respondents.
The fact that private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of their
desire to return to work, thus negating the petitioner's charge of abandonment.
For lack of any other proof that private respondent Sunga did not intend to return to work, the
two-year period cannot be a gauge of such intention, much less is it indicative of laches. To
recall, a complaint founded on illegal dismissal is not an ordinary money claim but one for
reinstatement. Being in derogation of a worker's rights, the action may be brought within four
(4) years from dismissal pursuant to Art. 1146 of the Civil Code.