The Doctrine of State Immunity

SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II

162 SCRA 88 (1988) Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as
against the Republic of the Philippines on the basis that
FACTS: there was no waver by the state. Hence, the petition for
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers certiorari.
(deceased) were both employed as game room attendants in
the special services department of the US Naval Station
(NAVSTA). They were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent fulltime to permanent part-
time. Their reaction was to protect the conversion and to ISSUE:
institute grievance proceedings. The hearing officer Whether the State by virtue of the administrative order
recommended the reinstatement of private respondents to waived its immunity from suit?
permanent full-time status plus back wages. In a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau, commanding Officer of HELD:
Subic Naval Base, petitioner Sanders, Special Services NO. Firstly, recommendation made by the commission does
Director of NAVSTA, disagreed with the recommendation not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to
and asked for its rejection. Moreau, even before the start of the state. In effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of
the grievance hearings, sent a letter to the Chief of Naval action on the event that any party decides to litigate his or
Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent’s her claim. The commission is merely a preliminary venue.
status and requested concurrence therewith. Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President
Aquino may have said or done, the same are not tantamount
Private respondents filed suit for damages claiming that the to the state having waived its immunity from suit. The
letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them principle of state immunity from suit does not apply in this
to ridicule and had caused them mental anguish, and case, as when the relief demanded by the suit requires no
prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion affirmative official action on the part of the state nor the
of their personal and proprietary rights. They make it clear affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the
that petitioners were being sued in their personal capacity. A state in its political capacity, even though the officers or
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was agents who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by
filed by the petitioner and was denied. virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners performing their official duties FESTEJO VS. FERNANDO
when they did the acts for which they are being sued for 94 PHIL 504 (1954)
damages?
FACTS:
HELD: Plaintiff Carmen Festejo filed an action against defendant
YES. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the Isaias Fernando, Director of Bureau of Public Works for
petitioners are being called to account were performed by unlawfully taking possession of portions of her three parcels
them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders as of land and causing the construction of irrigation canal
director of the special services department of NAVSTA, without obtaining right of way and without her consent or
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel including the knowledge. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiff Festejo.
private respondents and had a hand in their employment, On appeal, defendant Fernando invoked his being a public
work, assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related officer of the government of the Philippines and thus, enjoys
matters. The act of Moreau is deadly official in nature, immunity from suit and should be absolved from liability for
performed by him as the immediate superior of Sanders and damages.
directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
the special department of NAVSTA. ISSUE: May defendant invoke immunity from suit?

HELD:
REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL NO. Ordinarily, the officer or employee committing the tort is
220 SCRA 124 (1993) personally liable and may be sued as any other citizen and
held answerable for whatever injury.
FACTS:
By reason of the Mendiola massacre, wherein 12 rallyists
died in their quest for “genuine agrarian reform”, President U.S.A VS. GUINTO
Aquino issued Administrative Order No.11 which created the (G.R. NO. 76607 FEBRUARY 26, 1990)
Citizen’s Mendiola Commission for the purpose of CRUZ, J.
conducting an investigation for the disorders, death and
casualties that took place. The most significant FACTS:
recommendation of the Commission was for the deceased In the first case, the private respondents are suing several
and other victims of Mendiola incident to be compensated by officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in
the government. Due to the recommendation, petitioners connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts
filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the for barber services in the base. In the second case, private
government to which the latter did not take heed. The group respondents filed a complaint for damages against private
then instituted an action for damages against the Republic of petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force
the Philippines together with military officers and personnel Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station.
involved in Mendiola incident.
In the third case, private respondent, who was employed as The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil
a barracks boy in a U.S. Base, was arrested following a buy- Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a
bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners, special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on
officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air the ground that since the officers are designated "special
Force Office of Special Investigators. He then filed a agents," the United States government should be liable for
complaint for damages against the individual petitioners their torts.
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was
removed. In the fourth case, a complaint for damages was There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability
filed by the private respondents against the private and liability and a misconception that the two terms are
petitioners, for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as synonymous. Suability depends on the consent of the state
a result of the acts of the defendants. to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can
handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued.
them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has
injuries to them. allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
These cases have been consolidated because they all sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance
involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has
moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits The said article establishes a rule of liability, not
against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting suability.
the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
The government may be held liable under this rule only if it
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of State Immunity is not first allows itself to be sued through any of the accepted
applicable thereby making the State liable forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a
HELD: special agent even if he is so denominated, as in the case at
NO. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable. bar. No less important, the said provision appears to
It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed regulate only the relations of the local state with its
on the strength of the evidence, which have been carefully inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the Philippine
examined. The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State government and not to foreign governments impleaded in
from being sued in the courts of another State without its our courts. The complaints against the petitioners in the
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of court below were aptly dismissed.
the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE,
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary INC. VS CA
to distinguish them - between sovereign and governmental (G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEMBER 25, 1992)
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now FACTS:
extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application A suit was filed against the PC Chief for failure to act on the
of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the request by petitioner seeking to set aside the findings of
United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe. PADPAO expelling it from PADPAO and considering its
application for renewal of its license even without a
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper certificate of membership from PADPAO. A Motion to
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial Dismiss was filed invoking that it is a suit against the State
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial which had not given its consent.
activities or economic affairs.
ISSUES:
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to Whether or not the action taken by the petitioners is a suit
the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have against the State.
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract Whether of not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are liable in
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case their private capacities.
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement constitute as
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the an implied consent of the State to be sued
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes. HELD:
There is no question that the United States of America, like Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief and PC-
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its SUSIA being instrumentalities of the State exercising the
non-suability if governmental function of regulating the organization and
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private operation of private detective watchmen or security guard
capacity, as in the cases at bar. It is only when the contract agencies. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its
involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did
waiver may be implied. A State may be said to have not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for the
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be purpose.
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and
PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were civil responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the
performed by them as part of their official duties, without General Hospital was not such an agent.
malice, gross negligence or bad faith, no recovery may be
held against them in their private capacities.
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA
No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute an (G.R. NO. L-26400 FEBRUARY 29, 1972)
implied consent by the State to be sued because it was MAKALINTAL, J.
intended t o professionalize the industry and to standardized
the salaries of the security guards. It is merely incidental to FACTS:
the purpose of RA No. 5487 which is to regulate the Amigable is the registered owner of a lot covered by a
organization and operation of private security agencies. The Transfer Certificate of Title, where no annotation in favor of
State is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be sued the government of any right or interest in the property
when it enters into a contract. However, it does not apply appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior
where the contact relates to the exercise of its sovereign expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
functions. portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues already existed since 1921. In
MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
(G.R. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916) Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot
TRENT, J. which had been appropriated by the government. The claim
was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it.
FACTS: Amigable then filed in the court a quo a complaint against
Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an ambulance the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
owned by the Philippine General Hospital. A driver employed capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the
by the hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to sue the recovery of ownership and possession of the land traversed
Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was enacted by the by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the
Philippine Legislature authorizing Merritt to bring suit against payment of compensatory damages for the illegal occupation
the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the of her land, moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. A suit the suit. The Government had not given its consent to be
was then filed before the CFI of Manila, which fixed the sued.
responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance driver
and determined the amount of damages to be awarded to ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the
Merritt. Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff government under the facts of the case
Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in
rendering the amount against the government. HELD:
YES. Where the government takes away property from a
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant, Government of the private landowner for public use without going through the
Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well as legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
conceded its liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act No. aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
2457 government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. The
HELD: doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as
NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the government followed the procedure indicated by the
the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by
merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such
submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter
to interpose any lawful defense. in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the
same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there
The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners
the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act would not be in the sad plaint they are now.
as special agents. A special agent is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. failure to abide by what the law requires, the government
The special agent acts in representation of the state and would stand to benefit. It is not too much to say that when
being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust the government takes any property for public use, which is
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
executive agent who is an employee of the acting judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the
administration and who on his own responsibility performs jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
his office and which are regulated by law and the invoked.
regulations. The responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered
by a definite order or commission to perform some act or REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the 204 SCRA 212 (1991)
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with some FACTS:
administrative or technical office who can be held to the The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages against private respondents Bienvenido Tantoco Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985, which
and Dominador Santiago, et al. Private respondents jointly dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for
moved “to strike out some portions of the complaint and for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on
bill of particulars of other portions”, which motion was the ground of non-suability of the State. On January 22,
opposed by the PCGG. The Sandiganbayan gave the PCGG 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with then Court of First
45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by
certain allegations. Private respondents then presented a the Land
“Motion to leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
Rules of Court”. The Sandiganbayan denied private parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate
respondents’ motions. Private respondents filed an Answer area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of
to with Compulsory Counterclaim. Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question
In response, the PCGG presented a “Reply to Counterclaim from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a
with Motion to Dismiss compulsory counterclaim.” Private Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of
respondents filed a pleading denominated “Interrogatories to Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had
Plaintiff”, and “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff” as well acquired the property by purchasefrom the heirs of
as a motion for production and inspection of documents. Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was
evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his
The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories purchase of theproperty, he took actual possession of the
and granted the motion for production and inspection of same, introduced various improvements therein and caused
documents respectively. The PCGG moved for it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved
reconsideration, arguing that the documents are privileged in by the Director of Lands on October 24,1954.
character since they are intended to be used against the
PCGG and/or its Commission in violation of Sec.4 of EO No. On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued
1, V12: roclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under
a) No civil action shall lie against the the administration of the National Resettlement and
Commission or any member thereof for anything done or Rehabilitation
omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the
Order. Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after
which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land
b) No member or staff by the Commission shall be required Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or settlers; that the property in question, while located within
administrative proceedings concerning matter within its the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was
official cognizance. the private
property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded
The Sandiganbayan promulgated two Resolutions. The first, therefrom.
denying reconsideration of the Resolution allowing
production of the documents, and the second, reiterating, by Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true
implication the permission to serve the amended owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177
interrogatories on the plaintiff. hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legally
ISSUE: Is the PCGG immune from suit? valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel
and nullify all awards to the settlers.
HELD:
NO. The state is of course immune from suit in the sense ISSUE:
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is Whether or not the State can be sued for recovery and
axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its possession of a parcel of land
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit,
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG HELD:
cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not
while assuming of an act for the State. The suggestion that permitted, except upon a showing that the State has
the State makes no implied waiver of immunity by filing a suit consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
except when in doing so it acts in, or in matters concerning, through the use of statutory language too plain to be
its proprietary or non-governmental capacity, is misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte
unacceptable. It attempts a distinction without support in at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a
principle or precedent. On the contrary, “the consent of the derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but
State to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly.” must be construed instrictissimi juris (of strictest right).
Express consent may be manifested either through a Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The
general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
the authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an
State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a act of the legislative body. Also, it is noteworthy, that as
contract. pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion
posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of
Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PABLO FELICIANO "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted
AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of
G.R. NO. 70853; MARCH 12, 1987 Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of
proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the
FACTS: original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the only in case of loss of the original.
 relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case,
These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
authenticity and validity of the "informacion devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines,
posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to undisputed a function of the government of the highest
the dubiousness of said document is the fact that order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial
"possessory information calls for an area of only 100 or business purposes.
hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano
comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 The correct test for the application of State immunity is
hectares. not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal
nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil.
312 (1949).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ
136 SCRA 487 (1985) In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to
the United States of America for the use of its military
FACTS: officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the
Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of its premises on the ground that the term of the leases had
wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay Area. Eligion and expired,
Co. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Said They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments
company was requested by telegram to confirm its price shall have been vacated.
proposals and for the name of its bonding company, and
from which it complied.
Later, the United States, through its agents, informed said THE HOLY SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO JR
company that it was not qualified to receive an award at the 238 SCRA 524 (1994)
project for the poorly completed projects it awarded to third
parties. The company sued petitioner for specific FACTS:
performance and if no longer possible, for damages. It also Lot 5-A is registered under the name of the petitioner The
asked for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the Holy See. This lot is contiguous to lots 5-B and 5-D
defendants from entering into contracts with others. registered in the name of Philippine Realty Corporation
(PRC). These three lots were sold through an agent Msgr.
The United States entered a special appearance for the Domingo Cirilos Jr. to Ramon Licup. Licup assigned his
purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over rights to private respondent Starbright Sales Ent. Inc. (SSEI).
the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of the Due to refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots, a dispute
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of the eviction and clearing the land. SSEI insists that petitioner
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign should clear the property of the squatters. Petitioner refused
which has not given its consent to this suit or any other suit and proposed that either SSEI undertake the eviction or that
for the cause of action asserted in the complaint. US filed a the earnest money be returned. Msgr. Cirilos returned the
motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The trial court P100,000.00 earnest money, and the property was sold to
denied the motion and issued a writ. Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation
(Tropicana).
ISSUE: Whether the US may be sued?
SSEI filed suit for annulment of sale, specific performance
HELD: and damages against Msgr. Cirilos, PRC, and Tropicana.
No. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State The petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss for lack of
from being sued in the courts of another State without its jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. It was
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of denied on the ground that petitioner “shed off its sovereign
the principles of independence and equality of States. immunity by entering into the business contract” in question.
However, the rules of International A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this
Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and special civil action for certiorari.
evolving. And because the activities of states have
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — ISSUE: Did the Holy See properly invoke sovereign
between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and immunity for its nonsuability?
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The
result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure HELD:
imperii. YES. In the case at bar, lot 5-A was acquired as a donation
from the archdiocese of Manila for the site of its mission or
The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule the Apostolic Nuniciature in the Philippines. The subsequent
in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in disposal was made because the squatters living thereon
Western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, made it impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of
Public International Law, pp. 207-209 the donation. Petitioner did not sell lot 5-A for profit or gain.
[1984].) There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity,
each widely held and firmly established. According to the
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
activities or economic affairs. immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard
Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of
the level of an individual and can be thus deemed to have America v. Ruiz, 136
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when the contract
SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and
International Law 194 [1984]). subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its
The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises Under Art.31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity
theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving
a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis state over any real action relating to private immovable
or an act jure imperii. property situated in the territory of the receiving state which
The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the
sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a
connected with the discharge of governmental functions. diplomatic envoy with all the more reason should immunity
This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this
which took control of nationalized business activities and case is the Holy See.
international trading. This Court has considered the following
transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts Moreover the Department of the Foreign Affairs has formally
jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of intervened and officially certified that the Embassy of the
apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the
Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding Republic of the Philippines and as such is exempt from local
for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this court.
change of employment status of base employees (Sanders The determination of the executive arm of the government
v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or
diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive
On the other hand, this Court has considered the following upon the courts. Where the plea of immunity is reacquired
transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the
jure gestionis: courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
(1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s
three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee foreign relations.
and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City,
to cater to American servicemen and the general public
(United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
[1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops 54 SCRA 84 (1973)
in Clark
Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, FACTS:
182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the
other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for Republic of the Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration
profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By award of P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent corporation.
entering into the employment contract with the cook in the After the decision became final and executory, respondent
discharge of its proprietary function, the United States judge issued an order directing the sheriff to execute the
government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign said decision, and the corresponding alias writ of execution
immunity from suit. In the absence of legislation defining was thus issued. Hence the sheriff served notices of
what activities and transactions shall be considered garnishment with several banks especially the monies due to
"commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the
have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans
may be. Bank received such notice. As certified by the AFP
Comptroller, these funds of the AFP with the said banks are
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state public funds for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its
with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act military and civilian personnel.
can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings,
regular course of business. If the foreign state is not challenges the validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or declaring the decision final and executory and subsequently
transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in issuing an alias writ of execution directed against the funds
pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for
gain or profit. ISSUE:
May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be
As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra): sued againstpublic funds?
"There is no question that the United States of America, like
any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its HELD:
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by
or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its private parties, there is corollary that public funds cannot be
sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to
be implied." be sued has been previously granted and the state’s liability
has been adjudged. Thus in the case of Commission of
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands Public Highways vs. San
in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the
said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. opinion of Justice Teehankee. The universal rule that where
the state gives its consent to be sued by private parties being a governmental entity when it entered into the
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action questioned contract, not that it could have in fact performed
only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the any act proprietary in character, but be that as it may, the
stage of execution and that the power of the courts ends claims of private respondents arising from the contract for
when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds security services clearly constitute money claims for which
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or Act 3083 gives the consent of the state to be sued.
garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is based on obvious However, when the State gives its consent to be sued, it
considerations of public policy. does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestricted
execution against it. When the State waives immunity, all it
Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
corresponding appropriations as required by law. The prove, if it can, that the state has any liability.
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot
be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific object is PNB VS. PABALAN
appropriated by law. 83 SCRA 595 (1978)

FACTS:
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC A judgment was rendered against Philippine Virginia
227 SCRA 693 (1993) Tobacco Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan
issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice of
FACTS: garnishment of the funds of respondent PVTA which were
The DAR and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). PNB
for security services to be provided by the latter to the said objected on the constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of
governmental entity. Several guards of the agency assigned a state. It alleged that such funds are public in character.
to the petitioner’s premises filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, ISSUE: Was the contention of PNB correct?
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay,
and overtime pay as well as for damages, before the HELD:
Regional Arbitration, against the petitioner and the agency. NO. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution,
The Executive Labor arbiter rendered a decision finding the what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in
petitioner and the agency jointly and severally liable for the constitutional law has been set forth in express terms: “The
payment of the money claims. The decision became final State may not be sued without its consent.” If the funds
and executory. The Labor Arbiter then issued a writ of appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in
execution which resulted in the property of the petitioner the government, then, certainly such a provision would lie a
being levied. The petitioner asserts the rule of non-suability bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Garnishment
of the State. would lie. The
Supreme Court, in a case brought by the same petitioner
ISSUE: precisely invoking such doctrine, left no doubt that the funds
Can the Department of Agriculture be sued under the of a public corporation could properly be made the object of
contract entered with the agency? a notice of garnishment.

HELD: It is well settled that when the government enters into

YES. The basic postulate under Art. X section 3 of the commercial business, its abandons its sovereign capacity
Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Manila Hotel
consent” is not absolute for it does not say that the State Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company)
may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary,
as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys “that the
State may not be sued without its consent.” Its import then is RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN
that the State may at times be sued. The State’s consent 110 SCRA 460 (1981)
may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent
may be made through a general law waiving the immunity of FACTS:
the State from suit which is found in Act 3083, where the During the height of the infamous typhoon Kading, the NPC,
Philippine government “consents and submits to be sued acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez,
upon any money claim involving liability arising from opened or caused to be opened simultaneously all the three
contract, express or implied, which could serve as basis of floodgates of the Angat Dam. The many unfortunate victims
civil action between private parties.” Implied consent on the of the man-caused flood filed with the respondent court
other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences eleven complaints for damages against the NPC and
litigation, thus opening itself to counterclaim or when it Benjamin Chavez. NPC filed separate answers to each of
enters into a contract. the eleven complaints and invoked in each answer a special
and affirmative defense that in the operation of the Angat
In this situation, the government is deemed to have Dam, it is performing a purely governmental function. Hence,
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to it cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. The rule relied The respondent court dismissed the case on the grounds
upon by the NLRC is not, however, without qualification. Not that said defendant performs a purely governmental function
all contracts entered into by the government operate as a in the operation of the Angat Dam and cannot therefore be
waiver of its non-suability. Distinction must still be made sued for damages in the instant cases in connection
between one which was executed in the exercise of its therewith.
sovereign function and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity. In the instant case, the petitioner has
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its
ISSUE: Was the NPC performing a governmental function the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. filed suit in
with respect to the management and operation of the Angat the CFI against the Customs Arrastre Service and the
Dam? Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered
cases plus other damages.
HELD: The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
YES. However, it is not necessary to determine whether the ground that not being a person under the law,
NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the defendants cannot be sued. After the plaintiff opposed the
management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient motion, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
to say that the government has organized a private neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of
corporation, put money in it and has allowed itself to sue and Customs is suable.
be sued in any court under its charter. As a government
owned and controlled corporation, it has personality of its ISSUE: Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of
own, distinct and separate from that of the government. Customs be sued?
Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can sue and be
sued in any court is without qualification on the cause of HELD:
action as the one instituted by the petitioners. NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery
of the national government in the operations of arrastre
service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and a
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. BUREAU OF PRINTING necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is
EMPLOYEES immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary. The
ASSOCIATION Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from
1 SCRA 340 (1961) that of the government. Its primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from
FACTS: imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees,
Bureau of Printing Employees Association filed a case charges, fines, and penalties. To this function, arrastre is a
against herein petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin necessary incident. Although said arrastre function is
Salvador, and Mariano Ledesma. The complaint alleged that deemed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the
Salvador and Ledesma have been engaging in unfair labor primary and governmental function of the Bureau of
practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily
the Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the render said Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not
complaining association, in the exercise of their right to self- perform its governmental function without necessarily
organization, and by discriminating in regard to hiring and exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity granted as to the
tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from end should not be denied as to the necessary means to that
pursuing their union activities. Answering the complaint, end.
Salvador and Ledesma denied the charges, and contended
that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue
and be sued. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION VS COURT OF
APPEALS
ISSUE: Can the Bureau of Printing be sued? 167 SCRA 28 (1988)

HELD: FACTS:
NO. As a government office, without any juridical capacity, it Ernest Simke went to Manila International Airport to meet his
cannot be sued. The Bureau of Printing is an instrumentality future son-in-law. While walking towards the viewing deck or
of the government; it operates under the direct supervision of the terrace to get a better view of the incoming passengers,
the Executive Secretary. It is designed to meet the printing he slipped over an elevation about four inches high, and he
needs of the government. It is primarily a service bureau. It fell on his back and broke his thigh bone. He filed an action
is obviously not engaged in business or occupation for for damages based on quasi-delict with the CFI of Rizal
pecuniary profit. It has no corporate existence. Its against the Civil Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the
appropriations are provided for in the budget. It is not subject entity empowered to administer, operate, manage, control,
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. maintain, and develop the MIA. Judgment was rendered in
his favor, and on appeal to the Court of Appeals, judgment
Any suit, action or proceeding against the Bureau of Printing was affirmed.
would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the
government itself. The government cannot be sued without ISSUE: Whether the CAA, being an agency of the
its consent, much less over its objection. government, can be made a party defendant?

HELD:
YES. Not all government entities whether corporate or not
are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by
the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized. The CAA is not immune from suit it being
MOBIL PHILS. EXPLORATION, INC. VS. CUSTOMS engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. It is
ARRASTRE engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive
SERVICE prerogative of the state, may more than the construction of
18 SCRA 1120 (1966) public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. The CAA
was created not to maintain a necessity of the government,
FACTS: but to run what is essentially a business even if the revenues
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel
consigned to Mobil Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later and the convenience of the traveling public.
delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of
 deplorable though, it may be imposed on the municipality no
MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS. JUDGE FIRME duty to pay the monetary compensation.
195 SCRA 692 (1991)

FACTS: MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN VS.

Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, is a FERNANDEZ
municipality corporation. Respondent Judge Romeo N. 130 SCRA 56 (1984)
Firme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding
judge, while private respondents are heirs of the deceased FACTS:
Laureano Banina, Sr. On December 16, 1965, a collision In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of Bulacan rendered
occurred involving a passenger jeep, a gravel and sand judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to
truck, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, respondents
La Union which was driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the Imperio, et al. When the judgment became final, respondent
impact, several passengers of the jeep including Banina, Sr. judge issued a writ of execution to satisfy the same.
died. The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for Petitioner municipality filed a motion to quash the writ on the
damages against the owner and driver of the passenger ground that the municipality’s property or funds are public
jeep. However, the aforesaid defendant filed a third party exempt from execution. The motion was denied. The
complaint against the petitioner and the driver of the dump respondent judge issued another order requiring both the
truck of the petitioner. municipal and provincial treasurer to comply with the money
judgment. When the treasurers failed to do so, respondent
Thereafter, the private respondents amended the complaint judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be
wherein the petitioner and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig released upon compliance, hence the present petition.
were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner
filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack ISSUE: Whether the funds of the municipality in the hands of
of cause of action, non-suability of the state, prescription of the Provincial and Municipal Treasurers of Bulacan and San
cause of action, and the negligence of the owner and driver Miguel, respectively are public funds which are exempt from
of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause of the execution?
collision.
HELD:
On October 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision for YES. Municipal funds in possession of municipal and
the plaintiffs, and defendants Municipality of san Fernando, provincial treasurers are public funds exempt from
La Union and execution. The reason for those was explained in the case of
Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally the Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois ‘that are held in trust for
plaintiffs. The complaint against the driver and the owner of the people intended and used for the accomplices of the
the passenger jeep was dismissed. Petitioner filed a motion purposes for which municipal corporations are created and
for reconsideration and for a new trial. However, respondent that to subject said properties and public funds to execution
judge issued another order denying the motion for would materially impede, even defeat and in some instance
reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of time. destroy said purpose.” Thus it is clear that all the funds of
Hence, this petition. petitioner municipality in the possession of the Municipal
Treasurer of San Miguel as well as those in the possession
ISSUE: Whether the municipality is liable for the tort of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan are also public funds
committed by its employee? and as such they are exempt from execution.

HELD: Besides PD 447, known as the Decree on Local Fiscal

NO. The test of liability of the municipality depends on Administration, provides in section 3 (a) that “no money shall
whether or not the driver acting in behalf of the municipality be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
is performing governmental or proprietary functions. It has appropriation or other specific statutory authority.” Otherwise
already been remarked that municipal corporations are stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the
suable because their charters grant them the competence to form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid
for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown Sangguniang Bayan has passed any ordinance to this effect.
that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the state merely gives the claimants
the right to show the defendant was not acting in its MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted or that 190 SCRA 206 (1990)
the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law.
Failing this, the claimants cannot recover. FACTS:
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the An expropriation proceeding was initiated by petitioner
municipality insists that he was on his way to Naguilan River Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral
to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of the San Finance Creditors Consortium Inc., Home Building System
Fernando municipal street. In the absence of any evidence and Reality Corp., and Arceli P. Jo involving a parcel of land
to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official and improvements thereon located at San Antonio Village,
duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was Makati. An action for eminent domain was filed. Attached to
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. After the petitioner’s complaint was a certification that a bank
careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, account had been opened with the PNB. After the decision
we arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be has become final and executory, a writ of execution was
held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, issued and a notice of garnishment was served upon the
who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental manager of PNB where the petitioner had bank accounts.
functions. Hence, the death of the passenger, tragic and However, the sheriff was informed that a hold code was
placed on the account of the petitioner.he petitioner positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees
contended that its funds at the PNB cocked neither be assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973
garnished nor levied upon execution for to do so would result declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all
in the disbursement of public funds without the proper the dismissed employees and the payment of their back-
appropriation required under the law. wages and other emoluments. The City Government
appealed the decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the
In a petition with the Court of Appeals, petitioner alleges for City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her
the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB, back-wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City
one exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries
with the outstanding balance of P99, 743. 94. The other (supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to release the
account was for the obligations and other purposes of the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that
municipal government with a balance of P170,098,421.72. Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992
Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the
ISSUE: Whether the bank account of a municipality may be motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000. The
levied on execution to satisfy a money judgment against it amount was given to Santiago. The City Government
absent showing that the municipal council has passed an questioned the validity of the sale of motor vehicle;
ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount properties of the municipality were exempt from execution.
corresponding to the balance due to the RTC decision?
Judge Allarde denied the motion and directed the sheriff to
HELD: levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. On
YES. Since the first PNB account was specifically opened for October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed
expropriation proceedings it has initiated over the subject Ordinance No. 0134 which included the amount of
property, there is no objection to the garnishment or levy P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus
under execution of funds therein amounting to interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer
P4,965,506.40, the funds garnished in excess of to release the check but the City Treasurer can’t do so
P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7,
municipal government. Other statutory obligations are 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately
exempted from execution without the proper appropriation garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan
required under the law. The funds deposited in the 2nd PNB corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of
account are public funds of the municipal government. The garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City
rule is well-settled that public funds are not subject to levy Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment
and execution, unless otherwise provided by the statute. was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any
damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds
More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether of the city.
real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot
be attached and sold on execution sale to satisfy a money
judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues ISSUE:
derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to satisfy
financing governmental activities and functions of the Santiago’s claim.
municipality are exempt from execution. The foregoing rule
finds application in the case at bar. HELD:
Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means
This is not to say that private respondents are left with no of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of
legal recourse. When a municipality fails or refuses without the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed
justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the The rule is and has always been that all government funds
remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds. The court instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit,
will not condone petitioner’s blatant refusal to settle its remain government funds and may not be subject to
obligation arising from an expropriation proceeding it has in garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
fact initiated. Within the context of the state’s inherent power appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to
of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner courts ends when the judgment is rendered. Although the
of the land but also the payment of the land within a liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state
reasonable time from its taking. The state’s power of is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the
eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment
fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that against the state.
valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be
paid is fixed, and the municipal has had more than Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to
reasonable time to pay full compensation. satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication
that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and
make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule
CITY OF CALOOCAN VS. ALLARDE is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that
G.R. NO. 107271; SEPTEMBER 10, 2003 is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required
by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be
FACTS: legally enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City
In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the Council of Caloocan already approved and passed
position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount
of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back-wages plus interest. This
case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment
of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such
funds.