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SELECT SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON AGRARIAN LAW

2008

DELA CRUZ v. QUIAZON, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008

Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner

of a parcel of land brought under the coverage of PD 27. In 1981, Feliciano
dela Cruz, a tenant-farmer, was issued a CLT over a 3.7200-hectare portion
of the said property. In 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver adjudicating among
themselves all the properties left by both of their parents, except for the
subject property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of respondent.
In 1993, A, Quiazon filed a Complaint with the PARAD against petitioner
Ferdinand dela Cruz, alleging that in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract
with A. Quiazon, by virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of
palay as rental. Since 1991, petitioner F. dela Cruz allegedly failed to deliver
the stipulated rental because he had already abandoned the landholding. For
this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment from the property and the
termination of their tenancy relationship
1. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
Citing Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 178-179 [1996]:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a
party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. Indeed, relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise, the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which
had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
2. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER — EFFECT
Citing Planters Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December
9, 2005, 477 SCRA 185, 199;Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, G.R. No.
60269, September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 536, 540:
The issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the holder.

Citing Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004,
433 SCRA 195, 203-204:
The issuance of the CLT does not sever the tenancy relationship
between the landowner and the tenant-farmer. A certificate of land
transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified to avail
himself of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of
the land tilled by him as provided under P.D. No. 27. It is not a
muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee absolute ownership
of his tillage.

CitingPagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA
252, 259:

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It is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle a

farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the
vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding — a right which
then would have become fixed and established, and no longer open
to doubt or controversy. HTcDEa

3. PERSONALITY OF LANDOWNER TO RAISE ABANDONMENT

Citing Estolas v. Mabalot, 431 Phil. 462, 469 [2002]:
For this reason, the landowner retains an interest over the property that gives him
the right to file the necessary action to evict the tenant from the landholding
should there be an abandonment despite the fact that land acquired under P.D.
No. 27 will not revert to the landowner.
4. ABANDONMENT
Citing Corpuz v. Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1111 (2000):
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or
claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that
intention is expressed or carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a
departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the
right and the interest that have been abandoned.
Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA
97, 106-107;Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 238 (2004);Palele v. Court of
Appeals, 414 Phil. 417, 429 (2001):
The immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the U.S.A. did not necessarily
result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that one of his sons,
petitioner Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the land. Personal cultivation,
as required by law, includes cultivation of the land by the tenant (lessee) himself
or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to the members of
the family of the tenant and other persons who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him in the [agricultural] activities.
5. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER —
RETENTION/CANCELLATION
Citing Daez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 742, 754 (2000):
Without doubt, the landowner's right of retention may be exercised over tenanted
land despite the issuance of a CLT to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the
cancellation of a CLT over the subject landholding as a necessary consequence of
the landowner's exercise of his right of retention is within the jurisdiction of the
DAR Secretary, not the DARAB, as it does not involve an agrarian dispute.
In Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
93045, June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 545),the Court sustained the authority
or jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary to cancel the CLT issued to tenant-
beneficiaries after the landowners' right to retain the subject landholding
was upheld. The Court ruled that the issuance, recall or cancellation of
certificates of land transfer falls within the Secretary's administrative
jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. No. 27.
6. COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT
Citing Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 264 (1997):
To conclude, respondent's remedy is to raise before the DAR Secretary the matter
of cancellation of petitioner's CLT as an incident of the order granting the
landowners' application for retention over the said landholding. In the same forum,
petitioners can raise the issue of the validity of the DAR order granting the
application for retention based on their claim of denial of due process, or in a

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separate action specifically filed to assail the validity of the judgment. A collateral
attack against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void
upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.
xxx xxx xxx
2009

LAND BANK v. PACITA AGRICULTURAL MULTI-PURPOSE

COOPERATIVE, G.R. No. 177607, January 19, 2009

Eight parcels of land with an aggregate area of 34.96 hectare was placed
under the coverage of OLT. Between the years 1978 to 1983 CLTs were
issued to farmer beneficiaries. Between 1986 to 1990, EPs were issued. In
1986 and, LBP paid AAC P35, 778, the amount of only two of the eight
parcels of land. Thereafter, AAC sold the landholding to Pacita. Pacita then
inquired from LBP regarding the price of the remaining six parcels. LBP
valued the same at P148,172, which was refused by Pacita. Upon the
passage of DAR AO, Series of 1994, a 6% per year increment on the value of
land from the date it was taken up to October 1994 shall be imposed. Hence,
the value was increased to P537,538. However, the said value was still
refused by Pacita, which then filed a complaint for determination of just
compensation before the SAC. It asked that the value of the remaining
parcels be pegged at 2.7M.
1. JUST COMPENSATION — WHEN COMPUTED
The instant case involves a closely similar factual milieu as that
in Natividadand Meneses.The DAR acquired the subject property in 1972
through its Operation Land Transfer Program, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27. Since then, the subject property has already been
distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries who, since then, have exclusively
possessed the same and harvested its produce. Eventually, the
Emancipation Patents were issued in the beneficiaries' favor. Even after
the lapse of 23 years — from 1972, when the DAR took the subject land
property, until 1995, when respondent filed its Petition before the SAC —
the full payment of just compensation due respondent has yet to be made
by petitioner. These circumstances, the same as
inNatividad andMeneses, make it more equitable for the SAC to
determine the just compensation due the respondent for the remainder of
the subject property using values at the time of its payment.
xxx xxx xxx

LANDICHO v. SIA, G.R. No. 169472, January 20, 2009

The Aragons were the owners of a parcel of land tenanted by Arcadio
Landicho. Upon the latter's death, his son Francisco Landicho succeeded him
in his tenancy. Francisco Landicho cultivated the landholding with the help of
his son Buenaventura Landicho and his brother Federico Landicho.
Subsequently, he surrendered his tenancy rights over the landholding in favor
of E. Zolota, wife of one of the Aragons as per aKasulatan. Despite the
execution of theKasulatan, F. Landicho, et al. continued in the possession and
cultivation of the landholding. Years after, anotherKasulatan evidencing the
surrender of rights was executed. On the day of the execution of the
secondKasulatan, the Aragons sold the subject landholding to Sia who
managed to convert the use of the land for residential purpose without a DAR

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clearance. Thus, the Landichos filed a complaint for disturbance

compensation. TcCSIa

1. TENANCY — ESTABLISHMENT
Citing RA 1199:
A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the
landholder, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to
continue working on and cultivating the land.
2. TENANCY — QUANTUM OF PROOF
Citing Heirs of Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170346, March 12,
2007, 518 SCRA 202, 214-215, citingBerenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-60287, August 17, 1988, 164 SCRA 431, 438-439:
The petitioners cannot rely on their self-serving statements to prove the existence
of a tenancy relationship because independent and concrete evidence, aside from
self-serving statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of
harvests, or consent of the landowner.
3. CULTIVATION — INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH TENANCY
Citing Danan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132759, October 25, 2005,
474 SCRA 113, 126:
A tiller or a farmworker does not automatically become an agricultural tenant
recognized under agrarian laws by mere occupation or cultivation of an
agricultural land.
4. ELEMENT OF TENANCY — SHARING OF HARVESTS
Citing Cornelio de Jesus, et al. v. Moldex Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 153595,
November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 316:
Independent evidence, such as receipts, must be presented to show that there
was a sharing of the harvest between the landowner and the tenant. And,
assuming the landowners received a share of the harvest, that the fact of receipt,
without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso factocreate a tenancy.
5. IMPLIED TENANCY
Acquiescence by the landowner of their cultivation of the land does not
create an implied tenancy if the landowners have never considered
petitioners Federico and Buenaventura as tenants of the land and if the
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are lacking. There was no
intention to institute the petitioners as agricultural tenants.
Citing Epitacio Sialana v. Mary Y. Avila, et al., G.R. No. 143598, July 20,
2006, 495 SCRA 501:
For an implied tenancy to come about, the actuations of the parties taken in their
entirety must be demonstrative of an intent to continue a prior lease established
by the landholder.
6. CAPACITY TO GIVE CONSENT
Citing Mario J. Mendezona v. Julio H. Ozamiz, et al., 426 Phil. 888, 906
(2002):
A person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by
reason of physical infirmities. It is only when such age or infirmities impair the
mental faculties to such extent as to prevent one from properly, intelligently, and
fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated.
7. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF PUBLIC INSTRUMENT

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It is also important to note that both the 1976 and 1987Kasulatan are duly
notarized and are considered as public documents evidencing the
surrender of Francisco's tenancy rights over the subject landholdings.
They were executed with all the legal formalities of a public document and
thus the legal presumption of the regularity and validity of
the Kasulatanare retained in the absence of full, clear and convincing
evidence to overcome such presumption. Strong evidence is required to
prove a defect of a public instrument, and since such strong and
convincing evidence was not presented in the instant case, the 1976 and
the 1987 Kasulatanare presumed valid.
xxx xxx xxx
CASTILLO v. TOLENTINO, G.R. No. 181525, March 4, 2009
Tolentino was the owner of two parcels of land and a caretaker of another. The
said parcels were tenanted by Castillo who promised to remit lease rentals to
Tolentino. Castillo wrote the PARO informing the latter of his intention to
construct a water reservoir. Tolentino also received a copy of the letter and
opposed the same. Despite this, Castillo proceeded with the construction of the
water dike. Tolentino filed a case for ejectment. PARAD ruled for the ejectment
of Castillo. DARAB initially affirmed the Decision but reversed itself in a Motion
for Reconsideration. CA reinstated the Decision of the PARAD since it held that
the appeal was filed out of time.
1. OBLIGATIONS OF A TENANT WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRUCTION
OF IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LANDHOLDING
Section 32 of R.A. No. 3844 specifically requires notice to and consent of
the agricultural lessor before the agricultural lessee may embark upon the
construction of a permanent irrigation system. It is only when the former
refuses to bear the expenses of construction that the latter may choose to
shoulder the same. More importantly, any change in the use of tillable
land in the leasehold, e.g.through the construction of a sizeable water
reservoir, impacts upon the agricultural lessor's share in the harvest,
which is the only consideration he receives under the agrarian law. This
being the case, before the agricultural lessee may use the leasehold for a
purpose other than what had been agreed upon, the consent of the
agricultural lessor must be obtained, lest he be dispossessed of his
leasehold.
The law (Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 3844) does not give blanket authority to the
agricultural lessee to construct an irrigation system at anytime and for any
reason; instead, it presupposes primarily that the same is necessary.
2. IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF A TENANT
The fact that CASTILLO was convicted by final judgment of an offense
against TOLENTINO's son, George, demonstrates how relations between
the two have deteriorated. While R.A. No. 3844 authorizes termination by
the agricultural lessee of the lease for a crime committed by the
agricultural lessor against the former or any member of his immediate
farm household, the same privilege is not granted to the agricultural
lessor. Yet, this does not mean that the courts should not take into
account the circumstance that the agricultural lessee committed a crime
against the agricultural lessor or any member of his immediate family. By
committing a crime against TOLENTINO's son, CASTILLO violated his
obligation to his lessor to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith, an obligation that is deemed included in

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his leasehold agreement. Provisions of existing laws form part of and are
read into every contract without need for the parties expressly making
reference to them.
3. VIOLATION OF OBLIGATION OF A TENANT — GROUND FOR
DISPOSSESSION
In sum, we hold that the construction of the reservoir constitutes a
violation of Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been agreed upon, and a
violation of the leasehold contract between CASTILLO and TOLENTINO,
for which the former is hereby penalized with permanent dispossession of
his leasehold. SEAHcT

4. SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY

Citing Bautista v. Mag-isa, G.R. No. 152564, September 13, 2004, 438
SCRA 259; Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110335, June 18,
2001, 358 SCRA 598:
Agrarian laws were enacted to help small farmers uplift their economic status by
providing them with a modest standard of living sufficient to meet their needs for
food, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities. It provides the answer to the
urgent need to alleviate the lives of the vast number of poor farmers in our
country. Yet, despite such laws, the majority of these farmers still live on a hand-
to-mouth existence. This can be attributed to the fact that these agrarian laws
have never really been effectively implemented. Certain individuals have
continued to prey on the disadvantaged, and as a result, the farmers who are
intended to be protected and uplifted by the said laws find themselves back in
their previous plight or even in a more distressing situation.
Citing De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72282, July 24,
1989, 175 SCRA 559:
R.A. No. 3844, or the Agricultural Land Reform Code, was enacted by Congress
to institute land reforms in the Philippines. It was passed to establish owner-
cultivatorship and the family size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture; to
achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial
restraints and practices; as well as to make the small farmers more independent,
self-reliant and responsible citizens and a source of genuine strength in our
democratic society.
R.A. 3844 and R.A. 6389, being social legislations, are designed to
promote economic and social stability and must be interpreted liberally to
give full force and effect to their clear intent, not only in favor of the
tenant-farmers but also of landowners.
5. SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY — NOT INTENDED TO COUNTENANCE
WRONGDOING
We cannot allow a situation where — despite the one-sided nature of the
law governing agricultural leasehold tenancy (R.A. No. 3844), which
exceedingly favors the agricultural lessee/tenant and farmworker — the
agricultural lessee has shown lack of courtesy to the landowner and,
instead, abused his rights under said law, at the same time neglecting or
willfully refusing to take advantage of his rights under the comprehensive
agrarian reform law which would have otherwise fulfilled its mandate to
provide land for the landless. The primary purpose, precisely, of agrarian
reform is the redistribution of lands to farmers and regular farmworkers
who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement.
The law recognizes and condones that a leasehold tenant may have his
own land while he tills that of another, but certainly we cannot see any

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justification why a tenant should give away for free and sell his own
agricultural land until nothing is left, and then insist himself on someone
else's — without giving the landowner the proper respect and regard that
is due him, acting presumptuously and beyond his stature as mere
agricultural lessee.
Citing Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120363, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 819:
The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply
because it is committed by the underprivileged. Compassion for the poor is an
imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal
claiming an undeserved privilege.
xxx xxx xxx
MERCADO v. MERCADO, G.R. No. 178672, March, 19 2009
The grandfather of Edmundo Mercado was the owner of a parcel of land
tenanted by Julio Mercado. J. Mercado was issued a CLT, and subsequently,
an EP covering the landholding. Having been designated in his
grandfather'sHuling Habilin, E. Mercado was able to obtain a Certificate of
Retention. Thus, he filed a complaint for the cancellation of the EP, alleging
that the same had been irregularly issued, and ejectment on the ground of
deliberate non-payment of lease rentals. The PARAD declared the validity of
the EP. The said Decision was reversed by the DARAB, ordering the ejecment
of J. Mercado. No appeal having been taken within the reglementary period,
the DARAB Decision became final and executory.
1. IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT
Citing Biglang-awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. 158998, March
28, 2008, 550 SCRA 160, 177:
The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long become final and
executory, hence, immutable and unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law. Excepted from this rule is when the modification involves correction of
1) clerical errors, 2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and 3) void judgments. None of these exceptions is present in the case at bar,
however.
2. JURISDICTION — DARAB
Citing Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5,
2006, 489 SCRA 556, 563:
Jurisdiction over a case does not thus disappear the moment a certificate of title is
issued, for the issuance of such certificate is not a mode of transfer of property but
merely an evidence of such transfer.
3. JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL
Citing Hermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5,
2006, 489 SCRA 556, 563:
IN ANY EVENT, petitioner may not question the jurisdiction of the DARAB and its
adjudicative arm at this late juncture of the proceedings, he having actively
participated in the proceedings below. acADIT

4. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Respecting the affirmance by the appellate court of the denial by the
DARAB of petitioner's Petition for Relief from Judgment, Rule XVI of the
2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides the following conditions for
availing of such relief:

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Section 1. Petition for Relief from Decision/Resolution/Final Order. When a

decision/resolution/final order is rendered by the adjudicator against any party,
through fraud, accident, mistake, and excusable negligence and such party has
no other adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law, he may
file a petition for relief with said adjudicator, praying that the
decision/resolution/final order be set aside. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2. Form and Time of Filing of Petition. A petition for relief must be
verified and a copy thereof together with its annexes and supporting affidavits, if
any, must be furnished to the adverse party or parties and filed within sixty (60)
days from the time the fraud, mistake or excusable negligence was discovered
and within six (6) months after the decision/resolution/final order was rendered.
(Underscoring supplied)
Relief from judgment is thus available only against the decision of an
adjudicator, to be filed before the adjudicator, when the party seeking it
has no other adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary course of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
REYNALDO v. YATCO, G.R. No. 165494, March 20, 2009
DCN 3361
Belizario was the owner of a 4.3 hectare parcel of land which she donated to
Tomas Yatco as evidence by a Deed of Donation inter vivos. Said land was
tenanted by Aguido Levardo who subsequently executed aPinanumpaang
Salaysay signed by him and his children, waiving his rights as tenant. A.
Levardo received 2M as disturbance compensation. T. Yatco sold the
landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The Levardos filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation, Deed of Sale and the waiver of
rights.
DCN 3362
Leoncio Yatco was the owner of a 4.2 hectare parcel of land which was
tenanted by Francisco and his son Hernando Levardo. F. Levardo likewise
executed a similarPinanumpaang Salaysay waiving his rights as tenant. F.
Levardo received 2.4M as disturbance compensation. L. Yatco thereafter sold
the landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The Levardos filed a complaint for
the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation, Deed of Sale and the waiver
of rights.
In both cases, the plaintiffs grounded their causes of action on the claim that
the land in dispute was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). They contend that they were already
deemed the owners of the land on the basis of an alleged Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) in the name of their father Aguido, which was never issued by
the DAR, but on the basis of an alleged certified xerox copy of a Masterlist of
tenants wherein his name appeared.
1. PD 27 — COVERAGE
P.D. No. 27 should be read in conjunction with Letter of Instruction No.
474 (LOI No. 474) and the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines
on Retention by Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 (DAR
Memorandum). The pertinent portion of LOI No. 474 is as follows:
1. You shall undertake to place the Land Transfer Program of the government
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of
seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands
of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate

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income to support themselves and their families. (Emphasis and underscoring

supplied)
The pertinent portion of the DAR Memorandum is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be
covered by Operation Land Transfer. The relation of the land owner and tenant-
farmers in these areas shall be leasehold . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the lands in dispute do not fall
under the coverage of P.D. No. 27. The DAR Memorandum is categorical
that lands with seven hectares or less shall not be covered by OLT.
2. TERMINATION OF LEASEHOLD BY PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION
Based on the evidence on record, respondents paid Aguido
P2,000,000.00 and Hernando P2,417,142.00 as disturbance
compensation. A reading of thePinanumpaang Salaysayexecuted by
petitioners show that they gave up their leasehold rights"dahil sa aming
kagustuhang umiba ng hanap buhay ng higit ang pagkikitaan kaysa
panakahan."The money given by respondents as disturbance
compensation was indeed advantageous to the families of petitioners, as
it would have allowed them to pursue other sources of livelihood.
3. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER — EFFECT
CitingPagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA
252:
Moreover, assumingarguendothat CLTs were actually issued to petitioners, a
CLT does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described
therein. At most, the CLT merely evidences the government's recognition of
the grantee as partly qualified to await the statutory mechanism for the
acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided in P.D. No. 27.
Neither is this recognition permanent or irrevocable.
xxx xxx xxx
LAKEVIEW GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG
NAYON, G.R. No. 171253, April 16, 2009
Lakeview was the owner of a 60-hectare parcel of land. The DAR issued a
Notice of Coverage and served a Notice of Acquisition upon Lakeview. The
latter opposed the coverage alleging that: (1) the subject property is not
agricultural having been projected as a golf course prior to 1988; (2) that the
development for its conversion and utilization has already been commenced;
(3) that it is generally mountainous with major portions having a slope of over
18% and minimal topsoil; and (4) that it has no tenant or farmworker since the
alleged farmer-beneficiaries are mere intruders who entered the subject
property. OSEC denied the protest and directed the acquisition of the
landholding. CLOAs were then issued and registered.
1. JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE —
DAR SECRETARY
Citing Aninao v. Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 160420, July
28, 2005, 464 SCRA 526, 540:
Noteworthy, the afore-cited Section 2 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00 also
provides that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify
landholdings for coverage under the CARP, including protests or oppositions
thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. The matter of CARP coverage is
strictly an administrative implementation of the CARP whose competence belongs

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to the DAR Secretary. Significantly, the DAR Secretary had already denied
petitioner's protest and determined that the subject property was covered by the
CARP. Such ruling was even affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court.
Absent palpable error by these bodies, of which this Court finds none, their
determination as to the coverage of the subject property under the CARP is
controlling. HAaDcS

xxx xxx xxx

HERMOSO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009
Two lots which form part of a bigger parcel of land were tenanted. The tenants
filed an application for the coverage of the landholding under PD 27. The said
application was granted but the issuance of EP in favor of the applicants was
suspended because a separate case for the declaration of tenancy relationship
was filed by the said applicants with the DARAB. In the latter case, the DARAB
ruled that tenancy relationship existed. Subsequently, the applicants moved for
the issuance of EPs in their favor. The OSEC approved the same. However,
upon review by the OP where the owners raised the issue that the landholding
was not within the ambit of PD 27, it having been previously reclassified by the
OSEC as suited for residential, commercial, industrial and urban purposes.
1. CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two
types, i.e.,primary classification and secondary classification. The primary
classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3,
Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution,
however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may
further be classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as
secondary classification. Under existing laws, Congress has granted
authority to a number of government agencies to effect the secondary
classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial
or other urban uses.
2. COVERAGE UNDER PD 27
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage
of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is
agricultural. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as
follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.
and Section 3 (b) specifies agricultural activity as:
(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be
considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the
subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before
petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.
3. CONVERSION UNDER RA 3844 AS AMENDED BY RA 6389

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Citing De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156965, October 12,

2006, 504 SCRA 238, 249:
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to implement the
conversion of the agricultural land to non-agricultural purposes within a certain
period was deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory law, the condition
imposed on the landowner to implement the conversion of the agricultural land to
a non-agricultural purpose within a certain period was deleted. The remedy left
available to the tenant is to claim disturbance compensation.
xxx xxx xxx
SOLIMAN v. PASUDECO, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009
Dalmacio Sicat was the owner of a 10 hectare parcel of land. He offered to sell
the subject property to PASUDECO to be used as a housing complex for
PASUDECO's laborers and employees. The land was initially offered for sale at
the price of P8.00 per square meter. This was later reduced to P5.00 per
square meter. The Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution
authorizing the purchase of the subject property at P4.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed a Petition seeking approval of
the voluntary surrender of the subject property with payment of disturbance
compensation. The voluntary surrender was approved and the tenancy relation
was extinguished on the date they entered into the agreement. A Deed of Sale
with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter,
the documents needed for the conversion of the land to residential purposes
were prepared. TCT in favor PASUDECO was then issued and registered.
However, due to financial distress, PASUDECO did not complete the
construction. For the meantime, though, it did not authorize any person to
occupy the landholding.
Petitioners alleged that in 1970, the manager of PASUDECO made one Ciriaco
Almario his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from petitioners.
In turn, C. Almario remitted the rentals to the manager. In May 1990, C.
Almario certified that petitioners were the actual tenant-tillers of the subject
property. Moreover, petitioners deposited their alleged rentals with the LBP.
The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the
development of the property into a housing project for its employees in the
latter part of April 1990. In May 1990, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before the PARAD to restrain him from
harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective landholdings. Petitioners
together with armed men, entered the property and destroyed some of their
crops. Traversing the complaint, the manager raised as one of his defenses the
fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property.
1. TENANCY — ESTABLISHMENT
Citing Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002, 388 SCRA
471, 481-482:
Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an
agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section
4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either express or implied.
By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy
system and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The
other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in
writing.
2. IMPLIED TENANCY

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Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject

property without opposition, does not mean that PASUDECO impliedly
recognized the existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and
continued possession of the land will notipso facto make one a de jure
tenant, because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists is intent.
3. ELEMENT OF TENANCY — CONSENT
Citing Masaquel v. Orial, G.R. No. 148044, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA
51, 63and Bautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000, 326
SCRA 234, citingLastimoza v. Blanco, 110 Phil. 835, 838 [1961]).
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the
property, and not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to
the property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise would allow collusion among
the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder. cCaSHA

4. ACTUAL AND CONTINUED POSSESSION — NOT DETERMINATIVE

OF TENANCY
Citing Nicorp Management and Development Corporation v. Leonida de
Leon, G.R. No. 176942 and G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008:
Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one ade
jure tenant, because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists is intent.
5. QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE SHARING — SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
Citing Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401
SCRA 666, 690-691:
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied
by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate to prove the element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a
receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving
statements are inadequate.
6. CERTIFICATION ATTESTING TO TENANT STATUS — NOT BINDING
UPON JUDICIARY
Citing Salmorin v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 169691, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA
564, 571-572:
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de juretenants are
insufficient. In a given locality, the certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform or an authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC, concerning
the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending
parties, is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification
does not bind the judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
TARONA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009
Respondents Leanos were the owners of the landholding which was registered
in the name of their now deceased mother. They filed a complaint for recovery
of the landholding against the Taronas who claimed to be successor-tenants
(their uncle allegedly having been recognized by the respondents' father as
such tenant as per a leasehold agreement between the two). The Leanos
denied such claim arguing that the Taronas could not have been tenants
because they were not even residents of the place where the landholding was
located.

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1. ELEMENT OF TENANCY — PERSONAL CULTIVATION

Clearly, private respondents' evidence, which significantly the petitioners
failed to refute, more than substantially proved the impossibility of
personal cultivation. Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the place
where the subject land lies in Morong, Bataan, and now live in another
locality which is in Caloocan City. Since Bataan is of a considerable
distance from Caloocan City, it would undeniably be physically impossible
for the petitioners to personally cultivate the landholding.
Citing Deloso v. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244, November 11, 2005, 474
SCRA 585:
While a tenant is not required to be physically present in the land at all hours
of the day and night, such doctrine cannot be stretched to apply to a case
wherein the supposed tenant has chosen to reside in another place so far
from the land to be cultivated that it would be physically impossible to be
present therein with some degree of constancy as to allow the tenant to
cultivate the same.
Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA
97, 106-107:
It has been held that personal cultivation is an important factor in
determining the existence of an agricultural lease relationship such that in its
absence, an occupant of a tract of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter
thereon, cannot qualify as ade jurelessee.
2. JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE
The power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage
lies with the DAR Secretary pursuant to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657.
Verily, it is explicitly provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB
Revised Rules that matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations,
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of
the DAR. Moreover, under the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) Cases, set forth in Administrative Order No. 06-00, it
is provided that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over
classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the
CARP, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of
coverage. This being so, the CA's declaration regarding CARP coverage
of the subject land was premature considering that the Order of the DAR
Regional Director in A.R. Case No. LSD 015703, entitled In Re Protest
from CARP Coverage . . . upon which the CA based its questioned
declaration, was still pending review with the Office of the DAR Assistant
Secretary, as per Certification dated February 18, 2005 by the Legal
Affairs Office of the DAR.
3. IRRELEVANCE OF THE ISSUE OF CARP COVERAGE TO TENANCY
ISSUES
In any event, the resolution of the issue of whether the entire property or
only part of it is subject to CARP coverage has no bearing on the issue in
this case, i.e.whether petitioners can be considered bona fide tenants of
herein private respondents.
xxx xxx xxx
OCTAVIO v. PEROVANO, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009
Perovano was the owner of a landholding which was entered into and planted
on by Octavio, et al. Perovano filed a complaint for ejectment with the RTC.

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Octavio alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since the land
was subjected to CARP coverage. HTCDcS

1. JURISDICTION — IN GENERAL
Citing Rimasug v. Martin, G.R. No. 160118, November 22, 2005, 475
SCRA 703, 712:
At the outset, let us be clear that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law
at the time the action is commenced, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses

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