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Vitarich Corp v. Locsin
Vitarich Corp v. Locsin
181560
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181560 November 15, 2010
VITARICH CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
CHONA LOSIN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the November 26,
2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro (CACDO), in CA G.R. CV No.73726,2 which reversed the
August 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 6287,
in favor of petitioner Vitarich Corporation (Vitarich).
THE FACTS:
Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and catering services business named Glamours Chicken
House, with address at Parang Road, Cotabato City. Since 1993, Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch, had been
her supplier of poultry meat.3 In 1995, however, her account was transferred to the newly opened Vitarich branch in
General Santos City.
In the months of July to November 1996, Losin’s orders of dressed chicken and other meat products allegedly
amounted to ₱921,083.10. During this said period, Losin’s poultry meat needs for her business were serviced by
Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and Allan Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold
Baybay (Baybay), a supervisor of said corporation. Unfortunately, it was also during the same period that her
account started to experience problems because of the fact that Directo delivered stocks to her even without prior
booking which is the customary process of doing business with her.4
On August 24, 1996, Directo’s services were terminated by Vitarich without Losin’s knowledge. He left without
turning over some supporting invoices covering the orders of Losin. Rosa and Baybay, on the other hand, resigned
on November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1996, respectively. Just like Directo, they did not also turn over pertinent
invoices covering Losin’s account.5
On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to Losin covering her alleged unpaid account amounting to
₱921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked her records and discovered that she had an overpayment to
Vitarich in the amount of ₱500,000.00. She relayed this fact to Vitarich and further informed the latter that checks
were issued and the same were collected by Directo.6
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to ₱288,463.30 which were dishonored either for
reasons Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) or Stop Payment.7
On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Losin, Directo, Rosa, and Baybay before the
RTC.
On August 9, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision8 in favor of Vitarich, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant Chona Losin to pay plaintiff the
following:
1. P297,462.50 representing the three checks which had been stopped payment with interest at 12% per
annum from the date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
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2. P101,450.20 representing the unpaid sales (Exhibits ‘L’ and ‘M’) with interest at 12% from date of this
Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
3. P20,000.00 in concept of attorney’s fees; and
4. The cost of suit.
As to the complaint against defendant Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay, the same is dismissed. The complaint against
Rodrigo Directo still remains and is hereby ordered archived until he could be served with summons.
SO ORDERED.9
Not satisfied with the RTC decision, Losin appealed to the CA presenting the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE OVERPAYMENT MADE BY DEFENDANT
APPELLANT TO VITARICH CORPORATION;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF THE THREE (3) CHECKS WITH STOP
PAYMENT ORDERS AND WITHOUT ANY ANTECEDENT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES FOR THE TWO
(2) CHECKS, NAMELY: RCBC CHECK NO. CX 046324 AND RCBC CHECK NO. CX 046327 ; AND
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING VITARICH CORPORATION NEGLIGENT IN THE
SELECTION OF ITS EMPLOYEES AND NEITHER FINDING THE CORPORATION LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES A CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE.10
On November 26, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision in favor of Losin. Pertinently, the said decision
reads:
It is axiomatic that we should not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstances of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. The reason is that the trial court is in a better
position to determine questions involving credibility having heard the witnesses and having observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial unless there is showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. This is
such an instance.
By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on
behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. Thus, the elements of agency are (i) consent, express or
implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (ii) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third
person; (iii) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; and (iv) the agent acts within the scope of his
authority.
The Civil Code defines a contract of agency as follows:
"Art. 1868. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter."
As far as Losin is concerned, Directo was a duly authorized agent of Vitarich Corporation. As such, it fell upon
Directo to place her orders of dressed chicken and other related products to their General Santos City branch. All
such orders were taken from the Vitarich bodega by Directo as testified by Alona Calinawan, then bookkeeper of
Vitarich from March 1995 to September 1998, who was responsible for all the customers’ accounts, receivables and
withdrawals of dressed chicken from their bodega.
A perusal of the records would show that Vitarich included in their list of collectibles from Losin several amounts that
were not supported by their Charge Sales Invoices such as ₱44,987.70, ₱3,300.00; ₱28,855.40; ₱98,166.20;
P73,806.00; and ₱93,888.80 and which form part of their total claim of ₱912,083.10. Furthermore, Vitarich also
submitted Charge Sales Invoices showing the amount of ₱70,000.00, ₱41,792.40, ₱104,137.40 and ₱158,522.80
as part of their exhibits but which amounts are not included in its summary statement of collectibles against Losin.
It is noted that the dressed chicken and other related products as manifested by the Charge Sales Invoices, were
taken out of the bodega and received by Directo, who is now ‘at large.’ There was no evidence presented by Vitarich
to prove that aforesaid stocks were delivered to Losin. Contrary to what Vitarich claimed that Directo resigned on
August 24, 1996, exhibit ‘X’ shows that he was ‘terminated.’ The fact can not be put aside that Directo was the
salesman and authorized collector and by law, the agent of Vitarich. Criminal acts committed by Directo by his non
remittance of the proceeds of the checks given by Losin, is his separate accountability with Vitarich and should not
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be imputed to their client, Losin. In fact, defendant Directo absconded when plaintiffappellee started to question his
‘collectibles.’ The totality of Directo’s acts clearly indicated a deliberate attempt to escape liability.
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contracting with specified persons, its revocation
shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice thereof."
"Art. 1922. If the agent had general powers, revocation of the agency does not prejudice third persons who
acted in good faith and without knowledge of the revocation. Notice of the revocation in a newspaper of general
circulation is a sufficient warning to third persons." (Emphasis Ours)
The reason for the law is obvious. Since the third persons have been made to believe by the principal that the agent
is authorized to deal with them, they have the right to presume that the representation continues to exist in the
absence of notification by the principal.
Nowhere in the records can it be found that Losin was notified of the fact that Directo was no longer representing the
interest of Vitarich and that the latter has terminated Directo’s services. There is also an absence of any proof to
show that Directo’s termination has been published in a newspaper of general circulation.
It is well settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the particular
contention. In defendantappellant’s ‘Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich,’ prepared and signed by Losin’s
bookkeeper, Imelda S. Cinco, all the checks enumerated therein coincides with the bank statements submitted by
RCBC, thus corroborating Losin’s claim that she has paid Vitarich. Vitarich’s contention that ‘defendant Baybay tried
very hard to hide his accountabilities to the plaintiff x x x but failed to explain why the account remained unpaid,’
confirms its belief that their own agents as such, are accountable for transactions made with third persons. "As a
Sales Supervisor, he is principally liable for the behavior of his subordinates (Directo & Rosa) and for the
enforcement of company rules" which may have gone beyond their authority to do such acts.
Anent the third assigned error that the lower court erred in not finding Vitarich negligent in the selection of its
employees thereby making the former liable for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, We find the same to
be without basis as said article explicitly holds that:
"‘ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x x x x x x."
Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, that vicarious liability attaches only to an employer when the tortuous
conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question to ask should be whether at
the time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the employer or,
independently, in that of his own? Vitarich incurred no liability when Directo’s conduct, act or omission went beyond
the range of his employment.
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
"‘SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior
weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case,
the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number."
"Preponderance of evidence’ is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of the evidence’ or greater weight of the credible
evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
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x x x x x x x x x
We reviewed the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of evidence and the burden of
proof in civil cases, as explained by the Supreme Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals:
"xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favour, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie
case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favour of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of ‘preponderance of evidence’ refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means
probability of truth."
Hence, Vitarich who has the burden of proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with the former having to rely
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defendantappellant Losin’s.
In this light, we have meticulously perused the records of this case and [found] that the court a quo had erred in
appreciating the evidence presented.
In deciding this appeal, the Court relies on the rule that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must
establish his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or
when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails and
the petition/complaint must thus be denied. We find that plaintiffappellee Vitarich failed to prove that the goods were
ever delivered and received by Losin, said charge sales invoices being undated and unsigned by Losin being the
consignee of the goods.
On the other hand, Losin could not also prove that she has overpaid Vitarich. Hence, her contention that she has
overpaid Vitarich and her prayer for refund of the alleged overpaid amount, must necessarily fail.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the appealed judgment is hereby SET ASIDE and
VACATED. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition for review alleging that
AS THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SQUARELY CONTRADICTS THAT OF THE
TRIAL COURT, PETITIONER HUMBLY REQUESTS THE SUPREME COURT TO INQUIRE INTO THE
ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS MADE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.12
As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of law only. Questions
of fact are not reviewable and passed upon by this Court in its exercise of judicial review. The distinction between
questions of law and questions of fact has been well defined. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference
centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.13
The rule, however, admits of exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there
is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.14
The aforementioned exceptions, particularly the seventh exception, finds relevance in the case at bench since the
findings of the CA are clearly in conflict with that of the trial court. For this reason, the Court is constrained to
reevaluate the evidence adduced by both parties to resolve the issues which boil down to whether or not Losin is
liable to Vitarich and, if so, to what extent.
The Court resolves the issues partly in favor of Vitarich.
Initially, Vitarich claims a total of ₱921,083.10 from respondent Losin, Directo, Rosa and Baybay (defendants in Civil
Case No. 6287 for Sum of Money). According to Vitarich, "[t]he successive and sudden resignations of defendants
Directo, Baybay and Rosa and the sudden change of mind of defendant Losin after previously acknowledging her
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accounts are part of an elaborate and sinister scheme of defendants, acting singly or collectively, in conspiracy or
not, in defrauding plaintiff corporation xxx."15
The RTC ruled in favor of Vitarich, ordering Losin to pay the following: (1) ₱297,462.50 representing the three (3)
checks, the payment for which was stopped, with corresponding interest at 12% per annum from the date of the
RTC decision until fully paid; (2) ₱101,450.20 for the unpaid sales also with interest at 12% per annum from the date
of the RTC decision until fully paid; (3) ₱20,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and (4) cost of suit.16 It appears that Vitarich
did not challenge this part of the RTC decision anymore.17
After Losin obtained a favorable RTC decision, Vitarich now seeks relief from this Court through this petition for
review.
After an assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court opines and so holds that the CA erred in reversing the
RTC decision. Losin is clearly liable to Vitarich.
Records bear out that Losin transacted with Vitarich’s representative Directo.18 Vitarich presented several charge
sales invoices19 and statement of account20 to support Losin’s accountability for the products delivered to her. A
total of ₱921,083.10 was initially charged to her. Losin, on the other hand, presented a copy of the list of checks
allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo,21 and a Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich22 to support
her allegation of payment.
It is worth noting that both Vitarich and Losin failed to make a proper recording and documentation of their
transactions making it difficult to reconcile the evidence presented by the parties to establish their respective claims.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC,23 the Court ruled that
the burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove nonpayment. The debtor has
the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule
131 of the Rules of Court24 provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or
defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law. In this case, however, the burden of proof is
on Losin because she alleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin failed to discharge that burden.
After examination of the evidence presented, this Court is of the opinion that Losin failed to present a single official
receipt to prove payment.25 This is contrary to the wellsettled rule that a receipt, which is a written and signed
acknowledgment that money and goods have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although
not exclusive.26 All she presented were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent
Directo,27 a Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich,28 and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her
checking account with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these may only serve as
documentary records of her business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments made but these are not
enough to prove payment.
Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce
the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they have
been impaired. [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It was neither confirmed that the checks issued by Losin were
actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the Court cannot consider that payment, much less overpayment, made by
Losin.
Now, the Court ascertains the extent of Losin’s liability. A perusal of the records shows that Vitarich included in its
list of collectibles,29 several amounts that were not properly supported by Charge Sales Invoice, to wit, (1)
₱44,987.70; (2) ₱3,300.00; (3) ₱28,855.40; (4) ₱98,166.20; (5) ₱73,806.00; and (6) ₱93,888.80.30 It bears noting
that the Charge Sales Invoices presented for the amounts listed as collectibles were undated and unsigned by
Losin, the supposed consignee of the goods (except Exh. L). Of the six amounts, the Court particularly considered
the ₱93,888.80 as it was the amount of one of the checks issued by Losin. Indeed, the Court cannot disregard the
fact that Losin issued a corresponding check for the following amounts: (1) ₱93,888.96 (dated August 27, 1996);31
(2) ₱50,265.00 (dated August 30, 1996);32 and (3) ₱144,309.50 (dated August 31, 1996).33 The Court believes that
Losin would not have issued those checks had she not received the goods so delivered to her. The first two (2)
checks were apparently received by the Vitarich but were not encashed because of Losin’s instruction to RCBC.
Thus, Losin is liable to Vitarich but not for the total amount of the three (3) mentioned checks but only for the amount
of ₱93,888.96 and ₱50,265.00 corresponding to the first two (2) checks. Losin cannot be held liable for the amount
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of the third check ₱144,309.50 because Vitarich did not claim for this amount. The amount of ₱144,309.50 for some
reason, was not among those listed in the list of collectibles of Vitarich.34 1avvphi1
Aside from the earlier mentioned liabilities¸the Court also holds Losin liable for the amount of ₱78,281.00 which was
also among those listed as collectible by Vitarich. Although the Charge Sales Invoice35 bearing this amount was
undated, it nevertheless, appears that the goods corresponding to this amount were actually received by Losin’s
mother. This was even testified to by Rosa36 and confirmed by Losin herself.37 With the exception of the amounts
corresponding to the two (2) checks discussed above and the amount of ₱18,281.00 as appearing in Exh. L, the
other amounts appearing on the rest of the Charge Sales Invoice and on the Statement of Account presented by
Vitarich cannot be charged on Losin for failure of Vitarich to prove that these amounts are chargeable to her. Vitarich
even failed to prove that the rest of the goods as appearing on the other Charge Sales Invoices were actually
delivered and received by her or her representative since these Charge Sales Invoices were undated and unsigned.
Thus, Losin is liable to pay Vitarich the amounts of ₱93,888.96, ₱50,265.00 and ₱78,281.00 or a total of
₱222,434.96 only.
Inasmuch as the case at bar involves an obligation not arising from a loan or forbearance of money, but consists in
the payment of a sum of money, the legal rate of interest is 6% per annum of the amount demanded.38 Interest shall
continue to run from February 12, 1997, the date when Vitarich demanded payment of the sum amounting to
₱921,083.10 from Losin (and not from the time of the filing of the Complaint) until finality of the Decision (not until
fully paid). The rate of interest shall increase to 12% per annum only from such finality until its satisfaction, the
interim period being deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit.39 1avvphi1
Regarding the grant of attorney’s fees, the Court agrees with the RTC that said award is justified. Losin refused to
pay Vitarich despite the latter’s repeated demands. It was left with no recourse but to litigate and protect its interest.
We, however, opt to reduce the same to ₱10,000.00 from ₱20,000.00.
The claims against Rosa and Baybay who allegedly did not fully account for their sales transactions have not been
substantially proven by evidence. In fact, it appears that Rosa and Baybay resigned. Resignation would not have
been possible unless accountabilities with Vitarich had been settled first. It was only the services of Directo that was
apparently terminated by Vitarich.40 Summons, however, was not served on him, so he could not be made to
account for the shortages of collection.
WHEREFORE, the November 26, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
August 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, is REINSTATED subject to
MODIFICATIONS. Thus, the dispositive portion should read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Chona Losin to pay Vitarich Corporation the following:
(1) ₱222,434.96 representing the two checks, with Check Nos. CX 046324 dated August 27, 1996 and CX
046325 dated August 30, 1996 which had been stopped payment and the amount as appearing in Charge
Sales Invoice marked as Exhibit ‘L’ subject to an interest rate of 6% per annum from February 12, 1997, the
date when Vitarich demanded payment of the sum amounting to ₱921,083.10 from Losin until finality of the
Decision. The rate of interest shall increase to 12% per annum only from such finality until its satisfaction, the
interim period being deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit;
(2) ₱10,000.00 representing attorney’s fees; and
(3) Cost of suit.
The complaint against Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay is dismissed. The complaint against Rodrigo Directo is
ordered archived until he could be served with summons.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
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ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2034. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justice Teresita DyLiacco
Flores and Associate Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
2 Petitioner Vitarich Corporation was the plaintiffappellee in CA G.R. CV No.73726 while Chona Losin was
the defendantappellant.
3 Rollo, p. 21.
4 Id. at 22.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2223.
7 Id. at 23.
8 Id. at 3948.
9 Id. at 48.
10 CA rollo, p. 16.
11 Rollo, pp. 2433.
12 Id. at 11.
13 Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 481 Phil. 550, 561 (2004).
14 Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R. No. 178524, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 500,
504, citing Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 157851, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 73, 8384.
15 Records, p. 5.
16 Rollo, p. 48.
17 Id. at 110122; CA rollo, pp. 4453.
18 TSN, September 24, 1999, pp. 9293.
19 Exhs. "A" to "M."
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20 Exh. "N."
21 Exhs. "1" to "3."
22 Exh. "4."
23 G.R. No. 116960, 326 Phil. 89, 95 (1996).
24 SECTION 1. Burden of proof.—Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
25 TSN, September 24, 1999, pp. 9597; TSN, February 8, 2001, pp. 273275.
26 Alonzo v. San Juan, 491 Phil. 232, 244 (2005).
27 Exhs. "1" to "3."
28 Exh. "4."
29 Exh. "N."
30 Rollo, p. 26; See Exhs. "A" to "N."
31 Exh. "W4."
32 Exh. "W3."
33 Exh. "W2."
34 See Exh. "N."
35 Exh. "L."
36 TSN, October 25, 2000, pp. 249250.
37 TSN, February 8, 2001, p. 269.
38 Article 2209 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
39 Tropical Homes, Inc. v. CA, 338 Phil. 930, 944 (1997).
40 See Exh. "X."
The Lawphil Project Arellano Law Foundation
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