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Lagunzad vs. Sotto Vda.

De Gonzales
92 SCRA 476

Facts:

Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the


production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based
mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez,
Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla
Story".
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of
Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista
Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the
November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the
Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that
murder. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in
contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises
Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life
including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de
Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend. 
On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla,
for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for
certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.  
            On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the
petitioner and private respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement” where
the petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of P20,000.00
payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before
Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or
before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants
authority and permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and
develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the
PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to said production,
such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission for the
use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed
therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to retroact to the
date when LICENSEE first committed any of the acts herein authorized.
            After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was
shown in different theaters all over the country.
            Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant
to the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the
present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering
petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from
the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from
the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to
pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay
the costs.
            Petitioner contended in his answer that the episodes in the life of
Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and
was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over
those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or
consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion and
threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the
nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on
the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.
            Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
private respondent.
Issue:

  (1) Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life
of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure.
(2) Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional
right of freedom of speech and of the press.
Ruling:

1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book
entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for
prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly
episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members
of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis,” a privilege may be given
the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory,
but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased."
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto
a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or
novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure
he or she may be.  In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner
exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it
would be a drab story of torture and brutality. 
2.  No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would
appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too
much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of
speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as
radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test."  The
principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation." 
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy
asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that
under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner,
the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because
the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches
upon matters of essentially private concern.
Nachura:
The Court granted the petition to restrain the public exhibition of
the movie “Moises Padilla Story”, because it contained fictionalized
embellishments.

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