Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 131283 October 7, 1999

OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ and NENITA P. FERNANDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; and
PREMIERE INSURANCE & SURETY CORP., respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A writ of replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City may be served and enforced
anywhere in the Philippines. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount of the
claim alleged in the complaint, not by the value of the chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.

The Case

Spouses Oscar C. Fernandez and Nenita P. Fernandez challenge, via the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari   under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the September 4, 1997 Decision   and the
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November 14, 1997 Resolution,   both issued by the Court of Appeals   in CA-GR SP No. 44409.
3 4

The assailed Decision dismissed petitioners' suit for certiorari and prohibition praying for the
redelivery of the vehicle seized from them and for the declaration of nullity of the Writ of Replevin,
which had been issued by Judge Estelita M. Paas   of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
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City,   and all Other subsequent thereto. The challenged Resolution, on the other hand, denied
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reconsideration.

The Facts

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:

. . . [O]n or about October 26, 1993, [petitioners] purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan
through a financing scheme of the private respondent, the International Corporate
Bank, now Union Bank of the Philippines, and the chattel mortgage was executed in
favor of the financing institution on November 10, 1993. As borne out by the
Disclosure Statement in the credit transaction, the cash purchase price was
P492,000.00, minus the downpayment of P147,500.00, leaving the amount of P344,
[5]00.00 to be financed. The total amount to be paid for 48 monthly installments
would amount to P553,944.00. 1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner added that due to the respondent bank's "greedy desire" to unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of the petitioners, the former filed an unfounded complaint for a
sum of money with replevin (Case No. 983-96) before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 44, Pasay City.
Considering that the principal amount involved was P553,944.00, petitioners filed an
Answer mentioning in the special and affirmative defenses a Motion to Dismiss, for
lack of jurisdiction, but this was denied on February 10, 1997 and was received on
February 20, 1997. A Motion for Reconsideration was then submitted on April 2,
1997.

Aside from that, petitioners contested the venue considering that the principal office
of the respondent bank [was] in Makati, while their residence [was] in Quezon City.

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 9, 1997 and received by them on
May 29, 1997.

When the respondent bank filed its complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Replevin on November 28, 1997, the monthly installments were almost fully paid;
[they] would have been fully paid on November 26, 1997. Furthermore, the car's
mileage at the time of illegal seizure was only 28,464 kilometers. They could not
have been considered in default at the time the complaint was filed, considering that:
(a) they attempted many times to pay the bank their installments for the months of
August, September, October, 1996, and up to the time of the filing of the case, they
ha[d] not received any statement of delinquency as mandated by R.A. No. 3165,
otherwise known as the Truth in Lending Act.

If at all, petitioners added, the baseless filing of the case was deliberately done to
enrich the bank at the expense of the petitioners which [was] tantamount to simple
robbery. They even tried consigning the P69,168.00 through a Manager's Check
dated January 7, 1997 for the months of August to February, 1997, or beyond the
four months installment in advance but were similarly refused by the court for no
valid reason.

Their petition for the outright dismissal of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the
Writ of Replevin was denied even if the amount of P553,344.00 representing the
value of the chattel was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

To be precise, the February 10, 1997 Order (Rollo, p. 17) states:

For consideration before this court is the Urgent Motion to Re-deliver

the Chattel and the Motion to Dismiss by way of Special and
Affirmative Defenses the following:

that this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to try the case and to
issue the Writ of Replevin, for the reason that the plaintiffs office is in
Makati and defendant's residence is in Quezon City and that the
amount involved is P553,344.00 which is beyond the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case as well as
the Sheriff's Return which [show] that the subject value covered by
the Writ of Replevin was seized on January 7, 1997 by the branch
 sheriff of this court and thereafter turned over to the plaintiff in this
case.

Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from
January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure the
return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the
amount of the chattel.

In this respect, defendants failed to exercise his right.

As to the question of jurisdiction the complaint [shows] that the

amount plaintiff seeks to recover is P190,635.00, which is well within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Likewise the attached
Promissory Note in the Complaint also contains stipulation as to the
venue agreed upon by the parties in case an action is filed in court, in
which case this court has jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Re-deliver chattel filed by the

defendant to be untenable, the same is hereby denied for lack of
merit.

The Motion to Dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction is likewise

denied for being unmeritorious.

SO ORDERED.  7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City had jurisdiction
over civil cases in which the amount of the demand did not exceed P200,000 exclusive of interest,
damages and attorney's fees. The basic claim in the present case was P190,635.90; hence, the
MTC had jurisdiction.

The appellate court further held that the objection to the impropriety of the venue should have been
raised in a motion to dismiss before the filing of a responsive pleading. The said issue, however, was
raised for the first time only in petitioners' Answer.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals agreed with the MTC that the Writ of Replevin could be validly executed
anywhere in Metro Manila because Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129, authorized the establishment
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila with eighty-two (82) branches. Therefore, any branch
— in this case, Branch 44 which was stationed in Pasay — could issue writs and processes that
could validly be served and executed anywhere within Metro Manila.

Aggrieved, petitioners now seek the reversal of the foregoing rulings through this recourse.  8

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners present the following issues:

1. The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City is strictly limited within
the confines of the boundary limits of Pasay City, B.P. 129, Sec. 28.
 2. The Metropolitan Trial Court's jurisdiction is limited to not more than two hundred
thousand pesos.

3. Assuming that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City has jurisdiction to try and
decide the case and to issue the ancillary writ of replevin, the Court of Appeals
grievously erred in sanctioning the order of [the] Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
City in denying Petitioners['] Motion for Redelivery of the vehicle which was filed
within five days after such seizure, which in essence [was] an outright departure from
the express provision of the law and the settled jurisprudence on the matter.

4. The bank's Memorandum dated July 5, 1999 should be stricken off and ordered
expunged from the records for being fatally defective in form and substance. No
Annexes to said Memorandum were attached to petitioners' copy, thereby making
said memorandum fatally defective because the annexes [were] integral part[s] of the
memorandum itself. Up to this late date, respondent Premiere Insurance and Surety
Corporation has not submitted its memorandum and may now therefore be deemed
to have admitted the entire text of the Petition to be true, valid and binding against it.

To resolve this case, this Court shall dispose of the following questions: (1) May the Writ of Replevin
issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the city? (2) Did the MTC have jurisdiction
over the Complaint? (3) Were petitioners entitled to the redelivery of the subject vehicle?

This Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue: Territorial Enforcement

of the Writ of Replevin

Petitioners argue that the Writ of Replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay could be
enforced only within the confines of Pasay City. In support, they cite Section 28 of Batas Pambansa
(BP) 129, which states:

Sec. 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. — The Supreme Court shall constitute
Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may be established by
law whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and
municipalities comprising the metropolitan area.

Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which shall
be his permanent station and his appointment shall state the branch of the court and
the seat thereof to which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge
may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch within said metropolitan area
as the interest of justice may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an
assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.  9

We are not convinced. Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated January 11, 1983,
providing for the interim rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of
replevin like the one issued in the present case may be served anywhere in the Philippines.
Specifically, the said Resolution states:
 3. Writs and processes. —

(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo, warranto, habeas corpus and

injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in
the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court. 
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Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under item "a" of the
above-cited Rule, may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused the
jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one hand with, on the other, its power to
issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction. Applying the said
Rule, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals   reiterated the foregoing distinction between the jurisdiction of
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the trial court and the administrative area in which it could enforce its orders and processes pursuant
to the jurisdiction conferred on it:

We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed
in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even
if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In
contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of
which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. No
legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a
jurisdictional or territorial limit [to] its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the
above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement
anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph
(a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes
contemplated in paragraph (b).

Objection to Venue

Too Late

Petitioners object to the filing of the Complaint in Pasay City, pointing out that their residence is in
Quezon City, while private respondent's principal place of business is in Makati. Again, we are not
persuaded. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,   an objection to an improper
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venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.
In Diaz v. Adiong,   the Court explained such requirement in this wise:
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. . . Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it

does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue
relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.

Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made
in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings
are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses. Consequently, having
already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no
longer object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is
nevertheless waivable. As such, improper venue must be seasonably raised,
otherwise, it may be deemed waived.  14
In the present case, petitioners' objection to the venue of the case was raised for the first time in the
Answer itself. Not having been raised on time, their objection is therefore deemed waived.

In any event, petitioners had agreed to a stipulation in the Promissory Note that a suit arising from
their transaction may be filed in the proper court anywhere in Metro Manila, at the sole option of
respondent bank.   Necessarily, Pasay City is deemed included in the said stipulation.
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Second Issue:

MTC's Jurisdiction Over the Complaint

Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is in excess of P200,000 and thus outside the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. This argument has no legal and factual basis. The
fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as shown in respondent bank's Complaint,
is the collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the
MTC. Although the value of the vehicle seized pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have exceeded
P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case. After all, the
vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel mortgage that had been used to secure petitioners' loan.
In any case, private respondents are entitled only to the amount owed them. Under Section 14 of the
Chattel Mortgage Law, the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property shall be used primarily to
pay the costs of the sale, the obligation that has been secured and other subsequent obligations;
and the balance will be turned over to the mortgagors, herein petitioners.

Third Issue:

Redelivery of Subject Vehicle

Petitioners assail the MTC's refusal to release the seized vehicle despite a Manager's Check in the
amount of P69,168 they issued for the redelivery of the vehicle within five days from its seizure.

This argument is devoid of merit. As observed by the trial court, petitioners failed to comply with the
requisites for the redelivery of the vehicle seized:

Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997
to post a re-delivery bond, in order to secure the return of the subject vehicle and to
post a counter bond double the amount of the chattel.

In this respect[,] defendants failed to exercise his right. 

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Indeed, a careful perusal of the records shows that petitioners failed to comply with the requirements
prescribed by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court in effect at the time:  17

Sec. 5. Return of Property. — If the defendant objects to the sufficiency of the

plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot require the return of
the property as in this section provided; but if he does not so object, he may, at any
time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, require the return thereof, by
filing with the clerk or judge of the court a bond executed to the plaintiff, in double the
value of the property as stated in the plaintiff's affidavit, for the delivery of the
property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such
sum to him as may be recovered against the defendant, and by serving a copy of
such bond on the plaintiff or his attorney.
 Sec. 6. Disposition of property by officer. — If within five (5) days after the taking of
the property by the officer, the defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the
bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or require the return of the property as
provided in the last preceding section; or if the defendant so objects, and the
plaintiff's first or new bond is approved; or if the defendant so requires, and his bond
is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond,
the property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any reason the property is not
delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the defendant.

In their Petition for Review, petitioners plainly admit that they issued a check for only P69,168 for the
purpose of covering the advance payments plus the redelivery bond. Clearly, that amount was
insufficient to cover even just the required redelivery bond alone, which should be in an amount
double that of the chattel. Hence, the MTC's refusal to grant petitioners' Motion for redelivery was
correct, and the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding it.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.