Alawi Vs Alauya
Alawi Vs Alauya
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase
on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio.
Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing
loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate
of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to
be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18,
1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office,
and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his
salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by
which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming
sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage,
and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi
filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya
of:
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office
of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,
even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk
of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia
Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10
from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26,"
were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court,
this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest
mistake.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting
a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured."10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing
his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.11 He was induced to sign a blank contract
on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-
ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;12 He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it
the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever
saw.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious
and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him
by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa &
Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his)
authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands
that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others,
and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this
Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the
most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that
he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."19 Righteous indignation, or
vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.20 As a judicial employee, it is
expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times,
and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be
mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not,
is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.