Visayan Refining vs. Camus
Visayan Refining vs. Camus
CAMUS
Facts:
During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a demurrer questioning
the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no law authorizing the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Likewise, they moved for the revocation of the
order on the same ground stated and with additional allegation that the deposit had
been made without authority of law since the money was taken from the unexpended
balance of the funds appropriated by previous statutes for the use of the Militia
Commission and the authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain could not
be found in those statutes. The demurrer and motion were overruled and denied
respectively by Camus. This prompted the petitioners to file this instant petition to stop
the proceedings in the CFI.
Issue:
Can the Philippine Government initiate expropriation proceedings in the absence of a
statute authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain?
Held:
Yes, it can. The Philippine Government has the general authority to exercise the power
of eminent domain as expressly conferred by Section 63 of the Philippine Bill (Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902). It says that the Philippine Government is authorized to
acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal property, and may
acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right to eminent domain. The
same is subject to the limitation of due process of law. In consonance with this, Section
64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2711) expressly confers
on the Government General the power to determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of
the Philippine Island; and to direct the Attorney-General, where such at is deemed
advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having
proper jurisdiction. There is no question as to the Governor General’s authority to
exercise this power.
However, this authority is not absolute. It is subject to two limitations, namely,
that the taking shall be for public purpose and there must be just compensation.
Apparently, the reason behind the taking of the subject land was for military and aviation
purposes. This considered a public purpose given the importance of the military and
aviation in the operation of the State.
As to the second requirement, it must be remembered that at that time there was no law
requiring that compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of
condemnation. The deposit was made, despite the absence of said law, to afford
absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an
unwilling owner until compensation is paid. This is in conformity with the just
compensation requirement.
Given these reasons, the proceedings were made in accordance with law.
Petition is denied. Proceedings of the lower court were in all respects regular and within
the jurisdiction of the court.