Cui vs Arellano University, 112 Phil 135

Emerterio Ciu,plaintiff, took his preparatory course at the Arellano University, then enrolled in the
College of Law from his 1st year to 1st semester of his senior year.

During all the time he was studying at Arellano University he was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit so his tuition were refunded at the end of each semester, amounting to a total of
P1,033.87.
During the 2nd semester of his senior year, he transferred and graduated at Abad Santos University.
To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University.
The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant
which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on
the subject of "Scholarships", addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities"..

Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these
scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit
school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school”.

ISSUE: WON the contract between plaintiff and defendant, where the plaintiff’s waived his rights to
transfer to another school without getting refund of his scholarship.

HELD:
No. As per memorandum 38 paragraph 2 states, “The amount in tuition and other fees
corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students
when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be
offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.” But the defendant used the scholarship as a
business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution, which it is
not only inconsistent with sound policy but also, good morals. The practice of awarding the
scholarship to attract students and keep them in school is not a good custom.

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set
therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature, and the officer had no authority to issue it, and
because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the
official gazette.

The Court, ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at
the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
dismissing defendant's counterclaim.
G.R. No. 147902            
March 17, 2006

SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU, Petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Respondent.

Petitioners spouses Vicenta Yu ans Demetria Lee-Yu, mortgaged their title, interest and participation
over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City , in favor of the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (respondent) as security for the payment of a loan in the amount of
P9,000,000.00.
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due thereon,
respondents filed a petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Estate Mortgage on the Dagupan
properties on July 21, 1998. On August 3, 1998, the City Sheriff issued a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale
scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.
A certificate of sale was issued in favour of the respondent, on September 14, 1998, as the
respondent was the highest bidder, said sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan
City on October 1, 1998. On August 20, 1999 or two months before the expiration of the redemption
period, or, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City.

Petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Motion to dismiss and to
strike out the testimony of Rodante Manuel, was later denied by the RTC. Motion for reconsideration
was then filed on February 24, 2000, arguing that the complaint is a prejudicial issue the resolution of
which is determinative on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession, the resolution of which
is determinative of the issuance of the Writ of Possession, because the case pending before RTC is a
civil case and not a criminal case.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, on February 24, 2000, arguing that the
complaint is a prejudicial issue the resolution of which is determinative on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of possession. The court denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, holding
that the principle of prejudicial question is not applicable because the case pending before RTC is
also a civil case and not a criminal case.

Issue:
WON prejudicial question exist in civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition
for the issuance of writ of possession.

Held:
The courts the indivisibility of the real estate mortgage is not violated by conducting two
separate foreclosure proceedings located in different provinces as long as each parcels of land is
answerable for the entire debt. Also no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil
case for the annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in
a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and
the take their own direction independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is “once that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending
and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case”.
Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground
for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.42 Regardless of the pending suit for annulment of
the certificate of sale, respondent is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the
eventual outcome of said case.
G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975

ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO LEONARDO NG SUA and CO OYO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge, Branch III, CFI, Cebu and TAN PUT, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who
was a partner in the commercial partnership, Glory Commercial Company, with Antonio Lim Tanhu
and Alfonso Ng Sua that defendants Antonio Lim Tanhu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan,
and Eng Chong Leonardo, through fraud and machination, took actual and active management of the
partnership and although Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of Glory Commercial Company,
defendants managed to use the funds of the partnership to purchase lands and building's in the cities
of Cebu, Lapulapu, Mandaue, and the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla.
She alleged that after the death of her husband, the dependants without liquidation continued
the business of Glory Commercial Company by purportedly organizing a corporation known as the
Glory Commercial Company Incorporated, which money and other assets of the defunct Glory
Commercial Company partnership, of which the plaintiff has a share equivalent to one third.
That sometime in the month of November, 1967 defendants Antonio Lim Tanhu, by means of
fraud deceit and misrepresentations did then and there, induce and convince the plaintiff to execute a
quitclaim of all her rights and interest, in the assets of the partnership of Glory Commercial Company.
Thereafter in the year 1968-1969, the defendants who had earlier promised to liquidate the
aforesaid properties and assets in favour among others of plaintiff and until the middle the year 1970
when the plaintiff formally demanded from the defendants the accounting of the real and personal
properties of the company, the defendants refused and stated that they would not give the share to
the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
WON Tan Put has the right over her husband shares or the liquidated properties.
HELD:
The Supreme Court found no alternative but to hold that the plaintiff’s allegation that she is the
widow of TEE HOON Lim PO Chuan has not been satisfactory established and that on the contrary,
the evidence in record convincingly shows that her relation with the deceased was that of a common-
law wife.
Moreover, the Supreme Court said that the lower courts committed an error by awarding 1/3 of
the partnership properties to Tan because there has been no liquidation proceedings yet. And if there
has not been any liquidation of the partnership, the only rights plaintiff could have would be to what
might result after much liquidation to belong to the deceased partner (her alleged husband) and
before this is finished, it is impossible to determine, what rights or interest, if any the deceased had. In
other words no specific amounts or properties may be adjudicated to the heir or legal representative
of the deceased partner without the liquidation being first terminated.
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other
as husband and wife “shall be set forth in an instrument” signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage
must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactory explained. Surely, the
certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such
marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production
is first presented to the court.

Therefore certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu
City, is not, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the
marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the jurat
allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part
of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.

As regards the testimony of the plaintiff herself on the same point and that of her witness Antonio
Nuñez, there can be no question that they are both self-serving and of very little evidently value, it
having been disclosed at the trial that plaintiff has already assigned all her rights in this case to said
Nuñez, thereby making him the real party in interest here and, therefore, naturally as biased as
herself. The portion of the testimony of Nuñez copied in Annex C of petitioner’s memorandum, it
appears admitted that he was born only on March 25, 1942, which means that he was less than eight
years old at the supposed time of the alleged marriage. If for this reason alone, it is extremely
doubtful if he could have sufficiently aware of such event as to be competent to testify about it.
G.R. NO. 158896             October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July
1, 2003, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, dated January 31, 2001,
which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco, respondent.

On September 25, 1997 or after twenty-four (24) years of marriage, respondent filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that
all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him
which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature.

In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan, that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be
free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was the respondent who was
remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering.

In the pre-trial order, the parties only stipulated, That they were married on 27 June 1973, and they
have one son who is already 20 years old.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated
on the allegations in his petition. Then, Lucena Tan, respondent Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner
Juanita seldom went to respondent's office. But when she was there, she would call witness to
complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional
qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner. Dr Garcia concluded “To sum up, Manuel
de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There
is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love,
support and understanding.”

In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent's allegations. She insisted that they were a
normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent
Manuel started having extra-marital affairs which he had admitted to her. She remembered that after
the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to... give him a chance
to have a new family.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically... capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.

The trial court denied respondent’s petition on January 31, 2001.The Court of Appeals on July 1,
2003 reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr Garcia finding
both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated.

Issues:
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. In its findings that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated.
II. That petitioner and respondent separated on March 1997, the truth is that they are still living
together as husband and wife at the time of the filing of the petition up to the present
III. When it did not follow the guidelines laid down by the supreme court in the case of republic v.
Molina
IV. In declaring the marriage of herein petitioner and respondent null and void on ground of
psychological incapacity under article 36 of the family code

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its
factual milieu with the case at bar.

With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.

The psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill,
if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Article 36
of the Family Code, stresses, it is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond is to assume.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 1, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 31, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No
costs.
G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005
JAIME F. VILLALON, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON, Respondent.

On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition1 for the annulment of his marriage to
respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.As ground therefor,
petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.

Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early 70’s, after going steady for 2 years,
petitioner and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22,
1978. Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he believed that it was the right time to
raise a family and that she would be a good mother to his children. In the middle of 1993, petitioner
decided to separate from respondent.

In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode, despite their separation, petitioner would regularly
visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to
the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the children’s medical expenses as
well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.

On July 12, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the grounds
of psychological incapacity were:
(a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having
a normal married life;
(b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of
marriage as husband to his wife;
(c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his
false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards
respondent. Petitioner prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.

On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer denying petitioner’s allegations. She asserted
that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been "fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and
hopes for more growth in their relationship" and that their marital squabbles were normal based on
community standards.

Petitioner presented Dr Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged

psychological disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with "Casanova Complex". To
controvert the findings of petitioner’s expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr Cecilia
Villegas, who testified that Dr Dayan’s findings were incomplete because a "team approach" was
necessary in evaluating an individual’s personality.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether
there was collusion between the parties. The report submitted to the trial court stated that there was
no such collusion.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines and submitted an opposition to the petition on September 23, 1997.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

RTC’s rendered a decision on April 22, 1978, declaring the marriage between the petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
WON the totality of the evidence in the psychological reports supported the alleged
psychological incapacity of Jaime Villalon.

Held:
The totality of evidence and the evidence in this case does not support a finding that the
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfil his marital obligation. On the contrary, what is
evident is the fact that the petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of
time prior to their separation, a loving husband to their children and a good provider to their children.
Though he did had an affair, it does not appear to be a psychological disorder which rendered him
incapable.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision which was denied in an
order dated October 28, 2004.30 Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition has no merit.

In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has
consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he
was no longer part of respondent’s life and that the latter did not need or want him. Respondent’s
uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioner’s discontentment with the marital
relationship.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34583 October 22, 1931
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.
The Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the estate of the deceased Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, appealed to this Court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving
the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him
recovering the inheritance tax amounting to ₱1209 paid by plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze,
under protest and sum of ₱20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.

The record shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario
Gelano on January 16, 1914. The wife was at the time of the death of her husband, the late Adolphe
Oscar Schuetze, she was actually residing and living in Germany. That on March 31, 1926, the said
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, while in Germany, executed a will, in accordance with its law, wherein
plaintiff was named his universal heir.

That among the personal property of the deceased was found life-insurance policy No. 194538 issued
at Manila, Philippine Islands, on January 14, 1913, for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, Manila branch, a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of Canada, and duly authorized to transact business in the Philippine Islands.That in
the insurance policy the estate of the said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze was named the beneficiary
without any qualification whatsoever. Rosaio, was the sole heir of the deceased.
BPI, as administrator of the decedent's estate and as attorney-in-fact of the herein plaintiff, having
been demanded by the herein defendant to pay inheritance tax amounting, paid to the defendant
under protest the above-mentioned sum.

Issue:
WON the plaintiff, Rosario is entitled to the proceedings of the insurance.

Held:
The Supreme Court rule that the proceeds of life-insurance policy payable to the insured’s
estates, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, wherein one half to the
husband and the other half to the wife. If the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly
conjugal in part. The proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured’s estate as the
beneficiary.
The premiums were paid out of the conjugal funds, the husband then died. The heirs of the husband
and as well as the wife are entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. The proceeds of a life insurance
policy payable to an insured person’s estate, which the premiums were paid by the conjugal
partnership, is therefore conjugal and therefore the half belongs to the husband while the remaining
half belongs to the wife

with the exceptions of the first, the proceeds of the policy, excluding the proportional part
corresponding to the first premium, constitute community property, notwithstanding the fact that the
policy was made payable to the deceased's estate, so that one-half of said proceeds belongs to the
estate, and the other half to the deceased's widow, the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano Vda. de
Schuetze.

That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which premiums were
paid by the conjugal partnership. If the premiums were paid partly with separate property and partly
with conjugal in part, the proceeds are like proportion separate in part and conjugal in part. To have
the estate as the sole property would be to sanction a fraud upon the husband.

Therefore the defendant is ordered to return to the plaintiff the one-half of the tax collected upon the
amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.
G.R. No. 124853
February 24, 1998
FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondents.

Facts:

Private Respondent, Monina Jison, instituted that alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a
certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's
daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since
childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by
his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent
for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant
(CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly
recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998

FRANCISCO L. JISON, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, Respondent.

FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and
when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated
Esperanza, Amolar Monina’s mother (who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter
Lourdes). Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition
as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that
petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a
Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.

ISSUE:
Won Monina established her filiation as Francisco Jison illegitimate daughter.

RULING:
Court of Appeals initially declared that under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation
may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article
172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction
of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction
of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society
and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts were established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:

1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed
by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal
certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With
regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was
not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it
would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her
filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required for the success of an action
to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous
possession”. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.