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G.R. No. 111080 April 5, 2000 Orosa Vs CA Held
G.R. No. 111080 April 5, 2000 Orosa Vs CA Held
Facts: Furthermore, we agree with the appellate court that when private
The complaint alleged that on September 28, 1983, petitioner purchased respondent brought the complaint, it did so only to exercise a legal right,
the subject motor vehicle on installment from Fiesta Motor Sales believing that it had a meritorious cause of action clearly borne out by a
Corporation. He executed and delivered to Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. a mere perusal of the promissory note and chattel mortgage. Thus, there
promissory note in the sum of P133,824.00 payable in monthly was no malicious prosecution against the Orosa.
installments. 2 To secure payment, petitioner executed a chattel mortgage
over the subject motor vehicle in favor of Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. On G.R. No. 148132 January 28, 2008
September 28, 1983, Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note Regina Astorga vs Smart Communications Inc.
and chattel mortgage to private respondent FCP Credit Corporation. The
complaint further alleged that petitioner failed to pay part of the installment Facts:
which fell due on July 28, 1984 as well as three (3) consecutive installment The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a
which fell due on August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984. Complaint8 for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits
Consequently, private respondent FCP Credit Corporation demanded from with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann
petitioner payment of the entire outstanding balance of the obligation Margaret V. Santiago (Santiago). She claimed that abolishing CSMG and,
amounting to P106,154.48 with accrued interest and to surrender the consequently, terminating her employment was illegal for it violated her
vehicle which petitioner was allegedly detaining. right to security of tenure. She also posited that it was illegal for an
employer, like SMART, to contract out services which will displace the
The trial court ruled that private respondent FCP had no reason to file the employees, especially if the contractor is an in-house agency. 9
present action since petitioner already paid the installments for the months
of July to November 1984, which are the sole bases of the complaint. The SMART responded that there was valid termination. It argued that Astorga
lower court declared that private respondent was not entitled to the writ of was dismissed by reason of redundancy, which is an authorized cause for
replevin, and was liable to petitioner for actual damages under the replevin termination of employment, and the dismissal was effected in accordance
bond it filed. 3 with the requirements of the Labor Code. The redundancy of Astorga’s
position was the result of the abolition of CSMG and the creation of a
Private respondent was also ordered to return to petitioner the 1983 Ford specialized and more technically equipped SNMI, which is a valid and
Laser 1.5 Sedan, or its equivalent, in kind or value in cash, as of date of legitimate exercise of management prerogative.10
judgment and to pay the costs of the suit. 5
On June 7, 1988, a "Supplemental Decision" was rendered by the trial In the meantime, on May 18, 1998, SMART sent a letter to Astorga
court ordering private respondent's surety, Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic
to jointly and severally [with private respondent] return to petitioner the Sedan which was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or
1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan or its, equivalent in kind or in cash and to pay to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. 11 Astorga,
the damages specified in the main decision to the extent of the value of the however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a
replevin bond in the amount of P210,000.00. 6 suit for replevin with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) on August
10, 1998. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1936 and was
Issue: raffled to Branch 57.12
WON the issuance of the replevin is improper?
Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante,34 this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the
jurisdiction; (ii) failure to state a cause of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv) RTC over the replevin suit, explained:
forum-shopping. Astorga posited that the regular courts have no Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession
jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property
benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory
same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts. 13 proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal
The RTC denied Astorga’s motion filed a MR but RTC denied likewise. property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
Thus, Astorga appealed to the CA via certiorari and CA reversed the possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the
decision of the RTC stating that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to
the case because such issue is intertwined with the labor case pending require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor
with the NLRC. tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
xxxx
Issue: The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE Case. The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the
COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF A CAR WHICH ASTORGA case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from
ACQUIRED AS PART OF HER EMPLOYEE (sic) BENEFIT. blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the
petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is
Held: properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners’ right to
picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the
repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in
from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining
possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.
taken or detained the property. 30 The term may refer either to the action
itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy A.M. NO. P-07-2384 : June 18, 2008
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be KENNETH HAO, Complainant, v. ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV,
obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. 31 Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, Respondent.
That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of
Makati City was one for replevin hardly admits of doubt. Facts:
We do not agree. Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin
assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in docketed as Civil Case No. 31, 127-20052 entitled "Zenaida Silver, doing
denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the trade and business under the name and style ZHS Commercial v. Loreto
market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, Kenneth Hao and John Does," pending before
a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16.
creditor rather than employee-employer relations. 33 As such, the dispute
falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. On the strength of the order by Judge Fuentes on the Seizure order,
Andres the sheriff was able to seize a total of nine motor vehicles.
same day that the subject motor vehicles were discovered missing. He
In his Affidavit-Complaint6 against Andres before the Office of the Court even used the same in the filing of the carnapping case against Silver and
Administrator (OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to her co-conspirators.
Zenaida Silver in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized
the nine motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. Hao also averred that Finally, Andres insisted that the guarding of properties under custodia legis
Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a by policemen is not prohibited, but is even adopted by the court. Hence, he
military vehicle which was excessive since there were no resistance from prays that he be held not liable for the loss of the vehicles and that he be
them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the seized motor relieved of his duty to return the vehicles.15
vehicles were placed is actually owned by Silver.
Issue:
However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the nine seized motor vehicles WON Andres is guilty of gross negligence of duty?
were reported missing. Andres stated that he was shocked to find that the
motor vehicles were already missing when he inspected it on October 22, Held:
2005. He narrated that on October 21, 2005, PO3 Rodrigo Despe, one of
the policemen guarding the subject motor vehicles, reported to him that a Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are well-
certain "Nonoy" entered the compound and caused the duplication of the defined steps provided in the Rules of Court regarding the proper
vehicles' keys.11 But Andres claimed the motor vehicles were still intact implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure.
when he inspected it on October 21, 2005.
First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to
Andres denied implementing the Order of Seizure in an oppressive be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.22 In accordance with the said
manner. He said he took the vehicles because they were the specific rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give
vehicles ordered to be seized after checking their engine and chassis the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of
numbers. Andres also maintained that no form of harassment or the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor
oppression was committed during the implementation of the order, vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.
claiming that the presence of the policemen was only for the purpose of
preserving peace and order, considering there were 22 motor vehicles Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor
specified in the Order of Seizure. Andres added that he exercised no vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October 18, 2005, and another three
discretion in the selection of the policemen who assisted in the on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository
implementation of the order, much less of those who will guard the seized receipts, on October 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the
motor vehicles. Andres likewise contended that after the unauthorized seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19,
duplication of the vehicles' keys was reported to him, he immediately 2005. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in
advised the policemen on duty to watch the motor vehicles closely.14 He possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after seizure, or no
negated the speculations that he was involved in the disappearance of the more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres
seized motor vehicles as he claims to be the one who reported the incident committed a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with
to the court and the police. regard to the proper disposal of the property.
As to the allegation of undisclosed depository receipts, Andres maintained It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely
that he never denied the existence of the depository receipts. He said the for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that
existence of the depository receipts was immediately made known on the the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff,
and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five WON demand is necessary for a writ of replevin be issued?
days.23 Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles
immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing Held:
the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
Navarro vs Escobido replevin is filed, Navarro apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful
G.R. No. 153788 detainer.
Facts: For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an
affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, states:
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first complaint)6 and 98-598 (second
complaint),7 before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the
RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person
Navarro's possession. who personally knows the facts:
As evidence by a lease agreement with option to purchase Roger Navarro (a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
issued checks in payment of the rental fees but the fifth and sixth checks describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
were dishonored thus this case. The plaintiff Karen Go prays for the
immediate delivery of the two mounted cranes upon posting of the bond (b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging
double the value of the said vehicles. the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief;
Navarro’s defense is that the complaint did not state any cause of action
because since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with (c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment
Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) - the actionable or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
documents on which the complaints were based and that demand should attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it
be first be done by the party before they can avail of the provisional is exempt from such seizure or custody; andcralawlibrary
remedy of replevin.
(d) The actual market value of the property.
RTC dismissed the case and on MR RTC considered considering that
Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in
Court (Rules).12 Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned,
for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. Thus with MR of Navarrao for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be
RTC denied such then it went to CA. the CA affirmed the decision of the adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he
RTC and thus this action is brought to the SC for resolution. may recover from the applicant in the action.
Issue: We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a
prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action
for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an
action for a writ of replevin The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The
exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. This limitation applies to
G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013 contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs BPI Family Savings virtue of Art. 1485. The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of
Bank possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art. 1485
was fulfilled in this case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for
Facts: replevin to recover possession of movable property.
Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides, among others, Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never
that: for receiving the amount of Php834, 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of
17,391.00 every 15th day of each succeeding month until fully paid; the replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that
loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged
interest of 6% per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual
installment on or before the stated due date. foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative
prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or
August 15, 2002, respondent, through counsel, sent to petitioners a unjust enrichment30 to speak of.1âw
demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the entire obligation as
due and demandable and requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender
the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. 6 As the
demand was left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action
for Replevin and Damages before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
A writ of replevin was issued. 7 Despite this, the subject vehicle was not
seized.8 Trial on the merits ensued. On August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC
Br. 33 ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and
severally pay the amount of Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72%
per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit.
Appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and thus this
petition to the SC.
Issue:
Held: