Hope or Hype? Legitimacy and US Leadership in A Global Age
Hope or Hype? Legitimacy and US Leadership in A Global Age
Many foreign affairs cognoscenti agree that the United States needs to
restore its standing as a legitimate world leader and recommit to inter-
national institutions in order to address the world’s most pressing prob-
lems. However, these prescriptions mean relatively little without first
examining what legitimate leadership entails and whether such leader-
ship is, in fact, possible. This article proceeds in three steps. First, it dis-
cusses the meaning of legitimate leadership in the context of
international institutions and underscores the enduring challenges the
United States faces in this regard. Second, it highlights the domestic
political impediments that ineluctably constrain the implementation of
a consistent and cohesive US foreign policy. Finally, the article suggests
that if the US legitimacy deficit is to some degree a fact of life, we
should rethink which governance arrangements are most capable of
harnessing US power for a greater good and devote increased attention
to what legal scholars call ‘‘new governance.’’
It is coming up on two decades since Joseph Nye famously wrote that the United
States, as the lone superpower in an increasingly interdependent world, was
‘‘bound to lead.’’ At the time, his book took on a number of pundits (Calleo
1987; Kennedy 1987; Mead 1987) that saw US power in decline due to ‘‘imperial
overstretch,’’ trade deficits and waning economic competitiveness, large military
expenditures, and a growing web of international commitments. They prescribed
policies that would reduce US international commitments in accordance with its
depleted strength. Nye (1990) argued that it was a strategic necessity for the Uni-
ted States to maintain and even build upon its international commitments for
there were no unilateral solutions to transnational problems such as WMD prolif-
eration, terrorism, global warming, HIV ⁄ AIDS, or drug trafficking.1 For these
reasons, he called for increased US involvement in the creation and mainte-
nance of international institutions. In subsequent works, Nye prescribed policies
that would enhance US ‘‘soft power’’ or the ability to ‘‘attract others by the legit-
imacy of US policies and the values that underlie them’’ (Nye 2004a:16). By
co-opting states and other actors into a shared vision for the future, the United
States would not have to expend valuable blood and treasure on coercion.
1
For Nye, policies of retrenchment would likely weaken the American power they were supposed to preserve,
for ‘‘withdrawal from international commitments might reduce American influence overseas without necessarily
strengthening the domestic economy.’’ Further, the complex interdependence that characterized the international
environment would, in many ways, force the United States to maintain its international obligations. ‘‘Drawing back
from current international commitments,’’ he wrote, ‘‘would not stop technological change, hinder the develop-
ment and global extension of an information-based economy, or change the high degree of interdependence on
transnational actors.’’
doi: 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00141.x
2011 International Studies Association
338 Hope or Hype?
2
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html
3
Indeed, Aaron Wildavsky (1998) notably argued that there were ‘‘two presidencies,’’ one that has an advan-
tage in foreign policy and one with a disadvantage in domestic policy.
M. Patrick Cottrell 339
5
Weber 1978: chapter III, describes a relationship between legitimacy and ‘‘domination’’ or ‘‘authority’’ (‘‘the
probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons’’). The
legitimacy of a system of domination represents ‘‘the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes
will exist, and the corresponding practical conduct ensue.’’ He outlines three pure types of legitimate domination:
(i) rational-legal, ‘‘resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority
under such rules to issue commands;’’ (ii) traditional, ‘‘resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemo-
rial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them;’’ and (iii) charismatic, ‘‘resting on the
devotion to the exceptional…character of an individual person, and of the normative patters or order revealed or
ordained by him.’’
6
For a contemporary treatment of the various dimensions of power in global governance, see Barnett and
Duvall (2005).
7
For instance, a majority of contributors to Leffler and Legro’s (2008) recent edited volume on US grand
strategy after Bush make this basic argument.
8
For a related discussion on the ‘‘paradox of hegemony’’ see Cronin (2001).
9
On the Kosovo case, see Henkin (1999).
M. Patrick Cottrell 341
While Bolton views are extreme to some, the primacy of sovereignty and strategic
national interests that inform his opinion are quite mainstream. Indeed, the
United States and other powerful countries commonly invoke the legal norm of
sovereignty in practicing what Richard Haass refers to as ‘‘a la carte multilateral-
ism.’’ One need not look beyond recent US foreign policy controversies for
evidence of this behavior: the questioned legality of the invasion of Iraq, viola-
tions of international humanitarian law in Guantanamo Bay, unilateral incursions
into Pakistan in pursuit of Al Qaeda (which Obama ramped up), and other
instances where US compliance not just with international rules and norms, but
its own founding values of liberal democracy and human rights, come into
question.10 Further, the selective engagement of the United States has been fre-
quently cited as undermining the legitimacy (and, by extension, efficacy) of
international institutions from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to the
Kyoto Protocol.
Given the perceptual nature of legitimacy described earlier in the context of
international institutions, what would a legitimate US foreign policy look like?
One can envision three evaluative criteria. First, did the United States engage in
the ‘‘right process’’ by engaging the appropriate international institutions and
conducting diplomatic consultations in formulating and implementing a given
policy? Secondly, was the given policy action widely seen to conform with the
broader values of the international community, as enshrined by global institu-
tions? Third, to the extent that these actions are perceived to be procedurally
and substantively legitimate, are they implemented consistently and cohesively
over time?
The answers to these questions, of course, lie to a significant degree in the eye
of the beholder. However, international institutions often provide the focal point
for these legitimacy contests. Institutions are not simply reflections of great
power preferences or equilibrium outcomes among self-interested states. They
also reflect a normative and ideational consensus. Global regulatory politics are
not only driven by problems of trust and credible contracting, but also by deep
disputes over the causal assumptions and normative values that are at stake in
dealing with a problem (Hurrell 2005:36). The interpretive communities that
revolve around a given institution—states, NGOs, expert groups, international
lawyers, and governance networks—thus assign meaning to foreign policy actions
and inform broader views on whether a given policy is legitimate (Johnston
2001, Johnstone 2005).11
Many across the globe hold high hopes that a new brand of US leadership that
will reverse the trend of ‘‘a la carte multilateralism,’’ enact legitimate policies,
thereby reinvigorating international efforts to address the threats posed by weap-
ons proliferation, terrorism, climate change, poverty, and beyond. But until
the day that US national interest and the common interest align completely,
‘‘legitimate’’ action by even the most internationalist US administrations will
continue to be very difficult to formulate and implement consistently, thereby
10
US unilateralism and illegal actions under international law is not a new development. For instance, US
interventions in places such as Guatemala, Chile, and elsewhere also represent examples of such behavior, but were
largely overshadowed by Cold War politics.
11
Sometimes actors can use institutions as a foil in promoting international political change. See Cottrell
(2009).
342 Hope or Hype?
‘‘Bound in Leading?’’
Some scholars have identified an apparent paradox in US foreign policy: the
United States remains the world’s preponderant power, but is not powerful
enough to achieve its goals unilaterally (Nye 2003; Hook 2007). This paradox
suggests that the United States should exercise leadership in creating and bind-
ing itself to institutions that reflect some degree of common values and interests
with the rest of the international community. However, such leadership can be
difficult to come by, in large part because of the complicated nature US domes-
tic politics, which suggests a second paradox. On the one hand, the fragmenta-
tion of the foreign policy process invites discord and inconsistency in outcomes,
which fuels perceptions of the United States as an erratic partner in global coop-
erative efforts. On the other, US foreign policy can be prone to extremism, par-
ticularly when facing a major crisis or threat, which can mitigate the checks and
balances precisely when they are needed the most. This section examines how
each of these conditions can undermine the formulation and implementation of
a legitimate foreign policy.
The suggestion that the United States is inherently limited in its world leader-
ship ability is not new. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
…the advantages of democratic liberty in the internal affairs of the country may
more than compensate for the evils inherent in a democratic government. But it
is not always so in the relations with foreign nations…Foreign politics demand
scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require,
on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient…A
democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important
undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of
serious obstacles. (de Tocqueville 1985:284–285)
For de Tocqueville, the US political system was too fragmented to pursue a con-
sistent, cohesive foreign policy. The founding fathers of the United States did
not envision a government preoccupied with an activist or internationalist for-
eign policy. They were concerned instead with avoiding the abuses of executive
power and avoiding the tyranny of the majority, which led to a separation of
powers and the checks and balances system that provides inherent institutional
constraints on the exercise of state power in world affairs.12
As the US grew into a world power over the subsequent century in a half, sev-
eral other factors emerged that compounded the fragmentation of the foreign
policy process. The growth of bureaucratic agencies, each competing for fund-
ing and having distinct goals, makes it very difficult for the Executive Branch to
link policies and budgets. The welter of congressional committees and subcom-
mittees dealing with foreign policy issues provides multiple entry points for ini-
tiatives and opportunities to amend and vitiate legislation. The election cycle
leads to political turnover that can result in drastic changes in foreign policy,13
12
For instance, while the Executive formulates foreign policy, the Legislative Branch controls the budget
required to fund and implement it. For a comprehensive treatment, see Fisher (1997, 1998) and Mastanduno
(1994).
13
For example, congressional leaders in foreign policy that have accrued substantive knowledge over the years
might get voted out, retire, accept political appointments in the administration.
M. Patrick Cottrell 343
while a large number of candidates for elected office use foreign policy symbols
(such as the outsourcing of jobs) to help position themselves on local matters
that resonate with their constituencies without considering the bigger picture.14
Powerful special interests such as AIPAC or the defense industry can exercise a
disproportionate influence in the US political system, which frequently fuels
accusations of hypocritical or inconsistent behavior on the part of the United
States.15 Conversely, countervailing special interests (for example, between envi-
ronmental ⁄ labor activists and commercial interests on trade issues) can also
result in legislative logjams and invite inconsistent policy responses.16
These and other factors combine to make a legitimate foreign policy—one
capable of restoring and maintaining US moral authority and one that acts con-
sistently with international legal norms—extremely difficult to implement. Con-
sider the experience of President Clinton, who successfully pushed for and
signed what he publicized as the ‘‘longest sought, hardest fought prize’’ in the
history of arms control, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, only to
have Congress vote against ratification a little more than 2 years later, despite
the pleas of major US allies such as Britain, France, and Germany; or how the
United States can acquiesce to Israel’s covert nuclear weapons program, but
chastise others for developing their own nuclear capabilities; or how the United
States can pressure some not to sell arms to states of concern, while itself
accounting for more than 31% of global arms exports.17
Despite the fragmented nature of the US foreign policy process, there have
also been times of limited duration in which foreign policy consensus existed,
particularly during periods of heightened conflict or crisis.18 Such consensus can
have positive effects, such as the widely cited example of US foreign policy after
World War II. With the challenge of resurrecting a decimated global economy in
the face of a rising tide of communism, the United States led successful recon-
struction efforts in Europe and elsewhere through the Marshall Plan and the
Bretton Woods institutions. During the early stages of the Cold War, a ‘‘vital cen-
ter’’ in US politics allowed for the implementation of a grand strategy of con-
tainment. As James Schlesinger (1997) put it,
During the Cold War, the United States was ideally suited for its role of interna-
tional leader. Its purposes were benign. It generally stood ready to protect other
states against external assault, and most others were comfortable under the pro-
tective wing of the United States. The American public could focus on a central,
seemingly permanent military and political threat. Policies could focus on that
threat, and thus be shaped by an overarching design.
14
And once elected, these candidates tend to behave accordingly once in office.
15
For example, the Israel lobby is seen by some to undercut the US ability to be seen as a legitimate broker in
the Middle East. See Mearsheimer and Walt (2007).
16
For a broad description of this fragmentation, see Schlesinger (1997).
17
‘‘International Arms Transfers.’’ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute http://www.sipri.org/
yearbook/2009/07/07A.
18
George (1980) applies the concept of legitimacy to domestic politics to explain these circumstances.
344 Hope or Hype?
entitled for an international audience ‘‘Who Won the Cold War? Ask Instead
What Was Lost’’ (Kennan 1992). In it, he argued:
Nobody—no country, no party, no person—‘won’ the cold war. It was a long and
costly political rivalry, fueled on both sides by unreal and exaggerated estimates
of the intentions and strength of the other party. It greatly overstrained the eco-
nomic resources of both countries, leaving both, by the end of the 1980’s, con-
fronted with heavy financial, social and, in the case of the Russians, political
problems that neither had anticipated and for which neither was fully prepared.
More recently, the US invasion of Iraq and the so-called ‘‘war on terror’’ have
renewed concerns about an ‘‘imperial presidency,’’ a term born in a Vietnam era
that refers to when president exercises an extra-constitutional power in foreign
policy that could lead to an extreme policy, ostensibly to the detriment of the Uni-
ted States and, often, the world (Schlesinger 1973). Some go as far to make histori-
cal analogies between McCarthyism and the Patriot Act; to argue that the White
House blatantly and strategically manipulated its powers to authorize torture; and
to compare the Gulf of Tonkin resolution with the fateful 2002 vote by Congress
to authorize the use of force in Iraq (Fisher 2003; Cole 2005; Mayer 2008).19
There are several domestic political factors that might contribute to the more
extremist tendencies in the practice of US foreign policy—each of which can coun-
teract important checks and potential veto points in the process. First, some schol-
ars argue that the president actually has an institutional advantage in the realm of
foreign policy given, inter alia, informational advantages derived from his role as
chief bureaucrat, the use of the bully pulpit, and informal presidential powers such
as the use of executive orders and the executive pardon (Wildavsky 1998).20
Whereas the president’s domestic agenda is often difficult to legislate because of
the multiple veto points and collective action problems in Congress, in times of
conflict these conditions either fade away or can actually to work to the advantage
of the president. In one respect, it is difficult for Congress to mount an effective
opposition to a policy that the president has the authority to enact unilaterally and
without much warning. In other respect, a perceived common threat during war-
time is more likely to produce a strong rally around the flag effect, which polarizes
Congressional and public opinion in one direction and removes effective con-
straints on presidential power almost entirely.21
For instance, in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War, the Bush administration
made very effective use of its institutional advantages. The substantive case for
invasion relied on widely held perceptions that Iraq had not fulfilled all of its
obligations to disarm pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions and largely
circumstantial evidence that Iraq had been reconstituting its WMD programs
since inspectors left in late 1998 (see, e.g., Taft and Buchwald 2003). Although
Democrats maintained that first Bush went to the United Nations to devise a
multilateral solution to the Iraq problem before taking unilateral action,
the Bush administration made the case that they would need conditional
19
For general discussion of the former, see Adam Burke, ‘‘Revisiting McCarthyism in the Patriot Act Era,’’ Octo-
ber 26, 2005, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4975529 (Accessed May 11, 2011).
20
In response to Vietnam, Congress passed the War Powers Act in an attempt to reel in the presidential war-
making authority by requiring congressional consultations ‘‘in every possible instance’’ before introducing US
forces to hostilities and formal authorization from 60 to 90 days or withdraw troops. However, most scholars con-
clude that the War Powers Act did virtually nothing to enhance congressional checks on presidential power in the
foreign policy realm. See for instance, Fisher (1997).
21
These advantages do not mean that Congress is powerless with respect to foreign policy, but rather restricts
the conditions in which it can influence outcomes. For example, Howell and Pevehouse (2007) contend that parti-
san composition can have a strong impact on the president’s calculus in the use of force. In addition, congressional
influence is often achieved not through bold legislative action but by engaging the media, raising public concerns
over a proposed policy, and creating doubts over US resolve to see a particular policy through.
M. Patrick Cottrell 345
22
Although the United States and the United Kingdom successfully pushed through UNSCR 1441, which pro-
vided for renewed inspections by the UN Monitoring and Verification Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), these
inspections did not yield conclusive results, thereby paving the path to war.
23
Vocal opposition or the exercise of Congressional power such as refusing to fund military operations would
hurt 2002 and 2004 electoral prospects.
24
Most in the intelligence community believed these inferences to be spurious (Pillar 2006).
25
Janis highlights eight characteristics of groupthink: (i) illusion of vulnerability, (ii) belief in group’s inherent
morality; (iii) rationalization of warnings; (iv) stereotyped view of enemy; (v) self-censorship of deviations; (vi)
shared illusion of unanimity; (vii) pressure against dissenters; and (viii) self-appointed mind guards.
346 Hope or Hype?
26
According to a 2000 American Council on Education Survey, under a third (31%) of individuals could not
name either country that borders the United States, could only name one of the bordering countries, or incorrectly
named something other than Canada or Mexico. Only half (50%) of the public correctly named Britain’s prime
minister as Tony Blair and fewer than one in five (23%) could identify Kofi Annan as Secretary General of the
United Nations. See also, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996).
27
See also Almond (1960).
28
A recent poll by the Pew Center for the People and the Press found that more Americans reported following
the war in Iraq more closely than any other story in the news. See ‘‘Too Much Anna Nicole, But the Saga Attracts
an Audience: Pew Launches Weekly News Interest Index,’’ February 16, 2007, http://www.people-press.org.
29
In most political stories, the US media relies on public officials and outside experts or other sources in pre-
senting the news. However, with fewer resources available, fewer reporters ‘‘on the ground,’’ limited access, and a
lack of public interest, the US media must rely more on government officials for their foreign policy stories. A spate
of recent studies argues that the media tends to mirror or ‘‘index’’ to the dialogue of political elites.
30
For example, although there are many news outlets available, an overwhelming majority of Americans (74%)
claim to get their information on both national and international affairs from television. Of those who report rely-
ing on television as their primary source, more people say they get their news from local broadcasts than from any
one of the three national networks. And in a typical 30-minutes local newscast in 2004, world affairs only received
38 seconds of coverage, 25 seconds of which was devoted solely to Iraq. Contrast this number with the average
amount of time that local news spends on advertising (8 minutes, 51 seconds) and weather ⁄ sports (6 minutes,
21 seconds). National news did not do all that much better, devoting two minutes to Iraq-related stories and a little
more than a minute to other international and foreign policy issues. Cottrell and Fowler (2007). See Pew Center
for the People & the Press. June 26, 2005. ‘‘Public More Critical of Press, But Goodwill Persists.’’ http://people-
press.org. See also Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) and Iyengar and Kinder (1989). Source: University of Wisconsin
NewsLab data. See http://www.localnewsarchive.org.
31
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/770/iraq-war-five-year-anniversary.
M. Patrick Cottrell 347
procedurally (for example, for circumventing the UN Security Council) and sub-
stantively for not being perceived to be consistent with the values of the interna-
tional community (for example, for having just cause or being a war of last
resort, among other reasons). Over the next several years, the legitimacy of the
Iraq War would be contested even more strongly, including in US domestic poli-
tics. The failure to uncover WMD, rampant sectarian violence, the trillion dollar
price tag, and the Abu Ghraib scandal cast an even darker shadow over the Iraq
invasion and occupation. In response to growing criticism, President George W.
Bush’s press team likened his situation in Iraq to that of Harry Truman, who
entered the United States into an unpopular war and had very low approval rat-
ings during his time in office, yet was vindicated by history and subsequently
given a great degree of credit for laying the foundation necessary for the West to
‘‘win’’ the Cold War.
While this message was clearly targeted toward a domestic audience, the inter-
national community received it quite differently. In his farewell speech as UN
Secretary General, which was not coincidentally held at the Truman library in
Independence, Missouri, Kofi Annan gave voice to a more global perspective,
invoking the words of Truman himself (Annan 2006):
As Harry Truman said, ‘We all have to recognize, no matter how great our
strength, that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please.’
States need to play by the rules toward each other as well as toward their own cit-
izens…No state can make its own actions legitimate in the eyes of others. When
power, especially military force, is used, the world will consider it legitimate only
when convinced that it is being used for the right purpose—for broadly shared
aims—in accordance with broadly accepted norms.
…More than ever today Americans, like the rest of humanity, need a functioning
global system through which the world’s peoples can face global challenges
together. And in order to function, the system still cries out for far-sighted Amer-
ican leadership…I hope and pray that the American leaders of today, and tomor-
row, will provide it.
However, while Annan’s call may be a desirable one, the earlier discussion sug-
gests that it also may be slightly naı̈ve. The contradictory nature of the US
domestic political system and preeminence of materially defined US national
interests makes ‘‘far-sighted American leadership’’ difficult to come by, particu-
larly in today’s increasingly complex and global environment. We therefore need
348 Hope or Hype?
32
See also Brooks and Wohlforth (2009) and Walt (2005).
33
Though some contend that the term hegemon no longer applies. For them, US draining military commit-
ments abroad, massive foreign debt, shaky economy, and relative decline vis-à-vis China and other rising powers,
have effectively ended US hegemony. See, e.g., Layne (2006); etc. On the rise of the rest, see Khanna (2008). On
the limits of American power, see Bacevich (2008).
34
See, e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance Program
(IIGG) http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/iigg/index.html
M. Patrick Cottrell 349
35
For classic treatments of compliance, see Young (1979), Fisher (1981), Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996),
and Chayes and Chayes (1998). For a seminal treatment of ‘‘hard and soft law,’’ see Abbott and Snidal (2000). On
difficulties regarding verification and enforcement, see Adelman (1990).
36
See, e.g., the special issue of the Columbia Journal of International Law (2007) on ‘Narrowing the Gap? Law
and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union.’ See also Sabel and Zeitlin (2008), de Búrca and Scott
(2006), Scott and Trubek (2002), and Trubek and Trubek (2007). For an early application to transnational regula-
tion, see Abbott and Snidal (2009).
37
Despite the name, it may be misleading to suggest that new governance is entirely ‘‘new.’’ Indeed, this work
parallels developments of the broader international relations literature over the past two decades that analyzes the
emergence of informal governance arrangements (e.g., Lipson 1991, Abbott and Snidal 2000, Finnemore and
Toope 2001, and the Mattli and Woods 2009), networks (e.g., Slaughter 2004), and nonstate promoters and pro-
cesses of normative change (e.g., Haas 1992, Haas and Haas 1995, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). However, by
emphasizing the role of law in promoting problem-solving and experimentation, the new governance literature inte-
grates many of these insights in a nuanced fashion.
350 Hope or Hype?
38
This discussion draws from Scott and Trubek (2002) and Cottrell and Trubek (2010).
39
There are similar developments in other issue areas. Lang and Scott (2009), for instance, see a ‘‘hidden
world’’ of governance that underpins the WTO. Begg (2010) sees emerging new governance mechanisms in global
financial regulation.
40
The US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which now has the support of over 60 states, also embodies
a potential move toward new governance. It consists of a code of conduct called ‘‘interdiction principles’’ to
enhance international efforts to detect and stop illicit shipments of WMD-related equipment and materials and an
experts group that could, in principle, ratchet up those standards over time and broaden.
M. Patrick Cottrell 351
even the United Nations, the world’s signature security institution and arguably
the foremost target for legitimacy contests, has taken preliminary steps to
integrate new governance mechanisms, as evinced by the creation of the 1540
committee, which is discussed below in order to provide a more detailed account
of how these mechanisms might emerge and operate.
41
This section is adapted from Patrick Cottrell and Mark Nance, ‘‘After Hierarchy? Security and Governance in
a Post-9/11 World,’’ with M. Nance, paper presented at ISSS/ISAC Conference, Montreal, Canada, October 2007.
352 Hope or Hype?
42
Author phone interview with NGO expert, November 2008.
M. Patrick Cottrell 353
way forward to deal with emerging new threats and the changing global land-
scape, they must be developed much further to secure the degree of multilevel
cooperation required to solve transnational problems. Nevertheless, there is
reason to suggest that new governance holds promise not just in terms of
enhancing multilateral capacity for problem solving, but also a realistic opportu-
nity to reduce the US legitimacy deficit and sustainably enhance US leadership.
Conclusion
Brent Scowcroft recently wrote, ‘‘Increasingly, power… resides more in the col-
lectivity of states rather than in the hands of any individual power…The world is
not susceptible to US domination—but without US leadership not much can be
achieved’’ (Scowcroft 2007:6). The debate over how US power should be exer-
cised vis-à-vis international institutions will thus remain critical for years to come.
Even John Bolton (2000) wrote, ‘‘Whether we are ready or not, the debate over
global governance, fought out at the confluence of constitutional theory and for-
eign policy, is the decisive issue facing the United States internationally.’’
Despite Obama’s early success in reinvigorating optimism in the future of US
leadership and restoring the US brand name, it would be wise not to place too
much stock in the hype, particularly over the longer term. Domestic politics and
the primacy of US strategic interests make it very difficult for the US to imple-
ment a consistent and cohesive foreign policy that is in line with institutional
norms and the collective values of the international community. Thus, while its
size may vary over time, the US legitimacy deficit is a fact of life.
But there is also real reason to have hope for the present and future of US for-
eign policy. The Obama administration appears committed to building a global
governance architecture better suited to dealing with the major global policy
challenges of our time. In order for this effort to be sustainable, the United
States should concentrate not just on building international consensus on tough
policy issues such as global financial regulation, climate change, and nuclear pro-
liferation, but also governance mechanisms better capable of adapting to an
increasingly fluid global regulatory environment and maintaining a core basis for
cooperation long after Obama’s presidency is over.
New governance arrangements that facilitate policy coordination and promote
problem solving offer a number advantages in this regard. Procedural legitimacy
can be improved through increased participatory access and transparency, which
in turn helps to engage the appropriate sources of expertise and cope with
uncertainty. Perceptions of substantive legitimacy can be strengthened by reduc-
ing the emphasis on coercion, which can have a corrosive effect on cooperation,
and focusing more on knowledge creation, experimentation, and problem
solving.
However, new governance is no panacea. There are several outstanding ques-
tions about the effectiveness of new governance and its relationship with more
traditional forms of law. Some have raised valid concerns about the impact of
alternative regulatory arrangements on outcomes and how power is exercised in
these evolving regulatory contexts.43 Others (Trubek and Trubek 2007; Cottrell
and Trubek 2010) have begun to explore how new governance and more
traditional models might interact in hybrid constellations, asking whether
43
Indeed, some fear that contrary to the aims of new governance to increase participatory access, these pro-
cesses might actually violate norms of democratic input and accountability and ‘‘associate new governance with a
‘managerialism’ characterized by expert domination, decision-making behind-closed-doors, and balkanization
among technical fields’’ (Simon 2010). Similar concerns have been raised about the role of power in networked
governance—who exercises it and whether these processes are actually incorporating the perspectives of the publics
they are attempting to serve (e.g., Mattli and Woods 2009).
M. Patrick Cottrell 355
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