Notes in Judicial Department (Philippine Constitution)

RyD Notes | IV.
Judicial Department
IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
A. Judicial power
Q: Discuss the concept of judicial power.

ANS: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Sec.1, par
2)
Q: What does grave abuse of discretion mean?

ANS: Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law For
an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross (Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No 207264 (Resolution), June 25, 2013).
Q: Discuss the collegial nature of the Supreme Court.

ANS: The Court, whether sitting en banc or in Division, acts as a collegial body as it exercises judicial power through
the collective action of its individual members. While most of the Court's work is performed by its three divisions, the
Court remains one court — single, unitary, complete, and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while individual
justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. Any
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc (Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. PAL, G.R. Nos. 178083, March 13, 2018).
It also means that "although the Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot legally decide a case on his own
because of the Court's nature as a collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself, overturn the decision of
the Court. whether of a division or the en banc" (Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Amenda Against Justice Reynato
S. Puno et. aI A.M. No. 03-11-30.SC, June 09, 2005)
B. Judicial review
1. Requisites
Q: Discuss the concept of judicial review and its requisites.

ANS: Judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but
merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution (Angara vs Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July
15, 1986). Its requisites are: (ASEL)
1. There must be an Actual case or controversy calling-for the exercise of judicial power;
2. The person challenging the act must have the Standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the Earliest opportunity; and
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very Lis mota of the case (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R.
No. 192935, December 7, 2010).
Q: What is an actual case or controversy?

ANS: An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be
a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing taw and jurisprudence. The
Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is
submitted for judicial determination (The Province of North Cotabato et al. v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, supra).
2. Political question doctrine
Q: Discuss the political question doctrine.
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RyD Notes | IV. Judicial Department
ANS: The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers
to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity , or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom not legality of a particular measure (Tanada v.
Cuenco. G.R. No. L-10520. February 28, 1965)
Q: Is there any limitation to the application of the political question doctrine? ANS: Yes. The scope of the political
question doctrine has been limited by Ad. VIII. Sec. 1, Par. 2 of the Constitution particularly the portion which vests in
the judiciary the power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government"
3. Moot questions
Q: Discuss the concept of moot questions and its rules.

ANS: A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value (Deutsche Bank vs Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 193065, February 27, 2012). The moot and academic principle however is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
(GEC-R)
1. There is a Grave violation of the Constitution;
2. There is an Exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3. The constitutional issue raised requires formation of Controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; or
4. The case is capable of Repetition yet evading review (Navarro v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G,R. No. 180050,
April 12. 2011).
4. Operative fact doctrine
Q: What is the operative fact doctrine?

ANS: Under the operative fact doctrine, while a law recognized as unconstitutional, its effects, prior to its declaration of
nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine
is an admission that the law is unconstitutional (League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951,
April 24. 2010);
Note: In keeping with the demands of equity, the court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences
that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on
decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified (Hacienda Luisita Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, et al. G.R. NO: 171101, November 22, 2011)
C. Safeguards of judicial independence
Q: What are the safeguards of judicial independence?

ANS: The safeguards of judicial independence are the following:
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and may not be abolished by the legislature;
2. Members of the Supreme Court are removable by impeachment (CONST., Art. Xl, Sec. 2), or a petition for quo
warranto may be filed to oust an ineligible public official for acts or omission committed prior to or at the time of
appointment (Republic v. Sereno. G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018);
3. The SC cannot be deprived of its constitutionally-conferred original and appellate jurisdiction except through
constitutional amendment.
4. The SC's appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice or concurrence (CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 30);
5. The SC has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 6);
6. The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts;
7. Members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure (CONST., Art VIII. Sec. 2, par. (2));
8. Members of the judiciary mnay not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 12);
9. Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy (CONST., Art. Vlll, Sec. 3);
10. Non-diminution of salary (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 10);
11. SC alone may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court (CONST., Art, VIII, Sec. 5(5). The authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of institutional
independence (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017);
12. SC alone may order temporary detail of judges; and
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13. SC can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(6); NACHURA, supra at 310-
311).
1. Judicial and Bar Council
a. Composition
Q: What is the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)?

ANS: The JBC is composed of the following:
1. Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
2. Secretary of Justice as ex officio Members,
3. Representative of the Congress as ex officio Member
4. Representative of the Integrated Bar,
5. Professor of law,
6. Retired Member of the Supreme Court,
7. Representative of the private sector (CONST., Art.VIII, Sec.8, par.1)
Note: In Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (G.R. No. 20224, April 16, 2013), the SC ruled that only one (1) member
from the bicameral Congress may sit in the JBC. The member ex officio may come either from the Senate or the HOR,
but not both. The court based its rule on the unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) to treat each ex officio
member as representing only one co-equal branch of government. According to Fr. Bernas, the real reason was that
this provision was formulated for a unicameral Congress and no change was made when the final decision was for a
bicameral Congress. In practice, the two houses now work out a way of sharing representation (BERNAS, Philippine
Constitution Reviewer, supra at 355)
Q: Who appoints the regular members of the council?

ANS: The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec.8, par.2)
b. Powers
Q: What are the powers and functions of the JBC?

ANS: The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such
other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec.8, par.5) It shall also
recommend appointees to the Office of the Ombudsman and his five (5) deputies (CONST., Art. XI, Sec.9).
Note: The independent character of a constitutional body does not remove it from the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. The Court's general supervision over the JBC is in line with its constitutionally bestowed discretion to assign
additional functions and duties to the JBC (Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015).
Q: What positions require the screening and nomination by the JBC?

ANS: The positions that require the screening and nomination by the JBC are the Justices of the Supreme Court,
Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan, the judges of the tower courts (CONST., Art. VIII,
Sec.9) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (CONST. Art. XI, Sec. 9).
Q: Does the Supreme Court have supervisory power over the JBC?
ANS: Yes. The supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. It is
the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws
and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. However, the Supreme
Court may not prescribe its own manner of execution of the act. It has no discretion on this matter except to see to it
that the rules are followed (Jardaleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014).
2. Fiscal autonomy
Q: What is the scope of the Judiciary's grant of fiscal autonomy?

ANS: Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec.3)
D. Qualifications of members of the Judiciary
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Section 7.
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age,
and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed
judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Q: What are the qualifications for Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court?
ANS: The following qualifications must be met for a person to be Chief Justice or Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court: (N-40-15-CIPI)
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. At least 40 years old;
3. 15 years or more as a judge of a lower court or has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines for the
same period; and
4. A person of proven Competence. Integrity, Probity, and Independence (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 7).
Q: What are the qualifications for the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals?
ANS: The same qualifications as those provided for Justices of the Supreme Court must be satisfied for a person
seeking to become Presiding Justice or Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CONST., Art. VIII, sec. 7).
Q: What are the qualifications for Regional Trial Court Judges?

ANS: The following qualifications must be met for a person to be a Regional Trial Court Judge: (C-35-10.ClPl)
1. Citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 35 years old; and
3. Has been engaged for at least 10 years in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite (B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 15); and
4. A person of proven Competence. Integrity, Probity, and Independence (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 7. par.(3))
Q: What are the qualifications for Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges?
ANS: The following qualifications must be satisfied for Metropolitan, Municipal or Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges:
(C-30-5-ClPl)
1. Citizen of the Philippines:
2. At least 30 years old;
3. Has been engaged for at least 5 years in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite (B P. BIO. 129. Sec. 26); and
4. A person of proven Competence, Integrity, Probity and Independence (CONST., Art VIII. sec. 7, par. (3)).
Q: What is the procedure for appointments in the Judiciary?

ANS: Appointments to the Judiciary are made through the following:
1. The President appoints from among a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy; or
2. For lower courts, President shall issue the appointment 90 days from submission of the list (CONST., Art, VIII, Sec.
9)
Note: Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof (CONST.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)).
E. Workings of the Supreme Court
1. En banc and division cases
Section 4.
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1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.
2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Section 11. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted in thereon.
Section 4. Article VII. The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Q: Discuss how the Supreme Court decides cases en banc.

ANS: All decisions and actions in Court en banc cases shall be made up upon the concurrence of the majority of the
Members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues or issues involved and voted on them
(The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, A.M. 10-4-20-SC, May 4, 2010).
The following cases are to be heard and decided en banc:
1. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement or law;
2. Cases involving the constitutionality, applications or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations;
3. Cases heard by a division when the required majority in the division is not obtained;
4. Cases where the SC modifies or reverses a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down either en banc or in
division;
5. Administrative cases where the vote is for the dismissal of a judge of a lower court or otherwise to discipline such
one; and
6. Election contests for President and Vice-President
Q: Is a decision decided by all justices sitting en banc valid when there was no quorum during deliberations?
ANS: No. When the SC sits en banc, cases are decided by the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, provided there is quorum (The Internal
Rules of the SC, supra). If there was no quorum during the deliberations, even if there was quorum when the case
was decided, the quorum requirement during the deliberations was not satisfied.
Q: How are cases or matters decided or resolved by the divisions of the SC?
ANS: There are now three divisions of the Supreme Court with five (5) members each. Cases or matters heard by a
division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of
such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc.
Note: "Cases" are "decided" while "matters" are "resolved" applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. On the basis
of this distinction only "cases" are referred to the Supreme Court en banc for decision whenever the required number
of votes cannot be obtained (Fortich v. Corona. G.R. No 13"'457. August 19. 1999).
2. Procedural rule-making
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
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privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
Q: Discuss the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

ANS: The Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning: protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedures in all courts, admissions to the practice of law, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Note: The rule-making power of the Supreme Court is no longer shared with the Congress, much less with the
Executive (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999). Thus, for instance, the payment of
legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. It cannot be validly annulled, changed, or modified by the Congress (Baguio Market Vendors v. Judge
Cabato-Cortes, G.R. No. 165922. February 26, 2010).
Q: What are the limitations to the rule-making power of the SC?

ANS: The following are the limitations imposed by law on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court:
1. The rules must provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for speedy disposition of cases;
2. The rules must be uniform for all courts in the same grade; and
3. The rules shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
3. Administrative supervision over lower courts
Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Q: Discuss the power of administrative supervision of the SC.

ANS: The power of administrative supervision of the SC involves the following:
1. Administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon.
2. The power to hear by the SC en banc of administrative cases including:
a. Dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary;
b. Disbarment of lawyers;
c. Suspension of those under (a) and (b) for more than 1 year; or
d. Fine exceeding P10,000 (In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of Various Supreme Court
Rules any Resolutions, Bar Matter 209, March 16, 1993).
4. Original and appellate jurisdiction
Q: What is the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

ANS: The SC exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (CONST., Art. VIII. Sec. 5(1)).
The Supreme Court may also review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof (CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 18(3)).
Sitting en banc, it is also the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President (CONST., Art. VII. Sec. 4).
Q: What is the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

ANS: The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
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d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (CONST., Art. VIII. Sec. 5 (2)).
Q: Can the Congress pass a law increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?
ANS: No. The Constitution provides that "no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence" (CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 30). This provision is
intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. For the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and
thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects (First Lepanto
Ceramics Inc., v. CA, G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994).
Q: Discuss the formal requirements of a valid decision.

ANS: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor (CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 14).
A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of
court (RULES OF COURT, Rule 36, Sec. 1).
The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him
arid shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon
which the judgment is based (RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, Sec.2).
Judicial Department
Judicial Power
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court's judicial power to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The first part is to be known as the traditional concept of judicial power while the latter part, an innovation of the 1987
Constitution, became known as the court's expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now
delve into acts of any branch or instrumentality of the Government traditionally considered as political if such act was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)
Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the
proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. We held that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will
emasculate the Court's constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an
additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)
[Note: With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ,
the same special and specific jurisdiction is vested in the Court to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. Necessarily, and by parity of reasoning, a certiorari petition
invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the Congress' extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. (Lagman v. Senate
President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)]
Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the Congress' extension of such proclamation or suspension is
limited only to a determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. By its plain language, the Constitution
provides such scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority under Section 18, Article VII, which is
principally aimed at balancing (or curtailing) the power vested by the Constitution in the Congress to determine
whether to extend such proclamation or suspension. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018)
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A.C. No. 58-2003 is an implementation of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129, or the basic provision on longevity pay granted
by law to justices and judges in the judiciary. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is intended to recompense justices and judges
for each five-year period of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary. The purpose of
the law is to reward long service, from the lowest to the highest court in the land. xxx. On the other hand, A.C. No. 58-
2003 was issued by this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to interpret laws and, as such, has the force and
effect of law. In crafting the circular, the Court duly considered the long-standing policy of according liberal
construction to retirement laws covering government personnel.. (Re: Application for Optional Retirement under Republic
Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 5095 and Republic Act No. 9946, of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr .,
A.M. No. 15-11-01-SC, March 6, 2018)
Jurisdiction
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when
commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals,
or in the Supreme Court. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo warranto action. This authority is expressly conferred on the
Supreme Court by the Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII xxx. Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's
quo warranto jurisdiction only to certain public officials or that excludes impeachable officials therefrom. xxx. The
Constitution defines judicial power as a "duty" to be performed by the courts of justice. Thus, for the Court to
repudiate its own jurisdiction over this case would be to abdicate a constitutionally imposed responsibility (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)
[Note: The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the qualifications of the President and Vice-
President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was provided in the
rules of the Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on
the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)]
With the enactment of R.A. No. 1125, the CTA (Court of Tax Appeals) was granted the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to review by appeal all cases involving disputed assessments of internal revenue taxes, customs duties, and real
property taxes. In general, it has jurisdiction over cases involving liability for payment of money to the Government
or the administration of the laws on national internal revenue, customs, and real property. (Steel Corporation of the
Philippines v. Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 220502, February 12, 2018)
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770. (Ifurung v.
Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)
[Note: Clear from his petition was that the petitioner beseeches the Court for a declaration primarily as to the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 6770, and as a consequence thereof, a pronouncement
that the incumbent Ombudsman and the deputies are de facto officers and whose offices are vacant. The petition does
not task the Court to scrutinize the qualifications of the respondents to hold office as Ombudsman and deputies but
rather to determine the constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in so far as their term of office is concerned.
(Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018)]
(I)n Matting Industrial and Commercial Corporation v. Caras (647 Phil. 324 [2010]), this Court stated that jurisdiction over
intra-corporate disputes involving the illegal dismissal of corporate officers was with the Regional Trial Court , not
with the Labor Arbiter. (Malcaba v. Prohealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., G.R. 209085, June 6, 2018)
When a tax case is pending on appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Tax Appeals has the exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin the levy of taxes and the auction of a taxpayer's properties in relation to that case. (Philippine
Ports Authority v. The City of Davao, G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018)
[Note: In this case, the Court of Tax Appeals had jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal to resolve the question of
whether or not it was liable for real property tax. To recall, the real property tax liability was the very reason for the
acts which petitioner wanted to have enjoined. It was, thus, the Court of Tax Appeals, and not the Court of Appeals,
Page 8 of 19
that had the power to preserve the subject of the appeal, to give effect to its final determination, and, when necessary,
to control auxiliary and incidental matters and to prohibit or restrain acts which might interfere with its exercise of
jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal. Thus, respondents' acts carried out pursuant to the imposition of the real
property tax were also within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. (Philippine Ports Authority v. The City of
Davao, G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018)]
[Note: Even if the law had vested the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in real property tax
cases such as this, the Court of Appeals was still correct in dismissing the petition before it. Once a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case, it also has the power to issue all auxiliary writs necessary to maintain and exercise its
jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts. Thus, once the Court of Tax Appeals acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner's appeal, the Court of Appeals would have been precluded from taking cognizance of the case. (Philippine
Ports Authority v. The City of Davao, G.R. No. 190324, June 6, 2018)]
Requisites for Judicial Inquiry
We note at the outset that Dela Merced & Sons' attempt to assail the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 constitutes
a collateral attack. This is contrary to the rule that issues of constitutionality must be pleaded directly. Unless a law is
annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of the law's validity remains. (Republic v. N. dela Merced & Sons,
Inc., G.R. No. 201501, January 22, 2018)
[Note: Nevertheless, even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced & Sons still failed to
satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake a judicial review. Specifically, the issue of constitutionality of
Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this case. The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions
the constitutionality of a law must show that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional
question is unavoidable. Consequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of constitutionality avoided. In this case, Dela
Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional issue it has raised is
resolved. Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 stands. (Republic v. N. dela Merced & Sons,
Inc., G.R. No. 201501, January 22, 2018)]
In these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the
approval of the President's request to extend martial law in Mindanao. Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 and 236155 have
also put in issue the manner in which the Congress deliberated upon the President's request for extension. Clearly,
therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership, which has interest in the subject matter of these
cases. Consequently, it was procedurally incorrect for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061 and 236155 to implead
only the Senate President and the House Speaker among the respondents. (Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 235935,
February 6, 2018)
While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such
question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects
to the court's jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. (Specified
Contractors and Development, Inc. v. Pobocan, G.R. No. 212472, January 11, 2018)
Hierarchy of Courts
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant
case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of no
less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot
allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Petitioner's direct resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review as sanctioned by the
rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts. xxx. Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not
inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the exigency of
the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should
not be the case when the initial dispute - an ejectment case - is, by nature and design, a summary procedure and
should have been resolved with expediency. (Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Company,
G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018)
Page 9 of 19
[Note: Moreover, this Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this Court from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court upon questions of law, such as those which petitioner raises in this case. (Intramuros Administration v.
Offshore Construction Development Company, G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018)]
Rule-Making Authority
It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a person, are
considered substantial errors that were beyond the purview of the rule. (Republic v. Tipay, G.R. No. 209527, February
14, 2018)
[Note: R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work, which is harmless and immediately obvious to the understanding. It was further amended in 2011, when R.A.
No. 10172 was passed to expand the authority of local civil registrars and the Consul General to make changes in the
day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the recorded sex of a person when it is patently clear that there was a
typographical error or mistake in the entry. Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction with
the RTC in 2009, R.A. No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As such, to correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in
Virgel's birth certificate, the proper remedy was to commence the appropriate adversarial proceedings with the RTC,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The changes in the entries pertaining to the gender and date of birth are
indisputably substantial corrections, outside the contemplation of a clerical or typographical error that may be
corrected administratively. (Republic v. Tipay, G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018)]
To emphasize, the distinction in criminal law is this: substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. Based on the above, it may be gleaned that
the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure. It is therefore the Court who has the last say
regarding the appreciation of evidence. (People v. Teng Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018)
[Note: The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional power
of this Court. This includes the power to promulgate the rules of evidence. On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence
are provided in the Rules of Court issued by the Supreme Court. However, the chain of custody rule is not found in
the Rules of Court. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was passed by the legislative department and its
implementing rules were promulgated by PDEA, in consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other
agencies under and within the executive department. (People v. Teng Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018)]
[Note: xxx. … the Court's power to promulgate judicial rules, including rules of evidence, is no longer shared by the
Court with Congress. xxx. …the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure, and that the
Court has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Evidentiary matters are indeed well within the powers
of courts to appreciate and rule upon, and so, when the courts find appropriate, substantial compliance with the chain
of custody rule as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved may warrant the
conviction of the accused. (People v. Teng Moner y Adam, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018, cited in People v. Sipin, G.R.
No. 224290, June 11, 2018)]
[Note: Jurisprudence dictates that the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment
to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. (People v. Baptista, G.R. No. 225783, August 20, 2018, citing People v.
Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, 820 SCRA 204, 215, further citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil 1024
(2012), at 1038)]
Foremost, the rule-making power of the Court in matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested by
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Hence, being plenary in nature, the Court cannot be called upon by a
private citizen to exercise such power in a particular manner, especially through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari
or prohibition, which is intended for an entirely different purpose. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018)
[Note: The concept of SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) was first introduced to this jurisdiction
under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). As defined therein, a SLAPP refers to an
action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or
local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any
legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of
Page 10 of 19
environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights. In application, the allegation
of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed merely as a harassment suit against
environmental actions. xxx. Transposed to this case, the Court finds no occasion to apply the foregoing rules as the
Petition has no relation at all to "the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of
environmental rights." R.A. No. 9262, which involves cases of violence against women and their children, is not
among those laws included under the scope of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC xxx. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6,
2018)]
[Note: SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be exercised in
the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body. Here, petitioners cannot, under the
guise of substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not available to them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-
making power in their Petition, petitioners have admitted that the instant action has no basis under any of the rules
promulgated by the Court. The Court takes this occasion to remind petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-
size-fits-all" tool that may be invoked in any and all instances at the whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to
the orderly administration of justice. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018)]
Judges
According to the Republic, because respondent failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity
remains unproven. The Republic posits that the JBC's ostensible nomination of respondent does not extinguish the fact that the
latter failed to comply with the SALN requirement as the filing thereof remains to be a constitutional and statutory requirement.
If a candidate appointed despite being unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC and despite the lack of the
aforementioned qualifications at the time of application, the appointment may be the subject of a quo warranto
provided it is filed within one year from the appointment or discovery of the defect. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018)
[Note: When the Solicitor General files a quo warranto petition in behalf of the people and where the interests of the
public is [sic] involved, the lapse of time presents no effective bar. A quo warranto action is a governmental function
and not a proprietary function, and therefore the doctrine of laches does not apply. Indeed, when the government is
the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches
or prescription. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]
[Note: The Republic cannot be faulted for questioning respondent’s qualification for office only upon discovery of the
cause of ouster. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]
[Note: As will be demonstrated hereunder, respondent was never forthright as to whether or not she filed her SALNs
covering the period of her employment in U.P. xxx. Even up to the present, respondent has not been candid on
whether she filed the required SALNs or not. xxx. Hence, until recently, when respondent’s qualification for office
was questioned during the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaint
against the respondent, there was no indication that would have prompted the Republic to assail respondent’s
appointment, much less question the wisdom or reason behind the said recommending and appointing authorities’
actions. The defect on respondent’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]
[Note: On another point, the one-year prescriptive period was necessary for the government to be immediately
informed if any person claims title to an office so that the government may not be faced with the predicament of
having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding it albeit illegally, and another to the person not
rendering service although entitled to do so. It would thus be absurd to require the filing of a petition for quo warranto
within the one-year period for such purpose when it is the State itself which files the same not for the purpose of
determining who among two private individuals are entitled to the office. Stated in a different manner, the purpose of
the instant petition is not to inform the government that it is facing a predicament of having to pay two salaries;
rather, the government, having learned of the predicament that it might be paying an unqualified person, is acting
upon it head-on. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]
[Note: Most importantly, urgency to resolve the controversy on the title to a public office to prevent a hiatus or
disruption in the delivery of public service is the ultimate consideration in prescribing a limitation on when an action
for quo warranto may be instituted. However, it is this very same concern that precludes the application of the
prescriptive period when it is the State which questions the eligibility of the person holding a public office and not
merely the personal interest of a private individual claiming title thereto. Again, as We have stated in the assailed
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Decision, when the government is the real party in interest and asserts its rights, there can be no defense on the
ground of laches or limitation; otherwise, it would be injurious to public interest if this Court will not act upon the
case presented before it by the Republic and merely allow the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the Chief
Justice position to continue. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19,
2018)]
The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of the
Constitution. xxx. Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, our fundamental law is clear
that a member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. xxx.
Emphatically, integrity is not only a prerequisite for an aspiring Member of the Court but is likewise a continuing
requirement common to judges and lawyers alike. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of the
ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as a deterrent to
graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the
SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public
office. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC is a clear violation not only of the JBC rules, but also of the law
and the Constitution. The discordance between respondent's non-filing and non-submission of the SALNs and her
claimed integrity as a person is too patent to ignore. For lack of proven integrity, respondent ought to have been
disqualified by the JBC and ought to have been excluded from the list of nominees transmitted to the President. As the
qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member
of the Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise excluded
candidate. In other words, the inclusion of respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot
override the minimum Constitutional qualifications. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
[Note: The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No.
237428, May 11, 2018)]
Respondent insists that the filing of SALNs bears no relation to the Constitutional qualification of integrity. For her, the measure
of integrity should be as what the JBC sets it to be and that in any case, the SALN laws, being malum prohibitum, do not concern
adherence to moral and ethical principles.
Respondent's argument, however, dangerously disregards that the filing of SALN is not only a requirement under the
law, but a positive duty required from every public officer or employee, first and foremost by the Constitution. The
SALN laws were passed in aid of the enforcement of the Constitutional duty to submit a declaration under oath of
one's assets, liabilities, and net worth. This positive Constitutional duty of filing one's SALN is so sensitive and
important that it even shares the same category as the Constitutional duty imposed upon public officers and
employees to owe allegiance to the State and the Constitution. As such, offenses against the SALN laws are not
ordinary offenses but violations of a duty which every public officer and employee owes to the State and the
Constitution. In other words, the violation of SALN laws, by itself, defeats any claim of integrity as it is inherently
immoral to violate the will of the legislature and to violate the Constitution. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)
For lack of a Constitutional qualification, respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely
holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, respondent has never attained the status of an impeachable official
and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at
the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice. (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No.237428, May 11, 2018)
The present is the exigent and opportune time for the Court to establish well-defined guidelines that would serve as
guide posts for the bench, the bar and the JBC, as well, in the discharge of its Constitutionally-mandated functions. In
sum, this Court holds:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present, when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the
Page 12 of 19
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Members of the Judiciary are bound by the qualifications of honesty, probity, competence, and integrity. In
ascertaining whether a candidate possesses such qualifications, the JBC in the exercise of its Constitutional mandate,
set certain requirements which should be complied with by the candidates to be able to qualify. These requirements,
as well as subsequent changes thereto, are announced and published to notify not only the applicants but the public
as well. Changes to such set of requirements, as agreed upon by the JBC En Banc through a proper deliberation, such
as in this case when the JBC decided to allow substantial compliance with the SALN submission requirement, should
also be announced and published for the same purpose of apprising the candidates and the public of such changes. At
any rate, if a candidate appointed despite being unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC and despite the
lack of the aforementioned qualifications at the time of application, the appointment may be the subject of a quo
warranto provided it is filed within one year from the appointment or discovery of the defect. Only the Solicitor
General may institute the quo warranto petition.
The willful non-filing of a SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack of probity and lack of integrity. More so if the
non-filing is repeated in complete disregard of the mandatory requirements of the Constitution and the law.
Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be retained after more than ten years by the receiving
office or custodian or repository unless these are the subject of investigation pursuant to the law. Thus, to be in
keeping with the spirit of the law requiring public officers to file SALNs—to manifest transparency and accountability
in public office—if public officers cannot produce their SALNs from their personal files, they must obtain a
certification from the office where they filed and/or the custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In
the event that said offices certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located, said offices must certify the
valid and legal reason of their non-availability, such as by reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or
earthquake, or by reason of the allowed destruction after ten years under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713. (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
[Note: Accordingly, the Court, on the basis of an 8-6 vote, ruled that the respondent is ―found DISQUALIFIED from
and is hereby adjudged GUILTY OF UNLAWFULLY HOLDING AND EXERCISING THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE. Accordingly, respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED AND EXCLUDED therefrom. ‖ (Republic v.
Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)]
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special courts as we11 as
justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified
complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public
records of indubitable integrity. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of
Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)
[Note: The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be
accompanied by supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy and virtually unsubstantiated
charges against them. This is consistent with the rule that, in administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the
burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory
manner the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or
defense. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-
06-CA, March 13, 2018)]
[Note: In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro of selling favorable decisions, having a mistress,
and habitually playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law, immorality, and unbecoming conduct. These accusations, however, with the only exception of
gambling in casinos, are not supported by any evidence or by any public record of indubitable integrity. Thus, the
bare allegations of corruption and immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this reason, the charges of
corruption and immorality against Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit. (Re: Anonymous Letter-
Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]
[Note: With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, it is with regret that the Court finds them
inapplicable to the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances that the prohibition from entering and
gambling in casinos is applicable only to judges of inferior courts and court personnel. Stated differently, the aforesaid
issuances do not cover justices of collegial courts for the simple reason that they are neither judges of the inferior
Page 13 of 19
courts nor can they be described as personnel of the court. Although the term "judge" has been held to comprehend all
kinds of judges, the same is true only if the said term is not modified by any word or phrase. In the case of Circular
No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544- 0, the term "judge" has been qualified by the phrase "inferior courts." Thus,
absurd as it may seem, Justice Pizarro cannot be held administratively liable under Circular No. 4 and Administrative
Matter No. 1544-0. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M.
No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)]
[Note: From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government official connected directly to the operation of the
government or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the government whose tasks is the performance
and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or any agency thereof, as conferred on them by
law, without any intervening agency. Simply put, a "government official connected directly to the operation of the
government or any of its agencies" is a government officer who performs the functions of the government on his own
judgment or discretion - essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No. 292. (Re: Anonymous Letter-
[Note: Applying the above definition to the present case, it is clear that Justice Pizarro is covered by the term
"government official connected directly with the operation of the government." Indeed, one of the functions of the
government, through the Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its territorial jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as
a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a government official directly involved in the administration of justice; and in the
performance of such function, he exercises discretion. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated the
prohibition from gambling in casinos as provided under Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869. (Re: Anonymous Letter-
Notwithstanding respondent's dismissal from the service, the case remains justiciable because other penalties, such as
a fine, may still be imposed if he is found guilty of an administrative offense. (See v. Judge Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-16-
2454, June 6, 2018)
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the OCA did not make any explicit finding/recommendation on the administrative
charge against respondent in connection with the issuance of the Temporary Release Order in Misc. Case No. 3957.
This notwithstanding, the Court is not without power and authority to directly act on the matter. Section 6, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
Consistent with this authority, the Court has the discretion to directly rule on the administrative charge against
respondent relative to Misc. Case No. 3957, even in the absence of prior action from the OCA. (Rodriguez v. Noel, A.M.
No. RTJ-18-2525, June 25, 2018)
Judicial and Bar Council
Thus, in interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held that the Court's
supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. As when the
policies of the JBC are being attacked, the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to
inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC is compliant with its own rules. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. 237428, May
11, 2018)
JBC's absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper actions beyond the latter's reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
What is more, the JBC's duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
In fine, the Court has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, to insure that the JBC
faithfully executes its duties as the Constitution requires of it. Wearing its hat of supervision, the Court is thus
empowered to inquire into the processes leading to respondent's nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the
face of the Republic's contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin with.
(Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
[Note: As an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, the Court has the authority to insure that the JBC
performs its duties under the Constitution and complies with its own rules and standards. Indeed, supervision is an
active power and implies the authority to inquire into facts and conditions that renders the power of supervision real
and effective. Under its power of supervision, the Court has ample authority to look into the processes leading to
respondent's nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's contention that respondent was
Page 14 of 19
ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin with. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion
for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)]
[Note: The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based on facts
and, as such, generates no exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating body. Thus, whether a nominee is of the
requisite age, is a natural-born citizen, has met the years of law practice, and is of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence are to be determined based on facts and cannot be made dependent on inference or
discretion, much less concessions, which the recommending authority may make or extend. To say that the
determination of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity" is a task absolutely contingent upon the discretion of the
JBC is to place the integrity requirement on a plateau different from the rest of the Constitutional requirements, when
no such distinction is assigned by the Constitution. As well, to treat as discretionary on the part of the JBC the
question of whether a nominee is of "proven integrity" is to render the Court impotent to nullify an otherwise
unconstitutional nomination unless the Court's jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Such severely limiting course of action would effectively diminish the Court's collegial power of supervision over the
JBC. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, June 19, 2018)]
[Note: To re-align the issue in this petition, the Republic charges respondent of unlawfully holding or exercising the
position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The contents of the petition pose an attack to respondent's authority to
hold or exercise the position. Unmoving is the rule that title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by
quo warranto proceedings. As it cannot be assailed collaterally, certiorari is an infirm remedy for this purpose. It is for
this reason that the Court previously denied a certiorari and prohibition petition which sought to annul appointment
to the Judiciary of an alleged naturalized citizen. Aguinaldo, et al. v. Aquino, et al., settles that when it is the
qualification for the position that is in issue, the proper remedy is quo warranto, pursuant to Topacio. But when it is the
act of the appointing power that is placed under scrutiny and not any disqualification on the part of the appointee, a
petition for certiorari challenging the appointment for being unconstitutional or for having been done in grave abuse
of discretion is the apt legal course. (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration,
June 19, 2018)]
Practice of Law
The practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court.
(Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, 631 Phil. 139 [2010], cited in Tan v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, January 10, 2018)
A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes another ground prior to his eventual
disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable
act or actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession.‖ (Domingo v. Revilla, A.C. No. 5473,
January 23, 2018).
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the
court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an
officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues
despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure
of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices. (Zarcilla v. Quesada, A.C. No. 7186, March
13, 2018)
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has no jurisdiction to investigate government lawyers charged with
administrative offenses involving the performance of their official duties. (Trovela v. Robles, A.C. No. 11550, June 4,
2018)
[Note: The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of official duties as
prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and
Arellano exclusively pertained to their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the
authority to discipline pertained to the President. In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the
Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15,
paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of respondents as
officials performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated
from their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such
lawyers. (Trovela v. Robles, A.C. No. 11550, June 4, 2018)]
Decisions
Page 15 of 19
The doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court
to the exclusion of lower courts. It is true regardless whether the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally
sound as only decisions issued by this Court become part of the legal system. At the most, decisions of lower courts
only have a persuasive effect. (United Coconut Planters Bank v. Sps. Uy, G.R. No. 204039, January 10, 2018)
Ideally, the same trial judge should preside over all the stages of the proceedings, especially in cases where the
conviction or acquittal of the accused mainly relies on the credibility of the witnesses. xxx. However, inevitable
circumstances - the judge's death, retirement, resignation, transfer, or removal from office - may intervene during the
pendency of the case. An example is the present case, where the trial judge who heard the witnesses, Judge Francisco
D. Calingin (Judge Calingin), compulsorily retired pending trial. Judge Calingin was then replaced by Judge
Mordeno, who proceeded with hearing the other witnesses and writing the decision. Udang's argument cannot be
accepted as this would mean that every case where the judge had to be replaced pending decision would have to be
refiled and retried so that the judge who hears the witnesses testify and the judge who writes the decision would be
the same. What Udang proposes is impracticable. xxx. Applying the foregoing, the trial court decision convicting
Udang is valid, regardless of the fact that the judge who heard the witnesses and the judge who wrote the decision are
different. With no showing of any irregularity in the transcript of records, it is presumed to be a "complete, authentic
record of everything that transpire[d] during the trial," sufficient for Judge Mordeno to have evaluated the credibility
of the witnesses, specifically, of AAA. (People v. Udang, G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018)
The Court, too, issued Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 which required all judges to make
''complete findings of facts in their decisions, scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented, and avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.‖ (Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January 19, 2018)
[Note: The Constitution (Article VIII, Section 14) expressly provides that "'[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis
therefor.‖ (Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January 19, 2018)]
[Note: See Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which states that: Sec l. Rendition of judgments and final orders. - A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk
of court. (Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42, January 19, 2018)]
Likewise, his failure to cite in the Decision his factual and legal bases for finding the presence of the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is not a mere matter of judicial ethics. No less than the Constitution
provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. The Court cannot simply accept the lame excuse that Judge Dumayas failed to cite said bases
due to a mere oversight on his part that was made in good faith. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Dumayas,
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 6, 2018)
[Note: In this case, a review of the records shows that the RTC had failed to clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which it based its ruling insofar as Go's civil liability to East Oceanic is concerned. There is absolutely no
discussion at all in the assailed Decision as to the RTC's ruling in the collection case, particularly, on how it arrived at
its conclusion finding Go liable to pay East Oceanic "'the sum of 112,814,054.86 plus 6% interest to be computed from
the time of the filing of the complaint.'' (Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. Nos. 206841-42,
January 19, 2018)]
The constitutional provision clearly indicates that it contemplates only a decision, which is the judgment or order that
adjudicates on the merits of a case. This is clear from the text and tenor of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court xxx.
The October 4, 2011 resolution did not adjudicate on the merits of G.R. No. 178083. We explicitly stated so in the
resolution of March 13, 2012. What we thereby did was instead to exercise the Court's inherent power to recall orders
and resolutions before they attain finality. In so doing, the Court only exercised prudence in order to ensure that the
Second Division was vested with the appropriate legal competence in accordance with and under the Court's
prevailing internal rules to review and resolve the pending motion for reconsideration. (Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)
As we see it, the dissent must have inadvertently ignored the procedural effect that a second motion for
reconsideration based on an allowable ground suspended the running of the period for appeal from the date of the
Page 16 of 19
filing of the motion until such time that the same was acted upon and granted. Correspondingly, granting the motion
for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration has the effect of preventing the challenged decision from attaining
finality. This is the reason why the second motion for reconsideration should present extraordinarily persuasive
reasons. Indeed, allowing pro forma motions would indefinitely avoid the assailed judgment from attaining finality.
(Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)
[Note: By granting PAL’s motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, the Court effectively averted
the July 22, 2008 decision and the October 2, 2009 resolution from attaining finality. Worthy of reiteration, too, is that
the March 13, 2012 resolution expressly recalled the September 7, 2011 resolution. Given the foregoing, the conclusion
stated in the dissent that the Banc was divested of the jurisdiction to entertain the second motion for reconsideration
for being a "third motion for reconsideration;" and the unfair remark in the dissent that "[t]he basis of the supposed
residual power of the Court En Banc to, take on its own, take cognizance of Division cases is therefore suspect" are immediately
rejected as absolutely legally and factually unfounded. To start with, there was no "third motion for reconsideration"
to speak of. The September 11, 2011 resolution denying PAL’s second motion for reconsideration had been recalled by
the October 4, 2011 resolution. Hence, PAL’s motion for reconsideration remained unresolved, negating the assertion
of the dissent that the Court was resolving the second motion for reconsideration "for the second time." (Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)]
[Note: Nonetheless, we should stress that the rule prohibiting the filing of a second motion for reconsideration is by
no means absolute. Although Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court disallows the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) allows an exception, to wit:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any
exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at
least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the
assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's
declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for reconsideration to the Court
en banc. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13,
2018)]
[Note: The conditions that must concur in order for the Court to entertain a second motion for reconsideration are the
following, namely: 1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest
of justice; 2. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality; 3. If the ruling
sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at least three members of the
Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En Banc; and 4. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the
Court En Banc’s actual membership must be mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted . Under
the IRSC, a second motion for reconsideration may be allowed to prosper upon a showing by the movant that a
reconsideration of the previous ruling is necessary in the higher interest of justice. There is higher interest of justice
when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of
the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)]
Preliminarily, the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment, but
merely relied on the record of the case, does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the
judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses speak or
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Hence, the Court generally will not find any misapprehension of
facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of duties of public officers that the
transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself. (People v. Villalobos,
G.R. No. 228960, June 11, 2018)
En Banc
To reiterate, the Court, whether sitting En Banc or in Division, acts as a collegial body. By virtue of the collegiality, the
Chief Justice alone cannot promulgate or issue any decisions or orders. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)
Page 17 of 19
[Note: In Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda Against SC Justices Puna, Kapunan, Pardo, Ynares Santiago (A.M. No.
03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 1), the Court has elucidated on the collegial nature of the Court in relation to the
role of the Chief Justice, viz.: The complainant’s vituperation against the Chief Justice on account of what he perceived
was the latter's refusal "to take a direct positive and favorable action" on his letters of appeal overstepped the limits of
proper conduct. It betrayed his lack of understanding of a fundamental principle in our system of laws. Although the
Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot legally decide a case on his own because of the Court's nature as a collegial
body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself, overturn the decision of the Court, whether of a division or the en
banc. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. While
most of the Court's work is performed by its three divisions, the Court remains one court-single, unitary, complete
and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when
the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court
may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)]
Fortich v. Corona, which has expounded on the authority of the Banc to accept cases from the Divisions, is still the
prevailing jurisprudence regarding the construction of Section 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. However,
Fortich v. Corona does not apply herein. It is notable that Fortich v. Corona sprung from the results of the voting on the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Sumilao Farmers. The vote ended in an equally divided Division ("two-two").
From there, the Sumilao Farmers sought to elevate the matter to the Banc based on Section 4(3), Article VIII because
the required three-member majority vote was not reached. However, the factual milieu in Fortich v. Corona is not on all
fours with that in this case. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No.
178083, March 13, 2018)
[Note: It is well to stress that the Banc could not have assumed jurisdiction were it not for the initiative of Justice
Arturo V. Brion who consulted the Members of the ruling Division as well as Chief Justice Corona regarding the
jurisdictional implications of the successive retirements, transfers, and inhibitions by the Members of the ruling
Division. This move by Justice Brion led to the referral of the case to the Banc in accordance with Section 3(1), Rule 2 of
the IRSC that provided, among others, that any Member of the Division could request the Court En Banc to take
cognizance of cases that fell under paragraph (m). This referral by the ruling Division became the basis for the Banc to
issue its October 4, 2011 resolution. For sure, the Banc, by assuming jurisdiction over the case, did not seek to act as
appellate body in relation to the acts of the ruling Division, contrary to the dissent's position. The Banc's recall of the
resolution of September 7, 2011 should not be so characterized, considering that the Banc did not thereby rule on the
merits of the case, and did not thereby reverse the July 22, 2008 decision and the October 2, 2009 resolution. The
referral of the case to the Banc was done to address the conflict among the provisions of the IRSC that had potential
jurisdictional implications on the ruling made by the Second Division. (Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines v. Philippine Air Lines, G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018)]
Appeals
In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the
People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This power is expressly provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III,
Chapter 12 of the Revised Administrative Code. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the
Philippines in all criminal cases. (People v. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018)
Appeal is not a matter of right. Courts and tribunals have the discretion whether to give due course to an appeal or to
dismiss it outright. The perfection of an appeal is, thus, jurisdictional. Non-compliance with the manner in which to
file an appeal renders the judgment final and executory. (Malcaba v. Prohealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 209085,
June 6, 2018)
Contempt of Court
In any event, what is relevant and essential in this contempt case is the fact that, by virtue of petitioner's reliance upon
the said lawful and binding SEC Decision in the use of its corporate name in lieu of the proscribed "Big Mak" mark to
comply with the subject injunction order, petitioner's good faith is clearly manifest. Petitioner's justification of its
questioned action is not at all implausible. This Court finds no reason to reject petitioner's explanation or doubt its
good faith as certainly; the use of its corporate name was warranted by the SEC Decision. It was also not unreasonable
for the petitioner, through its officers, to think that the stalls and products bearing its corporate name would send the
message to the public that the products were the petitioner's and not those of respondent's, the very evil sought to be
Page 18 of 19
prevented and/or eradicated by the decision in the infringement/unfair competition case. Considering that
condemnation for contempt should not be made lightly, and that the power to punish contempt should be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, the Court finds no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that
there was no willful disregard or defiance of its order/ decision. We are, therefore, one with the Contempt Court in
dismissing the contempt case. (L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corporation, G.R. No. 233073, February, 14, 2018)
Page 19 of 19

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RyD Notes | IV.

IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Q: Discuss the concept of judicial power.

Q: What does grave abuse of discretion mean?

Q: Discuss the collegial nature of the Supreme Court.

Q: Discuss the concept of judicial review and its requisites.

Q: What is an actual case or controversy?

2. Political question doctrine

Q: Discuss the political question doctrine.

Q: Discuss the concept of moot questions and its rules.

4. Operative fact doctrine

Q: What is the operative fact doctrine?

C. Safeguards of judicial independence

Q: What are the safeguards of judicial independence?

1. Judicial and Bar Council

Q: What is the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)?

Q: Who appoints the regular members of the council?

Q: What are the powers and functions of the JBC?

Q: What positions require the screening and nomination by the JBC?

Q: What is the scope of the Judiciary's grant of fiscal autonomy?

D. Qualifications of members of the Judiciary

Q: What are the qualifications for Regional Trial Court Judges?

Q: What is the procedure for appointments in the Judiciary?

E. Workings of the Supreme Court

1. En banc and division cases

Q: Discuss how the Supreme Court decides cases en banc.

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Q: Discuss the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

Q: What are the limitations to the rule-making power of the SC?

3. Administrative supervision over lower courts

Q: Discuss the power of administrative supervision of the SC.

4. Original and appellate jurisdiction

Q: What is the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

Q: What is the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court?

Q: Discuss the formal requirements of a valid decision.

Requisites for Judicial Inquiry

Judicial and Bar Council

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