Rizal Cement WU Vs CIR
Rizal Cement WU Vs CIR
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. “Respondent argues that the notice of strike prescribed in Section 14,
842 par. (d) of Republic Act No. 875, applies to the strike in issue. This is
842 SUPREME COURT not so, because the present case involves a strike against unfair labor
practice acts, and not an economic strike. The required 30-day notice
REPORTS ANNOTATED which affords the parties cooling off period within which to settle
Rizal Cement Workers Union their difference through processes of collective bargaining applies to
economic strike.
(FFW) vs. Court of Industrial “With respect to the means employed in carrying out the strike
Relations staged by petitioner union, the evidence shows that the case was
Lacson & Beltran for petitioner. generally peaceful and orderly, with the exception of some alleged
Bausa, Ampil & Suarez for respondent Rizal Cement isolated acts of violence committed during the height of the strike,
particularly on May 27, 1956. The strike in issue was declared after a
Company, Inc.
general meeting of the union members who voted viva voce in favor
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial of it. Some of the strikers appear to have been charged in courts with
Relations. criminal acts, but there was no conviction by final judgment against
any of them. This being the case, and aware of the fact that passions
PAREDES, J.: and emotions are running high at the heat of the strike, it is believed
that a certain degree of reason and fairness be afforded the strikers
The antecedent facts, as found by the Court of Industrial who are seeking to vindicate the wrongs committed against them.
Relations are as follows: Consequently, this Court finds the strike in question justified.
“WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
On September 2, 1954, petitioner Union sent to respondent
CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby orders the respondent com-
company, a letter containing a set of proposals for the purpose
of entering into a collective bargaining contract with it. A 844
reply was made by respondent on September 11, 1954, stating 844 SUPREME COURT
that it could not entertain the proposals until after Case No.
REPORTS ANNOTATED
676-V, which was then pending with respondent CIR, has
been finally settled, since the demands in the proposals and Rizal Cement Workers Union
those involved in the pending case were the same. Petitioning (FFW) vs. Court of Industrial
Union, responding to the reply, claimed in a letter of Relations
September 24, 1954, that the proposals being submitted were pany to reinstate all the striking members of petitioner union to their
distinct and separate from those litigated in Case No. 676-V. former positions or substantially equivalent positions, without back
On September 29, 1954, respondent Company answered wages.”
petitioner’s letter and reiterated its previous stand regarding
the proposals. On October 5, 1954, the Union filed with the Petitioner Union sought a reconsideration of the above
Department of Labor, a Notice of Strike. At a conference held decision in so far as it did not award back wages contending
on October 30, 1954, with the intervention of the Conciliation that same is contrary to law and the evidence on record.
Service of the Labor Department, the Union proposals were Likewise, the respondent Rizal Cement Company moved for a
not discussed. On November 4, 1954, another Union, the reconsideration of the judgment, in so far as it considered the
Binañgonan Labor Union (NWB), presented a set of proposals strike justified. On January 16, 1961, the CIR, en banc, denied
with the respondent Rizal Cement Company, and after a series
both motions, with two Judges taking no part. Only the by the mere expedient of filing before the trial court a notice
petitioner Union appealed to this Court. of offer to return to work, during the
846
In the petition for Review, the Rizal Cement Workers Union 846 SUPREME COURT
contend, in the main, that since the respondent CIR found the REPORTS ANNOTATED
strike justified, it was error on its part not to award back wages
and urged a modification of the decision sought to be reviewed Rizal Cement Workers Union
so as to include strike-duration pay (back wages). It is claimed (FFW) vs. Court of Industrial
that— Relations
pendency of the labor dispute. Petitioner alleges that said
1. (1)Depriving employees of wages they should have refusal to accept them, constituted a “virtual lockout”. The law
earned but did not as a consequence of a lockout is a does not provide for a virtual lockout. But assuming, that the
violation of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 875, non-acceptance of the unconditional offer to return to work
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; was a virtual lockout, still the circumstances of the case would
2. (2)Denial of back wages to locked-out employees is a not justify the demand that the strikers are entitled ipso jure to
desecration of the express policies of the Magna back wages. This is so because the respondent court found that
Charta of Labor; and the strike was attended by isolated acts of violence committed
3. (3)Divesting locked-out employees of back pay is a by the strikers and stated, in the same breath, that certain
total disregard of all Philippine jurisprudence as degree of reason and fairness be accorded the strikers. Thus
well as American on the subject matter. respondent Court stated in its Answer—
“x x x. When this statement is preceded with an earlier statement
made of the awareness of the Trial Court of the fact that passions and
Respondents Court and Company filed separate answers and,
emotions run high at the heat of the strike, it is then clear that such
after the customary admissions and denials, maintained that it judicial pronouncement is based on the broad powers of respondent
was within the broad powers of the CIR to award or not to to adjust the parties in order to arrive into a happy solution of their
award back wages, as the facts and circumstances of the case dispute. If respondent Court has the power to adjust a strike legal,
warrant; that there was no lock-out; and although the even as it is attended with violence, personal injuries or damage to
respondent Court found that the strike was characterized with property, and this is not disputed in this case, then with equal reason
violence, it nevertheless justified said strike by tolerance, by respondent Court could also declare that such strikers may be
giving the strikers certain degree of reason and fairness, for reinstated without backwages. It could not be denied that the strikers
passion and emotional outbursts. Respondent company further failed to earn the wages they ought to have received when they
offered to return to work but not accepted; but it likewise could not
maintained that the review has become academic and moot, be denied that because of the strike and how it was carried out, the
since the decision sought to be reviewed has employer also suffered. The Decision and the En Banc Resolution
845 disputed, therefore, simply placed the parties in a situation where
VOL. 6, NOVEMBER 30, 845 one gained none for the fault of the other and vice-versa. This is in
1962 accordance with section 13, in relation to Section 20, of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, the effectivity of which is
Rizal Cement Workers Union revived upon the certification of the labor dispute by the President to
(FFW) vs. Court of Industrial respondent Court (Compania Maritima, et al., G.R. No. L-10115).”
Relations Inasmuch as the present case has been certified by the
already been implemented and/or executed, in that the strikers President of the Philippines to the CIR, said Court is
affiliated with the petitioner union, had returned to work and authorized to exercise its powers of arbitration under the
respondent company has reinstated them to their former provisions of Act No. 103, as amended, including the fixing of
positions or substantially equivalent positions, as ordered by the terms and conditions of employment which embrace
respondent court; that under the circumstances, petitioner is reinstatement of the strikers, with or without back wages.
now estopped from or has waived the right to question the “x x x upon certification by the President under Section
legality or validity of the decision.
847
It becomes, therefore, manifest, that the issues raised by
the petitioner center on whether or not its members are entitled VOL. 6, NOVEMBER 30, 847
to back wages. 1962
Petitioner principally based its claim for back wages on Rizal Cement Workers Union
the theory that there was lock-out or ‘‘virtual lock-out” which
prevented them to work. The law (Act No. 875), provides— (FFW) vs. Court of Industrial
“SEC. 15. Violation of Duty to Bargain Collectively.—It shall be Relations
unlawful for any employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the 10 of Republic Act No. 875, the case comes under the operation of
representative of his employees, or to declare a lockout without Commonwealth Act No. 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration
having first bargained collectively with the representatives of his in cases of labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national
employees, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Any interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial
employee whose work has stopped as a consequence of such lockout Relations. The evident intention of the law is to empower the Court
shall be entitled to backpay. x x x.” of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not only in the manner
prescribed under said Act No. 103, but with the same broad powers
It will thus be seen that under the above provision, the lockout and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial
referred to is that which is committed by the employer, if it Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial
refused to give work to its workers. No finding was made by dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to
the CIR on the question of lockout. That there was no lockout return back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of
is clear from the observations of the respondent court, when it Industrial Relations does not have the power or jurisdiction to carry
said; “the striking union decided on this question the solution into effect. And of what use is its power of conciliation
and arbitration if it does not have the power and jurisdiction to carry
of strike which was carried out and maintained by picketing
into effect the solution it had adopted. Lastly, if said court has the
the respondent’s cement plant at Binañgonan, Rizal”. The power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can
offer to return to work made by the members of the petitioner, order the return of the workers with or without backpay as a term or
did not make the refusal to accept the same, a lockout. This is condition of employment.” (Phil. Marine Radio Officers Association
so because the case on the legality or not of the strike was then vs. CIR, et al., Nos. L-10095 and L-10115, Oct. 31, 1957.) (Italics
pending decision by the CIR and said Court did not issue any supplied).
order in connection with said offer. The strike which was
openly and publicly declared by the petitioner union on May The doctrine enunciated above, finds a fitting application to
27, 1956, can not be converted into a pure and simple lockout, the case at bar.
Finding no reason/s, cogent or otherwise, to alter the decision
appealed from, or to declare that said respondent had
committed abuse of discretion, in not awarding the backpay
claimed by the Union, the petition is dismissed, and the said
decision is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Petition dismissed; decision affirmed.
Notes.—When reinstatement of the employees is to be
ordered, whether with or without backpay, the rights of the
employees prior to dismissal and seniority rating must be
included (Sec. 5[c], Industrial Peace Act, Rep. Act 875). But
the CIR has no authority to order the reinstatement of
discriminatorily dismissed employees who have been
convicted in the meanwhile of violence upon the employer’s
property or of unlawful acts (Consolidated Labor Asso. of the
Phil. v. Marsman & Co., Inc., L-17038, July 31,
848
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