Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd.

Vs.
Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay and Ors.
1974
FACTS
• These appeals and writ petitions relate to the legality of certain proceedings
taken under Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1961 and
the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955.
• According to the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act provisions, the
Commissioner in relation to premises belonging to or vesting in, or taken on
lease by the corporation was granted certain powers of eviction in respect of
unauthorized occupation of any corporation premises.
• Under Section 105B the Commissioner, by notice served on the person in
unauthorized occupation, could ask him to vacate the premises. Before making
such an order the Commissioner should issue a notice calling upon the person
concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.
• The person concerned can file a written statement and produce documents and is
entitled to appear before the Commissioner. The Commissioner has, for the
purpose of holding any inquiry, the same powers as are vested in a civil court
under the CPC. An appeal from every order of the Commissioner lies to the
principal Judge of the City Civil Court or such other judicial officer as the
principal Judge may designate.
• The provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act
are more or less similar except that they relate to Government
premises and the power to order eviction is given to the competent
authority not tower in rank than that of a Deputy Collector or an
Executive Engineer appointed by the State Government.
• Section 8A of this Act provides that no Civil Court shall have
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the
eviction of any person from any Government premises on any of the
grounds specified in Section 4 or the recovery of the arrears of rent
or the damages payable for use or occupation of such premises.
• These laws were challenged on the ground of availability of two
procedures for eviction of unauthorized premises one under ordinary
civil procedure and another under the special procedure under the
above Acts.
ISSUE
• Whether Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1961 and the Bombay
Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 are violative of Article
14 of the constitution ?
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
• The petitioner claimed that there were two procedures available to
the Corporation and the State Government, one by way of a suit
under the ordinary law (which is the CPC) and the other under either
of the two Acts, which is harsher and more onerous than the
procedure under the ordinary law, the latter is hit by Article 14 of
the Constitution in the absence of any guidelines as to which
procedure may be adopted.
• Since there are two procedures available, the question of which out
of the two procedures would apply, would be discriminatory in
nature as it would be completely at an arbitrary will on the decision
of the authority.
BENCH
7 Judge bench

Majority: A.N.Ray, D.G. Palekar, K.K. Mathew & Alagiriswami JJ

Concuring: P.N.Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna Iyer JJ, H.R. Khanna J

ALAGIRISWAMI JJ
Northern India Caterers Case
• In this case the question arose under the Punjab Public Premises and Land
(Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act of 1959.
• The majority concluded that the principle which emerged from these
decisions was that discrimination would result if there are two available
procedures, one more drastic or prejudicial to the party concerned than the
other which can be applied at the arbitrary will of the authority.
• They replaced the above with the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 which barred the jurisdiction of the
Court to entertain a suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any
person in unauthorized occupation of public premises.
• The argument that there are two procedures available where in one is
more harsh than the other, and, hence, discriminatory have led the courts
to take the decision that only the harsher one will apply. Alagiriswami then
contends that the remedy to go to ordinary Civil court being taken away is
not actually benefitting the people. Therefore it is difficult to think that
just because there is a possibility to go to court, a procedure should be
made invalid which would otherwise be valid.
• It can very well be argued that as long as a procedure does not by itself
violate either Article 19 or Article 14 and is thus Constitutionally valid,
the fact that that procedure is more onerous and harsher than the
procedure in the ordinary civil courts, should not make that procedure void
merely because the authority competent to take action can resort to that
procedure in the case of some and ordinary civil court procedure in the
case of others.
 TEST OF REASONABLE
CLASSIFICATION
1. Is the classification rationale and based on intelligible differentiate?
2. The basis of differentiation must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved.
3. There should be a rational nexus with its avowed policy and object.
• If both these tests are satisfied the statute must be held to be valid;
and in such a case the consideration as to whether the same result
could not have been better achieved by adopting a different
classification would be foreign to the scope of the judicial enquiry.
• If either of the two tests is not satisfied the statute must be struck
down as violative of Article 14.
• Illustration section 11 of Indian contract act, persons who have not attained
majority cannot enter into contract. The two classes are adults and minors. The
basis of classification is the age. Age obviously has a relation to the object of
legislation i.e. the capacity to enter into contract. This section therefore satisfies
both the requirements of a valid classification and it groups adults and minors
separately and such grouping has rational relation with the object of legislation
that is capacity to make a contract.
• But suppose the basis of classification is color of the hair –all persons having
black hair can make a contract. This classification would be invalid as the color
of the hair has no relation with the object of legislation that capacity to contract.
• The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the legislation in question.
State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952

• The petitioners argued that they were subjected to discriminatory

treatment as the procedure laid down under the WB Special Courts
Act was more cumbersome, harsh and disadvantageous to the accused
than the procedure of trial under Code of Criminal Procedure.
Hence there was procedural inequality.
• The issue was whether the act in question was violative of article 14
of the constitution
• Section 5(1) of the Act was invalidated by the majority because it
conferred arbitrary and uncontrolled power on the government to
classify offence at its pleasure.
• However, the Anwar Ali Sarkar's case was concerned with a piece of
legislation which covered the whole field of criminal law without any
basis for classification except speedier trial which was held not to be a
good ground for classification as it gave too much discretionary
power to the executive and no guidance was given by the statute.
• While in the present case, there is a basis for classification as the Acts
clearly state when they are to be applied :
1. Properties belonging to the government
2. Properties owned by the Bombay Municipal Corporation
for a speedy method of recovering these properties.
Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of
Saurashtra, 1952
• It is surprising to note that the Court was presided over by the same
bench as that of the Anwar Ali case but the decisions were
completely different because of a thin line of classification.
• The state in this case enacted the Saurashtra State Public Safety
Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949
• Section 11 of the Ordinance was exactly in the same terms as Section
5(1) of the previous case.
• The only difference between the two was that the Saurashtra
Ordinance was purported to have been passed to provide for public
safety and order.
• The impugned Ordinance having thus been passed to combat the
increasing tempo of certain types of regional crime.
• Hence, the two fold classification on the lines of type and territory
adopted in the impugned Ordinance was a reasonable classification
and not in contravention of Article 14.
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal,
1953
• Bajoria's case was based on a classification which, in the context of the
abnormal post-war economic and social conditions was readily intelligible
and obviously calculated to sub serve the legislative purpose.
• The mere fact that the legislation does not itself make a complete and
precise classification of the persons or things to which it is to be applied,
but leaves the selective application of the law to be made by the executive
authority in accordance with the standard indicated or the underlying
policy and object disclosed, is not a sufficient ground for condemning it as
arbitrary and, therefore, obnoxious to Article 14.
• The fact that in such cases they executive will chose which cases are to be
tried under the special procedure will not affect the validity of the statute
and is not arbitrary in nature.
ANALYSIS
• The statute itself in the two classes of cases before us clearly lays
down the purpose behind them, that is premises belonging to the
Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy
procedure in the matter of evicting unauthorized persons occupying
them.
• This is a sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the power
has been conferred. With such an indication clearly given in the
statutes one expects the officers concerned to avail themselves of the
procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the dilatory
procedure of the ordinary Civil Court.
• When an officer has the choice of two procedures which enables him
to get possession of the property either quickly or prolonged, it is
unreasonable to imagine the officer to resort to the latter.
• It is also necessary to point out that the procedures laid down by the
two Acts now under consideration are not so harsh or onerous as to
suggest that a discrimination would result if resort is made to the
provisions of these two Acts in some cases and to the ordinary Civil
Court in other cases.
• The main difference between the procedure before an ordinary Civil
Court and the executive authorities under these two Acts is that in
one case it will be decided by a judicial officer trained in law and it
might also be that more than one appeal is available. As against that
there is only one appeal available in the other but it is also open to the
aggrieved party to resort to the High Court under the provisions of
Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution. This is no less
effective than the provision for a second appeal.
• On the whole, considering the object with which these special
procedures were enacted by the legislature we would not be prepared
to hold that the difference between the two procedures is so
unconscionable as to attract the vice of discrimination.
H.R. KHANNA J
• When compared with the procedures under CPC, the procedure
envisaged in the impugned provisions is not onerous and drastic as
would justify an inference of discrimination.
• The simple fact that there are two forums with different procedures
would not justify the quashing of the impugned provisions as being
violative of article 14, especially when both procedures are fair and in
consonance with the principles of natural justice.
• What is necessary to attract the inhibition of article 14 is that there
must be substantial and qualitative differences between the two
procedures so that one is really and substantially more drastic and
prejudicial than the ether and that we should avoid dogmatic and
finical approach when dealing with life's manifold realities.
CONCLUSION
The Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1961 and the Bombay
Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 are not violative of Article
14 of the constitution as they have a clear purpose and a reasonable
ground of classification i.e. based on the kind of property.
The differentia has a rational relation to the object.