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THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,

Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, Respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative

(or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed

for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was
also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995,

Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you

of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into
between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch
office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my
consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent
which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights
and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite

acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad
faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with
the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of
our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on
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record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have

to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated
contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by
your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa

& Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope
containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no
stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of
the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been
typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at
Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void
his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his
housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from
salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby

annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract'
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself
is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail

what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC,

dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all
of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions
from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18,
1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management
& Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this
Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was
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allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming

sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the
Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and **
the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15,

1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter,
and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten
words, "Free Postage PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused
Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid

grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and

established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;"

and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular

members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous,

swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence
to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless
and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) **
"

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.

Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions
emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the
notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of
2
Court. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he

questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to
"a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk
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of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or

the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution
was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no
factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the
Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and
District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much

less aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the
former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were
done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying
his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5,

1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue
injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared
that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he
gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free
Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other
person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as
he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the
money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed
mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest
9
mistake. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that
it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to
which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers
the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not
consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did

"is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He
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claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a

classmate and friend.11 He was induced to sign a blank contract
on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed
document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not
know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement
with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; 12 He says
Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although
she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment,
clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever
13
saw. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice,
Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it
consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands,
her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to

Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April
22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court

Administrator for evaluation, report and
14
recommendation. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters,

he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no
solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,"
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter
alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by

gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and

unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
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3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who

had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the

contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued
the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements,

he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what
"is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
15
salary. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials

and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service.16 Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights
of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest."17 More than once has this Court emphasized
that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals,
good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others,
to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to
be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate.
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that
he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 19 Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of
the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
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standard of conduct more stringent than for most other

government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or
otherwise improper.20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that
he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has

already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or

"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment.
His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the

franking privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby

REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting
or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer,
and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any
similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.