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Indian Political Science Association

THE SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS : A STUDY OF THE ELECTION MANIFESTOS OF THE


NATIONAL PARTIES
Author(s): KOUSAR J. AZAM
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 3 (July-Sept. '77), pp. 375-394
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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THE SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS : A STUDY OF THE
ELECTION MANIFESTOS OF THE NATIONAL PARTIES
by

KOUSARJ. AZAM*

While the significant feature of the 1971 general elections was that il
followed a pre-mature dissolution of India's Lok Sabha for the first time
since independence the imposition of emergency with its allied regimentation
and constitutional modifications during the period of emergency (19 months),
added to the fervour of the Sixth general elections announced on 18th Jan-
uary 1977 about fifteen months ahead of the recently extended tenure of
India's Lok Sabha.

The election announcement came as a surprise to the contestants for


political power in India - most of whom were hurriedly released from the
Indian jails, where they had been detained either under MISA or DIR.
was a surprise because it came at a moment when the political elite in Indi
representing different shades of opinion had seemed to (to the Indian masse
at least) be almost reconciled to a state of political nullification, with curt
led individual liberties, censored press and a strictly authoritarian kind of
regimentation of the social and political life.

If the announcement of the elections was treated as a pleasant surpris


the outcome of the elections that followed was still more surprising. T
results of the Sixth Parliamentary elections proved to be a point of departu
from the earlier political tradition in India as it had been established since
1947, or to be more specific, since 1952. The outcome of an election fough
under the lingering shadow of the emergency and regimentation baffled th
analysts of the Indian political system both at home and abroad. It proved
to the chagrin of the champions of ideological regimentation-that democrac
imbued with popular participation ( in the case of India, mass participatio
is still relevant to the Indian situation. To the western political analys
obsessed with a sense of political sophistication and human values, the Ind
experience was an indication of the fact that peaceful democratic change i
not the privilege of the so-called developed world alone.

* Reader, Department of Political Science, Osmania University, Hyderabad (A. P.).

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3?6 ] the indián journal op political sgibncb

Back home, for an Indian observer, the election results, are perhaps
indicative of the efficacy of "golden mean", and the terms like the "Leftist"
and the "Rightist" perhaps need a redefinition considering the manoeuvra-
bility of the groups representing the varied shades of political option.

An analysis of the ideological postures of the different political groups


which aspired for political power in the Sixth general elections would also
necessitate a study of the election announcement itself made by Mrs. Indira
Gandhi. We would subsequently note that the election manifestos of the
opposition groups were not merely a reaction to the state of emergency, but
these were also a verbal response to the Prime Minister's accusations made
against them in her January 18th broadcast» It is because of this, that one
fails to locate major ideological or political alternatives in opposition mani-
festos.

Mrs. Gandhi, at least in her addresses to the nation made through the
AIR, has had a reputation of being precise, brief and clear. The clarity and
brevity of her announcements - be it the declaration of war against Pakistan,
or the decision of her government and people to support Bangla Desh - has
always added to the depth and the magnitude of the action that followed.
But of late a certain change became discernible in all her public announce-
ments - a change which pointed towards a peculiar psychology of defence -
and once this change set in, her declarations grew long and repetitive,
hyphenated with frequent personal references. ( One wonders whether it had
anything to do with the resurgence of Gandhism as symbolized by J. P. as
against extreme Machiavelism towards which she was steadily moving )•

Realising its absence, said Mrs. Gandhi, the emergency was relaxed to
"permit legitimate political activity" in the country. Her broadcast started
with a description of the conditions under which emergency was imposed
eighteen months ago, when "our beloved country was on the verge of disaster,"
when, "violence was preached, workers were exhorted not to work, students
not to study, and government servants to break their oaths." In an obvious
reference to Jai Prakash Narayan's "total revolution" the Prime Minister
said, "Massive paralysis was propagated in the n^me of revolution," It was to
curb this dysfunctioning of the social and political process in India that the
process had to be suspended.

The announcement also underlined the various issues over which the
oncoming electoral battle was to be fought - issues which were sought to be

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MANIFESTOS IN SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS [ 377

resolved through a series of government-sponsored and government-backed


schemes like the twentypoint and the five-point programmes. It also mentio-
ned the evil effects of the dowry system, the bonded labour and a neglect of
family planning. The concluding remarks made in the announcement, studied
in a different political perspective, seem truly ironical: "Change is the very
law of life" and that "every election is an act of faith... an opportunity to
cleanse the public life of confusion. So let us go to the polls with the resolve
to re-affirm the power of the people and uphold the fair name of India as a
land committed to the path of reconciliation, peace and progress." The
election that followed has already been described as a "revolution by ballot,"
by an Indian analyst.1

Several studies made from different perspectives will shed light on the
nature and significance of this 'revolution* through ballot, and will explain
the significance of this political change through peaceful means in our
"developing" system. The endeavour of the present study would be to analyse
the ideological and the political contents of the manifestos of the national
parties.

The ideological alternatives to the Indian voter varied from leftism of


an extreme nature to the espousal of Gandhian philosophy and action; the
extremity of positions that prevailed in the manifestos in the earlier elections,
say of 1967, was missing. The parties remained committed to their ideologi-
cal orientations as far as their titles were concerned, but in reality - except
on certain issues - almost all the four national parties had nothing different to
offer to the electorate.

The Congress
The manifesto of Indian National Congress was much more rhetorical
than that of the CPI, suggestive of a psychology of defence, but couched in a
language that exhorted development and dynamism as the inherent qualities
of the Indian National Congress.

The Congress had an obvious advantage over the other political groups
in the sense that it could, and did claim all progress made in the country
during the past thirty years, as its own individual achievements, as a testi-
mony of the relevance of its policies and their successful implementation in the

1. Anirudh Gupta, Revolution by Ballot , 1977*

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378 J THfe INDIAN JOURNAL OÍ? POLITICI AL SOlEŇOfe

Indian political system. Apart from that, it could reiterate once again ( and
with greater fervour, verging on sentimentality ) its historic role in ushering
in an era of independence, democracy, and development. Added to these
were the mentioning of the newly acquired "benefits" during the state of
emergency. These thoughts were expressed in a sort of preamble to the Con-
gress manifesto, entitled "The Sole Hope of the People" and in the earlier
sections of the manifesto itself.

J anata

The Janata manifesto depended to a great extent on the Gandhian


ethics and the efficacy of the Gandhian ideology in contemporary Indian
politics. It also denounced the Congress for its misdeeds and authoritarianism.
In the preamble of the Janata manifesto, the Janata offered itself as "A
Viable National Alternative" to the Congress and pleaded for a revival of
democracy in a land of democrats.

If the Congress emphasized the need for the strength of the Central
Government, capable of introducing and implementing developmental pro-
grammes, the Janata concentrated on an erosion of democratic values and
norms due to the development of the non- constitutional centres of power and
authority. Thus it was not surprising when the Congress raised the slogan of
democracy and development vs. disruption and chaos (which will be ushered
in by the new synthetic Janata group) and the Janata preferred the slogan of
democracy vs. dictatorship. The acceptance of Gandhi as a renewed political
diety could largely be attributed of the presence of a staunch Gandhiite, J.
P., as the guardian angel of the opposition's strength. If J. P. symbolized the
conscience of the nation, that resisted the torture of the body and the torment
of the soul, for upholding truth and righteousness, the Janata manifesto as-
pired to be an intellectual expression of this conscience.

The Gandhian alternative, that was rejected as unpracticable and


idealistic twenty seven years ago, was thus provided with a new political
legitimacy in an atmosphere charged with authoritarianism, denial of civil
liberties, press censorship and regimentation. One wonders whether this use
of Gandhian ideology for a purely political end will re-establish the relevance
of Gandhian methodology in the Indian political process. Any such possibility
would certainly imply a reconsideration of the alien ideologies in contrast
with the indigenous political alternatives be it Gandhism, or a Lohiaite ver-

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MANIFESTOS IN SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS [ 379

sion of Indian socialism or a reversion to primordiality, as expounded by one


of the components of the present Janata group.

As the Janata manifesto followed the Congress and other documents,


the idealogues of the Janata were able to avoid the lacunae not merely of the
Congress, but also those of the CPI, CPI (M) and were able to absorb the
aspirations articulated by the manifestos of the regional parties, like those of
the Akali Dal and the DMK.

As a party of national stature with the avowed goal of replacing the


decision-makers, the Janata had a difficult task in shaping its manifest
It had to absorb the ideological essence of the Jan Sangh, the Socialist and
the B. L. D. and the Congress-O - its four major components. It also had to
rise above the parochial promises of the regional groups without alienating
them, retaining at the same time the sympathies of the regional elite.

As a direct rival of the Congress the primary function of the Janata


manifesto was to expose the myths and prick the bubbles of the achievement
and aspirations of the INC, both before and during the emergency. This, th
Janata was able to achieve to a considerable extent, by offering a slog
devoid of ideological rigidity, underlining only the basics of human existenc
"Bread and Liberty." Both these, the manifesto emphasized, could be retai-
ned only through a Gandhian alternative." It described the coming election
as a choice between democracy and dictatorship "between abdicating th
power of the people or asserting it, between the Gandhian path and the w
that has led many nations down the precipice of dictatorship instabilit
military adventure and national ruin." It then dwelt upon the gruesom
conditions which prevailed during the emergency, curbing of individu
liberty, curtailment of the freedom of the press, imposition of MISA and DI
and the talk about a 'committed judiciary' 'committed bureaucracy' an
ťcommited press'.

The initial paragraphs of the Janata manifesto are in direct contrast


to the Congress, which narrated the glories and achievements of the Congres
The Janata document begins with a narration of the night-mare of fear, an
the perils of the subordination of the individual to the State. It accused th
Congress for the excesses during the emergency, for the development
"extra constitutional centres of power." The notorious forty-second amend
ment was described as a measure l<to satisfy and institutionalize a tot

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380 ] THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PO LITIO AL BOIENOB

concentration of power in the hands of one individual, the Prime Minister.9*


It was "a betrayal of the testament of faith that founding fathers bequeathed
on the people."

The other targets of the Congress achievement under Janata's attack


were the crisis in industry, the rise in prices despite the Congress claim of
their reduction, the export led growth, the uncalled for reserves in the food
grains when the masses needed them, and the most acathing attack was of
course made on the way in which the Congress government went about
implementing the Family Planning programme. The Janata considered itself
to be the "Jeffersonian alternative" of the Indian political system.

C. F. D.

The manifesto of the newly formed Congress for Democracy of Bab


Jagjivan Ram, can perhaps be considered as a more balanced, brief a
subtle document of the series, which was released after inordinate delays.
Indicative of the reticence of a seasoned politician, the manifesto took car
not to deviate much from the Janata declarations - its electoral ally. T
problem for the CFD was that of retaining a kind of identity that wou
enable it to fit into the new political set up irrespective of the gains and lo
of the other contestents. The fact that Jagjivan Ram retained the ter
"Congress" in the title of his new party and his public claim that his Con
gress was the real Congress suggests that he rejected the credentials of M
Gandhi's group for a claim of the "Congress" title.

The C. F. D. also started with a preamble, entitled "Towards a Na


tional Consensus." Viewed in its earlier relations with the Congress, t
opening sentence of the CFD manifesto assumes a new significance : "T
Congress for Democracy is the revolt of the conscience of the Indian Nation
Congress to preserve and protect the rich traditions and objectives of this
great organisation and to carry them forward."

Like its electoral ally, the CFD also mentioned Gandhi and his tea
chings and lamented about the way of INC had reduced "Mahatm
teachings of 'defiance against injustice and oppression* into 'convenient in
truments for asserting personal power*." It accused the INC for "the cont
nued denial of basic rights to freedom of speech and expression, and right
liberty which are the foundations of democracy." The purpose of its own

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MANIFESTOS IN SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS [ 381

emergence and existence was defined as ending of the emergency, restoration


of the liberties of the citizen, banishment of fear from public life and *a
march towards scientific socialism in keeping with our rich cultural heritage*.
It declared that it stood for "a modern India of the vision of Nehru... a* duly
entrusted to him by the father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, to wipe
every tear from every eye" - a utilitarian dream, indeed for the realization of
which the CFD is yet to prove its credentials.

Among the other national parties which took pains to present a mani-
festo, we would mention the CPI, and the CPI-(M). The Election Commission
as such recognised only four 'national' parties: the Indian National Congress,
the Janata ( allied with CFD) , the Communist Party of India and the
Communist Party of India - Marxist, treating the Janata-CFD alliance,
virtually as a single party.

The Leftists
If the Janata and CFD Manifestos suggested an obsession with Gandhian
thought, philosophy and action, the documents of the Leftist parties reflec-
ted a similar obsession with the extra-territorial origins of their existence.
In the absence of a Gandhian or Nehruvian counterpart, the Leftist
documents dinged to 'socialism* for all their exhortations, criticisms and
programmes.

CPI

The initial sentences of the document suggests a peculiar obsession wit


a propagandist rhetoric - a feature of the Leftist vocabulary all over t
world. "At stake are the issues which are decisive for national destiny and
for our people's advances to full-fledged democracy leading to socialism/*
(One has to view the CPI document in the perspective of the early days of
emergency when the CPI was the lone opposition which enjoyed the "freedo
to look through the bars-from outside".)

Among the many other things that the manifesto regarded as "a
stake" in the coming elections we could make a special mention of "gains o
the country", "the economic advances made by the country, the building
of a powerful dynamic public sector, with the help of Soviet Union." This
was the only party which made a direct reference to an outside power wh
contesting for the internal political hegemony in the country. It talked of t
"vested interests" grabbing the main gains while the masses remained steep
3-12

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382 ] THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITIGAL SCIftKOE

in poverty. Also at stake were "the progressive objectives and policies of our
nation, the inclusion of socialism in the preamble, the secular and democratic
system, the anti-imperialist foreign policy of peace, non-alignment, friendship
with Soviet Union and their socialist states."

As a traditional ally of the decision-makers in the Indian political


system, it was necessary for the CPI to defend the decisions - hence a defence
of the twenty-point programme and emergency as "a measure of the Govern-
ment to arrest internal and external destabilization." This, however, was
followed by a narration of the "misuse of powers during the emergency,
leading to a weakening of the democratic institutions of India." Its major
accusations against the Congress remained concessions to the vested interests,
coercive sterilization, demolition of the dwelling houses of the poor, denial of
worker's right to bonus, impounding of D. A., shelving of the land reform
programmes, slackening of the implementation of the twenty-point program-
mes, increasing violation of accepted democratic norms, encouragement of
the extra-constitutional measures." All this, felt the CPI "brought grist to
the mill of right reaction."

CPI-(M)
On the other hand, the Marxist wing of the CPI seemed to be more
forthright in declaring its intentions and aspirations - an account which did
not take recourse to the revolutionary rhetoric to make its presence felt.

Commenting upon the possible outcome of an election held under the


state of emergency, the CPI (M) manifesto made a bitter attack on the emer-
gency and the measures taken therein. It demanded along with the other
contestants for political power in India, an immediate lifting of emergency,
withdrawal of MISA, DIR, and the Prevention of the Publication of Objec-
tionable Material Act.

Though it mentioned the Chinese pattern of industrial development, it


did not harp on socialism, and secularism, but declared itself as "the only
democratic alternative to the Congress", and as the only "answer to the
one-party rule."

Unlike the earlier electoral battles in India, when the election mani-
festos were mostly taken for granted, and were left unread, and unrespondei
by the Indian electorate with its poor literacy, the party manifestos for the

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MANIFESTOS IN SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS [ 383

Sixth Parliamentary elections were eagerly awaited at least by those sections


who had direct stakes in the elections. This is not to suggest a sudden
increase in the rate of literacy, or a new-born love of the masses to seek and
opt for political civility. Perhaps it could be best attributed to the political
neglect culminating in political maturation of the Indian electorate. Let us
not confuse this political maturation with the capacity to make rational
political choices and expedient decisions. Given the option of an independent
choice after a regimented existence, the Indian electorate opted for a group
which had members who had dedicated their life to the cause of truth and
righteousness, (or so they thought!), for a group which promised the electorate
a freedom from a state of suppression and subjugation to the State. The
response of the Indian electorate in March 1977 has been interpreted by
some, as a resurgence of the rightist forces and by others as a rejection of the
Left oriented totalitarianism. But perhaps the fact remains in between these
two extreme positions. Perhaps a more rational approach would be to treat
the popular verdict as an expression of the ť anti" vote. A vote as much
against personalities and policies as it was against the situation which prevai-
led. The emergency taught the Indian voter in its own crude way, the
difference between an open society and a regimented one, the difference bet-
ween the joys of voluntary limitations of one's family and the perils of a
veternarian's approach to it, between the efficacy of a free ( though often
inadequate) press, and a "committed press", between a judiciary that was free
to defend the ruled, and a judiciary that was condemned to defend the ruler
against him, between enjoyment of 'seven glorious freedoms', which served as
the very link between the individual and the state, and their denial, between
fear and freedom, between democracy that they always had but never realized
and dictatorship which never experienced but were subjected to.

Rhetoric apart, the period of emergency quickened the pace of poli-


tical development, and maturity of the Indian masses. It achieved in nineteen
months what a sedate, free existence had failed to achieve in a span of 30
years. The gruelling regimented state of being finally enabled the Indian
electorate to make its own individual choice, resisting the influence of all
authority, power, promises, threats and even public apologies.

It is in this context that we shall try to probe into the nature of the
electoral promises and the treatment of the different issues and problems, and
their reaction among the Indian masses.

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3Ô4r ] Thb Indian journal of pòlìtigal sgíengâ

The basic issues over which the respective parties fought the elections,
could be identified as follows : The Congress : a justification of emergency in
view of stability and development, economic and other gains during the
period of emergency and the absence of ideology in the opposition camp.

For the opposition ranging from the CPI-M to the Janata, the issues
were the undesirability of the emergency, democracy, fundamental rights,
press censorship, coercion in the implementation of family planning schemes,
the 'development of non-constitutional centres of power' viz., Sanjay Gandhi,
and the forty second amendment. We do not suggest that these were the only
issues - the list could be large and exhaustive ranging from the tampering of
J. P.'s kidneys in the jail to the supposed threat to the modesty of a female
cine -star. Our attempt here will be to restrict an analysis to the issues wen-
tioned in the manifesto and not an analysis of everything that was said or
discussed.

The Election Manifesto : A Content Analysis


As we have said earlier, the manifestos as such were not the decisive
factors in turning the political tide in India. Nor did the political parties, as
political agents, were able to condition the political behaviour of the masses.
Perhaps the most important factor was a universal disgust towards autocratic
postures of the personalities. It was perhaps an open confrontation of public
personalities of the pampered and the neglected. If Mrs. Gandhi was the
"amma" who relieved the denied, and the denigrated sections of their misery
and misfortune, J. P. was the Lok Nayak, who stood for ahimsa, truth, right-
eousness - all that is good and decent in the public life of India. One wonders
whether it were the principles of 'scientific socialism', or the chained and
caged statue of George Fernandes, which moved the people. It was not so
much the feeling of the denial of personal freedom, as the visible symbols of
the denied freedom that influenced the voters' choice. It was not the basic
tenets of secularism as explained in the manifestos, but the firing at Turka-
man Gate which might have conditioned the choice of the voter. It was not
the amount of bank loans, buffallows and bulldozers, but the fear of extermi-
nation through indiscriminate sterilizations which brought the minorities and
the backward sections at least in the North - to the Janata Camp.

The direct rapport that was established between the masses and the
leaders of the Opposition was basically a product of negativism and negative
forces that succeeded in transcending their earlier commitments and the

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Manifestos in Sixth général elegtìons [ 3Ô5

earlier ideological stances. This negative mood of the mass was cleverly
exploited by the Opposition which went to the extent of appealing and insula-
ting the symbols of primordialities in their otherwise 'civic' camps.

However, a clarification on our part becomes necessary. It is not the


intention of the author to establish facts which do not exist or to extol facts
( like a documented manifesto ) which are not significant, or to deny or
devalue the party documents. The study is undertaken not to 'prove5 the
significance of the manifestos, but to probe whether these documents really
had anything novel to offer and if so whether the parties behind them succee-
ded in galvanising the public opinion around these.

As the past experience with manifestos suggest that they had largely
remained unread and unresponded. This was partly due to the low literacy
of our people, and also because the socalled reading public in India has
always been averse to read the election manifestos. The campaign and the
nature of electioneering normally does not depend on the manifesto for mak-
ing his political choice.2 The factors influencing the political choice of the
voter may be many and varied but hardly the text of the manifesto.

Considering this, the present study, remains, largely an attempt to


probe into the contents of the manifestos and locate their significance in the
election that followed. The endeavour here is only to suggest that even if the
masses brought about "a revolution through ballot," this "revolution" was
devoid of any ideological or philosophical content. One does feel the presence
of the theme of utilitarianism in almost all the non-Leftist documents, but
beyond a cursory mention of welfare and upliftment, the documents tend to
get lost in the unexplored jungles of political expediency. If at all, the mani-
festos (of the opposition) reflected an attempt to achieve what could be termed
as "status-quo pre-bellum", a desire to get back to the era of constitutional
democracy, civic liberties and press freedom, (of the second decade of inde-
pendence?) rather than a departure from the Indian political tradition. The
manifestos, the campaign, the election and its outcome was basically a nega-
tive response, indicative of the anger and frustration, and not of a healthy
sustained process of political-maturation. One is tempted to regard the 1967
election as a better indicator of the "ontological maturation" of the Indian
electorate than the present one.

2. A fact that has been authenticated by the sample survey conducted by the Department
of Political Science, Oimania University, Hyderabad.

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386 ] th* TNblAN JOURNAL OF POLÌTIOAL SO IE NOB

However, for the purpose of a proper content analysis we have listed


about thirty major issues not necessarily in the order in which these have
been treated by the manifestos, but in an order that is largely determined by
the general trend of the campaign.3

However, the treatment of the issues underlines the significant feature


of contemporary Indian politics, viz., the inability or the unwillingness of the
political agents in India to deviate from the traditional techniques and tradi-
tional vocabulary of politics. An unknown, undefined hesitation or fear could
easily be discerned in the manifestos which prevent the parties from suggesting
radical shifts in the accepted priorities of Indian politics. The 1977 parlia-
mentary election was certainly not fought over radical issues - if at all, the
issues were constitutional and traditional, symbolic of the democratic contin-
uity of the India's political traditions.

The Indian politics, right from the initial years of independence and
self-government, has never had a need to seek and opt for a radical change of
a Leftist nature. It also did not face the need of initiating a highly sophisti-
cated democratic, constitutional kind of a protest to oppose a supposedly
centralized, dictatorship. This could largely be attributed to the democratic
and consensual foundations of the political movement in India. The colonial
experience, despite its bitterness, did succeed in generating a respect and
dedication for democratic values among the participants of the freedom
struggle. If the British administrators were the cause of political discontent,
the British philosophers, to a great extent stimulated the political awakening.

After independence with the pan-Indian background of the national


movement, the egalitarian ideals of the constitution were able to absorb, not
only the probable disaffections but also the essence of the different ideological
alternatives. If the new Indian polity that emerged in 1950 was not classified
as a "socialist" polity, it had taken care to absorb the essence of socialism to
the extent it was then relevant and possible in the Indian situation. Similarly,
if the sophisticated mechanism of a Swiss type of democratic pattern was
rejected, it indicated the (limited) capacity of the Indian electorate to absorb
and assimilate the ideals and the ideas of democracy.

The subsequent amendments to the Constitution, indicating a shift


from egalitarianism of a mixed economy to a brand of socialist universalism

3. Please refer to the respective party documents.

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MANIF£STOS IN SIXTH GliNBRAL ELECTIONS [ 387

indicated the fluctuations within the Indian society as comprehended by its


ruling elite. The amendments to legalise radical socialist measures like bank
nationalization, abolition of privy purses, and the treatment of the concept of
private property by the decision-makers was suggestive of a slow and appar-
ently a consensual shift towards a greater regimentation of the different
aspects of Indian society and politics. During this process, the protest against
these moves was confined either to that group of enlightened and aware
individuals ( from different fields ) who were able to visualize the nature of
the subsequent developments, or to those sections that were directly affected
by these measures. The common man, his interest and his acquiesance was
brought in the whole issue only as a plank of the decision-makers to provide
a semblance of popular sanction ( not necessarily legal sanction ) to their
action. Truck-loads of villagers and farmers, ignorant of the basis of banking
or the implications of the abolition of privy purses, were imported in the
capital to provide a semblance of popular sanction over and above the legal
aspect. The "common man" had nothing to loose by way of participation in
these demonstrations ( which meant a free 'darshan* of the 'diety' ) and he
tacitly allowed himself and his image to be exploited by the ruling elite.

The perpetuation of this state of affairs could largely be attributed to


the absence of a viable political alternative to the masses, to the absence of a
substitute leader who would be able to communicate to them the extent and
depths of their own sufferings and miseries, through the medium of his own
personality - something in which Gandhi succeeded tremendously. But once
the masses were able to locate the source of an alternate identity - in Jai
Prakash Narayan - they were quick to discern the differences between the
ruling political elite and the non-ruling political elite.

This resurgence of Gandhism, synchronized with the severence of the


basic link between the ruler and the ruled in this country - with the subor-
dination of the fundamental rights to the dictates of executive action - and
the ruled were quick to identify themselves with J. P. whose unquestioned
leadership was symbolic of the nation's response to emergency.

Treatment of the Iësues


The difference in the treatment of political issues emanated from
the respective positions of the parties. The Congress was able to justify
the relevance of its programme in the light of its accomplishments. Its
manifesto, as S. Nihal Singh has mentioned, was "largely defensive, clo-

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388 ] THB INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITIGAL SGIENGE

thed in ostentatious modesty." It depended heavily on its past record and


claimed to its own individual credit, the total achievements of the country in
the past, with frequent references to personalities.

The Janata manifesto in contrast tried hard to appear as ca credible


alternative' to the Congress and relied heavily on the Gandhian version of
decentralization. So was the case with GFD, whose manifesto was condemned
as being 'casual' and criticized for *a light-hearted treatment of major issues.'
While the GPI-M displayed a desperation to dismantle the authoritarian
structure, the CPI manifesto held few surprises while its moves 'confirmed
the tactics of running with the hare and hunting with the hound'.

All opposition groups demanded an immediate termination of ( 1 )


emergency while the Congress remained its lone supporter. Similarly the
opposition groups urgently demanded in one voice the restoration of ( 2 )
civil rights, freedom, and the release of the political prisoners but the Congress
sought to justify these denials by holding, 'freedom does not include licence
to undermine national interests.' The third major issue of ( 3 ) constitutional
amendments and modifications, over which the opposition expressed a genuine
concern and 'holy anger', was casually justified by the Congress as essential
for the 'protection of the common man from political, economic and vested
interests.' (4) Family planning - an issue that was directly responsible for
alienating the entire Hindi-belt from the Congress, was treated as an urgent
need of our times by all concerned, while the opposition condemned their
rival for a coercive implementation of the programme, the Congress was
quick to realize its mistake and categorically declared its belief in voluntary
methods.

The close proxity between the Janata and the CFD stand on different
issues could be explained in view of the electoral understanding between
them and their subsequent merger after the elections Among the Leftist
parties, the silence of the CPI on a number of issues could best be explained
in view of its traditional links with the ruling elite. While the GPI-M
meticulously fulfilled the requirements of an electoral alliance with Janata,
and GFD, the campaign of the GPI sometimes assumed a ridiculous dimen-
sion, when it chose to oppose the Congress candidates in some place retaining
its Congress alliances elsewhere. This political vacillation is also reflected in
its treatment and studied silences on various issues.

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MANIFESTOS IN SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS [ 389

The (5) 'development of the extra-conHitutional centres of power' essen-


tially implied the ascendence of an otherwise non-political figure like Sanjay
Gandhi to great political heights. The Janata's was the lone voice of protest
over this. The Congress denied this charge in its verbal campaign while the
silence of the GFD could be attributed to its earlier associations with
Congress - nevertheless, Jagjivan Ram did refer to the "one and half lead
ships" during the campaign. The CPI, CPI-M, steadily avoided the is
both in their written documents as well as in their campaigns. Despite San
Gandhi's open dislike for communism and the Communists, as reflected i
his many political statements, the silence of the CPI could have either be
ominous or strategic.

A similar feeling is aroused when one fervently looks for Congress'


defence, apology, or justification of its stand on (6) press freedom! censorsh
certainly a volcanic issue of the elections - and fails to locate it anywher
the document. While all the parties, irrespective of their ideological affiliat
were unanimous in condemning the press censorship and in demandi
the revival of Feroz Gandhi Act, it failed to find a place in Congress
manifesto.

The silence of the CPI on an issue like (7) Judiciary which was used
by all the parties as a proof of their dedication to democratic values and an
open society was an eloquent indicator of the nature of the state, if and when
the CPI were to come to power. While Janata, the CFD and even the CPI-M
demanded a restoration of judicial review, the Congress justified the 42nd
Amendment as restoring "the harmony between the executive and judiciary
as originally contemplated by the Constitution."

As conventional crusadors of the cause of the have- nots, the silence of


the CPI over the issue of (8) property , was disappointing. At least the CPI-M
talked in terms of abolition of larid-lordism, through a take-over of the entire
land of the land-lords, but the CPI failed to project a defined posture regar-
ding this issue. The plea to delete the right to property by both the Janata
and CFD was also significant as an indication of the consensus (at least for
the purpose of elections) that was being built within the new group, enabling
the individuals to transcend their varied ideological commitments. This
socialistic bend of the 'rightist' groups could be explained in two different
ways : one is the interpretation given by the leaders themselves: as a measure
3-13

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390 ] THB INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITIGAL SCIENQB

of protection for the whole chapter on fundamental rights from attacks under
the pretext of helping the poor, the denied and the have-nots; secondly,
perhaps it was also an attempt to absorb, appease and insulate the potential
socialists from defecting to the other groups.

(9) Land-reforms , would have been the factor that would have
smoothen the working of a coalition government, (if there was tobe a need),
as this issue received almost a unanimous approval ( at least in theory ) from
all the parties.

Gandhian (10) ideology or Gandhism remained the major inspiration


of Congress, Janata and GFD's political thinking. The latter adding "scientific
socialism" to it; the CPI-M avoided mentioning its own ideological origins
by accusing the Congress of pursuing "an authoritarian and fascist ideology."
The only party with an ideological base, the CPI, had nothing to offer by
way of ideology.

(11) Minorities , (12) Scheduled Castes, Backward Classes, remained


the factors of unison among the contestants. Aware of its dangerous political
potential, the parties had nothing but fair treatment, protection, and special
reservations ( Janata's promise for the Backward classes ) to offer to these
sensitive segments of Indian society.

While all the political parties displayed a soft-corner for the (13) fair
sex (promising them better conditions of work, equal pay, maternity benefits
and childwelfare schemes) , none took the trouble of suggesting reforms of a
social nature (as different from political and economic) that would relieve the
rural sisters of the urban advocates of women's lib of the miseries and
tortures of their daily existence. The pronouncements of the parties at bes
remained vote-catching devices, and at worst, they suggest a callous attitud
of taking women for granted.

Likewise (14) youth received a sympathetic treatment by all the parties


with promises of a share in the decision-making process in educational and
administrative bodies, cheaper textbooks ( CPI ), restoration of student
union ( CPI-M ). The Janata and CFD promised to lower the voting age t
18 years.

(15) Education and educational reforms did figure in the manifestos of


all the parties, but not one of these had much to offer in the shape of a

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MANIFESTOS IN SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS [ 391

viable national educational policy. The attention of the parties remained at


the peripheral issues of education like compulsory free education upto 1 4
years ( CPI-M ), promise of a secular and socialist content to it ( CPI ), full
autonomy to universities ( GFD ), reform in examinations ( Congress ). The
Janata party, however, talked of restructuring higher and technical education
(without elaborating the scheme of restructuring). The CFD proposed a plan
for the establishment of a Grants Commission for primary and secondary
education - one wonders whether the CFD ideologues ever seriously pondered
over the implications of such a scheme.

A due recognition to the honour of ( 16 ) teachers was promised by the


Congress, whereas Janata/CFD made promises of uniform service conditions
and pay-scales. CPI showed a greater awareness of the immediate problems
of the teachers, by promising better emoluments at primary and secondary
level and the implementation of the U. G. C. scales for the college teachers,
CPI-M displayed absolutely no concern whatsoever, for the teachers.

Remunerative prices for the produce of the (17) peasants and provision
of adequate and cheap credit, remained the promise of all parties to the
peasants and farmers of India, the Congress was able to elaborate in greater
detail (perhaps due to its experience of office) its programme regarding soil
conservation, irrigation, cultivation and assistance to drought-prone areas.

The importance and primacy of ( 18 ) agriculture and rural development


over any other sector was vocalized by all, with the Janata manifesto probing
into the different means to achieve the desired result. Regarding the problems
of ( 19 ) workers and artisans too, the parties agreed on the basic issue of
workers' participation in industries - the Janata, CPI, and CPI-M deman-
ded a restoration of trade union rights, the Congress offered a National
Housing Fund for the workers and specific training programmes for the more
promising among them.

(20) Industry was also treated alike by all the four parties, with promi-
ses to restore sick mills, modern and scientific methods of the management of
industries (Congress), statutory reservation of spheres of production for mass
consumption (Janata), democratization of public sector (CPI) and nationali-
zation of monopoly houses (CPI-M). The CFD promised full utilization of
our industrial capacities to accelerate economic growth.

The most detailed programme of (21) economic reform came from


Janata under a separate section of Economic Chapter. The Gandhian concept

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392 ] THE INDIÁN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ŠG1BNGÉ

of 'Antyoday' was sought to be revived under-lining the technology of self-


reliance. The Congress banked once again, on the efficacy of its 20-Point
programme as a 'Cure-all of all ills', while the GPI utilized the opportunity
to attack the pressures of the world bank, and the neo-colonial offensive of
the imperialists. For the CPI-M, a take-over of the foreign capital, monato-
rium on foreign debt payments, and a take-over of foreign trade remained the
major concerns of an economic programme.

While the Congress and the CFD had nothing to offer on (22) Mono-
polies and multinationals , the CPI, CPI-M wanted prevention of the penetra-
tion of the multi-national companies. The Janata declared its intention of
reviving the functioning of the monopolies commission. It also criticized the
Congress for its failure to achieve the six basic needs through (23) planning
(food, safe drinking water, clothing, housing» education and health), but the
Congress attributed the success of the fifth plan to the introduction of 20-Point
programme and the 5-Point programme. While the CPI wanted to orient
planning to the development of home-market, rapid industrialization and
creation of employment, CFD wanted to check the process of growing regi-
onal disparities through planning.

(24) Inflation was proposed to be checked through a well-organised


public distribution system, coupled with a consumer's movement, by the
Janata, while the CFD promised the supply of all essential commodities at a
fixed price. The CPI advocated a take-over of the whole-sale trade in food
grains and other essentials. The only way for the CPI-M, to check inflation
was through a drastic reduction of the taxes and levies on essential articles,
and a state- take-over of the whole trade in food grains. The Congress on the
other hand felt that it has achieved positive results in this respect, through its
"vigorous stringent and effective fiscal and monetary anti-inflationary
measures"; another way, it felt, was through the erosion of the earnings of the
middle classes with fixed incomes.

While the CFD, CPI and CPI-M were silent on a politically significant
issue like (25) decentralization and devolution of authority , the Janata made
a plea for these for c,a maximization of individual initiative and popular
participation." It also expressed the desirability of smaller districts and
smaller developmental blocks and a revitalization of panchayats. The Cong-
ress, did not commit itself to these issues in print, but the tone of the verbal
campaign of the Congress remained very much against decentralization and

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toAMFB3T0S IN SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS [ 393

for a strong central government. Similarly, on the issue of (26) federalism


the Congress and the GPI opted to remain silent, while the GFD emerged as
the lone champion of federalism in Indian politics both in its verbal campaign
and the manifesto. The CPI-M, however, did oppose the concentration of
enormous power in the hands of central government.

A live issue like (27) language on which it had centred its initial
political awakening was dropped by the communist camp. The Janata and
GFD promised that Sindhi and Urdu would be given due importance and
reiterated their commitment to implement the three language formula. The
Congress did not treat language as an issue in the campaign for the Sixth Lok
Sabha elections.

The Janata, CFD, CPI and CPI-M were unanimous in voicing their
anger and disgust at (28) administrative corruption and the J anata/ GFD
suggested ways and means to check corruption in public life, the Congress
chose not to bring administration in electoral politics.

In the field of (29) foreign policy the national parties of India seemed
to be at a loss to find a substitute for the declared policy of non-alignment,
peace, with friendship with all. The leftists, however, found it necessary to
especifically promise friendship with the socialist countries of the world.

Apart from these there were varied (30) minor issues discussed by the
parties which were not common to all the documents. Among these a mention
could be made of Urban Development, communication and environment
(the Congress). The Janata elaborated in detail its political, economic and
social programmes, through three different 'Charters', the CFD promised
inquiry commissions to look into the excesses committed by the earlier regime,
the CPI had a word for the weavers and artisans and the CPI-M pleaded for
support to those forces that would throw the autocratic regime out of power.

Having lived through J. P.'s movement and witnessing its culmination


in the overthrow of the 30-year old Congress rule in India, having shared the
euphoria of the Janata party over its remarkable political achievement, one
does not quite experience a sense of novelty, a thrill of radicalism or even the
joy of the realization of a dream - for the realization of one dream has added
another dimension to the political reality in India - A dimension suggestive
of the viability of democracy in our country. The charisma of J. P. and
George Fernandes apart, the masses have not and will not experience major

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394 ] thè indìan jourňaL oí political sdíBNoá

qualitative shifts in the policies and priorities of the new government. Even
during the campaign, the political parties had refrained from suggesting
qualitative alternatives in the policies - the differences between the ruling and
the opposition parties were mainly those of omissions and commissions. The
silence of a party over a burning political issue did not create the fire but
added to the widening blaze of discontent and disillusionment. Similarly the
mentioning of an issue in the election manifesto, in no way, widened the
imagination of a voter, it perhaps reassured him in the choice that he had
already made.*

* The present analysis was conducted basically with the help of the documents issued by
the different parties on the eve of election and the subsequent reaction to these
documents by different groups and individuals as reported in the press, hence the
absence of elaborate footnotes and other references.

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