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Sec.

4 Assembly and petition

Primicias vs. Fugoso


Facts: Petitioner petitioner Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority
Parties against Valeriano Fugoso, Mayor of the City of Manila. An action was instituted by the
petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in
Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in
his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting
as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanour, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in
a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any
lawful assembly." Included herein is also is the use Free use of Public Place. Due to the urgency of
the case, the Court, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or
refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the
streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to
prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favoured the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government, no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented
is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property
is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

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