Dr.

Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University,

Lucknow

B.A LL.B (Hons.) 5th Semester

Project on Evidence Law

Topic: “Case Analysis Of Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh v.

Republic of India”

Submitted To: Mrs. Neetu Submitted By: Aakriti Pandey

Asst. Prof. In RMLNLU Roll No. – (1)

( Law Department) Section - A

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
 Intoduction

 Statement of facts

 Issues before the court

 Judgment of Supreme Court

 Sections of Indian Evidence Act raised in the case

 Conclusion

AIM AND OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT

The aim of this project is to do analysis of the judgment by in light of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The project would be focusing on the
sections of Indian Evidence Act construed by the Hon’ble Court and
insights provided on the sections being raised before it.
Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh v. Republic Of Inda

The Supreme Court in the case titled Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh v. Republic of
India1 dismissed the plea for death penalty to Dara Singh , convicted for burning alive Australian
missionary Graham Staines and his two minor sons in January 1999 while upholding life
sentence given to him by the Orissa High Court.

BENCH OF:

Justice P. Sathasivam and Justice B.S. Chauhan

Facts of the case:-

 Graham Stuart Staines, a Christian Missionary from Australia, was working among the tribal
people especially lepers of the State of Orissa. His two minor sons, namely, Philip Staines
and Timothy Staines were burnt to death along with their father in the midnight of
22.01.1999/23.01.1999.
 The deceased-Graham Staines was engaged in propagating and preaching Christianity in the
tribal area of interior Orissa. Manoharpur is a remote tribal village under the Anandapur
Police Station of the District Keonjhar of Orissa. Every year, soon after the Makar Sankranti,
the said missionary used to come to the village to conduct the Jungle Camp. Accordingly, on
20.01.1999, the deceased-Staines, along with his two minor sons Philip and Timothy and
several other persons came to the village Manoharpur. They conducted the camp for next two
days by hosting a series of programmes.
 On 22.01.1999, the Missionary Team, as usual conducted different programmes in the village
near the Church and retired for the day. Graham Staines and his two minor sons slept in their
vehicle parked outside the Church. In the mid-night, a mob of 60-70 people came to the spot
and set fire to the vehicle in which the deceased persons were sleeping. The mob prevented
the deceased to get themselves out of the vehicle as a result of which all the three persons got
burnt in the vehicle. The local police was informed about the incident on the next day. Since
the local police was not able to proceed with the investigation satisfactorily, on 23.04.1999,

1
(2011) 2 SCC 490
 the same was handed over to the State Crime Branch. Even the Crime Branch failed to
conduct the investigation, ultimately, the investigation was transferred to CBI.
 On 03.05.1999, the investigation was taken over by the CBI. After thorough investigation,
charge sheet was filed by the CBI on 22.06.1999. On the basis of charge sheet, as many as 14
accused persons were put to trial. Apart from these accused, one minor was tried by Juvenile
Court. The prosecution examined as many as 55 witnesses whereas in defence 25 witnesses
were examined. Series of documents were exhibited by the prosecution. By a common
judgment and order dated 15.09.2003 and 22.09.2003, Sessions Judge, Khurda convicted all
the accused and sentenced them for offences punishable under various sections. The death
sentence was passed against Dara Singh- Appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1366 of 2005
and others were awarded sentence of life imprisonment.
 The death reference and the appeals filed by the convicted persons were heard together by
the High Court and were disposed of by common judgment dated 19.05.2005 concluding that
the witnesses are not trustworthy and no credence should be given to their statements and
confessional statements were procured by the investigating agency under threat and coercion.
The High Court, by the impugned judgment, modified the death sentence awarded to Dara
Singh into life imprisonment and confirmed the life imprisonment imposed on Mahendra
Hembram and acquitted all the other accused persons. Questioning the conviction and
sentence of life imprisonment, Dara Singh and Mahendra Hembram filed Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1366 of 2005 and 1259 of 2007 respectively and against the acquittal of rest of the
accused, CBI filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 1357-65 of 2005 before this Court.
 Questioning the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment, Dara Singh and Mahendra
Hembram filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 1366 of 2005 and 1259 of 2007 respectively and
against the acquittal of rest of the accused, CBI filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 1357-65 of 2005
before Supreme Court.

 Question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court:-

The main question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the conviction and sentence
of life imprisonment imposed on Dara Singh and Mahendra Hembram is sustainable and whether
prosecution has proved its case even against the accused who were acquitted by the High Court?
 Findings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:

 That Graham Staines and his two minor sons were burnt to death while they were sleeping
inside a station wagon at Manoharpur, the intention was to teach a lesson to Graham Staines
about his religious activities, namely, converting poor tribals to Christianity.

 That it is true that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of criminal

jurisprudence. In the absence of definite assertion from the prosecution side, about their
specific role and involvement, it is not safe to convict them.

 That in a country like ours where discrimination on the ground of caste or religion is a taboo,
taking lives of persons belonging to another caste or religion is bound to have a dangerous
and reactive effect on the society at large. It strikes at the very root of the orderly society
which the founding fathers of our Constitution dreamt of. Our concept of secularism is that
the State will have no religion. The State shall treat all religions and religious groups equally
and with equal respect without in any manner interfering with their individual right of
religion, faith and worship.

 That the then President of India, Shri K R. Narayanan once said in his address that “Indian
unity was based on a tradition of tolerance, which is at once a pragmatic concept for living
together and a philosophical concept of finding truth and goodness in every religion”. We
also conclude with the hope that Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of religion playing a positive role
in bringing India’s numerous religion and communities into an integrated prosperous nation
be realised by way of equal respect for all religions. It is undisputed that there is no
justification for interfering in someone’s belief by way of `use of force’, provocation,
conversion, incitement or upon a flawed premise that one religion is better than the other.
 In view of the above, the Apex Court upholding the decision of the Orissa High Court
dismissed the Petitions filed by Rabindra Singh alias Dara Singh, Mahendra Hembran and
the CBI confirming the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the Appellants and the
order of acquittal of others who are all poor tribals.
Sections of Indian Evidence Act discussed :

A. Test Identification Parade evidentiary value

PW11, Bhakta Marandi was examined on the side of the prosecution as eye-witness. He
identified accused Dara Singh and Rajat Kumar Das in dock. His statement was neither recorded
by local police nor by the CID but recorded by the CBI on 05.06.1999. He belongs to Village
Manoharpur (the place of occurrence). His house is situated two houses apart from the church.
He stated that the deceased Graham Staines was known to him. He last visited Manoharpur on
20.01.1999 along with his two sons and others in two vehicles. Graham Staines and his two sons
used to sleep in the night inside the vehicle parked in front of the church. As usual in the night of
22.01.1999, Graham Staines and his two sons had slept in a vehicle. In the midnight, the witness
was woken up by his wife on hearing bursting sounds. He came out of his house and found 4/5
persons standing in front of his house holding torches and lathis. They were threatening that they
will kill the persons who will dare to come in their way. One of them threw a baton like stick at
him. He retreated to his house and went to the house of another person situated one house apart
from the church. A slim and tall man was holding an axe. They set on fire one of the vehicles.
Some of them brought straw and put the same on the vehicle. They set fire both the vehicles and
both the vehicles were burnt. They raised the slogans "Jai Bajarang Bali" and "Dara Singh
Zindabad". The witness pointed accused Dara Singh (A1) and accused Rajat Kumar Das in the
dock as two of those persons beating the vehicles and setting fire on the vehicles. The witness
identified accused Dara Singh (A1) as slim and tall fellow holding the axe and guiding the
miscreants. The witness further stated that the CBI while interrogating him showed photographs
of some persons and he had identified two of the photographs as that of miscreants. He had
signed on those photographs. About the admissibility of the identification of the accused persons
with the photographs can be considered at a later point of time.

In these circumstances, no importance need to be attached on the testimony of these eye-

witnesses about their identification of the appellants other than Dara Singh (A1) and Mahendra
Hembram (A3) before the trial Court for the first time without corroboration by previous TIP
held by the Magistrate in accordance with the procedure established. It is well settled principle
that in the absence of any independent corroboration like TIP held by judicial Magistrate, the
evidence of eye-witnesses as to the identification of the appellants/accused for the first time
before the trial Court generally cannot be accepted. As explained in Manu Sharma vs. State
(NCT of Delhi)2, that if the case is supported by other materials, identification of the accused in
the dock for the first time would be permissible subject to confirmation by other corroborative
evidence, which are lacking in the case on hand except for A1 and A3.

be helpful to the prosecution case. To put it clear, the evidence of witness given in the court as to
the identification may be accepted only if he identified the same persons in a previously held TIP
in jail. It is true that absence of TIP may not be fatal to the prosecution. In the case on hand, (A1)
and (A3) were identified and also corroborated by the evidence of slogans given in his name and
each one of the witnesses asserted the said aspect insofar as they are concerned

Learned Addl. Solicitor General, in support of the prosecution case about the photo identification
parade and dock identification, heavily relied on the decision of this Court in Manu Sharma
(supra)

 In para 254, this Court held:

"Even a TIP before a Magistrate is otherwise hit by Section 162 of the Code. Therefore to say
that a photo identification is hit by Section 162 is wrong. It is not a substantive piece of evidence.
It is only by virtue of Section 9 of the Evidence Act that the same i.e. the act of identification
becomes admissible in court. The logic behind TIP, which will include photo identification lies
in the fact that it is only an aid to investigation, where an accused is not known to the witnesses,
the IO conducts a TIP to ensure that he has got the right person as an accused. The practice is not
borne out of procedure, but out of prudence. At best it can be brought under Section 8 of the
Evidence Act, as evidence of conduct of a witness in photo identifying the accused in the
presence of an IO or the Magistrate, during the course of an investigation."

It was further held:

It is trite to say that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court. Apart from
the clear provisions of Section 9 of the Evidence Act, the position in law is well settled by a

2
(2010) 6 SCC 1 case
catena of decisions of this Court. The facts, which establish the identity of the accused persons,
are relevant under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a
witness is the statement made in court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person
at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of
a prior test identification, therefore, is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence.
It is, accordingly, considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the
sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused who are strangers to them,
in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to
exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose
testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades
belong to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code which obliges the
investigating agency to hold or confers a right upon the accused to claim a test identification
parade. They do not constitute substantive evidence and these parades are essentially governed
by Section 162 of the Code. Failure to hold a test identification parade would not make
inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. The weight to be attached to such
identification should be a matter for the courts of fact. In appropriate cases it may accept the
evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration.

It was further held that "the photo identification and TIP are only aides in the investigation and
do not form substantive evidence. The substantive evidence is the evidence in the court on oath".

Jana Yadav vs. State of Bihar 3, the following conclusion is relevant: "Failure to hold test
identification parade does not make the evidence of identification in court inadmissible, rather
the same is very much admissible in law, but ordinarily identification of an accused by a witness
for the first time in court should not form the basis of conviction, the same being from its very
nature inherently of a weak character unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in
the test identification parade or any other evidence. The previous identification in the test
identification parade is a check valve to the evidence of identification in court of an accused by a
witness and the same is a rule of prudence and not law. It is clear that identification of accused
persons by witness in dock for the first time though permissible but cannot be given credence
without further corroborative evidence. Though some of the witnesses identified some of the
3
(2002) 7 SCC 295, para 38,
accused in the dock as mentioned above without corroborative evidence the dock identification
alone cannot be treated as substantial evidence, though it is permissible.

It has been highlighted and elicited from the materials placed that all the eye- witnesses
examined by the prosecution consistently stated that during occurrence the miscreants raised
slogans in the name of Dara Singh as "Dara Singh Zindabad". The story of this slogan was also
mentioned in the first information report lodged soon after the occurrence. This slogan is in the
name of Dara Singh, corroborates the identification before the trial Court for the first time. In
addition to the same, some of the witnesses identified Dara Singh by photo identification. We
have already highlighted the evidentiary value of photo identification and identifying the person
in the dock.

Another question which we have to consider is

Whether the Police (CBI) had the power under the Cr.P.C. to take specimen signature and
writing of A3 for examination by the expert.

It was pointed out that during investigation, even the Magistrate cannot direct the accused to
give his specimen signature on the asking of the police and only in the amendment of the Cr.P.C.
in 2005, power has been given to the Magistrate to direct any person including the accused to
give his specimen signature for the purpose of investigation. Hence, it was pointed out that
taking of his signature/writings being per se illegal, the report of the expert cannot be used as
evidence against him. To meet the above claim, learned Addl. Solicitor General heavily relied on
a 11-Judge Bench decision of this Court in The State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and
Ors.,4. This larger Bench was constituted in order to re-examine some of the propositions of law
laid down by this Court in the case of M.P. Sharma and Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, District
Magistrate, Delhi and Ors.5. After adverting to various factual aspects, the larger Bench
formulated the following questions for consideration:

4
(1962) 3 SCR 10 = AIR 1961 SC 1808
5
(1954) SCR 1077
"2. On these facts, the only questions of constitutional importance that this Bench has to
determine are; (1) whether by the production of the specimen handwritings - Exs. 27, 28, and 29
- the accused could be said to have been 'a witness against himself' within the meaning of Article
20(3) of the Constitution; and (2) whether the mere fact that when those specimen handwritings
had been given, the accused person was in police custody could, by itself, amount to compulsion,
apart from any other circumstances which could be urged as vitiating the consent of the accused
in giving those specimen handwritings. ... ...

Main question which arises for determination in this appeal is :

whether a direction given by a Court to an accused person present in Court to give his specimen
writing and signature for the purpose of comparison under the provisions of section 73 of the
Indian Evidence Act infringes the fundamental right enshrined in Article 20(3) of the
Constitution.

When an accused person is called upon by the Court or any other authority holding an
investigation to give his finger impression or signature or a specimen of his handwriting, he is
not giving any testimony of the nature of a 'personal testimony'. The giving of a 'personal
testimony' must depend upon his volition. He can make any kind of statement or may refuse to
make any statement. But his finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of efforts at
concealing the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character. Thus, the
giving of finger impressions or of specimen writing or of signatures by an accused person,
though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger sense, is not included within the
expression 'to be a witness'.

B. Confession

instance relates to Mahadev Mahanta, Accused No. 11 who was arrested on 01.07.1999 by the
investigating agency and he was remanded to police custody. However, on 08.07.1999, Accused
No. 11 made a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. PW 55, I.O. has stated that the statement of
the accused was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. that he was under police custody and he was
remanded back to police custody. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. he also stated that
he was beaten by the investigating agency. (c) In the case of Turam Ho Accused No. 12, he was
arrested on 13.05.1999 by the Investigating Agency and from 19.05.1999 to 23.05.1999 the
accused person was in custody of the investigating agency. While so, on 21.05.1999, the accused
No. 12 made a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C and thereafter remanded back to police
custody. It was pointed out that he also stated in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he
was beaten by the investigating agency. (d) The next instance relates to Umakanta Bhoi,
Accused No. 13 who refused to make a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C prayed by I.O. to be
put for 16.03.1999 for recording statement. It was directed to jail authority to keep the accused
under calm and cool atmosphere. A 13 was produced from Judicial Custody for recording
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and he refused to make a statement. However, on
31.08.1999, he made a confessional statement. (e) In the case of Dayanidhi Patra, Accused No.
14, on 21.09.1999, he was arrested by the Investigating Agency. On 24.09.1999, Learned ASJ
granted police remand for 7 days i.e. on 01.10.1999 and that on that day A 14 made a statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It was pointed out that in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the
accused person stated that he was beaten by the investigating agency. 21) Before analyzing the
confessional statements of various accused persons and its applicability and the procedure
followed by the Magistrate in recording the statement, let us consider various decisions touching
these aspects.

In Bhagwan Singh and Ors. vs. State of M.P.6, while considering these issues, it was held:
"27......The first precaution that a Judicial Magistrate is required to take is to prevent forcible
extraction of confession by the prosecuting agency (see7). It was also held by this Court in the
case of Shivappa v. State of Karnataka8 that the provisions of Section 164 CrPC must be
complied with not only in form, but in essence. Before proceeding to record the confessional
statement, a searching enquiry must be made from the accused as to the custody from which he
was produced and the treatment he had been receiving in such custody in order to ensure that
there is no scope for doubt of any sort of extraneous influence proceeding from a source
interested in the prosecution.

It has also been held that the Magistrate in particular should ask the accused as to why he wants
to make a statement which surely shall go against his interest in the trial. He should be granted
6
(2003) 3 SCC 21
7
State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358
8
, (1995) 2 SCC 76
sufficient time for reflection. He should also be assured of protection from any sort of
apprehended torture or pressure from the police in case he declines to make a confessional
statement.

Unfortunately, in this case, the evidence of the Judicial Magistrate (PW 1) does not show that
any such precaution was taken before recording the judicial confession. The confession is also
not recorded in questions-and- answers form which is the manner indicated in the criminal court
rules.

It has been held that there was custody of the accused Pooran Singh with the police immediately
preceding the making of the confession and it is sufficient to stamp the confession as involuntary
and hence unreliable. A judicial confession not given voluntarily is unreliable, more so when
such a confession is retracted. It is not safe to rely on such judicial confession or even treat it as a
corroborative piece of evidence in the case. When a judicial confession is found to be not
voluntary and more so when it is retracted, in the absence of other reliable evidence, the
conviction cannot be based on such retracted judicial confession. 9

23) In Shivappa vs. State of Karnataka10, while reiterating the same principle it was held:- "6.
From the plain language of Section 164 CrPC and the rules and guidelines framed by the High
Court regarding the recording of confessional statements of an accused under Section 164 CrPC,
it is manifest that the said provisions emphasise an inquiry by the Magistrate to ascertain the
voluntary nature of the confession. This inquiry appears to be the most significant and an
important part of the duty of the Magistrate recording the confessional statement of an accused
under Section 164 CrPC. The failure of the Magistrate to put such questions from which he could
ascertain the voluntary nature of the confession detracts so materially from the evidentiary value
of the confession of an accused that it would not be safe to act upon the same. Full and adequate
compliance not merely in form but in essence with the provisions of Section 164 CrPC and the
rules framed by the High Court is imperative and its non- compliance goes to the root of the
Magistrate's jurisdiction to record the confession and renders the confession unworthy of
credence. Before proceeding to record the confessional statement, a searching enquiry must be
made from the accused as to the custody from which he was produced and the treatment he had
9
Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan, (1978) 3 SCC 435 (para 23
10
(1995) 2 SCC 76
been receiving in such custody in order to ensure that there is no scope for doubt of any sort of
extraneous influence proceeding from a source interested in the prosecution still lurking in the
mind of an accused.

In case the Magistrate discovers on such enquiry that there is ground for such supposition he
should give the accused sufficient time for reflection before he is asked to make his statement
and should assure himself that during the time of reflection, he is completely out of police
influence. An accused should particularly be asked the reason why he wants to make a statement
which would surely go against his self-interest in course of the trial, even if he contrives
subsequently to retract the confession. Besides administering the caution, warning specifically
provided for in the first part of sub-section (2) of Section 164 namely, that the accused is not
bound to make a statement and that if he makes one it may be used against him as evidence in
relation to his complicity in the offence at the trial, that is to follow, he should also, in plain
language, be assured of protection from any sort of apprehended torture or pressure from such
extraneous agents as the police or the like in case he declines to make a statement and be given
the assurance that even if he declined to make the confession, he shall not be remanded to police
custody.

The Magistrate who is entrusted with the duty of recording confession of an accused coming
from police custody or jail custody must appreciate his function in that behalf as one of a judicial
officer and he must apply his judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy his conscience that the
statement the accused makes is not on account of any extraneous influence on him. That indeed
is the essence of a `voluntary' statement within the meaning of the provisions of Section 164
CrPC and the rules framed by the High Court for the guidance of the subordinate courts.
Moreover, the Magistrate must not only be satisfied as to the voluntary character of the
statement, he should also make and leave such material on the record in proof of the compliance
with the imperative requirements of the statutory provisions, as would satisfy the court that sits
in judgment in the case, that the confessional statement was made by the accused voluntarily and
the statutory provisions were strictly complied with.
In State thr. Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT vs. Nalini and Others 11 (1999) 5 SCC 253 at 307,
the following paragraphs are relevant which read as under:- "96.

What is the evidentiary value of a confession made by one accused as against another accused
apart from Section 30 of the Evidence Act?

While considering that aspect we have to bear in mind that any confession, when it is sought to
be used against another, has certain inherent weaknesses. First is, it is the statement of a person
who claims himself to be an offender, which means, it is the version of an accomplice. Second is,
the truth of it cannot be tested by cross-examination. Third is, it is not an item of evidence given
on oath. Fourth is, the confession was made in the absence of the co-accused against whom it is
sought to be used.

“97. It is well-nigh settled, due to the aforesaid weaknesses, that confession of a co-accused is a
weak type of evidence. A confession can be used as a relevant evidence against its maker
because Section 21 of the Evidence Act permits it under certain conditions. But there is no
provision which enables a confession to be used as a relevant evidence against another person. It
is only Section 30 of the Evidence Act which at least permits the court to consider such a
confession as against another person under the conditions prescribed therein. If Section 30 was
absent in the Evidence Act no confession could ever have been used for any purpose as against
another co-accused until it is sanctioned by another statute. So, if Section 30 of the Evidence Act
is also to be excluded by virtue of the non obstante clause contained in Section 15(1) of TADA,
under what provision can a confession of one accused be used against another co- accused at all?
It must be remembered that Section 15(1) of TADA does not say that a confession can be used
against a co-accused. It only says that a confession would be admissible in a trial of not only the
maker thereof but a co- accused, abettor or conspirator tried in the same case. “

98. Sir John Beaumont speaking for five Law Lords of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R.12,
had made the following observations:

11
(1999) 5 SCC 253 at 307
12
AIR 1949 PC 257
"Section 30 seems to be based on the view that an admission by an accused person of his own
guilt affords some sort of sanction in support of the truth of his confession against others as well
as himself. But a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does
not indeed come within the definition of `evidence' contained in Section 3, Evidence Act. It is
not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by
cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver which
is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the court may take
the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court
may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must
be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved
in the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence."

The role of Mahendra Hembram A3, the prosecution very much relied on his letters dated
01.02.2002 and 02.02.2002 addressed to the Sessions Judge wherein he confessed his guilt.

It has been pointed for Mahendra Hembram (who is accused 3) three types of evidence are
available against him:

Confession: the letter Ex. 49 said to have been written by A3 to his Sister-in-law PW 9, which
contains his admission of involvement in the incident. It shows that A3 confessed to have
participated in the incident along with A1. It is seen that the entire contents of letter were used by
the trial Judge which was rightly accepted by the High Court.

In the course of trial, he filed petitions on 01.02.2002 and 02.02.2002 pleading guilty and
confessing to have set fire to the vehicles. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
on 04.02.2002, he has admitted to have set fire to the vehicles and in his statement recorded
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 24.03.2003 has admitted to have filed petitions pleading guilty and
to have stated in his earlier examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he had set fire to the
vehicles. There is no impediment in relying on a portion of the statement of the accused and
finding him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him as laid by the prosecution.

b) testimony of eye-witnesses/identification in court/PW 23 Joseph Marandi; and

it has been highlighted and elicited from the materials placed, it is relevant to point out that all
the eye- witnesses examined by the prosecution consistently stated that during occurrence the
miscreants raised slogans in the name of Dara Singh as "Dara Singh Zindabad". The story of this
slogan was also mentioned in the first information report lodged soon after the occurrence. This
slogan is in the name of Dara Singh, corroborates the identification before the trial Court for the
first time. In addition to the same, some of the witnesses identified Dara Singh by photo
identification

c) absconding of the accused.: The other circumstances urged by the prosecution was that A3
absconded soon after the incident and avoided arrest and this abscondence being a conduct under
section 8 Evidence Act, 1872 was taken into consideration.

 Comment and Opinion

 The findings of the Apex Court are unconstitutional to the extent that they go against
guarantees of freedom of faith on the one hand and seems to acknowledge vigilante action of
criminals like Dara Singh who take upon themselves ‘to teach lessons’ to persons serving
lepers and the poor. The Supreme Court of India is looked upto for penultimate interpretation
of the Constitutional provisions which is why it cannot abrogate from its obligation to
preserve the sense of secularism in the prevailing democracy.

 In his endeavour to fight against interference with the religious beliefs of the local people of
Manoharpur, Dara Singh and his accomplices in defiance of all humanitarian norms
interfered with Graham Staines’ and his minor sons’ right to live by setting them all on fire.
Article 25 of the Constitution of India incorporates right to practice, profess and propagation
of faith not only this, the Article guarantees the freedom of conscience. The Supreme Court’s
finding that “There is no justification to interfere in someone’s belief by any means”, clearly
implies that propagating one’s religion is equivalent to interference in another’s faith and
beliefs. This interpretation of laws by the Supreme Court is unwarranted and undemocratic in
nature in the light of the secular character of the Republic of India.

 The High Court had acquitted 11 accused who were convicted by the trial court. The
Supreme Court upheld these acquittals, calling the accused “poor tribals”. It is perhaps for
 the first time that the apex court has considered the socio-economic background of an
accused as a mitigating factor to justify his/her acquittal. This is again contrary to established
principles of criminal justice.

 It is a well known principle of criminal jurisprudence that -Life imprisonment is a rule but
death sentence is an exception and giving due consideration to this rule of criminal law the
Supreme court should not have simply ruled out it the exception in the form of death
sentence by covering the brutality of the criminal acts with the blanket of ‘unjustified
interference with religious beliefs’.

Therefore in my opinion the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rabindra Pal
Singh alias Dara Singh v. Republic of India has been delivered by applying judicial intellect
unfamiliar with the legal norms adopted under the Constitution of India and the same should be
subject to revision by a larger bench.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Referred :

 Chief Justice M. Monir, , Textbook On The Law Of Evidence (8th Edn.

Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. , 2010)

 Batuk Lal, Law of Evidence in India (5th Edn. Orient Publishing Company,

2010)

 Dr. Avtar Singh, Principles of the Law of Evidence (19th Edn. Central Law

Agency, 2011)

 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Law Of Evidence(21st Edn. Lexis Nexis

Butterworth Publication, 2010)

Website Referred :

1. www.manupatra.com

2. www.indlaw.com

3. www.supremecourt.com

4. www.scconline.com