G.R. No. 141524 Neypes Vs CA Facts

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G.R. No.

141524
Neypes vs CA

FACTS:

The petitioners in this case filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro

Subsequently both petitioners and respondents filed various motions with the trial court such as
the petitioners filed a Motion to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forest Development in default and the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss.

The RTC grant the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of
Forest Development in default for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was
improper. It was also denied Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action because
there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial. Also
denied the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo based on prescription, and
because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.

On March 3, 1998, petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal and on March
18, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (15 days after receipt of the order).
On July 1, 1998, the RTC issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998.

On July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
However on August 4, 1998, the RTC denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.

Petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was
filed before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal of the notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to
appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:

(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the
final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner
non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-
day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time
dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have
appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that
was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted
the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in
the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’
view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.

(2) YES. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be
filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final
order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a
new trial or reconsideration.

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