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Taylor & Francis, LTD., College Art Association Art Journal
Taylor & Francis, LTD., College Art Association Art Journal
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Extractsfrom
Personhood's Self-Cancellation
My work on personhood theory in the last two question whether it is what it pretends to be. It Do you think that is permissible reasoning?
years has taught me a very important lesson must be what it pretends to be for you to be able Then what about
which I must not forget because I am now to ask whether it is what it pretends to be.
deciding to "make the great return to lan- The answer is an automatic "yes" if the This sentence is in German, and the proof
guage." Just because I am going to target in on question can be asked. Yet nothing has estab- that it is in German is just the sentence
"cognitive language"-or properly, proto- lished that the question IS asked (that I am itself, which is in German.
semantic consciousness-events-I must nev- not "dreaming," as it were). Let me resort to
er again succumb to the tendency in Western the anachronistic language of philosophy to Ultimately, no matter how much you are con-
philosophy to take the universe of thought or explain, hoping that this surrender of rigor vinced that the second sentence expresses a
illumination as "the knowing subject qua verbal will help clarify rather than confuse. Nothing delusion, there is nothing with which to prove
cognition-machine." I must not hem myself has proved that semantic consciousness-events that it expresses a delusion. ("Ultimately": In
into a narrow, cognitive-linguistic strip at one exist, i.e. that the raw experiences which are this context, it is not permitted to "prove"
side of the person-world. Proto-semantic con- "indicated" as semantic consciousness-events assertions by citing sources of authority which
sciousness-events must be studied as they in- have the trans-experiential dimension required are more derivative than what is to be proved.
terpenetrate with the whole person-world.... for a semantic consciousness-event. But the We don't prove how many teeth are in a
Personhood inherently and pervasively in- situation is more acute than this remark rec- horse's mouth by looking it up in an encyclo-
volves a capacity to make attributions of verac- ognizes. "Some proof that they exist is needed." pedia, or prove the existence of God by looking
ity, realism, etc.; and a capacity to question Yes indeed, some proof that what I conven- it up in the Bible:) The form of the proposition
veracity, realism, etc.-or just to question, in tionally indicate as semantic events are what is automatic self-validation; and this form
a moment in which one wants a realistic or they pretend to be and not moments of decep- closes the circuit in such a way that a contin-
veracious answer. When these capacities, attri- tion, delusion, hoax, mirage. The conceptual gent actuality cannot be tested. The illumination
butions, attitudes are not especially spelled thinking which supposedly is constituted of which emerges from this meditation is that the
out in words, that is when my new designation semantic consciousness-events has this "re- whole realm of semantic consciousness-events
of proto-semantic consciousness-events is most quirement of verification of realism" as its takes the form of automatic self-validation and
needed. Earlier paradigms of personhood foremost inalienable norm. That there are therefore is caught in a circuit of futility.
seemed inert because these proto-semantic semantic consciousness-events needs to be a
events were not made central. Without imputa- contingent actuality so that it can be verified.
tions of objectivity, attributions of "that-hap- But it can't be a contingent actuality. The Viewed along the axis of semantic conscious-
pened," judgments of veracity or realism, war- point is obvious to me-I don't know if anyone ness-events, personhood is in a bind of global
iness of deceit and delusion, self-observed else will see it-"that there are semantic con- self-cancellation or impossibility or irreparable
self-deception, and apprehension, expectation, sciousness-events" is too true: the question is conflict with the norms of its subsisting or
anticipation, the person-world does not "arise" settled and disposed of before anything (con- establishment or installation.
or subsist. In short, inherent to personhood is tingent) has been established or verified. We I don't know if it will help, or make things
the capacity to ask or question, "Is this actual?" need to be outside of this question of whether worse, if I make the following heuristic state-
or "Does this exist?" in the sense of "Is this "Is this what it pretends to be?" is what it ment. The foregoing is a demonstration that
what itpretends to be?" pretends to be; and we can't get outside it. the person-world "does not exist." (Curiously
There is a very good illustration which I am and ironically, Eastern thought promised to
preparing to use in "Argument That the Meta- establish the same illumination. But I deliver
Now we arrive at the illumination which I have the promised "demonstration" here and now;
theory of Arithmetic Is Inconsistent." Consider
not previously formulated. ASK THE QUESTION while Eastern thought defers the demonstra-
"IS THIS WHAT IT PRETENDS TO BE?" OF THE tion to some inaccessible thought-escape from
This sentence is in English, and the proof
QUESTION "IS THIS WHAT IT PRETENDS TO that it is in English is just the sentence empirical consciousness.)
BE?" The insight that personhood does not exist
itself, which is in English.
If the question "Is this what it pretends to be?" is not a privation-except for those who were
is not what it pretends to be, then you cannot incorrigibly credulous and addicted to "creed-
visual-table-apparition). Then, there is the an "I" doing, seeing, feeling, thinking. All this Are there non-immediates?
120 ArtJournal
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or as I remain within the static visual modality).
Do non-immediates exist? Like depth and depth-distance or away-distance
in the visual field, personhood is an impression
Once again, the affirmative answers to these which cannot be substantiated-as it were.
questions, the declarative correlates of the Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy
questions, are automatically self-validating. But was to announce that all the things we were
now the automatic self-validation is indirect. It supposed to believe but couldn't prove are
involves an intermediate moment. Non-imme- "innately added by the mind." Very well. There
diates have to exist so the question regarding remains only one qualification. These innate
their existence can be meaningful. That is why additions of the mind are impossibles.
I began with the question of semantic con- *