Remedial Law-JLlonen Cases 2013

SURVEY OF CASES IN REMEDIAL LAW PENNED BY J.
LEONEN
2013-2019
JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2013
SEC. DE LIMA V. GATDULA

G.R. No. 204528, 19 February 2013
Proper procedure in Amparo Cases.
FACTS:
On 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila a “Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo” against petitioners
Justice Secretary Leila De Lima, Director Nonnatus Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo
Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (“De Lima, et al.”). The RTC issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an answer, and set the case for hearing. During that
hearing, De Lima, et al. argued that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.
In an Order dated 2 March 2012, Judge Pampilo insisted that "since no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge noted that the Rules of Court
apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
applied and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the
main case on 7 March 2012. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file
their respective memoranda. The court further decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al.
would be filed in lieu of their Answer
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo and interim reliefs prayed for. In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC’s Decision and Order are correct.
HELD:
No. The RTC’s Decision and Order are incorrect. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Due to the delicate and urgent nature
of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is
initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Appeals, or the Supreme Court.
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SURVEY OF CASES IN REMEDIAL LAW PENNED BY J. LEONEN
2013-2019
The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation of the facts as alleged in the
petition and the affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances detailed". After
evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the
case. The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the
clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer,
the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are
also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party. Hence, the court’s insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate.
It was also irregular to the hold a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the
writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly
joined.
The RTC erred in requiring a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of

De Lima, et al. The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject
to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the
other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually
required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since
these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit. More importantly, a
memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The fourth irregularity was the Decision itself. The privilege of the Writ of Amparo
should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes
availment of the entire procedure outlined in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining
the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary
hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if
not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed. It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial relief to the petitioner.
Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo."
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET

MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 204700, 10 April 2013
FACTS:
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties Marcelo N. Naval

(Naval) and Crispin I. Oben (Oben) are the defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export
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and Industry Bank (EIB) through a Complaint dated 9 February 2005, and currently pending
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Makati City.
By virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated 9 August 2006, EIB transferred EDC's

outstanding loan obligations of P10,232,998.00 to respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc. (Cameron), a special purpose vehicle. Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to
Substitute/Join EIB dated November 24, 2006, which was granted by the trial court.
On 22 February 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan

Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) dated 7 April 2006 (the “motion”) referred to in the Deed
of Assignment. Respondent Cameron opposed the motion and argued that petitioners have not
shown "good cause" for the production of the LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to
the case a quo. The RTC denied petitioners' motion for failure to show the relevance and "good
cause" for the production of the LSPA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC’s denial of the motion is correct.
HELD:
No. The provision on production and inspection of documents under Rule 27, Section 1
of the Rules of Court is one of the modes of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order
to enable not only the parties, but also the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in
connection with the case pending before it.
Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary

on the part of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied
because to do so would bar access to relevant evidence that may be used by a party-litigant and
hence, impair his fundamental right to due process. The test to be applied by the trial judge in
determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of
reasonableness and practicability.
The question was whether respondent had acquired a valid title to the credit, i.e., EDC's
outstanding loan obligation, and whether it had a right to claim from petitioners.
As respondent Cameron's claim against the petitioners relies entirely on the validity of
the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon respondent Cameron to allow petitioners to
inspect all documents relevant to the Deed, especially those documents which, by express
terms, were referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which pertains to the same
subject matter — the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to petitioners'
defense.
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Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a
writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be
inquired into by the other, and when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any
other writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the
Deed of Assignment was produced in court by respondent, petitioner must be given the
opportunity to examine the whole document.
See also: Eagleridge Development Corp. v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. G.R. No.
204700 (Resolution), 24 November 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BAYAO

G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013.
The non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, prior to the filing of a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was not fatal since the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
already been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
Petition prays for the reversal and setting aside of the Court of Appeals: (a) Resolution dated
March 21, 2007 that dismissed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner for
failure to resort to a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order dated October
9, 2006; and (b) Resolution dated August 16, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner argues that this case falls under the exceptions for filing a Motion for
Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition under Rule 65. On the other hand, respondents argue
that petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration is fatal. They contend that this is a
condition sine qua non for a Petition under Rule 65, and none of the exceptions are present in this
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correct.
HELD:
Yes, petitioner is correct. Generally, a Motion for Reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari because its purpose is to allow the court, through
the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of this case, to correct any actual or
perceived error. However, this rule admits well-defined exceptions: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
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for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where,
under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
The second exception is present in this case. The issues in the Petition with the Court of
Appeals have already been raised by petitioner on several occasions through its pleadings with
the trial court. The lower court, therefore, passed upon them prior to its issuance of its Order
dated 9 October 2006.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORP. V. JUDGE LIDUA, SR.

G.R. No. 169588, 7 October 2013.
Only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged involved is an ordinance.
FACTS:
In I.S. No. 2003-1997, Jadewell thru its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay
and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on 7 May 2003, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the
wheel of Walan’s Nissan Cefiro car, which was considered illegally parked for failure to pay the
prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell
personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving
its owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine
of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the respondents.
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each
other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-
1996 and 2003-1997.
In the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La
Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a case of
Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. On 2 October 2003, two criminal Informations
were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno
Aquino filed a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation, praying for the quashal of the two
Informations on the following grounds: (a) extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to
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prescription; (b) failure of the Information to state facts that charged an offense; and (c) the
imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.
In an Order dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the accused's
Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases, on the ground of prescription.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City, arguing that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses
charged have not prescribed. The RTC dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on 23 May
2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged in this case.
HELD:
No. The mere filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on 23 May
2003 for violation of an ordinance did not toll the prescription period.
The offense was committed on 7 May 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription
period. The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure.
Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx
B.Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
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Clearly, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime
charged involved is an ordinance.
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the
prescription period of the crime charged. The case of People v. Pangilinan categorically stated
that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred
to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to
violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of
the Information. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery,
and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within
which to file the Information.
TANKEH V. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171428, 11 November 2013.
FACTS:
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner Alejandro V. Tankeh stated that the Court of
Appeals (CA) seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in acting and deciding as if the
evidence stated in the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) Decision did not exist. He averred that the
ruling of lack of cause of action had no leg to stand on, and the CA had unreasonably,
whimsically, and capriciously ignored the ample evidence on record proving the fraud and
deceit perpetrated on the petitioner by the respondent. He stated that the CA failed to
appreciate the findings of fact of the RTC, which are generally binding on CA. He also
maintained that he is entitled to damages and attorney's fees due to the deceit and machinations
committed by the respondent.
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh averred that petitioner had chosen the wrong remedy by
filing the instant Petition for Certiorari instead of a Petition for Review. Thus, petitioner's failure
to show that there was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy merited
the RTC’s Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are correct.
HELD:
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No. The remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly that of a Rule 45 Petition for
Review. In Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, this Court made the distinction between a Rule 45
Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari:
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not

errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason
for the rule in this light: When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while
so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed . . . . Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct able through the original civil action of certiorari.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not
one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment, appeal is the
remedy.
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of
the Court of Appeals. These errors pertain to the petitioner's allegation that the appellate court
failed to uphold the findings of facts of the lower court. He does not impute any error with
respect to the Court of Appeals' exercise of jurisdiction.
In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari, this Court
has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review on
Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a
Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient
reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no
need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.
Petitioner filed his Petition within the reglementary period of filing a Petition for
Review. His Petition assigns errors of judgment and appreciation of facts and law on the part of
the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if the Petition was designated as one that sought the remedy
of certiorari, this Court may exercise its discretion to treat it as a Petition for Review in the
interest of substantial justice.
PRYCE CORP. V. CHINA BANKING CORP.

G.R. No. 172302, 18 February 2014, [En banc]
FACTS:
Petitioner Pryce Corporation (“Pryce”) filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation with
the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 138 (the “rehabilitation court”), which immediately
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issued a stay order without hearing. Respondent China Banking Corporation (“China Bank”)
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, questioning the rehabilitation court’s stay order.
China Bank claimed that the rehabilitation plan's approval impaired the obligations of
contracts. It argued that neither the provisions P.D. No. 902-A nor the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules) empowered commercial courts "to
render without force and effect valid contractual stipulations." Moreover, the plan's approval
authorizing dacion en pago of Pryce's properties without respondent China Bank’s consent not
only violated "mutuality of contract and due process.
The Bank of the Philippine Islands (“BPI”), another creditor of Pryce, filed a separate
petition with the Court of Appeals assailing the same order by the rehabilitation court (the “BPI
petition”).
The Court of Appeals, 7th Division granted China Bank’s petition, and set aside the
rehabilitation court’s stay order. The Court of Appeals, 1 st Division granted BPI’s separate
petition. On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled that the rehabilitation court’s stay
order is valid. This ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, Pryce elevated the Court of Appeal’s decision in China Bank’s petition with
the Supreme Court, which denied Pryce’s petition.
ISSUES:
Whether the issue on the validity of the rehabilitation court is now res judicata on
account of the Supreme Court’s decision in the BPI petition.
HELD:
Yes, the issue on the validity of the rehabilitation court is now res judicata on account of
the Supreme Court’s decision in the BPI petition. The elements for res judicata to apply are as
follows: (a) the former judgment was final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (c) the judgment was based on the merits; and (d) between
the first and the second actions, there was an identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of
action.
In this case, China Bank and BPI are creditors of Pryce and are both questioning the
rehabilitation court's approval of the amended rehabilitation plan. Thus, there is substantial
identity of parties since they are litigating for the same matter and in the same capacity as
creditors of Pryce. Both cases deal with the subject matter of Pryce’s rehabilitation. The element
of identity of causes of action also exists. In separate appeals, China Bank and BPI questioned
the same order of the rehabilitation court before the Court of Appeals. Since the order
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approving the amended rehabilitation plan was affirmed and made final in the BPI Petition, this
plan binds all creditors, including respondent China Banking Corporation.
On the element of identity of parties, res judicata does not require absolute identity of

parties as substantial identity is enough. Substantial identity of parties exists "when there is a
community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if
the latter was not impleaded in the first case." Parties that represent the same interests in two
petitions are, thus, considered substantial identity of parties for purposes of res judicata.
Definitely, one test to determine substantial identity of interest would be to see whether the
success or failure of one party materially affects the other.
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. V. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORP.

G.R. No. 193494, 12 March 2014
Civil Procedure; Default (Rule 9)
FACTS:
Lui Enterprises, Inc. (“Lui”) and Zuellig Pharma Corporation (“Zuellig”) entered into a
10-year contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin, Davao City.
Zuellig received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications (“PBCom”). Claiming to
be the new owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig to pay rent directly to it.
Zuellig promptly informed Lui of PBCom’s claim. Lui insisted on its right to collect the leased
property's rent.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui and PBCom over the rental payments, Zuellig
Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
PBCom filed its answer to the complaint. On the other hand, Lui filed a motion to dismiss. Lui
filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15-day period to file an answer, thus Zuellig moved that
Lui be declared in default.
RTC found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period. Thus, it denied Lui Enterprises' motion to dismiss and declared it in
default. Before the RTC rendered judgment, Lui filed a motion to set aside order of default in
the RTC on the ground of excusable negligence. Lui argued that its failure to file a motion to
dismiss on time "was caused by the negligence of its former counsel." This negligence was
allegedly excusable because Lui was prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting its case."
ISSUES:
1) Whether Lui correctly filed a motion to set aside order of default.

2) Should the motion to set aside order of default be granted?
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HELD:
1) Yes. Lui had discovered its default before the RTC rendered judgment. Thus, it
timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence.
2) No. Lui filed a motion to set aside order of default without an acceptable excuse
why its counsel failed to answer the complaint. It failed to prove the excusable negligence.
Excusable negligence is "one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against." The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved. In this case, we find that
Lui’s failure to answer within the required period is inexcusable.
MENDOZA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 197293, 21 April 2014
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause, Executive determination vs. Judicial determination
FACTS:
Juno Cars, Inc., filed a complaint-affidavit for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo
C. Mendoza (“Mendoza”). Provincial Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa, and
was charged thereof before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong (RTC). Mendoza filed a
motion for determination of probable cause before the trial court. The RTC issued an
order dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information on the basis of its own independent
finding of lack of probable cause.
HELD:
Yes. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence" to determine whether there is
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable
cause exists.
The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is
enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable
cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. While it is
within the trial court's discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand,
it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The
judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
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prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of
probable cause independent of the prosecutor's finding.
While the information filed by the Prosecutor was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the
discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the
accused and proceed with trial.
CASTRO V. GREGORIO
G.R. No. 188801, 15 October 2014
Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment (Rule 47)
FACTS:
Atty. Jose G. Castro (“Jose”) filed a petition for adoption of his illegitimate children, Jose
Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (“Jed”) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (“Regina”). Jose is the
estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (“Rosario”) and the father of Joanne Benedicta
Charissima M. Castro (“Joanne”)(“petitioners”). According to the Home Study Report by the
Social Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being
one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro. He was also a well-known
lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. The report mentioned that he was once married to Rosario,
but the marriage did not produce any children. It also stated that he met and fell in love with
Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina
on March 1989.
On 16 October 2000, the RTC approved the adoption, since "no opposition had been
received by this Court from any person including the government which was represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General." A certificate of finality was issued on 9 February 2006.
On 18 October 2007, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment
of judgment under Rule 47 to annul the decision of the RTC approving Jed and Regina's
adoption. Petitioners alleged that they only learned of the adoption sometime in 2005, and
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. The Court of Appeals denied the petition and
ruled that the fraud committed by Jose was merely intrinsic, and not extrinsic.
ISSUES: Whether or not the decision of the RTC granting the adoption should be annulled.
a) Does the trial court have jurisdiction?
b) Is there intrinsic fraud or extrinsic fraud?
HELD:
No. Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a party may file an action with the
Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of regional
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trialc. There are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic
fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must
be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties. Extrinsic fraud, on the other
hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to
the court, or [that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured."
a) The court lacks jurisdiction in granting the adoption.
Under Article III, Section 7 of R.A. No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of
his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock. Article III, Section 9 of R.A.
No. 8552 also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or
older. It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over
10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was
necessary for the adoption to be valid. To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose
misrepresented that he and Rosario were childless, thus preventing Joanne from being notified
of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was invalid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by of R.A. No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the RTC failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
b) There is extrinsic fraud.
The Court of Appeals erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as intrinsic on
the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured testimonies" presented during the trial.
It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was
either present at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court, thus:
Intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and
just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like
falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial
or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of
his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means,
including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the modes of
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discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and
evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not
preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore,
constitutive of extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless whether the fraud was
committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial. Jose's
actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the
adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the RTC would have hesitated
to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law.
See also: Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, 8 October 2014
CATHAY METAL CORP. V. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC.

G.R. No. 172204, 2 July 2014
Civil Procedure; Service of Summons (Rule 14)
FACTS:
In 1996, respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative (“Laguna West”) caused

the annotation of its adverse claim on the farmer-beneficiaries' certificates of title. In 1999,
petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation (“Cathay Metal”) and the farmer-beneficiaries executed
contracts of sale of the properties. Transfer certificates of title were also issued in the name of
petitioner. The annotations in the original titles were copied to petitioner's titles.
On 15 September 2000, Cathay Metal filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of

adverse claims on its transfer certificates of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagaytay City. It served a copy of the petition by registered mail to Laguna West's alleged
official address. The petition was returned to sender because respondent could not be found at
that address. Cathay Metal allegedly attempted to serve the petition upon respondent
personally. However, this service failed for the same reason. Upon Cathay Metal's motion, the
RTC issued an order 15 December 2000 declaring Cathay Metal’s substituted service, apparently
by registered mail, to have been effected. Cathay Metal argues that the service of summons to
Laguna West’s official address is valid, pursuant to Article 51 of Republic Act No. 9520 or
the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, viz:
Art. 51. Address. — Every cooperative shall have an official postal address to

which all notices and communications shall be sent. Such address and every change
thereof shall be registered with the Authority.
ISSUE: Whether the summons was validly served through Cathay Metal’s substituted service
by registered mail to Laguna West’s official address.
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HELD:
No. The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of
notices and summons. The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an
exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities.
These persons are the juridical entity's president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only in this
court. Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. This means that on matters relating to
procedures in court, it shall be the Rules of Procedure that will govern. Proper court procedures
shall be determined by the Rules as promulgated by this court.
Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special

proceeding is court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure.
The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives' activities

as administered by the Cooperative Development Authority. However, they are not procedural
rules that will govern court processes.
We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive.

Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is
invalid. Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons.
In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail and,
allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in respondent's Certificate of
Registration. Summons was not served upon respondent's officers. It was also not published in
accordance with the Rules of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to
present evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an order
cancelling respondent's annotations of adverse claims. Respondent was, therefore, not validly
served with summons.
OLIVAREZ REALTY CORP. V. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 196251, 9 July 2014
Civil Procedure; Summary Judgment (Rule 35)
FACTS:
Benjamin Castillo (“Castillo”) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Laurel, Batangas, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19972. The Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel of land based on TCT
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No. T-18493. Castillo and Olivarez Realty Corporation (“Olivarez”), represented by Dr. Pablo
Olivarez, entered into a contract of conditional sale over the property. Under the deed of
conditional sale, Castillo agreed to sell his property to Olivarez for P19,080,490.00. Olivarez
agreed to a down payment of P5,000,000.00. As to the balance of P14,080,490.00, Olivarez agreed
to pay in 30 equal monthly installments every 8th day of the month beginning in the month that
the parties would receive a decision voiding the PTA's title to the property. Under the same
deed, Olivarez shall file the action against the PTA "with the full assistance of Castillo".
Should the action against the PTA be denied, Castillo agreed to reimburse all the
amounts paid by Olivarez. As to the "legitimate tenants" occupying the property, Olivarez
undertook to pay them "disturbance compensation", while Castillo undertook to clear the land
of the tenants within six months from the signing of the deed of conditional sale. Should
Castillo fail to clear the land within 6 months, Olivarez may suspend its monthly down
payment until the tenants vacate the property.
The parties agreed that Olivarez may immediately occupy the property upon signing of
the deed. Should the contract be cancelled, Olivarez agreed to return the property's possession
to Castillo and forfeit all the improvements it may have introduced on the property.
In September 2004, Castillo filed a complaint for rescission against Olivarez and Dr.
Olivarez with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan City, Batangas, alleging that after the
parties had signed the deed of conditional sale, Olivarez immediately took possession of the
property. However, the corporation only paid P2,500,000.00 of the purchase price. Contrary to
the agreement, the corporation did not file any action against the PTA to void the latter's title to
the property. The corporation neither cleared the land of the tenants nor paid them disturbance
compensation. Despite demand, Olivarez refused to fully pay the purchase price.
In their answer, Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez admitted that the
corporation only paid PhP2,500,000.00 of the purchase price. In their defense, defendants
alleged that Castillo failed to "fully assist" the corporation in filing an action against the PTA.
Neither did Castillo clear the property of the tenants within six months from the signing of the
deed of conditional sale. Thus, according to defendants, the corporation had "all the legal right
to withhold the subsequent payments to [fully pay] the purchase price".
Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment, which the RTC granted, and rendered a
decision in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC can render judgment based on the motion for summary judgment.
HELD:
Yes. Trial may be dispensed with and a summary judgment rendered if the case can be
resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers
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filed by the parties. A motion for summary judgment is filed either by the claimant or the
defending party. The trial court then hears the motion for summary judgment. If indeed there
are no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court shall issue summary judgment. Section 3,
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion shall be served at least ten
(10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admission at least three (3) days before the hearing.
After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
An issue of material fact exists if the answer or responsive pleading filed specifically
denies the material allegations of fact set forth in the complaint or pleading. If the issue of fact
"requires the presentation of evidence, it is a genuine issue of fact". However, if the issue "could
be resolved judiciously by plain resort" to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and the trial court may resolve the action through
summary judgment.
A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings. Under

Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case decided through
judgment on the pleadings if the answer filed fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the claimant's pleading.
In this case, Olivarez Realty Corporation admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase
price as agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from
Castillo, it set up the following affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not file a case to void the
PTA's title to the property; second, Castillo did not clear the land of the tenants; third, Castillo
allegedly sold the property to a third person, and the subsequent sale is currently being litigated
before a Quezon City court. Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez's
answer tendered an issue, Castillo properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment.
PEOPLE V. COGAED
G.R. No. 200334, 30 July 2014
Criminal Procedure; Arrest, Warrantless Search – Stop and Frisk
FACTS:
Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (“PSI Bayan”), received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana from
Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. PSI Bayan
organized checkpoints in order to intercept the suspect. PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime
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Taracatac, Jr. (“SPO1 Taracatac”), to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from
San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.
A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac's checkpoint.

The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers
who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed (“Cogaed”) and Santiago Sacpa Dayao
(“Dayao”). SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed
and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as
a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag,
revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac arrested Cogaed and
Dayao and brought them to the police station. Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their
respective bags inside the station.
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit
(“PO3 Campit”) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. Inside Cogaed's sack was
four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, and inside Dayao's yellow bag was a
brick of suspected marijuana. PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory
testing. PSI Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and
found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.
According to Cogaed, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, waiting for a jeepney to take

him" to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide. He boarded a jeepney and
recognized Dayao, his younger brother's friend. Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney. Dayao allegedly asked for Cogaed's help in
carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack. Cogaed agreed because they
were both going to the market. This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he did not know.
SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.
Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.
These facts were corroborated by an eyewitness, Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across
the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit him on the head. The bags
were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside. It was only later when Cogaed
learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Cogaed
guilty.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; and
(2) Whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted.
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HELD:
The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based
on their personal knowledge. The information as to the accused's whereabouts was sent
through a text message. The accused who never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The
bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating
circumstances and without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights.
This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no
reasonable suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver
of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper pressure
or coercion. The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent
with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible admissible evidence,
the accused should be acquitted.
(1) There was no valid search.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens
in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. A basic criterion would be the
concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. The police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading
to the suspicion of an illicit act. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves
observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Here, Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney.
There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver.
(2) The evidence obtained through the search should not be admitted.
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible. The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. For
there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless
arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
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from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
None of the above instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of

Court were present when the arrest was made.
CHING V. CHENG
G.R. No. 175507, 8 October 2014
Civil Procedure; Two-Dismissal Rule (Rule 17)
FACTS:
On 7 October 1998, Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng, and Mercedes Igne (the “Chengs”) filed
a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching (“Ching”) before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91046 (the “first
case”). On 22 March 1999, the complaint was amended, with leave of court, to implead
additional defendants, including Po Wing Properties, of which Ramon Ching was a primary
stockholder.
After the responsive pleadings had been filed, Po Wing Properties filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. On 13 November 2001, the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter (the first case).
On 19 April 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Annulment of
Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates of Title Issued by
Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. This case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 02-103319 (the “second case”) and raffled to Branch 20 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. When Branch 20 was made aware of the first case, it issued an order
transferring the case to Branch 6, considering that the case before it involved substantially the
same parties and causes of action.
On 11 November 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a motion to dismiss their
complaint in the second case, praying that it be dismissed without prejudice (the second case).
On 22 November 2002, Branch 6 issued an order granting the motion to dismiss on the
basis that the summons had not yet been served on Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties, and
they had not yet filed any responsive pleading. The dismissal of the second case was
made without prejudice. On 9 December 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order dated 22 November 2002.
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The Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for "Disinheritance and Declaration of
Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
and Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
105251 (the third case) and was eventually raffled to Branch 6.
The Chengs argued that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the "two-
dismissal rule" of Rule 17, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the previous
dismissal of the first case.
ISSUE: Is the two-dismissal rule applicable?
HELD:
No. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the

plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules will not apply if
the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
The trial court dismissed the first case by granting the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants. When it allowed Atty. Mirardo Arroyo Obias a period of fifteen (15) days to file an
appropriate pleading, it was merely acquiescing to a request made by the plaintiff's counsel that
had no bearing on the dismissal of the case.
Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff
defaults; it does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction.
Since there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiff's default, the trial court's instruction to file
the appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the
appropriate pleading, the trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the
case still stands.
The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule 16,
Section 1 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Section 5 of the same rule, a party may re-
file the same action or claim subject to certain exceptions.
Thus, when respondents filed the second case, they were merely re-filing the same claim
that had been previously dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to
dismiss the second case, the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the
plaintiff's instance.
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before
the service of any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of
right that is not subject to the trial court's discretion. In O.B. Jovenir Construction and
Development Corporation v. Macamir Realty and Development Corporation:
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The trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal
by the plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the
plaintiffs. Even if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court
has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such
dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground.
For this reason, the trial court issued its order dated 22 November 2002 dismissing the
case, without prejudice.
When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already
one prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the
defendants. While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it does
not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be examined to
determine before the rule may apply, as in this case.
BUENA, JR. V. BENITO

G.R. No. 181760 14 October 2014
Civil Procedure; Petition for Mandamus (Rule 65)
FACTS:
On 24 August 2005, Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9, Lanao del Sur, to compel the Civil Service Commission-Regional Office to
attest to his permanent appointment as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent. Dr. Benito
claimed that it was the Regional Office's ministerial duty to attest to his appointment. Under
Article VII, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 9054, the Regional Governor of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao is the appointing authority for positions in the civil service in the
region. Since the appointing authority already exercised his discretion, the Regional Office
allegedly had no choice but to attest to Dr. Benito's appointment.
ISSUE: Is Mandamus the correct remedy?
HELD:
Yes. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It
may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An
act is ministerial if the act should be performed under a given state of facts, in a prescribed
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manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
the body’s own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The body must
have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a
discretionary act wherein the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.
The CSC’s attestation of appointments in the civil service is a ministerial duty once it
finds the appointee eligible for the position. The CSC is limited only to the non-discretionary
authority of determining whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions
laid down by the law. If the appointee possesses such qualification, the CSC hasno choice but to
attest to the appointment.
DE PEDRO V. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.

G.R. No. 194751, 26 November 2014
Civil Procedure; Service of Summons (Rule 14)
FACTS:
Respondent Romasan Development Corporation (“Romansan”) filed complaints for

nullification of free patents and original certificate of titles before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Antipolo City. Attempts to personally serve summons on Petitioner De Pedro failed. The
officer's return reads in part:
OFFICER'S RETURN
xxx xxx xxx
1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO — Unserved for the reason that according to the
messenger of Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address.
Romansan filed a motion to serve summons and the complaint by publication. The RTC
granted the motion. The summons and the complaint were published in People's Balita.
Romansan moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in

default for failure to file their answers. Romansan also moved to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte. The RTC granted the motions. The RC then issued an order declaring as
nullity the titles and free patents issued to all defendants in respondent's complaint, including
the free patent issued to De Pedro.
ISSUE:
Was the service of summons by publication valid?
HELD:
No. Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed

when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown owner or if his or her
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whereabouts are "unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." It may only be
effected after unsuccessful attempts to serve the summons personally, and after diligent inquiry
as to the defendant's or respondent's whereabouts.
A look into the content of the sheriff's return will determine if the circumstances
warranted the deviation from the rule preferring personal service of summons over other
modes of service. The sheriff's return must contain a narration of the circumstances showing
efforts to personally serve summons to the defendants or respondents and the impossibility of
personal service of summons.
This return shows no detail of the sheriff's efforts to serve the summons personally upon
petitioner. The summons was unserved only because the post office messenger stated that there
was no "Aurora N. De Pedro" in the service address. The return did not show that the sheriff
attempted to locate petitioner's whereabouts. Moreover, it cannot be concluded based on the
return that personal service was rendered impossible under the circumstances or that service
could no longer be made within reasonable time.
ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC. V. CHIONGBIAN

G.R. No. 197530, 9 July 2014
Civil Procedure; Motion to Dismiss, failure to state cause of action
FACTS:
On 8 January 1996, Aboitiz Shipping Corporation ("ASC"), CAGLI, and William Lines,
Inc. ("WLI"), entered into an agreement, whereby ASC and CAGLI would transfer their
shipping assets to WLI in exchange for WLI's shares of stock. WLI, in turn, would run their
merged shipping businesses and, henceforth, be known as WG&A, Inc. ("WG&A"). CAGLI
made demands to ATSC (the renamed WLI/WG&A) to deliver the shares of stocks due to it. Its
claims not having been satisfied, CAGLI filed the first of two applications for arbitration ("first
complaint") against respondent Chiongbian, ATSC, ASC, and petitioner AEV, before the Cebu
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 20(“RTC Branch 20”).
In response, AEV filed a motion to dismiss dated February 5, 2009. AEV argued that
CAGLI failed to state a cause of action as there was no agreement to arbitrate between CAGLI
and AEV. On 4 December 2009, RTC Branch 20 issued an order dismissing the first complaint
with respect to AEV. It sustained AEV's assertion that there was no agreement binding AEV
and CAGLI to arbitrate CAGLI's claim. CAGLI did not contest this dismissal. CAGLI filed a
notice of dismissal dated July 8, 2010, withdrawing the first complaint, which the court allowed.
CAGLI filed a second application for arbitration ("second complaint") before the Cebu
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 (“RTC Branch 10”).
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On 28 October 2010, AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the ground
of res judicata, among others. In the first of the two (2) assailed orders dated May 5, 2011, RTC
Branch 10 denied AEV's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Did RTC Branch 10 correctly deny the motion to dismiss?
HELD:
No. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may very well be considered a
judgment on the merits and, thereby, operate as res judicata on a subsequent case. To reiterate,
the Cebu City Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 made a definitive determination that CAGLI had
no right to compel AEV to subject itself to arbitration vis-a-vis CAGLI's claims. This
determination was arrived at after due consideration of the facts established and the arguments
advanced by the parties. Accordingly, RTC Branch 20's December 4, 2009 order constituted a
judgment on the merits and operated as res judicata on the second complaint.
CLUB FILIPINO, INC. V. BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, ET AL.

G.R. 168406, 14 January 2015
FACTS:
Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union representing the employees

of Club Filipino, Inc. CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc. entered into previous collective
bargaining agreements, the last of which expired on May 31, 2000.
In 2001, CLUFEA staged a strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. For the violation
fo the rule on Notice of strikes, the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal. The NLRC then
denied appeal and reconsideration for lack of merit. Aggrieved, CLUFEA filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted partly the Petition and set aside the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision for being null and void and ordered the payment of full backwages
and benefits to them from the time of their dismissal up to the finality of the CA’s Decision.
Upon acting on Club Filipino Inc.’s Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Supreme Court
sustained the finding the Labor Arbiter gravely abused its discretion and denied Petition in its
Resolution dated 13 July 2009. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with
finality on September 9, 2009. Thereafter, Solis Medina Limpingco and Fajardo entered its
appearance for Club Filipino, Inc. and simultaneously filed a Motion for Leave to file and admit
the attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The SC granted the leave and noted the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. However, because of this court’s Resolution dated
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September 9, 2009, an Entry of Judgment was issued on October 26, 2010, declaring that this case
had become final and executory as of October 26, 2009.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prevented the
Court’s Resolution from being final and executory.
HELD:
No. Club Filipino, Inc.’s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, although was
granted leave to be filed, is in the nature of a second Motion for Reconsideration.
As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution is prohibited pursuant to Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. A second motion
for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons, and only upon
express leave first obtained. The propriety or acceptability of such a second motion for
reconsideration is not contingent upon the averment of "new" grounds to assail the judgment,
i.e., grounds other than those theretofore presented and rejected.
A decision or resolution of this court is deemed final and executory after the lapse of 15
days from the parties’ receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of leave to file
the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that the
Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should the second Motion for Reconsideration be
granted. Thus, this case became final and executory on 26 October 2009.
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE V. SPS. RUNE AN LEA STROEM

G.R. No. 204689, 21 January 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Rune and Lea Stroem (Spouses Stroem) entered into an Owners-Contractor
Agreement with Asis-Leif & Company, Inc. (Asis-Leif) for the construction of a two-storey
house on the lot owned by Spouses Stroem. On November 15, 1999, pursuant to the agreement,
Asis-Leif secured Performance Bond No. LP/G(13)83056 in the amount of ₱4,500,000.00 from
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold). sis-Leif failed to finish the projecton time
despite repeated demands of the Spouses Stroem. Thus, Spouses Stroem filed a Complaint for
breach of contract and for sum of money with a claim for damages against Asis-Leif, Ms.
Cynthia Asis-Leif, and Stronghold.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment in favor of the Spouses Stroem, and
ordered Stronghold to pay the Spouses Stroem ₱4,500,000.00 with 6% legal interest from the
time of first demand. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The appeal of
Stronghold was dismissed by CA.
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Meanwhile, Stronghold filed this Petition before the Supreme Court, pending Spouses
Stroem’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration with the CA. Spouses Stroem argue that
Stronghold deliberately committed forum shopping in filing this petition. Stronghold claims
that it fully disclosed in its Petition that what it sought to be reviewed was the CA’s Decision,
which involves the same issues and parties, but is an entirely different case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner committed forum shopping
HELD:
Yes, There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle
applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations
commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending.
The following are the elements of forum-shopping: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the
two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment rendered in the pending
cases, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other case.
Here, petitioner’s duly authorized officer failed to carry out its duty in the Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping of promptly informing the court of any pending action or proceeding
before this court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. This court cannot
countenance petitioner’s disregard of the rules.
IN THE MATTER OF; SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT
UDK-15143, 21 January 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
perceived hostility of Congress. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress
and the President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.
ISSUE:
Whether Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the petition and
issue a writ of mandamus.
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HELD:
No. The writ of mandamus will issue when the act sought to be performed is ministerial. An
act is ministerial when it does not require the exercise of judgment and the act is performed in
compliance with a legal mandate. In a petition for mandamus, the burden of proof is on
petitioner to show that one is entitled to the performance of a legal right and that respondent
has a corresponding duty to perform the act. Mandamus will not lie "to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law." In this case, petitioner has not shown how he is
entitled to the relief prayed for. Hence, this court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of
judicial review since there is no actual case or controversy.
RICHARD RICALDE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 211002, 21 January 2015
FACTS:
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-
Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and textmate of
XXX, then 10 years old. After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their
house as it was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor. It was
around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the
sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that
Ricalde played with his sexual organ. XXX’s mother then filed a case of rape through sexual
assault against Ricalde.
Ricalde denied the allegations against him. He argues that this masturbation could have
caused an irritation that XXX mistook as penetration. XXX could also have mistaken the
"overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to enter his [anus]. Assuming these acts took place,
these would only be considered as acts of lasciviousness and the court should have applied the
"variance doctrine" and found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may apply the variance doctrine in this case.
HELD:
No. Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the "variance doctrine," as stated:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there

is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
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SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
Moreover, in People v. Sumingwa, the accused was charged with qualified rape but was
convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article
III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to
insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."
Here, XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus." The slightest
penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of
rape. Thus, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial
considering that prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of
rape through sexual assault.
HENRY ONG LAY HIN V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 191972, 26 January 2015
FACTS: Henry Ong Lay Hin (Ong) and Leo Obsioma, Jr. (Obsioma, Jr.) failed to pay
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) a total of P344,752.20, in violation of their
trust receipt agreement with the bank. As such, they were convicted of estafa punished under
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Ong appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA then issued an Entry of Judgment, declaring that the case became final and
executory on 15 May 2003. Upon receipt of the original records of the case, the Decision and
Entry of Judgment issued by the CA, then presiding judge ordered the arrest of Ong. Almost 6
years after, Ong was arrested.
Ong filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with application for
issuance of preliminary and/or mandatory injunction alleging that (a) his counsel never
received a copy of the CA’s Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration; (b) CA Decision
never became final and executory, and (c) the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
Entry of Judgment, and Judge Gabriel Ingles likewise gravely abused his discretion in issuing a
warrant for his arrest and ordering his commitment to the Cebu City Jail.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the entry of judgment
HELD:
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No. Grave abuse of discretion is the "arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law."
The registry return card is the "official . . . record evidencing service by mail." It "carries
the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties that have been regularly
performed [and, therefore,] it is presumed to be accurate, unless proven otherwise. Ong failed
to rebut this presumption. As such, it must be presumed that his former counsel received a copy
of the Resolution on April 29, 2003 as indicated in the registry return card. The 15-day period to
appeal commenced from this date. Since petitioner did not file an Appeal within 15 days from
29 April 2003, the Decision became final and executory on 15 May 2003.
The CA did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Entry of Judgment, which
declared petitioner’s conviction final and executory as of 15 May 2003. Under Rule 51, Section
10 of the Rules of Court on "Judgment," "if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration
is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith
be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry."
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION V. LA SAVOIE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 168616, 28 January 2015
FACTS:
La Savoie Development Corporation (La Savoie) is a domestic corporation engaged in

the business of "real estate development, subdivision and brokering." With the onset of the
Asian financial crisis in 1997, La Savoie found itself unable to pay its obligations to its creditors.
Thus, it filed a "petition for the declaration of state of suspension of payments with approval of
proposed rehabilitation plan"7 under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation. Thereafter, the RTC issued a Stay Order staying the enforcement of all claims
against La Savoie.
Home Guaranty Corporation (“HGC”) filed an Opposition. Even though it was not a
creditor of Petitioner it asserted that it had a "material and beneficial interest in the Petition, in
relation to the interest of Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), Planters Development Bank (PDB),
and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), which are all listed as creditors of Petitioner vis-a-vis
certain properties or assets that might have been taken cognizance of, and placed under the
custody of the RTC and/or the appointed Rehabilitation Receiver.
A Verification Report on Accuracy of Petition was filed by the Rehabilitation Receiver.

Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to La Savoie's Petition for
Rehabilitation and lifting the June 4, 2003 Stay Order. Aggrieved, La Savoie filed an Appeal
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before the Court of Appeals, who reversed and set aside the RTC’s Order and reinstated the
stay order. Aggrieved, HGC filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, La Savoie filed its Comment ascribing the
following procedural infirmities against HGC, claiming that: (a) Atty. Danilo C. Javier, the
officer who signed the Petition's verification and certification of non-forum shopping was not
authorized to do so; and (b) Home Guaranty Corporation engaged in forum shopping.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Atty. Javier was authorized to sign the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping of HGC’s Petition; and
2. Whether HGC engaged in forum shopping.
HELD:
1. Atty. Danilo C. Javier was authorized to sign the verification and certificate of
non-forum shopping on behalf of HGC.
As pointed out by HGC, its board of directors issued Board Resolution No. 30, Series of
2001, "specifically authorizing the President of petitioner to designate the officer to institute the
appropriate legal actions[.]" It was pursuant to this resolution that Atty. Danilo C. Javier, HGC’s
then Officer-in-Charge and Vice President for Legal, was made signatory to the present
Petition's verification and Certification of non-forum shopping.
2. Yes, HGC engaged in forum shopping. As correctly pointed out, as of the time of
the filing of its Comment, another case between HGC and La Savoie, docketed as Civil Case No.
05314, was pending before the Makati City Regional Trial Court.
Forum Shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different
courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or
related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining
a favorable decision or action. It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets. What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who
asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered
by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the
suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for
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determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
Litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the
same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious, while prior judgment or res judicata bars a subsequent case when the following
requisites concur: "(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits;
(4) there is — between the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action."
Here, it is not disputed that there is identity of parties in the present Petition and in Civil
Case No. 05314. As regards the divergence in specific reliefs sought, in Civil Case No. 05314,
HGC asked that La Savoie cease collecting payments and that collected payments be remitted to
it because it supposedly now owns the real estate development projects of La Savoie that form part of the
Asset Pool. In the present Appeal, HGC asks that the properties forming part of the Asset Pool
be excluded from corporate rehabilitation proceedings because it, and no longer La Savoie, is the
owner of these properties. Thus, in both cases, HGC is invoking the same right and is proceeding
from the same cause of action, i.e., its supposed ownership.
ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 204644, 11 February 2015
FACTS:
Rebecca Agbulos (“Agbulos”) is a jeweler. Dorie Cruz-Abadilla (“Abadilla”) and

Agbulos entered into several transactions for the sale of jewelry. In all these transactions,
Angelita Cruz Benito (“Benito”) accompanied Agbulos.
Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla and agreed that Agbulos would return
the pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell them. Agbulos then issued
Abadilla a check for the value of the jewelry received. Agbulos, upon receiving the third batch
of jewelry from Abadilla, issued a check in the amount of Php453,000.00. Agbulos likewise gave
the owner’s copy of the TCT 438259, upon the request of Abadilla.
Upon verification with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the certificate of title
given by Agbulos turned out to be spurious. Abadilla then deposited the checks Agbulos issued
to her, and all were dishonored by reason of "closed account." Abadilla then tried to locate
Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found.
After several months, Abadilla learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned under the
name “Linda Chua”. Upon verification, she learned that the "Linda Chua" who pawned her
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jewelry was Benito. Hence, Agbulos and Benito were charged with estafa punished under
Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
In her Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, Benito prayed that the
Court examine the truth on the her alleged: (a) receipt of the jewelry from Abadilla; and (b)
representation as Linda Chua in pawning said jewelry.
ISSUE:
Whether said factual findings may be raised in Benito’s Petition for Review on Certiorari
HELD:
Yes, considering that the rulings of the RTC and CA are based on a misapprehension of
facts.
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, with the exception that questions of fact may be raised in a
Rule 45 Petition if any of the following is present: (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2)
when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the
Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
A question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts." On the other hand, a question of law exists "when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts."
Here, while Benito raises questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari,
specifically whether she received jewelry from Abadilla and whether she posed as "Linda Chua"
and pawned the jewelry she received from Abadilla, the Court took cognizance of her Petition
as the RTC and CA misapprehended the facts of this case.
ABS-CBN CORPORATION V. GOZON, ET AL.

G.R. No. 195956, 11 March 2015
FACTS:
The controversy arose from GMA-7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino
overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz on 22 July 2004, which was apparently
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footages of ABS-CBN. Assistant Prosecutor Venturanza found probable cause to indict
respondents for copyright infringement. Thereafter, respondents filed for a Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Then, DOJ Secretary Gonzales held that good faith may
be raised as a defense in the case and ruled in favor of the respondents (the “Gonzales
Resolution”). Both parties moved for the reconsideration of the Gonzales Resolution.
Meanwhile, on 19 January 2005, the trial court granted the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed earlier by respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. Perusing the motion,
the court finds that a petition for review was filed with the DOJ on January 5, 2005 as confirmed
by the public prosecutor. Thus, pursuant to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the court be suspended the case for a period of sixty (60) days counted from January
5, 2005.
In 2010, DOJ Secretary Agra issued a resolution reversing the Gonzales Resolution.
Respondents thus assailed the Agra Resolution through the Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the Petition and set aside the Agra Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court properly granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
HELD:
Yes, however, it erred when it failed to resume the proceedings within the designated
period.
Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the
accused’s arraignment in certain circumstances only. In Samson v. Daway, this court
acknowledged the applicability of this rule in a criminal prosecution for infringement under the
Intellectual Property Code. However, this court emphasized the limits of the order of deferment
under the Rule, particularly, while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows,
therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused
or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In this case, the trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes
and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice on 8 March 2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the
temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when it
did not act on the criminal case during the interim period.
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NATIONAL CORPORATION V. SOCORRO T. POSADA, ET AL
G.R. No. 191945, 11 March 2015
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) instituted expropriation proceedings for the
acquisition of a right-of-way easement over parcels of land located in Barangay Marinawa,
Bato,Catanduanes owned by respondents. The RTC of Virac, Catanduanes confirmed the NPC’s
right to expropriate the properties and ordered the creation of a commission to determine the
amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents. The court-appointed commissioners
recommended a fair market value of ₱1,500.00 per square, which NPC opposed. Thus, NPC
filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the RTC
granted. It also served respondents with a Notice to Take Possession stating that "it shall enter
and take possession of the property on September 26, 2005.
Respondents filed a Motion to Lift and/or Suspend the Issuance of the Writ of
Possession, which the trial court denied. Undaunted, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to
Grant Defendants Time to Remove their Houses and Improvements as well as Additional
Deposit for Use in Land Acquisition and Expenses for Transfer of their Respective Residential
Houses, which the RTC granted. The RTC likewise fixed the value of the structures based on the
value determined by the commissioners and ordered the NPC to deposit an additional amount.
NPC failed to make its deposit. The issue on the amount of just compensation was also
submitted for decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court’s determination of just compensation is proper
HELD:
Yes, in accordance with Rule 67, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. Just compensation as
required by the Constitution is different from the provisional value required by Republic Act
No. 8974. The payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While
the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, the just compensation is
based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.
Just compensation, is the final determination of the fair market value of the property. It
has been described as "the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation." Market values, has also been
described in a variety of ways as the "price fixed by the buyer and seller in the open market in
the usual and ordinary course of legal trade and competition; the price and value of the article
established as shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the fair value of
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the property between one who desires to purchase and one who desires to sell; the current
price; the general or ordinary price for which property may be sold in that locality.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

Once the amount of just compensation has been determined, it stands to reason that this is the
amount that must be paid to the landowner as compensation for his or her property.
NICO MACAYAN, JR., Y MALANA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175842, 18 March 2015
FACTS:
Private complainant Annie Jao (“Jao”) is the owner of Lanero Garments. Jao hired Nico
Macayan, Jr., Y Malana (“Macayan”) as a sample cutter, and to undertake materials purchasing.
In 2001, Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family would be harmed and/or kidnapped
if she did not give him Php200,000.00. The following day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to
reiterate his threat and to specify the time and place — February 16, 2001, sometime between
6:00 and 7:00 p.m. at McDonald’s Banawe Branch — in which the 200,000.00 should be handed
to him. Jao claimed that she was sure it was Macayan speaking to her, as the person on the
phone addressed her as "Madam," which was how he customarily called her.
Macayan arrived at the agreed venue at about 9:00 p.m. He saw Angel, Jao’s secretary,
standing outside McDonald’s. He approached Angel, who then accompanied him inside and
led him to a four-seat corner table. He was surprised to see Jao present. Jao then brought out of
her bag a piece of paper indicating that Macayan received the settlement amount for the illegal
dismissal case. Macayan signed this as he was of the understanding that this was necessary to
the settlement. Jao then pulled out a white envelope, handed it to Macayan, and told him to
count its contents. While counting the contents, a flash bulb went on somewhere to his right.
Then, a man who claimed to be an NBI operative struck a blow on the right side of Macayan’s
face and told him, "Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me kaso."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Macayan’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt has been established.
HELD:
No. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies that the requisite
quantum of evidence in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. This rule places upon
the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the strength of its
own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but
similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."
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"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of
course, that an accused must be acquitted
The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court appreciates

evidentiary matters in relation to the requisites of an offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a
fundamentally factual issue.
In this case, however, clues of untruthfulness in the testimony of Annie Uy Jao are
abundant while incentives for fabrication of a story are not wanting. The only way to eliminate
any doubt in Annie Uy Jao’s assertions would have been to find independent confirmation from
the other sources, as by way of unambiguous testimony of a competent and credible witness.
Sadly, no such confirmation could be had as the prosecution’s evidence on the most crucial
elements of the crime was limited to that testified on by Annie Uy Jao.
In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the
accused. Ei incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts - not he who denies - must prove. The
burden must be discharged by the prosecution on the strength of its own evidence, not on the
weakness of that for the defense. Hence, circumstantial evidence that has not been adequately
established, much less corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction. Suspicion alone is
insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
"the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or
compass."
BRACERO V. ARCELO AND THE HEIRS OF VICTORIANO MONISIT

G.R. No. 212496, 18 March 2015
FACTS:
Respondents Heirs of Victoriano Monisit filed a Complaint for Quieting of

Titles/Ownership, Recovery of Possession with Damages against Rodulfo Arcelo (“Rudolfo”)
and Nestor Bracero (“Nestor”) over a 48,632-square-meter parcel of land located in Lubo,
Sogod, Cebu. Respondents claim that Nestor claimed to be Rudolfo’s tenant, who cultivated the
property. Thus, for his failure to cultivate and share the products, respondents sued him. Nestor
filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing prematurity, res judicata, and lack of jurisdiction. The trial
court denied Nestor Bracero’s Motion to Dismiss and also denied reconsideration.
Trial proceeded and on motion by respondents, Nestor was declared in default for his
failure to file an Answer. The period to appeal lapsed, and the trial court issued the writ of
execution, without opposition. Thus, Nestor received the Notice to Vacate on Execution, and on
the same day, his counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution on the ground
that he was not furnished a copy of the RTC’s Decision. He further alleged that even if the
motion for execution indicated that he was furnished a copy, he never received such copy and
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respondents did not present a post office certification to prove they furnished counsel with a
copy
ISSUE:
Whether the receipt of petitioner’s counsel of a copy of the motion for execution
amounts to effective official notice of the RTC’s Decision if he was not furnished a copy thereof.
HELD:
Yes. While notice sent directly to client is not notice in law, this rule nevertheless admits
of exceptions.
In Santiago, this court considered the filing of a motion for reconsideration as actual
notice of the assailed Decision. In Ramos v. Spouses Lim, this court considered Atty. Estaniel’s
receipt of Atty. Datukon’s Manifestation informing the court that he had been formally
substituted by Atty. Estaniel as counsel as "an alerting medium that a final ruling has been
issued by the trial court.
In this case, Nestor’s counsel was furnished a copy of the motion for execution on
September 11, 2009. As discussed by the CA, this motion categorically states that the trial court
rendered its Decision on April 16, 2009, yet petitioner’s counsel filed no opposition. At that
time, he did not file any motion asserting that he was not furnished a copy of the Decision. It
was only on January 8, 2010 when his client informed him of the Writ of Execution did
petitioner’s counsel file an Urgent Motion to Vacate the Writ of Execution on the ground that he
did not receive a copy of the Regional Trial Court Decision. Considering the several
opportunities he had, Nestor failed to argue his position before the courts, as such he shall now
be considered in estoppel from assailing the RTC’s Decision.
DYNAMIC BUILDERS V. HON. RICARDO PRESBITERO, JR., ET AL.

G.R. No. 174202, 7 April 2015
FACTS:
In 2005, the Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, published an invitation to

bid for the construction of a 1,050-lineal-meter rubble concrete seawall along the municipality’s
shoreline, known as the "Construction Shoreline Protection Project." The Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) conducted a pre-bid conference attended by six (6) prospective contractors,
including Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (“Dynamic Builders”). However, only four (4)
bidders were considered during the opening of the bids. On March 27, 2006, the Bids and
Awards Committee issued Resolution No. 6 recommending the award in favor of HLJ
Construction and Enterprise. The BAC, not having received any objection, proceeded with the
issuance of the notice of award, letter of acceptance, signing of contract, and notice to proceed.
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On 5 May 2006, Dynamic Builders request for BAC to be furnished with a copy of all
submitted bid documents and relevant BAC resolutions, but this was denied invoking
confidentiality under Section 2.46 of the LOGOFIND guidelines. Thereafter, Dynamic Builders
lodged a formal protest with the head of the procuring entity, Mayor Ricardo P. Presbitero, Jr.
(“Mayor Presbitero”), to set aside the BAC decision declaring Dynamic Builders’ bid as not
substantially responsive. However, Mayor Presbiterio dismissed the protest. Mayor Presbitero
also denied Dynamic Builders’ Motion for Reconsideration. .
Dynamic Builders submits that Article XVII, Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184
implicitly allowed it to simultaneously file a Petition for Certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court assailing the protest case on the merits, and another Petition before this court for
injunctive remedies. On the other hand, public respondents counter that Dynamic Builders
"grossly violated the rules against splitting a single cause of action, multiplicity of suits, and
forum shopping and availed of an improper remedy in total disregard of the rule on ‘hierarchy
of courts.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner violated the rules against the splitting of a cause of action,
multiplicity of suits, and forum shopping;
2. Whether petitioner violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts; and
3. Whether petitioner resorted to an improper remedy when it filed a petition for
prohibition with this court.
HELD:
1. Yes. Dynamic Builders’ Petition seeks to enjoin the execution of public respondent’s
Decision and Resolution on the protest — the same Decision and Resolution sought to
be set aside in the Petition before the Regional Trial Court. In essence, petitioner seeks
the same relief through two separate Petitions filed before separate courts. This violates
the rule against forum shopping.
In essence, forum shopping is the practice of litigants resorting to two different for a for
the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment. In determining whether forum shopping exists, it is important to consider the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts
and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by
the different courts or for a on the same issues. We have ruled that forum shopping is present
when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action
and reliefs prayed for and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration.
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2. Yes, petitioner violated the hierarchy of courts. The second paragraph of Article XVII,
Section 58 of Republic Act No. 9184 simply means it does not preclude a direct filing
before this court in proper cases.
The Rules of Court provides for original concurrent jurisdiction by the Regional Trial
Court, the Court of Appeals, and this court in entertaining petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus. However, parties must adhere to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Clearly, the
proper recourse to a court action from decisions of the BAC, such as this one, is to file a
certiorari not before the Supreme Court but before the regional trial court which is vested by
R.A. No. 9184 with jurisdiction to entertain the same. Hence, the petitioner violated the doctrine
on hierarchy of courts.
3. Yes, petitioner resorted to an improper remedy when it filed a petition for prohibition
with this court. Prohibition is a preventive remedy. This court has held that injunctive
remedies will not lie for acts already accomplished.
Prohibition is defined as "an extraordinary remedy available to compel any tribunal,

corporation, board, or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions, to desist from further
[proceeding] in an action or matter when the proceedings in such tribunal, corporation, board
or person are without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. It has been
stressed that extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are "prerogative
writs of equity, and it is within the court’s sound discretion whether these writs should be
granted, and it will need to ensure that there is a clear right to the relief.
Here, the acts sought to be enjoined in this case included the implementation of the
Construction Shoreline Protection Project awarded to private respondent HLJ Construction and
Enterprise. The project had already commenced and had been ongoing at the time petitioner
filed this case. Considering that petitioner alleges that this matter is "of extreme urgency,
involving as it does the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law,” it
should have prayed for injunctive relief before the trial court where its Petition for Certiorari via
Rule 65 was pending, together with a bond fixed by the court. Mere allegation or invocation that
constitutionally protected rights were violated will not automatically result in the issuance of
injunctive relief. The plaintiff or the petitioner should discharge the burden to show a clear and
compelling breach of a constitutional provision.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETIITON FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG

SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO
G.R. No. 197597, 8 April 2015
FACTS:
Datukan Malang Salibo (“Salibo”) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for
the Hajj Pilgrimage from 7 November to 19 December 2009. On 3 August 2010, Salibo learned
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that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station (“DHPC”) in Maguindanao suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang, who had a pending warrant of arrest for being one of the 197 accused of 57
counts of murder for allegedly participating in the2009 Maguindanao Massacre.
To clear his name, Salibo presented himself before the police officers of DHPC. He
explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the 23
November 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia. He presented his
passport and other documents to support his claim. However, the police officers apprehended
him and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on 7
November 2009. They then detained Salibo at the DHPC for about three (3) days. He was then
transferred to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was
detained for another 10 days. Then, on August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the
Quezon City Jail.
On 17 September 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) the Urgent Petition
for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty. The
CA issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, and ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail
Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person
of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010. The RTC granted the petition and
Salibo’s immediate release from detention was ordered. On appeal, the CA reversed and set
aside the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC decision on Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus is appealable to the CA
2. Whether Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus
HELD:
1. Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition
filed before this court or any of its members, the CA or any of its members in instances
authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges. The court or judge
grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the writ is then
conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the
writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made
returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of
the designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority to determine the merits of the
petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the
court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
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In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA. The CA
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the
Petition on the merits. The trial court has thus "acquired the power and authority to determine
the merits" of Salibo’s petition. Since the CA is the court with appellate jurisdiction over
decisions of trial courts, respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the CA.
2. Yes. Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
"shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."
"Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly
deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then
has become legal, and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.
In this case however, the police officers had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant. It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the DHPC to
clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner
Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of DHPC, he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense
that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
Salibot was thus deprived of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a
petition for habeas corpus may be issued. Note, however, that in ordering petitioner Salibo's
release, the Court is prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence.
SPS. BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS V. KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171601, 8 April 2015
FACTS:
Lucia Paras (“Lucia”) was a concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at Kabulihan,
Toledo City, while Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation (“Kimwa”) is a
construction firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu. Lucia and
Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates"
(“Agreement”) where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to
Kimwa, who was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at
₱240.00 per truckload.
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When Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates, Lucia, joined by his husband, filed a
complaint for breach of contract against Kimwa, asserting that the Agreement articulated the
parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was
never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras were
barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
ISSUE:
Whether parole evidence may be admitted
HELD:
Yes. Following Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence on the Parol
Evidence Rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed, "forbids any
addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence
purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of
the written contract."
Two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the
existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not
been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be
presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
Truly, Sps. Paras’ Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such as
"mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is
evident that the crux of Sps. Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that the Agreement entered into
was founded on the parties’ supposed understanding that the quantity of aggregates allotted in
favor of Kimwa must be hauled by 15 May 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by
the rechanneling of Lucia Paras’ permitted area. Thus, Sps. Paras’ Complaint sufficiently put in
issue the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to express the parties’ true
intent (and even responded to by Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions
provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SPS. ROBERTO AND TERESITA GENUINO

G.R. No. 208792, 22 July 2015
FACTS:
BPI filed a Complaint for Sum of Money/Judgment on the Deficiency against the
Spouses Genuino. Upon receipt of the latter’s Answer, BPI opted not to file a reply. Thereafter,
the RTC dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of interest to prosecute under Rule 17,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The court also denied reconsideration. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, the Petition for Certiorari filed by BPI.
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ISSUE:
Whether BPI’s failure to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served
and filed warrants an outright dismissal of the Complaint.
HELD:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set
the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17,
failure to comply with the said duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to
prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules. However, A.M.
No. 03-1-09-SC entitled Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges
and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures,
which took effect on August 16, 2004, provides that within five (5) days from date of filing of the
reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If
the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice
of pre-trial.
Reading together A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17, Section 3 and Rule 18,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint upon
plaintiff’s failure to show justifiable reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within the period
provided by the Rules. Thus, in considering the facts of each case, the court allows cases to
proceed despite failure by the plaintiff to promptly move for pre-trial when it finds that "the
extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted":
It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-trial without
any justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might
not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are
special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC upholds this purpose in requiring the Clerk of Court to issue a
notice of pre-trial if the plaintiff fails to file the said motion [to set case for pre-trial] within the
given period. However, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands also has the duty to set the
case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, and to diligently pursue its
case and comply with the rules. Failure to do so without justifiable cause warrants an outright
dismissal of the Complaint.
Between the parties, petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands is in a better position to bear
the costs of a procedural misstep of its own doing as compared with respondents Spouses
Genuino. The bank may have had its reasons to waive payment or the pursuit of its claims. For
instance, it could have weighed that the costs of pursuing its litigation against respondents
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Spouses Genuino outweigh the potential benefits. It could be that their business with the bank
was far more valuable than the incidental rupture in their relationship caused by this
transaction. In all these possible cases, respondents Spouses Genuino and other debtors have a
right to rely on the non-action of the plaintiff. In their view, the non-filing of the basic motion
for setting of pre-trial would have been, at best, a reasonable economic signal that the bank was
no longer interested. At worse, it was clearly negligence of an entity with enough institutional
resources to maintain a large arsenal of in-house and external counsel. The bank’s explanation
for its own negligence is unavailing. While it is true that A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does provide that
the Clerk of Court set the date of pre-trial, plaintiff should not be rewarded for his or her
negligence.
CELSO PASCUAL, SR. V. CANIOGAN CREDIT AND DEVELOPMENT COORPERATIVE,

ET AL.
G.R. No. 172980, 22 July 2015
FACTS: Petitioners Celso F. Pascual, Sr. (Pascual) and Serafin Terencio (Terencio) were
appointed by the former Board of Directors of Caniogan Credit and Development Cooperative
(CCDC) to act as the cooperative's General Manager and Collection Manager, respectively, from
start of operations until they reach the compulsory age of retirement of 65. Despite their
retirement, they both continued to serve CCDC which urged the Board of Directors to issue a
resolution terminating their services and declaring that they should serve only until September
30, 2005 and October 15, 2005, respectively. Despite the lapse of these periods given, Pascual
and Terencio refused to vacate their positions.
Thus, the newly appointed General Manager, filed a Complaint for Injunction with
prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before
the RTC. The Complaint was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute. Finding that the case involves an intra-
corporate dispute, the case was re-raffled to Branch 79. However, Branch 79 returned the case to
Branch 12 ruling that the case is not an intra-corporate dispute, but an intra-cooperative one.
Branch 12 of the RTC then issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss for lack of
merit and deferring action on petitioner’s Very Urgent Motion to lift the temporary restraining
order. Petitioners thus challenged the Order with the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition
for Certiorari. The CA dismissed the Petition since petitioners did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the impugned Regional Trial Court Order.
ISSUES:
1. Whether this case has become moot with the finality of the judgment by default
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing outright Petitioners’ Rule 65 Petition on the
ground of prematurity
HELD:
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1. Yes. An appeal of the outright dismissal of a petition for certiorari against an
interlocutory order of a lower court becomes moot and academic where, during its pendency,
judgment on the merits has been rendered in the main case and has become final and executory.
As such, this case had become moot and academic with the finality of the judgment by
default, rendered on July 20, 2006 permanently enjoining petitioners from assuming the
positions of General Manager and Collection Manager of respondent CCDC and ordered them
to pay it, jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
2. Yes, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before
resort to the special civil action for certiorari is made. This is to afford the court or tribunal the
opportunity to correct its error, if any. An omission to comply with this procedural requirement
justifies a denial of the writ of certiorari applied for.
We find no exceptional circumstance to justify petitioners' omission to file a motion for

reconsideration. Their allegation that the trial court was unable to resolve their many motions
for a long time is belied by the facts on record. Their Motions to Dismiss and to lift the
temporary restraining order were submitted for resolution on January 30, 2006. On March 3,
2006, a little over one month later, the trial court issued its impugned order. To our mind, this
period of time does not constitute undue delay on the part of the trial court in resolving the
motions. Moreover, there is no "extreme necessity and urgency" to excuse their direct resort to
a certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners' Rule 65 Petition.
MONICO LIGTAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200751, 17 August 2015
FACTS:
Monico Ligtas (“Ligtas”) was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). In its Decision, the RTC convicted Ligtas considering that the
defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence. The CA affirmed
the ruling and declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision declaring him as a
bonafide tenant of the land is irrelevant.
Ligtas then diled a Petition for Review on Certiorari arguing that the findings of fact of
both the trial court and Court of Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on
the claim of petitioner as tenant."
ISSUE:
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Whether the issue of tenancy in this case may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
HELD:
Yes. Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this
court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This court has differentiated between a question
of law and question of fact:
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct

application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when
certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken
into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of
reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal."
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is

generally a question of fact. However, to be precise, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a
legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy.
PEDRO MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS V. REYNOSA VALTE

G.R. No. 172961, 7 September 2015
FACTS:
Sometime in 1978, Reynosa Valte (Valte) filed a free patent application dated July 6, 1978
for a 7.2253-hectare parcel of land in San Isidro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. The application listed
Procopio Vallega and Pedro Mendoza (Mendoza) as witnesses who would testify to the truth of
the allegations in Valte's application.
On December 6, 1982, Mendoza and Jose Gonzales (Gonzales) filed a protest against

Valte's application, claiming to be "the lawful owners and possessors since 1930 thru
predecessor-in-interest and who had been in actual uninterrupted, open, peaceful,
exclusive,and adverse possession in the concept of an owner of the above-described property."
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In the proceedings before the Office of the President, Mendoza and Gonzales reiterated
their claim of ownership and possession of the land since 1930 and the nullity of Valte's title for
having been acquired through fraudulent means. Valte countered that her father bought the
land in 1941, and her mother ceded the land to her in 1978. Thereafter, the Office of the
President reversed the DENR’s finding that Mendoza and Gonzales are mere tenants of the
land. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the Office of the President and affirmed the
DENR’s Decision. Aggrieved, Mendoza and Gonzales filed a Petition for Review filed under
Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether this case falls within the exceptions that allow the examination of questions of
fact before this court
HELD:
No. The existence or non-existence of fraud is a legal conclusion based on a finding that
the evidence presented is sufficient to establish facts constituting its elements. Questions of fact
are generally not entertained in a petition for review before this court.
A petition for review filed under Rule 45 may raise only questions of law. The factual
findings by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally
conclusive and binding on the parties and are no longer reviewable unless the case falls under
the recognized exceptions.
The existence or non-existence of fraud in an application for free patent depends on a

finding of fact insofar as the presence of its requirements. As observed by the CA, Mendoza
admitted against his interest when he stated in his Joint Affidavit that respondent "has
continuously occupied and cultivated the land." Petitioners cannot also now raise the factual
issue on land identity since a change of theory on appeal offends due process and fair play.
ALEJANDRO CEPRADO, JR., ET AL V. NATIONWIDE SECURITY

G.R. No. 175198, 23 September 2015
FACTS:
On 16 November 2000, the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor
and Employment - Region IV (Regional Office) conducted a regular inspection of Uniden's
Cabuyao plant pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128(b) of the
Labor Code. Finding that Nationwide Security and Uniden failed to rectify the alleged
violations "despite the ample time given to both respondents, the inspector’s findings were
declared final. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Nationwide Security, Regional
Director Martinez reversed his Order.
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Petitioners then wrote to the Secretary of Labor praying that the Resolution dated May 8,
2002 be set aside. Former Secretary of Labor and Employment Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Secretary
Sto. Tomas) treated the Letter as an appeal and set aside the Regional Director’s Order since
petitioners were not notified of the proceedings subsequent to the issuance of the April 19, 2001
Order. Thus, petitioners were deprived of their right to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether a motion for reconsideration not served on the adverse party tolls the running
of the reglementary period.
HELD:
No. Motions for reconsideration not served on the adverse party do not toll the running
of the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Appeal is a purely statutory privilege that may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. If an appellate
court or tribunal takes cognizance of an appeal that does not comply with the rules, the
appellate court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction. The decision on the appeal is null and void.
Petitioners never denied that they failed to furnish respondent a copy of their Letter-
Appeal to the Secretary of Labor. Moreover, throughout the proceedings, petitioners never
disputed that they merely filed a letter, and they did not avail themselves of the proper appeal
pleading—a memorandum of appeal filed before the DOLE.
Secretary Sto. Tomas, thus, acted without jurisdiction in treating petitioners' Letter as an
appeal. Although the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices
provide that the rules "shall be liberally construed," still, courts and tribunals are "limited by the
legislative will and intent, as expressed in the law itself."
SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION V. CA AND FIRST ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE

G.R. No. 158836, 30 September 2015
FACTS:
Sunrise Garden Corporation (“SGC”) entered into an agreement with the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Antiopolo, and undertook to construct the city road at its own expense, subject
to reimbursement through tax credits. The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and SGC.
When SGC began to position its construction equipment, armed guards allegedly hired
by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. (“HAI”), prevented SGC’s contractor from using an access road to
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move the construction equipment. SGC filed a suit for damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against HAI, which the trial court granted.
Undaunted by the temporary restraining order, HAI continued to block the movement
of the construction equipment. Thus, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, subject to the posting of a bond by SGC. While the Complaint was
pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed city road.
SGC, thus, filed a Motion to amend the Writ of Preliminary Injunction "to include any
and all persons or group of persons from interfering, preventing or obstructing all of
petitioner's contractors, equipment personnel and representatives in proceeding with the
construction of the city road as authorized by Ordinance No. 08-98 of Antipolo City." The trial
court granted the motion and issued an amended writ.
Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly hired by First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. (“FAREDI”), blocked SGC’s contractor's employees and prevented
them from proceeding with the construction. SGC then filed a Motion to cite K-9 Security
Agency in contempt.
K-9 Security Agency, joined by FAREDI opposed the Motion to cite them in contempt,
raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, since they were not bound by the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Is FAREDI bound by the court’s Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction?

HELD:
No, the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it sought to enforce the Amended Writ
of Preliminary Injunction against FAREDI. A person who is not a party in the main action
cannot be the subject of the ancillary writ of preliminary injunction.
Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court requires that the party to be enjoined must be
notified and heard. In this case, petitioners did not refute that FAREDI was never a party to the
case. During the hearings before the Court of Appeals, SGC placed much emphasis on its
argument that FAREDI did not prove ownership over the property but did not refute the
primary issue of lack of jurisdiction. This is an admission that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over FAREDI.
Moreover, SGC’s claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction when
FAREDI voluntarily appeared in court has likewise no merit. While Rule 14, Section 20 of the
Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the
appearance of respondent FAREDI and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a
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voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
MARILOU S. LAUDE V. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE

G.R. No. 217456, 24 November 2015
FACTS:
On 11 October 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude was killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon
Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott
Pemberton (“Pemberton”). Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Roline M. Ginez-
Jabalde (“Judge Jabalde”) on December 19, 2014, and he was then arraigned.
On the same day, Marilou S. Laude (“Laude”) filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and
a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled for hearing on December 22,
2014, at 2 p.m. According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton's
counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also furnished a copy of the
motion personally ... at the hearing of the motion.
Judge Jabalde denied petitioner’s motion, and thereafter, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, for utter lack of merit. Laude then filed this for Petition for Certiorari claiming
that Judge Jabalde gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the Urgent motion,
particularly since the three-day rule on motions is not absolute, and should be liberally
interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances. Likewise, she claims that the
absence of the public prosecutor’s concurrence may be dispensed with for being a mere
superfluity.
ISSUE:
Whether said procedural lapses should be excused.

HELD:
No. The failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the
concurrence of the Public Prosecutor to move for an interlocutory relief in a criminal
prosecution cannot be excused by general exhortations of human rights.
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the
adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to
comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the
adverse party's right to procedural due process.
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While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule
15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon
by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or
her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to
enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the
general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study petitioners'
Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
MELANIE DE OCAMPO V. RPN-9/ RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.

G.R. No. 192947, 9 December 2015
FACTS:
Melanie De Ocampo (“De Ocampo”) was the complainant in a case for illegal dismissal,
unpaid salaries, damages, and attorney's fees against Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN-9)
and several of its officers. In 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision finding De Ocampo
to have been illegally dismissed and ordering the payment of her separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement and full backwages. The NLRC affirmed the Decision.
RPN-9 then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. In the CA’s resolution preventing
the enforcement of the Decision for a period of 60 days. After the lapse of said period, the
Decision became final and executory. Then, upon De Ocampo’s motion, a Writ of Execution was
issued directing the Sheriff to collect from RPN-9 the total amount of P410,826.85. Upon full
satisfaction of the award, De Ocampo sought for the payment of an additional amount of
P518,700.00 representing additional backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay. She also
prayed for an additional amount of P53,188.83, representing 12% interest per annum on the
original monetary award.
ISSUE:
Whether De Ocampo may still seek a recomputation of and an increase in the monetary
award given her.
HELD:
No. As basic as the principle of finality of judgments is the rule that filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has
been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.” Unlike an
appeal, a pending petition for certiorari shall not stay the judgment or order that it assails.
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The 2005 Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, which were
in effect when the material incidents of this case occurred, explicitly and specifically makes this
principle applicable to decisions of labor arbiters and of the National Labor Relations
Commission. Accordingly, where no restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is
issued, the assailed decision lapses into finality. Thereafter, execution may ensue.
The pivotal facts of this case are also settled. After the filing before the Court of Appeals of
RPN-9's Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order
preventing, for a period of 60 days, the National Labor Relations Commission from enforcing its
ruling. However, the sixty-day period lapsed without a writ of preliminary injunction being
subsequently issued by the Court of Appeals. Thus, on May 27, 2006, the ruling of Executive
Labor Arbiter Manansala, as affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission, became
final and executory on May 27, 2006. Conformably, Entry of Judgment was made on July 19,
2006.
DE LIMA V. REYES
G.R. No. 209330, 11 January 2016
FACTS:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and
anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. On 24 January 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot
dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
After a brief chase with police officers, Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an
extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Edrad, Aranas,
Noel, Jr.
On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-

Terrorism Division of the NBI where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Reyes
who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. On February 7, 2011, Secretary Leila De Lima issued
Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct
preliminary investigation. The First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued
the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega's wife,
filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the
mastermind of her husband's murder. The Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710 creating a
new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case and to
address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First Panel. The Second Panel issued the
Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused,
including former Governor Reyes.
ISSUES:
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1. Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the
scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition - NO
2. Whether, under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice may, even without a
pending petition for review, motu proprio order the conduct of a reinvestigation - YES
3. Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul - YES
HELD:
1. The actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of

prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or

ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an
allegation of grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice
may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief
state prosecutor even without a pending petition for review.
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is
within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice

who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
rulings.
3. The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the
respondent's warrant of arrest has already rendered this Petition moot. Once the information is
filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the case or to
determine the accused's guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
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DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 209387, 11 January 2016
FACTS:
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled,

"coming back and forth taking a vessel." Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to
go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It
took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of
the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of
the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she
called the attention of port personnel and baggage inspector Igot. Igot asked Dela Cruz whether
he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot's
manual inspection of the bag. Igot called Port Police Officer Abregana.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures- YES
2. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case- YES
HELD:
1. When Dela Cruz presented his bag for inspection to port personnel, the x-ray
machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine station, there was no
unreasonable search. There is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel.
2. Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done

without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions
protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to
ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security
measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports.
The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the
exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented
warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.
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In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
PEOPLE V. BARON
G.R. No. 213215, 11 January 2016
FACTS:
AAA’s mother testified that AAA sought her permission to play at the day care center,
which was a short distance from their house. At about 1:30 p.m., Baron arrived with AAA, both
of them wet from head to toe. They informed her that they bathed at the seawall. They then
asked her permission to go for a "joy-ride" in Baron’s trisikad. She then noticed that AAA was
missing. AAA’s lifeless body was found at the seawall.
Ruben Baron was charged with and convicted of the crime of rape with homicide by the
trial court. Baron contends that the prosecution has not established his involvement with
certainty. He bewails the prosecution’s reliance on supposedly tenuous circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baron was properly convicted of the crime on the basis of mere
circumstantial evidence.
HELD:
Yes. The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are settled.
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstances; (b) The facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the
trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact or
circumstance of weight and substance.
A multiplicity of circumstances, which were attested to by credible witnesses and duly

established from the evidence, points to no other conclusion than that Baron was responsible for
the rape and killing of the seven-year-old child victim.
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REPUBLIC V. SPOUSES GIMENEZ
G.R. No. 174673, 11 January 2016
Demurrer to Evidence; Classification of Documents
FACTS:
The Republic, through PCGG instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion,

Accounting, Restitution and Damages against Fe and Ignacio Gimenez (Spouses Gimenez)
before the Sandiganbayan. The Complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth allegedly acquired
by them as dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos and Imelda Marcos.
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Spouses Gimenez. The Republic’s
several witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by them.
Spouses Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence, arguing that the
Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause of action.
Sandiganbayan granted Spouses Gimenez’ Motion, ruling that the Republic failed to make a
formal offer of evidence despite the extensions of time given to it. Due to Republic’s failure to
file its Formal Offer of Evidence, the court excluded several of the exhibits it presented
previously. Sandiganbayan considered the Republic to have waived its right to file its Formal
Offer of Evidence. The court noted that the documentary evidence presented by the Republic
consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the persons who certified the documents as
copies of the original were not presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.
ISSUE:
Whether the Demurrer to Evidence should be granted.
HELD:
No. It is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value than to
outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds. In case of doubt, courts should proceed
with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order granting
demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits. The grant of such Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of Demurrer to Evidence was not proper because Sandiganbayan excluded the exhibits
previously presented by the Republic, which should all have been considered in determining
the propriety of the demurrer to evidence.
Correct classification of documents
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may
be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
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a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record
of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a

private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which
some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character
of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court.
DST MOVERS CORP. V. PEOPLE'S GENERAL INSURANCE CORP.

G.R. No. 198627, 13 January 2016
Hearsay Rule
FACTS:
An accident occurred involving a Honda civic driven by Adeline Dela Cruz, a truck
allegedly belonging to DST Movers, and a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Harrison Valdez . It was
alleged that the truck hit the Honda Civic and pushed it forward, thereby hitting the Mitsubishi
Lancer. The driver of the truck then allegedly escaped. An investigation report was prepared by
PO2 Tomas describing the involved Honda civic and Mitsubishi Lancer, their drivers, and
damaged sustained but on the trucks description the driver was stated as unidentified and the
damaged was undetermined. The Honda Civic was covered by PGIC’s insurance and paid its
owner the entire amount of the insurance.
PGIC then filed a complaint for sum of money against DST movers. In its answer DST
Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck, however it claimed that the truck did
not make any trips on the day of the alleged accident. They supported their claims with copies
of invoices and receipts and vouchers relating to repairs and maintenance procedures that were
undertaken on the truck on specific dates which included the date when the accident occurred.
The MTC ruled in favor of PGIC.
DST Movers insisted that its liability was not established by a preponderance of
evidence. Specifically, it faults the MTC for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how its version of
events was supported by nothing more the Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that
reliance on this Report was misplaced as it was supposedly “improperly identified [and]
uncorroborated.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether DST Movers’ liability was established by a preponderance of evidence. - NO
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2. Whether it was an error for the MTC to admit and give evidentiary weight to the Traffic
Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas. - YES
HELD:
While the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as evidence, the
investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had
sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or
through official information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not
presented. The Traffic Accident Investigation Report should not have been admitted and
accorded weight as it was improperly identified and uncorroborated.
Non-presentation in court of PO2 Tomas, the officer who prepared the report, was fatal
to respondent’s cause. The Report should not have been admitted as evidence for violating the
Hearsay Rule.
Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Hearsay Rule. It
renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons who are not
presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated.
REPUBLIC V. MOLDEX REALTY, INC.,

G.R. No. 171041; 10 February 2016
A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue
that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist.
FACTS:
Luis Erce, Rosa Cinense, and Maria Clara Erce Landico applied for the registration of
parcels of land in Alulod, Cavite before the RTC of Naic Cavite. Applicants eventually sold two
lots with a total land area of 40,000 square meters to Moldex Realty, Inc. Applicants were then
substituted by Moldex Realty in the application for registration pending before the RTC. To
prove its title, Moldex Realty, Inc. presented the testimonies of Manaloto and Pio Atis. The RTC
rendered the Decision granting the application. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the Republic of the Philippines appealed the RTC’s Decision before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The OSG then filed a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeal’s
Decision. Subsequently, the Supreme Court received a Manifestation and Motion from Moldex
Realty stating that although it had already been issued a favorable decision by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, it opted to withdraw its application for registration of the
properties in its name. Hence, the case had become moot and academic.
ISSUE:
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Whether the Supreme Court still has jurisdiction to try the case despite respondent’s
withdrawal of its application for land registration.
HELD:
No. Respondent’s withdrawal of its application for registration has rendered the case
moot and academic. A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events,
the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any
justiciable controversy that may be resolved by the court. The Supreme Court refuses to render
advisory opinions and resolve issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts
generally "decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.” The
controversy ended when respondent filed that Manifestation. A ruling on the issue of
respondent’s right to registration would be nothing but an advisory opinion.
It is true that this court does not always refuse to assume jurisdiction over a case that
has been rendered moot and academic by supervening events. Courts assume jurisdiction
over cases otherwise rendered moot and academic when any of the following instances are
present:
(1) Grave constitutional violations;

(2) Exceptional character of the case;
(3) Paramount public interest;
(4) The case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or
(5) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
None of these circumstances are present in this case.
VIVA SHIPPING LINES, INC. V. KEPPEL PHILIPPINES MINING, INC.,

G.R. No. 177382; 17 February 2016
Liberality is an extreme exception, justifiable only when equity exists.
FACTS:
In its Amended Petition, Viva Shipping Lines claimed to own and operate 19 maritime
vessels and Ocean Palace Mall, a shopping mall downtown Lucena City. Shipping Lines also
declared its total properties’. However these allegations were contrary to the attached
documents in the Amended Petition. The RTC found that Viva Shipping Lines’ Amended
Petition to be sufficient in form and substance and issued a stay order. Before the initial
hearing, respondents City of Batangas, Keppel Philippines Marine Inc., and Metrobank filed
their respective comments and oppositions to Viva Shipping Lines’ Amended Petition. In an
Order, the Regional Trial Court lifted the stay order and dismissed Viva Shipping Lines'
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Amended Petition for failure to show the company's viability and the feasibility of
rehabilitation. Viva Shipping Lines filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals. Said Petition for Review was dismissed upon finding that
Viva Shipping Lines failed to comply with procedural requirements under Rule 43.
ISSUE:
Whether the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation mandates a

liberal construction of procedural rules, which must prevail over the strict application of Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
No. The ruling in New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo
City clarifies that an appeal from a final order or decision in corporate rehabilitation
proceedings may be dismissed for being filed under the wrong mode of appeal. The Supreme
Court required therein compliance with the procedural rules in appealing corporate
rehabilitation decisions. It is true that Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the
"rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." However, this provision does not
negate the entire Rules of Court by providing a license to disregard all the other provisions.
Resort to liberal construction must be rational and well-grounded, and its factual bases must be
so clear such that they outweigh the intent or purpose of an apparent reading of the rules.
Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed under Rule 43. First, it did
not implead its creditors as respondents. Instead, petitioner only impleaded the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, contrary to Section 6 (a) of Rule 43. Second, it did not serve a copy
of the Petition on some of its creditors, specifically, its former employees. Finally, it did not
serve a copy of the Petition on the Regional Trial Court.
There are two kinds of "liberality" with respect to the construction of provisions of law.
The first requires ambiguity in the text of the provision and usually pertains to a situation
where there can be two or more viable meanings given the factual context presented by a case.
Liberality here means a presumption or predilection to interpret the text in favor of the cause of
the party requesting for "liberality."
Then there is the "liberality" that actually means a request for the suspension of the
operation of a provision of law, whether substantive or procedural. This liberality requires
equity. There may be some rights that are not recognized in law, and if courts refuse to
recognize these rights, an unfair situation may arise. Specifically, the case may be a situation
that was not contemplated on or was not possible at the time the legal norm was drafted or
promulgated.
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It is in the second sense that petitioner pleads this court. Liberality lies within the
bounded discretion of a court to allow an equitable result when the proven circumstances
require it. Liberality acknowledges a lacuna in the text of a provision of law. This may be
because those who promulgated the rule may not have foreseen the unique circumstances of a
case at bar. Human foresight as laws and rules are prepared is powerful, but not perfect.
Liberality is not an end in itself. Otherwise, it becomes a backdoor disguising the

arbitrariness or despotism of judges and justices. The factual antecedents of a plea for the
exercise of liberality must be clear. There must also be a showing that the factual basis for a plea
for liberality is not one that is due to the negligence or design of the party requesting the
suspension of the rules. Likewise, the basis for claiming an equitable result — for all the parties
— must be clearly and sufficiently pleaded and argued. Courts exercise liberality in line with
their equity jurisdiction; hence, it may only be exercised if it will result in fairness and justice.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. DELOS REYES, JR.

G.R. No. 20897; 22 February 2016
Liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked to justify a flagrant disregard of the rules of
procedure.
FACTS:
Formal administrative charges for dishonesty and gross neglect of duty were filed
against Delos Reyes and Elizabeth Driz for their: (a) deliberate delay in the submission of the
periodic sales report; and (b) the partial remittance of total sales that were made to cover
previous collections and Lottery Operation Assistants turned over lotto proceeds, and lotto
ticket sales reports to Delos Reyes as the Division Chief. Delos Reyes and Driz were then
criminally charged with malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding Delos Reyes
and Driz guilty of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty and ordering their dismissal
from service. Delos Reyes’ partial motion for reconsideration was denied thus he filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of
Appeals granted the petition and reversed and set aside the Office of the Ombudsman’s
decision and resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.
HELD:
No. Liberal application of the rules cannot be invoked to justify a flagrant disregard of
the rules of procedure. Appeals of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of
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Court. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the
Ombudsman that this court will entertain review of the assailed ruling or order. The rules and
jurisprudence require the dismissal of the petition before the Court of Appeals.|
PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. No. 217508, 18 April 2016
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation, Appeal to DOJ
FACTS:
A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police-Olongapo City
Police Office and private respondent Marilou Laude (“Laude”) against petitioner Joseph Scott
Pemberton (“Pemberton”).
The City Prosecutor of Olongapo City found probable cause against Pemberton for the
crime of murder, and on the same day, filed an Information for murder against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest.
On December 18, 2014, Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of
Justice. In the Resolution dated January 27, 2015, Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's
Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on record, there was "no reason to
alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City." Pemberton
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, questioning the validity of Secretary de
Lima’s resolution.
ISSUE:
Can Pemberton question Secretary de Lima’s finding of probable cause?
HELD:
No. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in

any other venue is rendered moot by the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the conduct of
arraignment.
PILIPINAS SHELL FOUNDATION, INC. V. FREDELUCES

G.R. No. 174333, 20 April 2016.
Civil Procedure; Motion to Dismiss, failure to state cause of action
FACTS:
Respondents Fredeluces, et al. (“respondent”) filed a Complaint for damages against

petitioners Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc. (“petitioner”)
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before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City (RTC). Respondents alleged that having
resided in the area even prior to 1998, they were lawful residents of Sitio Agusuhin. They
allegedly constructed their houses and introduced improvements in Sitio Agusuhin, such as
fruit trees and other seasonal plants.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint based on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, among others. Respondents opposed the Motion to Dismiss and prayed for its
denial. In their Opposition, respondents argued that petitioners, in filing their Motion to
Dismiss, hypothetically admitted the factual allegations in their Complaint. Corollarily, the trial
court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations and may only resolve the Motion to
Dismiss based on the facts as alleged in the Complaint. Respondents expressly admitted that
they never owned Sitio Agusuhin. Nevertheless, they contended that they "were peacefully
settled in the area and had introduced improvements" when petitioners "summarily evicted"
them. It is for their "unlawful eviction" from, not ownership of, Sitio Agusuhin for which
Fredeluces, et al. demand payment of damages.
The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state cause of
action. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s ruling, finding that the complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action.
ISSUE:
In a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency to state a cause of action, should a court

only consider the allegations in the complaint?
HELD:
No. When a motion to dismiss is filed, only allegations of ultimate facts are
hypothetically admitted. Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law, as well as
allegations whose falsity is subject to judicial notice, those which are legally impossible,
inadmissible in evidence, or unfounded, are disregarded.
In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, a

defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint." Since
allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are omitted in pleadings, "the
hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the
complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom." However, it is mandatory that courts
"consider other facts within the range of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and
jurisprudence" in resolving motions to dismiss.
There are, however, exceptions to the rule on hypothetical admission. In Dabuco v.
Court of Appeals:
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There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject
to judicial notice, or if such allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts
which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document included in the
pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to the
complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the
parties, or in the course of hearings related to the case.
ROXAS V. REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORP.

G.R. Nos. 208205 & 208212, 1 June 2016.
Civil Procedure; Immutability of Judgment
FACTS:
Republic Real Estate Corporation (“RREC”) entered into an agreement with Pasay City
for the reclamation of the foreshore lands along Manila Bay. The Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) sued for recovery of possession and damages. This case entitled Republic v. Court of
Appeals eventually reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered the Republic to pay
Pasay City and RREC Php10,900,000.00. RREC and Pasay City filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) a Motion for Execution. The RTC issued the Writ of Execution. Sheriff IV Reyner S.
De Jesus (“Sheriff De Jesus”) issued a Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay against the
Republic for P49.1M instead of the P10.9 million ordered by the Supreme Court, to be divided
between RREC and Pasay City. Sheriff De Jesus based his computation on a formula that set the
Philippine peso today at P51.58 for every one (1) peso in 1962, with compounding interests. He
did not attach his source for the alleged real value.
The Republic moved to quash the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Execution and
Notice to Pay, but it was denied by the RTC. The Republic filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari assailing the trial court's Orders. The Court of Appeals granted the
Petition. It ruled that Sheriff De Jesus' Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay cannot go beyond
this Court's judgment in Republic v. Court of Appeals, thus:
The assailed Sheriff's Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay is palpably at

variance with what was embodied in the November 25, 1998 decision of the Supreme
Court. The dispositive portion of the said decision is categorical and unequivocal in its
language that the amount to be paid by [the Republic] to [RREC and Pasay City] is only
Php10,926,071.29, plus interest at 6% per annum from May 1, 1962 until full payment.
Thus, there is no justification for the adjustment of the judgment award to its present day value.
Indubitably, the assailed Sheriff's Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay is null and void
as it does not conform to the tenor of the November 25, 1998 decision which it purports to
implement.
ISSUE:
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Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus'
Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay as null and void.
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals correctly declared the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus'
Notice null and void. Republic v. Court of Appeals has long been final and executory. Pursuant to
the doctrine of res judicata, our ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals is the settled law of this case.
The Supreme Court's decision cannot be amended by the trial court or the sheriff.
Absent an order of remand, we cannot allow attempts to adjust or vary the terms of the
judgment of this Court. Neither the Regional Trial Court nor its sheriff can, in any way, directly
or indirectly, alter this Court's November 25, 1998 Decision through a writ of execution or a
notice purporting to implement the writ. A judgment, once final, is immutable and unalterable.
DIO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 208146, 8 June 2016.
Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash (Rule 117)
FACTS:
Private respondent Timothy Desmond (“Desmond”) is the Chair and Chief Executive
Officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, of which Virginia Dio is Treasurer and Member of
the Board of Directors.
Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel. Dio moved to quash the Informations,
arguing that the "facts charged do not constitute an offense." Initially, the trial court denied
Dio’s motion. Thereafter, the trial court granted Dio's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, for
failure to allege the element of publication in the information.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in quashing the information?
HELD:
No. When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by
amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend the
information. If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court states:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is

based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
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If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment,
or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
In this case, since Dio had not been arraigned yet, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court applies. If the information is defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to
amend it before it may be quashed.
CITY OF TAGUIG V. CITY OF MAKATI

G.R. No. 208393, 15 June 2016
Forum Shopping
FACTS:
Taguig asserted that the areas comprising the Enlisted Men's Barangays, or EMBOs, as
well as the area referred to as Inner Fort in Fort Bonifacio, were within its territory and
jurisdiction. The RTC ruled in favor of Taguig.
Makati filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It assailed RTC's Decision as having been rendered
without jurisdiction and in violation of due process. It claimed that the Decision was rendered
after the judge had retired, and was merely antedated to make it appear that it was rendered
before he retired. At the same time, Makati filed before the RTC its Motion for Reconsideration
Ad Cautelam.
Court of Appeals dismissed Makati's Petition for Annulment of Judgment: (1) for being
functus officio and/or moot; (2) for being premature; and (3) for forum shopping. Court of
Appeals likewise ruled that in filing a Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for Annulment
of Judgment, Makati effectively split a single cause of action and thereby engaged in forum
shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether the City of Makati engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously pursuing a

Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision, and a Motion for Reconsideration of the same
Decision. – YES
HELD:
The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.
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Forum shopping can be committed in several ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is
also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
SANTAMARIA V. CLEARY
G.R. Nos. 197122 &197161, June 15, 2016
Deposition
FACTS:
Cleary, an American citizen with address in California, filed a Complaint for specific
performance and damages before the RTC of Cebu. In his pre-trial brief, Cleary stipulated that
he would testify “in support of the allegations of his complaint, either on the witness stand or
by oral deposition.” Moreover, he expressed his intent in availing himself “of the modes of
discovery under the rules.” Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition. He prayed
that his deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and
be used as his direct testimony.
Petitioners argued that the oral deposition was not intended for discovery purposes if
Cleary deposed himself as plaintiff. Since he elected to file suit in the Philippines, he should
submit himself to the procedures and testify before the RTC of Cebu. They argued that oral
deposition in the United States would prejudice, vex, and oppress petitioners who would need
to incur costs to attend.
The trial court denied Cleary’s Motion. It held that depositions are not meant to be a
substitute for actual testimony in open court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cleary’s Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition be granted.
HELD:
Yes. The deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on
trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony. The taking of
depositions has been allowed as a departure from open-court testimony.
Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after
trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness
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stand. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it;
no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial.
Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of
the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave
of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists.
NAPOLES V. DE LIMA
G.R. No. 213529, 13 July 2016
Probable Cause; Arrest
FACTS:
Arturo Luy, Gertrudes Luy, Arthur Luy, and Annabelle Luy alleged that a family
member, Benhur Luy, had been detained against his will, transferred from place to place in a
bid to cover up the JLN Group of Companies' anomalous transactions involving PDAF.
Secretary of Justice De Lima directed the NBI Special Task Force to investigate the matter. This
led to a “rescue operation” to release Benhur Luy.
Finding no probable cause against Lim and Napoles, Prosecutor Navera recommended
the dismissal of the complaint for serious illegal detention. Prosecutor Navera’s
recommendation was initially approved by Prosecutor General Arellano. However, in the
Review Resolution Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and Chair of the Task Force on Anti-
Kidnapping Theodore M. Villanueva (Prosecutor Villanueva) reversed the Resolution. An
Information for serious illegal detention was thereafter filed against Napoles and Lim.
Recommending no bail for Napoles and Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for their arrest.
ISSUE:
Whether there is grave abuse of discretion in the filing of Information against Napoles.
HELD:
None. A petition for certiorari was not the “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law” because, as discussed, the trial court already acquired jurisdiction over
the case. The proper remedy for Napoles was to proceed to trial and allow the exhaustive
presentation of evidence by the parties.
With the filing of the Information, this Petition has become moot and academic. The trial
court has then acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and the determination of the
accused's guilt or innocence rests within the sole and sound discretion of the trial court. The
determination of probable cause for filing an Information in court and that for issuance of an
arrest warrant are different.
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DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CLARGES REALTY CORP.
G.R. No. 170060, 17 August 2016
Third-Party Complaint
FACTS:
The property was registered under the name of Marinduque Mining. To secure a loan,
Marinduque Mining first mortgaged the property to Caltex second mortgage was constituted
over the property, this time in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). When Marinduque Mining failed to pay its loan obligations,
the DBP and the PNB jointly instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the property.
Caltex foreclosed its mortgage on the property. As second mortgagee, DBP redeemed
the property from Caltex, and the property formed part of the DBP's physical assets. DBP then
offered the property for public sale, where Clarges Realty emerged as the highest bidder. DBP
and Clarges Realty executed a Deed of Absolute Sale for the property. DBP delivered to Clarges
Realty the owner's duplicate copy of TCT. Clarges Realty demanded a clean title, but the DBP
failed to deliver a clean title.
Clarges Realty filed before the RTC of Makati City a Complaint for Specific Performance
and Damages praying that the DBP be ordered to deliver a title to the property free of liens and
encumbrances. Clarges Realty had already rested its case when DBP moved for leave of court to
file a third-party complaint. DBP sought to implead the Asset Privatization Trust as a third-
party defendant and maintained that the Asset Privatization Trust had assumed the "direct and
personal" obligation to pay for Marinduque Mining's tax liability and to have the partially
reduced tax lien cancelled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the third party complaint should be denied?
HELD:
Yes. The admission of a third-party complaint lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court. If leave to file a third-party complaint is denied, then the proper remedy is to file a
separate case, not to insist on the admission of the third-party complaint. There was no grave
abuse of discretion in denying leave to admit the third-party complaint against the Asset
Privatization Trust. The trial court would have wasted time and effort had it admitted the third-
party complaint.
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DPWH V. CITY ADVERTISING VENTURES CORP.
G.R. No. 182944, 9 November 2016
FACTS:
City Advertising Ventures (“CVA”) is a company engaged in the advertising business.
City Advertising Ventures entered into a lease agreement with the MERALCO Financing for the
use of 5,000 of MERALCO lampposts to display advertising banners. Under this contract, CVA
obtained sign permits from city’s Department of Engineering, Office of the Building Official,
Signboard Permit Section. It obtained similar permits from Pasay and Makati. City Advertising
likewise obtained permits for setting up pedestrian overpass banners in Quezon City.
When Typhoon Milenyo hit, several billboards in Metro Manila were blown by strong
winds and fell. Administrative Order No. 160-A was issued, specifying the legal grounds and
procedures for the prohibition and abatement of billboards and signboards constituting public
nuisance or other violations of law. DPWH announced that they would start dismantling
billboards. CVA then filed with the RTC a Complaint for vViolation of Administrative Order
No. 160, Tort, and Injunction with Prayer for injunctive relief. Asserting that Administrative
Order No. 160 pertained specifically to billboards, such as large panels that carry outdoor
advertising, and not to small advertising fixtures such as its signages and banners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not injuction may be granted.
HELD:
Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is issued in order to prevent threatened or

continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard fully. Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated.
Moreover, an urgent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.
Petitioners prevented and threatened to prevent respondent from engaging in its

cardinal business activity. Confronted with acts seemingly tantamount to deprivation of
property without due process of law, the RTC acted well within its competence when it
required petitioners to temporarily desist, pending a more complete and circumspect estimation
of the parties' rights.
CRISPINO V. TANSAY
G.R. No. 184466, 5 December 2016
FACTS:
Anatolia Tansay, now deceased, was twice widowed. In 1947, Anatolia established her
residence in Misamis Occidental. There, she met 20-year old Zenaida Capili who was then
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single. Anatolia took in Zenaida and treated her as her own child. Subsequently, Anatolia and
Zenaida moved to Cebu City, where Anatolia acquired a parcel of land (Lot No. 1048) known as
the Tansay Compound. Anatolia subdivided the compound into three lots. Zenaida eventually
got married to Ben Echaves and had several children, among whom are petitioners Luz
Anatolia E. Crispino and Caridad C. Echaves. By virtue of two deeds of sale, Anatolia allegedly
sold Lot No. 1048- A-1 in favor of Zenaida.
In 1991, Zenaida returned from abroad and discovered that the titles of the lots were
missing from her room. Based on the evidence on record, the trial court found that Zenaida, Luz
Anatolia, and Caridad did not pay any monetary or other valuable consideration for the
transfer of the properties in their names. Hence, the deeds of sale could not have been valid.
RTC rendered a Decision Declaring plaintiff Anatolia as the lawful and rightful owner of
Lot and Ordering the Register of Deeds of Cebu City to cancel said TCT. CA denied the Urgent
Motion to Remand Records of the Case for the Re-Opening of Trial. The appellate court
considered the same as a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence under Rule
53 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the motion to remand was correctly treated as a motion for new trial.
HELD:
No. The CA’s power to receive evidence to resolve factual issues in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction is qualified by its internal rules. In an ordinary appeal, the Court of
Appeals may receive evidence when a motion for new trial is granted based on newly discovered evidence.
Although the CA has the power to receive evidence pursuant to its expanded powers,
this power is not without limit. CA cannot simply accept additional evidence from the parties. If
the interpretation were otherwise, then there would be no end to litigation. Hence, in appeals in
civil cases, CA may only receive evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.
The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does not fall under
the concept of newly discovered evidence. The following criteria must be satisfied for evidence
to be considered newly discovered: (a) the evidence could not have been discovered prior to the
trial in the court below by exercise of due diligence; and (2) it is of such character as would
probably change the result.
The document denominated as Confirmation of Previous Sales was allegedly executed

three years after the RTC rendered its decision. However, the document is not of such character
that would probably change the lower court's judgment.
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HEIRS OF LOYOLA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 188658, 11 January 2017
FACT:
The Heirs of Teodora Loyola (“Heirs”) filed a Complaint for annulment of free patent
and original certificate of title, reconveyance of ownership and possession, and damages
against respondent Alicia Loyola (“Alicia”) over a 4,419-square-meter parcel of land located in
Bataan.
The Regional Trial Court did not rule on the merits. Instead, it dismissed the case
without prejudice for failure to implead an indispensable party. The trial court found that the
successors of one of the heirs, Guillermo Mendoza (Zosimo's deceased brother), were not
impleaded as party-plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeals found that the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that there
was a failure to implead an indispensable party as the heirs of Guillermo Mendoza were not
indispensable parties and judgment could be rendered without impleading them as party-
plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the CA found that the evidence presented by the Heirs was
insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the free patent and original
certificate of title issued to Alicia.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling on the merits of the case and not just on
the issue of dismissal for failure to implead indispensable parties.
HELD:
The CA did not err in ruling on the merits of the case. As a general rule, only matters
assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. Rule 51, Section 8 of the Rules of Court
provides that no error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless
stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and
properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Jurisprudence has likewise established several exceptions to this rule, namely:
(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors
within contemplation of law;
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in
arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest
of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
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(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and
are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties
failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a
question properly assigned, is dependent.
Petitioners' appeal primarily focused on the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the
Complaint for failure to implead an indispensable party. Nonetheless, the CA correctly ruled
on whether petitioners were able to prove their claim. It had the discretion to properly
consider this separate issue in order to arrive at a complete resolution of the case.
Ordinarily, this case should have been remanded to the Regional Trial Court to make
the proper factual determination. However, due to judicial economy, or "the goal to have
cases prosecuted with the least cost to the parties," the Court of Appeals correctly reviewed
the case in its entire context.
Please see also: Oriental Assurance Corporation v. Ong, G.R. No. 189524, 11 October 2017.
ATTY. ROQUE, JR. V. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF

G.R. No. 214986, 5 February 2017.
FACTS:
On 11 October 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude, 26-year old Filipino, was allegedly killed at
a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton. After
nearly a month since the killing, police had not been able to obtain Pemberton’s latent
fingerprints and oral swabs, because he was confined by his superiors on a ship and placed
under their custody. Pemberton was eventually transferred from his ship to a facility in the
headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. However, Philippine authorities
maintained that until a case was filed against Pemberton, custody over him remained with the
United States of America.
On 22 October 2014, news broke out that Pemberton had been flown into Camp
Aguinaldo, where a detention facility had been constructed for him, in the premises of the
Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board. Thus, petitioner, together with his clients,
the family of the slain Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude, and German national Marc Sueselbeck, went to
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to demand to see Pemberton.
Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced their way inside the premises
of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board and gained entry despite having been
instructed by Military Police personnel not to enter the compound, and even though the gates
were closed. Respondents allege that the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having been
subject of various national television, radio, internet, and print media publications.
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In response to the events of 22 October 2014, respondents released a press statement that
they were considering filing disbarment proceedings against petitioner. Thus, on November 4
2014, respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner, before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. On the same day, respondent Cabunoc called a conference at Camp Aguinaldo,
and publicly announced that a disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted
from, by media. Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section
18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Further, petitioner claims that respondents' acts put to
question his professional and personal reputation.
Respondents argue that the press statements are not among the contumacious acts
prescribed under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The subject of the disbarment case
pertains to a serious breach of security of a military zone. The statements were official
statements made in the performance of a public function to address a public concern. The filing
of the disbarment case was not meant to malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response
to the events that transpired at Camp Aguinaldo. Respondents also claim the issue is a matter of
public interest, which is a defense in contempt proceedings such as this. With the Laude
Murder case being of public concern, petitioner has attained the status of a public figure,
susceptible of public comment in connection with his actions on the case. In any case,
respondents instituted the disbarment complaint against petitioner in good faith. They are
laymen, and are not familiar with the confidentiality rule.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a violation of the confidentiality rule constitutes contempt of court;

2. Whether respondents' public pronouncements violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court;
3. Whether respondents may raise public interest as a defense; and
4. Whether respondents may be punished for contempt.
HELD:
1. No. The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or
promote the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to
declare as contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality rule, we apply a restrictive
interpretation. The Supreme Court declined to exercise its contempt power under the conditions
of this case.
Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents'

supposed public threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents' public
statement that they had filed a disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings
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against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep private and confidential. Respondents' threats were
made before November 4, 2014, and there was no proceeding to keep private.
As for the Press Statement made on November 4, 2014, a close examination reveals that
it does not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt. The Press Statement
declared only three (3) things: first, respondent AFP filed a disbarment complaint against
petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself according to the
standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is prohibited by the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Press Statement's coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished
report that a complaint had been filed. Such an announcement does not, in and of itself, violate
the confidentiality rule, particularly considering that it did not discuss the disbarment
complaint itself.
In any case, the Press Statement does not divulge any acts or character traits on the part
of petitioner that would damage his personal and professional reputation. Although the Press
Statement mentioned that a disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner, no
particulars were given about the content of the complaint or the actual charges filed.
2. Yes. Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality

rule as laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The canons of the profession
tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character
and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
The confidentiality rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment

proceedings as a tool to damage a lawyer's reputation in the public sphere. Thus, the general
rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment proceedings may be punished with contempt.
3. Yes. The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is

not to be applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. As a general
principle, speech on matters of public interest should not be restricted. This Court recognizes
the fundamental right to information, which is essential to allow the citizenry to form intelligent
opinions and hold people accountable for their actions. Accordingly, matters of public interest
should not be censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict application of the confidentiality
rule. Thus, in Palad v. Solis, this Court dismissed claims that the confidentiality rule had been
violated, considering that the lawyer therein represented a matter of public interest
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The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept
private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept private and
confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual disbarment complaints to
the press. However, the rule does not extend so far that it covers the mere existence or
pendency of disciplinary actions.
4. No. In Cabansag v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court was asked to review a charge of

contempt, which was based on a remark in a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action
Commission. In said case, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of freedom of speech
and press, and reversed the contempt charges, considering that the allegedly contumacious
letter did not undermine or cause any serious imminent threat to the fair administration of
justice. The Supreme Court also noted that the intent behind sending the letter was not to
degrade the courts. Given these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that citing respondents
in contempt would be an unreasonable exercise of its contempt power.
MAZA VS HON. EVELYN A. TURLA

G.R. No. 187094. 15 February 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners Maza, Ocampo, Casiño, and Mariano are former members of the House of
Representatives. Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were
allegedly responsible for the death of Bayudang, Peralta, and Felipe. His findings show that the
named individuals conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of
AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN). Bayudang and Felipe were AKBAYAN community
organizers, whereas Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN
supporter. Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted and
that an Information for each count of murder be filed against the 19 individuals. The panel
found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito Bayudang and Jimmy Peralta, and for
kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against the nineteen 19 suspects.
However, the panel considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores Sinohin, as a state witness. The
panel recommended that the corresponding Informations be filed against the remaining
suspects. On the same day, two (2) Informations for murder were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an Information for
kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (the “Guimba case”). Judge Turla
REMANDED the case to the prosecutor. On 18 July 2008, Judge Turla issued an Order on the
Palayan cases and held "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
was not followed in the Palayan cases" There is no dispute that the two (2) Informations for
murder were filed without first affording the movants their right to file a motion for
reconsideration. Judge Turla added that her order of remanding the Palayan cases back to the
provincial prosecutors "for a complete preliminary investigation is not a manifestation of
ignorance of law or a willful abdication of a duty imposed by law ... but due, to the peculiar
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circumstances obtaining in [the cases] and not just 'passing the buck' to the panel of
prosecutors[
Petitioner filed a certiorari to the SC, praying that the Orders of Judge Turla be set aside
and annulled and that the murder cases against them be dismissed for failure to show probable
cause. Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors
had no basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules.
ISSUES:
Whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion when she remanded the
Palayan cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary investigation.
HELD:
The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another
preliminary investigation is improper. Petitioners assert that the documents submitted along
with the Informations are sufficient for Judge Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If
she finds the evidence inadequate, she may order the prosecutors to present additional
evidence. Thus, according to petitioners, Judge Turla's action in remanding the case to the
prosecutors for further preliminary investigation lacks legal basis.
A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court
judge has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show
probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt on
the existence of probable cause. The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based
on her or his personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The
determination of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function. Regardless of
Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it was incumbent
upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused after a personal
evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the supporting documents. She could even disregard
the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the prosecutors to submit additional
evidence. There was no option for her to remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for
another preliminary investigation. In doing so, she acted without any legal basis.
BIADO V. BRAWNER-CUALING
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, 15 February 2017.
An issue of jurisdiction is a judicial matter, which can only be decided upon through judicial
remedies. A party's recourse, if prejudiced by a judge's orders in the course of a trial, is with the proper
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reviewing court and not with the Office of the Court Administrator, through an administrative
complaint.
FACTS:
In their Joint Complaint Affidavit dated September 11, 2015 filed before the Office of the
Court Administrator, petitioners (complainants) stated that they were the defendants in Civil
Case No. 302 entitled Heirs of Cariño Sioco v. Dominador Biado et. al. filed before the 5th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Tuba-Sablan, Benguet, over which Judge Marietta S. Brawner-Cualing
(respondent judge) presided.
On December 9, 2011, respondent judge issued a Decision in favor of the Heirs of Cariño
Sioco, and holding that all the elements of unlawful detainer were present in the case. She
directed the complainants to vacate the disputed lot and to "turn over the possession to the
plaintiffs." She also ordered them to pay monthly rental fees to the heirs until they vacated the
premises.
Complainants appealed before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet.

However, their appeal was dismissed due to their "failure to appear and participate in it." Since
there was no further appeal made, respondent judge's decision became final and executory.
On December 14, 2012, through motion of the prevailing party, respondent Judge issued
an Order granting the Heirs of Cariño Sioco's Motion for Execution. Similarly, she issued a Writ
for Execution ordering the sheriff to cause the immediate implementation of the Decision.
Complainants opposed the assailed decision and Writ of Execution, and claimed that
respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case. They insisted that the disputed property
was not within the jurisdiction of Tuba-Sablan, Benguet but within Pangasinan.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through a Report dated 28 June 2016,
recommended the dismissal of this case for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not OCA’s recommendation should be affirmed.
HELD:
Yes. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge
deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available. It must be stressed
that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot
be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous,
provided he acts in good faith.
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In this case, it is apparent that the assailed orders relate to respondent judge's acts in her
judicial capacity. These alleged errors, therefore, cannot be the proper subject of an
administrative proceeding, but is only correctible through judicial remedies. Hence, what
complainants should have done was to appeal the assailed orders to the higher court for review
and not to file an administrative complaint against respondent judge.
It is to be emphasized that the complainants initially filed a Petition for Annulment of

Judgment before the Court of Appeals relative to the assailed orders. As correctly observed by
the Office of the Court Administrator, this act showed complainants' recognition that the issues
they were raising against respondent judge required judicial determination. An issue of
jurisdiction is a judicial matter, which can only be decided upon through judicial remedies. A
party's recourse, if prejudiced by a judge's orders in the course of a trial, is with the proper
reviewing court and not with the Office of the Court Administrator, through an administrative
complaint.
GATMAYTAN V. DOLOR
G.R. No. 198120, 20 February 2017.
When a party's counsel serves a notice of change in address upon a court, and the court acknowledges this
change, service of papers, processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's former address is ineffectual. Service is
deemed completed only when made at the updated address. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of when
service was made is distinct from the burden of proving the allegation of where service was or was not made.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, praying that the assailed
24 March, 2011 Decision and 9 August 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) be
reversed and set aside and that the CA be directed to resolve petitioner Mercedes S.
Gatmaytan's (Gatmaytan) appeal on the merits.
In its assailed 24 March 2011 Decision, the CA dismissed Gatmaytan's appeal, noting
that the assailed 27 March 2006 Decision of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 223, had already
attained finality as Gatmaytan filed her Motion for Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15-day
period. The RTC’s Decision resolved an action for reconveyance against Gatmaytan and in favor
of the plaintiff spouses, now respondents Francisco and Hermogena Dolor.
While petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's Decision, there is a
dispute as to the date from which the 15-day period for the filing thereof must be reckoned.
That is, there is a dispute as to when petitioner was given notice of the Decision.
ISSUE:
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Whether the RTC's Decision has already attained finality, thus, precluding the filing of
petitioner Mercedes S. Gatmaytan's appeal with the CA.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative, denying the instant petition. In
accordance with Rule 36, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, unless a motion for reconsideration is
timely filed, the judgment or final order from which it arose shall become final. In turn, Rule 37,
Section 1, in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, allows for 15 days from notice of
a judgment or final order within which a Motion for Reconsideration may be filed.
Reckoning the date when a party is deemed to have been given notice of the judgment
or final order subject of his or her Motion for Reconsideration depends on the manner by which
the judgment of final order was served upon the party himself or herself. When, however, a
party is represented and has appeared by counsel, service shall, as a rule, be made upon his or
her counsel pursuant to Rule 13, Section 2 of the Rules.
We sustain petitioner's position that the service made on her counsel's former address
was ineffectual. We find however, that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proving the
specific date - allegedly 1 June 2006 - in which service upon her counsel's updated address was
actually made. Having failed to establish the reckoning point of the period for filing her Motion
for Reconsideration, we cannot sustain the conclusion that petitioner insists on, and which is
merely contingent on this reckoning point: we cannot conclude that her Motion for
Reconsideration was timely filed. Having failed to discharge her burden of proof, we are
constrained to deny her Petition.
In Cortes v. Valdellon, this Court noted the following as acceptable proofs of mailing and
service by a court to a party: (1) certifications from the official Post Office record book and/or
delivery book; (2) the actual page of the postal delivery book showing the acknowledgment of
receipt; (3) registry receipt; and (4) return card. Petitioner could have produced any of these
documents or other similar proof to establish her claim. She did not. All she has relied on is her
bare allegation that delivery was made on June 1, 2006.
VALDERRAMA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 220054, 27 March 2017
FACTS:
Four (4) Informations for grave oral defamation against Deogracia M. Valderrama
(Valderrama) were filed pursuant to a complaint filed by Josephine ABL Vigden (“Vigden”).
Vigden was present but the private prosecutor was absent despite notice. On motion of the
defense, the Metropolitan Trial Court considered the prosecution to have waived its right to
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present further evidence and required a formal offer of its documentary evidence within five
(5) days.
The prosecution failed to formally offer its evidence within five (5) days from the
hearing. Vigden filed a Very Urgent Motion to Reconsider (“Motion to Reconsider”)
explaining that the private prosecutor failed to appear because he had to manage his high
blood pressure.
Valderrama filed an opposition arguing that the public prosecutor did not give his
conformity to Vigden's Motion to Reconsider, in violation of Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court, and the Motion to Reconsider's Notice of Hearing "was defective because it was not
addressed to the parties, and did not specify the date and time of the hearing." She further
argued that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period allowed for motions for
reconsideration. She likewise pointed out that there was no medical certificate attached to the
Motion to Reconsider to prove the private prosecutor's sickness. Finally, she contended that
the eight (8)-year delay in the prosecution of the cases violated Valderrama's right to speedy
trial. The Metropolitan Trial Court granted Vigden's Motion to Reconsider and set the
continuation of the prosecution's presentation of further evidence for the last time.
ISSUE:
Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the Motion to Reconsider to allow the prosecution to continue its presentation of evidence.
HELD:
Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
Motion to Reconsider to allow the prosecution to continue its presentation of evidence. The
public prosecutor's conformity to the Motion to Reconsider is necessary under Rule 110,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The required conformity of the public prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was
necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private party does not have the legal personality to
prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the People of the Philippines who are the real
party in interest. The criminal case must be under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. Thus, when the public prosecutor does not give his or her conformity to the
pleading of a party, the party does not have the required legal personality to pursue the case.
In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This circumstance was
not denied by the private respondent. Private respondent merely claimed that the the Office of
the City Prosecutor did not object to the filing of the Motion to Reconsider. The Office of the
City Prosecutor was only furnished with a copy of the Motion to Reconsider and it opens with
the phrase "[p]rivate complaining witness, through counsel and the Office of the City
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Prosecutor of Quezon City, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states . . ." This is not
sufficient. Since the Motion to Reconsider pertains to the presentation of the prosecution's
evidence, it involves the criminal aspect of the case and, thus, cannot be considered without
the public prosecutor's conforme.
The Supreme Court also noted that the Motion to Reconsider was filed outside the
period allowed by the rules as set in Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. Since Vigden's
Motion to Reconsider was laden with procedural defects, the Metropolitan Trial Court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of juridiction. Thus, its orders
should be declared void.
GUILLERMO V. PHILIPPINE INFORMATION AGENCY

G.R. No. 223751, 15 March 2017
FACTS:
Miguel "Lucky" Guillermo (Guillermo) and AV Manila Creative Production, Co. (AV
Manila) filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages before the Regional Trial Court.
Guillermo and AV Manila alleged that in the last few months of the Administration of Former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo Administration), then Acting Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways Victor Domingo (Acting Secretary Domingo),
consulted and discussed with Guillermo and AV Manila the urgent need for an advocacy
campaign (Campaign). The purpose of the Campaign was to counteract the public's negative
perception of the performance of the outgoing Arroyo Administration.
After all the deliverables had been delivered, petitioners followed up on the payment
from the Philippine Information Agency. Despite several demands, no payments were made.
Petitioners said that they made demands through letters dated August 19, September
20, and October 12, 2010, to various officials of the Philippine Information Agency, under the
Administration of Former President Benigno Aquino III. However, respondents refused and
failed to pay the amount of Php25,000,000.00.
The Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Regional Trial Court of
Marikina granted the Office of the Solicitor General's Motion to Dismiss, Court of Appeals
affirmed the Regional Trial Court Order dismissing petitioners' Complaint. The Court of
Appeals found that the Complaint sought to enforce a legal right based on a contract.
ISSUE:
Whether the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
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HELD:
Yes, the Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. To
determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in
the complaint should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted. To
sufficiently state a cause of action, the Complaint should have alleged facts showing that the
trial court could grant its prayer based on the strength of its factual allegations.
To support the foregoing prayer, the Complaint attempted to lay down the elements of
a contract between the petitioners on one hand, and respondents on the other. Thus, it alleged
a series of communications, meetings, and memoranda, all tending to show that petitioners
agreed to complete and deliver the "Joyride" project, and that respondents agreed to pay
₱25,000,000.00 as consideration.
Assuming that the Complaint's factual allegations are true, they are not sufficient to
establish that the Regional Trial Court could grant its prayer.
The Complaint attempts to establish a contract that involves expenditure of public

funds. As pointed out by respondents, contracts involving the expenditure of public funds
have additional requisites to be valid, which are: (a) appropriation before entering into
contract; and (b) certificate showing appropriation to meet contract.
The Complaint, however, completely ignored the foregoing requisites for the validity
of contracts involving expenditure of public funds. Thus, the Regional Trial Court could not
order the enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis of the Complaint, and the
Complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action for resolving a motion to dismiss, a

court must determine, hypothetically admitting the factual allegations in a complaint, whether
it can grant the prayer in the complaint.
PAVLOW V. MENDENILLA
G.R. No. 181489, 19 April 2017
FACTS:
Steven R. Pavlow, an American citizen and President of Quality Long Term Care of
Nevada, Inc., married Maria Sheila (“Shiela”), a Filipino, in civil rites in Quezon City. Barely
three (3) months into their marriage, on May 31, 2005, Sheila filed a Complaint-Affidavit against
Pavlow for slight physical injuries. On June 3, 2005, Sheila filed an Amended Complaint-
Affidavit to include maltreatment in relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground. The
complaint was dismissed.
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Following this, on August 26, 2015, Shiela’s mother, Cherry L. Mendenilla (“Cherry”) filed
with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court a Petition for Maria Sheila's benefit, praying for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order or Permanent Protection Order under the Anti-
VAWC Law.
ISSUES:
a. Whether Cherry had personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order
under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law for the benefit of her daughter, Sheila;
b. Second, whether Cherry engaged in forum shopping by filing a petition for the issuance
of a protection order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law was
dismissed by the prosecutor; and
c. Finally, whether summons was properly served on petitioner Pavlow and jurisdiction
over his person was validly acquired.
HELD:
The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly
given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the
Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9
to file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself.
Nevertheless, in this case, Cherry filed her petition after her daughter's complaint-affidavit
had already been dismissed.
The filing of Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her own
petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the
level of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial proceeding that leads to the
issuance of a protection order. Thus, the pendency and subsequent dismissal of Sheila's
Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of either litis pendentia or res judicata, which
would serve the basis of a finding of forum shopping by her mother.
Summons by substituted service was also sufficient. This case pertains to alleged acts of
violence against a woman. Pavlow was alleged to have physically and psychologically
assaulted his wife, Sheila, on multiple occasions. Sheila was noted to have had to be confined in
a medical facility on account of petitioner's assaults. Sheila's mother found herself having to
intervene to protect her daughter. The totality of these entails an urgency which, by statute,
justifies the issuance of a temporary protection order even as the respondent to Cherry’s
petition was yet to be heard. This is an urgency, which the Regional Trial Court actually found
to be attendant as it did, in fact, issue a temporary protection order.
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Time was of the essence. The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes
and how, by the convenience of petitioner Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal
service was rendered impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons
upon Pavlow during his temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable
age and discretion, who also resided at his own residence. Jurisdiction over his person was then
validly acquired, and the dismissal of respondent Cherry’s petition on this score was correctly
held to be unwarranted.
MAHINAY V. DURA TIRE & RUBBER INDUSTRIES, INC.

G.R. No. 194152, 5 June 2017.
The period to redeem a property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not extendible. A
pending action to annul the foreclosure sale does not toll the running of the one (1) year period of
redemption under Act No. 3135.
FACTS:
The subject property, with an area of 3,616 square meters and located in Barrio Kiot,
Cebu City, was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 111078 under the name of
A&A Swiss International Commercial, Inc. (A&A Swiss). The property was mortgaged to Dura
Tire and Rubber Industries, Inc. (Dura Tire), a corporation engaged in the supply of raw
materials for tire processing and recapping, as security for credit purchases to be made by Move
Overland Venture and Exploring, Inc. (Move Overland). Under the mortgage agreement, Dura
Tire was given the express authority to extrajudicially foreclose the property should Move
Overland fail to pay its credit purchases.
On 5 June 1992, A&A Swiss sold the property to Mahinay for the sum of ₱540,000.00. In
the Deed of Absolute Sale, Mahinay acknowledged that the property had been previously
mortgaged by A&A Swiss to Dura Tire, holding himself liable for any claims that Dura Tire
may have against Move Overland.
For Move Overland's failure to pay its credit purchases, Dura Tire applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the property on January 6, 1995. Despite the protest, Sheriff Romeo
Laurel (Sheriff Laurel) proceeded with the sale and issued a Certificate of Sale in favor of Dura
Tire, the highest bidder at the sale. The property was purchased at ₱950,000.00, and the
Certificate of Sale was registered on February 20, 1995.
On 23 March 1995, Mahinay filed a Complaint for specific performance and annulment
of auction sale before the RTC of Cebu City. Mahinay having acquired the property from A&A
Swiss before Dura Tire foreclosed the property, the trial court ruled that Mahinay became a
"successor-in-interest" to the property even before the foreclosure sale. Therefore, by operation
of law, Mahinay was legally entitled to redeem the property. However, considering that one (1)
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year period of redemption had already lapsed, Mahinay could no longer exercise his right of
redemption.
ISSUE:
Whether the one (1)-year period of redemption was tolled when Mahinay filed his
Complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Contrary to Mahinay's claim, his right to
redeem the mortgaged property did not arise from the Court of Appeals' "judicial declaration"
that he was a "substitute mortgagor" of A&A Swiss. By force of law, specifically, Section 6 of Act
No. 3135, Mahinay's right to redeem arose when the mortgaged property was extrajudicially
foreclosed and sold at public auction. There is no dispute that Mahinay had a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage. Consequently, he had the right to buy it back from the
purchaser at the sale, Dura Tire in this case, "from and at any time within the term of one year
from and after the date of the sale." The "date of the sale" referred to in Section 6 is the date the
certificate of sale is registered with the Register of Deeds. This is because the sale of registered
land does not '"take effect as a conveyance, or bind the land' until it is registered."
The right of redemption being statutory, the mortgagor may compel the purchaser to
sell back the property within the one (1) year period under Act No. 3135. If the purchaser
refuses to sell back the property, the mortgagor may tender payment to the Sheriff who
conducted the foreclosure sale. Here, Mahinay should have tendered payment to Sheriff Laurel
instead of insisting on directly paying Move Overland's unpaid credit purchases to Dura Tire.
The right of redemption must be exercised in accordance with the mode prescribed by
the statute." The one (1)-year period of redemption is fixed, hence, non-extendible, to "avoid
prolonged economic uncertainty over the ownership of the thing sold." Since the period of
redemption is fixed, it cannot be tolled or interrupted by the filing of cases to annul the
foreclosure sale or to enforce the right of redemption.
SPOUSES ABOITIZ AND CABARRUS V. SPOUSES PO

G.R. No. 208450, 5 June 2017
FACTS:
Mariano Seno executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his son, Ciriaco Seno
(“Ciriaco”), which Ciriaco sold the two (2) lots to Victoria Po (“Victoria”). The parties
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Mariano died and was survived by his five (5) children (the
“Mariano Heirs”). In 1990, Peter Po (“Peter”) discovered that Ciriaco had executed a quitclaim
dated 7 August 1989, renouncing his interest over Lot No. 2807 in favor of petitioner Roberto
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Aboitiz (“Roberto”). In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was "the declared owner of Lot
Nos. 2835 and 2807.
The Spouses Po confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and the Spouses Po
executed a Memorandum of Agreement in which Ciriaco agreed to pay Peter the difference
between the amount paid by the Spouses Po as consideration for the entire property and the
value of the land the Spouses Po were left with after the quitclaim. However, Lot No. 2835
was also sold to Roberto. The Mariano Heirs, including Ciriaco, executed separate deeds of
absolute sale in favor of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto immediately developed the lot as part of
a subdivision called North Town Homes.
Roberto filed an application for original registration of Lot No. 2835 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Mandaue City, acting as land registration court. The case was raffled to
Branch 28 and docketed as LRC Case No. N-208.
In its Decision dated 28 October, 1993, the RTC granted the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-887 in the name of Roberto. The lot was immediately subdivided
with portions sold to Ernesto and Jose.
The Spouses Po filed a complaint to recover the land and to declare nullity of title with
damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Po. The Spouses Aboitiz appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 31, 2012, partially
affirmed the trial court decision, declaring the Spouses Po as the rightful owner of the land.
The Spouses Aboitiz thus filed their Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 208450. They argue that the Decision of Branch 55, Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City
granting the complaint of the Spouses Po is void for lack of jurisdiction over the matter. They
claim that a branch of the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to nullify a final and
executory decision of a co-equal branch, and it is the Court of Appeals which has the
jurisdiction to do so. They likewise assert that the Spouses Po's cause of action has prescribed,
which allegedly accrued when the Deed of Absolute Sale between the Spouses Po and Ciriaco
was executed on May 5, 1978. The Spouses Aboitiz further insist that "estoppel and laches
have already set in." They claim that they have been "in open, public, continuous,
uninterrupted, peaceful[,] and adverse possession" in the concept of owners over the property
for "46 years as of 1993," without the Spouses Po acting on the Deed of Absolute Sale. They
posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po is "clearly fake and
fraudulent" as evidenced by certifications of its non-existence in the notarial books and the
Spouses Po's failure to enforce their rights over the property until 18 years later. Lastly, they
contend that the Mariano Heirs should have been impleaded in the action as they are
indispensable parties.
ISSUES:
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a. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Spouses Po's complaint;
b. Whether the action is barred by prescription,
c. Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply;
d. Whether the land registration court's finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the
property in trust for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case; and
e. Whether the Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are
indispensable parties.
HELD:
The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case. A complaint for
reconveyance is an action which admits the registration of title of another party but claims
that such registration was erroneous or wrongful. It seeks the transfer of the title to the
rightful and legal owner, or to the party who has a superior right over it, without prejudice to
innocent purchasers in good faith. It seeks the transfer of a title issued in a valid proceeding.
The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic fraud-fraud committed on the
true owner instead of fraud committed on the procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Except for actions falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving "title to, or
possession of, real property." An action for reconveyance and annulment of title is an action
involving the title to real property.
The complaint of the Spouses Po asserted that they were the true owners of the parcel
of land which was registered in the name of the Spouses Aboitiz. They alleged that they
acquired the property from Ciriaco, who acquired it from Mariano. They claimed that the
Spouses Aboitiz had the property registered without their knowledge and through fraud.
Thus, they sought to recover the property and to cancel the title of the Spouses Aboitiz. The
complaint of the Spouses Po is clearly an action for reconveyance and annulment of title.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
While the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to annul judgments of the regional trial
courts, the case at bar is not for the annulment of judgment. It is for reconveyance and the
annulment of title. As stated, a complaint for reconveyance is a remedy where the plaintiff
argues for an order for the defendant to transfer its title issued in a proceeding not otherwise
invalid. The relief prayed for may be granted on the basis of intrinsic rather than extrinsic
fraud; that is, fraud committed on the real owner rather than fraud committed on the
procedure amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
An action for annulment of title, on the other hand, questions the validity of the grant
of title on grounds which amount to lack of due process of law. The remedy is premised in the
nullity of the procedure and thus the invalidity of the title that is issued. Title that is
invalidated as a result of a successful action for annulment against the decision of a Regional
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Trial Court acting as a land registration court may still however be granted on the merits in
another proceeding not infected by lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud if its legal basis on
the merits is properly alleged and proven.
Considering the Spouses Aboitiz's fraudulent registration without the Spouses Po's
knowledge and the latter's assertion of their ownership of the land, their right to recover the
property and to cancel the Spouses Aboitiz's title, the action is for reconveyance and
annulment of title and not for annulment of judgment.
The Spouses Po's action has not prescribed. An action for reconveyance prescribes in
10 years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property." The basis for this is Section
53, par. 392 of P.D. No. 1529, in relation to Articles 1456 and 1144(2) of the Civil Code. Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring a property through fraud becomes an
implied trustee of the property's true and lawful owner.
An implied trust is based on equity and is either (i) a constructive trust, or (ii) a
resulting trust. A resulting trust is created by implication of law and is presumed as intended
by the parties. Article 1144 of the Civil Code states that the prescriptive period to enforce this
trust is 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to question the
contract which allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to the property. What is put on
issue in an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is the ownership of the property
and its registration. It does not question any fraudulent contract. Should that be the case, the
applicable provisions are Articles 1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code. Thus, an action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the time of the issuance of
the Torrens title over the property.
Considering that the Spouses Po's complaint was filed on November 19, 1996, less than
three (3) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property on April 6, 1994, it is
well within the 10-year prescriptive period imposed on an action for reconveyance.
The Spouses Po are not barred by laches. There is laches when a party was negligent or
has failed "to assert a right within a reasonable time," thus giving rise to the presumption that
he or she has abandoned it. Laches has set in when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow
the party to assert the right.
The elements of laches are: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he
claims, gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after
knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant had no
knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.
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There is no showing that the Spouses Po abandoned their right to the property. The
factual findings reveal that the Spouses Po had their rights over the property registered in the
assessor's office. They testified that they introduced improvements by cultivating fruit trees
after they purchased the lots. When the Spouses Po discovered that Ciriaco executed a
quitclaim renouncing his interest over Lot No. 2807 in favor of Roberto, the Spouses Po
executed a Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco to protect their interest in Lot No. 2835.
The RTC’s Decision in LRC Case No. N-208 cannot be binding in this action for
reconveyance. The Spouses Aboitiz insist that there is already a finding by the Regional Trial
Court in LRC Case No. N-208 that Ciriaco merely held the property "in trust for the [Mariano
Heirs]." Thus, Ciriaco could not have validly sold the property to the Spouses Po. They claim
that these findings are binding on the whole world because land registration proceedings are
actions in rem.
In Racoma v. Fortich, the Supreme Court held that res judicata could not be a defense in
an action for reconveyance based on fraud where the complainant had no knowledge of the
application for registration. The reason for this rule is to prevent the unjust deprivation of
rights over real property.
In this case, the Spouses Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They
contend that they were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and prove
their claim over the property. Aside from several tax receipts, the Spouses Po formally offered
as evidence, among others, the Deed of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco's favor, the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their favor, and the Tax Declaration under Victoria's
name. Additionally, they also submitted their Memorandum of Agreement with Ciriaco and
the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the Spouses Aboitiz. These documents were not
considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in favor of the Spouses
Aboitiz. The Spouses Po also offered the Application of Original Registration of Title of the
Spouses Aboitiz to prove that the Spouses Aboitiz only submitted to the land registration
court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration of the Spouses
Po.
Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the
Spouses Po the remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows them to
prove their ownership over the property. Hence, they are not precluded from presenting
evidence that is contrary to the findings in the land registration case.
The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. An indispensable party is the party
whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that "the action cannot be finally
determined" without him or her because his or her interests in the matter and in the relief "are
so bound up with that of the other parties."
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The property owners against whom the action for reconveyance is filed are
indispensable parties. No relief can be had, and the court cannot render a valid judgment,
without them. The property has been sold to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel. Thus, they
are indispensable parties.
However, the seller of the property is not an indispensable party. The Mariano Heirs,
as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties. They are at best necessary
parties, which are covered by Rule 3, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. Necessary parties may be
joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but the case may go on without them
because a judgment may be rendered without any effect on their rights and interests.
The Mariano Heirs may likewise be considered material witnesses to the action. A
material matter to which a witness can testify on can be a "main fact which was the subject of
the inquiry" or any circumstance or fact "which tends to prove" the fact subject of the inquiry,
"which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to such inquiry," and "which
legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies."
VERIDIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200370, 7 June 2017
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, a concerned citizen called the police radio operator of
the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing them that a certain alias "Baho," who was later
identified as Mario Veridiano (“Veridiano”), was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain
illegal drugs.
A checkpoint was set up and the police officers thereat personally knew Veridiano. At
around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San
Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The
police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to
be marijuana." POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano
was arrested and then brought to the police station.The contents of the tea bag tested positive
for marijuana.
The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of illegal possession of marijuana. CA affirmed Veridiano’s guilt.
ISSUES:
a. Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;
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b. Whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and
c. Whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.
HELD:
There was no valid warrantless arrest or valid warrantless search. In this case,
petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law
enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers
relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime
has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any
fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested
has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a
warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement
in "stop and frisk" searches. Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting
"stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search
cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine
reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that
criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all,
cannot produce a reasonable search. Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney
who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that
he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any check
point. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that
would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.
Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as

consent to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the
waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence. Consent to a warrantless search
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and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress
or coercion."
The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the

circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was
given such as "the presence of coercive police procedures." Mere passive conformity or silence
to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all.
The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the
tea bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the
exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence
to support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.
CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. V. HON. OMELIO

G.R. No. 189102, 7 June 2017
FACTS:
In 1993, thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries instituted

class suits for damages in the United States against 11 foreign corporations, such as Shell Oil
Company. The banana plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP) in the 1970s up to the 1990s while working in plantations that
utilized it. The United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non
conveniens and directed the claimants to file actions in their respective home countries.
1,843 Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages against the same foreign
corporations before the Regional Trial Court in Panabo City, Davao del Norte, Philippines.
Before pre-trial, Chiquita Brands, Inc., Chiquita Brands International, Inc.

(collectively, Chiquita), Dow Chemical Company (Dow), Occidental Chemical Corporation
(Occidental), Shell Oil Company (Shell), Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., and Del Monte
Tropical Fruit Co. (collectively, Del Monte) entered into a worldwide settlement in the United
States with all the banana plantation workers. The Compromise Agreement provided, among
others, that the settlement amount should be deposited in an escrow account, which should be
administered by a mediator. The Regional Trial Court, Panabo City approved the
Compromise Agreement by way of judgment on compromise.
Shortly after the dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-45, several claimants moved for the
execution of the judgment on compromise. Chiquita, Dow, Occidental, Shell, and Del Monte
opposed the execution on the ground of mootness. They argued that they had already
complied with their obligation under the Compromise Agreement by depositing the
settlement amounts into an escrow account, which was administered by the designated
mediator, Mr. M.A. "Mickey" Mills (Mr. Mills).
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The Regional Trial Court issued an Amended Writ of Execution. The RTC also
imposed solidary liability on all the subsidiaries, affiliates, controlled and related entities,
successors, and assigns of Dow, Shell, Occidental, Chiquita, and Del Monte. Accordingly, the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City issued the Alias Writ of Execution125 on August 12, 2009.
On August 26, 2009, Chiquita instituted before the Supreme Court a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
HELD:
The doctrine on hierarchy of courts prohibits "parties from directly resorting to the
Supreme Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts." This rule is founded
upon judicial economy and practical considerations. On the one hand, it allows the Supreme
Court to devote its time and attention to those matters falling within its exclusive jurisdiction.
It also "prevent[s] the congestion of th[is] Court's dockets." On the other hand, it "ensure[s]
that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient
manner." The doctrine on hierarchy of courts was designed to promote order and efficiency.
Generally, the Supreme Court will dismiss petitions that are directly filed before it if
relief can be obtained from the lower courts. Trial courts and the Court of Appeals are "in the
best position to deal with causes in the first instance." They not only resolve questions of law
but also determine facts based on the evidence presented before them.
Nevertheless, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction may be

justified "when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition." Immediate
resort to the Supreme Court may be warranted:
1. when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed

immediately;
2. when the case involves transcendental importance;
3. when the case is novel;
4. when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Supreme Court;
5. when time is of the essence;
6. when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
7. when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;
8. when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice;
9. when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
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10. when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that: “We may take cognizance of this case ‘in the
interest of judicial economy and efficiency.’ The records of this case are sufficient for this
Court to decide on the issues raised by the parties. Any further delay would unduly prejudice
the parties.”
CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 210266, 7 June 2017.
No evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and pre-marked during trial.
This provision, however, allows for an exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown.
FACTS:
Cruz was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 8484, otherwise
known as the “Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998.” According to the prosecution, on 18 April
2006, at around 7:30 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase 2 bottles of Calvin Klein perfume
worth US$96.00 from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall. Danilo Wong (Wong), the cashier at the
Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card. The
transaction was approved, although Wong doubted the validity of the credit card since the
number at the back was not aligned.
At around 8:00 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes worth
US$363.00. Ana Margarita Lim (Lim), the cashier on duty, facilitated the sales transaction. Cruz
paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos," with
credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping card,
Cruz presented a shopping card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another
identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the name "Gerry Santos."
Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit card for approval. The
card was approved, but she noticed that the last 4 digits of the card were not properly embossed
and its validity date started in November 2006. She called Citibank to verify the credit card.
Upon verification, Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and that the real
Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk Management Division. Lim was advised to
transfer the matter to the Security Department.
After the prosecution formally offered their evidence, Cruz filed a Demurrer to Evidence
asserting that the credit card was inadmissible since it was presented and offered by the
prosecution in violation of A.M. No. 03-1- 09-SC as it was not marked during pre-trial.
On 6 August 2009, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and stated that the
credit card receipts were properly identified by the witnesses. The trial court also stated that the
alleged counterfeit credit card was offered in evidence by the prosecution.
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On 5 May 2010, the trial court rendered its Judgment finding Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 8484 in Criminal Case Nos. 06-
04 79 and 06-0480, when he used a counterfeit access device to purchase a pair of shoes worth
US$363.00. However, it acquitted Cruz in Criminal Case No. 06-0481 upon finding that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of using a counterfeit access
device to purchase 2 bottles of perfume worth US$96.00.
Cruz appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed Cruz's conviction. Cruz’s motion
for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed Cruz’ conviction.The rule is that no evidence shall be
allowed during trial if it was not identified and pre-marked during trial. This provision,
however, allows for an exception: when allowed by the court for good cause shown. There is no
hard and fast rule to determine what may constitute "good cause," though this Court has
previously defined it as any substantial reason "that affords a legal excuse."
The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to be presented at trial even if
not previously marked during pre-trial. Here, the trial court allowed the presentation of the
counterfeit credit card at trial due to the prosecution's explanation that during pre-trial, the
counterfeit credit card was still in the Criminal Investigation and Detective Group's custody
The prosecution was able to present and mark during pre-trial Citibank's certification
that the access device used was counterfeit. It is this certification that makes the possession and
use of the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial court determined that the access device could
still be presented at trial since it merely formed part of an· exhibit that had already been
presented and marked during pre-trial.
CASCAYAN V. SPOUSES GUMALLAOI

G.R. No. 211947, 3 July 2017
FACTS:
The Spouses Gumallaoi built a residential house on Lot No. 20029. Renovations and
improvements were made on said residential house. Subsequently, the Cascayan Heirs
claimed that the renovations made on Lot No. 20029 encroached upon their own Lot No.
20028. The Spouses Gumallaoi ignored the notifications that they had encroached into Lot No.
20028. Thus, the Cascayan Heirs filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession, Demolition, and
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Damages against the Spouses Gumallaoi before the Regional Trial Court and prayed that the
Spouses Gumallaoi be directed to vacate Lot No. 20028, and restore it to their possession.
They likewise prayed that the municipal engineer of Bangui issue the necessary demolition
permit as well as cause the demolition of the portion of the house that encroached on Lot No.
20028.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision declaring the Spouses Gumallaoi the
legal owners of Lot No. 20028. It ruled that petitioners did not prove that they or their
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of it. Conversely, noting that the bigger portion
of the Spouses Gumallaoi's residence had been constructed on this land, the RTC found that it
was more likely that the residence was intended to be constructed on Lot No. 20028. The
Regional Trial Court found inconsistencies between the claims of the Cascayan Heirs and the
evidence they presented in support of their free patent application. It concluded that OCT No.
P-78399 had been secured through fraud, without legal and proper basis, and hence,
disregarded it.
The Cascayan Heirs appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA
denied the petition and affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision. Quoting the RTC, the
Court of Appeals found that the evidence proved that the Cascayan Heirs obtained their title
through fraud and misrepresentation. Additionally, it ruled that the Spouses Gumallaoi
proved their title as well as the identity of the land pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals properly appreciated the evidence presented by the
parties and whether the Supreme Court may review the same.
HELD:
Petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall pertain only to questions of law.
Thus, as a general rule, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind the Supreme Court.
However, the issues in this case require the Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals'
appreciation of evidence.
The CA determined, based on the evidence presented, that petitioners obtained their
title to Lot No. 20028 through fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners asked the Supreme
Court to reverse the CA’s determination, insisting that regardless of any impropriety in the
filing of an application for a free patent, they have proven that they owned Lot No. 20028.
They assert that they have established that Lot No. 20028 had long been owned by Cayetano
since 1925fba and that they have possessed it since time immemorial, whereas none of the
evidence shows that respondents ever owned it. Petitioners also insist that the affidavits of
waiver should not have been given weight by the Court of Appeals, considering that
affidavits retracting the affidavits of waiver have been submitted to it.
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These issues require the Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals' appreciation
of evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the evidence did not sufficiently prove
petitioners' claims of possession or ownership over Lot No. 20028.
The Court of Appeals' appreciation of the evidence on the possession of Lot No. 20028
and the weight to be given to the parties' Tax Declarations and affidavits, which is consistent
with the Regional Trial Court findings, is binding on the Supreme Court and there is no
cogent reason to review it.
CRUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 224974, 3 July 2017
FACTS:
Marvin Cruz (“Cruz”) was charged with Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and by a
Band for unlawfully taking 4 sacks filled with scraps of bronze metal and a copper pipe worth
Php72,000.00 collectively. Cruz posted bail through a cash bond in the amount of Php12,000.00.
The case was dismissed after the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which was granted by Branch 170, Regional Trial Court, Malabon.
Through his bondsman, Cruz filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond. The RTC denied the
Motion on the ground that the case was dismissed through desistance and not through
acquittal. Cruz filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the Motion to Release Cash Bond.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition, stating that Cruz
should have filed an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari, to question the denial of their
Motion to Release Cash Bond. The Court of Appeals further stated that it could not treat the
Petition for Certiorari as an appeal since the period for appeal had lapsed before its filing.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the
wrong remedy to question the denial of a motion to release cash bond.
HELD:
The CA was wrong in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy.
It is true that the writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been
committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and
tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no
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appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to correct the error.
Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal.
However, non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor
General asserts, a mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion. When a
court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is
to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court. A
party may still file a petition for certiorari in instances where the lower court commits grave
abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction.
The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not always result in the immediate
release of the bail bond to the accused. A cash bond, unlike a corporate surety or a property
bond, may be applied to fines and other costs determined by the court. The excess shall be
returned to the accused or to the person who deposited the money on the accused's behalf.
There was no fine imposed on Cruz. The Order does not specify any costs of court that
he must answer for. There was, thus, no lien on the bond that could prevent its immediate
release. Considering these circumstances, petitioners could not have been faulted for filing a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals since there was no legal basis for the Regional
Trial Court to deny their Motion to Release Cash Bond.
PEOPLE V. ESCOBAR
G.R. No. 214300, 26 July 2017
FACTS:
Manuel Escobar (“Escobar”) was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary
Grace Cheng-Rosagas, daughter of Filipino-Chinese businessman Robert G. Cheng (“Cheng”),
and two (2) other victims. Cheng was the owner of Uratex Foam, Philippines, a manufacturing
company of foams and mattresses.
After his arrest, Escobar filed a petition for bail before the Regional Trial Court, which was
denied. Pending the final judgment on the merits of the case, he subsequently filed a second
petition for bail.
ISSUE:
Whether Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata.
HELD:
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Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not
recognized in criminal proceedings. Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with
finality the dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Marcelo
declares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in
civil law and "has no bearing on criminal proceedings." Indeed, while certain provisions of the
Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in
nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument
of the prosecution in this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy,
the same will still not apply. Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his
express consent. Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar
has not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.
Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar’s
Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.
See also: Escobar v. People, G.R. No. 205576, 20 November 2017.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. PRICE RICHARDSON CORP.

G.R. No. 197032, 26 July 2017.
Courts may pass upon the prosecutor's determination of probable cause only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
Respondent Price Richardson Corporation (Price Richardson) is a Philippine corporation

whose primary purpose is "to provide administrative services which includes but is not limited
to furnishing all necessary and incidental clerical, bookkeeping, mailing and billing services."
On 17 October 2001, its former employee, Michelle S. Avelino (Avelino), executed a

sworn affidavit at the National Bureau of Investigation's Interpol Division, alleging that Price
Richardson was "engaged in boiler room operations, wherein the company sells non-existent
stocks to investors using high pressure sales tactics." Whenever this activity was discovered, the
company would close and emerge under a new company name.
On 4 December 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) its complaint against Price Richardson, including its incorporators
and directors. In defense, the incorporators and directors denied knowing or agreeing to the
offenses charged.
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On 13 March 2002, State Prosecutor Aristotle M. Reyes (SP Reyes) issued a Resolution,
dismissing the SEC's complaint "for lack of probable cause." After its motion for reconsideration
was denied, the SEC filed with the DOJ a Petition for Review, which was denied by then DOJ
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez (Secretary Gonzalez). The reconsideration of the same was likewise
denied.
The SEC filed with the Court of Appeals its Petition for Certiorari against Secretary
Gonzalez, Price Richardson, Velarde-Albert, and Resnick. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
DOJ’s assailed Resolutions.
ISSUE:
Whether the courts may pass upon the prosecutor's determination of probable cause.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that courts may pass upon the prosecutor's determination
of probable cause only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion. It has long been established
that the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is an executive function,
which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor and the justice
secretary. However, if the public prosecutor erred in its determination of probable cause, an
appeal can be made before the DOJ Secretary. Simultaneously, the accused may move for the
suspension of proceedings until resolution of the appeal.
Upon filing of the information before the court, judicial determination of probable cause
is initiated. The court shall make a personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its
supporting evidence. Unlike the executive determination of probable cause, the purpose of
judicial determination of probable cause is "to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused." This determination is independent of the prosecutor's
determination of probable cause and is a function of courts for purposes of issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Accordingly, a judge may immediately dismiss the case if he or she finds that
there is no probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest based on the records.
Thus, the general rule is that the determination of probable cause is an executive
function which courts cannot pass upon. As an exception, courts may interfere with the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause only when there is grave abuse of discretion.
A prosecutor gravely abuses his or her discretion in not finding probable cause by
disregarding or overlooking evidence that "are sufficient to form a reasonable ground to believe
that the crime ... was committed and that the respondent was its author." In this case, grave
abuse of discretion exists, which warrants this Court's interference in the conduct of the
executive determination of probable cause.
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GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC. V. SOLID BANK CORPORATION
G.R. No. 209452, 26 July 2017
FACTS:
Gotesco Properties, Inc. (“Gotesco”) obtained from Solidbank a term loan of ₱300
million through its President, Mr. Jose Go (Mr. Go). Gotesco mortgaged several parcels of
land in favor of Solidbank.
Solidbank found that there was a deficiency in the collateral, which Gotesco had to
address, and required Gotesco to replace or add to the mortgaged properties. Gotesco found it
unnecessary to address the alleged deficiency in the collateral. It insisted that the aggregate
sound value of the mortgaged properties had not changed and was still at
Phpl,076,905,000.00. Solidbank sent a demand letter dated June 7, 2000 to Gotesco as the loan
became due. Despite having received this demand letter, Gotesco failed to pay the
outstanding obligation. Solidbank then filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the
lot. The public auction was held and Solidbank was declared the winning bidder.
Gotesco filed a complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure Proceedings, Specific

Performance, and Damages against Solidbank, Atty. Mangiliman, and the Register of Deeds of
San Fernando, Pampanga. Solidbank filed an Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed Gotesco's complaint for the annulment of the
foreclosure proceeding and granted the Writ of Possession in Solidbank's favor. CA affirmed
the Decision.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the respondent validly foreclosed the property and complied with the
requisites of Act No. 3135; and
b. Whether the Writ of Possession was properly issued.
HELD:
Respondent was within his rights in foreclosing the property. Petitioner defaulted in
its obligation twice. First, when it failed to pay the loan according to the terms of the
promissory note. Second, when it failed to provide the additional collateral demanded by
respondent.Thus, respondent was within its rights to foreclose the property.
However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, that there was no perfected
restructuring agreement between the parties. As respondent points out, the theory that the
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loan was restructured is hinged on the 24 January 2000 letter from petitioner. However, this
letter which allegedly proposed the restructuring of petitioner's obligation was not offered in
evidence. Under the rules, the Supreme Court cannot consider any evidence not formally
offered.
When respondent asked to have the mortgaged properties replaced, it was requiring
petitioner to comply with its obligation to sustain the loan's security at an appropriate level.
Clearly, petitioner defaulted when it refused to heed respondent's demand for additional
collateral, as expressed in the 9 February 2000 letter. This gave respondent enough reason to
foreclose the property.
The return card submitted by respondent proves that the demand letter was received
by petitioner. The Supreme Court is inclined to give more evidentiary weight to documentary
evidence as opposed to a testimony which can be easily fabricated. In any case, the question of
whether the letter was received is a factual matter better left to the lower courts. Since the
factual findings of appellate courts are conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court when
supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court sees no reason to disturb the findings
of the Court of Appeals.
The foreclosure proceeding was valid for compliance with the requisites therewith.
Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the Notice of Sale be a) physically posted in
three (3) public places and b) be published once a week for at least three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the city where the property is situated.
Petitioner claims that since the foreclosed property was located in Pampanga, the
publication of the Notice of Sale in Remate was not valid. Petitioner suggests that the Notice
of Sale could only be published in a newspaper printed in the city where the property was
located. Petitioner is mistaken. If notices are only published in newspapers printed in the city
where the property is located, even newspapers that are circulated nationwide will be
disqualified from announcing auction sales outside their city of publication. This runs
contrary to the spirit of the law which is to attain wide enough publicity so all parties
interested in acquiring the property can be informed of the upcoming sale.
The crucial factor is not where the newspaper is printed but whether the newspaper is
being circulated in the city where the property is located. Markedly, what the law requires is
the publication of the Notice of Sale in a "newspaper of general circulation.”
Verily, there is clear emphasis on the audience reached by the paper; the place of
printing is not even considered.
As to the alleged defect with the posting requirement, petitioner argues that the
Notice of Sale was posted less than the required 20 days. Records show that petitioner only
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raised this argument in the Petition for Review submitted before the Supreme Court. The
alleged defect was not raised before the lower courts. The Notice of Sale was posted for 16
days, only four (4) days less than what the law requires.
The object of a Notice of Sale in an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding is to inform the

public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold and the time, place, and terms of
the auction sale. Mistakes or omissions that do not impede this objective will not invalidate
the Notice of Sale.
As the winning bidder, respondent is entitled to the Writ of Possession. The Supreme
Court in China Banking Corp. v. Spouses Lozada discussed that when the foreclosed property is
in the possession of a third party, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser
ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. However, for this exception to
apply, the property must be held by the third party adversely to the mortgagor.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that this case does not fall under the exception.
Since it is the petitioner, and not a third party, who is occupying the property, the issuance of
the Writ of Possession is ministerial.
There is also no merit to petitioner's argument that the Writ of Possession should not
be issued while the complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure proceeding is still
pending. Fernandez v. Spouses Espinoza already ruled that a pending case assailing the validity
of the foreclosure proceeding is immaterial.
PEOPLE V. PO3 JULIETO BORJA

G.R. No. 199710, 2 August 2017
FACTS:
Ronalyn Manatad (“Ronalyn”) was walking with her friend in Quezon City when a man
who was later identified as PO3 Julieto Borja (“Borja”), grabbed Ronalyn by her right forearm
and forcibly took her inside a gray van where three (3) other men were waiting. PO3 Borja and
his companions drove the van around Quezon City.They contacted Ronalyn’s relatives to
demand the ransom of Php100,000.00. PO3 Borja was arrested trying to obtain the ransom
money.
The Regional Trial Court found PO3 Borja guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom. The CA affirmed the Decision.
ISSUES:
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a. Whether accused-appellant PO3 Julieto Borja can be guilty of crime of kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, despite invoking his membership in the
Philippine National Police; and
b. Whether accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping under

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
No, accused-appellant's membership in the Philippine National Police does not

automatically preclude the filing of an information for kidnapping or serious illegal detention
against him. He may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if it is shown
that he committed acts unrelated to the functions of his office. The burden is on the accused to
prove that he or she acted in furtherance of his or her official functions.
Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the
fact that the accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an
information for kidnapping against him. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is "the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it." The
deprivation of a person's liberty can be committed in different ways. It is not always necessary
that the victim be imprisoned. The element of the crime of kidnapping is met as long as there is
a showing that the victim's liberty of movement is restricted.
Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty. She was forcibly taken inside a vehicle by
accused-appellant and his cohorts and was driven around Quezon City for at least 5 hours.
ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. KEIHIN-EVERETT FORWARDING

COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 191937, 9 August 2017
FACTS:
Orient Freight International, Inc. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 with the Supreme Court. Keihin-Everett filed its Comment thereon, arguing that the
petition does not contain the names of the parties in violation of Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure to state the names of the parties in this Petition for Review, in
accordance with Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, is a fatal defect.
HELD:
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The petition does not violate Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court for failing to state
the names of the parties in the body. The names of the parties are readily discernable from the
caption of the petition, clearly showing the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse
party as the respondent. The Court of Appeals had also been erroneously impleaded in the
petition. However, the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, et al. ruled that
inappropriately impleading the lower court as respondent does not automatically mean the
dismissal of the appeal. This is a mere formal defect.
POWER GENERATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NPC V. NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 187420, 9 August 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to permanently enjoin the implementation of the
Operation and Maintenance Agreement (the “Agreement”) jointly executed by National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
(PSALM), and to declare this Agreement void for being contrary to EPIRA.
Petitioners filed this Petition directly with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 78 of
the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) to enjoin the implementation of the
Operation and Maintenance Agreement.
ISSUES:
a. Whether petitioners may file a Petition for Injunction under Section 78 of EPIRA to
question the validity of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement between
respondents PSALM and NAPOCOR; and
b. Whether petitioners may question the validity of the Operation and Maintenance
Agreement despite not being one (1) of the contracting parties.
HELD:
The Operation and Maintenance Agreement is a contract that preserves the

implementation of EPIRA. Thus, it is covered by Section 78, which states that no restraint or
injunction whether permanent or temporary, could be issued by any court except by the
Supreme Court.
However, in Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court invalidated the

second paragraph of Republic Act No. 6770, Section 14 for being unconstitutional. The
assailed provision prohibited any court, except the Supreme Court Court, to enjoin
investigations of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court explained in Carpio-Morales that
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provisional remedies found in the Rules of Court are within the Supreme Court’s
constitutional prerogative to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure.
Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, all courts have the inherent power to issue
temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction. When Congress passes a law
that prohibits other courts from exercising this power, it encroaches upon the Supreme
Court’s power to promulgate rules of procedure, in violation of the separation of powers.
However, Carpio-Morales dealt only with temporary restraining orders, not

permanent injunctions. The injunction contemplated in EPIRA is not a mere interlocutory
action by a court but a permanent remedy. Thus, Section 78 of EPIRA can still apply to this
case.
Petitioners, not being privy to the Operation and Maintenance Agreement, have no
cause of action against respondents. They are not the real parties in interest to question its
validity.
Provisional reliefs, such as a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary

injunction, are ancillary writs issued by the court to protect the rights of a party during the
pendency of the principal action.
HEIRS OF ZOLETA V. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205128, 9 August 2017.
The power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. Thus, administrative
agencies may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state organs even when they exercise
supervisory authority over these officers or organs.
FACTS:
On 29 September 1996, Eliza Zoleta (Eliza), through Venancio Q. Zoleta, voluntarily

offered for sale to the government, under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-87673. This lot was located in Barangay Casay, San
Francisco, Quezon and had an area of approximately 136 hectares.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Landbank made a valuation of the land and
determined that only 125.47 hectares of the property's 136 hectares were covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. It valued the covered portion at P3,986,639.57.
Landbank then deposited this amount in the name of Eliza.
Eliza rejected Landbank's valuation. Thus, the matter was endorsed to the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Quezon II. On October 3, 2000, Regional
Adjudicator Miñas rendered a Decision fixing just compensation at P8,938,757.72. Not satisfied
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with the amount, Landbank filed a Petition for Just Compensation before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 56, Lucena City, acting as Special Agrarian Court, on 7 November 2000. On 9
November 2000, Eliza filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before the Office of Regional
Adjudicator Miñas, which was unsuccessfully opposed by Landbank.
On 16 January 2001, Regional Adjudicator Miñas granted Eliza's motion for execution
and issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of execution,
however, was returned unsatisfied. Thus, Regional Adjudicator Miñas issued an alias writ of
execution on 15 February 2001. The following day, the DARAB Sheriff issued a Notice of
Garnishment and a Notice of Levy on Personal Property.
Landbank sought from the Special Agrarian Court the quashal of the alias writ of
execution and, in the interim, the issuance of a temporary restraining order against its
implementation. In the Resolution dated 27 March 2001, the Special Agrarian Court denied
Landbank's plea as DARAB had never been impleaded by Landbank as respondent, thereby
failing to vest the Special Agrarian Court with jurisdiction over DARAB.
Unable to obtain relief from the Special Agrarian Court, Landbank, on April 2, 2001,
filed before DARAB a "petition for certiorari pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 3, Rule VIII of the
1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure." In the Resolution dated May 12, 2006, DARAB granted
Land Bank's petition for certiorari and "annulled" the 16 January 2001 Order and the 15
February 2001 Alias Writ of Execution.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 alleging that DARAB exceeded its authority when it granted Landbank's Petition
for Certiorari under Rule VIII, Section 3 of the 1994 Rules.
In its assailed 23 July 2012 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that DARAB's actions
were sustained by its general "supervisory authority" and appellate jurisdiction over rulings of
RARADs and PARADs. In its assailed 9 January 2013 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether it was proper for respondent DARAB to issue its 12 May 2006 Resolution,
which granted respondent Landbank's "petition for certiorari pursuant to paragraph 2, Section
3, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure."
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, and further held that a perceived abuse
cannot be cured by an abuse. Administrative agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), are not courts of law exercising judicial power. The
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power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. Thus, administrative agencies
may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state organs even when they exercise
supervisory authority over these officers or organs.
This Court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In doing so, this Court
emphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter must be provided by law. It noted that
there was no law that vested DARAB with jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. Rather than
finding constitutional or statutory basis, DARAB's supposed certiorari power was provided only
by its own rules of procedure:
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must
exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred
by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to
issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or
statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly
designated.
JOSON V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, 9 August 2017.
FACTS:
In his Affidavit-Complaint (Complaint) dated 6 August 2008, petitioner Joson charged

private respondents before the Ombudsman with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
At the time of filing the Complaint, Joson was then Nueva Ecija's Vice Governor and its
Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Presiding Officer, while Umali was Nueva Ecija's Governor.
Agtay, Abesamis, and Pancho served as Nueva Ecija's Provincial Trade and Industry Officer,
OIC-Provincial Administrator, and Treasurer, respectively. Pallanan was the former Provincial
Administrator of Nueva Ecija.
Joson alleged that on 21 September 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed

by the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija and Ryan Angelo Sweets and Catering Services
(Ryan Angelo Catering), which was owned by Cleopatra Gervacio (Cleopatra). Under this
Agreement, Ryan Angelo Catering's services for two (2) years “shall include regular serving of
meals for breakfast, lunch, dinner, and snacks at the canteen and the convention center, special
meals and catering services shall be provided as may be required."
Joson claimed that another caterer was hired during Umali's oath-taking ceremony.
However, Agtay asked Ryan Angelo Catering, through Cleopatra, for a receipt of P1,272,000.00
under the name of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, Joson claimed that Agtay made
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this request to make it appear that Ryan Angelo Catering actually catered and to justify the
withdrawal of P1,344,000.00 from the treasury of Nueva Ecija's provincial government.
On 4 December 2009, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Francis Euston R.

Acero (Prosecutor Acero) of the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution dismissing all charges
against Umali, Abesamis, Agtay, Pancho, and Pallanan. On the violation of Section 3(e) and (g)
of R.A. No. 3019, Prosecutor Acero held that the evidence was insufficient to prove undue
injury on Cleopatra or on the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija. On the violation of Article
213 of the Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero found that there was not enough evidence to
prove that private respondents committed fraud to use public funds for their personal benefit.
On the violations of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article
215 of the Revised Penal Code, Prosecutor Acero held that there was no sufficient evidence that
could establish private respondents' prohibited material or pecuniary interest in the unnamed
caterer. On the allegation of grave misconduct, Prosecutor Acero found that Joson was not able
"to demonstrate that [private] respondents, in the performance of their functions, have engaged
in intentional wrongdoing or have committed a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard
of behavior."
Joson moved for reconsideration, which was denied for being filed out of time. Hence, on
15 July 2011, Joson filed this Petition for Certiorari against the Office of the Ombudsman, Umali,
Agtay, Abesamis, Pancho, and Pallanan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner Joson's late filing of his motion for reconsideration bars him from
instituting a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65;
2. Whether petitioner Joson's resort to Rule 65 instead of Rule 43 is proper; and
3. Whether public respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the charges against private respondents.
HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Under the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, an aggrieved party may file a motion for
reconsideration (a) within 5 days from receipt of notice of the assailed decision in a criminal
case or (b) within 10 days from receipt of the Ombudsman's decision in an administrative case.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the required period.
Nonetheless, this Court has allowed the relaxation of procedural rules to ensure the realization
of substantial justice in several instances. Although a motion for reconsideration is required
before this Court can entertain a petition for certiorari, this rule admits certain
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exceptions, which is present in this case. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the petition
will still fail on other procedural grounds and on its merits as will be discussed below.
In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman's decision may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals via Rule 43. In Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, this Court declared Section 27
unconstitutional for increasing this Court's appellate jurisdiction in violation of the proscription
under Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. This Court further held in Fabian that "appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
With respect to the dismissal of the administrative charge for gross misconduct, the
Court finds that the same has already attained finality because Joson failed to file a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The assailed ruling of the Ombudsman absolving
the private respondents of the administrative charge possesses the character of finality and,
thus, not subject to appeal. Here, petitioner's failure to avail of the correct procedure with
respect to the administrative case renders the Office of the Ombudsman's decision final.
It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's
determination of whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent
and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by, or in contemplation of law.
In this case, petitioner Joson filed to show that the Office of the Ombudsman acted in an
"arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner." The Office of the Ombudsman
laboriously discussed each and every charge of petitioner by enumerating the elements of each
law and pointing out where petitioner fell short in evidence.
MAGAT, SR. V. TANTRADE CORP.

G.R. No. 205483, 23 August 2017.
FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, praying that the assailed
31 May 2011 and 15 January 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05929
be reversed and set aside.
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The assailed 31 May 2011 Resolution denied the Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review under Rule 424 filed by Mario Magat, Sr., Mario S. Magat, Jr., Mario S.
Magat III, Ma. Margarita M. Estavilla, and Ma. Marjorie S. Magat (petitioners). It likewise
ordered that petitioners' appeal be dismissed. The assailed January 15, 2013 Resolution denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the extensions
sought by petitioners and in dismissing their appeal.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two
(2) extensions of 15 days each. An initial extension may be given, provided that it is sought
through a proper motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a deposit for costs is made before
the expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial extension, Rule 42 permits a second
extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be "for the most
compelling reason."
Petitioners have effectively pleaded grounds that warrant the extensions prayed
for. However, this Court finds it to be a serious error for the Court of Appeals to decry
petitioners' supposed "procrastination" when, to begin with, petitioners acted well within the
periods sanctioned by Rule 42. Petitioners did not ask the Court of Appeals to sanction an
aberrant situation beyond Rule 42, Section 1's contemplation. Thus, this case is not even about
suspending, relaxing, or extraordinarily applying Rule 42, Section 1.
It is true that in seeking an extension, rather than immediately filing a petition,

appellants wager on the Court of Appeals' favorable action. Still, it remains that they have 15
days to seek an extension. They should not be faulted for maximizing the period that Rule 42
allows. In doing so, they are not "procrastinating" but are merely exercising a legitimate option.
Ultimately, this Court considers it to be in the better interest of justice had the Court of
Appeals been more perceptive of petitioners' plight and granted them the extension sought, in
order that they could have fully litigated their cause.
DEE HWA LIONG FOUNDATION MEDICAL CENTER V. ASIAMED SUPPLIES AND

EQUIPMENT CORP.
G.R. No. 205638. 23 August 2017.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed under Rule 45, praying that the 30
August 2012 Decision and the 23 January 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
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CV No. 91410 be reversed and set aside. Respondent argued, however, that petitioners failed to
prove that their petition only involves questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the instant petition should be granted.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, as only questions of law are allowed in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is a general rule that factual findings
of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive, especially when they have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this Court. Although
jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to this rule, exceptions must be alleged,
substantiated, and proved by the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the
case. Here, the Court of Appeals made a factual determination that the effectivity of the
Contract of Sale did not depend on any alleged loan application from Planters Bank. It relied on
the evidence presented, particularly the Contract of Sale, which did not mention any loan from
Planters Bank.
Petitioners have failed to show how the Court of Appeals' factual determination based
on the evidence presented is an error of law. Indeed, petitioners' argument that respondent was
aware of the conditionality of the contract hinges on an appreciation of evidence. Petitioners
have failed to allege, substantiate, or prove any exception to the general rule allowing only
questions of law to be raised in a petition for review so that this Court may evaluate and review
the evidence presented and the facts of the case.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION V. SPS. HUANG

G.R. No. 197654, 30 August 2017
FACTS:
Stephen Huang (“Stephen”) and his parents, Spouses Richard Y. Huang and Carmen
G. Huang, filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against Mercury Drug
Corporation (“Mercury Drug”) and Rolando J. Del Rosario (“Del Rosario”). Mercury Drug
was the registered owner of a six (6)-wheeler truck driven by Del Rosario, which figured in an
accident with Stephen's car. Stephen became a paraplegic.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and
severally liable for damages. CA affirmed the RTC Decision but reduced the award of moral
damages, which was affirmed by the SC.
Stephen and his parents moved for the execution of the judgment, which RTC granted.
Mercury Drug and Del Rosario moved to quash the Writ of Execution as it allegedly
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contravened the tenor of the judgment, and also filed an urgent motion to defer the
implementation of the Writ of Execution. These motions were denied by the RTC.
As a result of the garnishment proceedings, Citibank N.A. issued in favor of Richard

Y. Huang a Manager's Check in the amount of P40,434,062.00. Afterwards, Stephen and his
parents filed a Satisfaction of Judgment before the RTC. Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA denied the Petition. The CA found
that "the perceived error in the computation of the award and [its] correction" entailed a
substantial amendment of the judgment sought to be enforced. Under the doctrine on
immutability of judgments, courts are precluded from altering or modifying a final and
executory judgment.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the case falls under any of the exceptions to the doctrine of
immutability of judgments, and whether or not a clerical error existed that would
warrant the modification of the dispositive portion of the judgment; and
b. Whether or not the Writ of Execution conforms to the judgment sought to be enforced.
HELD:
The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of
judgments, and no clerical error existed that would warrant the modification of the
dispositive portion of the judgment.
It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes

immutable and unalterable. The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment
may no longer be modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the
modification or amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known
as the doctrine of immutability of judgment is a matter of sound public policy, which rests
upon the practical consideration that every litigation must come to an end.
The doctrine of immutability of judgment, however, is not an ironclad rule. It is subject

to several exceptions, namely: (1) The correction of clerical errors; (2) The so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
Clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of a judgment may result from
inadvertence. These errors can be rectified without violating the doctrine of immutability of
judgment provided that the modification does not affect the substance of the controversy.
Clerical errors are best exemplified by typographical errors or arithmetic miscalculations.
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They also include instances when words are interchanged. In determining whether there are
clerical errors or ambiguities in the dispositive portion of the judgment that should be
rectified, courts should refer primarily to "the court's findings of facts and conclusions of law
as expressed in the body of the decision." The parties' pleadings may also be consulted if
necessary.
In this case, petitioners assert that the case falls under the first exception: that clerical
errors attended the computation of the amounts awarded as life care cost and loss of earning
capacity. The resolution of the present petition would, therefore, require a comparison
between the dispositive portion and the body of the judgment.
There are no clerical errors or ambiguities regarding the computation of life care cost
and loss of earning capacity awarded to respondent Stephen. The amounts indicated in the
dispositive portion of the judgment faithfully correspond to the findings of fact and
conclusions of the trial court.
A writ of execution must substantially conform to the judgment sought to be

enforced. A writ of execution that exceeds the tenor of the judgment is patently void and
should be struck down. Upon a finding of its invalidity, the case may be remanded to the
lower court for the issuance of the proper writ. In this case, the Writ of Execution issued by
the Regional Trial Court neither varied nor departed from the terms of the judgment in any
manner.
CORTAL V. INAKI A. LARRAZABAL ENTERPRISES

G.R. No. 199107, 30 August 2017
FACTS:
Private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises) owned

three (3) parcels of land in Ormoc City, which were placed under the Compulsory Acquisition
Scheme of P.D. No. 27. Pursuant thereto, Emancipation Patents and new transfer certificates of
title were issued to farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners included.
Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional
Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). It alleged that no
price had been fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties, in violation of the
just compensation requirement under P.D. No. 27.
Regional Adjudicator Felixberto M. Diloy (Regional Adjudicator Diloy) ruled in favor

of Larrazabal Enterprises and ordered that it be restored to ownership of the lots. DARAB
reversed the Decision and ruled that Larrazabal Enterprises' action was already barred by
prescription and laches, and likewise gave credence to the certificates issued by Landbank,
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which confirmed the payment of just compensation. Thereafter, DARAB reversed its own
decision and granted Larrazabal Enterprises' Motion for Reconsideration.
CA dismissed petitioners’ Petition for the following formal errors:
a. the name of Raymundo Claros Codilla (“Codilla”) was indicated in the Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review as one of the petitioners, but in the Petition for Review
and in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, his name was no longer
indicated;
b. the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to show any competent
evidence of identity of several of the petitioners, at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the photographs and signatures thereof, in violation of
Sec. 2.(2) Rule IV of the Rules of Notarial Practice;
c. petitioners failed to attach the copy of the Complaint filed by respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal
Enterprises before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, Tacloban City, docketed as DARAB
Case No. E.O. No. 288 (sic); and
d. counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Norjue I. Juego did not indicate the place of issue of his IBP
number.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal for purely formal defects and
without discussing the merits of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was justified by the errors noted by the
Court of Appeals.
HELD:
No. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, the Supreme Court did not consider
the formal defects to have been so fatal as to peremptorily deny petitioners the opportunity to
fully ventilate their case on appeal.
An affiant verifies a pleading to indicate that he or she has read it and that to his or her
knowledge and belief, its allegations are true and correct and that it has been prepared in
good faith and not out of mere speculation. Jurisprudence has considered the lack of
verification as a mere formal, rather than a jurisdictional, defect that is not fatal. Altres v.
Empleo, outlined the differences "between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping”"
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1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not

necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are
such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition nave been made
in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect

therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons".
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties
to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all
the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
In the same vein, the inclusion of Codilla in the Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review but not in the Petition for Review and in the verification and certificate
of non-forum shopping should not have been fatal to petitioners' appeal. The defective
verification amounted to a mere formal defect that was neither jurisdictional nor fatal and for
which a simple correction could have been ordered by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners are
acting out of a common interest. Even assuming that a strict application of the rules must be
maintained, the Court of Appeals could just as easily have merely dropped Codilla as a party
instead of peremptorily and indiscriminately foreclosing any further chance at relief to those
who had affixed their signatures.
Equally not fatal to petitioners' appeal was their supposed failure to show competent
evidence of identities in their petition's verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Competent evidence of identity enables the notary to "verify the genuineness of the signature
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of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free act and
deed." It is evident from Rule IV, Section 2(b)(2) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the
need for a competent evidence of identity is not an absolute requirement. It is imperative only
when the signatory is not personally known to the notary. When the signatory is personally
known to the notary, the presentation of competent evidence of identity is a superfluity.
In this case, the Court of Appeals' bare reference to petitioners' inadequate proof of
identity does not justify the outright denial of their appeal. The Court of Appeals failed to
absolutely discount the possibility that petitioners may have been personally known to the
notary public, especially considering that, by that advanced stage in litigating their claims,
they must have already verified several pleadings, likely before the same notary public.
Ultimately, a defective verification is merely a formal and not a fatal, jurisdictional

defect, which could have very easily been ordered corrected. As to the defective certification
of non-forum shopping, the greater cause of justice should have impelled the Court of
Appeals,to have at least enabled petitioners to rectify their lapse, rather than completely deny
them a chance at exhaustive litigation.
The failure to submit certain documents, assuming there was such a failure on
respondent's part, does not automatically warrant outright dismissal of its petition.
Petitioners' failure to attach a copy of the complaint originally filed by Larrazabal Enterprises
before the DARAB should not have been fatal to their Rule 43 petition. Its inclusion was not
absolutely required, as it was certainly not the award, judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from. If, in the Court of Appeals' judgment, it was a material document, the more
prudent course of action would have been to afford petitioners time to adduce it, not to make
a justification out of it for dispossessing petitioners of relief.
CA was ordered to give due course to the petition subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 04659.
BELO MEDICAL GROUP, INC. V. SANTOS

G.R. No. 185894, 30 August 2017
On 5 May 2008, Belo Medical Group received a request from Jose Santos for the
inspection of corporate records. Santos claimed that he was a registered shareholder and a co-
owner of Belo's shares, as these were acquired while they cohabited as husband and wife. Belo
Medical Group asked for time in order for Henares to accommodate Santos' request.
Belo wrote Belo Medical Group to repudiate Santos' claims. Thereafter, Belo Medical
Group filed a Complaint for Interpleader alleging that there was nothing on the record to show
that Santos had paid for the shares under his name.
Santos, for the third time, sent a letter to schedule an inspection of the corporate books
and warned that continued rejection of his request exposed the corporation to criminal liability.
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Belo and Belo Medical Group wrote to Santos and informed him that he was barred from
accessing corporate records because doing so would be inimical to Belo Medical Group's
interests.
Belo Medical Group filed a Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief under Rule 63
of the Rules of Court, and prayed that Santos be perpetually barred from inspecting its books
due to his business interest in a competitor.
Belo Medical Group filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the case be tried as a civil
case and not as an intra-corporate controversy. It argued that the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies did not include special civil actions for interpleader
and declaratory relief found under the Rules of Court. Belo Medical Group later on moved that
Santos be declared in default. Instead of filing an answer Santos filed a Motion to Dismiss.
Santos argued that Belo Medical Group's Complaint and Supplemental Complaint must
be dismissed "for its failure to state, and ultimately, lack of, a cause of action." Santos also
argued that a prerequisite to filing these cases is that the plaintiff has not yet incurred liability to
any of the parties. Since Belo Medical Group had already incurred criminal liability, it could no
longer file a complaint for interpleader or declaratory relief. Santos denied any conflict of
interest because Belo Medical Group's products and services differed from House of Obagi.
Belo Medical Group filed its Opposition and argued that the Motion to Dismiss was a
prohibited pleading under Section 8 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies. It reiterated that Belo and Santos must litigate against each other to
determine who rightfully owned the 25 shares. Santos filed his Reply and agreed that the
controversy was not intra-corporate but civil in nature, as it involved ownership.
The trial court declared the case as an intra-corporate controversy but dismissed the
Complaints. Finally, the Complaint for Declaratory Relief was struck down as improper because
it sought an initial determination on whether Santos was in bad faith and if he should be barred
from inspecting the books of the corporation. The act of resolving these issues is not within the
province of the special civil action as declaratory relief is limited to the construction and
declaration of actual rights and does not include the determination of issues.
Belo filed her Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. Belo Medical Group, on
the other hand, directly filed its Petition for Review with the SC. It argued that it is enough that
there are 2 people who have adverse claims against each other and who are in positions to make
effective claims for interpleader to be given due course.
The CA Court of Appeals dismissed Belo's Petition for Review and ruled that the
pending case before the SC was the more appropriate vehicle to determine the issues.
ISSUES:
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a. Whether or not Belo Medical Group, Inc. committed forum shopping;
b. Whether or not the present controversy is intra-corporate;
c. Whether or not Belo Medical Group, Inc. came to the SC using the correct mode of
appeal; and
d. Whether or not the trial court had basis in dismissing Belo Medical Group, Inc.'s
Complaint for Declaratory Relief.
HELD:
Neither Belo nor the Belo Medical Group is guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping
exists when parties seek multiple judicial remedies simultaneously or successively, involving
the same causes of action, facts, circumstances, and transactions, in the hopes of obtaining a
favorable decision. It may be accomplished by a party defeated in one forum, in an attempt to
obtain a favorable outcome in another, "other than by appeal or a special civil action
for certiorari."
What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who
asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered
by the different fora upon the same issues.
Belo Medical Group filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the
SC to appeal against the Joint Resolution of the trial court. It did not file any other petition
related to the case, as indicated in it verification and certification against forum shopping. It was
Belo, a defendant in Belo Medical Groups Complaint, who filed a separate appeal under Rule 43
with the Court of Appeals primarily to protect her counterclaims. The Court of Appeals already
ruled that litis pendencia was present when Belo and Belo Medical Group filed their respective
petitions on the same date before different fora. The two petitions involved the same parties,
rights and reliefs sought, and causes of action. The issue of forum shopping has become moot.
Belo Medical Group filed a case for interpleader, the proceedings of which are covered
by the Rules of Court. At its core, however, it is an intra-corporate controversy. A.M. No. 01-2-
04-SC, or the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, enumerates
the cases where the rules will apply, particularly, inspection of corporate books. The same rules
prohibit the filing of a motion to dismiss.
Applying the relationship test, the SC noted that both Belo and Santos are named
shareholders in Belo Medical Group's AOI and GIS for 2007. The conflict is clearly intra-
corporate as it involves 2 shareholders although the ownership of stocks of one stockholder is
questioned. Unless Santos is adjudged as a stranger to the corporation because he holds his
shares only in trust for Belo, then both he and Belo, based on official records, are stockholders of
the corporation.
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Applying the nature of the controversy test, the dispute is an intra-corporate dispute.
The Complaint for interpleader seeks a determination of the true owner of the shares of stock
registered in Santos' name. Ultimately, however, the goal is to stop Santos from inspecting
corporate books. The totality of the controversy must be taken into account to improve upon the
existing tests. The SC noted that Belo Medical Group used its Complaint for interpleader as a
subterfuge in order to stop Santos, a registered stockholder, from exercising his right to inspect
corporate books.
The SC held that as an intra-corporate dispute, Santos should not have been allowed to
file a Motion to Dismiss. The trial court should have continued on with the case as an intra-
corporate dispute considering that it called for the judgments on the relationship between a
corporation and its two warring stockholders and the relationship of these two stockholders
with each other.
Rule 45 is the wrong mode of appeal. A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC promulgated by the SC En
Banc on September 14, 2004 has laid down that all decisions and final orders falling under the
Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-
Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Belo Medical Group argued that since it raises only questions of law, the proper mode
of appeal is Rule 45 filed directly to the SC. The court held this would have been correct
assuming there were no rules specific to intra-corporate disputes. Considering that the
controversy was still classified as intra-corporate upon filing of appeal, special rules, over
general ones, must apply. However, the court held that based on the policy of judicial economy
and for practical considerations, the Court will not dismiss the case despite the wrong mode of
appeal utilized.
Two cases were filed by Belo Medical Group: the Complaint for interpleader and the
Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Relief. Under Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, a
joinder of cause of action is allowed, provided that “the joinder shall not include special civil
actions or actions governed by special rules”. Assuming the case continued on as an
interpleader, it cannot be joined with the Supplemental Complaint for declaratory relief as both
are special civil actions. However, as the case was classified and will continue as an intra-
corporate dispute, the simultaneous complaint for declaratory relief became superfluous.
The trial court may make a declaration first on who owns the shares of stock and
suspend its ruling on whether Santos should be allowed to inspect corporate records. Or, it may
rule on whether Santos has the right to inspect corporate books in the meantime while there has
yet to be a resolution on the ownership of shares. Remedies are available to Belo Medical Group
and Belo at any stage of the proceeding, should they carry on in prohibiting Santos from
inspecting the corporate books.
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ALVARADO V. AYALA LAND, INC.
G.R. No. 208426, 20 September 2017.
The prior filing of an answer, therefore, serves as a bar to the consideration of Rule 16, Section 1's six (6)
other grounds. However, the grounds stated in a belatedly filed motion to dismiss may still be considered provided
that they were pleaded as affirmative defenses in an answer.
FACTS:
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Capitol) owned a 15,598-square-meter parcel
in Quezon City covered by TCT No. N-253850. In November 2007, this entire parcel was levied
by the Quezon City Treasurer on account of unpaid real estate taxes. It was subjected to a tax
delinquency sale. Alvarado was noted to have been the highest bidder. Thereafter, a Certificate
of Sale of Delinquent Property was issued in Alvarado's favor.
In December 2010, respondents filed with the RTC, Quezon City a Complaint assailing
the validity of the tax sale. Alvarado, the Quezon City Treasurer, the Quezon City Register of
Deeds, and several John and Jane Does who allegedly participated in the conduct of the levy
and sale were impleaded as defendants. The Complaint alleged several anomalies in the sale.
After filing his Answer, Alvarado filed his Motion to Dismiss dated 14 April 2011, substantially
reiterating the same procedural defects he noted in his Answer
In her Order dated 6 September 2011, Judge Payoyo-Villordon denied Alvarado's

Motion to Dismiss. She noted that the Motion was filed out of time as Alvarado already filed his
Answer and that "Alvarado was considered estopped from filing the subject Motion to
Dismiss." She conceded that the rule preventing the consideration of motions to dismiss filed
after the filing of answers admitted exceptions but noted that the grounds pleaded by Alvarado
still did not warrant the dismissal of respondents' Complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Quezon City Regional Trial Court Presiding Judge
Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon in issuing her Orders.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Judge Payoyo-Villordon correctly
observed that petitioner filed his Answer ahead of his Motion to Dismiss. The filing of an
answer precludes a motion to dismiss. However, the grounds invoked by petitioner in his
Motion to Dismiss had been previously pleaded in his Answer. The consideration of these
grounds was, therefore, not forestalled by petitioner's belated filing of a motion to dismiss.
These grounds are still considered timely pleaded in his Answer and merely reiterated in his
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Motion to Dismiss. Ultimately, however, Judge Payoyo-Villordon correctly found petitioner's
pleaded grounds to be unavailing. Thus, the Supreme Court sustained her denial of petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss.
Two (2) categories of motions to dismiss may be recognized under the Rules of Civil
Procedure: first, those that must be filed ahead of an answer, and second, those that may be
entertained even after an answer has been filed. Motions to dismiss under the first category may
plead any of the 10 grounds under Rule 16, Section 1. Those under the second category may
only plead four (4) of Rule 16, Section 1's 10 grounds: lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription. In addition to these 4 grounds, motions to
dismiss under the second category may also plead lack of cause of action and other grounds
that may only be made known after the answer was filed.
The prior filing of an answer, therefore, serves as a bar to the consideration of Rule 16,
Section 1's 6 other grounds. However, the grounds stated in a belatedly filed motion to dismiss
may still be considered provided that they were pleaded as affirmative defenses in an answer.
There is then no waiver of the previously pleaded defenses. The complaint may be dismissed
even for reasons other than lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action, or delayed discovery of a ground for dismissal.
The belatedly filed motion to dismiss is not a useless superfluity. It is effectively a motion for
the court to hear the grounds for dismissal previously pleaded as affirmative defenses in the
answer, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 6. Still, the continuing availability of grounds does not
guarantee a dismissal. An allegation of non-compliance with a condition precedent may be
belied by antecedent facts; a claim of failure to state a cause of action may be negated by
sufficient allegations in the complaint.
STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION, LTD. V. SULPICIO LINES,

INC.
G.R. Nos. 196072 and 208603, 10 September 2017.
FACTS:
Sulpicio contends that Steamship's Petition for Review should be dismissed outright on
procedural grounds. First, this Petition, couched as a Rule 45 Petition, is actually a Rule 65
Petition because it contained arguments dealing with "grave abuse of discretion" allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals. Second, the Petition's Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping is defective because it was signed and executed by Steamship's lawyer. The
Power of Attorney appended to the Petition did not indicate its signatory's name and authority.
Third, the issue of whether or not Sulpicio has been furnished with the Club's Rulebook, which
contained the arbitration clause, is factual and beyond the realm of a Rule 45 petition.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not Sulpicio’s contention are correct.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, and further held that the appeal from a
final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special
civil action under Rule 65. A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or
resolution of the Court of Appeals even if the error assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law. "The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be
no appeal." Allegations in the petition of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals do not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65.
In this case, what Steamship seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of
the Court of Appeals. These errors pertain to Steamship's allegations of the Court of Appeals'
failure to rule that a valid arbitration agreement existed between the parties and to refer the case
to arbitration. It does not impute any error with respect to the Court of Appeals' exercise of
jurisdiction. As such, the Petition is simply a continuation of the appellate process where a case
is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the Court of Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45.
LAO, JR. V. LGU OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY

G.R. No. 187869, 13 September 2017.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

questioning the Orders of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 17. This petition is filed by
Barangay Captain Enrico D. Salcedo (Salcedo) of Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City and Cagayan De
Oro City Councilors Teodulfo E. Lao, Jr. (Lao), Roger A. Abaday (Abaday), and Zaldy O. Ocon
(Ocon) (petitioners).
Respondents argue that among the four (4) errors that petitioners assign to the RTC, two
(2) are questions of fact, hence, not cognizable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether it was proper for petitioners to file a Petition under Rule 45 directly with SC
HELD:
No. Direct resort to this Court by way of petition for review on certiorari is permitted
when only questions of law are involved.
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There is a question of law when there is doubt as to which law should be applied to a
particular set of facts. Questions of law do not require that the truth or falsehood of facts be
determined or evidence be received and examined. Matters of evidence more properly pertain
to the trial courts as the trier of facts and the appellate courts as the reviewer of facts.
As correctly pointed out by public respondents, among the four (4) errors that
petitioners assign to the Regional Trial Court, two (2) are questions of fact. The nullity of the
Agora Complex BOT Contract due to the mayor's alleged lack of authority to sign it and the
local government's alleged failure to determine the project proponent's financial capacity
require the reception and examination of evidence. These issues are questions of fact not
cognizable in a petition for review under Rule 45.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 213581, 19 September 2017
FACTS:
Verlina Silo (“Silo”), Acting Bank Officer III at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
admitted misappropriating a portion of another officer’s, Evelyn Yap’s (“Yap”), cash
accountability when said amounts were under her custody. Upon audit of the notes that used to
be in the custody of Silo, a shortage in the amount of P32,701,600.00 was missing from Yap's
cash accountabilities. Silo executed an affidavit where she admitted sole responsibility for the
cash shortage, and admitted repeatedly stealing cash from her accountabilities for a period of
about five (5) years. Yap denied responsibility over the cash shortage and attached Silo's
affidavit where she admitted sole liability over the missing cash.
The Commission on Audit (COA) filed administrative charges of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, and criminal charges of malversation and violation of Section 3(E) of Republic Act
No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Silo, Yap and Perry Dequita,
Manager of BSP, before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman found Silo
liable of the administrative charge and the criminal case against her but dismissed the
administrative charges against Dequita and Yap.
The BSP sent COA a request for an evaluation of the status of Yap's liability, considering
the dismissal of the administrative case against her. On April 12, 2013, instead of providing an
opinion regarding Yap's liability, the Commission on Audit issued a Decision dated 12 April
2013, denying the alleged request to extinguish Yap's liability in the cash shortage and holding
her liable for it. The Commission on Audit held that while Silo had already admitted causing
the cash shortage of P32,701,600.00, her admission of guilt did not automatically release Yap
and Dequita from their responsibility over the funds entrusted to them. They still needed to
"prove that they exercised the highest degree of care in performing their job in order to protect
and safeguard their accountabilities."
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ISSUE:
Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Decision.
HELD:
It is beyond dispute that Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officials of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, Cotabato Branch were denied due process with the issuance of the assailed
Commission on Audit Decision.
It was an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion to hold Yap liable, and Dequita
and the other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarity liable with Yap for the
cash shortage without an actual complaint being filed and without giving them the chance to
defend themselves.
COA rendered its assailed Decision in blatant disregard to its own rules, treating the
BSP’s request for opinion as a request for relief from accountability even if the former did not
include the required documents and comments or recommendations needed under either the
1997 Rules or 2009 Rules. Furthermore, the request for opinion was filed by BSP alone, yet the
assailed Decision found Yap, Dequita, and other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch jointly
and solidarily liable, even if they were never parties to the request for opinion or request for
relief from accountability.
Thus, the assailed Decision violated the basic tenets of due process and must be
annulled and set aside. Due process in administrative proceedings does not require the
submission of pleadings or a trial-type of hearing. Due process is satisfied if the party is duly
notified of the allegations against him or her and is given a chance to present his or her defense.
Furthermore, due process requires that the proffered defense should have been considered by
the tribunal in arriving at its decision.
See also: Sps. Aboitiz and Cabarrus v. Sps. Po, G.R. No. 208450, 5 June 2017; Visayan Electric
Company, Inc. v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 209910, 29 November 2017; Torres v. People, G.R. No. 206627, 18
January 2017; Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 203943, 30 August 2017.
PEOPLE V. CABELLON
G.R. No. 207229, 20 September 2017
FACTS:
A buy bust operation was planned to capture Siegfred Cabellon (“Cabellon”) in the act
of selling drugs. The asset poseur-buyer transacted with Cabellon in an alley, wheree police
officers descended upon Cabellon, who then ran away.
Cabellon ran and hid inside a nearby house. The police officers stumbled upon three
(3) men sniffing shabu inside the house, one (1) of whom they apprehended while the other
two (2) managed to escape. The police officers caught up with Cabellon inside the house,
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whom they thereafter frisked. They recovered the marked P100.00 and P50.00 bills from him.
After Cabellon's arrest, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of shabu he purchased from
Cabellon to PO3 Bucao. On the same date, a sachet marked with "SCC 04/13/06" was turned
over to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for examination. Cabellon was
charged with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements for the illegal
sale of shabu. CA upheld RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Cabellon's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the non-
observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of R.A No. 9165.
HELD:
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the manner by which law enforcement
officers should handle seized dangerous drugs, that the PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition. While it may be true that strict
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 may be excused under justifiable
grounds, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items must still be preserved by the
apprehending officer.
In this case, the Supreme Court was not convinced that the prosecution was able to prove
the identity of the shabu supposedly seized from the accused.
The four (4) links that should be established by the prosecution to constitute an
unbroken chain of custody are: (a) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (b) the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (c) the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and (d) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court.
Undeniably, a noticeable gap exists in the chain of custody with the prosecution's
failure to present evidence that the seized sachet was actually marked by any of the three (3)
apprehending officers. The prosecution likewise did not present evidence that the seized
sachet was inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused or his representative,
a representative from the media or the Department of Justice, and an elected public official.
Neither did it provide an explanation as to why the police officers did not follow the
requirements provided under the law.
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The prosecution utterly failed to proffer evidence on who placed the markings on the
sachet Furthermore, it also failed to account for the seized sachet's transfer from PO3 Bucao to
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination, creating another
gap in the chain of custody.
This blatant lack of compliance with the safeguards established in Republic Act No.
9165 is made even more egregious by the fact that the seized sachet only contained 0.03
grams of shabu, no more than a grain of rice. The danger of tampering and planting of
evidence was, thus, heightened, which should have put the lower courts on guard and not
have so easily relied on the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in the
performance of their official acts.
See also: People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 208471, 2 August 2017.
BICOL MEDICAL CENTER V. BOTOR

G.R. No. 214073, 4 October 2017
FACTS:
Road Lot No. 3, which stretched from Panganiban Road to J. Miranda Avenue, is a
service road which leads to the Provincial Hospital. The Camarines Sur Provincial
Government donated about 5hectares of land to the Ministry of Health, now the Department
of Health (DOH), as shown by TCT No. 13693. The Training and Teaching Hospital and Road
Lot No. 3 were included in this donation.
The Training and Teaching Hospital became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC) in 1995.
BMC issued Hospital Memorandum No. 0310, which ordered the rerouting of traffic inside
the BMC Compound.
This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and pedestrians along J.
Miranda Avenue. The gate closure drew a lot of criticism from the community, and on May
19, 2012, Atty. Noe Botor (Atty. Botor) wrote to Naga City Mayor John Bongat (Mayor
Bongat), asking for the reopening or dismantling of the gate for being a public nuisance.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a resolution authorizing Mayor

Bongat to dismantle the gate. However, instead of dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed a
Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-0073 and raffled to RTC, Naga City.
RTC, Naga City's application for injunctive relief, ruling that Naga City failed to prove
a clear and unmistakable right to the writ prayed for. The Court of Appeals granted the
petition and emphasized that only a prima facie showing of an applicant's right to the writ is
required in an application for writ of injunctive relief.
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ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in directing the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction on the closure of Road Lot No. 3.
HELD:
Yes. Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be
proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may
be issued: (1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent
need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary,
speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented
before the RTC the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification
Map which both identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the Province of Camarines
Sur. Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to corroborate Naga City's claims of the
public nature of Road Lot No. 3.
A careful reading of the records shows that respondents failed to establish prima

facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they sought to
establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the DOH's certificate
of title and the City Engineer's categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban Drive up
to the entrance and exit gate was not included in the list" of city roads under Naga City's
control.
Instead of merely relying on a tax map and claims of customary use, Naga City or
respondents should have presented a clear legal right to support their claim over Road Lot
No. 3. Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by
the public to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road because customary
use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation; hence, it does not ripen into a right.
Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control over
Road Lot No. 3, the DOH's title over the BMC compound must prevail over the
unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and respondents. DOH's ownership over Road Lot No. 3,
with the concomitant right to use and enjoy this property, must be respected.
The Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely to the evidence
presented by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether petitioners' evidence,
which had the effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and respondents' assertions. The Court
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of Appeals failed to appreciate the nature of the ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary
injunction as against the ex parte nature of a temporary restraining order.
Thus, Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction," giving the applicant an
opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury will result if no writ is issued and
allowing the opposing party to comment on the application. Writs of preliminary injunction
are granted only upon prior notice to the party sought to be enjoined and upon their due
hearing. On the other hand, a temporary restraining order that is heard only with the
evidence presented by its applicant is ex parte, but it is issued to preserve the status quo until
the hearing for preliminary injunction can be conducted
CRUZ V. SPOUSES CHRISTENSEN

G.R. No. 205539, 4 October 2017
FACTS:
Velia J. Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land in San Juan City inherited
from her mother, which Susan Christensen had been occupying during her mother’s lifetime,
pursuant to a verbal lease agreement. Velia’s alleged tolerance stopped when she demanded
that Susan vacate the property and pay all her unpaid rentals. After barangay mediation failed,
a Certificate to File Action was issued on 11 August 2005. Three years later, Cruz sent Susan a
demand letter demanding that she pay the unpaid rentals and vacate the property within 15
days from receipt. The MeTC dismissed the Complaint as it found that the registry receipts and
return cards as proof of the receipt of the demand letter, must first be authenticated. The RTC
reversed the MeTC decision. The CA reversed the RTC and held that the filing of a
memorandum of appeal within 15 days from the receipt of the order is mandatory.
ISSUES:
Whether the RTC should have dismissed the appeal considering that petitioner Velia's
Memorandum of Appeals was not filed within the required period.
HELD:
Rule 40, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states that failure of the appellant to file a
memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. The rule requiring the filing of the
memorandum within the period provided is mandatory. In this instance, a Memorandum of
Appeal was filed late but was nonetheless given due course by the Regional Trial Court. Thus,
the jurisdictional defect was cured since petitioner was able to specifically assign the Municipal
Trial Court's errors, which the Regional Trial Court was able to address and resolve. Procedural
defects should not be relied on to defeat the substantive rights of litigants. Even procedural
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rules of the most mandatory character may be suspended where "matters of life, liberty, honor
or property" warrant its liberal application.
CRISTOBAL V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,

G.R. No. 201622, 4 October 2017
Cristobal is a pilot for PAL. When PAL had a downsizing program, he applied for leave
without pay from PAL. PAL approved the application and advised him that he would continue
to accrue seniority during his leave and that he could opt to retire from PAL during this period.
On March 10, 1999, Cristobal advised PAL of his intent to retire. In response, PAL advised him
that he was deemed to have lost his employment status way back June 9, 1998. Thus, Cristobal
filed a complaint with the NLRC.
The LA found Cristobal's dismissal illegal and that Cristobal's retirement benefits should
not be less than the amount provided under the law. NLRC affirmed the LA but reduced the
award of moral and exemplary damages.
Cristobal filed his Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari holding that June 2011 MR was the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, it
did not toll petitioner's period to file a petition for certiorari assailing the May 31, 2011 Decision.
Consequently, the petition for certiorari was filed out of time. The CA also held that the petition
did not contain copies of the pertinent supporting documents. Cristobal filed his Petition for
Review on Certiorari with the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether Cristobal’s 24 June 2011 motion for reconsideration assailing the NLRC’s 31 May
2011 Decision was a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
HELD:
No. Where a tribunal renders a decision substantially reversing itself on a matter, a

motion for reconsideration seeking reconsideration of this reversal, for the first time, is not a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration. In Solidbank Corp. v. Court of Appeals, an
Amended Decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision, for
which a new motion for reconsideration may be filed again. In Barba v. Liceo De Cagayan
University, the SC held that the prohibition against a second motion for reconsideration
contemplates the same party assailing the same judgment.
Here, the NLRC’s 31 May 2011 Decision substantially modified its 30 September 2010
Decision. Thus, petitioner was not precluded from seeking reconsideration of the new decision
of the National Labor Relations Commission, and it was clearly an error for the Court of
Appeals to find that petitioner's petition for certiorari was filed out of time on that ground.
TAAR V. LAWAN
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G.R. No. 190922, 11 October 2017
FACTS:
Narcisa Taar (Narcisa), Alipio Duenas (Alipio), Fortunata Duenas (Fortunata), and
Pantaleon Taar (Pantaleon) inherited 2 tracts of land in Tarlac. One (1) parcel of land was
adjudicated exclusively in favor of Pantaleon while the other parcel of land was given to
Pantaleon, Narcisa, Alipio, and Fortunata. Narcisa sold her share to Spouses Primitive T.
Adaoag and Pilar Tandoc (the Adaoag Spouses) and to Spouses Ignacio Gragasin and
Genoveva Adaoag (the Gragasin Spouses).
Later, Pantaleon, Alipio, Fortunata, the Adaoag Spouses, and the Gragasin Spouses
executed an agreement to partition the second parcel of land. This agreement was approved
by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its 18 February 1948 Decision. Pursuant thereto,
petitioners prepared a subdivision plan over the Property in 2000. The subdivision plan,
denominated as Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-03-000964-D, was approved on 6 February
2001. Petitioners applied for free patents over the Property.
On 16 March 2001, Claudio Lawan (Claudio), Marcelino M. Galo (Marcelino), Artemio

Abarquez (Artemio), Augusto B. Lawan (Augusto), and Adolfo L. Galo (private respondents)
filed a verified protest alleging that their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, physical,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since 1948. Petitioners
countered that private respondents occupied the property as tenants.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Executive

Director for Region III Leonardo R. Sibbaluca (Director Sibbaluca) found that private
respondents were the actual occupants of the Property. Director Sibbaluca's 29 May 2002
Order attained finality.
Later that year, private respondents filed their free patent applications with the Tarlac
CENRO. Their applications covered the Property, which was also claimed by petitioners.
DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes (Secretary Reyes) adopted the findings of the investigating
team and ordered the cancellation of the free patents and the certificates of title issued in favor
of private respondents.
The Office of the President (OP), through then Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
(Executive Secretary Ermita), reversed Secretary Reyes' 18 January 2007 Decision and
reinstated Director Sibbaluca's 29 May 2002 Order. The OP held that Secretary Reyes erred in
reversing Director Sibbaluca's Order as it had already attained finality.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari against private respondents and Executive

Secretary Ermita with the Court of Appeals. They alleged that the Office of the President
committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order
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considering that their predecessors-in-interest had been declared ipso Jure owners of the
Property as early as 1948 by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari outright for being an

inappropriate remedy. The Court of Appeals noted that an appeal could have been taken from
the Decision and the Resolution of the OP. Instead of filing an original action for certiorari,
they should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari; and
b. Whether private respondents are barred by the principle of res judicata from instituting
free patent applications over the Property claimed by petitioners.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy. Its
scope of review is narrow, limited only to errors of jurisdiction. Errors of judgment can only
be reviewed through an appeal. Errors of judgment may involve a court's appreciation of the
facts and conclusions of law drawn from such facts. If a court acts within its jurisdiction, then
"any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more
than mere errors of judgment[.]"
On the other hand, errors of jurisdiction are those where the act or acts complained of
were done without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The mere allegation of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari does not

mean that the petition will automatically be given due course. The general invocation of grave
abuse of discretion is insufficient.
In this case, petitioners' allegation that the OP, through then Executive Secretary
Ermita, gravely abused its discretion in failing to appreciate the merits of the 18 February
1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Assuming that the issue raised by petitioners pertains to an error of jurisdiction, there is no
showing that the Office of the President exercised its power in an "arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility."
Petitioners could have taken an appeal from the OP’s Orders by filing a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which governs appeals from judgments rendered
by quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers.
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While it is true that courts may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari despite the
availability of appeal, petitioners failed to allege and prove that appeal would be inadequate
to promptly relieve them of the effects of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Office of
the President. Well-settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari cannot be used as a
substitute for a lost appeal "especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse." In this regard, the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari outright.
The principle of res judicata does not apply. In this case, there is no identity or
substantial identity of parties and identity of subject matter between the 18 February 1948
Decision of the Court of First Instance and private respondents' free patent applications.
The 18 February 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance involved an agreement
between petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, private respondents were not parties to
the agreement. Moreover, there is no clear showing that private respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest shared a common interest with any of the parties to the agreement.
However, assuming that there is identity or substantial identity of parties, there is no

identity of subject matter between the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance
and private respondents' free patent applications. Although both relate to the same Property,
the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance was simply an agreement
partitioning the bigger parcel of land, which embraced the smaller portion claimed by
petitioners and private respondents. On the other hand, private respondents' free patent
applications involved the establishment of their rights as the purported occupants and
cultivators of the Property. Evidently, there is no identity of subject matter. The principle
of res judicata does not apply.
PIEDAD V. BOBILLES
G.R. No. 208614, 27 November 2017.
If manifest wrong or injustice would result with the strict adherence to the statute of limitations or
doctrine of laches, it would be better for courts to rule under the principle of equity. xxx xxx xxx This Court, in a
long line of cases, has allowed for the execution of a final and executory judgment even if prescription has already
set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her benefit or advantage.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1974, Simeon Piedad (Piedad) filed a case for annulment of an absolute
deed of sale against Candelaria Linehan Bobilles (Candelaria) and Mariano Bobilles (Mariano).
The case raffled to Branch 9, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, presided over by Judge
Benigno Gaviola (Judge Gaviola).
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On 19 March 1992, the RTC ruled in Piedad's favor and declared the deed of sale as null
and void for being a forgery. Candelaria and Mariano appealed the trial court Decision, but on
15 September 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC ruling. The
Court of Appeals Decision became final and executory on 1 November 1998. On 22 October
2001, Judge Gaviola issued an order for the issuance of a writ of demolition.
On 4 December 2001, Judge Gaviola issued a Writ of Demolition against Candelaria and
Mariano and referred it to Sheriff Antonio A. Bellones (Sheriff Bellones) for its implementation.
That same day, in the same case, Candelaria filed a Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Simeon Piedad. Judge Gaviola ordered that the petition be heard independently
and that it be raffled to another branch. Candelaria's Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Simeon Piedad was eventually docketed as S.P. Proc. No. 457-T and raffled to
Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, presided over by Judge Gaudioso D. Villarin
(Villarin).
On 12 July 2010, the Heirs of Piedad filed with the RTC, Branch 29, Toledo City a Motion
Praying that an Order Be Issued to Sheriff Antonio Bellones to Resume the Unfinished Writ of
Execution and/or Writ of Demolition. In his Order dated 15 May 2012, Presiding Judge Ruben F.
Altubar (Judge Altubar) of the RTC, Branch 29, Toledo City denied the motion. He opined that
since more than 12 years had passed since the Court of Appeals’s Decision became final and
executory, the execution should have been pursued through a petition for revival judgment, not
a mere motion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners have duly established their personality to file the petition as heirs of
Simeon Piedad; and
2. Whether the motion to revive judgment was timely filed.
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioners have been repeatedly recognized as Piedad's rightful heirs not
only by the Court of Appeals but also by this Court. In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Exec. Judge
Estrera, petitioners filed an administrative case in their capacity as Piedad's heirs and this Court
acknowledged their standing to sue in this capacity. The same is also true in the assailed Court
of Appeals 15 September 1998 Decision where petitioners filed their appeal as Piedad's heirs
and their personality to represent their father was never questioned or assailed.
This Court upheld petitioners' personality to sue in Heirs of Simeon Piedad and sees no
reason to deny them the same recognition in the case at bar when the current case is merely an
offshoot of their father's original complaint for nullity of deed of sale.
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2. Yes. The Court of Appeal's ruling on the nullity of the deed of absolute sale
executed between Piedad and respondents became final and executory on 1 November 1998.
Judge Gaviola, upon motion, then issued an order for the issuance of a writ of demolition on 22
October 2001. However, the writ of demolition was never served on respondents due to their
dilatory tactics and the gross ignorance of the law and undue delay caused by Judges Estrera
and Villarin. The case only began to gain traction on 12 July 2010, when petitioners filed their
motion for the revival of judgment. But by this time, almost 12 years had passed since the Court
of Appeals 15 September 1998 Decision became final and executory.
Despite diligent efforts and the final and executory nature of the Decision, petitioners
have yet to regain possession of what is legally their own. These circumstances clearly
demonstrate that the failure to execute the judgment was due to respondents' refusal to follow
the several writs ordering them to vacate the premises. It would be unfair for the Court to allow
respondents to profit from their defiance of valid court orders.
It is likewise emphasized that if manifest wrong or injustice would result with the strict
adherence to the statute of limitations or doctrine of laches, it would be better for courts to rule
under the principle of equity. Petitioners filed a motion for execution well within the five (5)-
year period prescribed by Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. However, their efforts were
thwarted by respondents' machinations and Judges Estrera's and Villarin's illegal acts of issuing
restraining orders against a coequal court. Nonetheless, petitioners continued to persevere and
filed several motions before Judge Villarin, which the judge proceeded to ignore.
In a long line of cases, the execution of a final and executory judgment was allowed even
if prescription has already set in, if the delay was caused by the judgment obligor for his or her
benefit or advantage.
PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT SELLING, INC. V. TERESITA L. CARANDANG

G.R. No. 206958, 8 November 2017
FACTS:
Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. (“Personal Collection”) filed against Teresita L.
Carandang (“Carandang”) a criminal complaint for Estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of
confidence under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. An Information was
issued against Carandang. However, upon Carandang’s filing of her Motion for
Reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) recommended that the complaint be
dismissed. It also filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the Regional Trial Court, stating
that the Office of the City Prosecutor found that there was lack of probable cause to hold
Carandang liable for estafa.
The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Withdraw Information. The trial court
also noted the general policy of the courts to not interfere in the conduct of preliminary
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investigations and to give the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable
cause. It found that no exception existed in the case that would require the court to intervene in
the findings of the preliminary investigation.
Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that
the trial court failed to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case and only relied on
Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales' recommendation that there was no probable cause to charge
Carandang with estafa. Personal Collection also alleged that it was deprived of due process
when the RTC granted Carandang's Motion to Release Cash Bond, even though Personal
Collection did not receive a copy of this motion.
CA dismissed the Pteition for Certiorari, finding that: (a) the Regional Trial Court
conducted an independent asessment of the facts of the case; (b) Personal Collection was not
deprived of the opportunity to oppose Carandang's Motion to Release Cash Bond, since under
Rule 110, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the accused's bail bond shall be automatically
cancelled when the accused was acquitted; and (c) only the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), can ask for the reinstatement of the criminal case against Carandang,
since a private offended party's interest in a criminal case was limited to its civil aspect.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the RTC correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information against
Carandang upon a finding that there was a lack of probable cause;
b. Whether Personal Collection was deprived of due process when it was allegedly not
given notice or opportunity to be heard on respondent Carandang's Motion to Release
Cash Bond; and
c. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Petition was improper, as it is
only the State which may pray for the reinstatement of the criminal case.
HELD:
Yes. The RTC correctly allowed the withdrawal of the Information against Carandang.
In granting or denying a motion to withdraw an Information, the court must conduct a cautious
and independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and must be convinced that the
merits of the case warrant either the dismissal or continuation of the action. However, courts are
not absolutely barred from reversing a prior determination of probable cause upon the
reassessment of evidence presented to it. There is no grave abuse of discretion when an earlier
finding of probable cause is overturned, if it can be shown that the judge arrived at the later
conclusion upon an independent study of the available facts and evidence on record.
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The order granting the withdrawal of an information must state the judge's assessment
of the evidence and reasons in resolving the motion. It must clearly show why the court's earlier
assessment of probable cause was erroneous. The court should not merely accept the
prosecution's findings and conclusions. Its independent judicial discretion in allowing the
information to be withdrawn must not only be implied but must be palpable in its
order. Should the court fail to faithfully exercise its judicial discretion, the order granting the
withdrawal of the information is void.
A reading of the Order shows that the trial court made its own assessment of the
prosecution's evidence as embodied in its January 29, 2010 Resolution, It sufficiently explained
how the elements of estafa were not met based on the additional evidence presented by the
accused at the reinvestigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor. The trial court also
considered the opposition filed by Personal Collection to the Motion to Withdraw Information,
giving even the private offended party the opportunity to be heard.
No. Personal Collection’s right to due process was not violated when it was not given
notice or an opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release Cash Bond. No notice or hearing
was necessary since the bail was automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case.
Petitioner's hypothetical objections to the Motion to Release Cash Bond would have been
superfluous and unnecessary since the release of the cash bond to Carandang was already
warranted under the Rules of Court.
Yes. If the case is dismissed or if there is an acquittal, the appeal of the criminal aspect
of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State. The capability of
the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect
of the case. Moreover, a Petition for Certiorari was inappropriate, since appeal, under Rule 122,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, was an available remedy for Personal Collection. Despite the
use of an improper remedy, the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the issues to pursue
judicial economy.
TEODORO C. TORTONA, ET AL., V. JULIAN C. GREGORIO, FLORENTINO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 202612, 17 January 2018.
FACTS:
During their lifetime, Rufina and Rafaela co-owned and equally shared with their other
siblings two (2) parcels of land located in Bacoor, Cavite.
Sometime in 1997, petitioners Teodoro, et al., the heirs of Rufina, filed a complaint for
recovery of real property with damages against their cousin, Casimiro, representing the heirs of
Rafaella. Petitioners Teodoro, et al. alleged that instead of the giving themtheir 1/10 th share in
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the proceeds of the expropriation of their properties, Casimiro only offered the amount of
Php50,000.00 as “balato.” Casimiro, on the other hand, argued that Rufina already sold her
share to the properties to Rafaella, through a purported notarized Deed of Sale. Since she was
illiterate and could not sign her own name, Rufina supposed thumbmarked the Deed of Sale.
During trial, petitioners Teodoro, et al., presented an NBI Agent who testified that the
thumb mark in the Deed of Sale does not match the standard thumb marks of Rufina appearing
in other public documents. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners Teodoro, et al., and held that
the Deed of Sale was forged. However, the CA reversed trial court’s decision and ruled that the
Deed of Absolute Sale was a notarized document and had in its favor the presumption of
regularity.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in applying the presumption of regularity on
the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
HELD:
No. The presumption of regularity in the execution of the Deed of Sale was contradicted
by clear and convincing evidence. Documents acknowledged before a notary public are
presumed to have been duly executed. This presumption may be contradicted by clear and
convincing evidence.
It is then incumbent upon petitioners to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
seller's thumbmarks, as appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale, are forged. Petitioners
successfully discharged this burden. With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina's
apparent thumbmarks on the Deed of Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks on authentic
documents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO

G.R. No. 207074, 17 January 2018
FACTS:
Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always been female. Her
parents, married on 23 May 1981, have never changed their names. To accurately reflect these
facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the RTC for the correction of her name from
"Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano" her
mother's middle name, "Angangan;" her father's middle name, "Balingao;" and her parent's
marriage date, 23 May 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.
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The RTC granted Gallo’s petition under Rule 108. The OSG assailed the RTC’s ruling and
argued that the petition should have been made under Rule 103 because her petition is not just
for mere correction of entries, but will cause substantial changes which require looking into the
party’s records, supporting documents, testimonies and other evidence. The Court of Appeals
denied the OSG’s appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Gallo’s relief is governed by R.A. No. 9048, Rule 103 or Rule 108.
HELD:
Except for the change in her sex from “male” to “female,” which is correctly governed
by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the changes in the entries of Gallo’s records merely involve
the correction of mistakes, are governed by R.A. No. 9048. Thus, she should have sought the
correction thereof administratively.
R.A. No. 9048 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. By qualifying the definition of a clerical,
typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding," the law
recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to and evaluation of
existing documents presented.
Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is
"obvious to the understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the
birth certificate was ever used.
The corrections in Gallo’s Certificate of Live Birth regarding her first name, inclusion of
her middle name, inclusion of her parents’ middle names and her parents’ date of marriage,
may be done by referring to existing records in the civil register. None of it involves any change
in Gallo's nationality, age, status, or sex. Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought
to correct them administratively before filing a petition under Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under Rule
108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or typographical errors
in R.A. No. 9048.
N.B.: Since R.A. No. 10172 was enacted only 15 August 2012, which allows
typographical errors in entries in the biological sex to be administratively corrected, is not yet
applicable when this case was filed.
Also note that although there was no compliance by Gallo of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, for reasons of equity, the Supreme Court allowed this petition for the
prosecutor’s failure to raise the issue of at an opportune time.
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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RAUL T. MANZANO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 188243, 24 January 2018.
FACTS:
Respondents Manzano et al. are owners of 4 parcels of land planted with rubber trees in
Isabela, Basilan. Respondents voluntarily offered their lands to the DAR for agrarian reform
under CARP. The DAR then endorsed the matter of land valuation to the LBP. The issue of the
valuation reached the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB).
Since they were not satisfied with the PARAB’s determination in the total of
P2,944,797.26 for the four (4) lots, respondents filed with the RTC an action for determination of
just compensation. While the case was pending, LBP deposited the PARAB’s judgment award,
through cash and LBP bonds, as provisional compensation for the acquired properties.
The RTC adopted the Commissioners’ report and determined the amount of Php
9,100,711.00 as just compensation for the four (4) lots. Thus, LBP filed a Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals, seeking for the reversal of the RTC’s Decision.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal, pursuant to Rule
39, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion for execution pending
appeal. LBP filed an Urgent Verified Motion/Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals arguing that the RTC’s
order granting respondents’ motion for execution pending appeal violated judicial courtesy.
ISSUES:
1. In determining just compensation, whether or not the Regional Trial Court can simply
adopt the Consolidated Commissioners' Report, and whether or not it is mandated to
follow the formula prescribed under R.A. No. 6657, Section 17 in relation to
Administrative Order No. 05-98 and Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99;
2. Whether there may be execution pending appeal; and
3. Whether the 6% legal interest should be imposed
HELD:
1. Yes. The RTC, as a Special Agrarian Court has the full discretion to make a
binding decision on the value of the properties, and must be respected.
Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may accept Commissioners'
Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further report, set it aside and appoint new
commissioners, or accept only a part of it and reject the other parts.
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The determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed
or limited by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.
2. Yes. Under Rule 39, Section 2(a), a judgment appealed before the Court of
Appeals may still be executed by the RTC, provided there are good reasons for the judgment's
execution. The RTC found that respondents have been deprived of their land since 1999. They
were dispossessed of the beneficial use, fruits, and income of their properties, which were taken
from them more than 20 years ago without compensation. Thus, the denial of the execution
pending appeal will infringe on their constitutional right against taking of private property
without compensation.
In their motion for execution pending appeal, respondents indicated their willingness to
return any amount in the event that the just compensation fixed by the RTC is modified by the
Court of Appeals. This sufficiently addresses petitioner’s sole objection against execution
pending appeal.
3. Yes. While the deposits might have been sufficient for purposes of the immediate
taking of the landholdings, the deposits cannot be claimed as amounts that would excuse the
payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the compensation due.
Interest should be awarded to the landowner if there is no "prompt and valid payment."
There is no prompt payment if the payment is only partial. Thus, petitioner's delay in payment
makes it liable for legal interest by way of damages. The legal interest must be applied on the
unpaid balance of the compensation due. Therefore, the amount already received by
respondents should be subtracted from the total judgment, and the rate of legal interest should
be calculated from that amount.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF SSGT. EDGARDO L.

OSORIO V. ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR JUAN PEDRO C. NAVERA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 223272, 26 February 2018.
FACTS:
Major General Palparan and SSgt. Osorio were charged in two (2) Informations before
Branch 14, RTC, Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines students
Empeño and Cadapan. Warrants of Arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio.
SSgt. Osorio was arrested by Colonel Herbert Yambing, the Provost Marshall General of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. SSgt. Osorio was turned over to the PNP-CIDG. He was
detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine Army Custodial
Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
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Contending that he was illegally deprived of liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed his petition for
habeas corpus arguing: (a) that the courts-martial, not a civil court such as the RTC, had
jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the
offense charged was allegedly "service-connected; and (b) a ranking officer of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines may not be charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention because
such felony may only be committed by a private individual.
ISSUE:
Whether a writ of habeas corpus is petitioner SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio's proper remedy
HELD:
No. A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy
is to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This ordinary remedy is
to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest based on one or more of the
grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under the Revised Penal
Code. Applying R.A. No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court, specifically by
the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the crime of kidnapping. The processes
which the trial court issued, therefore, were valid.
It should also be noted that kidnapping is not “service-related.” Kidnapping is not part
of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the legal duty to detain a person, the
public officer must be able to show the existence of legal grounds for the detention. Without
these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted in a private capacity and is
considered a "private individual."
EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, ET AL. V. SPOUSES BARBARONA
G.R. No. 195814, 4 April 2018.
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FACTS:
Spouses Barbarona claimed that they are owners of a lot located in Mandaue City, Cebu,
virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 53698. They filed a complaint for ejectment with
the MTC against petitioners namely, Eversley, Jagobiao National High School, the Bureau of
Food and Drugs, and some residents, who are the occupants. The occupants alleged they had
been in possession of the property for more than 70 years, and therefore, the MTC has no
jurisdiction.
In its Decision, the MTC, finding that the case is one for unlawful detainer, ordered the
occupants to vacate the property. The RTC upheld the MTC’s Decision. One of the occupants,
Eversley filed a motion for reconsideration to the RTC’s decision.
During the pendency of Eversley's motion, the Court of Appeals, in another case,
rendered a Decision, cancelling OCT No. R0-824 and its derivative titles, including the TCT No.
53698 of Spouses Barbarona, for lack of notice to the owners of the adjoining properties and its
occupants.
Meanwhile, the RTC denied Eversley’s motion. It appealed the case to the Court of
Appeal, which was, however, dismissed. Thus, this present petition by Eversley arguing that:
(a) the Court of Appeals’ invalidation of the TCT of Spouses Barbarona had the effect of
invalidating their right of possession; and (b) the action is one of accion publiciana, and
therefore, not within the MTC’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
None. A case for unlawful detainer must state the period from when the occupation by
tolerance started and the acts of tolerance exercised by the party with the right to possession. If
it is argued that the possession was illegal from the start, the proper remedy is to file an accion
publiciana, or a plenary action to recover the right of possession. Moreover, while an ejectment
case merely settles the issue of the right of actual possession, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally passed upon if the issue of possession cannot be resolved without it. Any final
disposition on the issue of ownership, however, must be resolved in the proper forum.
In this case, Spouses Barbarona ailed to state when Eversley’s possession was initially
lawful, and how and when their dispossession started. All that appears from their Complaint is
that Eversley’s occupation is illegal and not anchored upon any contractual relations with
Spouses Barbarona.
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Such allegation is insufficient to determine if the action was filed within a year from
dispossession, as required in an ejectment case. On the contrary, Spouses Barbarona allege that
Eversley’s occupation was illegal from the start. The proper remedy, therefore, should have
been to file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to assert their right of possession or their
right of ownership.
Considering that respondents filed the improper case before the MTC, it had no
jurisdiction over the case. Any disposition made, therefore, was void. The subsequent
judgments of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which proceeded from the void MTC’s
judgment, are likewise void.
KIM LIONG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200630, 4 June 2018
FACTS:
In an Information, Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to
Equitable PCI Bank, despite demand, a total of US$50,955.70, which was erroneously deposited
in his dollar account.
Initially, the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence was scheduled on 19 December

2005. However, at the prosecutor’s instance, the hearing was cancelled four times, and its first
witness, Dela Rama, was only presented on 8 June 2006. Dela Rama’s direct examination was
only terminated on 25 January 2007. The cross examination of Dela Rama was initially set on 15
March 2007. However, at accused’s instance, the hearing for the cross examination of Dela Rama
was cancelled was reset three (3) times. However, on 31 July 2008, the hearing was again reset to
16 October 2008 because Dela Rama had suffered a stroke. The hearings scheduled on 5
February, 7 May, and 27 August 2009, were cancelled for failure of accused’s counsel to appear.
Thus, the prosecution moved that accused be considered to have waived its right to cross-
examine Dela Rama. The court granted the prosecution’s motion.
ISSUE:
Whether accused should be considered to have waived its right to cross-examine the
prosecution’s witness
HELD:
Yes. The delay is attributable to accused’s own actions and evident tactic to delay the
case.
Denying an accused the right to cross-examine will render the testimony of the witness
incomplete and inadmissible in evidence. However, like any right, the right to cross-examine
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may be waived. When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but fails
to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have waived this right.
In this case, accused was given more than enough opportunity to cross-examine witness
Dela Rama. Contrary to his allegation, five (5) of the cancellations are attributable to him.
Accused failed to aggressively exercise his rights to confront and cross-examine witness Dela
Rama. The absence of counsel during the two (2) hearings was never explained. Accused had
the habit of frequently changing counsels. In fact, he was even admonished for again changing
his counsel and causing delay to the proceeding.
When the accused abuses its option to choose his counsel as in this case, he can be
deemed to have waived his right to confrontation and cross-examination. The pattern of
postponements and changes of counsel in this case is so obvious and patent. Petitioner should
have been dissuaded by any of the lawyers, unless they, too, connived in such an amateurish
strategy, which wastes the time and resources of our judicial system.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V. THE CITY OF DAVAO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 190324, 6 June 2018
FACTS:
On 17 June 2004, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) received a letter from the City
Assessor of Davao for the assessment and collection of real property taxes against its
administered properties located at Sasa Port. This includes the subject properties. It appealed
the assessment via registered mail to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals through the Office
of the City Treasurer of Davao on 2 August 2004. The Office of the City Treasurer of Davao
received the appeal on 11 August 2004, and forwarded it to the Chairman of the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals, who received it on 6 September 2004. While the case was pending, the
City of Davao posted a notice of sale of delinquent real properties, including the three (3)
properties subject of this case.
The Local Board of Assessment Appeals dismissed PPA’s appeal for having been filed
out of time, and for its lack of jurisdiction on the latter's tax exemption. The PPA appealed
before the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, but this appeal was denied in the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, it filed an appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Meanwhile, the PPA filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing
the City of Davao’s notice of sale of delinquent properties.
While the petition with the Court of Appeals is pending, the CTA granted PPA’s appeal
and declared the subject properties exempt from real estate taxes.
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Thereafter, the Court of Appeals dismissed PPA’s petition for certiorari, and held that
the CTA had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the propriety of the levy and that PPA should
have applied for the issuance of writ of injunction or prohibition before the CTA
ISSUE:
Whether the CTA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction or prohibition
HELD:
Yes. R.A. No. 9282, provides that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

....
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided
by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals[.]
The real property tax liability was the very reason for the acts which PPA wanted to
enjoin. Thus, the CTA, and not the Court of Appeals, which had the power to preserve the
subject of the appeal, to give effect to its final determination, and, when necessary, to control
auxiliary and incidental matters and to prohibit or restrain acts which might interfere with its
exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal. Thus, the City of Davao’s acts carried out
pursuant to the imposition of the real property tax were also within the jurisdiction of the CTA.
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals’ Decision assailed by PPA before the Court of
Appeals was rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the real property tax
assessment of its properties. Clearly, this falls within the above-cited provision. Indeed, there is
no dispute that this Central Board of Assessment Appeals decision constitutes one of the cases
covered by the CTA's exclusive jurisdiction.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (DARMPC),

V. CARMENCITA DIAZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 206331, 4 June 2018
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner DARMPC with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter, however, dismissed the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The NLRC denied
respondents’ motions for reconsideration.
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Thus, respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
assailing the NLRC’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted respondents’ Petition for
Certiorari and ruled that they were illegally dismissed.
Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court its Urgent Motion to Admit Attached Petition,
with an attached Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego. In
the motion, petitioner’s counsel explained that his belated filing of the Petition for Review
before this Supreme Court was due to the Court of Appeals’ resolution being misplaced during
the holiday season, and that he went to the province to prepare for elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition for Review should be denied for being filed out of time
HELD:
YES. Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it,
within the period prescribed under Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court results in a party's
loss of right to appeal. It is settled that appeal, being a mere statutory right, must "be exercised
in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law.” Failure to file one's appeal
within the reglementary period is fatal to a party's cause, "precluding the appellate court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner's plea for the liberal application of procedural rules is unavailing. A liberal
construction of rules of procedure must be based on justifiable reasons or at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with them. In this case, however, no reasonable attempt has been made
by petitioner to comply with the mandatory requirement of filing within the reglementary
period. Its counsel’s excuses of failing to monitor the date of the receipt of the Court of Appeals
and his electoral activities do not excuse compliance with the period.
JEROME R. CANLAS V. GONZALO BENJAMIN A. BONGOLAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. 199625, 6 June 2018
Petitioner Canlas filed his Complaint-Affidavit against respondents, who are Home
Guaranty’s officers. Canlas claimed that the Home Guaranty Officers were guilty of grave
misconduct and of entering into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the government under
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 by selling lots owned by the government at a low price.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, which the Court of Appeals upheld. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel approved of the
proposal before the Home Guaranty’s Board of Directors approved the sale. It also ruled that
petitioner Canlas was a stranger to the contract and had no right to dictate the parameters
under which the contracting parties may determine price.
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ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Canlas may appeal the decision dismissing the administrative
complaint against respondents
HELD:
No. For administrative cases, under Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, the
Ombudsman's decision may not be appealed if it dismisses the complaint or imposes the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine
equivalent to one (1)-month salary. Otherwise, it may be appealed to the Court of Appeals
under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman's Decision exonerated respondents. Thus, petitioner
Canlas has no right to appeal this Decision. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of
law. Since there is no law allowing petitioner Canlas to appeal, he has no right to appeal.
This absence of a right to appeal affects petitioner Canlas' legal standing in this case. He
is not a party entitled to the relief prayed for, or one who will benefit or be injured by the results
of the suit.
FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC. V. PHILIPPINE BANK OF

COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 202836, 19 June 2018.
FACTS:
Petitioner First Sarmiento entered into a loan agreement with PBCOM, which was
secured by a real estate mortgage. PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real
Estate Mortgage, claiming that First Sarmiento failed to pay the loan. This prompted PBCOM to
resort to extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.
First Sarmiento attempted to file a Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage with
the Regional Trial Court. However, the Executive Clerk of Court refused to accept the
Complaint in the absence of the mortgaged properties' tax declarations, which would be used to
assess the docket fees. First Sarmiento then filed an “Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of
Subject Matter of the Complaint as Not Capable of Pecuniary Estimation” with the Executive
Judge. The Executive Judge ruled that First Sarmiento's action for annulment of real estate
mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, First Sarmiento was able to file its
Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage.
PBCOM opposed First Sarmiento’s complaint arguing that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for annulment of mortgage was
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a real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market value of the
mortgaged properties. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed First Sarmiento’s Complaint ruling that
the court never acquired jurisdiction for First Sarmiento’s failure to pay for docket fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not First Sarmiento’s action for annulment of real estate mortgage is an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
HELD:
Yes. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the court, the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought must be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought such as specific performance, support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, the action may not be estimated in terms of money. Thus,
these cases are cognizable exclusively by the RTC.
In this case, petitioner First Sarmiento never prayed for the reconveyance of the
properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession
over them. Rather, it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it
entered into with PBCOM because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the loan
agreement.
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO V. SEIICHI TANAKA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 199515, 25 June 2018
FACTS:
Racho and Tanaka were married on 20 April 2001 in Las Piñas City. They lived in Japan
and had no children. In 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce which was granted. This was evidenced
by the Divorce Certificate issued the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines, and authenticated
by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Racho tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered in the Philippines in Civil Registry
of Manila, National Statistics Office and the DFA for her passport renewal, however, said
offices refused since there was no court order recognizing it.
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Thus, Racho filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to
Marry with the RTC, Las Piñas City. The RTC denied her Petition and ruled that Racho was not
able to prove the law of Japan.
In the Court of Appeals, Racho argued that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by
agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by
two (2) or more witnesses. She thus submits that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance
Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan
on 16 December 2009” is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by
agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce.
ISSUE:
Whether Racho’s divorce may be recognized in the Philippines
HELD:
Yes. Racho sufficiently proved the laws of Japan, and that the divorce was obtained in
compliance therewith. Before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a
separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and foreign judgment. It must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial
courts.
In this case, Tanaka’s national law was duly admitted by the RTC when Racho presented
"a copy [of] the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan translated under the authorization of
the Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee. The law was sufficiently proven.
On the other hand, in proving that the divorce decree was validly obtained in
accordance with the laws of Japan, Racho submitted her Divorce Certificate and Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce.
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that
are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any
officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country.
In this case, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by
an Authentication issued by Consul of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan. Applying Rule 132,
Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of
the fact of divorce between Racho and Tanaka.
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ELMER P. LEE V. SALES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 205294, 4 July 2018.
FACTS:
The Ombudsman Field Investigation Office charged spouses Lee, who are both
employed in the BIR as Revenue Officer I, with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In its Decision, the Ombudsman found the Spouses Elmer and Mary Lee guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct. Thus, petitioner Lee filed his Motion for Reconsideration.
During the pendency of his Motion for Reconsideration, Elmer Lee received a letter from the
BIR directing him to turn over all government assets and documents to the head office. The
letter also prohibited him from reporting to, representing the office, among other.
Thus, Elmer Lee’s filed a petition for injunction with the RTC seeking to enjoin the BIR
from executing his dismissal during the pendency of Motion for Reconsideration with the
Ombudsman. The RTC denied Elmer Lee’s Petition stating that the Ombudsman’s Decision is
immediately executory.
ISSUE:
Will the pendency of Elmer Lee’s motion for reconsideration enjoin the execution of the
Ombudsman Decision? Will an injunctive writ enjoin the execution of the Ombudsman’s
decision?
HELD:
No. A pending motion for reconsideration of a decision issued by the Ombudsman does
not stay its immediate execution. Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory
even pending appeal, it follows that they may not also be stayed by the issuance of an injunctive
writ.
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 has been amended by Administrative
Order No. 17, thus:
Sec. 7. Finality and execution of decision. — x x x
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be

executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the
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decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against said officer.
Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal, it
follows that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an injunctive writ. It bears noting that for
an injunction to issue, the right of the person seeking its issuance must be clear and
unmistakable. However, no such right of petitioner exists to stay the execution of the penalty of
dismissal. There is no vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to hold office.
DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY V. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. No. 192223, 23 July 2018
FACTS:
Lihaylihay is a "Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to Republic Act No.
2338, duly accredited and registered as such with the BIR and PCGG. Said law provides that an
informant may be rewarded in a sum equivalent to 25% of the revenues, charges or fees
recovered, or compromise agreement offered.
Thus, he wrote letters to the BIR-PCGG Task Force and gave information regarding
Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth. Twenty (20) years later, Lihaylihay demanded that he paid the
informant’s reward in the amount of 25% of the Phop118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered
by the Philippine government through compromise agreements with the Marcoses.
The BIR referred him to the PCGG. The PCGG thereafter, referred him to the
Department of Finance. Without waiting for the latter’s response, Lihaylihay filed a petition for
mandamus insisting his entitlement to the reward.
ISSUE:
Whether Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondents then
Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Governor of
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to deliver to him proceeds and properties representing 25%
informer's reward pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338.
HELD:
No. The grant of Lihaylihay’s entitlement to an informant’s reward is not merely

ministerial function. It requires that determination of compliance with the laws and rules, and
examination of evidentiary matters.
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A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, "when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station"; second, "when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled."
The following are the requisites in proving entitlement to the writ of mandamus: (a)
petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established; (b) must also be shown to
have actually neglected to perform the act mandated by law; and (c) the duty is ministerial.
In this case, fatal to Lihaylihay’s claim for an informer's reward under Section 1 of R.A.
No. 2338 is the fact that R.A. No. 2338 is no longer in effect. The grant of an informer's reward
for the discovery of tax offenses is currently governed by Section 282 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, which was amended by R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
Under Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, an
information given by an informer shall merit a reward only when it satisfies certain formal and
qualitative parameters. As a matter of form and procedure, that information must be voluntarily
given, definite, and sworn to. Qualitatively, that information must be novel and, subsequently,
prove itself effective.
Thus, Lihaylihay’s entitlement to an informer's reward is not a ministerial matter. Quite

the contrary, its determination requires a review of evidentiary matters and an application of
statutory principles and administrative guidelines. Its determination is a discretionary, quasi-
judicial function, demanding an exercise of independent judgment on the part of certain public
officers.
CESAR M. CAGANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 31 July 2018
FACTS:
On 10 February 2003, the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging that

Amelia May Constantino, Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the Vice Governor's Office,
Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or
aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies."
On 31 December 2003, the Commission on Audit submitted its audit report finding that
the officials and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to have
embezzled millions in public funds.
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On 30 September 2003, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order which recommended that a
criminal case for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Cagang, among others.
There was delay in the release of the Ombudsman’s order. Only five (5) sets of
reproductions were released on 20 November 2003 while the rest were released only on 15
January 2004.
In a 293-page Resolution dated 11 August, 2004 the Ombudsman found probable cause
to charge Governor Escobar, Vice Governor Constantino, Board Members, and several
employees of the Office of the Vice Governor of Sarangani and the Office of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It was later on modified in its Supplemental Order dated 18
October 2004. The Supplemental Order stated that a preliminary investigation should be
conducted against Mangalen and Macagcalat.
In the meantime, the Ombudsman filed the informations against the foregoing,
including accused Cagang. In 2010, Escobar, Maglinte, and Cagang were acquitted.
In a Memorandum dated 8 August 2011, the prosecutor prayed for the approval of the
informations to be filed against Cagang, among others. The recommendation was approved by
Ombudsman Morales on 20 October 2011, or more than 7 years from the issuance of the
Supplemental Order in 2004. Thus, accused Cagang filed his “Motion to Quash/Dismiss with
Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest” arguing that there was an inordinate delay of 7
years in the filing of the Informations.
ISSUE:
Whether there was inordinate delay in the prosecution of Cagang’s case to warrant the
dismissal thereof.
HELD:
Although there was delay, Cagang failed to invoke his right to speedy disposition of
cases despite knowledge that the preliminary investigation of his case is still pending.
Moreover, the complexity of the case justifies the period spent for the preliminary investigation.
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in
the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of
how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the
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complexity of a given case. Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional
rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of
right.
In this case, Cagang is considered to have waived his right. Despite the pendency of the
case since 2003, Cagang only invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the
informations were filed on 17 November 2011.
Moreover, the records of the case show that the transactions investigated are complex
and numerous. As the Ombudsman points out, there were over a hundred individuals
investigated, and eventually, 40 of them were determined to have been involved in 81 different
anomalous transactions. Thus, there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition
of cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex case.
MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ V. THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. 210950, 15 August 2018
FACTS:
Enriquez filed a Complaint for Replevin against Asuten before the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City, Pampanga to recover her Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at P300,000.00. Enriquez
applied for a replevin bond from Mercantile Insurance. The bond was effective for one (1) year.
She also executed an indemnity agreement with Mercantile Insurance where she agreed to
indemnify the latter "for all damages, payments, advances, losses, costs, taxes, penalties,
charges, attorney's fees and expenses of whatever kind and nature" that it would incur as surety
of the replevin bond.
On 24 May 2004, the RTC dismissed Enriquez’ complaint. Due to Enriquez’ failure to
post a new bond because the previous bond expired, and non-compliance with the order to
surrender the van, the court declared the bond forfeited. The court also directed Mercantile
Insurance to pay Asuten the amount of P600,000.00.
Thus, Mercantile Insurance filed a complaint for a sum of money against Enriquez. She
argued that she may not be held liable to pay considering that the replevin bond already
expired.
ISSUE:
Should Enriquez be held liable for the replevin bond?
HELD:
Yes. Enriquez is still liable to Mercantile Insurance despite the expiration of the
coverage. Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property.39 It is both a principal
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remedy and a provisional relief. When utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover
possession of personal property. As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for
the delivery of the property before the commencement of the action or at any time before an
answer is filed. Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the party seeking the issuance of the writ must
first file the required affidavit and a bond in an amount that is double the value of the property.
A surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally decided,
resolved, or terminated, regardless of whether the applicant fails to renew the bond. The
applicant will be liable to the surety for any payment the surety makes on the bond, but only up
to the amount of this bond.
AMOGUIS V. CONCEPCION BALLADO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 189626, 20 August 2018.
FACTS:
Ballado Spouses filed a Complaint for damages, injunction with writ of preliminary
injunction, mandatory injunction, cancellation and annulment of titles, and attorney's fees
against St. Joseph Realty who supposedly rescinded their contracts of sale of lots. It appears that
St. Joseph Realty already sold the lots to petitioners.
In their Answer, St. Joseph Realty argued that had no jurisdiction to hear the case, and
that jurisdiction was properly vested in the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The
case was archived in 1989 without prejudice, pending the submission of a settlement by the
parties. Five (5) years later, on 8 April 1994, the case was revived upon Spouses Ballado’s
motion.
It was only 1996 that Ballado Spouses were finally able to present their evidence in chief.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the Ballado Spouses, and against St. Joseph Realty
and the Amoguis Brothers.
St. Joseph Realty and the Amoguis Brothers appealed the RTC’s decision with the Court
of Appeals. Notably, they did not raise the issue of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, Court of Appeals discussed the issue on jurisdiction, and ruled that the
subject matter of the case involved subdivision lots. Therefore, jurisdiction was lodged with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. However, since neither St. Joseph Realty nor the
Amoguis Brothers raised the issue of jurisdiction before the RTC, they must be considered
estopped from raising it on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are estopped from questioning the issue of the RTC’s jurisdiction
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HELD:
Yes. Petitioners are already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Laches had already set in. According to Presidential Decree No. 1344, exclusive
original jurisdiction for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman is lodged with the HLURB.
The Ballado Spouses' Complaint should have been filed before it. The HLURB also had
jurisdiction over the injunction and annulment of titles sought against petitioners as these were
incidental to St. Joseph Realty's unsound business practices.
Although the RTC has no jurisdiction, petitioners are nevertheless considered to be

estopped.
A party is estopped from claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction when:
(1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;

(2) the statutory right was not invoked;
(3) an unreasonable length of time lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction;
(4) the claimant actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court
without jurisdiction;
(5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of which forum possesses subject
matter jurisdiction;
(6) irreparable damage will be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the
claimant's implicit waiver.
In this case, the allegations, determinative of subject matter jurisdiction, were apparent
on the face of the Complaint. The law that determines jurisdiction of the HLURB had been in
place for more than a decade when the Complaint was filed. St. Joseph Realty raised lack of
jurisdiction in its Answer. Petitioners sought affirmative relief from the Regional Trial Court
and actively participated in all stages of the proceedings. Therefore, there was no valid reason
for petitioners to raise the issue of jurisdiction only in the Supreme Court.
RE: ELVIRA N. ENALBES

A.M. NO. 18-11-09-SC, 22 January 2019
Period for Supreme Court to decide on cases merely directory
FACTS:
Petitioner is a party to two (2) petitions filed the Supreme Court, which were both
raffled to the Supreme Court’s Division. At that time, the Supreme Court’s First Division was
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headed by Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro (“CJ de Castro”). Despite the lapse of
five (5) years, the Supreme Court’s First Division failed to decide on said petitions.
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, gross
inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service against CJ de Castro. She alleged that the failure to promptly act on the Petitions
resulted in a violation of her constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases.
ISSUE:
Whether CJ de Castro should be held administratively liable for failing to decide on the
two (2) petitions despite the lapse of five (5) years.
HELD:
No. The 24-month period for the Supreme Court to decide on cases, as provided under
Article 8, Section 15 of the Constitution and Rule 13, Section 1 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court is merely directory in nature. Failure to render a decision within this period
would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid. It
is a mere directive to ensure this Court's prompt resolution of cases, and should not be
interpreted as an inflexible rule.
HYGIENIC PACKAGING CORP. V. NUTRI-ASIA, INC.

G.R. NO. 201302, 23 January 2019
Stipulation as to venue and referral to arbitration should be
stated in a contract of sale to be binding
FACTS:
Nutri-Asia, Inc. (“Nutri-asia”) purchases plastic bottles and ratchet caps for its banana
catsup products from Hygienic Packaging Corporation (“Hygienic”). Every transaction was
covered by a Purchase Order issued by Nutri-Asia, which includes as part of the terms and
conditions an “arbitration clause” that “all disputes arising in connection with this Contract
shall be referred to an Arbitration Committee, in accordance with the Philippine Arbitration
Law…” Hygienic issued Sales Invoices and Delivery Receipts for all sales to Nutri-asia.
Hygienic filed a complaint for sum of money against Nutri-asia with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila “pursuant to the stipulation of the parties as stated in the Sales Invoices
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the City of Manila in any legal action
arising out of their transaction.”
In its Answer with Motion to Dismiss, Nutri-asia alleged that: (a) Hygienic failed to
comply with a condition precedent since under the “Terms and Conditions” stated in the
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Purchase Order, Hygienic should have first referred the matter to the Arbitration Committee;
and (b) venue is improperly laid because the Complaint should have been filed either before the
trial courts of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City, where the principal places of business of
Hygienic and Nutri-Asia are located, respectively. According to Nutri-asia, it is not bound by
the venue of actions as stated in the Sales Invoices since it did not give its express conformity to
that stipulation.
ISSUE:
Whether the provision on the Hygienic’s Sales Invoice as regards the venue of action,
and the provision on the referral to arbitration stated in Nutri-asia’s Purchase Order are binding
on the parties.
HELD:
No. Neither the Sales Invoice nor the Purchase Order is a contract of sale containing the
specific terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. Petitioner’s Sales Invoices merely state
that respondent's representative “Received the above goods in good order and condition.” The
purpose of respondent's representative in signing the Sales Invoices is merely to acknowledge
that he or she has received the plastic containers in good condition. To extend the effect of the
signature by including the venue stipulation would be to stretch the intention of the signatory
beyond his or her objective. This Court, then, cannot bind respondent to the other stipulations
in the Sales Invoices.
On the other hand, respondent’s Purchase Orders show that the signature of petitioner's
representative is above the phrase “Acknowledged By (Supplier).” Moreover, the Purchase
Orders included a note stating that the “[Purchase Order] must be DULY acknowledged to
facilitate payment.” Thus, petitioner’s act of signing the Purchase Orders was limited to
acknowledging respondent's order and facilitating the payment of the goods to be delivered. It
did not bind petitioner to the terms and conditions in the Purchase Orders, which included the
arbitration clause.
Petitioner and respondent may have entered into a contract of sale with respect to
petitioner's merchandise. However, the case records do not show that they have a contract in
relation to the venue of any civil action arising from their business transaction. Since there is no
contractual stipulation that can be enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of
petitioner's personal action will be governed by the Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The case was
dismissed without prejudice.
LAPI v. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 210731, 13 February 2019
Right to question validity of arrest may be waived
FACTS:
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Petitioner was arrested without a warrant for alleged violation of Section 15, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, after police officers “peeped through his window” and saw him and two
others “having a pot session.” Upon drug examination after the arrest, petitioner tested positive
for drugs. The RTC convicted petitioner, and ruled that the warrantless arrest against him was
legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. In his petition before the Supreme Court, petitioner questioned the validity of his
arrest. He alleged that his warrantless arrest was illegal from the start, and argued that the
police officer committed "a malevolent intrusion of privacy" when he peeped through the
window; had he not done so, he would not see what the people in the house did.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may question the validity of his arrest for the first time in his Petition
before the Supreme Court
HELD:
No. As with certain constitutional rights, the right to question the validity of a
warrantless arrest can be waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest. In this case, petitioner admits
that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment. He did not move to
quash the Information against him before entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel when he
entered his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence. Hence, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the validity of the warrantless arrest.
No items were seized from him during his arrest as he was not charged with possession
or sale of illegal drugs. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165.
REYNES v. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 223405, 20 February 2019
Admission by silence
FACTS:
Reynes alleged that Barangay Captain Amores collected increased monthly garbage
collection fees amounting to P2,000.00, even without any ordinance or statute, or any other
regulation authorizing its collection, and despite the City of Lapu-Lapu already collecting its
own garbage fees. When Reynes questioned the increase in the collection fee, Amores ordered
the cessation of the collection of the resort's garbage.
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Aggrieved, Reynes wrote a letter dated 8 August 2011 to Amores questioning her
authority to levy garbage collection fees, considering that the same fees were already being paid
to the City of Lapu-Lapu alongside business taxes and fees for licenses, and considering that no
public hearing was ever conducted. Copies of this letter were furnished to the offices of the City
Mayor, Vice Mayor, City Attorney, and City Secretary.
Amores still offered no explanation and, in a meeting, merely told Reynes' wife, Dr.
Sonia Beth Reynes (Dr. Reynes), that the collection of P2,000.00 was "final and unalterable.” Left
with no alternative, lest the resort's garbage be left uncollected, Reynes relented to paying
P2,000.00 monthly.
Reynes filed a complaint for illegal exactions under Article 213 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code against Amores with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. Reynes
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the Ombudsman’s resolution
dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether Amores’ failure to explain, despite receipt of the letter dated 8 August 2011, be
considered as evidence against her during the preliminary investigation
HELD:
Yes. The situation engendered by the 8 August 2011 letter calls to mind the Revised
Rules of Evidence's provision on admission by silence. To be clear, the Revised Rules on
Evidence did not govern the proceedings before public respondent, “except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.” Moreover, the provision on
admission by silence refers to any “act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing [of another],” not to a declaration made in written correspondences. Nonetheless, the
basic wisdom underlying the provision on admission by silence is obvious and
commonsensical. The application of that underlying wisdom, if not of the actual rule, is readily
appreciable here.
The grave imputations that were communicated not only to private respondent Amores,
but even to the highest officials of the Lapu-Lapu City Government, demanded a denial, a
refutation, or some manner of response from private respondent Amores. Yet, the record is
bereft of proof of any such response. That she appears to have never bothered to address a
damning situation raises grave questions that can only militate against her cause.
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MARANTAN v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. NO. 206354, 13 MARCH 2019
Grave abuse of discretion in preliminary investigation
FACTS:
On 6 January 2013, a shootout occurred in Atimonan, Quezon between the combined

forces of the Philippine National Police (police personnel) and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines' First Special Forces Battalion (armed forces personnel) on one (1) side, and 13 fully
armed men riding a convoy of vehicles on the other.
Then President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (“Pres. Aquino”) ordered the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate what was called the Atimonan Encounter. While
the investigation was ongoing, and before all the involved police and armed forces personnel
filed their affidavits recounting the incident, then Department of Justice Secretary Leila De Lima
(“SOJ De Lima”) made public pronouncements on the Atimonan Encounter, reportedly
mentioning petitioner’s name.
Alarmed by SOJ De Lima's statements, petitioner, together with a number of soldiers

represented by their respective counsel, wrote the head of the NBI requesting that, upon the
investigation's conclusion, any action against those allegedly responsible for the shooting
incident be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the Department of Justice.
SOJ De Lima submitted to then President Aquino a report stating that the NBI would file
criminal charges against the involved police and armed forces personnel.
The NBI filed the complaint with DOJ. Petitioner filed a letter-request for the DOJ’s
inhibition in hearing the complaint. It was denied. After the submission by the parties, the DOJ
Panel found probable cause to indict petitioner for multiple murder.
Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
alleging that the DOJ Panel acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause
against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Marantan's
letter request for inhibition.
HELD:
No. The relevant issues in determining whether grave abuse of discretion attended the
preliminary investigation are: (1) whether petitioner had been so fundamentally deprived of an
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opportunity to be heard in relation to the purposes of preliminary investigation; (2) whether the
infirmities were so fatal that they effectively deprived petitioner of any opportunity to be heard
during the judicial examination, pre-trial, and trial; and (3) whether there would be a public
policy interest in suspending the criminal action.
The process of preliminary investigation is essentially one-sided, as it serves only to

assist the prosecution to summarily decide whether there was sufficient basis to: (1) charge a
person with an offense; and (2) prevent a harassment suit that both prejudices a respondent and
wastes government resources. During the preliminary investigation, the prosecution only needs
to determine whether it has prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of the information.
Petitioner failed to show any basis to find that the DOJ Panel’s Resolution, which found
probable cause to charge him with murder, as erroneous. He broadly claims that the Panel was
not an impartial tribunal and, because their superior had already prejudged petitioner to be
guilty, they had no choice but to arrive at the same conclusion and tailor their resolution fit to
find probable cause against petitioner. However, aside from failing to establish respondent
Department of Justice Secretary De Lima's bias against him, petitioner also failed to show that
the Panel's conclusion was wrong, much less tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Panel's conclusions appear to have been well-reasoned evidence-based. It listed the
evidence and circumstances it relied on to conclude that the police personnel had, in conspiracy,
killed the victims.
HA DATU TAWAHIG V. HON. CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR

G.R. NO. 221139, 20 MARCH 2019
Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes designed to
address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the tribal chieftain of the Higaonon Tribe. A criminal complaint for rape
was filed against him. Citing R.A. No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997,
petitioner filed an action for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the RTC Cebu and
all public prosecutors of Cebu to honor a Resolution dated 3 January 2007 issued by a body
known as the “Dadantulan Tribal Court,” and be required to put an end to petitioner’s criminal
prosecution. The Dadantulan Tribal Court absolved Sumatra, a tribal leader of the Higaonon
Tribe, of liability for charges of rape and discharged him from criminal, civil, and
administrative liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the court may issue a writ of mandamus against the RTC Cebu and the public
prosecutors of Cebu to desist from proceeding with the rape case against petitioner in view of
the provisions of R.A. No. 8371
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HELD:
No. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from
taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative
rights and duties in support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
Moreover, the basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions make it improper
for the State to yield "disputes" involving criminal offenses to indigenous peoples' customary
laws and practices. To yield criminal prosecution would be to disregard the State and the
Filipino people as the objects of criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may
enable a measure of reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will
never enable the consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino people. Ultimately
then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a miscarriage of justice.
It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscarriage of
justice. Its view of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances.
Preservation is pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the
national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes designed to
address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.
MANIBOG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 211214, 20 MARCH 2019
Standards of stop-and-frisk vis-à-vis search incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest
FACTS:
A policeman received information from a police asset that Manibog was standing
outside the Municipal Tourism Office of Dingras, Ilocos Norte with a gun tucked in his
waistband. To verify this information, a team of policemen proceeded to the Municipal Tourism
Office located around 20 meters from the police station. About five (5) to eight (8) meters away
from the Municipal Tourism Office, the Chief Inspector saw Manibog standing outside the
building. The team slowly approached him for fear that he might fight back. As he moved
closer, the Chief Inspector saw a bulge on Manibog's waist, which the police officer deduced to
be a gun due to its distinct contour. The Chief Inspector went up to Manibog, patted the bulging
object on his waist, and confirmed that there was a gun tucked in Manibog's waistband. He
disarmed Manibog of the .45 caliber handgun inside a holster, after which he arrested him for
violating the election gun ban and brought him to the police station for an inquest proceeding.
The RTC found Manibog guilty of the election offense with which he was charged. It
ruled that the warrantless search on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest because there
was probable cause for the police officers to frisk and arrest him. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC’s finding and ruled that the warrantless search made on Manibog was incidental to a
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lawful arrest, since the police officers had probable cause to believe that he was committing a
crime when he was arrested. It noted that Manibog had been caught in flagrante delicto and
failed to show a permit allowing him to carry his firearm.
ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless search made upon petitioner Manibog was unlawful, and,
consequently, whether the gun confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence.
HELD:
The warrantless search falls under a valid stop-and-frisk search. The gun confiscated
from Manibog is admissible in evidence.
For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under
Section 5(a), the arresting officer must have personally witnessed the crime; under Section 5(b),
the arresting officer must have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
committed an offense. However, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally
precedes, or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search. In contrast with warrantless
searches incidental to a lawful arrest, stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime.
For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal
knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit act.
Anything less than the arresting officer's personal observation of a suspicious circumstance as
basis for the search is an infringement of the "basic right to security of one's person and effects."
To sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have
personally observed two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then
create a reasonable inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate
further.
Here, while the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted
on petitioner, the facts on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. Rather, what transpired was a stop and frisk search.
The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner
had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable suspicion that he was
carrying a gun during an election gun ban. However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonymous
with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrantless
arrest. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the search conducted on petitioner fell
under the established exception of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
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Nonetheless, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers'
observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason
for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner.
LIM V. LIM
G.R. No. 214163, 1 July 2019
Petition for Certiorari; Judicial Affidavit Rule
FACTS:
Ronald Geralino M. Lim (Ronald) filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor, a
Complaint for grave threats against his brother, Edwin M. Lim (Edwin). Acting favorably on the
Complaint, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an Information against Edwin before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Iloilo City.
Pre-trial ensued but was reset for a number of times, to enable the prosecution to submit
their judicial affidavits. Accordingly, pre-trial was reset to 21 November 2013, at 8:30 a.m. On
the said day, however, the prosecution moved that they be allowed to submit the judicial
affidavits of Ronald and their witness later that day. It explained that it had completed the
Judicial Affidavits earlier, but “for whatever reason,” was not able to submit them. Despite the
defense counsel’s insistent opposition, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities granted the Motion
and gave the prosecution until 5:00 p.m. that day to submit the judicial affidavits.
Aggrieved, Edwin moved for reconsideration, which the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
denied. It reasoned that since it had already received the Judicial Affidavits and in the interest
of justice, its 21 November 2013 stands. Nevertheless, it ordered the prosecution to pay a fine of
Php1,000.00 for its failure to file the Judicial Affidavits within the period prescribed by the
Judicial Affidavit Rule. Hence, Edwin filed before the Regional Trial Court, a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, which was granted. In granting Edwin’s Petition for Certiorari,
the Regional Trial Court held that the Municipal Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in admitting the prosecution’s Judicial Affidavits, stating that the prosecution is
required to submit the same not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. However, despite
several postponements of the pre-trial, the prosecution still failed to comply with the express
provision of the Judicial Affidavit Rule.
ISSUE:
Whether the Municipal Trial Court’s non-compliance with procedural rules may be
questioned through a Petition for Certiorari.
HELD:
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Yes, the Municipal Trial Court’s non-compliance with procedural rules may be
questioned through a petition for certiorari. It is undisputed that the Municipal Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion in blatantly disregarding the clear wording of A.M. No. 12-
8-8-SC or the Judicial Affidavit Rule. The Rule is explicit: the prosecution is mandated to
submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five (5) days before pre-trial. Should
they fail to submit them within the time prescribed, they shall be deemed to have waived their
submission.
Nevertheless, if the belated submission of judicial affidavits has a valid reason, the court
may allow the delay once as long as it "would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and
the defaulting party pays a fine of not less than Pl ,000.00 nor more than PS,000.00, at the
discretion of the court.
ARREZA V. TOYO
G.R. No. 213198, 1 July 2019
FACTS:
On 1 April 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese
citizen, were married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo. After
19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of
Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in
Tetsushi's family register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu.
On 24 May 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. In support of her Petition,
Genevieve submitted a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's Family Register, the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and an English translation of the Civil
Code of Japan, among others.
On 14 February 2014, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment, denying

Genevieve's Petition. The Regional Trial Court that while the pieces of evidence presented by
Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government of
Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan's law.
The Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English
translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in
Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Aggrieved,
Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was subsequently denied in the Regional
Trial Court.
ISSUE:
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Whether the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation submitted by
Genevieve may be admitted in evidence even if they were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
‘
HELD:
No, the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation submitted by
Genevieve are inadmissible in evidence, as they were not duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
As a rule, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or

the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication
of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is
an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied
under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document
have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
In this case, the English translation submitted by Genevieve was published by Eibun-
Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in publishing English translation of
Japanese laws, which came to be known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. 55 However, these
translations are "not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;" rather, it is
in the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws and regulations are published,
albeit in Japanese.
Accordingly, the English translation submitted by Genevieve is not an official

publication exempted from the requirement of authentication.
Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise. Under the Rules
of Court, “a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge.”
The evidence is hearsay when it is "not . . . what the witness knows himself [or herself] but of
what he [or she] has heard from others." 59 The rule excluding hearsay evidence is not limited to
oral testimony or statements, but also covers written statements.
The rule is that hearsay evidence "is devoid of probative value.” However, a published
treatise may be admitted as tending to prove the truth of its content if: (1) the court takes
judicial notice; or (2) an expert witness testifies that the writer is recognized in his or her
profession as an expert in the subject.62
Here, the Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator's and
advisors' qualifications. Nor was an expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only
evidence of the translator's and advisors' credentials is the inside cover page of the English
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2013-2019
translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the Regional Trial Court was correct in not
considering the English translation as a learned treatise.
BATAC V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 216949, 3 July 2019
FACTS:
Eduardo T. Batac (“Batac”) filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
a Complaint against Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and Martin. He averred that in
May 2005, he was informed that his property in Barangay San Antonio, Mexico, Pampanga was
being quarried without his consent, under the instructions of Mayor Tumang, and using the
latter’s dump trucks. As a result of which, Batac claimed that Mayor Tumang and his co-
perpetrators Barangay San Antonio Captain Rafael P. Yabut (“Barangay Captain Yabut”) and
Pantaleon Martin (“Martin”), and charged them for violation of Republic Act Nos. 3019 and
6713.
The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause against Mayor Tumang, Barangay
Captain Yabut, and Martin for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. It found that
Martin posed himself as a tenant of the property, provided no evidence of his tenancy, and
exercised an act of ownership over the property. The local officials, meanwhile, were found
inexcusably negligent when they acceded to Martin's request without the property owner's
consent. The Office of the Ombudsman further ruled that Batac was injured by the quarrying,
because he was deprived from the use of the lahar deposits.
However, the charges of theft and violation of R.A.No. 3019, Section 3(a) were
dismissed. The Office of the Ombudsman also issued a Decision on the administrative aspect of
Batac's Complaint. It found Mayor Tumang and Barangay Captain Yabut guilty of misconduct
and violation of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6713, and penalized them each with a three (3)-month
suspension. Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut, and Martin filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Resolution, as did Batac.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed all charges against Mayor Tumang, Barangay
Captain Yabut, and Martin. In ruling that no corrupt practice under Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 had been committed, the Office of the Ombudsman reasoned that the element of
undue injury to any party or giving a private party unwarranted benefits was absent. It found
that Batac was not injured since he did not own the lahar deposits on his property. Neither was
the government injured since the lahar was used for road development in San Antonio.
While acknowledging that the public officials could be held administratively liable for
not securing a permit before quarrying, the Office of the Ombudsman nonetheless found the
charges lacking in merit. It noted that after the Complaint had been filed in 2006, Mayor
Tumang was re-elected in 2007 and 2010, which rendered the charge against him moot under
the condonation doctrine. As for Barangay Captain Yabut, the record showed no evidence that
he had conspired with Mayor Tumang in the unauthorized quarrying. Accordingly, the Office
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2013-2019
of the Ombudsman issued a resolution, recommending the dismissal of the criminal and civil
aspects of the complaint for lack of merit. Consequently, Batac filed a Petition for Certiorari,
arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding
probable cause to file complaints against Mayor Tumang, Barangay Captain Yabut and Martin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not this Honorable Court may reverse the Office of the Ombudsman’s
finding that there is no probable cause to file complaints against Mayor Tumang, Barangay
Captain Yabut and Martin for corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
HELD:
Generally, the Supreme Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's
exercise of its prosecutorial and investigative powers, and in its determination of reasonable
ground to believe a crime has been committed.
Special civil actions for certiorari do not correct alleged errors of fact or law that do not
constitute grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court only reviews the Office of the
Ombudsman's determination of whether probable cause exists upon a clear showing of its
abuse of discretion, or when it exercised it in an "arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic
manner."
Absent the existence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court generally shall not disturb
public respondent Office of the Ombudsman's determination as to whether probable cause
exists in this case.
BDO UNIBANK, INC. V. CHOA

G.R. No. 237553, 10 July 2019
Petition for Certiorari; Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 119)
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) against
Choa, then president and general manager of Camden Industries, Inc. (Camden). He was
charged with violating Presidential Decree No. 115, or the Trust Receipts Law, to the prejudice
of BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO), the private complainant.
On 13 October 2014, upon his receipt of the RTC’s order admitting the prosecution’s
evidence, Choa filed his Motion for Leave (To File Demurrer to Evidence), and attached thereto,
his Demurrer to Evidence.
In its Order dated 26 November 2014, the RTC issued an Order granting Choa’s
Demurrer to Evidence, stating that the records and the witnesses’ testimonies failed to establish
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2013-2019
his guilt. Similarly, the trial court declared that the case is subject to compensatory action, which
is civil in action. Such dismissal was eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
ISSUES:
1. Whether BDO has the legal personality to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA;
2. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in granting Choa’s Demurrer to Evidence.
HELD:
1. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court held that in a criminal case in which the
offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party
is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court
or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such appeal.
In this case, although BDO discussed Choa’s criminal liability in its Petition for
Certiorari, the totality of its arguments concerns the civil aspect of the case. Thus, BDO has the
legal personality to file a special civil action questioning the RTC Order insofar as the civil
aspect of the case is concerned.
2. Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states that the Motion for Leave of Court
to file Demurrer to Evidence shall be filed within a non-extendible period of 5 days after the
prosecution rests its case.
In this case, the prosecution is deemed to have rested its case on 12 September 2014,
when the RTC admitted its documentary evidence. However, the 5-day period did not
commence on 20 August 2014, when the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence; or on 12 September 2014, when the RTC admitted the evidence. Instead, it started
upon Choa’s receipt of the 12 September 2014, for only then was he notified had rested its case.
Choa filed his Motion for Leave and Demurrer to Evidence on 13 October 2014. In this
case, RTC issued its 12 September 2014 directing Choa to submit his comment/opposition to
BDO’s formal of evidence, which he submitted on 25 September 2014. Thus, even if there is no
record of when Choa received a copy of the 12 September 2014 Order, it can be surmised that he
received it before 25 September 2014. Hence, the Motion for Leave and the Demurrer to
Evidence was filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period provided under Rule 119, Section 23.
PEOPLE V. SISON
G.R. No. 238453, 31 July 2019.
Search and Seizure
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2013-2019
FACTS:
According to the prosecution, the Municipal Police Station of M'lang, North Cotabato
received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup carrying 3 people that was
transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police instructed the alert team to set up a
checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along the road from Matalam to M'lang. When said
vehicle reached the checkpoint, it was stopped by the team of police officers on standby. Their
team leader thereafter asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The driver alighted and, at
an officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered
beside the engine.
The RTC convicted Yanson, Sison, and Bautista of the crime charged, stating that the
search conducted on the tipped vehicle is a valid warrantless search as the accused consented
thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether a valid search and seizure was conducted on the pickup boarded by accused.
HELD:
A search of a moving vehicle is one of the few permissible exceptions where warrantless
searches can be made. However, for a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid,
probable cause remains imperative. Law enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct
searches.
In these illustrative cases, law enforcers acted on tipped information that a crime was
being committed, or was about to be committed. However, the seizures and arrests were not
merely and exclusively based on the initial tips. Rather, they were prompted by other attendant
circumstances. Whatever initial suspicion they had from being tipped was progressively
heightened by other factors, such as the accused's failure to produce identifying documents,
papers pertinent to the items they were carrying, or their display of suspicious behavior upon
being approached. In all these instances, the finding of probable cause was premised on more
than just the initial information relayed by assets. It was the confluence of initial tips and a
myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable cause.
It cannot be said that Sison, the driver, consented to the search made by the arresting
officers. Jurisprudence states that "[m]ere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search
is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all."
MILLER V. MILLER
G.R. No. 200344, 8 August 2019
Correction of entry
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2013-2019
FACTS:
John Miller (John) and Beatriz Marcaida were legally married. They bore 4 children,
namely: (1) Glenn M. Miller (Glenn); (2) Charles Miller; (3) Betty Miller (Betty); and (4) and John
Miller, Jr. After John's death, Joan Miller (Joan), through her mother Lennie Espenida (Lennie),
filed with the RTC a Petition for Partition and Accounting of John's estate with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, receivership, support, and damages. Alleging that she is John's
illegitimate child with Lennie, Joan presented her Certificate of Live Birth which showed John to
be her registered father.
Glenn filed a separate Petition praying that Joan's Certificate of Live Birth be cancelled.
With it, he also prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Gubat, Sorsogon be directed to replace
Joan's surname, Miller, with Espenida, and that Joan use Espenida instead of Miller in all official
documents. Glenn claimed that John did not acknowledge Joan as a natural child, pointing out
that John's signature was not in her birth certificate. It was also not shown that John knew and
consented that his name would be indicated in the certificate.
On 26 November 2004, the RTC issued a Judgment in favor of Joan. It held that the "due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further action is required.” Glen thus filed an Appeal with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC’s Judgment allowing Joan
Miller y Espenida to continue using the surname Miller.
HELD:
Glenn's initiatory pleading before the RTC is a Petition for Correction of Entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Joan Miller y Espenida. This type of petition is governed by Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, it is undeniable that petitioners sought the correction of Joan Miller’s
surname in her birth certificate registered as Local Civil Registrar No. 825. They want her to use
her mother's surname, Espenida, instead of Miller, claiming that she was not an acknowledged
illegitimate child of John. Surely, what petitioners seek is not a mere clerical change. It is not a
simple matter of correcting a single letter in private respondent's surname due to a misspelling.
Rather, private respondent's filiation will be gravely affected, as changing her surname from
Miller to Espenida will also change her status. This will affect not only her identity, but her
successional rights as well. Certainly, this change is substantial.
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This Court emphasized that "legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack." Moreover,
impugning the legitimacy of a child is governed by Article 171 of the Family Code, not Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
WEBB V. GATDULA
G.R. No. 194469, 18 September 2019
Double Jeopardy; Contempt
FACTS:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb (Webb), among others, was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde (Carmela), then killing her, her mother, and
her sister in 1991. While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a
Motion to Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA
Analysis. As he claims in his Petition, the DNA testing would establish his innocence since the
results would show that the semen found in Carmela did not belong to him. When the Motion
was denied, Webb filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial. In a 20 April 2010
Resolution, the Supreme Court granted Webb’s request to order a testing on the semen
specimen found in Carmela’s cadaver, in view of the Rules on DNA Evidence. The Court
likewise ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to assist the parties in submitting the
semen specimen to the University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute.
However, the NBI claimed that the semen specimen was no longer in its custody. It
alleged that the specimen had been submitted as evidence to the trial court when its Medico-
Legal Chief, Dr. Cabanayan testified. Due to the missing semen specimen, Webb filed this
Petition for Indirect Contempt.
ISSUES:
1. Whether this action is barred by the decision of the Supreme Court in Lejano; and
2. Whether respondents are guilty of indirect contempt; particularly: (i)

disobedience or resistance to a lawful order of the court; and (ii) improper conduct tending to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
HELD:
1. No, this action is not barred by the decision of the Supreme Court in Lejano. The
principle of res judicata, a civil law principle, is not applicable in criminal cases. To be sure,
while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, Rule
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39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Besides, even if the principle of res judicata were applied, this action is still not
precluded by the finality of the decision in the criminal case. Between Lejano and this
contempt case, only the first three (3) elements of res judicata are present: (a) the judgment
in Lejano is final; (b) it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (c) it was
a judgment on the merits. The last element is absent: there is no identity of parties, issues, and
cause of action in the two (2) cases.
2. Yes, respondents may be held liable for indirect contempt. Criminal contempt is
a “conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect.”
The disobedience that the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. To
be held liable for contempt, a person’s act must be done willfully or for an illegitimate or
improper purpose. Thus, the good faith, or lack thereof, of the person being cited in
contempt should be considered.
The facts here sufficiently prove that, indeed, there was willful disobedience.
Respondents Gatdula, Caabay, Mantaring, Dr. Bautista, Dr. Cabanayan, Atty. Arizala, and Atty.
Esmeralda should, therefore, be cited in contempt for disobedience of a lawful order of this
Court.
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Remedial Law-JLlonen Cases 2013

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SURVEY OF CASES IN REMEDIAL LAW PENNED BY J.

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2013

SEC. DE LIMA V. GATDULA

Proper procedure in Amparo Cases.

The RTC erred in requiring a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of

EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORP. V. CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET

Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties Marcelo N. Naval

By virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated 9 August 2006, EIB transferred EDC's

On 22 February 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan

Whether or not the RTC’s denial of the motion is correct.

Although the grant of a motion for production of document is admittedly discretionary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BAYAO

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORP. V. JUDGE LIDUA, SR.

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

TANKEH V. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whether or not respondents are correct.

Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2014

PRYCE CORP. V. CHINA BANKING CORP.

On the element of identity of parties, res judicata does not require absolute identity of

LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. V. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORP.

Civil Procedure; Default (Rule 9)

1) Whether Lui correctly filed a motion to set aside order of default.

Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause, Executive determination vs. Judicial determination

Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment (Rule 47)

a) The court lacks jurisdiction in granting the adoption.

b) There is extrinsic fraud.

CATHAY METAL CORP. V. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC.

Civil Procedure; Service of Summons (Rule 14)

In 1996, respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative (“Laguna West”) caused

On 15 September 2000, Cathay Metal filed a consolidated petition for cancellation of

Art. 51. Address. — Every cooperative shall have an official postal address to

Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or special

The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to cooperatives' activities

We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive.

OLIVAREZ REALTY CORP. V. CASTILLO

Civil Procedure; Summary Judgment (Rule 35)

A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings. Under

A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac's checkpoint.

According to Cogaed, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, waiting for a jeepney to take

(1) There was no valid search.

None of the above instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of

ISSUE: Is the two-dismissal rule applicable?

No. Rule 17 of the Rules of Court governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the

BUENA, JR. V. BENITO

ISSUE: Is Mandamus the correct remedy?

DE PEDRO V. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORP.

Respondent Romasan Development Corporation (“Romansan”) filed complaints for

Romansan moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, including De Pedro, in

No. Service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation is allowed

ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC. V. CHIONGBIAN

ISSUE: Did RTC Branch 10 correctly deny the motion to dismiss?

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2015

CLUB FILIPINO, INC. V. BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, ET AL.

Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union representing the employees

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE V. SPS. RUNE AN LEA STROEM

RICHARD RICALDE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there

HENRY ONG LAY HIN V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION V. LA SAVOIE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

La Savoie Development Corporation (La Savoie) is a domestic corporation engaged in