EN BANC

[A.C. NO. 7054 : December 4, 2009]

CONRADO QUE, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a complaint for disbarment,1 Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla,
Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline
(IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondent's abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition
for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the
final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court2 (MeTC) and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer
case rendered against the respondent's clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts
have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the
complainant's and his siblings' titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;

(2) The respondent's commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to
impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal
gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC
judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

(3) The respondent's lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by
resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration
of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued
by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the
respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up
his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in
supporting the above falsehood.4

(4) The respondent's willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the
good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous
counsel of the respondent's clients.

(5) The respondent's deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the
petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

(6) The respondent's willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment
of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in
Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

In his Answer,5 the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development
Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate,
the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over
the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful
detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were
the plaintiffs and the respondent's present clients were the defendants.

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his
sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions
to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these
petitions were all based on valid grounds - the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC
over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty.
Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family against his
clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the
complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his resort to
a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of
his clients.

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of
the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint),
the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations and the notes
he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court.

The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect
to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by
dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted
sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied
having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of
title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole
representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The
respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor
General to represent his clients in the case.6

The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or
immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith
in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to
uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent
additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainant's counsel,
Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings7 before the IBP that the present complaint
violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on
which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before
the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint
was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to
harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case
No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan8 (Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his
Report and Recommendation, he stated:

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights
of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is
the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the
courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his
clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage
multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.9

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted
the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final
decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.10

On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in
filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a
petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in
the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.11

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence
showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition
for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to
the presiding judge, all of which were untrue.12

On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondent's
explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of
whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-
01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the
representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants
complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating
Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondent's argument regarding his
misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that
only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint
for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.

The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No.
XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.13 On reconsideration,
the Board of Governors reduced the respondent's suspension from the practice of law to one
(1) year.14

The Issue

The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the
imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.

The Court's Ruling

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline.

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed
involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been
filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,15 we
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially
imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the
suspension to six (6) months.16

Abuse of court procedures and processes

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of
serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the
execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against
these clients:

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question
the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the
respondent's petition, the CA held:

Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it
must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.17

Second, notwithstanding the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again
questioned the MeTC's and the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a
petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC
with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.18

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-
38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainant's title to the
property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were
both dismissed "for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs" to file the
petition.19

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for
annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising
their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent
based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainant's title because the property is a
part of forest land.

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he
had filed in several courts - the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment,
the second petition for annulment of complainant's title and the petition for declaratory relief
- reveal the respondent's persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final
decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case.

Under the circumstances, the respondent's repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means
allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already
uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In
these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure
and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." By his actions, the respondent used
procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.20

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,21 as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are
directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations
constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak
havoc on orderly judicial procedure;22 and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.23

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts' jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondent's subsequent
petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts
to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing
the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his
clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment
and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer
decision, long after this decision had become final.

Willful, intentional and deliberate

falsehood before the courts

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon
City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The
extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:

In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the
proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration -
thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them
away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise
and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived
with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner
(defendants therein) '24

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for
reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he
believed "that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void."25
These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting
the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the
reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.

Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second
petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that
only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands26 on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by
the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be
represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines
was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the
respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the "plaintiffs."
In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and
waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and
his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both
counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in
open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their
counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO
DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER
TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD.27 [Underscoring and
emphasis theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for
the respondent's application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the
adverse party's motion to dismiss.28 The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in
abeyance the respondent's application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the
motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party.29 As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge
of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as
transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for
Reconsideration are not true.

'how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal
bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of
irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter
of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the
respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are
all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what
allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing.30

For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of
Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyer's duty to observe candor and fairness in
his dealings with the court. This provision states:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court,
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer "never to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."31
The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an
indispensable participant in the administration of justice,32 and that he is expected to act
candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.33 His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to
conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how
demanding his duties to his clients may be.34 In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield
to his duty to deal candidly with the court.35

In defending his clients' interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN

THE BOUNDS OF LAW

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor.36 He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless
appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.37 The recital of what the respondent did to
prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed
what the above rule expressly prohibits.

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the
respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and
accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the
adverse party.

We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his
accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in
the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the
respondent's petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for
reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful
detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void
ab initio.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to "conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues." He was unfair because he
imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he
effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.

Unauthorized appearances

We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanan's finding that the respondent twice

represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of
judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.38

In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of
judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15
individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondent's off-hand explanation that he truly
believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in
the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly
improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the
respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who
received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University of the
Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously
associated.39 As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondent's explanation of
compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real
charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly
represented.

In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the
respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the
Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where
he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as
a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended
complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs - his clients and the Republic.

In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not
represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latter's representative or, in
the absence thereof, without leave of court.40 The willful unauthorized appearance by a
lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants
disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.41

The Respondent's Defenses

We find no merit in the respondent's defenses.

"Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of
another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an
honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms
and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would
render the transaction unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for
an ulterior purpose.43 As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the
attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person
whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.

In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his
clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he
made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread
the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the
soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC
and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his
petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and
honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of
avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.

On the respondent's allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not
amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.44 As we
explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyer's discretion in acting for his client can
never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must
give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client's case with
the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath
he took upon admission to the Bar that he 'will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same'; and that he 'will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.' Needless to state, the lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it
must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyer's responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by
ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.45

We cannot give credence to the respondent's claim that the disbarment case was filed because
the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this
argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against
him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate
disbarment case against the respondent.

The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment
proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of
the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice - an issue where the complainant's
personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also
explained in the case In re: Almacen:

. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.

xxx

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.46 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the
complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year
suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to
the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent's multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate
action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and
from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the
expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly
administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent's first ethical infraction
of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia v. Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of
court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating
with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his
penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it
is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited
traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent's professional legal career for
the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164

dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of
the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the
Lawyer's Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon
12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21
and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed,
and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.