FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 165987             March 31, 2006

JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners,

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004 denying
the motion for reconsideration thereof.

On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor
filed a Complaint for Partition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among
the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who
claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor
Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.

On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention,4 alleging
as follows:

1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for
partition between plaintiffs and defendants;

2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one
of the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is
subject to herein special proceedings for partition;

3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her late
husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.

WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to submit attached
Answer in Intervention.5

Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention,6 claiming that she was the surviving
spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and
Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the
appointment of a special administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her
pleading a copy of the marriage contract7 which indicated that she and Jose were married on
February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented the
marriage contract as well as the Reply-in- Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased, where
Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of
the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9 However, Josefina did not appear in court.

Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated that she and the deceased
were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that they
were subsequently married in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966.
Among those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito
Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her father.11 While she did not know Josefina
personally, she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two
did not live together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s
relatives consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with Jose because there had been no news of
Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and
Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate
Josefina and her whereabouts remained unknown.

Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina annulled
because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more
than seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita also
declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married
three times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United States.

On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12 denying the motion and
dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court
pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody thereof. According to the
court, the determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the
second marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been
previously married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof
required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that
while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification
and the accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities
required by law could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.

The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were
the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to
them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the
oppositor did not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan through counsel, not
sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and compliance with the basic rules of evidence
to proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir
of the deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss (sic) with
cost[s] de oficio.

On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through counsel
sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly
supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children,
Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late
Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in
accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or
intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they are
legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case maybe (sic).13

Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita admitted
in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous
marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous
marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage was proven in accordance with the basic
rules of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second
marriage was void from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article
83 of the Civil Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present"
(thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second
marriage were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an
absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate
spouses.

The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.

Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous
marriage valid and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also stressed
that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any
subsequent marriage is null and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that
she had been absent for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.

In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal
wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the
following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the
matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedding; the birth and the baptismal certificates of children during such union, and other
subsequent documents mentioning such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the
first marriage in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was
mere hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent
Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own personal knowledge.
They also pointed out that Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose
after their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first time in 1988 during the filing
of the case for partition of the latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed out that
Josefina does not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of
Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article 41 of the Family Code, is
applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she had not
been heard of for more than seven years.

In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that
Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the
deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission
no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that
Josefa was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18 the appellate court ruled
that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission, and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted
by the party who made the admission should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the
other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention
and to forthwith conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the
appellate court.

Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the
admission of private respondent’s intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that
in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the
CA completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof, such admission
may be contradicted by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. Moreover,
Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting knowledge
of the alleged first marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.

Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under Section
4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission which
does not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in
her favor.

Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage
to private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing,
for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be
considered hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate
her Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a
purported marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.

The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other
party who claims to be the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition
involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.

The petition is dismissed.

The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the
existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:

1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956;20

Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late
husband had been previously married to another. To the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes
a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21 A party who judicially admits a
fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;22 production of
evidence is dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field
of controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by
the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the
contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party
or not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as
against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.26

On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the pertinent provision of
the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:

SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in
a separate proceeding.

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter
in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof.27 Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or action by
which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in
claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of
plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a
third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court,
of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a
party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such
proceedings."28

Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent
Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has
shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia
Ltd. v. Court of Appeals:29

x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties
to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated,
expensive and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an
interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would
put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the
establishment of which plaintiff could not recover.30

In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving legal
spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings even
after the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties of the
decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside the
compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that "in the
interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the action for partition,
given the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper disposition of
the case."32

Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals33 is not in point, as
the Court therein did not discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved
the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the Court
ultimately determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a
share in the subject properties.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper
proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

WE CONCUR:
 ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-
Magtolis (Chairman) and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-47.
2
 Rollo, p. 48.
3
 Id. at 49-59.
4
 CA rollo, pp. 40-42.
5
 Id. at 41.
6
 Id. at 43-47.
7
 Id. at 53.
8
 Id. at 48-52.
9
 Id. at 48.
10
 Order dated September 13, 2002, id. at 13.
11
 CA rollo, p. 14.
12
 Id. at 13-20.
13
 G.R. No. 96740, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 138.
14
 CA rollo, p. 20.
15
 Id. at 21-28.
16
 TSN, 13 February 2002, pp. 9-10, 18-19, 22, 27; CA rollo, pp. 23-26.
17
 CA rollo, p. 29.
18
 G.R. No. L-20241, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 146, 149.
19
 Rollo, p. 47.
20
 CA rollo, p. 48.
21
 In Re Lefkas General Partners No. 1017, 153 B.R. 804 (N.D.Ill. 1993).
22
 Sherill v. W.C.A.B. (School Dist. of Philadelphia), 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 492 (1993).
23
 Re Marriage of Maupin, 829 S.W.2d 125 (1992).
24
 Mobil Oil Co. v. Dodd, 515 S.W.2d 350 (1974).
25
 Elayda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49327, July 18, 1999, 199 SCRA 349, 353, citing
Joe’s Radio Electric Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 104 Phil. 333 (1958).
26
 Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232 (1948), citing McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 Phil
248 (1922).
27
 First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 88345, February 1,
1996, 253 SCRA 30, 38.
28
 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, G.R. No.
89909, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 820, 824.
29
 451 Phil. 482 (2003).
30
 Id. at 492-493.
31
 G.R. No. 102726, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 579.
32
 Id. at 585.
33
 Supra note 13.