A.C. No.

12066, August 28, 2018

VICENTE FERRER A. BILLANES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEO S.

LATIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative case stemmed from a complaint1 dated February 14, 2013 filed by
complainant Vicente Ferrer A. Billanes (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent Atty. Leo S. Latido (respondent), praying that the
latter be administratively sanctioned for his alleged professional misconduct.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that sometime in 2009, he decided to engage respondent as

counsel in order to have his marriage with his estranged Filipina wife, Meriam R. Arietta
(Arietta), annulled. After undergoing a series of interviews with respondent and paying
the appropriate legal fees, respondent told complainant to await the notice from the
court where the former filed the petition.2 About a month later, respondent informed
complainant that his petition was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros,
Cagayan, Branch 33 (RTC-Ballesteros), docketed as Civil Case No. 33-306B-2008, and
that, in fact, a Decision3 dated May 14, 2009 (RTC Decision), penned by Executive
Judge Francisco S. Donato (Judge Donato), was already rendered in his
favor.4 Complainant was then shown a copy of the said Decision; however, he doubted
the authenticity of the same, given that: (a) regarding the venue of the case, he was a
resident of Lipa City, Batangas and yet his petition was filed before the RTC-
Ballesteros; and (b) the RTC-Ballesteros purportedly granted his petition, without him
even participating in the proceedings therein. These concerns notwithstanding,
respondent assured complainant of the RTC Decision's authenticity, claiming that "non-
appearance" in annulment cases is already allowed.5 Eventually, respondent caused the
annotation6 of the RTC Decision on complainant's marriage contract that was on file at
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Dumaguete City (OCR-Dumaguete). Respondent also
assisted in the celebration of complainant's marriage to Minh Anh Nguyen7 (Nguyen),
an Australian national, in San Jose, Batangas, sometime in September 2011.8

After his marriage to Nguyen, complainant filed an application for an Australian visa,
attaching thereto the RTC Decision as a supporting document. In the process,
complainant received an electronic mail9 dated January 24, 2012 from the Australian
Embassy, informing him that the RTC Decision was actually "fraudulent" and his
submission of the same may result in the denial of his visa application. Surprised,
complainant himself verified the matter with the RTC-Ballesteros, which in turn, issued
a Certification10 dated June 15,2012, stating that: (a) Civil Case No. 33-3068-
2008,11 entitled "Vicente Ferrer A. Billanes, petitioner versus Meriam R. Arietta-Billanes,
respondent,"  is not filed in the said office; and (b) the signatures of Judge Donato and
Clerk of Court VI Atty. Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino (COC Aquino) appearing on the RTC
Decision and Certificate of Finality,12 respectively, are fake.13
Aggrieved, complainant confronted respondent, who maintained that the RTC Decision
was not spurious and that the RTC-Ballesteros just disowned the same. According to
complainant, respondent's malpractice caused him prejudice as the RTC Decision not
only caused the denial of his Australian visa application, but also forced him to incur
more costs in undergoing annulment proceedings all over again.14

In his Answer15 dated April 29, 2013, respondent denied any involvement with the
procurement of the RTC Decision. He averred that sometime in 2009, complainant
sought his assistance in annulling his marriage so he can re-marry an Australian citizen,
and thereafter, migrate to Australia.16 However, at that time, respondent was planning
to give his all-out support to a local candidate, and thus, would require much of his
time. Given the situation, respondent, with complainant's knowledge and consent,
referred the case to another lawyer by the name of "Atty. Aris Panaligan" (Atty.
Panaligan), who in turn, referred the same to another lawyer.17 Since then, respondent
claimed that he no longer had any active participation in complainant's case.18 Later on,
he found out that complainant already secured a favorable decision in connection with
his annulment case.19

Complainant expressed to respondent that he was unfamiliar as to what follows when a

court renders a decision declaring a marriage null and void. Because of that,
respondent supposedly felt obliged to assist complainant. Relying on the Certificate of
Finality, respondent caused the annotation of the RTC Decision in the records of the
OCR-Dumaguete. In addition, respondent also assisted in the celebration of the civil
wedding rites of complainant to Nguyen.21

Respondent maintained that he himself was surprised when complainant discovered

that the RTC Decision was fake, and that the same resulted in the denial of
complainant's Australian visa application. As respondent felt responsible for
complainant's predicament, he: (a) assisted complainant in appealing the denial of his
Australian visa application before the Australian Migration Review Tribunal (MRT), but
to no avail; (b) offered to refer complainant's case to another lawyer, which
complainant declined; and (c) voluntarily gave complainant the amount of P108,000.00
in an honest effort to rectify the situation and to share in the expenses for his new
lawyer.22

Finally, respondent claimed that he had taken efforts to find out the circumstances
surrounding the fabrication of the spurious RTC Decision. He averred that he contacted
Atty. Pana1igan, but failed to receive any valuable information from the
latter.23 Further, he made inquiries with the RTC-Ballesteros and the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Ballesteros, Cagayan (OCR-Ballesteros), and found out that there had
already been previous instances where rulings in annulment cases purportedly issued
by the RTC-Ballesteros were registered in the OCR-Ballesteros, but later on, the said
court would disown the same.24

Accordingly, the administrative complaint was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar

Discipline for investigation. During the mandatory conference, however, only
respondent appeared.25

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation26 dated February 24, 2015, the Investigating

Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded for failure to exercise the
diligence required of a lawyer to his client.27

The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant failed to prove with "clear
preponderant evidence" his allegations of respondent's malpractice and gross
misconduct. On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to
respondent's defense of good faith, considering that he had a genuine desire to help
complainant by assisting him in the appeal process of his visa application and by giving
him the amount of P108,000.00 in an effort to help rectify the situation and share in
the additional expenses that may occur.28

Nevertheless, the Investigating Commissioner still found basis to hold respondent liable
for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He explained
that an attorney-client relationship was still formed between complainant and
respondent, despite the latter's non-participation in the former's case. As such,
respondent should have exercised reasonable care and diligence by verifying the
authenticity of the RTC Decision with the issuing court, and his failure to do so resulted
in his client spending more time and money regarding his legal matter.29

In a Resolution30 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation, meting upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years for violating Canon 18 of the CPR.

Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration31 which was, however, denied by the

IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution32 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

Essentially, complainant claims that he engaged respondent as his lawyer to handle the
annulment of his marriage and was made to believe that they were following the
correct legal process. Notwithstanding the fact that complainant was a resident of Lipa
City, Batangas, and that he never participated in any court proceedings, respondent
eventually presented to him the RTC Decision issued by the RTC-Ballesteros purportedly
granting his petition for annulment. As respondent assured complainant of the
Decision's authenticity, the latter submitted a copy of the same as one of the
supporting documents of his Australian visa application. To complainant's surprise, the
Australian Embassy informed him of the spurious nature of the RTC Decision, which
hence, caused him prejudice, not only in terms of jeopardizing his visa application, but
also resulting in more legal expenses since he had to process the annulment of his
marriage anew.

For his part, respondent disavows any knowledge of the RTC Decision's spurious nature.
He invokes the defense of good faith, averring that he, in fact, had no participation in
any court proceedings before the RTC-Ballesteros since he actually refused to take on
complainant's case.

While the Investigating Commissioner found merit in respondent's asseverations, the

Court is, however, inclined to do otherwise. Upon an assiduous scrutiny of this case, it
has observed that respondent's own account of the events is not only unsupported by
any credible evidence; it is, in fact, riddled with key inconsistencies that ultimately belie
the truth of his defense. The following circumstances are revelatory:

(1) As earlier mentioned, respondent denies handling the annulment case of

complainant because of another engagement involving a local candidate in Batangas for
which he pledged his all-out support. As such, he allegedly referred complainant's case
to a certain Atty. Panaligan, who, in turn, referred the same to another lawyer.
However, records fail to show that an Atty. Panaligan or any other lawyer indeed took
up complainant's case. Other than respondent's self-serving declaration, no other
evidence was presented on this score. Verily, if respondent's assertions were indeed
true, then he could have easily secured corroborating statements from such lawyers or
any other person connected to these lawyers who supposedly took complainant's case,
in order to prove his point.

(2) Moreover, respondent failed to disclose the circumstances on how he had come to

return to complainant's cause, process the annotation of the RTC Decision before the
OCR-Dumaguete, and furthermore, arrange complainant's marriage with Nguyen. In
the natural course of things, it should have been the original handling lawyer, who
procured the RTC Decision, who would be tasked to do these things. And yet,
respondent, who had already begged-off from the engagement, suddenly re-entered
the picture and admittedly took upon the task of fixing complainant's consequential
affairs.

(3) Even on the assumption that respondent was re-engaged by complainant to take-

over the matter left by the original handling lawyer, respondent would have necessarily
inquired about the antecedents of the RTC Decision and thereupon, noticed that it was
tainted by a glaring flaw, particularly on the venue33 of the subject annulment case.
Records reveal that neither complainant nor his spouse was a resident of Ballesteros,
Cagayan;34 yet, it was purportedly the RTC-Ballesteros that granted the petition. This
palpable circumstance should have reasonably alerted respondent, and accordingly,
prompted him to confront the original handling lawyer about the case, which he failed
to do so. Instead, respondent proffered that upon learning from complainant that a
Decision had already been issued in his favor, he immediately caused its annotation on
complainant's marriage certificate. Either respondent was grossly negligent when he,
without any semblance of hesitation, took-over complainant's case or was the one who
actually procured the fake RTC Decision. To the Court, the latter scenario seems to be
more plausible, in light of the fact that: (a) on the one hand," complainant, who had no
motive at all to implicate respondent unless he was telling the truth, adamantly claimed
that it was respondent who solely handled his case and presented him with a copy of
the RTC Decision; and (b) on the other hand, respondent presented no proof at all of
any engagement between complainant and any other lawyer.

(4) What further diminishes the credibility of respondent's defense was his own
admission that he went on to handle the appeal of complainant's visa application before
the Australian MRT, and more so, voluntarily shouldered a portion of complainant's
legal expenses in the fairly significant amount of P108,000.00. Respondent argued that
he did such "noble" things on his own volition because he felt obligated to rectify the
situation. However, it, once more, goes against the grain of ordinary human experience
for respondent to feel so obligated and exert such magnanimous efforts if his only
participation was to refer complainant's case to another lawyer. Instead, it is more
reasonable to conclude that respondent went to such great lengths for complainant
because he was the one who actually handled the latter's annulment case since its very
inception and hence, responsible for any impropriety attending the same.

(5) And finally, respondent attempted to cover up his faults by claiming that he tried to
investigate the circumstances behind the fabrication of the RTC Decision. He maintained
that he contacted Atty. Panaligan to seek clarification regarding complainant's case;
and that he even inquired with the OCR-Ballesteros, where he supposedly found out
that there had already been irregularities occurring with annulment cases resolved by
the RTC-Ballesteros. However, same as above, respondent only bases these assertions
on bare allegations, without any other evidence to substantiate the same. "The basic
rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof."35

Thus, based on the afore-mentioned circumstances, the Court is satisfied that there
exists substantial evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for procuring the
spurious RTC Decision which caused great prejudice to complainant as his client.

According to jurisprudence, substantial evidence is "that amount of relevant evidence

which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."36 Contrary
to the finding of the Investigating Commissioner, substantial evidence – and not "clear
preponderant evidence" – is the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in
disciplinary cases against lawyers. In the recent case of Reyes v. Nieva,37 the Court had
the opportunity to clarify that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is
substantial evidence. It explained that:

[T]he evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence — as opposed to preponderance of

evidence — is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential
considerations attending [to these types] of cases. As case law elucidates,
"[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.  Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither
a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio.  Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration
of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion
to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor."38

Applying this standard, the Court finds that respondent's acts are in gross violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "as officers of the court, lawyers are bound
to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing."39 Indubitably, respondent fell short of such standard when
he committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against
complainant. Such acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; they further reveal basic moral flaws that make respondent unfit to
practice law.40

In Tan v. Diamante,41 the Court found the lawyer therein administratively liable for
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR as it was established that he, among others,
falsified a court order. In that case, the Court deemed the lawyer's acts to be "so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral
unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar."42 Thus, the
Court disbarred the lawyer.

Similarly, in Taday v. Apoya, Jr.,43 promulgated just last July 3, 2018, the Court
disbarred the erring lawyer for authoring a fake court decision regarding his client's
annulment case, which was considered as a violation also of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
CPR. In justifying the imposition of the penalty of disbarment, the Court held that the
lawyer "committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] and deceitful conduct, and lessened
the confidence of the public in the legal system. Instead of being an advocate of justice,
he became a perpetrator of injustice. His reprehensible acts do not merit him to remain
in the rolls of the legal profession. Thus, the ultimate penalty of disbarment must be
imposed upon him."44

Accordingly, following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court likewise finds respondent

guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. Hence, he is disbarred from the
practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys, effective
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leo S. Latido GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from
the roll of attorneys, effective immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Leo S. Latido's record in this
Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Peralta,  Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,

Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bersamin, J., no part due to close relations with a party.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on August 28, 2018 a Decision, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on October 4, 2018 at 3:30 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 2-4.

2
 See id. at 2.

3
 Id. at 7-9

4
 See id. at 3.

5
 See id.
6
 See Marriage Contract; id. at 6.

7
 "Minh Anh Thi Nguyen" in the Certificate of Marriage; id. at 56.

8
 Id. at 66.

9
 Id. at 10.

10
 Id. at 11. Signed by Clerk of Court VI Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino.

11
 Incorrectly referred to as "Civil Case No. 33-3608-2008" in the said Certification; see
id.

12
 Issued on August 4, 2009. Id. at 30.

13
 See id. at 3 and 66-67.

14
 See id. at 4 and 67.

15
 Id. at 23-29.

16
 See id. at 23.

17
 See id. at 23-24.

18
 Id. at 24.

19
 See id.

21
 See id.

22
 See id. at 25-26.

23
 See id. at 26.
24
 Id. at 26-28.

25
 See Order dated March 4, 2014 signed by Commissioner Mario V. Andres; id. at 42.

26
 Id. at 65-70.

27
 Id. at 70.

28
 See id. at 68-69.

29
 See id. at 69-70.

30
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXI-2015-301 issued by National Secretary
Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at 64, including dorsal portion.
31
 See motion for reconsideration dated November 16, 2015; id. at 71-89.

32
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1303 issued by National
Secretary Patricia-Ann T. Prodigalidad; id. at 93-94.

33
 Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, entitled "PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES" (March 15, 2003), reads:
Sec. 4. Venue. —  The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found
in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.

34
 Records show that complainant is a native of Banilad, Dumaguete City but transferred
his residence several times and now resides in Lipa City, Batangas, while Arietta was a
native of Calindagan, Dumaguete City; see rollo, pp. 2, 4, 6, 43, and 56.

35
Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Inc., 605 Phil. 926, 937 (2009).

36
Peña v. Paterno, 710 Phil. 582, 593 (2013). See also Section 5, Rule 133 of the
REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE.

37
 794 Phil. 360 (2016).

38
 Id. at 379-380; citation omitted.

39
Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 780 Phil. 113, 122 (2016), citing Tabang v. Gacott,  713 Phil.
578, 593 (2013).

40
 Id., citing Spouses Olbes v. Deciembre,  496 Phil. 799, 812 (2005).

41
 740 Phil. 382 (2014).

42
 Id. at 392.
43
 See A.C. No. 11981.

44
 See id.