SECTION I

Republic Act No. 6735             August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND

APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

I. — General Provisions

Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or
to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments

to the Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through
an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act

or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative
bodies.

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

 (e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people.

(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number
of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission
on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and
Punong Barangay, as the case may be.

Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by
all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.

Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten
per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district
is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a
petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five
(5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the

legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated
 if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the
province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each
municipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed

validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly

initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said
barangay.

Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special

registration day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.

II. — National Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call
and supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon
determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice
in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the
determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the

enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and
approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the

votes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall
become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the
Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the
votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become
effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and
the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or
amended shall remain in full force and effect.
 (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification
and proclamation by the Commission.

Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or

referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate;
and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically
vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90)
days after its effectivity.

Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law,
may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that
the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall
have precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.

Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court
within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. — Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and
cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a
petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the
adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from
its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered
representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local
legislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of
Local Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

 (e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous
regions, ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in
subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated
representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a
public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be.
Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through
its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the
required number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number
is a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a
date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters
in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the
date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of
autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45)
days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative
shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and
proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.

Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority

of the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if
affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive
concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.

Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of
the local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto
the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such
action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.

Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or

resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not
be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months
from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative
body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members:
Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the
expiration of the first six (6) months.

Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any

local legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution
duly enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty
(60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty
(30) days in case of barangays.

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of
the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

IV. — Final Provisions

SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code
and other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all
initiatives and referenda.

Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate

such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General
Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full
implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: August 4, 1989

FACTS: 
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of
American-English origin) has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature (“Congressional
Belgica vs. Honorable Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The
“Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the
Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development
Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF)
under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the
present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency:
PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class
municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the
implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within ninety
(90) days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the
written concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or
beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as

follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000)

for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for
infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of
Special Provision No. 1; and

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects
listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects
listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the
use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in
the first semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second
semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The
Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within
the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original
project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work;
and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed
in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED,
That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft or
hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in
case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the
LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been
deposited back to the BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be
released to the implementing agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1
and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and
the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under
Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social
Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced
from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to
judicial review

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of
the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8
of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,

are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:

A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of
the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in
these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for
the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund
– are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF”
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has
no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and
academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the
fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of
the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability
of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality
of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of
exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in
fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of
numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are
needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern
of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the
findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if
only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is  applicable largely due to the practical need
for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate
controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but
more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized
in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition
that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur,
an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain
public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and
hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise
judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come
before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that
they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess
the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under
which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer
from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have
been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the
issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA
Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not
[merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of
the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first
and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively.
However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel
System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality –
and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided
alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On
the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-
relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the
entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of
the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare
decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA
Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the
same was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any
controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these
cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority
to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph
of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF
Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF
Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of
powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling
in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their
position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution,
must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court
in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law  a
certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are
able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013
PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget”
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to
decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda
and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law
leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be
subject to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing
the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line
budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,

who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their
own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or
the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked
to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation,
may affect the process of  impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics
and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an
improper subject of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to
the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by
and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline
for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on
this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account
the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result,
a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President –
who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already
legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.”
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards
managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem
generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the
class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited
only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,

indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for
any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not
supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as
one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to
any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910
– it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they
are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.
SECTION V FACTS:

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)  The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-
list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either
by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
 December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these
13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang
Bagong Bayani).
 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the
elections.
 Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 

ISSUE:

 Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:

 No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since
the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners,
we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under
the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
 Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
 First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the
party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
 Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the
party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that,
after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies
under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
 Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
 R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to
deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-
list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from
the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear
intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the
COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation;
and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and
outlined its platform of governance.

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: This Petition is dismissible on
moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. and proceeded to
define sexual orientation as that which refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which (3) shocks,
defies; or disregardsdecency or morality.

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil
Code provides that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows as follows:
 All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined
that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation."
Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. COMELECFACTS:

( G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010) Respondent delisted petitioner, a
party list organization, from the roster
of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system through its resolution, denying also the latter’s motion for reconsideration, in accordance
with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
x  x  x  x

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections.  Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among
others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of
merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill
No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:
Political Law
(1)  Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2)  Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

Civil Law (Statutory Construction)

(1)  Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:
Political Law
(1)  No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it
cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear
and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of
RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply
cannot stand.
(2)  No. On the due process issue, petitioner’s right to due process was not violated for [it] was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution].  The
essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.  A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.  The requirement is satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x  x  x. [It is] obvious [that]
under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1)  No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which
are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides,
thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents.  It requires courts in a country to

follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court.  That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.  The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by [SC’s] judicial system from the doctrine
of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to
the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general.  Clearly,
[SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling.  Thus,
[SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.

Palparan vs. HRET FACTS: Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of
(G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010)
the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the
2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House
of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the
House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently,
any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such
question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

HELD:

although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of
the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed
the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
 Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan
was represented in Congress through 4 legislative
districts. Before the passage of the Act through House
Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and
Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of
223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as

requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then
Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of
NSO that the population of Malolos will be as
projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. 

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591

is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city
to meritrepresentative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a

legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan”
is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City
of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected. 

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the

R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the
1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population. In relation with this, Regional Director
Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal
Aldaba vs. COMELEC effect because the Regional Director has no basis and
(G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010)no authority to issue the Certification based on the
following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O.
135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by
the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document
have been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1,
2010. 

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

Aquino vs. COMELEC FACTS:

(G.R. No. 189793, April 2, 2010)
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative
district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from
House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD:
NO. The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand,
and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a
representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
 BANAT vs. COMELEC Facts:
(G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009)On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the
national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
     BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution
No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
     On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of
the NBC.

Issue:
 Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
     1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
     2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
     3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
     4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
     5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?

Held:
 WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution
of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as
a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a
valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
     We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling.
     In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900,
the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round
of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which
is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the
17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available
seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second
round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
     Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a
"party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A.
No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)
     The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with
regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the
party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list
system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect
to the participation of the major political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not
in direct congruence with theirs, hence
     There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional
political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001
where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results
confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that
major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties
which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties
garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of
1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose qualifications were
contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or
42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of
votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list
representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only
8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%.
     In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the
framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the
Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people
recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the
traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political
institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral
process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and
betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the
party-list system.
     IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into
the party-list system.
 
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)
     However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the inflexible 2%
threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the House of
Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote
requirement ─ fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system ─ presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine
Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared constitutional policy, as well as the
legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the people’s broadest representation
in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.
     Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s decision in Veterans Federation Party,
we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list representatives, using the
Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote
requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.
    Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote
requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and
elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation
Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback
position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very
low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the
system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected
representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the
legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of
the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who
have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents
and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of
the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9
     However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat
allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable
growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not
adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent
with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
     It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of
party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the
precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places
the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we
must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply
an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to
ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory
construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision
inoperative and ineffectual.
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA7941 vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007)
FACTS: 
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups
which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007. 

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition
seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile petitioner
Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law
Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms.
Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3,
2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner
Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that
requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not
be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.

In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess
the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to. 

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3,
2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of
the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections. 

ISSUE: 
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees
do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.

Ruling:
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would
require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial
review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on
record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the
evidence. Also, the petitioner’s posture that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications
of their nominees is without basis, Nowhere in R .A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization.

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names
of the nominees of the partylist groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees
shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny
the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is
limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of
the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were,
there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even
publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees.
The Comelec obviously misread the limited nondisclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by
the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7941.
SECTION XVII

Tanada vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(G.R. No. 217012, March 1, 2016)
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. or Wigberto (Liberal Party) and respondents Angelina D.
Tan or Angelina (National People’s Coalition) and Alvin John S. Tañada or Alvin John
(Lapiang Manggagawa) were contenders for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in the May 13, 2013 National
Elections.
2. On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC 2 separate petitions: 1st petition –
to cancel Alvin John’s CoC; 2nd petition – to declare Alvin John as a nuisance candidate.
3. On Jan. 29, 2013, COMELEC 1st Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit.
4. 1st Petition: COMELEC En Banc granted the MR and canceled Alvin John’s CoC for having
committed false material representations concerning his residency in accordance with
Section 7812 of BP Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (OEC).
5. 2nd Petition: On Wigberto’s MR, COMELEC En Banc's April 25, 2013 Resolution, upheld the
1st Division’s ruling that Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate as defined under Sec. 69
of the OEC.
 May 15, 2013: Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the COMELEC
En Banc ’s ruling on the ground of newly discovered evidence. He alleged that Alvin
John’s candidacy was not bona fide because: (a) Alvin John was merely forced by his
father to file his CoC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia posted in official COMELEC
posting areas in several barangays of Gumaca, Quezon Province; (c) he did not even vote
during the May 13, 2013 National Elections; and (d) his legal representation appeared to
have been in collusion with the lawyers of Angelina.
6. Despite the cancellation of Alvin John’s CoC, his name was not deleted from the ballot,
prompting Wigberto to file a motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon
Province (PBOC) asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him
instead in accordance with the Court’s ruling in Dela Cruz v. COMELEC and COMELEC
Resolution No. 9599. The PBOC denied Wigberto’s motion on May 16, 2013 because the
cancellation of the Alvin John’s CoC was on the basis of his material misrepresentations
under Sec. 78 of the OEC and not on being a nuisance candidate under Sec. 69 of the same
law.
7. On May 16, 2013, PBOC proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate. According to
Wigberto, it was for the foregoing reason that he impleaded Angelina as a party-respondent
in the instant petition for certiorari.
8. It appears, however, that Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul
the Proclamation of Angelina asserting that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, the
votes cast for Alvin John would have been counted in his favor which could have resulted in
his victory. While the Petition to Annul was still pending resolution, Wigberto initiated the
instant certiorari case against the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated April 25, 2013
declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate.
9. On July 3, 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the SC that he had caused the filing
of an Election Protest Ad Cautelam (Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr. v. Angelina ‘Helen’ D. Tan)
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). He prayed that he be
declared the winner in the 2013 congressional race in the 4th District of Quezon Province. He
also alleged that on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution
annulling the proclamation of Angelina as Member of the House of Representatives for the
4th District of Quezon Province. The propriety of this ruling is now pending resolution before
the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE/S: W/N the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation
of respondent Angelina D. Tan fall under the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.(YES.)

HELD: Petition is dismissed. Considering that respondent Angelina D. Tan had already been
proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province
on May 16, 2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June
30, 2013, the SC is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. The issues concerning
the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina D. Tan are matters,
which fall under the scope of the terms “election” and “returns” and hence, properly fall under
the HRET’s sole jurisdiction.
RATIO:
 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective
members.1
 Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET.
 The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” refers to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestee’s title.
 “Election” refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of
the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes.
 “Returns” refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns.
 “Qualifications” refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against
the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.

Pimentel vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002) Facts: On March 3, 1995, the
Party-List System Act took
effect. This sought to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system in pursuant of section2 of the Republic
Act 7941. On 11 May 1998, national elections were held, which included for the first time the

1
election of party-list group through popular vote. Fourteen representatives were elected coming
from thirteen party-list groups namely APEC, ABA, COOP-NATCO, AKBAYAN, and ABANSE.
Subsequently, the House constituted its House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Commission of Appointments contingent by electing representatives to these bodies. It appears
that no one from the party-list group was nominated. On 18 January 2000, Senator Pimentel
wrote two letters to Senate President Ople as Chairman of Commission of Appointments and
Justice Melo as chairman of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to reorganize both
bodies in order to include partylist representative in accordance to Sec. 17 and 18 Art. VI of the
Constitution. On 2 February 2000, Petitioners filed a petition in the Supreme Court assailing that
party-list representatives should have at least 1.2 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in CA. They
assert that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on
Senator Pimentel’s letter. Hence, they invoked section 11 of Republic Act 7941. The Solicitor
General’s consolidated comment shows that the party-list group only constitutes 6.36% of the
House.

Issues: Does the composition of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and
Commission of Appointments violate the Constitutional Requirement of proportional
representation on the ground of the absence of party-list representatives in the said
Constitutional bodies?

Ruling: No. The composition of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and Commission
of Appointments is within the prerogative of the House of Representative as defined within
constitutional limits. The House of Representatives may choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted in the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal and Court of Appeals in pursuant to sections 171 and 182 in
the 1987 constitution. The said provisions are reiterated in Rules 33 and 4(a)4 of the 1998
Rules of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal where from the 9 members, 3 will come
from the Supreme Court and the remaining 6 will come from the House. Thus, the primary
recourse to the House of Representatives is necessary. The Court cannot resolve and interfere
with the issues presented because it cannot violate the doctrine of separation of powers. The
House of Representatives is constitutionally mandated to govern such matters unless there has
been a clear violation of the Constitution. The presence of a constitutional question needs to
have an actual controversy, a substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy, a
controversy has been raised in the earliest reasonable opportunity and resolution must be
indispensable to the final determination of the controversy. Given these circumstances, the
instant case has not alleged that there was an unlawful deprivation on the part of the petitioners.
The petitioners must first show that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled
to seats in the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and Commission of Appointments.
However, the Court held that the said case has already become moot and academic because
elections had been held last May 14, 2001. Also, they have refrained from participating in the
election process and designating nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions.
 Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990)
FACTS
Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the
position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987
congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.
Rep. Virgilio Robles elected to 1st Dist. of Caloocan. Romeo Santos then filed an elec. contest
w/ HRET (electoral fraud & irregularities) & called for re-counting / re-appreciation of votes.
Santos, filed Motion to Withdraw Contest but later filed Urgent Motion to Recall/Disregard his
Previous Motion. 1st Motion not acted upon by HRET, 2nd Motion granted. Robles claimed that
the 1st motion divested HRET of jurisdiction.

ISSUE
Whether HRET acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion thus giving
the Supreme Jurisdiction over the subject matter

RULING
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested
precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the
tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once
acquired, is not lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated.  Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the
withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit
a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Petition is dismissed.

Palparan vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010)
FACTS: Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is
the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the
members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims
of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and
security guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was
actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the
House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently,
any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such
question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

HELD:

although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of
the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed
the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal

(G.R. No. L-83767, October 27, 1988)
FACTS: 1. This is a petition to nullify the resolution of
the SET denying the Motion for Disqualification/ Inhibition against 22 candidates of the LABAN
coalition who were proclaimed senators elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by
the Commission on Elections. 2. The Petitioners filed with the SET a Motion for Disqualification
or Inhibition of the Senator-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the case on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Senators Saguisag and Paterno also
filed for disqualification of Senator-Members. 3. Senator Enrile voluntary inhibited himself from
performing and the 5 senators were disqualified to be part of the tribunal leaving only the 3
Justices to be part of the Tribunal. 4. Petitioners argue that the SET cannot make a judgement
because there are no senator-members.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SET can render judgement given a lack of Senator-members
RULING: Art VI Sec 17 is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests shall be
resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that Chamber are
represented The Constitutional provision clearly mandates the participation in the same process
of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court. In this situation where
senators cannot sit in the tribunal due to the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or
body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators. The overriding consideration is that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the
incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and
principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

(G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936)
FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last
date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the
National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for
filing of protests is on Dec. 9.  Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case. 

    ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of
a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and
the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner
to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that
said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still
lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole
judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost
against the petitioner. 

Lazatin vs. Electoral CommissionFacts:

[8 SCRA 391 (1988)]
 Petitioner and respondent was candidates for Rep.
of 1st District of Pampanga. Respondent raised in
Comelec the non-inclusion of certain returns resulting in suspending declaration of
winning party however later comelec announced to proceed with the declaration
resulting with petitioner proclaimed Congressman-elect.
 Resondent filed to prohibit petitioner from assuming office which Comelec grant stating
proclamation of the petitioner void-ab-initio however petitioner filed challenging such
grant with the Court and as such reversing Comelec decision
  Respondent then filed with the HRET which the petitioner filed motion for dismissal that
such filing was late however HRET states it was filed on time in accordance with HRET
rules in Sec 9
 Petitioner relies on Sec 250 of Omnibus Election in determining time filed which is 10
days after proclamation and proclamation was made May 27 1987which was suspended
and run again on January 28 1988 while filing made to HRET on Feb 8 1988 while the
10 day limits is only until Feb 6 1988.
 Sec 9 of HRET on the other hand states filing within 15 days from date of proclamation.

ISSUE: WON HRET erred in stating filing was made on time?

Ruling: NO

 Sec 250 applies to only those that filed before the COMELEC on election of members of
Batasang Pambansa as stated in Sec 249 and these elections of members has ceased
upon the 1987 constitution being that the Batasang Pambansa has already been
abolished and sole jurisdiction over election, returns, and qualification is vested to the
Electoral Tribunal.
 Power of HRET includes promulgate rules and regulation on matters in his jurisdiction
such as period of election protests.
 The power grant to Electoral Tribunal is being the sole judge emphasizing the exclusive
character.
 Unlike 1973, intent of 1987 constitutional framers like that of 1935 framers was to restore
exclusive jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal with COMELEC retaining purely administrative
powers except to decide in election case, which is vested to the Electoral Tribunal.

Chavez vs. COMELEC FACTS: On 5 May, 1992, the Supreme Court issued a
[211 SCRA 315 (1992)]resolution in the case of Francisco Chavez vs. COMELEC (GR
104704) which disqualified Melchor Chavez from running for Office
of Senator in the May, 1992 elections. When COMELEC received
the resolution, Francisco Chavez filed an urgent motion to the COMELEC praying that 1.) to
disseminate through the fastest available means the resolution to all election officials and areas,
and 2.) to delete Melchor Chavez’s name among the list of certified candidates and "to count all
votes cast for the disqualified Melchor Chavez in favor of Francisco Chavez."
COMELEC issued Res. No. 92-1322 which deleted the name of Melchor Chavez from
the list of candidates, however it failed to order the crediting of “Chavez” votes in favor of
Francisco. According to Francisco, COMELEC failed delete the name of the disqualified
candidate, in violation of RA 7166, Sec. 7, and thus the name of Melchor Chavez remained
undeleted during election day. In this confusion, the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) from
170,354 precincts nationwide declared votes for Melchor Chavez as either stray or invalidated,
and as a result votes for Melchor were not credited to Francisco.

Francisco then filed a petition for COMELEC to, among other points, to re-open the
ballot boxes in 13 provinces involving some 80,348 precincts, to scan for the "Chavez" votes for
purposes of crediting the same in his favor, and to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning
candidates through the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO.)

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain Francisco’s petition.

HELD: No, the Court does not have jurisdiction in this case.

The Court stated that the nature of Francisco Chavez’s controversy is one of a pre-
proclamation, which is defined as "any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party
or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns" (Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).

The Court stated that although COMELEC has jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), pre-
proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives. Republic Act 7166, Section 15 states that “For
purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the
certificate of canvass, as the case may be.”

Additionally, RA 7166 states that only "manifest errors (i.e. appearing on the face) in the
certificate of canvass or election returns” may be corrected. The Court cited the case of
Sanchez v. COMELEC which further defined the characteristics for such manifest errors under
the Omnibus Election Code: the election returns are incomplete or contain material defects (sec.
234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or
contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the
result of the election (sec. 236). Francisco Chavez’s complaint that “Chavez” votes were not
counted in his favor clearly does not fall under any of the elements listed in the Omnibus Code.

In the absence of any manifest error, the Court further states that Francisco’s proper
recourse would be to take up the case to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Under Article VI,
Section 17 of the Constitution, "(t)he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members…" The word “sole” emphasizes that only
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over election contests over their respective members which, as
worth noting in this case, includes members of the Senate. Thus, the Court does not have
jurisdiction to entertain Francisco Chavez’s petition and must therefore dismiss it for lack of
merit.
 Ongsiako Reyes vs. COMELEC
Facts:
(G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013)
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the
Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque.

On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny
Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner,
on the ground that it contained material representations.On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC
cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On
May 14, 2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.

However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June
5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same
day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon
of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she
was duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative of Marinduque.

Held:

Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2)
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed
office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made
(1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.  Here,
although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made
during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
office was indeed complied.

Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and
proved to exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave
abuse of discretion exists.
 Bondoc vs. Pineda FACTS:
(G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991)
Pineda and Bondoc were rival candidates as
Representatives of the 4th district. Pineda won in the
elections, prompting Bondoc to file a protest with the HRET, which decided in favor of the latter.
However, before promulgation of the decision, Congressman Camasura’s membership with the
HRET was withdrawn on the ground that he was expelled from the LDP. As such, the decision
could not be promulgated since without Congressman Camasura’s vote, the deicison lacks the
concurrence of 5 members as required by the Rules of the Tribunal.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the House of Representatives can issue a resolution compelling HRET not to
promulgate its decision
 Whether or not the composition of the HRET may be affected by a change in the political
alliance of its members
RULING:
HRET is a non-political body

The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the
1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as
judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647,
February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-
thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this
Court had earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals
of the Senate and House of Representatives:

Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office,
devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of
members of the legislative houses

The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as
special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications
of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent bodies which must be
permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them, without any
legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent.
Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with
the Legislature nor with the Courts.

The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and
though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
xxx xxx xxx

The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting within the limits of
its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to promulgate its decision?
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as
distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.

Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party impairs HRET constitutional prerogative

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House
Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be
powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of
the tribunal.

Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET?

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from
the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of
the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion,
an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

HRET members enjoy security of tenure

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that
it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole
judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of
the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be
expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right
to security of tenure.