This document is a court decision from the High Court of Gauhati regarding two criminal revision petitions challenging orders allowing additional evidence to be filed in two cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court analyzed the provisions of Section 143 of the Act regarding summary trial procedures and whether a successor magistrate can rely on a predecessor's evidence and allow additional evidence. The court ultimately dismissed the revisions, finding that the magistrate had discretion to try the cases following summons procedures and allow additional evidence, and that failing to strictly comply with Section 143(1) procedures did not invalidate the trial.
This document is a court decision from the High Court of Gauhati regarding two criminal revision petitions challenging orders allowing additional evidence to be filed in two cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court analyzed the provisions of Section 143 of the Act regarding summary trial procedures and whether a successor magistrate can rely on a predecessor's evidence and allow additional evidence. The court ultimately dismissed the revisions, finding that the magistrate had discretion to try the cases following summons procedures and allow additional evidence, and that failing to strictly comply with Section 143(1) procedures did not invalidate the trial.
This document is a court decision from the High Court of Gauhati regarding two criminal revision petitions challenging orders allowing additional evidence to be filed in two cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court analyzed the provisions of Section 143 of the Act regarding summary trial procedures and whether a successor magistrate can rely on a predecessor's evidence and allow additional evidence. The court ultimately dismissed the revisions, finding that the magistrate had discretion to try the cases following summons procedures and allow additional evidence, and that failing to strictly comply with Section 143(1) procedures did not invalidate the trial.
Crl. Rev. Pet. Nos. 351 and 440 of 2018 Decided On: 24.10.2019 Appellants: Milan Das Vs. Respondent: Nripen Borkakoty Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Ajit Borthakur, J. Counsels: For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: H.J. Tamuli, Advocate For Respondents/Defendant: K.C. Deka, Advocate, R.J. Boruah, Addl. P.P. and Z. Kamar, Sr. Advocate as Amicus Curiae Case Note: Criminal - Additional evidence - Order for - Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Present criminal revisions filed against orders passed in NI Case filed under Section 138 of NI Act - Whether order impugned allowing to file additional evidence need interference - Held, court below found prima facie ground to proceed under Section 138 of NI Act - Court issued summons to petitioner/accused - Complainant/respondent filed his evidence-on-affidavit - Respondent/complainant filed petitions seeking permission to file additional documentary evidence - Question of injustice or prejudice to petitioner/accused does not arise - Revision dismissed. [17] DECISION Ajit Borthakur, J. 1 . As both the above Criminal Revisions filed under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. are directed against two orders, dated 12.07.2018, passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonitpur at Tezpur in NI Case No. 21/2017 and NI Case No. 43/2017 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1883 ('NI Act' for short) involving common questions of procedural law, I propose to decide the same by this common judgment and order. 2 . Heard Mr. H.J. Tamuli, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K.C. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1/complainant as well as Mr. R.J. Boruah, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam for the State/respondent No. 2. Also heard Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Senior counsel appearing as the Amicus Curiae. 3. The learned Addl. CJM, Sonitpur at Tezpur fixed the above mentioned two NI Act cases for additional evidence, by the impugned order, dated 12.07.2018, so as to enable the respondent No. 1/complainant to mark and exhibit a bank statement in NI Case No. 21/2017 and a lease agreement in NI Case No. 43/2017 for the purpose of fair adjudication. 4 . The petitioner being aggrieved by the impugned orders, dated 12.07.2018, has raised the following legal issues:-
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(i) Section 143 of the NI Act categorically states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, all offences contained in Chapter XVII shall be tried by a Judicial Magistrate, 1st class or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 Cr.P.C., procedure of summary trial, shall, as far as may be, apply to such proceedings. Further, Section 260 Cr.P.C. read with Section 143 of the NI Act shows that if it appears to the Magistrate that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 1(one) year may have to be passed, for reasons to be recorded, the case may be tried as a summons case instead to try summarily, the witnesses may be recalled and proceed to rehear the case. However, in the instant cases, the learned Magistrate did not pass any order as to why the aforesaid proceedings have not been tried summarily; and (ii) That though Section 326 Cr.P.C. categorically states about conviction or commitment, based on evidence partly recorded by one Judge or Magistrate and partly by another, this procedure shall not apply to summary trial, and as such, in a case under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which the procedure laid in Section 143 is applicable, the successor Magistrate cannot allow any additional evidence to be adduced by the complainant. 5 . Mr. H.J. Tamuli, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused contended that a perusal of the Section 143 of the NI Act reveals that in a proceeding under Section 138 of the said Act, the Magistrate should try the case summarily, if he is of the opinion that the case may warrant a conviction of the accused and pass a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year, for reasons to be recorded and try as summons case. According to Mr. Tamuli, as the learned Magistrate did not form any such opinion, based on the facts and circumstances to try as summons case, he cannot act on the evidence recorded by his predecessor and allow the respondent/complainant, in view of Section 326(3) Cr.P.C., to produce any additional evidence and as such, the impugned orders and the proceedings are liable to be set aside. In this connection, Mr. Tamuli has relied on the judgment of the apex Court rendered in Nitinbhai Saevantilal Shah & another Vs. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal and another, reported in MANU/SC/1014/2011 : (2011) 9 SCC 638. 6. Per contra, Mr. K.C. Deka, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/complainant, contended that Section 143 of the NI Act empowers the trial Magistrate either to follow the summary procedure provided in Chapter XXI Cr.P.C. or summons procedure in chapter XX Cr.P.C., if he sees reason that in the facts and circumstances, the punishment of more than 1(one) year imprisonment is likely to be passed against the accused and further, if he decides to try the case summarily, substance of evidence of the witnesses may be recorded. On such substance of evidence recorded by the Magistrate to his best understanding, the successor Magistrate cannot act, thereon for he may not be in a position to appreciate such substance of evidence his predecessor recorded. Thus, the provision under Section 143 of the NI Act is not mandatory. In support of his contentions, Mr. Deka has relied on a judgment rendered by the apex Court in J.V. Baharuni and another Vs. State of Gujarat & another, reported in MANU/SC/0995/2014 : (2014) 10 SCC 494. 7 . Mr. Z Kamar, learned Senior counsel as Amicus Curiae, contended that under Section 143 of the NI Act, the offence under Section 138 of the said Act is to be tried summarily following the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 Cr.P.C. However, where in course of trial, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or for any other reason, it is undesirable to try the case summarily, it is open to the Magistrate to hear the parties and record an order to that effect and thereafter, recall
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any witness and proceed to hear or rehear the case as per the procedure in trial of summons case. While applying the aforesaid discretion, Mr. Kamar submitted, the Magistrate is to record reasons and give opportunity of hearing to both sides. Relying on an earlier judgment delivered by this Court in Smt. Dipti Choudhury vs. Sangeeta Mandal @ Sangita Das in Criminal Petition No. 49/2013, Mr. Kamar contended that omission to comply with Section 143(1) of the NI Act does not invalidate the trial as in the present two cases. Mr. Kamar, learned Sr. Amicus Curiae, further contended that in case the Magistrate decides to try summarily, the previsions contained in Sections 326(1) and 326(2) Cr.P.C. will not be applicable and therefore, except in regard to those cases which fall within the ambit of Section 326 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate cannot proceed with the trial placing reliance on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. Mr. Kamar also contended that the impugned orders passed by the learned Magistrate indicate that he decided to try the cases following the summons procedure and relied on the judgment of the apex Court in J.V. Baharuni (supra). 8 . Mr. R.J. Boruah, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State respondent subscribed to the argument advanced by Mr. Z. Kamar, learned Sr. Amicus Curiae. 9. I have considered the respective submissions made by the learned counsel of both sides as above and perused records. 10. The two impugned orders, dated 12.07.2018, read as hereunder. In NI Case No. 21/2017; "Complainant is present. Accuse is absent with steps. Today is fixed for passing necessary order on petition no. 1770/18. Vide the petition, complainant has submitted that the copies of the Bank Statements of the Complainant Sri Nripen Borkakoti bearing A/C No. 1125010113014 with United Bank of India, Tezpur was submitted at the time of filing affidavit as to evidence of the complainant and was also exhibited at that time. That, now the up to date original copy of the above mentioned bank statement of the complainant with statement and certificate from the bank regarding its authenticity and containing the relevant transaction of the accused is filed herewith today for kind perusal and acceptance of this Court. Accused has filed written objection stating inter alia that complainant has already marked bank statements as Exhibit in his evidence which was already signed by the Court that, on 11.05.18, in order to fill up his lacuna, complainant has intended to exhibit certificate dtd. 08.05.18 by bank up to date account statement. That, it is a case under Special Act and there is no any provision for granting leave for filing document on this stage of the proceeding. In view of the above, prayer has been made to reject the petition of the complainant. I have already heard Ld. Counsel for both the parties. Perused the record which reveals that complainant has already marked and exhibited the photocopies of his bank statements through my Ld. Predecessor. However, considering that up to date statement and certificate
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of bank official in respect of authenticity and genuineness of the statement will be helpful in fair adjudication of the matter, I deem it fit and proper to allow the complainant to mark and exhibit the same by way of filing additional evidence. Accused will, in no way, be prejudiced as because he will get the scope to cross-examine the complainant on this document. In view of the above, prayer is allowed to the effect that complaint shall file his additional evidence on affidavit to exhibit the same. It is to be mentioned herein that his additional affidavit shall remain confined in exhibiting the aforesaid document only. Fix: 15.09.18 for additional evidence of the complainant. In NI Case No. 43/2017; "Complainant is present. Accused is absent with steps. Today is fixed for passing necessary order on petition no. 1771/18. Vide the petition, complainant has submitted that he has recently been able to procure original deed of lease bearing no. 407 dtd. 30.11.15 executed between complainant and three other persons wherein, accused Milan Das was a witness. That, the said document was not in his possession at the time of filing of the case and the same is a vital and important document for proper adjudication of the case. That, the reference of the document has already been made earlier in the affidavit evidence of the complainant. Accused has filed written objection stating inter alia that complainant has already filed evidence on affidavit and marked as many as 8 documents as exhibits. The complainant mentioned about a deed of lease as Ext. 2 and marked the signature of the complainant and accused as Ext. 2(1). That, the said examination-in-chief on affidavit was submitted on 17.11.17. That, admittedly, the original was not in their possession at the time of filing the examination-in-chief. Therefore, the marking of photocopy of documents as Ext. 2 is questionable. That apart, complainant has not mentioned the reason behind the documents not being in his possession. That, since this is a case under NI Act, there is no provision to grant leave for filing document on subsequent stage of the proceeding. In view of the above, prayer has been made to reject the petition. I have already heard Ld. Counsel for both the parties. Perusal of examination-in-chief of the complainant given on affidavit reveals that he had marked the lease deed between him and proprietor of Bihali Tea Co. as Ext 2 but neither the original nor the photocopy of the document was filed at the time of filing his evidence on affidavit and as such, the marking of the document as Ext. 2 in his evidence on affidavit is erroneous. I have gone through the original of the lease agreement submitted along with the petition. Perusal of the lease agreement reveals that it has relevancy with the case in hand and will be helpful in fair adjudication of the matter.
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Therefore, complainant is allowed to mark this document by way of filing additional evidence. Accused will, in no way, be prejudiced as because he will get the scope to cross-examine the complainant on this document. In view of the above, prayer is allowed to the effect that complainant shall file his additional evidence on affidavit to exhibit the lease deed in question. His additional affidavit shall remain confined in exhibiting the aforesaid document only. Fix: 15.09.18 for additional evidence of the complainant." 11. Needless to say, despite a civil remedy, Section 138 of the NI Act is intended to prevent dishonesty on the part of the drawer of the negotiable instruments to draw a cheque without sufficient funds in his account in a bank and makes the payee or holder in due course to act upon such instruments. 1 2 . The offence under Section 138 of the NI Act prescribes punishment with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine, which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. Second proviso to Section 143 of the NI Act provides that the offence under Section 138 is to be tried summarily, following the procedure in Chapter XXI of Cr.P.C., but it is open to the trial Magistrate to adopt the procedure of summons case provided in Chapter XX of Cr.P.C., if in the interests of justice, the sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year may have to be passed. 1 3 . In J.V. Baharuni case(Supra), the Supreme Court summarized the provision contained in Section 143 and held (Relevant positions): "60.2. The learned Magistrate has the discretion under Section 143 of the NI Act either to follow a summary trial or summons trial. In case the Magistrate wants to conduct a summons trial, he should record the reasons after hearing the parties and proceed with the trial in the manner provided under the second proviso to Section 143 of the NI Act. Such reasons should necessarily be recorded by the trial Court so that further litigation arraigning the mode of trial can be avoided: 60.6. While examining the nature of the trial conducted by the trial Court for the purpose of determining whether it was summary trial or summons trial, the primary and predominant test to be adopted by the appellate Court should be whether it was only the substance of the evidence that was recorded of whether the complete record of the deposition of the witness in their chief-examination, cross-examination and re-examination in verbatim was faithfully placed on record. The appellate Court has to go through each and every minute detail of the trial Court record and then examine the same independently and thoroughly to reach at a just and reasonable conclusion." 14. On reading of Section 326 Cr.P.C, it appears that, it is a general principle of law that a Judge or Magistrate, who has recorded the evidence should decide the case. However, the exception to this general principle is provided in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 326 Cr.P.C., whereunder the successor Judge or Magistrate can act on the evidence recorded by the predecessor to obviate the necessity of a denovo trial of part-heard case, when the Judge or Magistrate is transferred or otherwise relinquishes his office and a new Judge or Magistrate takes over. But Sub-Section (3) of Section 326 Cr.P.C. specifically provides that the provisions of Section 326(1) and 326(2) do not apply to summary trial. Therefore, a case under Section 138 of the NI
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Act, which requires to be tried in a summary way as contemplated under Section 143, if tried summarily, the restriction in Sub-Section (3) of Section 326 will be applicable. To speak it differently, if the case is not tried in a summary way as provided in Section 143 of the NI Act and tried as a summons case, the succeeding Judge or Magistrate can act on the evidence recorded by his predecessor and decide the case. 1 5 . The aforesaid legal position is succinctly explained by the Supreme Court in Nitinbhai case (supra) as herein below extracted: "12. Section 326 is part of the general provisions as to inquires and trials contained in Chapter XXIV of the Code. It is one of the important principles of criminal law that the Judge who hears and records the entire evidence must give judgment. Section 326 is an exception to the rule that only a person who has heard the evidence in the case is competent to decide whether the accused is innocent or guilty. The section is intended to meet the case of transfers of Magistrates from one place to another and to prevent the necessity of trying from the beginning all cases which may be part-heard at the time of such transfer. Section 326 empowers the succeeding Magistrate to pass sentence or to proceed with the case from the stage it was stopped by his preceding Magistrate. Under Section 326(1), the successor Magistrate can act on the evidence recorded by his predecessor either in whole or in part. If he is of the opinion that any further examination is required, he may recall that witness and examine him, but there is no need of a retrial. 13. In fact, Section 326 deals with part-heard cases, when one Magistrate who has partly heard the case is succeeded by another Magistrate either because the first Magistrate is transferred and is succeeded by another, or because the case is transferred from one Magistrate to another Magistrate. The rule mentioned in Section 326 is that the second Magistrate need not rehear the whole case and he can start from the stage the first Magistrate left it. 14. However, a bare perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 326 makes it more than evident that sub-section (1) which authorizes the Magistrate who succeeds the Magistrate who had recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in a trial to act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor, does not apply to summary trials. The prohibition contained in sub-section (3) of Section 326 of the Code is absolute and admits of no exception. Where a Magistrate is transferred from one station to another, his jurisdiction ceases in the former station when the transfer takes effect. 15. Provision for summary trials is made in Chapter XXI of the Code. Section 260 of the Code confers power upon any Chief Judicial Magistrate or any Metropolitan Magistrate or any Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court to try in a summary way all or any of the offences enumerated therein. Section 262 lays down the procedure for summary trial and sub-section (1) thereof inter alia prescribes that in summary trials the procedure specified in the Code for the trial of summons case shall be followed subject to the condition that no sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months is passed in case of any conviction under the chapter." 16. In the case of Smti. Dipti Choudhury (supra), this Court in para 15, observed as
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follows:- "15. It is in the context of the summary proceeding, the Apex Court, taking note of the mandatory language in which section 326(3) is couched, held that when a case is tried as a summary case, a Magistrate, who succeeds the Magistrate who had recorded the part or whole of the evidence, cannot act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor. It was further held that in summary proceedings, the successor Judge or Magistrate has no authority to proceed with the trial from a stage at which his predecessor has left it. It was explained that provision of sub-section (1) and (2) of section 326 of the Code have not been made applicable to summary trials because of the reason that in summary trials, under Section 264 Cr.P.C., only the substance of evidence has to be recorded and the Court does not record the entire statement of witnesses. Therefore, the Judge or the Magistrate who had recorded such substance of evidence is in a position to appreciate the evidence led before him and the successor Judge or Magistrate cannot appreciate the evidence only on the basis of evidence recorded by his predecessor. The Apex Court further held that Section 326(3) of the code does not permit the Magistrate to act upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, the obvious reason being that if the succeeding Judge is permitted to rely upon the substance of the evidence recorded by his predecessor, there will be a serious prejudice to the accused and it would be difficult for a succeeding Magistrate to decide the matter effectively and to do substantial justice. 23. It will appear to this Court that having regard to the purpose for which section 143 was inserted, which is to cut short delay and thereby facilitate expeditious disposal of trial, cases under section 138 of the Act are to be tried summarily. Second proviso to section 143(1), however, empowers the Magistrate to try the case other than in a summary manner by passing an order after hearing the parties if it appears to him that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year has to be passed or, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily. Thus, it is not that invariably and mandatorily an offence under section 138 of the Act has to be tried summarily and some amount of flexibility is in-built in the section itself. Recording of reason and opportunity of hearing is provided for in the proviso when the Magistrate contemplates not to try the case, either at the commencement or during continuance of a summary trial, so as not to prejudicially affect the right of the parties to otherwise have a summary trial. Failure to record reasons or grant opportunity of hearing before proceeding to try the case as a summons procedure case, will not, ipso facto, render the proceeding invalid as being without jurisdiction. It is the substance and mode of the proceeding which is decisive. If any of the parties is aggrieved by initiation or commencement of the trial as in a summons procedure case without there being an order to that effect after hearing the parties, certainly such course of action on the part of the Magistrate could be challenged in an appropriate proceeding at the appropriate time. If the parties a low the proceeding to go on as in a summons procedure case without any demur and participate therein fully, it cannot be countenanced that the proceeding is to be deemed to be a summary proceeding. Non-recording of reasons as well as failure to grant opportunity as contemplated in proviso to section 143(1) is, in that event, only an irregularity which does not invalidate the trial." 1 7 . It is noticed that the learned Magistrate having found prima facie ground to proceed under Section 138 of the NI Act issued summons to the petitioner/accused
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