National Strategy For Maritime Security 2014 PDF

The UK National
Strategy for
Maritime Security
May 2014
The UK National Strategy
for Maritime Security
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence

by Command of Her Majesty
May 2014
Cm 8829
© Crown Copyright 2014
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Contents 5
Contents
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................... 8
WHAT IS MARITIME SECURITY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Explaining the Maritime Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Establishing Maritime Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Assessing Maritime Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
OUR APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
UNDERSTAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
INFLUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
PREVENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
PROTECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
RESPOND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
DELIVERING OUR OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Objective 1: To promote a secure international maritime domain and
uphold international maritime norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Objective 2: To develop the maritime governance capacity and capabilities
of states in areas of strategic maritime importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Objective 3: To protect the UK and the Overseas Territories, their citizens
and economies by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore
installations and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Objective 4: To assure the security of vital maritime trade and energy
transportation routes within the UK Marine Area, regionally and internationally . . . . . . . . . . 33
Objective 5: To protect the resources and population of the UK and the
Overseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious
organised crime and terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
FUTURE DIRECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
ANNEX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
UK Maritime Security Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
ANNEX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Departmental Roles and Responsibilities for Maritime Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
ANNEX C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6 Foreword
Foreword
Foreword 7
Foreword
The UK’s maritime industry directly contributes up to £13.8 billion to the UK economy1 and indirectly
contributes a further £17.9 billion.2 The sector accounts for over 2% of the entire economy, supports
one in every 50 jobs and creates nearly £8.5 billion in revenue for the UK Exchequer each year.3
The United Kingdom is an island nation with a strong maritime heritage and maritime interests throughout
the world. Almost every aspect of our national life depends on our connections to the wider world, and
most of these connections are provided by the sea. We depend on the sea for our prosperity and security
and are reliant on a stable global market for the raw materials, energy and manufactured goods critical to
sustaining our way of life. Recent trends such as globalisation, resource competition, population growth
and climate change have changed the maritime domain to one that is simultaneously more connected –
providing substantial growth opportunities for UK business; and more contested – in which developments
in distant maritime regions can have an immediate and direct impact on our prosperity and security.
As a nation, we have always looked out into the wider world to shape and influence international events.
This strategy explains how we organise and use our current national capabilities to identify, assess and
address maritime security issues at home and overseas, and how we intend to improve our ability to do
so in future through the most efficient use of available resource.
We will achieve the objectives set out here through a thorough understanding of the risks we face, coupled
with an ambitious but pragmatic approach to the opportunities we could exploit – so as well as having the
capabilities to respond to security incidents, we also undertake overseas capacity building, deterrence and
diplomacy to disrupt potential future threats before they appear. This requires a comprehensive cross
government approach to maritime surveillance, information gathering, and decision making, enhanced by
regional and multinational cooperation, and supported by ongoing scrutiny to ensure we continue to improve.
The future will see further expansion in the global requirement for safe and secure seas as the offshore-
energy sector continues to expand and maritime trade increases to meet the consumer demands
of emerging countries and new consumer classes. We will seek to take advantage of this economic
opportunity by continuing to promote London as the global centre for maritime business, promoting a
stable maritime domain and the freedom of the seas, and maintaining the UK’s position as a driver of
international cooperation and consensus.
William Hague Theresa May

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Home Secretary
Philip Hammond Patrick McLoughlin

Secretary of State for Defence Secretary of State for Transport
1 Department for Transport analysis.

2 Oxford Economics research, Department for Transport Analysis.
3 Oxford Economics research.
8 Executive Summary
Executive
Summary
Executive Summary 9
Executive Summary
Introduction Our Objectives

1.1 The UK considers ‘maritime security’ to be 1.4 The UK benefits from a strong position.
the advancement and protection of the UK’s We have highly competent policing, military and
national interests, at home and abroad, through diplomatic capabilities; we are a centre of global
the active management of risks and opportunities trade with a large network of capable ports and
in and from the maritime domain, in order to maritime infrastructure supporting our economy;
strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security and our large coastline provides us with extensive
and resilience and to help shape a stable world. resources, including fisheries and energy. While
1.2 This strategy places the maritime domain in we assess that our capabilities are adequate to
context and explains why it matters to the UK. It deliver this strategy and that we already have
sets out our approach and the objectives we wish effective mechanisms in place to counter maritime
to achieve, as well as explaining how we intend to security threats, the maritime domain is extensive
improve our efforts in future. Finally, it outlines and the future will see considerable expansion
the governance structure which will allow us to in the global use of the seas. Thus, in a climate
deliver effective and efficient maritime security. of limited resources, we must maximise the
effect of our assets, focusing on integration and
The Maritime Domain Matters cooperation wherever possible.
1.3 While the sea is the lifeblood of our economy, 1.5 Analysis of the UK’s maritime security risks
conveying the vast majority of our trade and many (covered further in Paragraph 3.7) identified
of our vital resources, it can also be exploited by terrorism, disruption to trade or freedom
nations, criminals and terrorists. It thus requires of navigation, maritime attack against UK
national and international policing and regulation, infrastructure, arms proliferation, drugs and people
and strong global partnerships to address areas of smuggling as the areas of greatest significance.
common interest, striking the appropriate balance 1.6 We will therefore advance and protect our
between facilitating legitimate movement, and national interests by focusing our effort on five
monitoring hostile activity. The maritime domain maritime security objectives:
is also a complicated international system in which 1. Promoting a secure international maritime
the UK is a leading player, using diplomatic, military domain and upholding international maritime
and law enforcement levers to drive international norms;
cooperation and build capacity. In order for us
to influence and intervene where necessary, we 2. Developing the maritime governance capacity
must carefully assess and prioritise the maritime and capabilities of states in areas of strategic
risks and opportunities we face, and allocate our maritime importance;
resources accordingly. 3. Protecting the UK, our citizens and our
economy by supporting the safety and security of
ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign
Group (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships;
10 Executive Summary
4. Assuring the security of vital maritime trade 1.11 Where understanding and then influence
and energy transportation routes within the UK fail, we aim to prevent maritime security concerns
Marine Area, regionally and internationally; from arising or escalating. Prevention takes
5. Protecting the resources and population the form of pre-emptive work to build security
of the UK and the Overseas Territories from capacity in areas of instability, but can also be in
illegal and dangerous activity, including serious the form of responsive action. An example is the
organised crime and terrorism. international work to improve regional stability
and provide lawful economic opportunities to
Our Approach to the Maritime Domain prevent piracy off the Horn of Africa.
1.7 In order to manage a security environment 1.12 When we are unable to prevent a threat
which incorporates the overlapping interests from arising, we work to protect our interests
of multiple UK government departments and by taking action to reduce the vulnerability of
agencies as well as almost every nation and our shipping and maritime infrastructure (such
multiple international organisations, we need as enabling the use of armed Private Security
to work together to deliver maritime security Companies through published guidance and
outputs that are more than the sum of their existing legislation and the provision of military
parts. Therefore the two key principles we assets to deter violent behaviour) as well as efforts
have adopted to guide our work are integration to increase our resilience in the event of an attack
and collaboration – we will bring together the (for example through the establishment and
instruments of government, driving cooperation implementation of protective security practices).
and efficiency; and we will work globally with allies 1.13 Throughout this systematic approach, we
and partners, including industry and the public, in remain ready to respond whenever appropriate
pursuit of our mutual goals. or necessary. This may take the form of law
1.8 We will apply these principles of integration enforcement or interdiction action or, in the more
and collaboration to five core Maritime Security extreme cases, the use of military force.
Tasks which support the delivery of the objectives 1.14 This strategy describes how the UK will apply
described. These represent the strategic ‘ways’ of the above approach to our five maritime security
our approach – to UNDERSTAND, INFLUENCE, objectives (which are not in any order of priority):
PREVENT, PROTECT and RESPOND.
1. To promote a secure international
1.9 The maritime domain is vast, but not maritime domain and uphold international
uniform – the activity taking place within it is maritime norms.
largely concentrated within ports, shipping lanes,
waterways, fixed infrastructure, and fishing We pursue an active and activist foreign policy,
grounds, leaving large swathes of the world’s seas working with other countries to strengthen
and oceans broadly empty. Our first challenge the rules-based international system. We are
is therefore to monitor activity and identify that committed to freedom of navigation, unimpeded
which has relevance to our security. We therefore lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of
invest significant resource in understanding the disputes based upon international law. We use
maritime domain – gathering intelligence, sharing our best efforts to secure compliance by other
information, building partnerships, analysing data states with the United Nations Convention
and identifying concerns. on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and work
with allies to bring non-compliant states into
1.10 Once we understand, we seek to influence. compliance. Where disputes arise, we use
Influence takes a number of forms, from diplomacy wherever possible to settle them,
diplomacy through to law enforcement, economic with recourse to judicial settlements if necessary.
activity and military engagement. The aim is to We maintain strong and effective representation
help achieve our objectives by driving behaviour in the key organisations dealing with these issues.
– persuading our allies to support us, or deterring
adversaries from acting against our interests.
Executive Summary 11
2. To develop the maritime governance To enable UK criminal law to be enforced at sea,

capacity and capabilities of states in areas of power is vested in the police, Border Force, the
strategic maritime importance. National Crime Agency (NCA) and the Royal
Maritime security is an international responsibility, Navy. These agencies carry out surveillance,
but some states are more capable than others. deter unlawful activity, and interdict suspect
In recognition of this, we need to carry out work vessels. Police forces use local knowledge to
to build intelligence, law enforcement, coastguard respond to threats in their maritime regions
and military capabilities within specific states so while the NCA’s Border Policing Command
that they are better able to police their marine provides a coordinated response to organised
area and contribute to regional and international crime in the maritime domain. The Royal Navy
efforts on the high seas. and Border Force work together to patrol our
3. To protect the UK and the Overseas waters, intercepting vessels when required.
Territories, their citizens and economies by Improving Maritime Security
supporting the safety and security of ports and
offshore installations and Red Ensign Group 1.15 We intend to take the following action to
(REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships. improve our maritime security efforts in the future.
The Department for Transport (DfT) regulates • Understanding: We will harmonise
port and ship security to ensure UK citizens understanding of the maritime domain through
and assets are protected at sea, assessing the better use of existing cross-government
terrorist risks, setting appropriate security levels resources, such as the National Maritime
for maritime traffic, providing intelligence-led Information Centre (NMIC), and strengthening
security advice, and monitoring compliance. The relationships with our industry and international
Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure partners. We aim to bring together existing
(CPNI) works with the operators of critical separate activity focused on generating maritime
maritime infrastructure, including oil rigs and understanding and will investigate how best to
wind farms, to ensure that risk is understood measure the effectiveness of these efforts;
and mitigated. • Influence: We will continue to work closely
4. To assure the security of vital maritime with our maritime partners – bilaterally, through
trade and energy transportation routes championing regional security initiatives, by
within the UK Marine Area, regionally and working towards an EU Maritime Security
internationally. Strategy and through assertion of our freedom
The UK and global economies depend on of navigation. The UK has declared an Exclusive
international trade and energy. Where security Economic Zone, recognising the additional
is threatened, we work with our international security benefits that this can bring;
partners, including through the deployment • Prevention: We will share information,
of our navies, to build understanding, deter intelligence and best practice with our partners
threats and protect shipping engaged in lawful and continue our international capacity-building
commerce. As a last resort, we are prepared efforts in areas of key strategic importance,
to use force to prevent attacks and to uphold including South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf 4
international law. and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red
5. To protect the resources and population Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean
of the UK and the Overseas Territories from and the Gulf of Guinea;
illegal and dangerous activity, including serious • Protection: We will monitor developments
organised crime and terrorism. in security technology to ensure that we stay
The UK faces threats from the maritime domain ahead of the threat. We will exploit cross-
including organised crime, terrorism, unlawful government research and development in
crossing of our borders, and illegal exploitation support of our joint maritime security goals;
of our marine area (including fisheries).
4 The Persian Gulf is also known as the Arabian Gulf.

12 Executive Summary
• Response: We will seek better to coordinate 2.2 Focused primarily on the five-year period
joint operations between UK maritime from 2014 to 2019 but adopting a 20-year
departments and agencies. We will investigate outlook where appropriate, the NSMS sets
opportunities to acquire equipment jointly out our approach to these challenges, including
which meets the common needs of different how maritime capabilities support the delivery
maritime-focused government departments of objectives. By outlining cross-government
and agencies. priorities, this strategy sets out the whole-of-
government approach, including our reliance on
Governance to Maximise Impact international partners, required to secure the
1.16 Effective delivery of maritime security seas and oceans that Britain depends upon for its
activity requires clear and robust decision making national security and economic well being.
in government – to respond to incidents, to seek 2.3 The NSMS formalises the structures
evidence, and to generate policy. This strategy which allow our Government departments
sets out a more holistic approach to maritime jointly to identify solutions to the maritime
security than we have taken in the past, bringing security challenges faced by the UK, its Crown
together myriad government activity under a single Dependencies and Overseas Territories.
governance structure. Further, it identifies potential cost-efficient
1.17 A ministerial working group has been formed solutions to improve our effectiveness and
to focus on maritime security in its entirety. This rationalise our efforts on issues of cross-
group will meet regularly to consider maritime departmental maritime interest.
security issues and make decisions. Beneath this, 2.4 The NSMS is focused first and foremost on
a group of senior officials will meet to coordinate maritime security as set out at Paragraph 3.1 and
the cross-government work required to enact while maritime safety is touched upon where it has
the decisions made by ministers. To reflect the direct relevance to security, the following areas are
cross-government nature of maritime security, the not considered further in this strategy:
ministerial group will be chaired by the Foreign and • ‘Defence of the Realm’ i.e. the protection of
Commonwealth Office while the officials’ group the UK, our 3 Crown Dependencies and 14
will be chaired by the Department for Transport. Overseas Territories from concerted military
An additional forum will support regular dialogue attack. The response to such an attack would
with our industry partners. As with other areas of be authorised by the Cabinet and coordinated
National Security, the National Security Council will by the National Security Council;
engage when relevant.
• Military Campaigns i.e. coordinated UK
SCOPE military responses to direct threats or hostile
acts. These are authorised by the Cabinet,
2.1 This National Strategy for Maritime Security coordinated by the National Security Council,
(NSMS) contributes to and is fully coherent and implemented by a number of departments;
with Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) 2010
National Security Strategy (NSS),5 reflecting • Maritime Safety. Maritime safety includes ship
technical and quality standards, the training
that the UK wishes to be a prosperous, secure,
of crews and labour conditions, routing and
modern and outward-looking nation which
nautical charts, and responsibility for life
promotes its values and ideas globally. Pursuant
saving and pollution prevention and control.
to the NSS, the NSMS aims to safeguard and
The responsibilities lie primarily with the
promote our interests and prosperity by upholding
Department for Transport (DfT) and the
the freedom of the seas, by mitigating national
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA);6
security threats (ideally at range) and by exploiting
opportunities throughout the maritime domain.
6 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is responsible for providing
information and assistance to mariners, responding to accidents and
emergencies at sea and around the UK coastline, and helping to save lives
5 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, and prevent pollution. The MCA works nationally and internationally
HM Government, October 2010 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ with partners in the shipping industry to promote the safe construction,
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf). operation and navigation of ships.
Executive Summary 13
• Natural disasters and major accidents. 2.5 The NSMS is one of several strategies
The Department for Environment, Food stemming from the NSS. In implementing
and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the devolved the strategy we will ensure that it is aligned
governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern with related strategies, notably the CONTEST
Ireland are responsible for national emergency Counter Terrorism Strategy, the Serious and
planning for flooding and coastal erosion in Organised Crime Strategy, the International
the UK. Support to our Overseas Territories Defence Engagement Strategy, the Building
is detailed in a White Paper published by the Stability Overseas Strategy, and the Cyber
Government in 2012.7 The MCA is the lead Security Strategy.
agency for responding to maritime accidents
within the UK Pollution Control Zone8 and
Search and Rescue Region.9
7 The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability, HM

Government, June 2012 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/32952/ot-wp-0612.pdf).
8 Established under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Extends out to 200
nm from the baseline (or to the international median line).
9 The UK Search and Rescue Region includes the Pollution Control Zone
and extends to 40° West.
14 What is Maritime Security?
What is Maritime
Security?
What is Maritime Security? 15
What is Maritime Security?
3.1 For the UK, and in the context of this detailed in the United Nations Convention on the
National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in which state authority,
Maritime Security is: both in terms of law and capacity, diminishes in
each zone as distance from the land increases.
The advancement and protection of the 3.3 UNCLOS is the international agreement
UK’s national interests, at home and abroad, that resulted from the third United Nations
through the active management of risks Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
and opportunities in and from the maritime III), which took place between 1973 and 1982.
domain, in order to strengthen and extend It defines the rights and responsibilities of
the UK’s prosperity, security and resilience states in their use of the world’s oceans, and
and to help shape a stable world. establishes a framework for the conduct of
maritime commerce, the environment, and
Explaining the Maritime Domain the management of marine natural resources.
The Convention sets the geographical limits
3.2 The seas and oceans account for 72% of the of maritime zones, and establishes rights
earth’s surface. This maritime domain is divided and discretionary and non-discretionary
into a series of maritime zones (Figure 1) as responsibilities of coastal States, as follows:
Figure 1: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Zones (Source: MOD)
Baseline. The normal baseline for measuring the setting laws and regulating the use of these waters
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line (Figure 2), subject to the right of vessels from
along the coast as marked on officially recognised other states to exercise innocent or transit passage.
large-scale charts;10 This zone is also referred to as Territorial Waters;
Internal Waters. Covers all water and waterways Contiguous Zone. A zone, that may not extend
on the landward side of the baseline (Figure 2). beyond 24 nm (or the international median line),
The UK is responsible for setting laws and in which a coastal State can intervene to prevent
regulating the use of these internal waters;11 potential offences that may otherwise occur
Territorial Sea. From the baseline up to 12 inside its territorial sea (relating to fiscal, customs,
nautical miles (nm).12 The UK is responsible for sanitary and immigration offences), and to
apprehend vessels that have committed offences
inside territorial waters and are endeavouring
to escape. The UK does not currently claim a
contiguous zone;
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This extends
from the edge of the territorial sea up to 200
nm from the baseline. Within this area, a state
may claim sole exploitation rights over all natural
resources. Foreign nations have the freedom
of navigation and overflight, provided these
activities do not prejudice the economic interests
of the coastal State. Foreign states may also lay
submarine pipes and cables. The UK Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) is the area within which the
UK is responsible for enforcing fishing measures.
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their
own zones within the EEZ in which they are
responsible for fisheries enforcement;
Continental shelf. On the physical continental
shelf beyond 200 nm from the baseline the UK
has the right to exploit the mineral and other
non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil,
together with living organisms belonging to
sedentary species, to the exclusion of others;
High Seas. The high seas are open to all states.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by international law. As a
general rule, states have exclusive jurisdiction over
Figure 2: The UK Marine Area (Source: UKHO) – a
definition of UK Marine Area is provided in the Glossary their flagged vessels on the high seas and while
engaged in innocent or transit passage through
10 As stated in Part II of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
territorial waters. States also have a duty to
Sea (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/ effectively regulate their flagged vessels;13
part2.htm).
11 The term ’UK’ includes reference to the UK Overseas Territories and 3.4 Freedom of Navigation. Freedom of
British Crown Dependencies.
12 The limit remains 3 nm in British Indian Ocean Territory, Gibraltar,
Navigation (FON) is the term given to the bundle
Montserrat, Pitcairn, the Sovereign Base Areas, and Guernsey. The limit is of rights and freedoms that warships, merchant
12 nm in the UK, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, ships, aircraft and submarines enjoy to navigate
Falkland Islands, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South
Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, the Isle of Man
and Jersey. Where the United Kingdom currently claims three nautical miles
of territorial sea, it formally reserves the right under Article 3 of the United 13 Limited rights of visit by foreign warships are provided for in UNCLOS
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 and customary international (Article 110) (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/
law to claim a territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles. unclos/closindx.htm).
on, over, and under the world’s seas: it is vital may be fundamentally undermined by excessive
to the security and economic stability of the claims over sea areas or interferences with
UK. FON facilitates global maritime trade and navigational rights and freedoms. HMG supports
provides the UK military with the legal landscape a programme to capture and record excessive
to allow it to respond to threats to security at geographical or jurisdictional maritime claims
range.14 FON rights are set out in the 1982 by states, including incidents of unwarranted
United Nations Convention of the Law of the interference with UK shipping, and directs
Sea (UNCLOS). The stability of the UNCLOS diplomatic responses or demonstrations of UK
regime, and in consequence maritime security, counter-practice as appropriate.
The Scale of the Task

• The UK Marine Area extends over some 298 thousand square miles (3.5 times the UK terrestrial
extent); (Figure 2)
• The marine zones of the UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies extend over some
2.32 million square miles (25 times the UK terrestrial extent); (Figure 3)
• Shipping carries 95% of British trade by volume. UK ports handle

15
393 million tonnes of
international cargo and over 4.4 million containers annually;
• The value of UK goods imported/exported by sea is over £500 billion/annum. UK16export growth
of 30% to Asia, over 40% to Latin America and almost 70% to Africa is predicted;
• At any one time there are around 1,500

17
large commercial ships off the UK coast and every day
500 ships use the busy Dover Strait;
• There are around 675 UK direct-owned, 845 UK parent-owned, 1,151 UK-managed trading ships,
18
3,700 Red Ensign Group-registered ships and approximately 24,000 UK seafarers active at sea;
• Internationally,
19
more than 55,000 merchant ships carry more than 8.4 billion tonnes of goods
each year.
14 The seas beyond territorial waters are free from the sovereignty of all States. Access through the high seas does not rely on third state permission either in
peacetime or conflict. Warships can operate in all the world’s oceans right up to the edge of the territorial sea unfettered by coastal State control.
15 DfT UK Port Freight Statistics, 2012.
16 Centre for Economic and Business Research Study, 1 July 2012 (http://www.cebr.com/reports/good-exports).
17 Business Plan 2012-2016, MCA, Page 4, April 2012 (http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/the__business_plan_2012_16.pdf).
18 Shipping Fleet Statistics 2012, DfT, 25 September 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/shipping-fleet-statistics-2012).
19 How Shipping Has Changed the World, M Stopford, 7 September 2010.
Figure 3: The Marine Zones of the UK, Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Territories (Source: UKHO)
Establishing Maritime Security Objectives

UK Maritime Security Objectives21
3.5 The 2010 ‘Programme for Government’ set out
the Coalition’s strategic priorities across the range of 1. To promote a secure international
government business, with an emphasis on tackling maritime domain and uphold international
the deficit and returning to economic growth. In maritime norms;
the defence and security sphere, the 2010 NSS built 2. To develop the maritime governance
upon this and emphasised two principal national capacity and capabilities of states in areas of
security objectives: ensuring a secure and resilient strategic maritime importance;
UK; and shaping a stable world.20 For an island 3. To protect the UK and the Overseas
trading nation, maritime security has an important Territories, their citizens and economies by
role to play in support of both our economic and supporting the safety and security of ports and
wider national security objectives. offshore installations and Red Ensign Group
3.6 The UK’s maritime security objectives, along (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships;
with the activity we will carry out to achieve them, 4. To assure the security of vital maritime
are detailed below. The objectives are focused trade and energy transportation routes
both on protecting our citizens and our economy, within the UK Marine Zone, regionally and
and on promoting a secure international maritime internationally.22
domain which will benefit all nations. They strike a 5. To protect the resources and population
balance between managing risks and creating and of the UK and the Overseas Territories
exploiting opportunities to strengthen the security from illegal and dangerous activity, including
of the maritime domain. They represent the serious organised crime and terrorism.
strategic ‘ends’ of our approach.
21 Not in any order of priority.

22 Vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes include the Dover
Strait, North Channel, Irish Sea and the Pentland Firth; a southern corridor,
connecting the Straits of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, the Gulf
of Aden and the Persian Gulf. An eastern corridor, stretching from the East
and South China Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean; and
20 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, a western corridor connecting Europe with the Americas. The opening of the
HM Government, October 2010 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ Northern Sea Route, running along the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacific
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf). may take on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in the medium term.
Assessing Maritime Security Risks 3.8 The Maritime Risk Assessment will be
refreshed biennially in line with the timeframe for
3.7 Our maritime security strategy requires us
updating the NSRA.
to identify the most pressing risks to the delivery
of our objectives, and to put in place the ways 3.9 Mitigating these risks, and achieving the
and means to address them. On a biennial basis, maritime security objectives outlined above
the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) requires close coordination of national, regional
process is used to prioritise all major areas of UK and international activity across the maritime
national security risk – domestic and overseas.23 domain, and flexible response options that are
The NSRA was used as an evidence base for proportionate, and both cost- and operationally-
the 2010 NSS and underpinned its decisions on effective.24 While, with international partners,
priorities. The risks identified in the NSRA are we will continue to maintain our contribution
those which are likely to cause significant harm to maritime security on a global scale wherever
and disruption to the UK. For the purposes of possible, our national resources will be focused
this strategy, a more specific risk assessment on safeguarding the following maritime interests
was carried out – the Maritime Risk Assessment (which are not in any order of priority):
(MRA). Cognisant of, and consistent with, the • UK citizens and UK entitled persons in a vessel
NSRA, this assessment identifies the key risks of any state;
that we face in the maritime domain. The 2013 • The UK Marine Area;25
Maritime Risk Assessment assessed the following
risks to be those of highest priority, taking into • Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged passenger and
cargo ships;
account both likelihood and impact.
• Maritime infrastructure in the UK,
25
including
maritime offshore installations;
The Maritime Security Risks for 2014-15 • UK-owned maritime offshore installations;25
• Terrorism affecting the UK and its maritime • UK trade.26
interests, including attacks against cargo or
passenger ships;
• Disruption to vital maritime trade routes
as a result of war, criminality, piracy or
changes in international norms;
• Attack on UK maritime infrastructure or
shipping, including cyber attack;
• The transportation of illegal items by sea,
including weapons of mass destruction,
controlled drugs and arms;
• People smuggling and human trafficking.
24 And where possible allows the UK to overcome challenges at range.
25 While the Overseas Territories have, in the main, taken responsibility for
policing their maritime zones, the UK has an ongoing scalable responsibility in
many areas. Additional information is available in, The Overseas Territories:
Security, Success and Sustainability, HM Government, June 2012 (https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/32952/ot-wp-0612.pdf); Overseas Territories – the MoD Contribution,
HM Government, March 2011 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27626/overseas_territories.pdf); DfT’s
Partnership With the Overseas Territories: An update, HM Government,
May 2012 (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/3977/overseas-territories.pdf); and DECC Support
for the Overseas Territories, HM Government, January 2013 https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69184/
23 As described in A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Paper_-_DECC_Support_for_the_Overseas_Territories.pdf).
Security Strategy, HM Government, October 2010 (https://www.gov.uk/ 26 While the security of the ship, its crew and cargo lie with the Flag State,
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national- HMG retains an interest in maintaining the safe passage of energy imports,
security-strategy.pdf). food and manufactured goods through UK ports.
20 Our Approach
Our Approach
Our Approach 21
Our Approach
4.1 At the heart of our approach to maritime 4.2 The NSS set out eight National Security
security are two key principles: integration and Tasks to support the delivery of the UK’s
collaboration. national security objectives. In a similar way,
• Integration: Maritime security is a whole- this strategy is built upon five core Maritime
of-government activity, reflecting the extent Security Tasks which support the delivery of the
to which the UK’s security and prosperity is objectives described at Paragraph 3.6. These
reliant upon the sea. This is reflected in the represent the strategic ‘ways’ of our approach –
governance structure, which will be explained to UNDERSTAND, INFLUENCE, PREVENT,
later, but which brings together 16 parties within PROTECT and RESPOND.
Government27 to maximise the coherence and
efficiency of our approach. Consistent with the UNDERSTAND
National Security Strategy, the aim is to draw 4.3 The starting point of this strategy is that we
together and use all the instruments of national need to understand both the evolving strategic
power and influence to deliver an output that is context and the maritime domain itself if we are
greater than the sum of its parts. to be able to identify threats and opportunities,
• Collaboration: Beyond our sovereign to orientate ourselves rapidly to change and to
responsibility to protect our territorial sea, our focus our limited resources in the most efficient
infrastructure, our citizens and our interests and intelligent way. Understanding also underpins
from seaborne threats, we do not have to the development of the Maritime Risk Assessment
do everything ourselves. Maritime security described earlier. In the maritime domain,
is a truly international affair. The scale of understanding comes from three core activities:
the challenge means that working in close • Long-term horizon-scanning: The
collaboration with our allies and partners, at the Government has recently strengthened the
national, regional and multinational level, is the internal architecture which allows it to take a
best way to uphold the rules-based international long-term view of the future. From a security
system which governs it. perspective, the key programme of work is the
Global Strategic Trends (GST) programme,
which is run by the Ministry of Defence’s
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
(DCDC). This supports a 30-year view of what
27 Cabinet
established and emerging trends at the strategic
Office, the Department for Transport, the Home Office,
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, level might mean for the maritime domain,
the Department of Energy & Climate Change, the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the National Crime Agency, the
allowing us to test the resilience of this strategy
Border Force, the Royal Navy, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, the against possible future changes.
Crown Prosecution Service, the National Maritime Information Centre,
the police, the Marine Management Organisation, and the Maritime and • Terrorism Intelligence & Risk Analysis: The
Coastguard Agency. The Scotland Office, Northern Ireland Office and
Wales Office will be invited to attend for specific agenda items. The
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), and,
Offices will be consulted in-between NMSC(O) meetings as part of cross- for Northern Ireland, the Security Services,
government work stream development.
22 Our Approach
Understand Case Study: The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)

Recognising the need for cross-government understanding of activity within the maritime domain,
the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review established a National Maritime Information Centre
(NMIC) to provide the UK with a comprehensive picture of potential threats to UK maritime security.
The NMIC brings together information and intelligence provided by Border Force, the MCA,
the police, the Armed Forces, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Marine Management
Organisation, the National Crime Agency (Border Policing Command) and other agencies and,
supported by its international partnerships, incorporates additional global information to provide the
UK with unified situational awareness of maritime activity in UK and international waters.
The NMIC’s focus is on the here and now rather than delivering the longer-term strategic analysis
undertaken elsewhere in government. It provides real-time information to assess the impact of
maritime activity to the UK and contribute to decision making.
Its roles are to:
• Monitor and track maritime activity around the UK and areas of national interest, and collate that
data within a trusted environment;
• Analyse and share information, enabling better understanding of maritime security issues;
• Act as a national focal point for regional and international partners on maritime domain awareness;
• Support government and industry decision making in times of need;
• Respond to government department and agency tasking to support their outputs on a
case-by-case basis.
Since its inception in 2011, the NMIC has undertaken daily provision of data to support many
maritime security operations and provided support to ensure the safety and security of the Olympic
Games and during 2011 operations to protect civilians in Libya.
This strategy recognises the added value provided by NMIC to maritime stakeholders across
government and in industry since its inception. Within revised maritime security governance
arrangements (Annex A) maritime stakeholders are considering how NMIC can be utilised to
maximum effect to support the UK’s maritime security objectives for 2014–15 and beyond.
provide a synthesised assessment of terrorist together all-source data to create the most
threats in the maritime domain by drawing upon complete picture of daily maritime activity that
and analysing intelligence from a wide range of the UK has ever had. Effective analysis and
sources. The Department for Transport (DfT), distribution of this fused picture underpins
in conjunction with the CPNI, undertakes the much of our maritime security activities. The
analysis of terrorist risks to the commercial National Crime Agency’s (NCA) intelligence
maritime industry (ports and shipping) and is hub provides a similar capability for serious and
responsible for liaison and advice to industry on organised crime. At the same time, the UK has
terrorism threats and risks. a well-developed network spread across a range
• Information & Non-Terrorism Intelligence of Government Departments and Agencies
Analysis: Activity in the maritime domain for gathering intelligence on illegal activities, or
produces enormous quantities of data every on emerging threats to UK national interests.
day. For example, international regulations This includes the work carried out by Defence
require all larger ships to carry transponders Intelligence (DI) to provide maritime focused
which regularly transmit their position. In 2011, strategic intelligence to the Ministry of Defence
the UK established the National Maritime and the Armed Forces.
Information Centre (NMIC), which fuses
Our Approach 23
4.4 Again, we aim to draw together and analyse PROTECT

such information in order to maximise warning
4.7 Our aim is to strengthen our protection
time of impending threats, and to inform our
against known threats, improving security and
national response.
reducing vulnerabilities. Where, despite our
INFLUENCE actions, threats are manifested, we seek to
maximise our resilience, response and recovery
4.5 The UK will exert all its levers of influence arrangements. The ‘protect’ task includes, for
to uphold and strengthen the rules-based example, DfT security regulation and advice on
international system which governs the maritime protective practice to the commercial maritime
domain, and which underpins our national security industry, the deployment of Royal Navy units to
and prosperity. The ‘influence’ task is primarily the enforce international maritime law and protect
responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth UK merchant shipping,28 as well as steps to reduce
Office (FCO), and involves diplomatic activity vulnerabilities at national infrastructure sites, such
through the UN Security Council, of which the as ports and offshore installations. A key tenet
UK is a permanent member, and through the of the Protect function is to ensure freedom of
associated bodies to promote maritime security navigation, a policy spearheaded by the FCO and
and to uphold the UN Convention on the Law codified in international law through UNCLOS.
of the Sea (UNCLOS). In addition, the UK will Wherever possible we seek to minimise the impact
continue to play its part at the International of protection measures on trade, and will maintain
Maritime Organization (IMO) in supporting action close liaison with industry and other partners.
to establish international standards for security
across the maritime domain, and EU efforts RESPOND
to monitor standards within member states.
4.8 Where we have identified activities which
Influence can also be achieved through economic
may be illegal, or which may threaten our national
and other pressures including the use of law
interests (nationally or internationally), we have
enforcement and, where deemed appropriate
a range of capabilities which provide us with the
and lawful, military activity to deter or interdict
ability to respond in a timely, precise and intelligent
terrorism, illegal activity or other threats to
manner. This includes law enforcement assets to
maritime security.
police the UK’s borders, to prevent the trafficking
PREVENT of illegal goods and to protect our economic
resources, as well as a range of military capabilities
4.6 The NSS emphasised the importance of which can, as a last resort, use lethal force to
tackling problems early and at source, rather than protect our people, economy, infrastructure,
waiting until they manifest themselves closer to territory and way of life from seaborne threats.
the UK. In this spirit, the strategy incorporates
efforts overseas to prevent maritime security
threats from occurring. This includes action to
support the development of maritime security
capabilities amongst partner nations. For example,
the development of fishery protection capabilities
can help to safeguard legitimate livelihoods for
coastal communities in developing countries, and
prevent them turning to illegal activities such as
piracy, maritime crime or smuggling.
28 The Shipping Defence Advisory Committee (SDAC) provides a

long-established forum for Government-Military-Industry security and
defence dialogue.
24 Delivering Our Objectives
Delivering Our
Objectives
Delivering Our Objectives 25
Delivering Our Objectives
Objective 1: To promote a secure 5.4 The maritime domain is constantly evolving.

international maritime domain and Our long-term horizon-scanning activity ensures
uphold international maritime norms. that we are alive to potential future changes,
opportunities and risks to freedom of navigation
5.1 The UK pursues an active and activist foreign and trade on the high seas, and the concomitant
policy, working with other countries to strengthen risks to regional and international stability when
the rules-based international system in support these are threatened. For example, horizon
of our values. In the maritime domain, we are scanning has identified the Arctic region is critical
committed to freedom of navigation, unimpeded to the UK’s national interests,29 with 29% of
lawful commerce, and the peaceful resolution of energy consumed in the UK being imported from
disputes based upon international law. Norway. Over the next 20 years, the impact
5.2 A stable and secure maritime domain is of climate change will mean that previously
essential to the smooth working of the global impassable navigational routes, notably the
economy, with over 90% of global trade North West Passage, Transpolar Route and
transported by sea. The high seas are often Northern Sea Route will be open for longer
referred to as part of the ‘global commons’ – an periods.30 The latter of these (Figure 4) reduces
area of resource that lies beyond the political the sailing distance between Felixstowe (the UK’s
ownership or control of any single nation-state. busiest container port) and Busan in Korea from
Their security is dependent upon international 10,700 to 7,400 nm. This presents the UK with
cooperation aimed at setting and enforcing both opportunities for responsible commercial
appropriate and globally shared standards of exploitation, and potential new maritime security
action, consistent with international law, threats. International cooperation, particularly
custom and practice. through the Arctic Council, on which the UK has
observer status, and the Arctic Security Forces
5.3 The key international framework underpinning
Roundtable, of which the UK is a member, will
this collaboration is the 1982 UN Convention
be an essential means of managing these
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which 166
significant developments.
states are party, including the UK. UNCLOS
defines the rights and responsibilities of nations
in their use of the world’s oceans, establishing
rules for shipping, the environment, and the
management of marine natural resources. As a
permanent member of the UN Security Council,
the UK is committed to upholding and, where
necessary and through lawful means, enforcing
UNCLOS in the interests of the international 29 Adapting to Change: UK policy towards the Arctic, Foreign and
community as a whole. Commonwealth Office, 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/government).
30 The Russian Government predicts that traffic through the Northern Sea
Route will increase from 1.26 million tonnes in 2012 to 4 million tonnes in
2015 (http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6036).
Influence Case Study: Military Alliances

The UK is an important contributor to three military alliances which help deliver maritime security;
NATO, the EU and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). These alliances operate groups of ships,
aircraft and other assets in the strategically important regions of the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean and the Persian Gulf. By playing a part in these collaborative international organisations we
gain from the benefits of regional understanding, influence and security that they deliver.
Following the re-organisation of the NATO Command structure, the sole senior maritime
commander in the organisation is a British Vice Admiral based in the NATO Maritime HQ near
London. Alongside broader NATO responsibilities, he/she commands two maritime security
operations; Operation OCEAN SHIELD, focused on counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean,
and Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR providing broader maritime security in the Mediterranean.
Both these operations are conducted primarily by task groups of warships provided by NATO
member states but there is also a growing emphasis on drawing together the information from a
network of sensors and sources to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the maritime
domain. The NATO task groups work closely with regional Navies and Coast Guards on operations
and exercises to provide maritime security and to help to develop their capacity and capabilities.
The main EU contribution to maritime security is Operation ATALANTA – the first EU maritime mission.
Under UK Command since its inception in 2008, ATALANTA is focused on counter-piracy in the Indian
Ocean. It links into and supports EU missions ashore that aim to develop regional maritime capacity and
to provide military training to strengthen the institutions of the Somali National Government.
Finally, the UK has an important role in CMF, a broad coalition of 29 nations with a shared interest in
contributing to maritime security in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
5.5 The UK Government is concerned by the

tensions in the South and East China Seas. The
UK has significant political and economic interests
in the Asia Pacific region, as reflected in the recent
strengthening of our diplomatic network there. It
is important that all nations in the region resolve
any maritime disputes peacefully and within
the rule of law, while protecting and promoting
freedom of navigation and trade.
5.6 The UK works to promote a secure
international maritime domain through active
diplomatic engagement to build and enhance key
relationships. This involves working with
international partners to safeguard maritime security
by ensuring compliance with existing international
law, and where necessary developing new
international agreements which help to defend the
Figure 4: Northern Sea Route (blue) and alternative route maritime domain and enable freedom of movement
through the Suez Canal (red) (Source: MOD) on the high seas. The principal means are:
• To use best efforts to secure compliance
by other states with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
and promote other agreements complementary
to UNCLOS;
• To monitor situations where the rules in up to £15 billion every year.35 The theft of natural
UNCLOS are not being complied with and, in resources, whether energy supplies or fish, can
collaboration with allies and partners, to use have a very severe impact upon the economies
best efforts to bring States into compliance; of developing countries, feeding corruption and
instability which, in turn, affects the stability and
• Where a dispute occurs, to use appropriate security of the maritime domain.36
diplomatic efforts to secure our interests and, if
necessary, to use the available means of judicial 5.9 The 2010 NSS emphasised the importance
settlement; 31 of tackling at root the causes of instability. As
• To maintain strong and effective representation a result, the Department for International
in the key organisations dealing with Law of the Development (DfID), the Foreign and
Sea issues. Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of
Defence published the Building Stability Overseas
Objective 2: To develop the maritime Strategy (BSOS),37 which sets out Government’s
governance capacity and capabilities of strategic approach to addressing instability and
states in areas of strategic maritime conflict overseas.
importance. 5.10 In the maritime context, the Government
5.7 Many coastal States do not have the capacity recognises that instability at sea usually stems
to govern their maritime zones effectively. This, from problems on the land. In seeking to address
and the failure of some Flag States effectively to these challenges at source, and to prevent threats
administer their Flag Vessels, or enforce maritime to maritime security from emerging, we aim to
security in their territorial seas, creates the employ a sophisticated and integrated approach
conditions for a wide spectrum of crime which drawing upon a wide range of Government
impacts upon stability ashore. Piracy and theft Departments and agencies. This can include:
are just two manifestations of maritime insecurity • Work to build the intelligence, law enforcement,
which, in areas such as the Horn of Africa and coastguard and military capabilities of States so
Gulf of Guinea, threaten not only national but that they are better able to police their own
also regional stability. £90 billion of UK maritime waters, and successfully detain and prosecute
trade transits the Horn of Africa every year and those who break the law;
the cost of piracy to the global economy has been • Efforts to strengthen States’ economies, for
estimated at over £12 billion.32 In Nigeria alone example by seeking recognition of an Exclusive
the equivalent of around 100,000 barrels of crude Economic Zone;
oil are stolen every day, with a market value of • Development efforts to reduce poverty and
between £2 billion and £5 billion per year.33 increase stability;
5.8 Fisheries are also a vital natural resource. Fish • Political efforts to foster peace and reconciliation
represents over 25% of all protein consumed initiatives in conflict-affected countries at the
in many of the poorest countries,34 but it is also national, regional and local levels.
a global export industry worth more than £80
billion in 2011, more than half of which comes
from developing countries. While this is an
essential source of revenue, illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishing is estimated to be worth
31 UNCLOS, Annex VII. Arbitration (http://www.un.org/depts/los/

convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex7.htm). 35 Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing. DJ Agnew, J Pearce, G
32 The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation, World Pramod, T Peatman, R Watson, et al, PLoS ONE 4(2), 2009 (http://www.
Bank, 2013 (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/ plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2F
pirates-of-somalia-main-report-web.pdf). journal.pone.0004570&representation=PDF).
33 Nigeria’s Criminal Crude. C Katsouris and A Sayne, Chatham House, 36 Piracy, Illegal Fishing, and Maritime Insecurity in Somalia, Kenya, and
September 2013 (http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/ Tanzania, G Schbley and W Rosenau, CNA, October 2013 (http://www.cna.
Research/Africa/0913pr_nigeriaoil.pdf). org/sites/default/files/research/IIM-2013-U-005731-Final3.pdf).
34 Sustainable Fisheries and Poverty Reduction (http://ec.europa.eu/ 37 The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (https://www.gov.uk/government/
europeaid/what/development-policies/intervention-areas/environment/fish_ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-
en.htm). EC Development and Cooperation, accessed 21 October 2013. overseas-strategy.pdf)
Prevent Case Study: Promoting a Secure Maritime Domain

Maritime criminality in the Gulf of Guinea presents a significant risk to economic development,
peace and security in West and Central Africa, and the reduction of these risks will contribute
to the security and prosperity of other nations including the UK. A number of partners engage
in capacity building activities with countries in the region, and the UK identified that better
coordination of international efforts could help avoid duplication of effort, facilitate joint projects
and best use of resources, and therefore maximise capacity building efforts to tackle maritime
crime in the Gulf of Guinea.
Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea was discussed under the G8 peacekeeping/peace building
experts group in 2011 with the aim of improving the coordination of international maritime capacity
building in West and Central Africa. The UK presented a paper at the April 2012 meeting suggesting
the establishment of a larger, informal group that involved all countries conducting capacity building
work in the Gulf of Guinea. The first initial meeting of this new grouping was held in July 2012.
Subsequently, under the UK Presidency of the G8 in 2013, this group became formalised and known
as the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG). The FOGG is an official-level group comprising
international partners actively engaged in working to support States in the Gulf of Guinea region
on maritime security. It includes representatives from the G8 plus Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, as well
as the EU, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the International Maritime Organisation.
The FOGG has helped reduce duplication of effort while maximising international support to tackle
maritime crime. Specifically, to date, the FOGG has delivered:
• The establishment of a G8++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea Coordination Platform. The Platform
details all activities planned or undertaken by international donors and helps target assistance and
avoid duplication;
• A clear statement of international support for regional ownership of maritime security capacity
building, with targeted international assistance to support this aim;
• Agreement on clear and consistent political messages;

• A mechanism for the delivery of financial support from international partners for the industry-
led initiative to establish a Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre for the Gulf of Guinea;
• A framework for a joint strategy for pursuing prosecutions in the region.

In sum, the FOGG has reduced duplication of effort while maximising support from international
partners to discuss political developments which contribute to tackling maritime crime.
5.11 Some of our current activities, designed to at Sea (REFLECS-3)38 based in the Seychelles and
prevent the emergence of maritime security through training and capacity building projects
threats, include: in coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea including
• Full and active participation in international Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Togo, Sao
action, e.g. the Contact Group on Piracy off the Tome and Principe, Ghana and Nigeria;
Coast of Somalia and the G8++ Friends of the
38 REFLECS-3, opened in February 2013, brings together experts to share
Gulf of Guinea Experts Group; intelligence and information to tackle the king-pins and financiers of piracy. It
• Developing the maritime capacity of coastal supports regional initiatives to tackle organised crime in Somalia and across
the Indian Ocean. The UK committed £550 000 toward construction costs
States to combat crime e.g. the Regional Fusion and provided legal advisors, and the Centre’s first co-director. International
partners include the Seychelles, the USA, Tanzania, Mauritius, the
Law Enforcement Centre - Safety, and Security Netherlands, Australia, INTERPOL and the EU Naval Force. The CPS has
also provided prosecution advice to Kenya.
• Being a contracting party and key donor to Objective 3: To protect the UK and
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on the Overseas Territories, their citizens
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against and economies by supporting the safety
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP); and security of ports and offshore
• Working in close partnership with UK industry, installations and Red Ensign Group
including by supporting the proposed industry- (REG)-flagged passenger and cargo ships.
led initiative to establish a Maritime Trade 5.12 The Government’s primary responsibility
Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) for the is to protect its citizens, both in the UK and
Gulf of Guinea; 39 abroad. We therefore take steps to ensure
• Promoting and contributing to overseas that our people are protected irrespective of
maritime governance building programmes their location.41 This includes working with
including the international deployment of Royal our European and international partners to
Air Force Command and Control aircraft, raise security standards. In addition, the global
Royal Navy warships, or Naval Task Groups, economy and the UK’s dependence on maritime
to areas of potential tension. For example trade means that the Government requires that
we are providing cross-government assistance reasonable steps are taken to protect specific
in regions including the Persian Gulf, the maritime assets of UK economic interest – ships,
Mediterranean, East and West Africa and cargoes and infrastructure – from harm.
the Caribbean; 40
Port and ship security
• Development of other States’ judicial
procedures and assistance with the 5.13 The International Maritime Organization
construction and operation of prisons, e.g. (IMO) is the United Nations’ specialised agency
support to Somalia in establishing an effective, with responsibility for the safety and security of
internationally recognised, prosecution and shipping and the prevention of marine pollution
detention process; by ships. The IMO’s International Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) sets international
• The forward deployment of training teams standards for the security of ships, and the areas of
to work in partnership with other nations to
ports from which they operate, in the International
train, mentor and assist state-led maritime
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Within
security elements, including in Albania, Oman,
Europe, the IMO standards are mandated through
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya and the United
European legislation.42 The ISPS Code requires
Arab Emirates;
all ports and ships which fall under the Code43 to
• Working in partnership with states and take appropriate security measures based on a
international legal organisations to tackle standardised risk assessment framework.
transnational maritime crime, including through
information sharing; 5.14 The DfT sets the security levels with which
maritime interests in the UK, UK Overseas
• Contributing to EU and NATO efforts to build Territories, Crown Dependencies, and Red Ensign
partner capacity and uphold maritime norms.
Group shipping must comply. This process takes
account of the maritime threat assessments
provided by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
41 Including onboard ships and offshore infrastructure.

42 Enhancing Ship and Port Facility Security, Regulation (EC) No 725/2004
Of The European Parliament And Of The Council, 31 March 2004 (http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:129:0006:0091:
en:PDF). There is also additional European security legislation that applies to
39 MTISC is intended to be the regional information portal for merchant the wider port area – Directive 2005/65/EC on enhancing port security, 26
shipping operating in the Gulf of Guinea. A successful trial, conducted in October 2005 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
February 2013, involved the Oil Companies International Marine Forum L:2005:310:0028:0039:EN:PDF).
(OCIMF), the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), INTERPOL, the 43 Article 3.1 of the ISPS Code applies to the following types of ships
EU Joint Research Centre, the Royal Navy (RN), the Ghana Navy (GN), engaged on international voyages: passenger ships, including high-speed
industry and the IMO. This centre will open in 2014. passenger craft; cargo ships, including high-speed craft; of 500 gross tonnage
40 The deployment of Royal Navy ships is decided by a cross-Government and upwards; and mobile offshore drilling units; and port facilities serving such
group which determines priorities based on risk to UK interests and the ships engaged on international voyages. In addition, the UK has extended the
strategic effects required. provisions of the ISPS Code to certain categories of domestic ships.
(JTAC), the vulnerability of assets, and existing highlights the potential for major international
security measures which help to mitigate the threat. maritime crime, including piracy, to migrate to
To communicate these requirements, DfT issues other areas. The FCO leads on counter-piracy
instructions to the UK port and shipping industries policy with the DfT, MOD, Home Office, BIS, the
which explain which security measures ports and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), a number of
ships in the UK, and UK-flagged ships overseas, are other Government Departments and industry
required to put in place.44 As part of this process playing a significant role. The FCO sets out HMG’s
DfT maintains close liaison with industry. approach to piracy in Somalia on its website.46
5.15 Compliance is monitored and measured 5.18 DfT is responsible for the development
through a comprehensive programme of of counter-piracy policy for UK flagged shipping,
inspections and reviews: including the policy in relation to engaging armed
• DfT operates a risk-based security inspection guards. This is set out in the DfT’s Interim
programme covering port facilities in the UK, UK Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of
Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, Armed Guards to Defend Against the Threat of
and UK passenger ferries and cruise ships; Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances.47
• The programme includes the review and approval 5.19 The Government is working to promote
of the security required from industry partners the highest standards, including on human rights,
(Port Facility Security Plans, Port Security Plans, across all private maritime security companies.
Ship Security Plans) and the undertaking of The FCO is supporting the UK Accreditation
security assessments at ports/port facilities; Service to conduct a pilot, to accredit certifying
• Security compliance of the UK-flagged bodies to independently certify Private Maritime
commercial cargo fleet is undertaken by the Security Companies (PMSCs) to the ISO 28000
MCA. As part of this security compliance standard, incorporating the requirement of the
programme, the MCA provides the ISO PAS 28007 guidance. This sets out guidelines
communication infrastructure for the receipt of for PMSCs providing privately contracted armed
ship security alerts and undertakes inspections security personnel on board ships. The FCO
of overseas ships arriving in UK ports; are contributing to the funding of the newly-
• DfT and MCA hold ships assessed to have established International Code of Conduct for
serious security deficiencies at UK ports, Private Security Providers Association. The
and have powers to compel ports to rectify Association, made up of governments, industry
security deficiencies. and civil society organisations, will independently
monitor implementation of the International
5.16 SO15 Counter Terrorism Command has lead Code of Conduct. The Government encourages
responsibility for the initial notification of maritime the clients of PMSCs to take into account both
terrorist incidents involving a vessel that may accredited certification, and membership of the
affect the UK’s interests. Our national response Association, when contracting PMSCs.
is administered through Operation STERN45 and
involves partner agencies and organisations. The 5.20 The UK Armed Forces work with
Senior National Co-ordinator Counter Terrorism international partners to police, intercept and
(SNCCT) has overall responsibility for managing interdict illegal activity to provide freedom of
the initial UK policing response. navigation and safety in areas of high risk.
Counter-piracy policy for UK-flagged

shipping
5.17 Recent years have seen a growth in the threat
from piracy. This has been particularly prevalent 46 Preventing and reducing piracy off the coast of Somalia, HM Government,
on the coast of East Africa, and a growing trend December 2012 (https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/preventing-and-
reducing-piracy-off-the-coast-of-somalia).
47 DfT Interim Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on the Use of Armed
44 A combination of physical and procedural security measures, including Guards to Defend Against the Threat of Piracy in Exceptional Circumstances
searching, screening and the designation of restricted areas. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
45 The Metropolitan Police Service response on behalf of UK policing to the file/204123/use-of-armed-guards-to-defend-against-piracy.pdf), HM
notification of a potential terrorist incident at sea. Government, May 2013.
Protect Case Study: Counter Piracy Off Somalia - An International Dilemma

The fall of the Somali government
and the ensuing civil war in 1991
marked the beginning of a long period
during which Somalia lacked effective
governance. Consequently instability,
terrorism, crime and corruption
flourished throughout the failed
state. The consequent freedom to
conduct illicit activity from Somalia’s
2,100 nm coastline was seized by
international criminal and terrorist
elements manifesting itself in piracy,
people trafficking, kidnapping, smuggling
(including narcotics and weapons), illegal
fishing and toxic waste dumping. Figure
5 shows the vast area of risk generated
by this illicit activity. It is estimated that
40% of the world’s traded material –
fuel, food, manufactured goods and
trade (£600 billion of which is en-route
to or from European ports) transits
through the High Risk Area annually.
A global response was required to reduce the permissiveness of this environment to illegal activity
and to then rebuild the governance and capability of the failed state. The UK contributed Royal Navy
warships to EU, NATO and CMF task forces to patrol and intercept renegade ships within the High
Risk Area as well as providing the leadership under a UK Admiral and staff to coordinate multi-national
activity from a headquarters just outside London. This international answer, including the authorisation
for Private Security Companies to embark on our merchant ships and the issuing of policy guidance –
including industry issued self-protection measures, and reporting procedures – to Shipping Companies
when coming into contact with pirates significantly reduced opportunities for illegal activity in the area.
With a lack of guaranteed financial return, the incentives for many of the criminal elements disappeared
– however it remains important to dissuade any future return to such practices.
As an example of the comprehensive nature of the UK approach, a number of prevention measures
have been taken:
• UK-led international efforts to develop regional justice and the rule of law programmes in
Somalia and the wider Indian Ocean region including developing prosecution capabilities in the
Seychelles and Mauritius, and a detention capacity in Somalia;
• In order to generate legitimate employment for the population, the UK is developing opportunities
in Somalia by supporting prosperity and tackling poverty with the Department for International
Development (DfID) engaged in a 4-year, £250 million, programme – one example of which is the
support to the economic and alternative livelihood program which aims to create 45,000 jobs;
• The UK is actively encouraging the Somali Government to declare an EEZ in order to bring
certainty to its maritime claims.
From a peak of 47 ships in 2010, the international effort reduced piracy by over 80% by 2012 and in
2013 there was not a single successful attack.
(EU NAVFOR Somalia. Key Facts and Figures. http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures)
Figure 6: The International Underwater Cable Network (Source: TeleGeography). www.submarinecablemap.com
Security of energy and communications redistribution of data flow and resilience of the
infrastructure onshore Cable Landing Stations will continue to be
the primary mitigation actions, response options
5.21 The UK’s coastline is home to a significant may be required in the future.
number of critical energy assets, including much
of the civil nuclear power infrastructure, which 5.23 The Centre for the Protection of National
provides on average 16% of the UK’s electricity. Infrastructure (CPNI) is engaged with asset
In addition, the security of gas and oil import owners and operators to ensure that risks to
terminals, and undersea pipelines in the North critical marine and coastal infrastructure are fully
Sea, are critical to the delivery of a robust energy understood, and that proportionate mitigation
supply. Within the UK Marine Area there are strategies are in place. Procedures to regain
approximately 300 gas and oil rigs and a rapidly control of offshore installations that have been
increasing number of offshore wind farms.48 The overrun by subversive elements are practised on
Department for Energy and Climate Change a regular basis.
(DECC) is responsible for setting the security and
resilience approach for energy infrastructure. Food Security
5.22 With over 95% of all intercontinental digital 5.24 Around 40% of the food consumed by the
traffic traveling through underwater cables (Figure UK is imported, and over 91% of that arrives
6) rather than satellites,49 it is important that we by sea. The dependency on a small number of
protect this essential flow of information, on which specialised ports through which the imported food
the global economy relies, from physical or cyber arrives creates vulnerability. Defra, working closely
attack, as well as ensure compliance by coastal with other departments, has commissioned work
States with the freedom to lay cables conferred to mitigate this vulnerability and thus increase the
by UNCLOS.50 While measures to allow the resilience of UK food supply.
48 One of 19 operational sites, the London Array (opened in July 2013) is

the world’s largest offshore wind farm – consisting of 175 turbines capable
of generating enough energy to power nearly half a million UK homes.
49 NSTAC: Cyber Security Collaboration Report, National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee, 21 May 2009.
50 Reliability of Global Undersea Cable Communications Infrastructure
(ROGUCCI) Study and Global Summit, K F Rauscher, Issue 1, 2010 (http://
www.ieee-rogucci.org/files/The%20ROGUCCI%20Report.pdf).
Figure 7: Global Maritime Shipping Density (Source: Prof JP Rodrigue, Hofstra University)
Objective 4: To assure the security output of Government requiring international

of vital maritime trade and energy action. The UK achieves this by applying a
transportation routes within the combination of diplomatic, military and law
UK Marine Area, regionally and enforcement effort, informed by accurate real-
internationally.51 time situational awareness:
5.25 The oceans are a medium connecting

• We maintain a range of international alliances
and partnerships which provide a powerful
peoples and nations. Both the UK Marine Area lever to preserve free movement of trade when
and the world’s maritime superhighways are routes are threatened;
increasingly a crucial supply of resources and
conduits of trade (Figure 7). National prosperity • We deploy Royal Navy ships acting
is often dependent on distant resource, and the independently or as part of an international
Government is clear on the importance of the force to maintain vital trade routes and ensure
international system to our national interests: the freedom of navigation, including a persistent
UK depends on open trade routes and a stable forward presence in the Atlantic, Indian
global market for the critical supply of energy, raw Ocean and the Persian Gulf. We also deploy
materials, food and manufactured goods. The specialised Naval shipping and capabilities to
likelihood and impact of disruption is elevated in key chokepoints in order to understand and
strategic ‘chokepoints’: straits like Dover, Gibraltar influence these areas, and if necessary to take
and Hormuz where the proximity of land funnels action to prevent and respond.
ships into higher densities. • Should the security situation deteriorate such
that safe passage cannot be guaranteed, we will
5.26 Because the global economy is vulnerable take action to reduce the level of risk in the
to disruptions to maritime routes, we and other area. This could include military protection to
nations consider their protection an important transiting ships or other UK maritime interests,
or lowering the risk through deterrence.
51 VitalMaritime Trade Routes include the Dover Strait, North Channel,
Irish Sea and the Pentland Firth; a southern corridor, connecting the Straits 5.27 The potential for maritime criminality to
of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the
Persian Gulf. An eastern corridor, stretching from the East and South China threaten vital energy trade and transport routes is
Seas through the Malacca Straits into the Indian Ocean; and a western mitigated through coordinated, cross-government
corridor connecting Europe with the Americas. The opening of the Northern
Sea Route, running along the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacific may effort, outlined in more detail at Objective 5.
take on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in the medium term.
Protect Case Study: Maintaining Freedom of Navigation in a Strategic Chokepoint

While threats to Freedom of Navigation commonly take the form of excessive geographical
jurisdictional claims, in relation to the world’s key maritime chokepoints they may also be physical.
The Strait of Hormuz, which separates the Persian Gulf from the Arabian Sea, is a key route for
all shipping both in and out of the Gulf area. All ships have a right of transit passage through the
Strait, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), yet
periodic threats to close the Strait do arise. The Persian Gulf remains an economic centre of gravity
with 17 million barrels of oil and 3.5 billion cubic feet of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) passing through
the Strait of Hormuz daily – representing over 20% of worldwide trade. Any threat of disruption
would have a profound effect on world oil and gas prices and many economies: HM Treasury analysis
predicts that a 30-day closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have an impact on the global economy
lasting at least four years. Consequently, it is a key strategic chokepoint, not only for the countries of
the region, but globally – and freedom of navigation for all ships must be maintained.
The geographical nature of the Strait, which is 21 miles across at its narrowest point, makes
shipping highly vulnerable to disruption. For relatively little cost the Strait could be closed for some
considerable time by state or non-state actors. Conflict or an increase in tensions in the area would
have a similar effect.
In order to mitigate this risk, to deter attempts to disrupt the Strait, and to maintain freedom of
navigation to and from the Gulf, an international military coalition, including the UK Armed Forces,
operates in the region. Since 2006 the Royal Navy has maintained four forward-deployed Mine
Countermeasure Ships (MCMVs) operated out of Bahrain. This expeditionary force, supported by a
ship from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and a Command and Control element, is part of the international
effort to maintain the movement of the world energy supply. The success of this effort continues
to be dependent on wider political engagement and whole-of-government activity across the region,
including intelligence and information sharing.
5.28 As outlined at Objective 5, within the UK this is not confined to seas and waterways, the
Marine Area, a permanent prevent and respond characteristics of the maritime domain lend
capability is provided by Border Force Cutters, themselves to certain types of activity, including
Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels and the Royal drug and people trafficking. In addition, we face
Navy Fleet Ready Escort. periodic maritime hazards, such as flooding,
pollution or extreme weather events. As
Objective 5: To protect the resources mentioned in Paragraph 2.4 while these are not
and population of the UK and the considered maritime security threats, the national
Overseas Territories from illegal and response will require coordination of government
dangerous activity, including serious assets and personnel normally employed on
organised crime and terrorism. maritime security tasks. To enable UK criminal
5.29 Threats from the maritime domain include law enforcement to be conducted at sea, power is
the illegal entry of people and goods, criminal vested in a number of government agencies – the
activity including terrorism, organised crime police, Border Force, National Crime Agency and
incorporating a maritime component, and the the Royal Navy, among others.
deliberate or wilful failure to observe laws to
Protecting our territory and resources
protect resources such as fish stocks or Marine
Protected Areas. Organised crime costs the 5.30 Border Force is responsible for securing
UK more than £24 billion per year52 and while the UK border and facilitating the legitimate
movement of goods. This is achieved by carrying
52 Understanding organised crime: estimating the scale and the social and out immigration and customs controls for people
economic costs. H Mills, S Skodbo and P Blyth Research Report 73. Home
Office, October 2013. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
and goods entering the UK, with Border Force
uploads/attachment_data/file/246390/horr73.pdf). officers working at 140 sea and air ports across
the UK and overseas. The three Royal Navy 5.32 Our fishing industry directly employs
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and five Border over 12,000 people and UK fishing vessels
Force fast patrol ships (Cutters) are the main land over 600,000 tonnes of fish with a value
contributors to the protection of the UK’s Marine of £770 million each year; fish stocks are also
Area, carrying out reconnaissance, deterrence a critical source of revenue for many of our
and interdiction at sea.53 The UK also operates Overseas Territories.55 The Marine Management
an airborne maritime surveillance capability.54 Organisation (MMO) and the Devolved
Together these efforts: Administrations work with partner organisations
• Deter unlawful activity across our maritime to secure fish stocks, prevent the importation
borders; of illegal fishing products and protect the
environment from illegal activities:
• Provide reconnaissance to locate, identify, track
and interdict traffic approaching the UK; • In England, the MMO co-ordinates an
enforcement programme for monitoring,
• Have the capability to carry out enforcement control and surveillance of all sea fishing
operations and act upon intelligence including
activity around the coast of England, and UK
through the interdiction of vessels suspected of
vessels operating outside those waters. The
carrying out illicit activity;
programme includes the inspection of fishing
• Provide a law enforcement capability in remote vessels at sea and in port, inspections of fishing
harbours, ports and coastlines where there is industry premises, fish markets and other
limited shore presence, and provide operational locations around the coast and further inland
seagoing capability to partner organisations such by marine enforcement officers. Inspections at
as the police or National Crime Agency (NCA). sea are carried out by the Royal Navy under an
5.31 Royal Navy Offshore Patrol Vessels and agreement with the MMO;
Border Force Cutters work together to improve • In Northern Ireland, the Northern Irish
their combined effect by coordinating patrols, Government co-ordinates a programme for
exchanging specialist personnel and sharing monitoring, control and surveillance of sea
information. The Border Force Cutters are used fishing activity. This programme includes the
primarily in coastal waters to intercept drug activities described for England’s programme,
shipments and other restricted or prohibited above. The Department for Agriculture
goods being trafficked by sea while the Royal Navy and Rural Development of Northern Ireland
specialises in offshore patrolling, with a proven carries out inspections at sea, with the support
high-seas ship intercept capability. Both classes of of the Royal Navy;
ship can also be used to insert specialist Maritime
Counter Terrorism (MCT) teams. A number • In Wales, the Welsh Government and the
MMO co-ordinate a programme for
of Royal Air Force aircraft and the Fleet Ready
monitoring, control and surveillance of sea
Escort of the Royal Navy (a Frigate or Destroyer)
fishing activity. This programme includes the
are also held at very short notice to respond to
activities described for England’s programme,
major intelligence-led risks, maritime terrorism
above. A Welsh team of Marine Enforcement
incidents or other escalating events within the UK
Officers carries out fisheries protection and
Marine Area. This multi-layered reconnaissance,
enforcement with the support of the Royal
deterrence and interdiction capability will be
Navy for inspections at sea. Welsh Marine
further improved with the introduction of new
Enforcement Officers have a range of assets
RN Offshore Patrol Vessels in 2017 and the next
at their disposal including two Fisheries
generation of Border Force Cutters in 2020.
Patrol Vessels;
53 Future Coastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement Surveillance and
Interdiction Study, RUSI/Dstl, dated 26 July 2013, demonstrated that the UK
is doing more with fewer homeland based maritime assets when considered
against international partners or comparable nations. Although the report
was favourable on the output of our UK based forces and agreed that
current levels were consummate with current risk, it recommended that
further reductions should not be made without detailed analysis. 55 UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2012, Marine Management Organisation:
54 Currently delivered by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Border (http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/fisheries/statistics/documents/
Force, the Marine Management Organisation and Marine Scotland. ukseafish/2012/final.pdf).
• In Scotland, fisheries protection is carried out 5.35 The Police National Maritime Security
by Marine Scotland – a directorate of Scottish Strategy (PNMSS) sets out the protective security
Government. Marine Scotland operates posture undertaken by the police and partners,
shore-based fisheries compliance officers and to counter the combined landside, seaward and
a support headquarters, as well as a fleet of sub-surface threat from terrorism and crime in
3 Marine Protection Ships, and 2 aircraft. In an integrated programme of activity. The UK is
addition, the UK Fisheries Monitoring and divided into Portal Regions where close-to-shore
Control Centre is located in Edinburgh and run protective security activity is undertaken including:
on behalf of the UK by Marine Scotland. • The Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment
5.33 The UK’s rights and responsibilities regarding (MATRA). This is used to detail the relevant
the maritime security and sustainable management threats to the security of the maritime region
of the waters of its 14 Overseas Territories and an assessment of the effectiveness of the
are defined within UNCLOS. Where these security measures in place to mitigate those risks;
territories are uninhabited, the UK Government • Regional Maritime Security Plans. These
administers these responsibilities directly. Where consider the detection, deterrence or
they are inhabited, we work in partnership with disruption of waterborne and landside attacks
the territorial administrations, helping to build within the portal region, and build upon other
the necessary legislative capacity and other security plans and codes already in place such
mechanisms to safeguard their maritime security as: the International Ship and Port Facility
and manage their marine resources sustainably. In Security (ISPS) Code, Port Facility Security
addition to maintaining Permanent Joint Operating Plans; Port Security Plans; Ship Security Plans;
Bases in Gibraltar, the Sovereign Base Areas in Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) site
Cyprus,56 the British Indian Ocean Territory and security plans; Government Security Zones;
the Falkland Islands,57 when appropriate, we and other miscellaneous plans. The police work
deploy specific military capabilities to reassure with stakeholders to ensure that these plans
the citizens of the overseas territories and, if are comprehensive and collectively provide a
necessary, deter hostility. coherent security framework.
5.34 In the Southern Ocean, we remain 5.36 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland,
committed to strong and effective engagement in Special Branch police operating at ports work
support of our sovereign responsibilities for the closely with the National Crime Agency’s Border
security of the British Antarctic Territory (BAT), Policing Command, the NMIC, Border Force,
South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands (SGSSI) and other agencies to assess and respond to
(shown in Figure 3). The UK is a party to the 1959 threats. This includes ensuring that individuals of
Antarctic Treaty which froze existing territorial known interest are identified and appropriate
claims and prevented new claims from being action taken, and that those previously unknown
submitted. By maintaining our strong leadership individuals of potential interest are identified
position within the Antarctic Treaty System and through intelligence wherever possible. Routine
an active and influential continuous presence in policing brings together a suite of techniques and
Antarctica, we will ensure effective international assets focused on risk assessment, data gathering,
management of the Southern Ocean maintaining information sharing and community influence to
a clear focus on conservation and sustainable combat maritime risks. In Scotland, this function is
management of resources, as well as the long-term led by Police Scotland’s Border Policing Command
prohibition on commercial hydrocarbons/minerals which brings together all agencies operating at the
related activities. border, including the National Crime Agency.
56 The Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia were retained by the
UK under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. (http://www.sbaadministration.
org/images/admin/docs/SBAA_Treaty_of_Establisment.pdf).
57 RAF maintains an air station on Ascension Island.
Respond Case Study: Defeating Transnational Crime at Home and Overseas

In August 2013 the National Crime Agency (NCA) received intelligence that a South American
organised crime group planned to use a merchant ship to transfer cocaine to the UK. The NCA
requested support from its partners at the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) to
identify and track ships sailing from South American ports. Government maritime experts at the
NMIC filtered a vast quantity of data to identify a ship that met the profile provided by the NCA.
The NMIC was able to make use of global, regional and national surveillance systems to track the
ship throughout its journey. The NMIC’s collaborative environment allowed a single harmonised
product to be delivered to those with response responsibilities. On arrival in the UK Territorial Sea,
the ship was boarded by a specialist Border Force Search Team, and narcotics were discovered in a
concealed compartment. As a result of close multi-nation and cross-government working, Class A
drugs were prevented from reaching the UK and the individuals involved were arrested. Post-event
analysis, and the criminal investigation of this case, presented a compelling picture of further illicit
activity which we continue to monitor.
Later, in October 2013, the Royal Navy Ship HMS LANCASTER, in its role as Atlantic Patrol Task
(North) protecting the security interests of the Caribbean Overseas Territories and Bermuda,
seized £58 million worth of cannabis and cocaine in the Caribbean. LANCASTER, alerted to
suspected traffickers by a Canadian tanker, gave chase using her Lynx helicopter, and the embarked
Royal Marine sniper team shot out the speedboat’s engine. Once stopped, a United States Coast
Guard team apprehended those on board and recovered 400 kg of cocaine. Just days earlier, the
warship recovered marijuana weighing 1.2 tonnes. HMS LANCASTER was working with the US-
based Joint Inter Agency Task Force South (JIATFS), contributing to a 15-nation effort to prevent
the transfer of illicit goods in Central America and drug trafficking from South America to the
Caribbean and on to the UK.
5.37 The National Crime Agency (NCA) is an 5.38 Internationally, the UK has the ability to
important, new and powerful intelligence-led deploy military and law enforcement personnel
body that has an unprecedented mandate to at range to conduct effective counter terrorist
lead the whole of law enforcement’s fight against activity. In addition, the UK is a signatory to several
serious and organised crime affecting the UK. Its multinational treaties and agreements which
remit is broad, with a determined and nationally promote cooperation to interdict vessels on the
coordinated strategy to pursue those individuals high seas.58 These include vessels suspected of
and groups who pose the greatest risk to the illegal activity such as carrying Weapons of Mass
public. While the NCA’s activity is not confined Destruction or constituent parts, or prohibited
to specific domains (land, sea or air), the activity narcotic or psychotropic substances.
of one of its four commands, the Border Policing 5.39 Separately, a Memorandum of
Command (BPC), includes the maritime domain. Understanding (MoU) was signed between
BPC brings together the NCA’s overseas capability Bermuda and Hampshire Constabulary in
and its border capability into a single operational October 2013 to provide a framework for
response to disrupt and prevent serious, organised police co-operation to investigate serious crimes
crime in the maritime domain and ensure that all committed on board Bermudian registered ships
law enforcement agencies operating in and around when Hampshire is the first port of call post
the UK’s border are working to achieve the same incident. This MoU will be subject to an annual
ends. The BPC representatives within the NMIC review to monitor and evaluate its effectiveness.
support NCA’s efforts to make the border more
secure and prevent criminal exploitation of the
58 Such as the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, the
maritime domain. 1998 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, and the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (to which 188 States are party/parties).
38 Future Direction
Future Direction
Future Direction 39
Future Direction
6.1 The future will see considerable expansion a huge expansion in the offshore renewable
in the global use of the seas as both UK and energy market with potentially 100 times as many
international offshore-energy sectors continue offshore wind turbines in operation by 2030.61
to expand, fishing intensifies,59 maritime trade 6.2 To counter potential threats, and ensure that
increases to meet the consumer demands of our nation, our markets, and our seas remain
emerging countries and new consumer classes, secure and prosperous, the UK will continue
and seabed mining becomes a reality. Between to utilise diplomatic, development, intelligence,
2014 and 2020 the transportation of global military, and law enforcement levers.
maritime cargo is predicted to double while 6.3 In order to continue to deliver our maritime
the number of floating oil and gas platforms is security objectives in the most effective and
predicted to rise from under 300 today to over efficient manner, we will focus on the following
600 by 2030.60 In addition, there is likely to be priorities between 2014 and 2019.
UNDERSTAND
• Horizon Scanning. We will use preparations for the 2015 National Security Strategy to harmonise
horizon scanning across Government, and will review the Maritime Risk Assessment biennially to
identify future threats. This horizon scanning will help us anticipate future resource competition
which may require mitigation. In addition, we will assess the security implications of future growth
in the marine transportation and offshore-energy sectors and the potential for international tension
as the Northern Sea Route increases in significance.
• Maritime Domain Awareness. Through the proven framework of the NMIC, we will continue
to build coherence across departments and agencies, and develop a robust, accurate and timely
understanding of maritime activity affecting our interests domestically and internationally. Working
closely with the private sector, and our international partners, we will share situational information,
harmonise future regional and international maritime domain awareness initiatives, and provide the
maritime industries accredited to the UK with the situational awareness information necessary to
support coordinated action.
• Aerial Surveillance. In order to deliver more cost-effective aerial surveillance of the UK Marine Area
while satisfying the needs of the MCA, Border Force and MMO, we will work to harmonise contracted
Aerial Maritime Surveillance provision by 2015. This new provision will take full advantage of advances
59 Between 2001 and 2011 fish catches in the Eastern Indian Ocean increased by 48% (MMO UK Sea fisheries Statistics 2012)
(http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/fisheries/statistics/documents/ukseafish/2012/final.pdf).
60 Global Marine Trends 2030, Qinetic, Lloyd’s Register and the University of Strathclyde Report, 2013
(http://www.qinetiq.com/what/capabilities/maritime/Documents/GlobalMarineTrends2030Report.pdf).
61 Offshore Wind Power Summary Report, Low Carbon Innovation Coordination Group, February 2012
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48279/4467-tina-offshore-wind-summary.pdf).
40 Future Direction
in technology and deliver some contingent capability to other agencies and government departments.
The UK Armed Forces requirements and capabilities in air-based Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), including future maritime surface and sub-surface surveillance, will be
considered in 2015, within the Strategic Defence and Security Review process.62
• NMIC. The creation of the NMIC in SDSR 2010 has proven a great success. Under new
governance arrangements, Border Force will take lead agency responsibility for NMIC, supported
by a Management Board reporting to the National Maritime Security Committee (Officials) (as
outlined at Annex A). Work is ongoing to define the NMIC’s future role, initiate its relocation,
strengthen information sharing, and maximise its cross-government effect.
• MCA. The Future Coastguard Programme will deliver a single maritime safety response
organisation, linked together by a robust information and command and control network. This will
allow vessel traffic risks to be coherently assessed and managed.
• Measures of Effectiveness. We will develop a framework for qualitative assessment of the
effectiveness and significance of action taken to deliver the UK’s maritime security objectives.
INFLUENCE
• NATO. We will support NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy.63 While the NATO Strategy has a
wider remit and a more military focus than the NSMS, it shares many of the same overarching
objectives, namely preservation of freedom of trade; maintenance of traffic flow through
chokepoints; protection of infrastructure; the prevention of proliferation, terrorist activity and
crime; and the protection of citizens aboard private vessels. In addition, we will train routinely
with our NATO Allies in order to maintain a level of interoperability that allows rapid and effective
collective maritime security when necessary.
• European Union (EU). We will aim to play a leading role in developing an EU Maritime Security
Strategy, ensuring that it is coherent with the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy and sea basin strategies.64
• Regional Security Initiatives. Regional Security Initiatives are cooperative agreements between
groups of states with common maritime security interests. The UK will champion these through
diplomatic efforts and strengthen regional institutions, as the principal method for delivering
effective security in areas of potential instability within the maritime domain.65
• Rules-Based International System. Freedom of Navigation operations provide an enduring strategic
benefit to UK security by protecting our maritime rights and freedoms, encouraging lawful practice
and preventing excessive geographical and/or jurisdictional claims gaining legal traction in international
law. We will continue to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations to ensure that the UNCLOS
provisions are respected. Operations will be agreed and reviewed jointly by the FCO and MOD.
• The UK Marine Zone. The UK declared EEZ came into force on 31 March 2014.66 In addition,
consideration into statutory powers will be examined in relation to the declaration of a Contiguous
Zone for the UK.
62 While the Government took the difficult decision to cancel the Nimrod MRA4 programme in 2010, core aircrew skills have been maintained through
personnel placement with some of our key Allies.
63 Alliance Maritime Strategy (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_75615.htm).
64 Progress of the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:DKEY=688422:EN:NOT), The Commission
to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee and the Committee Of The Regions, 11 September 2012.
65 Such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
66 This EEZ declaration related to the UK only. It does not include the OverseasTerritories
Future Direction 41
PREVENT
• International Cooperation. We will help to build strong, legitimate maritime capability by
working with our regional and international partners, including our Overseas Territories, to
share information and intelligence, best practice on protective security and, where appropriate,
interdiction capabilities in order to ensure security at identified points of vulnerability.
• Capacity Building. In cooperation with our international and regional partners, and UK industry,
we will continue to encourage nations to invest in protective security, maritime surveillance and
interdiction capabilities, and the legal structures to enable effective policing of their maritime zones.
Our national effort will be focused on developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities
of allies and partners in areas of political, military, or economic importance, including South-East
Asia, the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the
Caribbean and the Gulf of Guinea.
• Presence. In order to engender a secure maritime domain, anticipate instability internationally,
and be ready to take fast, appropriate and effective action, we will, where appropriate, maintain a
persistent maritime presence both internationally and within our marine zone.
PROTECT
• Innovation. We will continue to monitor the latest innovative technological developments in
security screening and detection equipment with a view to sponsoring joint trials with UK industry
and our European and international partners. This will allow us to exploit the latest research and
development activity and deliver effective and low cost solutions to future maritime threats.
RESPOND
• Interdiction. In order to allow the rapid and effective deployment of interdiction assets in support
of maritime security objectives, capability needs will be regularly reviewed and options for closer
operational and tactical coordination and cooperation between the maritime forces of the UK law
enforcement agencies and the UK Armed Forces explored. The interdiction and enforcement
capabilities within UK waters will be further improved with the introduction of new RN Offshore
Patrol Vessels in 2017.67
• Enforcement. Linked to the above we will investigate options for harmonizing the empowerment
of officials across agencies to allow enforcement in the widest range of circumstances, both within
the UK Marine Area and beyond.
• Research and Development. Where maritime security interests clearly overlap, cooperative research
and development across government, and where possible internationally, will become the norm.
• Common Acquisition. We will build the evidence base for greater flexibility, interoperability,
cost-effectiveness and coherence in relation to maritime security. This will include identification of
new or shared capability requirements and investigation of the feasibility and benefit of delivering
common systems, equipment and platforms.
67 FutureCoastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement Surveillance and Interdiction Study, RUSI/Dstl, dated 26 July 2013, demonstrated that the UK is doing
more with less homeland based maritime assets when considered against international partners or comparable nations. Although the report was favourable on
the output of our UK based forces and agreed that current levels were consummate with current risk, it recommended that further reductions should not be
made without detailed analysis.
42 Annex A
Annex A
Annex A 43
Annex A
UK Maritime Security Governance
National Security KEY

Council (NSC) Lines of reporting
Line of accountability
Ministerial Body
Ministerial Working Group
on Maritime Security
(Chaired by FCO)
(Previously the Counter-Piracy Working Group)
DfT Maritime
Administration Board*
Senior Official Body Any DfT workstream

would share info as
Border Force chaired National Maritime Security necessary with MAB
inter-Departmental Committee (Officials) NMSC (O):
Management Board Hosted by DfT, incl all MSOG Depts/Agencies
Meets minimum three times per year
NMSC(O) Secretariat National Maritime Security

Committee (Industry) - NMSC (I)
National
Maritime NMSC(O)’s
Information Stakeholder/Industry Group
Centre (NMIC) Would meet yearly / twice yearly
DfT Port DfT Ship DfT Cyber

Cross-government Maritime Security Workstreams Security WG Security WG WG
* The Maritime Administration Board (MAB), chaired by the Department for Transport was established to take a strategic overview of all maritime policy and regulatory activity being
undertaken by the Department, and is a key focal point for engagement with other Government Departments, Arms’ Length Bodies, the devolved administrations and maritime stakeholders on
policies affecting UK maritime interests. The MAB takes a cross-cutting view of environmental, safety and security issues affecting shipping, ports and the maritime industry with valuable input
from industry experts and other government departments.
Figure 8: UK Maritime Security Governance Structure
Introduction Ministerial Working Group on

I. In order to deliver greater coherence to Maritime Security
government and industry workstreams on maritime II. The Ministerial Working Group on Maritime
security a revised governance structure has been Security, which meets regularly, has responsibility to:
established (Figure 8). The existing Ministerial
Working Group on Counter-Piracy has been • Provide oversight for the National Strategy for
Maritime Security (NSMS);
expanded to cover all maritime security matters,
and renamed the Ministerial Working Group on • Provide oversight on maritime security more
Maritime Security (MSWG). The Maritime Security generally;
Oversight Group (MSOG) has been merged • Co-ordinate and drive forward national and
with the National Maritime Security Committee international security issues relating to the
(NMSC), and will now have both an officials forum maritime domain.
and an industry forum. The National Security
III. Chaired by the FCO Parliamentary Under
Council, as the main forum for collective discussion
Secretary of State, the Working Group members
of the government’s objectives for national security,
represent the Attorney General’s Office; Cabinet
may, when relevant, task the MSWG. Details of the
Office; the Department for Transport; the Home
new governance structure are provided below.
44 Annex A
Office; the Ministry of Defence; the Ministry National Maritime Security Committee
of Justice; the Department for Environment, (Industry) (NMSC(I))
Food and Rural Affairs; and the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills. VI. The NMSC(I) is the senior forum for
interaction between the commercial maritime
National Maritime Security Committee industry and Government on maritime security
(Officials) (NMSC(O)) matters. It is responsible for:
IV. The cross-Government NMSC(O) is • Providing a high level forum for consultation
responsible for: between Government and key industry
maritime security stakeholders on maritime
• Maintaining an overview of maritime security security initiatives;
risks and commissioning updates from
Departments and Agencies on a biennial basis • Acting as the NMSC(O) industry stakeholder
(to coincide with updates to the NSRA where advisory group;
practicable), and identifying to Departments • Providing strategic direction relating to existing
and Agencies where there are gaps or where and proposed maritime transport security
further mitigation / capability may be needed; policies;
• Maintaining an overview of, and co-ordinating • Providing assurance that the UK’s maritime
and challenging, the delivery of cross- transport security regime is commensurate to
government maritime security work streams in current risks and is being delivered effectively;
order to implement the future work programme • Setting objectives for the Port Security Working
set out in the NSMS and decisions taken by the Group, Ship Security Working Group and other
Ministerial Working Group on Maritime Security; Working Groups as appropriate.
• Communicating maritime security priorities to VII. Chaired by the maritime transport industry,
the NMSC(I) and ensuring there is effective the NMSC(I) draws its members from key
co-ordination of government and industry senior level maritime transport industry strategic
maritime security work streams; stakeholders and senior government officials.
• Commissioning and coordinating updates from Other organisations and specialist individuals
Departments and Agencies to the NSMS, will be requested to support working groups, or
ensuring that cross-government maritime attend meetings as necessary, in order to inform
security activity is coherent with the NSMS; discussions on specific issues.
V. Chaired by the Director of DfT Maritime
Directorate, the NMSC(O) members represent
the Cabinet Office, the Department for Transport,
the Home Office (Office for Security and Counter
Terrorism), the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Royal Navy,
the Department of Energy & Climate Change,
the Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs, the National Crime Agency, Border
Force, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, the
National Maritime Information Centre, the police,
the Marine Management Organisation, and the
Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Scotland Office,
Wales Office, and Northern Ireland Office.
Foreword 45
46 Annex B
Annex B
Annex B 47
Annex B
Departmental Roles and Responsibilities for
Maritime Security
UK Maritime Security Policy/Strategy Delivery Support

Objective 1: To promote a secure international
NCA(BPC)
maritime domain and uphold international
MCA
CPS
maritime norms.
Police Service
Department for Transport
MOD
DFID
MoJ
Objective 2: To develop the maritime governance

capacity and capabilities of states in areas of
strategic maritime importance.
DI/Security Services
Objective 3: To protect the UK and the OTs, their
citizens and economies by supporting the safety/
DECC
NMIC
MCA
JTAC
FCO
RAF
RN
security of ports and offshore installations and
REG-flagged passenger and cargo ships.
CPNI/Security Services
Objective 4: To assure the security of vital
maritime trade and energy transportation routes
within the UK Marine Area, regionally and
internationally.
MOD
BF
Objective 5: To protect the resources and

Home Office
Marine Scotland
NCA(BPC)
Police Svc
DEFRA
population of the UK and the OTs from illegal and

MMO
DfT
MoJ
dangerous activity, including serious organised

crime and terrorism.
International Maritime Security

United International Maritime European
NATO Other States
Nations Organisation Union
Key
Government Department International Actor Delivery organisation responsible to government
Devolved entity Cross-government body NDPB Intelligence analysis organisation
Figure 9: Interaction and responsibilities within the Maritime Domain
Departmental Roles and Responsibilities harbours or small stretches of beach. Border

for Maritime Security Force has permanent presence at large ports
and deploys officers to smaller ports based on
This annex outlines the roles and responsibilities intelligence and/or risk but not all known ships
of departments and agencies in connection with are met by Border Force officers. To enhance
maritime security. intelligence Border Force is actively involved at
Border Force (BF) checks arriving crew and the NMIC and builds partnerships with coastal
passengers and regulates goods both in and out communities to improve monitoring of the
of the UK. The long coastline of the UK makes coastline. It has a fleet of five fast patrol ships
it challenging to control arriving ships. Maritime used for UK coastal enforcement, intervention,
transport can arrive and depart from the largest surveillance, and stop-and-board activity.
ports in the UK, for example Dover, through to
48 Annex B
Through the Border Policing Command (BPC), UK’s national intelligence committee – the Joint
the National Crime Agency (NCA) is a vital Intelligence Committee (JIC) – and also to the
part of the Government’s wider approach to Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC).
delivering increased security at the border and The Department of Energy and Climate Change
tackling all serious and organised crime threats (DECC) is responsible for driving ambitious
before they reach the UK. The BPC brigades action to tackle climate change and for delivering
the NCA’s operational response overseas and secure energy on the way to a low-carbon future.
at the UK border into a single entity. The BPC DECC holds policy responsibility for the security
leads border partners in driving the allocated of the UK’s energy sector, which includes offshore
control strategy activity, setting out the multi- renewable energy sources and offshore Critical
agency response to the threats, and leading and National Infrastructure (CNI), as well as CNI sites
coordinating action to address them. and civil nuclear sites on the UK’s coastline.
The Centre for the Protection of National The Department for Environment, Food and
Infrastructure (CPNI) is an interdepartmental Rural Affairs (Defra) is responsible for policy and
organisation, with resources from industry, regulations relating to: the natural environment,
academia and a number of government food supply/resilience, fisheries, international
departments and agencies that provides trade in plant and animal material, environmental
intelligence-led and risk-based integrated security protection and pollution.
advice (across the physical, personnel, cyber and
human factors disciplines) in response to industry The Department for Transport (DfT) is the
requirements. CPNI’s advice is derived from security regulator responsible for the security
expert knowledge about how to make the national of ports/port facilities in the UK and the UK’s
infrastructure less vulnerable. Through advice Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies,
delivery CPNI aims to protect national security by and for the UK-flagged shipping fleets. It ensures
helping to reduce the vulnerability of the national that the UK balances commercial interests with
infrastructure to terrorism, espionage and other safety, security and environmental considerations
threats. Key partners within the maritime domain while promoting a successful, safe and sustainable
include DfT and Police. UK shipping and ports sector. It encourages
shipping companies to be UK registered;
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is implements and influences International
the Government Department responsible for and European Union safety and security
prosecuting criminal cases investigated by the legislation; and ensures the efficient delivery
police and other investigating bodies in England and modernisation of marine aids to navigation.
and Wales. In Scotland, this function is carried The DfT represents the UK at the IMO as well
out by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal as representing the UK at the EC’s Maritime
Service, and in Northern Ireland by the Public Regulatory Security Committee (MARSEC).68
Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (PPS).
As part of the UK’s counter-piracy effort, the The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)
CPS has provided advice on prosecutions to the is responsible for coordinating the promotion
authorities of the Seychelles, Kenya, Somalia of British interests overseas and supporting UK
and Mauritius. entitled personnel and businesses across the
globe. It has overall responsibility for ensuring the
Defence Intelligence (DI) provides strategic integrity of UNCLOS and for representing the
defence intelligence to the Ministry of Defence UK in bilateral and multilateral discussions on Law
and the Armed Forces. It provides timely of the Sea issues. It also represents the UK in the
intelligence products, assessments and advice to International Seabed Authority, which deals with
guide decisions on policy and the commitment deep sea mining. It works with other countries to
and employment of the Armed Forces; to inform
defence research and equipment programmes;
and to support military operations. DI is also an 68 MARSEC is a Regulatory Committee established by virtue of Article 11
of Regulation (EC) No 725/2004. It assists the Commission with regard
essential element of the UK’s wider intelligence to its activities under Directive 2005/65/EC. The Regulatory Committee
machinery, contributing staff and resources to the is chaired by the Commission and consists of experts representing all
Member States.
Annex B 49
strengthen the rules-based international system and System (AIS).69 The MCA supports DfT in its role
is responsible for the coordinating efforts across as security regulator by being responsible for cargo
government to ensure the safety, security and ship security compliance activity.
governance of the Overseas Territories, delivered The Marine Management Organisation (MMO)
through Royal Navy presence in the Caribbean is a non-departmental public body responsible for
and South Atlantic. The FCO also plays a leading implementing a marine planning system designed
role in identifying and funding the development to integrate the social requirements, economic
of maritime capacity building initiatives in coastal potential and environmental imperatives of our
States to combat maritime crime around the world, seas; implementing the marine licensing regime;
together with other Government Departments enforcement of fishing activity of all nationalities
and international partners. within English waters.
The Home Office (HO) is responsible for UK Marine Scotland is the directorate of Scottish
immigration, security, and law and order, including Government responsible for marine and fisheries
counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism issues in Scotland. In addition to a number of
The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) shore-based fisheries compliance officers and a
assesses the threat worldwide from international support headquarters, Marine Scotland operates
terrorism to UK maritime assets. It analyses a fleet of 3 Marine Protection Ships, MPV Minna,
incoming intelligence from a wide range of MPV Jura and MPV Hirta, and owns 2 aircraft.
sources on potential maritime terrorist threats The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is responsible
and produces assessments detailing their for defence against direct threats to the UK
judgement on their credibility and plausibility. and its overseas territories; providing strategic
JTAC regularly reviews the intent and capability intelligence; supporting counter-terrorism work
of terrorist groups to conduct maritime attacks (CONTEST); and providing military assistance to
and communicates this information in the form the civil authorities.
of JTAC threat levels. JTAC sets the threat levels
(terrorism) for UK commercial maritime assets, The multi-agency National Maritime Information
military vessels and important maritime areas such Centre (NMIC), established in 2011, harmonises
as choke points. These threat levels communicate departmental and agency activity to help secure
JTAC’s view on the likelihood of a terrorist attack the UK advantage in the maritime domain. It
on maritime assets in that location and are used by delivers improved identification and assessment
wider government as the basis for assessments of of surveillance and operational risks to maritime
the risk to shipping worldwide. security and provides a permanent architecture
for facilitating national, regional and international
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) information sharing.
is the United Kingdom Maritime Authority. It acts
as the safety regulator for UK flag shipping, and
operates the UK Ship Register. It also coordinates
the activities of the ship registers of the Overseas
Territories and Crown Dependencies via the
Red Ensign Group (REG). It has responsibility for
the implementation of international maritime
safety conventions and codes, the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships and the International Convention
of Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers. It inspects foreign flag
merchant ships calling at UK ports for compliance
with regulatory instruments. It is the UK’s National
Competent Authority (NCA) for the long-range 69 The Vessel Traffic Monitoring Directive imposes an obligation on
Member States to monitor certain activities, to receive reports on accidents
identification and tracking of ships (LRIT) and and incidents, to communicate information to other Member States and to
for the operation of the Automatic Identification initiate action internally within the UK on receipt of information from other
Member States pursuant to the Directive.
50 Annex B
The Police Service – the police seek to prevent short notice and 3 Offshore Patrol Ships (OPV)
crime in Inland Waterways, Ports, Harbours, delivering a permanent at sea presence; the
UK Territorial Waters and Offshore Energy primary role is an armed response capability to
Installations. Through the Police National deter or interdict terrorism and other criminal
Maritime Security Strategy they work with activities, with the OPVs also having a secondary
partner agencies to provide proportionate responsibility to deliver fisheries enforcement
protective security in and around the UK. They under a Marine Management Organisation
also have a global responsibility to investigate (MMO) contract. Internationally the RN, including
crimes committed on British Ships. the Royal Marines, works independently, bilaterally
The Royal Air Force (RAF) protects Britain’s or as part of an EU, NATO or other Maritime Task
interests, citizens, territory and trade through Forces reinforcing and developing international
the intelligent application of Air Power, exploiting relationships and deterring or countering illegal
the inherent speed of reaction, speed of reach maritime activity, particularly in the Northern
and speed of effect that this offers – to enable Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, East and West coasts
flexible political choice and, ultimately, to deliver of Africa, the Caribbean and South Atlantic and
military effect. In concert with allies, partners and contributes to the development of maritime
the other Services, the RAF provides support governance capacity and capabilities in areas of
to international maritime security and deters strategic maritime importance.
threats to UK prosperity and security. The RAF SO15 Counter Terrorism Command (CTC)
maintains a number of aircraft and units ready sits within London’s Metropolitan Police Service.
to respond at extremely short notice to threats This CTC is responsible for providing a proactive
to the UK; the roles include Quick Reaction and reactive response to terrorism, domestic
Alert (to sustain Control of the Air), Attack, and extremism and related offences, including the
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance prevention and disruption of such activity;
(ISR). Internationally, the RAF works with supporting the National Coordination of
partners to counter illegal maritime activity, Terrorist Investigations outside London; assessing,
including piracy, drug smuggling and other illegal analysing and developing intelligence to aid
trade, particularly in the Mediterranean, the Gulf, operational activity; being the police single point
the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, and it also of contact for international partners in counter-
contributes to the development of maritime air terrorism matters; assisting in the protection of
surveillance capabilities. UK interests overseas and the investigation of
The Royal Navy (RN) protects Britain’s interests, attacks against them.
citizens, territory and trade through judicious use The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
of its ships, submarines, aircraft, Royal Marines and office in Dubai is the primary point of contact for
training teams. In concert with allies and partners, merchant ships and liaison with military forces in
the RN promotes international maritime security the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. The
and deters threats to UK prosperity and security. Maritime Trade Information Centre (MTIC) in
For the UK Marine Area, the RN maintains a Portsmouth supports UKMTO outputs.
number of ships and units ready to respond at
Annex C 51
52 Annex C
Annex C
Annex C 53
Annex C
Glossary
Baseline: This is usually the low water mark Continental Shelf: The continental shelf of a
around the coast. But there can be straight coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil
baselines across the mouths of bays, and all of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
rocks, reefs etc above the sea at low water but territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation
submerged at other times extend the baseline if of its land territory to the outer edge of the
they are within 12 nm of the mainland or an island. continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
The UK baseline is delineated in the Territorial miles from the baselines from which the breadth
Waters Order in Council 1964 (as amended by of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
the Territorial Sea (Amendment) Order 1998, SI edge of the continental margin does not extend
1998/2564). Marine waters to the landward side up to that distance.
of the baseline are known as internal waters. Exclusive Economic Zone: Under UNCLOS,
Crown Dependencies: Crown Dependencies are an EEZ is capable of extending to 200 nm from
the Bailiwick of Jersey, the Bailiwick of Guernsey the baseline. Details of the UK EEZ are found
and the Isle of Man. The Crown Dependencies in the Exclusive Economic Zone Order 2013
are not part of the UK but are self-governing (S.I. 2013/3161)
dependencies of the Crown. They have their Flag State: The role of ship registration and the
own directly-elected legislative assemblies, rights of ships to fly national flags is set out in
administrative, fiscal and legal systems and their Article 91 of UNCLOS.70
own courts of law. The Crown Dependencies are
not represented in the UK Parliament. Freedom of Navigation (FON): This is the term
given to the rights and freedoms that warships,
The Ministry of Justice is responsible for managing merchant ships, aircraft and submarines enjoy
the constitutional relationship with the Crown to navigate on, over, and under the world’s seas;
Dependencies. it is vital to the security and economic stability
Contiguous Zone: The band between 12 of the UK and facilitates global maritime trade
nm and 24 nm, in which a coastal State can and provides the UK military with the legal
intervene to prevent potential offences that may framework to allow it to respond to threats to
otherwise occur inside territorial sea (relating security at range. FON rights are set out in the
to fiscal, customs, sanitary and immigration 1982 United Nations Convention of the Law of
offences), and to apprehend vessels that have the Sea (UNCLOS).
committed offences inside territorial waters and Hazards: Non-malicious risks which occur
are endeavouring to escape. The UK does not naturally, by accident, or where the architect of
currently claim a contiguous zone. the threat was not malicious.
70 Article
91 of UNCLOS (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm).
54 Annex C
High Seas: All parts of the sea that are not place outside the jurisdiction of any state; Any
included in the EEZ, territorial sea or in the internal act of voluntary participation in the operation of
waters of a state. The high seas being open to all a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
nations, no state may validly purport to subject making it a pirate ship or aircraft; Any act of
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of inciting or of intentionally facilitating the two acts
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid described previously.
down by the UN Convention on the High Seas and Red Ensign Group (REG)-flagged ship: The
by the other rules of international law. It comprises, REG is a group of British Shipping Registers. It is
inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal states: made up from the United Kingdom, the Crown
freedom of navigation; freedom of fishing; freedom Dependencies (Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey)
to lay submarine cables and pipelines; freedom to and the UK Overseas Territories (Anguilla,
fly over the high seas. These freedoms, and others Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
which are recognized by the general principles of Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, St Helena
international law, shall be exercised by all states with and the Turks & Caicos Islands) which operate
reasonable regard to the interests of other states in shipping registers from their jurisdiction. Any ship
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. registered in the UK, a Crown Dependency or UK
Interdict: Intercept and prevent the movement of Overseas Territory, is a “British ship” and is entitled
a prohibited commodity or person. to fly the Red Ensign flag.
Internal Waters: see ‘Baseline’. Southern Ocean: The Convention Area, which
Marine Area: The area of sea within the seaward covers around 10% of the Earth’s surface, is
limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the state, and defined in the CAMLR Convention as the
any area of sea within the limits of the exclusive area south of the Antarctic Convergence. The
economic zone, and the area of sea within the Convention also applies in the area south of 60°S
limits of the state’s sector of the continental shelf to which the 1959 Antarctic Treaty applies.
(including the bed and subsoil of the sea within UK Continental Shelf: The seas within the UK
those areas) (see also ‘UK Marine Area). sector of the continental shelf comprise the area
Marine Protected Area: Marine area protected of sea outside the UK territorial sea but within
by Government due to its ecological importance.71 an area specified in an order under section 1(7)
Maritime Domain: All areas and things of, under, of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 (c. 29). Rights
relating to, or bordering on a sea or ocean including in the continental shelf extend to mineral and
all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, other non-living resources of the seabed and
people, cargo, ships and other conveyances. subsoil together with living organisms belonging to
sedentary species.
Maritime terrorism: The undertaking of terrorist
acts and activities in the maritime domain, using or UK Entitled Persons: Entitled persons are
against ships or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or non-UK citizens for whom HMG has accepted
against anyone and their passengers or personnel, responsibility for their safety and security.
against coastal facilities or settlements, including UK-flagged Ship: Merchant ships are required
tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities. to register under a national flag to determine the
Piracy: Consists of any of the following acts: Any legal jurisdiction under which they operate and
illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act their associated tax obligations. UK-flagged ships
of depredation, committed for private ends by are those registered in the UK.
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or UK Marine Area: As detailed in the Marine and
a private aircraft, and directed on the high seas, Coastal Access Act 2009, this consists of the
against another ship or aircraft, or against persons following: (a) the area of sea within the seaward
or property on board such ship or aircraft or limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the United
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a Kingdom, (b) any area of sea within the limits of the
exclusive economic zone, (c) the area of sea within
71 The Government’s approach to Marine Protected Areas is covered further the limits of the UK sector of the continental shelf
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-and-sustainably-using-
the-marine-environment/supporting-pages/marine-protected-areas. (so far as not falling within the area mentioned in
Annex C 55
(b), and includes the bed and subsoil of the sea United Nations Convention on the Law of
within those areas. The area of sea mentioned in the Sea (UNCLOS): Also called the Law of the
subsection (c) is to be treated as part of the UK Sea Convention, UNCLOS is the international
marine area for any purpose only to the extent agreement that resulted from the third United
that such treatment for that purpose does not Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
contravene any international obligation binding on (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973
the United Kingdom or Her Majesty’s government. and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines
UK Overseas Territories: Anguilla; Bermuda; the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use
British Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean of the world’s oceans, establishing guidelines for
Territory; The British Virgin Islands; The Cayman businesses, the environment, and the management
Islands; The Falkland Islands; Gibraltar; Montserrat; of marine natural resources. UNCLOS came into
The Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie & Oeno Islands; force in 1994. 166 countries and the European
Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha Union have joined the Convention.
(including Gough Island Dependency); South Vital maritime trade and energy transportation
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands; Sovereign routes: Vital Maritime Trade Routes include: the
Base Areas (SBAs) Akrotiri and Dhekelia (on Dover Strait; North Channel; Irish Sea and the
Cyprus); The Turks & Caicos Islands. Pentland Firth; a southern corridor connecting
UK Territorial Sea: The UK territorial sea is the Straits of Gibraltar with the Gulf of Suez; the
defined by the Territorial Sea Act 1987 as the sea Red Sea; the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf;
extending 12 nm from the baseline. For the most an eastern corridor stretching from the East and
part, the territorial sea of the UK does not adjoin South China Seas through the Malacca Straits
that of any other state. Where it does so, in the into the Indian Ocean; and a western corridor
English Channel, the Territorial Sea (Limits) Order connecting Europe with the Americas. The
1989 (SI 1989/482) sets out the limits of the opening of a northern corridor, running along the
territorial sea in the Strait of Dover. Within the Russian Arctic coast and into the Pacific may take
territorial sea, the UK has jurisdiction for the sea on similar geo-strategic significance for the UK in
itself, the seabed subjacent and the air above. This the medium term.
is subject to the right of innocent passage by ships
of all other states. A graphical representation of
this area is available at: https://www.ukho.gov.uk.
56 Notes
Notes
Notes 57
58 Notes

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The UK National

Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................... 8

WHAT IS MARITIME SECURITY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

DELIVERING OUR OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

William Hague Theresa May

Philip Hammond Patrick McLoughlin

1 Department for Transport analysis.

Introduction Our Objectives

2. To develop the maritime governance To enable UK criminal law to be enforced at sea,

4 The Persian Gulf is also known as the Arabian Gulf.

7 The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability, HM

What is Maritime Security?

The Scale of the Task

• Shipping carries 95% of British trade by volume. UK ports handle

• At any one time there are around 1,500

Establishing Maritime Security Objectives

21 Not in any order of priority.

Understand Case Study: The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)

4.4 Again, we aim to draw together and analyse PROTECT

28 The Shipping Defence Advisory Committee (SDAC) provides a

Delivering Our Objectives

Objective 1: To promote a secure 5.4 The maritime domain is constantly evolving.

Influence Case Study: Military Alliances

5.5 The UK Government is concerned by the

31 UNCLOS, Annex VII. Arbitration (http://www.un.org/depts/los/

Prevent Case Study: Promoting a Secure Maritime Domain

• Agreement on clear and consistent political messages;

• A framework for a joint strategy for pursuing prosecutions in the region.

41 Including onboard ships and offshore infrastructure.

Counter-piracy policy for UK-flagged

Protect Case Study: Counter Piracy Off Somalia - An International Dilemma

Figure 6: The International Underwater Cable Network (Source: TeleGeography). www.submarinecablemap.com

48 One of 19 operational sites, the London Array (opened in July 2013) is

Objective 4: To assure the security output of Government requiring international

5.25 The oceans are a medium connecting

Protect Case Study: Maintaining Freedom of Navigation in a Strategic Chokepoint

Respond Case Study: Defeating Transnational Crime at Home and Overseas

National Security KEY

Senior Official Body Any DfT workstream

NMSC(O) Secretariat National Maritime Security

DfT Port DfT Ship DfT Cyber

Figure 8: UK Maritime Security Governance Structure

Introduction Ministerial Working Group on

UK Maritime Security Policy/Strategy Delivery Support

Objective 2: To develop the maritime governance

Objective 5: To protect the resources and

population of the UK and the OTs from illegal and

dangerous activity, including serious organised

International Maritime Security

Devolved entity Cross-government body NDPB Intelligence analysis organisation

Figure 9: Interaction and responsibilities within the Maritime Domain

Departmental Roles and Responsibilities harbours or small stretches of beach. Border

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