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1) Suarez - v. - Emboy - Jr.
1) Suarez - v. - Emboy - Jr.
DECISION
REYES J :
REYES, p
For review in the instant Petition 1 is the Decision 2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and
Resolution 3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489.
The CA granted the Petition for Review 4 led by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and
Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, 5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3,
6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No. CEB-33328, 7 and on
September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832, respectively. The RTC af rmed the MTCC in
upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful
detainer instituted against the respondents.
Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No.
1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu
City, and covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of
Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A, 8 which
was partitioned in the following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos)
and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion): 9
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The
respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her
lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter
stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn
succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion. 1 1
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In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of
Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion
sans a right of way. They refused to comply insisting that Claudia's inheritance pertained to
Lot No. 1907-A-2. 1 2
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita's counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R.
Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the
subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita had already purchased on February 12,
2004 the subject lot from the former's relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the
demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered
possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of
deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they led before the RTC
of Cebu City a complaint 1 3 for nulli cation of the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs
covering the heirs' respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A. 1 4DaTICE
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita led before the MTCC and against the respondents a
complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition. She alleged that she
bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, 1 5 the registered
owners thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere
tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the
subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same. 1 6
The MTCC upheld Carmencita's claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The
respondents were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the
improvements they had built thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay
Carmencita Php20,000.00 as attorney's fees. 1 7
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling. 1 8
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review 1 9
filed before the CA.
The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of
owners for several decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for
having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the
subject lot's title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer was led on December 8, 2004
subsequent to the respondents' institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nulli cation
of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA , 2 0 the respondents emphasized that "even if one is
the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had
been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting
to a summary action of ejectment." 2 1 The respondents also invoked the doctrine
enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag 2 2 that the pendency of another action anchored on the
issue of ownership justi es the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real
property. The foregoing is especially true in the case at bar where the issue of possession is
so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of ownership
would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was
attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being spurious. First,
Atty. Pareja's demand letter sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of sale
dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged
from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida
Padilla, a ctitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she, too,
was impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only
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registered the following year after its supposed execution.
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to
Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for
Carmencita's claim that the respondents' possession of the subject lot was by mere
tolerance of the alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they
found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned
as an "Agreement," 2 3 dated February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse,
Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The document stated that
Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a
collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have been
executed in order to be fair to Vicente's siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of
Vicente no longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
The respondents also averred that Carmencita's complaint lacked a cause of action. The
certi cation to le an action was issued by the of cials of Barangay Duljo in the name of
James Tan Suarez, Carmencita's brother, who had no real rights or interests over the subject
lot. Further, while Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale
executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that
date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as the date of
its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be
filed.
In support of the respondents' prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that
their loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the respondents' petition for
nulli cation of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded
as a defendant, would be rendered useless in the event that the latter's complaint for
unlawful detainer would be granted and the former's ancestral house demolished.
The Ruling of the CA
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions
of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA
explained:
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages
and costs.
The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained
in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals,:
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Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on
who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession
was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination
of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for,
in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause
of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in
possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into
the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be led against the
intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is
one of unlawful detainer which must be led within one (1) year from the
date of the last demand.
A close perusal of [Carmencita's] complaint a quo reveals that the action was
neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue
of ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not
characterize [the respondents'] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was
legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and
constructed a house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the respondents']
possession became legal before [Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the
land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot [the
respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its
new owner, demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is
undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the
land for several decades already. There was no averment as to how or when
[Carmencita's] predecessors tolerated [the respondents'] possession of the land.
Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied,
between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on
the other, as would qualify [the respondents'] possession of the land as a case of
unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of
the land through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of
forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the
respondents'] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because
[Carmencita's] predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia]
took possession thereof. Take note that [Carmencita's] predecessors-in-interest
merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of [Claudia].
Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer,
plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the
possession which he later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at
bar. SIEHcA
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is
truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real
right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the
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RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:
For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested
from another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12)
years through a summary action for ejectment. Although admittedly[,]
petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior
actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that
regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has
the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 2 4 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)
In Carmencita's Motion for Reconsideration 2 5 led before the CA, she alleged that the case
of Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it
involves a boundary dispute, which is properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and
over which the MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera 2 6 nds more
relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each other's relatives and
the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the
complainant is not necessary. 2 7 Instead, what is required is a better right of possession.
Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert
ownership over the disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita's Motion for
Reconsideration.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues :
I
Whether or not Carmencita's complaint against the respondents had suf ciently
alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents' petition for nulli cation of
partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certi cates of title can
abate Carmencita's ejectment suit.
Carmencita's Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the
Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale,
respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in
Carmencita's behalf, demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents' refusal to
comply with the demand turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the
possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to le a
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certi cate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack
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28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A
pending suit involving the question of ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an
ejectment complaint as the two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking
different reliefs. 2 9
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA 3 0 that the
registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA , 3 1 the Court also
explained that the occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others
depends on the former's tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to
vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper. 3 2
The Respondents' Arguments
In their Comment 3 3 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita's
complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no
speci c averment as to when and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began.
In the complaint, Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents possessed "the
property by mere tolerance 'with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the
premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners'." 3 4 In Spouses
Valdez, Jr. v. CA , 3 5 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of
jurisdiction over the action.
In their rejoinder, 3 6 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and
ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar. Carmencita's complaint for ejectment
was based solely on her spurious title, which is already the subject of the respondents'
petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A.
Our Disquisition
The instant petition lacks merit.
Carmencita had not amply alleged
and proven that all the requisites
for unlawful detainer are present in
the case at bar.
"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual
occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial
remedy and, once he chooses what action to le, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper." 3 7
In Spouses Valdez, Jr., 3 8 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property, viz.:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is
deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that
in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and
that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful
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detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible
entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlaw ll detainer. The issue in
said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted
for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of
the ling of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had become illegal,
the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion
publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding. 3 9 (Citations omitted)
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged
and sufficiently established:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 4 0
In the case at bar, the rst requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed
to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and
constructed a house upon it. 4 1 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the
details on who speci cally permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when
such tolerance came about. 4 2 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion,
sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents' initial occupation of the subject lot
was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became
deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot's possession after Carmencita, as
purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property.
4 3 It is worth noting that the absence of the rst requisite assumes even more importance in
the light of the respondents' claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject
lot as owners thereof.
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must suf ciently show
such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
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started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 4 4
As an exception to the general rule, the
respondents' petition for nullification
of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A can
abate Carmencita's suit for unlawful
detainer.
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same
property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying
reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case
in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set
up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending
civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendañao , wherein the Court
declared:
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the
demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning,
considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We
note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of unlawful detainer and
not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a
demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the "confusion,
disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the af rmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to
go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners
from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is
claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as
well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage
wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is
permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.
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We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not on an
expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in
any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious
under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case. 4 5
(Citations omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997,
penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the
Amagan case sprang:
"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful
detainer on the theory that petitioners' possession of the property in question was
by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 . . .,
petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written,
asserting that they are 'owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal
Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.' In other words, it is not merely physical
possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.["]
"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners led an
action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action.
Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to
the possession of the premises in question.["]
"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case
will include the removal of the petitioners' house [from] the lot in question.["]
"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of
petitioners' house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot
on which it stands." 4 6 (Citation omitted)
We nd the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for
reasons discussed hereunder.
Carmencita's complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the
respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners.
The respondents, on the other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and
point to the pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nulli cation of the partition
of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties.
Further, should Carmencita's complaint be granted, the respondents' house, which has been
standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to demolition. The foregoing
circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the
general rule.
All told, we nd no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita's
complaint for unlawful detainer. As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of
possession by mere tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven.
Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings.
Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose. The
respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having their house
demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nulli cation of the partition of Lot No.
1907-A, where ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , the instant petition is DENIED.
DENIED The Decision rendered on
March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
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No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
3.Id. at 40.
4.Id. at 65-95.
12.Id.
13.Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-30548.
14.Rollo, p. 22.
15.Vicente's spouse.
16.Rollo, p. 23.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 65-95.
20.320 Phil. 146 (1995).
23.Rollo, p. 121.
24.Id. at 24-27.
25.Id. at 29-38.
26.453 Phil. 404 (2003).
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27.Id. at 410.
28.Citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree.
29.Citing Punio v. Judge Go, 357 Phil. 1, 6 (1998), and Silverio v. CA, 454 Phil. 750, 758 (2003).
30.424 Phil. 544 (2002).
34.Id. at 59.
35.523 Phil. 39 (2006).
40.Supra note 37, at 363; see also Delos Reyes v. Odones , G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646
SCRA 328, 334-335.
42.Id.