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Strategic Trends Programme
Future Operating Environment 2035
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ii Future Operating Environment 2035

Conditions of release
The Future Operating Environment 2035 comprises one element

of the Strategic Trends Programme, and is positioned alongside
Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045 (Fifth Edition), to provide
a comprehensive picture of the future. This has been derived
through evidence-based research and analysis headed by the
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, a department
within the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD).
This publication is the first edition of Future Operating Environment

2035 and is benchmarked at 30 November 2014. Any developments
taking place after this date have not been considered.
The findings and deductions contained in this publication do not

represent the official policy of Her Majesty’s Government or that of
UK MOD. It does, however, represent the view of the Development,
Concepts and Doctrine Centre.
This information is Crown copyright. The intellectual property

rights for this publication belong exclusively to the MOD. Unless
you get the sponsor’s authorisation, you should not reproduce,
store in a retrieval system or transmit its information in any form
outside the MOD. This information may be subject to privately
owned rights.
Future Operating Environment 2035 iiiiii

Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Chapter 1 Strategic context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The global context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The UK context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Global stress map : 2035. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chapter 2 Characteristics of the future operating environment . . . . . . . . 11

Actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Culture and identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Cyberspace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Electromagnetic environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Physical environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Future legal aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Chapter 3 Implications for Defence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The increased importance of the ‘understand’ function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Remote and automated systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Access, anti-access and area denial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
The urban and littoral challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Blurring of UK and overseas threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Reconstitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Agility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
A commander’s perspective: 2035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

The ‘5Cs’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Future Operating Environment 2035 v

vi Future Operating Environment 2035

Introduction
Aim commissions were produced. Subsequent

The Future Operating Environment 2035 proactive engagement by DCDC with a
(FOE 35) forms part of the Development, broad range of contributors has provided
Concepts and Doctrine Centre’s (DCDC) essential peer review and challenge
Strategic Trends Programme. DCDC is the functions for this product in pursuit of
MOD’s independent think tank and, as robustness and resilience.
such, FOE 35 does not represent the official
position of Her Majesty’s Government. It Scope
supersedes the 2010 Future Character of While FOE 35 aims to provide a long-term
Conflict (FCOC) and aims to: analysis of the key characteristics of the
operating environment in 2035, the nature
describe the characteristics of the 2035 of ‘futures’ work is such that attempting
operating environment to provide to pinpoint when particular trends or
evidence-based insights that can inform characteristics will emerge is invariably
future Defence capability development. problematic. Where this is the case, we
discuss characteristics emerging out to, as
FOE 35 describes the potential characteristics well as in, 2035. Some characteristics of the
of the future operating environment, and is future operating environment in 2035 are
designed primarily to inform UK Defence and likely to be similar to those apparent today,
security policy-makers and our Armed Forces but novel factors will emerge and some
more broadly. However, it is intended to characteristics will become increasingly
have applicability across UK Government and important in determining the future
agencies to help inform their understanding environment in comparison to today.
of the future operating environment in
which we all (military, other UK Government Chapter 1 outlines the principal factors
departments, international organisations identified in GST 5 that may drive the
and agencies) may find ourselves operating UK Government to employ the military
in 2035. instrument. Chapter 2 describes the key
institutional, technological, cultural and
Method physical characteristics likely to shape the
As part of DCDC’s Strategic Trends operating environment in 2035. It places
Programme, FOE 35 uses Global Strategic understanding people (the actors) and
Trends – Out to 2045, Fifth Edition (GST 5) their motivations at the centre of our ability
as its foundation. Extensive contributions to achieve an understanding of the future
were garnered from across Defence, operating environment. Chapter 3 identifies
UK Government, think tanks, academics, some of the key implications drawn from our
non-governmental organisations and analysis. This will enable us to assess future
other UK and international institutions. military utility and opportunities for Defence
Following gap analysis, additional directed in 2035. Elements of both can contribute to
Defence’s future force development process.
Future Operating Environment 2035 vii

Introduction
The challenge DCDC’s previous publication, the Future

The challenge of looking 20 years ahead is Character of Conflict, described the 2014 joint
significant but, like GST 5, this work does not battlespace as:
seek to predict the future. Rather, it describes
congested, cluttered, contested,
the characteristics of plausible operating
connected and constrained.
environments, resulting from rigorous trend
analysis. It seems likely that the future will While these descriptors endure, FOE 35
be characterised by an increase in the rate aims to provide a wider and more detailed
and impact of some current global trends analysis to inform future Defence capability
(in particular urbanisation, globalisation development.
and inter-connectivity) and an increasingly
complex, ambiguous and wide range of Exploitation pathway
potential threats. The rate of change in some
This document sets out to provide context
technological fields is likely to be particularly
for policy-makers. It aims to inform the
dramatic, which may have the effect of
debate on the future and, therefore, wider
‘accelerating’ the future towards us in certain
conceptual force development. FOE 35
fields. Equally, some trends may experience
is intended to provide a baseline for
local reversal. The potential for unforeseen,
experimentation, but not to constrain
disruptive events cannot be ignored. These
Commands in their thinking. Indeed, to
events – or ‘shocks’ – have a low probability
innovate and adapt are two attributes that
of occurring, but Defence must consider
will greatly assist Defence and its people as
shocks because of the high impact they
they move into the future. Armed with a
could have. This suggests that a premium
better understanding of the future through
should be placed on flexibility, adaptability
FOE 35, threats can be anticipated and
and national resilience. Readers wanting
opportunities seized.
more detail on thematic and geographic
trends or on potential strategic shocks
should refer to GST 5.
viii Future Operating Environment 2035

Strategic context
Chapter 1
Strategic context
Introduction. DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends
– Out to 2045, Fifth Edition (GST 5) provides
The global context
a vision of a world in transition out to 2045. The global trends discussed in GST 5 could
There are likely to be significant challenges lead to tension, but where such trends
resulting from population growth, migration, collide, instability and conflict are more likely
greater demand for energy, climate change, to occur (see pages 8-9). These trends may
continuing globalisation, rapid urbanisation also reverse or develop in unexpected ways,
and the exponential rate of change in and some could also have positive benefits
some readily-available technologies. A for UK security, interests and prosperity.
combination of these factors may lead to GST 5 provides a comprehensive insight
challenges at home, as well as fragility and into trends. The trends most relevant to the
instability within the wider international Future Operating Environment 2035 (FOE 35)
system. It is crucial to understand these are detailed below.
broad trends – and the way they combine
– as they are likely to underline the principal Globalisation and interconnectivity.
reasons for deploying the military instrument The UK will be more interconnected than
as an element of a coordinated across UK it is today, continuing to benefit from
Government, multinational response in the globalisation.1 By 2035, disruptive events
future. Chapter 1 outlines the key factors
identified in GST 5 that are likely to set the
1 Financial Times. (2014), ‘Lexicon’. Globalisation
context for UK Defence in 2035.
describes a process by which national and
regional economies, societies, and cultures have
become integrated through the global network
of trade, communication, immigration and
transportation.
Future Operating Environment 2035 1

Strategic context
less economically powerful state and

non-state actors will also aim to exert
influence (for example, through sponsoring
terrorism or cyber attacks). In 2035, the key
global economic powers will be the US,
China and the EU – with India rising rapidly –
but only the US and China are likely to have
the capability to dictate global events and
potentially challenge world order.
Demography. The global population is

likely to rise from the current 7.2 billion
to between 8.1 billion and 9.4 billion by
2035.2 The rate of growth will be slower
An increasingly interconnected world in most developed states: in some, it may
even decline. In developing states, rapid
will have increasingly global consequences population increases and urbanisation may
– requiring action from the international lead to instability. This could be exacerbated
community. However, in particular by age and gender imbalances that are likely
circumstances, there may be significantly less to add to political and social tensions. In
time available for states and other actors to particular, a large male youth population
plan for, and respond to, global and regional in the Middle East, Central Asia and
events that emerge rapidly. Faster and more sub-Saharan Africa could provide a reservoir
agile military responses may be called of disaffected young men more susceptible
for, posing a challenge for policy- and to radicalisation.3 Conversely, investing in
decision-makers. education and healthcare could lead to job
creation, economic growth and positive
Shift in the balance of power. The centre social development.4
of gravity of global economic power is
continuing to shift, away from North America Urbanisation. By 2035, the majority of
and Europe, towards Asia, resulting in a the world’s population is expected to
change in the balance of power and an live in cities, with many located on or
increasingly multipolar world. While the US near the coast.5 The greatest increases in
is likely to remain the world’s leading military urbanisation are likely to be in Asia (see
power in 2035, its military advantage is likely pages 8-9). Developed cities will be very
to be reduced and challenged increasingly modern with well-functioning infrastructure
by China. Other rising powers, such as and institutions as well as ready access to
Brazil and India, will take a strategic interest resources. However, due to the rapid rate of
beyond their own regions in pursuit of urbanisation, many suburban areas are likely
resources. States such as Australia, Canada, to be shanty towns. Failed or failing cities
Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, could become the source of major security
South Africa and Turkey all look likely to have
increasing regional significance. Russia may
continue to have a global impact through its 2 UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs.
trans-regional conduct, bolstered by its sheer (2012), ‘UN (2012) World Population Prospects’.
size and military power. However, it is likely 3 Caprioli, M and Trumbmore, PF. (2003), ‘Identifying
to be increasingly hindered by demographic Rogue States and Testing their Interstate Conflict
Behaviour’.
decline, dated infrastructure and systemic
4 Lagarde, C. (2014), ‘A New Multi-Culturalism for
challenges including corruption and poor the 21st Century’, The Richard Dimbleby Lecture.
governance. In an evermore globalised and
5 UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs.
interconnected world it is not only these (2007), UN World Urbanisation Prospects
powers that will exercise influence. Other Database.
2 Future Operating Environment 2035

Strategic context
“
The trends are
clear: more
people than
ever before in
history will be
competing
for scarcer
and scarcer
resources
in poorly
governed
areas that
lack adequate
Some areas will struggle to cope with rapid urbanisation infrastructure,
and these
issues. Often they will be located in areas unlikely to have the resources to mitigate its
areas will be
prone to natural disasters and lack resilience effects as successfully as more developed more and
due to poor infrastructure, scarce resources countries. more closely
and ineffective or absent institutions and connected to
emergency services. Poor governance and Resource scarcity. Demand for a range of
the global
inadequate institutions could allow violent natural resources is likely to increase over the
next 20 years. Rising costs associated with system, so that
and criminal non-state actors to flourish.
Patronage systems – often viewed as counter this demand may lead to intolerable levels local conflict
to Western norms – will, in some areas, of inequality within, or between, nations. will have far
continue to provide vital services where Climate change could put more pressure wider effects.
”
formal governance is lacking. on the availability of drinking water6 and
contribute to food shortages. As many states
Climate change. As a result of climate share the same water sources, scarcity and
change, sea levels will rise and extreme diversion of rivers may cause shortages and Dr David Kilcullen 9
climatic events are likely to increase in crop failure, resulting in famine, migration
intensity, frequency and duration out to 2035, and possibly conflict. There may also be a
resulting in loss of life, physical destruction, scarcity of fossil fuels,7 rare earth elements
disease and famine. Secondary effects may and new ‘high tech’ materials.8 To overcome
lead to migration, social unrest, instability these shortages, exploration will occur in
and conflict that could affect the UK’s remote and challenging environments,
interests. There is likely to be an increased requiring new and more efficient extraction
need for humanitarian assistance to address techniques to be developed. These areas 9
greater and more widespread suffering.
The military is likely to be more frequently
6 Oxford Research Group. (2011), ‘Competition Over
engaged in providing assistance – albeit Resources; Drivers of Insecurity and the Global
in a supporting role – alongside evermore South’.
capable non-governmental organisations. 7 International Energy Agency. (2012), ‘World
While the effects of climate change will be Energy Outlook’.
seen across the globe, developing countries 8 Department for the Environment, Food and Rural
will feel the economic and social impacts Affairs. (2012), ‘Resource Security Action Plan’.
of climate change more keenly, as they are 9 Dr Kilcullen, D. (2013) ‘Out of the Mountains: The
Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla ’.

Strategic context
Better control measures at the national

and international level will be necessary to
increase transparency and reduce corruption.
Relationships with the state. There will

be a broader spectrum of influential and
empowered actors in 2035 who are likely
to challenge the state more frequently on
a variety of issues. These actors may range
from small, grass-roots movements to large,
well-connected collectives. Such actors
will have a particularly noticeable effect
in developing countries. While the state
will continue to be the dominant actor in
Water scarcity – a possible source of conflict international affairs, large multinational
corporations, non-governmental
are likely to require appropriate protection organisations and international organisations
measures to ensure their security, and may be more prominent and influential.
ultimately, their viability. Old grounds for
Technology. Technology will be a key
extracting resources may also become
driver of change due to the rate of advance
profitable again as technology develops.
and growing accessibility in some fields. A
The need to transport critical resources over
novel approach to technology is also likely
long and sometimes conflict-prone areas
to provide opportunities to offset some
or routes may increase uncertainty and
sources of future tension. Globalisation of
tension between states. The need to protect
technology will lead to greater proliferation
these lines of communication, as well as to
of lower-end equipment and a reduction in
guarantee access to resources, may increase
its cost, through economies of scale. This
competition and act as a catalyst for intra-
and inter-state conflict.
Corruption and criminality. Corruption

undermines the proper functioning of
governments by eroding their credibility,
legitimacy and accountability. It can cause
and perpetuate conflict and instability, and
contributes to global inequality. Out to 2035,
criminal transactions will increasingly use
alternative currencies, making it easier to
finance terrorist organisations anonymously.
It will be more difficult than today for
governments to freeze transnational
criminal assets or sanction rogue regimes.10
Enforcing anti-corruption legislation will be
challenging, especially in post-conflict states.
Resistance to reforms may result in conflict
or instability. Increased trafficking of drugs,
weapons and people across porous borders
will remain a worldwide security problem.
10 UK Ministry of Defence DCDC. (2014), ‘Global Expensive high-end technology may make
Strategic Trends – Out to 2045, (Fifth Edition)’, procuring sufficient numbers unviable
Strategic Trends Programme.

Strategic context
“
will allow a wider range of actors access They will achieve this through:
to comparatively sophisticated weapons.
Actors may employ existing dual use or a commitment to collective security via a The art of
commercial technologies in highly innovative rules-based international system and key
war is of vital
ways, which may be disruptive. The previous alliances; and
importance
technological advantage enjoyed by Western a ‘whole of UK Government’ approach,
militaries will continue to be reduced out to based on a concept of security that goes
to the State. It
2035, for a number of reasons. Proliferation beyond military effect. is a matter of
of technology means that a range of actors life and death,
will have access to systems which used to be Although the National Security Strategy will a road either
the sole preserve of developed countries. At evolve over time to reflect the changing
strategic landscape, its general themes and
to safety or
the same time, Western countries are likely
tenets are likely to endure. ruin. Hence it
to be overtaken economically, meaning that
they can be outspent on mass and capability. is a subject of
Furthermore, the West is unlikely to be able Utility of the military instrument. The inquiry which
military instrument has a fundamental role
to rely entirely on high-end prime platforms can on no
to maintain its edge, as these look set to to play in ensuring the survival of the state
and the security of its citizens. The ultimate account be
become considerably more expensive – neglected.
”
making procurement of sufficient manifestation of this is its ability to fight the
numbers unviable. nation’s wars – and war fighting remains the
foundation of our national military capability. Sun Tzu,
It also has a broader role in supporting The Art of War
The UK context our Government’s wider interests and
contributing to the nation’s prosperity and
The 2010 National Security Strategy states: stability through applying both hard and
‘The security of our nation is the first duty soft power.
of Government. It is the foundation of our
freedom and our prosperity’. It sets out To deliver both hard and soft power in
a strategic approach to national security, pursuit of national security, prosperity and
summarised as follows: interests, the military instrument must be
capable of fulfilling three overarching and
use all national capabilities to build interrelated functions, to:
prosperity, extend the UK’s influence in
the world and strengthen its security; protect the UK mainland, our Overseas
use all the instruments of national power Territories and citizens abroad;
to prevent conflict and avert threats actively shape the international
beyond UK shores; environment to promote UK interests
tie the efforts of all UK Government overseas and to enhance the
departments to address threats to UK’s reputation and contribute to
national security and interests and to international security and stability; and
seek new opportunities for the UK; and respond to crises by projecting
be a prosperous, secure, modern and power to protect UK interests overseas
outward looking nation, confident in its and maintain international security
values and ideas. and stability.
Although these three functions will remain

relevant in the future, the way in which the
UK uses the military instrument is likely to
change, necessitating new approaches and
capabilities. The balance of investment for
each function will inevitably evolve to meet
future challenges.

Strategic context
As we compete within a larger peer group, UK influence could decline
The UK in the international system. The Rule of law. The UK will retain a vested
UK has a vested interest in maintaining interest in upholding state sovereignty
international organisations in which it plays and ensuring that countries adhere to
an important role and wields significant international law. In areas where these rules
influence.11 The UK’s relative influence could, are no longer observed, such as in failing
though, decline out to 2035 as we compete states, human security14 and economic
within a larger peer group. However, our development will be jeopardised. The
influence will continue to be bolstered potential for violence in such areas may
by our system of government and our generate direct security threats for the UK at
diplomatic, cultural and commercial weight, home and abroad.
as well as the professional reputation of our
Armed Forces. The UK has attributes that Energy and resources. The UK will remain
can be exploited despite the relative growth heavily reliant on imported energy, food
of other powers. Furthermore, the UK is likely and industrial resources. Our use of nuclear,
to remain a significant global economy in as well as renewable sources of energy and
2035, possibly retaining its 2014 ranking as alternative fuels, will increase out to 2035,
the world’s 6th largest economy.12 Continued but hydrocarbons will continue to form
access to established and emerging markets the backbone of our energy requirements.
across the globe will remain key to the The security of trade routes along with the
UK’s economic prosperity. Any substantial stability of the environments these resources
disruption to globalisation, such as a originate from will remain vital. Our Armed
major trading partner adopting significant Forces may be required to guarantee the
protectionism, could have a severe impact security and supply of the UK’s vital resources
on the UK economy.13 through deterrence, engagement or the
application of force to defend against armed
attacks.
11 Rt. Hon. Hague, W. (2010), ‘Letter from Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to
DSPG’.
14 Freedom from want, freedom from fear,
12 Centre for Economic and Business Research.
freedom to live in dignity, http://unocha.org/
(2014), ‘World Economic League Table’.
humansecurity/about-human-security/human-
13 Dstl Policy and Capability Studies. (2013), security-all, accessed 2014.
‘Future Operating Environment 2035: UK Culture
and Interests’.

Strategic context
“
UK soft power. Soft power is ‘the ability critical infrastructure within the UK becomes
to affect others through the co-optive increasingly exposed and vulnerable to
means of framing the agenda, persuading, remote attack, particularly from cyberspace. Greater
and eliciting positive attraction to obtain Borders will almost certainly be more interconnectivity
preferred outcomes’.15 The UK has strong porous by 2035, facilitating higher levels may mean
cultural, social and ethnic links across the of migration. Larger immigrant diasporas
globe – such connections will be invaluable are likely to maintain closer ties with that... critical
if we wish to continue to use ‘soft-power’ their country of origin, through better infrastructure
as a tool for influence worldwide.16 This communication links, such as social within the
is manifest in the active role the UK plays media. As a result, events abroad are likely UK becomes
within international institutions such as the to have a more direct impact at home. increasingly
United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth Military operations overseas may be
exposed and
and European Union (EU). Our Armed Forces influenced by the concerns of UK diaspora
should expect to continue to contribute communities, such as the desire to provide vulnerable to
to the UK’s soft power in numerous ways humanitarian assistance to victims of a remote attack,
as part of Government strategy, including natural disaster from their country of origin. particularly from
Defence Engagement and when deployed While it is possible that UK society may be cyberspace.
”
on operations. Military soft power will have less homogenous as a result of larger,
greater credibility if underpinned by hard better-connected diasporas (and the
power. potential security challenges they may bring),
a more globally-engaged population could
Population. In 2035, the UK is likely to have also present significant opportunities.18
one of the largest populations in Europe,
mainly due to immigration.17 The growing Public attitudes to operations. External
immigrant population may, if not integrated, scrutiny of the military (along with other
strain social cohesion. However, positive public organisations) is likely to increase
demographic profiles will contribute to out to 2035. In liberal democratic societies,
the potential for strong economic growth public and parliamentary opinion impacts
and boost the state’s ability to reconstitute military operations and governments’
military capability in times of crisis. Our willingness to deploy armed forces. When
Armed Forces will need to embody the faced with a direct or existential threat,
diversity of the society they protect – a more public and parliamentary opinion is likely
diverse Armed Forces may be better able to to be resolute. But, when faced with more
operate in a globalised world where cultural obscure, indirect threats to national security,
awareness will be even more crucial than interests and prosperity, public opinion can
it is today. Building greater diversity will be vary regarding so-called ‘wars of choice’.
particularly important in addressing growing While current trends may suggest public
recruitment challenges, generated in part unease with UK military intervention – with
by individuals feeling less connected to the particular concerns over casualties, cost and
state and, hence, less inclined to serve. longevity – such discomfort could reverse
in the future. Shock events may change
Blurring of the overseas and mainland reticence overnight. Technology,
threat. Greater interconnectivity may such as automated systems, may also afford
mean that, without mitigation measures, new opportunities.
15 Nye, J. (2004), ‘Soft Power: The Means to Success

in World Politics, Public Affairs’.
16 Barkawi, T and Brighton, S. (2013). ‘Brown Britain:
Post-Colonial Politics and Grand Strategy’,
International Affairs. 18 Barkawi, T and Brighton, S. (2013). ‘Brown Britain:
17 UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs. Post-Colonial Politics and Grand Strategy’,
(2012), ‘UN (212) World Population Prospects’. International Affairs.

Strategic context
Global stress map : 2035

It is impossible to predict when and where humanitarian
disasters, instability or conflict will occur. However, where
global strategic trends are most likely to materialise, and
particularly where they collide, we can begin to
understand where crises could emerge and
where these may affect major
population centres.
Paris
Chicago London
Europe and North America

Los Angeles will remain the most important
regions to the widest variety
of UK interests, although other
regions are likely to grow in
Stress relative economic and political
significance, potentially
increasing challenges to NATO
Extreme and EU cohesion.
New York
Newark
High
Medium Lagos
Mexico City
Low
Kinshasa
Major centres of population
Sub-Saharan Africa
This map overlays data, from GST 5, on food has the potential for
and water insecurity and population density creating significant
to identify areas of potential stress. economic and political
opportunities for the
UK, potentially rivalling
The global commons will remain a South America is unlikely South Asia. However,
critical enabler of international security, to become more politically Rio de the region is likely to
trade and communication, increasingly significant to the UK than it Janeiro be characterised by
facilitating many essential defence is today, although it is likely enduring instability
capabilities. The commons will provide to rise steadily in economic and conflict, housing
São Paulo non-state groups that
opportunities for access and freedom of value.
manoeuvre, as well as challenges. Some threaten the UK or its
actors are likely to try to undermine Buenos Aires interests.
the tenuous balance between global
cooperation and competition. Behaviour In Antarctica, the key challenge out to 2035
across the commons will remain will be accommodating increased commercial
dependent on, and underpinned by, exploitation within carefully managed bounds.
established norms and practices.

Strategic context
As Artic sea ice retreats, more shipping routes are likely to open up, along with
greater opportunities for resource exploitation. This commercialisation could
drive conflict, although large-scale military confrontation is unlikely. Governance
arrangements could come under greater scrutiny, although significant change is not
likely to occur by 2035. Russia is likely to remain of geopolitical significance
out to 2035. Despite its declining economy and ageing
population, it could pose a growing instability that
could threaten UK interests, perhaps requiring greater
Western unity to provide European security.
Moscow
Istanbul
Beijing
Tianjin
Tokyo
Wuhan
Cairo The Far East and South-East Asia
Shanghai
are likely to be of growing economic
Dongguan, Guangdong and political significance to the UK
out to 2035, relative to other regions.
China’s ability and willingness to
Guangzhou, Guangdong
Karachi intervene militarily in the future is
Chongqing likely to increase. This could be as
Dhaka
Mumbai part of international organisations
Calcutta Manila such as the UN, or independently
Bangalore
where its national interests are
deemed to be at stake. Some actors
Delhi may share Beijing’s argument that
The Middle East
a multi-polar world is preferable to
and North Africa
South Asia is a US-led model of liberal capitalism
are likely to remain
likely to become Jakarta – others will fear China’s regional
considerable sources
more economically dominance.
of threat to the
important to the
UK’s interests, with
UK out to 2035.
terrorism, inter-state
The region could
conflict, weapons
generate threats
Luanda proliferation and
to the UK from
internal instability
terrorism, extremism
likely to increase.
and weapons
The regions will be
proliferation.
of significant, but
Inter-state conflict
falling, economic
and internal
value to the UK over
instability are also
the next 20 years.
possible.

Strategic context
Chapter 1 – Key points

Increased globalisation may mean that states and individuals have
significantly less time to plan for, and respond to, global and regional
events that emerge rapidly. Faster and more agile military responses may
be called for, posing a challenge for policy- and decision-makers.
The US is likely to remain the world’s leading military power in 2035,
although its military advantage is likely to be challenged increasingly
by China.
By 2035 the majority of the world’s population is expected to live in
cities, with many located on or near the coast. These areas will often be
prone to natural disasters. Failed or failing cities could become sources
of major security issues: such cities may lack resilience due to poor
infrastructure, lack of resources and ineffective or absent institutions
and emergency services.
The effects of climate change are likely to drive an increased need for
humanitarian assistance to address greater suffering, suggesting that the
military will more frequently be used to provide assistance – albeit in a
supporting role – alongside capable non-governmental organisations.
The need to protect lines of communication, as well as to guarantee access
to resources, may increase competition and act as a catalyst for intra- and
inter-state conflict. This will be important to the UK, which will remain
heavily reliant on imported energy, food and industrial resources.
There will be an increasing range of empowered actors in 2035, although
the state will continue to play a dominant role in international affairs.
Growing proliferation will allow a wider range of actors to access more
sophisticated weapons, while the previous technological advantage
enjoyed by Western militaries will continue to be reduced.
The UK’s relative influence could decline out to 2035, as it competes within
a larger peer group.
UK Defence is likely to have a broader role in supporting the Government’s
wider interests and contributing to the nation’s prosperity and stability by
applying both hard and soft power.
Events abroad are likely to have a more direct impact at home, and military
operations overseas may be influenced increasingly by UK mainland
security needs.
Critical UK infrastructure may become increasingly vulnerable to remote
attack, particularly from cyberspace.

Characteristics of the future operating environment
Chapter 2
Characteristics of the future
operating environment
Introduction. Operating successfully in growing competition between states for
future environments requires a detailed access to, and influence over, ever-scarcer
understanding of their likely characteristics. resources. Whilst traditional state-on-state
Identifying influential trends early will help conflict cannot be ruled out over the next 20
decision-makers plan more effectively for years, state-sponsored terror attacks, use of
the future. Chapter 2 identifies the main proxies and cyber attacks are more likely.
actors and key characteristics that are likely
to shape the operating environment in 2035. Non-state actors. By 2035, some
Many of these characteristics will increase non-state actors – multinational
the potential for instability and conflict, while corporations, non-governmental
others will offer opportunities for developing organisations and city authorities – are
a more stable and balanced world. likely to be more influential than they are
today, having a greater impact on world
affairs. Cooperation between state and
Actors non-state actors will sometimes be essential,
State actors. The nation state will endure with three-way engagement between
over the next 20 years and beyond, militaries, non-governmental organisations
remaining central to the international and multinational corporations becoming
order in 2035. Adaptable states are more increasingly important. Given trends towards
likely to be successful, needing to interact greater and more complex urbanisation,
increasingly with a variety of evermore engagement with city authorities will be
influential non-state actors, international particularly relevant for urban operations.
organisations and even super-empowered Extremist non-state actors, often driven
individuals. In 2035 there is likely to be by ideological and criminal concerns,

The increasing diversity of non-state actors will make the operating environment more complex
will also persist. By 2035, extremists will

almost certainly be more able to exploit
Institutions
information technologies, with the potential Alliances and partnerships. Working
to significantly disrupt communication within international organisations, or
and economic links. Extremists may also with allies and partners, is likely to remain
be able to employ a wider array of military the preferred method of international
capabilities (albeit on a limited scale), using engagement for the UK in 2035. The
innovative tactics that exploit our inherent importance of such partnerships will grow,
vulnerabilities, including any institutional but they are likely to change in construct
inertia. They are likely to develop and character, resulting in a more complex
ever-higher levels of lethality to counter and ambiguous international environment
our protection systems and may even have where there is greater alliance variability.
access to weapons of mass effect. To achieve ‘Partnerships of the willing’ or bilateral
continued impact, extremist non-state actors alliances, such as the US-Japan Defence
may seek to deliver progressively more Alliance, are likely to become more prevalent
‘spectacular’ and violent acts that ultimately – particularly for specific operations and
lead them to be alienated and isolated. perhaps as a subset of larger alliances. For
However, where successful, these may cause the UK, NATO will remain the defence
mass casualties on a scale not yet seen,19 with alliance of choice – providing the continued
significant economic, social and institutional commitment to Article 5 (collective
impact. The links between extremist non- self-defence of member states) but also
state actors and more powerful criminal the means of interoperability with a wide
organisations are likely to be maintained. range of nations that could form coalitions
Distinguishing between criminals and of the willing. A shift in UN Security Council
terrorists may become more difficult over the membership may occur by 2035, perhaps
next 20 years. with additional members reflecting the
shifting balance of power. The UN is likely to
19 Hoffman, B. (1993), ‘Holy Terror: The Implications

of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative’.

“
work through regional organisations20 By 2035 extreme religious networks are likely
– such as the ASEAN (Association of to be increasingly global24 and will often play
South-East Asian Nations) – to achieve its a greater role in channelling transnational In an
aims, including a greater role in upstream support to ideologically-driven conflicts. environment
conflict prevention. The need for large-scale defined by the
UN operations – perhaps in Africa – and UK Nationalism. Nationalism and national
identity will be a significant, albeit reducing, intermingling
involvement in (and possible leadership of)
them should not be discounted. The EU driver of conflict out to 2035. Tensions arising of friends,
is also likely to continue to play a greater from differences of nationality and culture25 enemies, and
defence and security role.21 Interoperability and a rise in ‘identity politics’ will carry a high neutral parties,
and adaptability will be key as bespoke risk of sectarian or communal violence.26 understanding
alliances and partnerships are formed, This will be especially true where dominant social and
both between nations and with non-state national identities continue to suppress
cultural
actors (such as governments working with weaker ones. Globally, armed forces may
be engaged in more areas where the networks
non-governmental organisations to deliver
challenges of both national and transnational becomes just
humanitarian relief).
allegiances are present. as important
as the weapons
Culture and identity Social and behavioural intelligence. we employ.
”
Technological advances are likely to mitigate
By 2035, identity may be more dependent on some of the inherent challenges associated
culture and ideology than geography. The with understanding human behaviour and
ongoing growth and proliferation of social Gen. Ray Odierno,
activity. Analysis and predictive modelling US Army28
media, and evermore rapid spread of ideas, of social behaviour will increasingly support
will create new forms of identity-based operations.27 Analysis and visualisation
‘turbulence’ or volatility, which gain strength techniques will be reliant on social media28
by their associations. This is likely to intelligence feeds,29 including tactical
intensify, complicating battlespaces by information gathering. Such intelligence
broadening audiences and energising will guide and support decisions, including
‘causes’ for which people fight, and for targeting, across the spectrum of conflict.
whom pragmatic compromise will be harder It may also help us to understand human
to accept. All actors are likely to exploit behaviours across social networks, as well as
social media’s readily-available open-source providing opportunities to influence them.
intelligence-gathering advantages for control,
recruitment, manipulation and targeting.
Extreme religious and nationalistic ideologies Technology
are likely to characterise the future operating
Technology will remain an essential and
environment more often.
pervasive element of the future operating
Religion. Faith-based ideologies will environment and a key driver of military
continue to shape many conflicts around the change over the next 20 years. Increasingly,
world and will remain an organising force defence and security systems will rely
in 2035.22 More extreme religious ideals on exploiting commercial research and
will tend to make wars longer and more
violent, especially where religious sites are
24 Roy, O. (2004), ‘Globalized Islam: The Search for a
co-located with valuable natural resources.23 New Ummah’, Columbia University Press.
25 Hechter, M. (2000), ‘Nationalism and Rationality’,
20 UK Ministry of Defence NATO and European Policy Journalism of World Research Systems.
(NEP). (2013), ‘The UN’. 26 The Japan Times, (2013), ‘Nationalism, Tibetans
21 UK Ministry of Defence NEP. (2013), ‘The EU’. and Uighurs in Today’s China’.
22 Gutowski, S. (2013), ‘Religion and Security in 27 Lock, R, Uttley, M and Lyall, P. (2011), ‘Honing
International Relations Theories’. The Routledge Defence’s Intellectual Edge’.
Handbook of Religion and Security. 28 Gen. Odierno, R. (2013), ‘The Force of Tomorrow’.
23 Toft, M.D. (2007),’Getting Religion: The Puzzling 29 Canna, S. (2013), ‘Operational Relevance of
Case of Islam and Civil War’, International Security. Behavioural and Social Science to DoD Missions’.

The changing technological landscape

The technological challenge. Technology
developments will offer our Armed Forces
opportunities as well as posing challenges.
Gaining and sustaining military technological
advantage will be increasingly challenging
out to 2035, although some states may
achieve temporary dominance in particular
areas. Pressure on defence budgets,
weapon proliferation and adversaries who
choose to focus their capabilities in specific
environments will all be contributing factors.
As a result, by 2035, the UK and other Western
militaries, probably with the exception of the
US, will almost certainly have been overtaken
“
innovation.30 Sharing knowledge amongst in some technologies, and may need to
diverse communities will also lead to become accustomed to being overmatched
innovative, break-through technologies – by derived capabilities.
New some of which may be game-changers.31
technology Proliferation. Global connectivity and
Increasing competition to maintain open markets will facilitate greater access
needs to be technological advantage may also prompt to research, equipment concepts and
increasingly a sudden ‘technology jump’ leading to technologies. Along with decreasing
adaptable. strategic or operational shocks. production costs, these factors will enable
”
technologies to proliferate, allowing a diverse
range of actors to access capabilities once
restricted to just a few states.32 A range of
actors, including less advanced adversaries,
may employ existing dual-use or commercial
technologies in highly innovative ways that
may dislocate our understanding of their
activity. Additive manufacturing (sometimes
referred to as 3D printing), reverse
engineering and greater innovation will
increase the amount of illicit and unregulated
technology transfer, exacerbating the threat
to the UK. Other actors will access, adopt
and integrate technology at a rate that will
make it increasingly difficult for the UK to
maintain a technological edge.
Tempo. The rate of technological change

will accelerate out to 2035, serving to
highlight inadequacies in less adaptable
procurement processes within Defence.
Civil companies will be able to raise revenue
far more quickly, driving technology
30 FitzGerald, B. and Sayler, K. (2014), ‘Creative development in new directions and at faster
Disruption: Technology, Strategy and the Future rates. Over the next 20 years, militaries are
of the Global Defense Industry’.
31 McKinsey Global Institute, (2013), ‘Disruptive
Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, 32 Krepinevich, A. (2011), ‘Get ready for
Business & the Global Economy’. Democratization of Destruction’.

likely to find it more difficult to maintain

capability levels, unless new technology
is quickly and affordably integrated. This
tempo may mean that our capabilities have
a shorter service life as countermeasures are
developed more quickly, requiring a regular
refresh to maintain advantage.
Adaptation. New technologies will need

to be increasingly adaptable out to 2035 –
both to allow for interoperability with legacy
systems and for modernisation or upgrade.
Simply procuring superior capability will not
be enough – the speed at which Defence
can adapt and integrate technologies
will be more important.33, 34 Maximising
cross-environment utility will also be
an important consideration for military
equipment. In future, the UK may be obliged
to share with, and use, allies’ intelligence
and cutting-edge technology to enhance
interoperability and effectiveness.
Key technological capabilities

Anti-access and area denial capabilities.35
By 2035, proliferation of anti-access and
area denial capabilities will enable a wider
range of potential adversaries to deploy
weapons to deny our access to, and freedom Sophisticated anti-access threats will challenge our ability
of movement within, operational areas. The to operate at range
aim of our adversaries is likely to be to deter
Western powers by raising the potential cost
capabilities such as:
of action.
ballistic missiles (conventional warhead);
Anti-access is intended to exclude our Armed
Forces from theatres or limit their effective loiter-capable automated systems;
use and transit of the global commons. In anti-ship ballistic missiles;
the broadest sense, anti-access may involve super-cavitating torpedoes;
political and economic exclusion, which in
advanced (perhaps even unmanned)
military terms could translate into refusal for
submarines; and
basing, staging, transit or overflight rights.
Under more hostile circumstances, lethal weapons of mass effect.
anti-access systems in 2035 will include
For more advanced actors, offensive space-
evermore sophisticated longer-range
or ground-based anti-satellite systems will
be able to disrupt the UK’s own space assets.
33 US Defense Science Board (2013), ‘Technology Offensive and defensive cyber capability will
Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030’. offer specific advantages – disrupting our
34 Miller, M. J. (2014), ‘Statement by Deputy networks and systems, while countering our
Undersecretary of the Army for Research and offensive cyber operations. Less technical
Technology’.
methods will include conventionally-armed
35 Extracts in this section from Freier, N. (2012), ‘The
terrorist attacks and proxy warfare methods
Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge’,
Center for Strategic and International Studies. that open alternative fronts. Such methods

target-specific mines;
guided and kinetic munitions;
directed energy weapons;
increasingly effective and longer-range
man-portable air defence and
anti-armour systems;
automated weapon systems; and
swarm tactics.
Remote and automated systems. Remote

and automated systems,36 including those
that are armed, will proliferate over the
next 20 years. As they become cheaper
and easier to produce, technologically
advanced systems are likely to proliferate,
with developing states and non-state actors
having growing access to capable systems.
Novel weapons: future ballistic missile defence?
While initially the questions surrounding
are likely to distract both our resources and new automated systems may limit their
attention away from the areas the UK is use when there is a low appetite for risk, as
trying to access, while seeking to impose capabilities become more advanced and
excessive political costs for decision-makers. more trusted, their use is likely to become
Acute, sophisticated and comprehensive commonplace. The level and nature of
anti-access challenges are likely to be human control of remote and automated
most evident in Asia, but by 2035 weapon systems will be key. By 2035, it seems likely
proliferation and technological advances will that automated systems will be advanced
mean the threat is increasingly global, and and highly adaptable. Low-end systems
more potent. with limited mission-sets will retain the
advantages of low cost, rapid procurement
Area denial threats are also likely to impact and quick adaptation to the challenges of
heavily upon both political and military risk the operating environment. Advances in
calculations. The coordinated and networked technology will almost certainly enable
use of both high- and low-end technologies swarm attacks, allowing numerous devices
in a multilayered approach will limit or deny to act in concert. This may serve to counter
our ability to project power, and sustain and the advantage of high-end systems.
protect our fielded forces – they will present Western militaries are likely to insist on
a prolific barrier to effective theatre entry humans continuing to make decisions on
and operation. Lethal and disruptive area the engagement of targets by automated
denial threats will manifest most often at systems, but some of our adversaries
close range, attacking our vulnerabilities in all may not be bound by, or follow, the same
environments. Initially, they create physical legal and ethical constraints.
resistance to theatre entry and then limit the
freedom of manoeuvre of forces in theatre.
In 2035, lethal area denial capabilities will
range from the crude to the increasingly
36 ‘Remote’ and ‘automated’ capabilities are
sophisticated. Methods will include: often taken to be interchangeable. However,
an important distinction is that automated
more readily available and advanced systems need not operate at range, and remote
cruise and ballistic missiles; capabilities need not be automated (they could
be controlled, at a distance, by a human operator).
weapons of mass effect;

“
... a range
of state
actors may
use tactical
nuclear
weapons
as part of
their strategy
against
non-
nuclear and
The potential use of tactical nuclear weapons will complicate deterrence conventional
threats...
Novel weapons. By 2035, the majority of barriers of power generation and storage including
missiles (including anti-ship cruise missiles) for these weapons will almost certainly have severe cyber
will operate at supersonic or even hypersonic been overcome by 2035. Radio frequency attacks.
”
speeds (five times the speed of sound or or microwave emitters will also be capable
greater), with new technologies designed to of delivering energy on personnel to cause
defeat advanced electronic countermeasures. lethal and non-lethal effects. Militaries
They are likely to have increased survivability will need to protect their own systems
aids through stealth technologies and and personnel against disruption by these
alternatives to global positioning systems weapons, as the threats from these weapons
(GPS). Some weapons may be limited in rapidly emerge.39
range and the advantage offered by high
speed may be negated by countermeasures Nuclear weapons. There are currently
such as directed energy and electromagnetic nine independent nuclear weapon states
pulse weapons. Gun systems are likely to holding some 17,300 warheads (down
incorporate electromagnetic rail gun and from 68,000 in 1985) although only the US
hybrid explosive technologies, allowing and Russia have more than 300.40 Despite
a large number of smart munitions to be reductions, nuclear states are almost certain
delivered with greater precision and lethality. to continue to modernise their capabilities
out to 2035 and remain committed to
Cheaper, faster and more effective missiles retaining nuclear weapons. Assessments of
will continue to drive a revolution in missile whether particular actions warrant a nuclear
defence capabilities. Further, growing strike may differ between actors. Some
intolerance towards civilian casualties and commentators believe it is increasingly likely
demand for increased levels of accountability that a range of state actors may use tactical
will drive the need for greater distinction, nuclear weapons as part of their strategy
precision and proportionality. As a against non-nuclear and conventional threats
consequence, our Armed Forces will need
to exploit directed energy weapons such
39 House of Commons Defence Committee. (2012),
as high-powered lasers.37, 38 The current
‘Developing Threats: Electro-Magnetic Pulses
(EMP) Tenth Report of Session 2010–12’.
37 Boeing Counter-electronics High-powered 40 Federation of American Scientists, (2013), ‘Status
Microwave Advance Missile Project. of World Nuclear Forces’.
38 UK Ministry of Defence, Dstl. (2014), ‘Novel
Weapons programme’, www.gov.uk/government/
publications/novel-weapons-programme.

coming from any environment, including may experience step changes in their
severe cyber attacks.41, 42 Limited tactical development, emerging from combinations
nuclear exchanges in conventional conflicts of individual technical advances, rather than
by 2035 also cannot be ruled out, and from a single specific field. In particular,
some non-Western states may even use such advanced materials, additive manufacturing,
strikes as a way of limiting or de-escalating power and energy technologies, and
conflict. developments in life sciences could have
a profound effect on military capability.
If isolated military targets are subject to Advanced materials will possess new physical,
nuclear attack, any land-based nuclear thermal and chemical properties while
response could be seen as an unjustified offering the ability to manufacture at the
escalation, in light of the nature of the nano-scale. This will allow us to create new
weapon, civilian casualties and its impact structures and to integrate capabilities at ever
on the environment. Future threats may smaller, cheaper and effective scales. They
also come from groups who – due to their will also offer advantages of protection,
dispersed locations – cannot be the subject
“
reduced weight, deception and repair
of a nuclear counterstrike, such as terrorists or through self-healing. Additive manufacturing
cyber criminals. Of note, illicit nuclear trade is will make our logistics chain lighter.45 This
likely to continue out to 2035 and preventing will be key to operating in non-permissive
The
nuclear proliferation is likely to require greater environments, especially when the support
likelihood international consensus and political will. chain is long, expensive or threatened. It
of terrorists may also allow individuals, non-state actors
succeeding Other weapons of mass effect. The
and developing states to produce very
likelihood of terrorists succeeding in attacks
in attacks large numbers of cheap, precision weapons.
that cause real mass destruction will remain
that cause low. If terrorists do use weapons of mass
Research in power and energy generation and
real mass storage could create smaller, lighter and more
effect in the future, attacks are likely to be
durable batteries. This will lessen the physical
destruction chemical, biological or radiological – and
burden on our personnel and further reduce
will remain could even be nuclear.43 Weapons of mass
the logistics burden to extend our operational
low. effect will be under continued international
reach.
”
surveillance but future limited tactical
use by rogue regimes or ideologically By 2035, physical and cognitive performance
driven non-state actors cannot be ruled will be artificially enhanced via biomechanical
out. Future developments may include systems such as exo-skeletons or prosthetics,
the targeted spread of disease and use of wearable devices and sensors, and
nanotechnology. For example, nano-sized memory-enhancing drugs. Synthetic
carbon particles could be used to cause biological components will enable new
severe respiratory problems.44 substances to be developed. But such
advances could also lead to new pathogens
Exploiting technical advances being deliberately or accidently created and
By 2035, many of today’s key emerging released, potentially causing or exacerbating
technologies will have a major impact across pandemics. By 2035, it may even be possible
Defence. Some capabilities may have a to create genetic weapons.
disruptive effect, while other technologies
Quantum technologies. Although a
breakthrough will not necessarily occur in the
41 Hedenskog, J. and Vendil Pallin, C. (2013), ‘Russian next 20 years, quantum technologies promise
Military Capability in a 10 Year Perspective’.
a vast increase in processing capabilities
42 Main, S. J. (2010), ‘The Mouse that Roared or the
and secure communication, particularly for
Bear that Growled?’.
encoding and deciphering sensitive messages
43 Mauroni, A. (2010), ‘A Counter-WMD Strategy for
the Future’.
44 Forest, J. J. F. and Howard, R. (2012), ‘Weapons of 45 Middleton, A. J. (2013), ‘Additive Manufacture –
Mass Destruction and Terrorism’. Impact on MOD’s Logistics from 2013-2035’.

Ally or adversary...
and signals analysis. Quantum technologies Big Data analytics. The opportunities
may also lead to improvements in precision provided by the growing volume of data
sensing, allowing the visualisation of objects will increase, as will the risk of information
and voids in subterranean locations or behind overload. Big Data analytics (the ability
obstructions. This will drive changes to stealth. to collect and analyse a vast amount of
Other developments are likely to include information quickly) will become
precision-timing devices that will enhance increasingly important and sophisticated
communications and global positioning. over the next 20 years. Organisations,
including non-state actors, will seek to gain
Information and communications information advantage. Like many state
Out to 2035, our Armed Forces will continue actors using Big Data analytics, they will be
to rely on information and communications able to uncover patterns and correlations
for: operations; political support at home; to create probabilistic forecasts. By 2035,
and strategic influence around the world. language processing, anomaly detection and
visualisation tools will be far more prevalent
Information and communications and will identify activities and trends much
technology. Information systems earlier than conventional techniques.
development will be increasingly driven by
the commercial sector. By 2035, computers Surveillance. By 2035, persistent real-time,
will more frequently connect, collect and multi-sensor surveillance capabilities will
share data with other devices seamlessly be ubiquitous, cheap and passive, offering
and without human intervention or (in some considerable advantage to a range of actors.
cases) knowledge – the so-called ‘Internet This will have significant implications for
of Things’. Practically unlimited data storage operational security and counter-surveillance
will be available on micro-scale devices, techniques. Surveillance capability is likely
driven by the growing volume of digital to be exploited through sensors distributed
data. Defence will need to continue to across all environments, including space.
understand the impact on privacy, assurance, Surveillance throughout cyberspace will be
jurisdiction and security for data stored increasingly evident. By 2035, sensors will
on any foreign-based servers. Such data be integrated with weapon delivery systems
servers will become an important part of that track multiple targets.
critical national infrastructure, but may not
have the type of protection afforded by UK
sovereignty.

“
Cyberspace may result in systems that do not function
properly or securely and it may not even be
FOE 35 considers cyberspace as a separate evident that a cyber attack has occurred.
...cyberspace
entity purely to emphasise that it will be We will also face the ongoing risk of insider
will be ubiquitous by 2035, pervading every aspect access to stored sensitive information and
ubiquitous of the physical environments to a far higher the resulting threat of unauthorised sharing.
by 2035, degree than today. Cyber operations
pervading and awareness must be considered as Cyber capabilities. Cyber capabilities
mainstream activities. In effect, cyber will be integrated into overall targeting
every aspect
operations are part of the all-arms processes, contributing to a broad-based
of the physical battlespace. As military systems become deterrent posture. Capabilities will become
environments increasingly dependent on information more prevalent and mainstream as they
to a far higher networks (particularly to integrate sensors, become better understood. Cyber activity
degree than weapons and command and control), cyber may offer a credible way to provide deterrent
today. protection and resilience will be essential. effect that complies with the principle of
”
Any use of cyberspace that impacts critical distinction, perhaps by threatening a state’s
national and international infrastructures critical infrastructure, rendering that state
could result in military responses. open to coercion.46 Effective deterrence
through cyber activity will have to overcome
The global nature of cyberspace. The a number of obstacles. These obstacles
number of entry points and its decentralised include ensuring that attacks can be directly
and dispersed nature will mean that attributed, and are not mistaken for the
cyberspace is likely to remain porous and efforts of hactivists; making certain that
vulnerable to disruption. Cyberspace attacks will always have the desired effect;
infrastructure is often situated in sovereign and stopping the effects from being easily
territory with dispersed ownership, reversed.
particularly for space-based and cloud
storage overseas. Although states may
be both capable and willing to exercise Electromagnetic
jurisdiction over these areas, they will
lack full control because of the seamless environment
boundaries across which information moves The electromagnetic environment is
globally. Local dominance may be achieved defined as: the totality of electromagnetic
temporarily, but dominance of global phenomena existing at a given location.47
cyberspace will be impossible. The electromagnetic environment
permeates the physical environment and
Threats from cyberspace. Cyberspace will overlaps with cyberspace as information
continue to be contested out to 2035, by a passes through it. It is an integral part of
larger and more diverse range of actors. The the joint operating environment and its
challenges to information and infrastructure importance will increase further out to
security will be immense in 2035, with cyber 2035. Defence’s ability to communicate,
attacks growing in scope, frequency and navigate, deliver kinetic and non-kinetic
impact. Adversaries will be adaptive and be effects, and gain situational awareness
able to develop malicious cyber effects that and understanding is dependent on
strike at strategic, operational and tactical access to the electromagnetic spectrum.
levels – not just against traditional military Where bandwidth is limited, our access
and critical infrastructure targets. to the spectrum may be constrained by
commercial operators seeking to expand
Computers and networks will continue
to be compromised either by delivering
malicious software to penetrate and damage 46 Libicki, M. (2009), ‘Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar’.
information systems, or by corrupting the 47 Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, (2014),
electronic component supply chain. This ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definition’.

The volume of goods moving across the global commons is likely to increase dramatically
their own use. Increasing reliance on

space-based technologies will increase our
Physical environment
electromagnetic spectrum vulnerability. This section considers some of the
factors likely to characterise the physical
Electronic warfare capabilities. By 2035, environment in 2035. These are: the global
advanced electronic warfare capabilities commons as a key enabler of globalisation;
will have become ubiquitous. As these sovereign territory remaining key to the
capabilities proliferate, less capable international order; the increasing complexity
adversaries will modify them, creating a and ambiguity of actors in the land
broad range of electronic warfare threats. environment; and the urban and
To survive, our information, systems and littoral challenge. It does not include
platforms will need electromagnetic what some consider to be the ‘virtual
protection to be resilient to electronic global commons’ of cyberspace and the
attack and able to operate in hostile electromagnetic environment which have
electromagnetic environments. Electronic already been considered.
defence-measures will need to continue
to counter the threat from improvised The importance of the
explosive devices, as well as mitigate the global commons
effects of radio frequency, infrared or
laser guided weapons. Passive and active The high seas, the air above it, and space
protection measures will be required to constitute the physical global commons. To
defend our data-networks and systems varying degrees, they are largely accessible
from cyber attacks conducted through by all actors and not subject to national
the electromagnetic environment. jurisdiction – although they are all managed
Countermeasures and mitigating electronic and controlled to some degree through
warfare attacks will be important, though international treaties and agreements. The
reinvigorating and exploiting electronic global commons present opportunities to
attack capabilities could ensure Defence build partnerships to tackle shared problems
possesses operational advantage. However, out to 2035.
Defence will also need to reduce its reliance
on the electromagnetic spectrum.

De-conflicting orbits will be a growing problem
Access and vulnerabilities. Maintaining as strategic choke points, that adversaries

UK access to the global commons will be and criminals may exploit. Greater access
essential for ensuring global reach, national to the global commons will make the world
prosperity and to deliver strategic effect. increasingly interconnected, but also bring
The global commons are enablers of wide variations in security standards. Our
globalisation and, out to 2035, will continue security will only be as good as the weakest
to facilitate ready access to the land and its link in the chain, potentially resulting in
people, principally through ports, airports enhanced risks from terrorism and the spread
and satellite-based communications. There of infectious diseases.
are likely to be an increasing number of
access points to the global commons by Supply lines. There is currently an
2035, and direct transport routes will be extremely high volume of goods moved
more typical. The global commons will across the global commons, and this is likely
remain a critical enabler of international to increase dramatically out to 2035. Working
security, trade and communication, and with international partners, our Armed
will act increasingly as a conduit of military Forces will contribute to the continued flow
power.48, 49 However, the global commons of maritime trade and air movements around
also contain inherent vulnerabilities, such the globe.
There will be greater summer use of Arctic

48 Redden, M. E. and Hughes, M. P. (2010), ‘Global sea routes by 2035, in particular the Northern
Commons and Domain Interrelationships: Time Sea Route, north of Russia. This will give
for a New Conceptual Framework?’. Russia influence over the movement of trade,
49 Brzezinski, Z. (2012), ‘Strategic Vision: America and as sea routes to and from North-East Asia
the Crisis of Global Power’.

“
will be shorter. If the UK develops significant to operate space services and provide space
trade dependencies, and if companies for vehicles and equipment.52 These companies
which the UK has some responsibility use this may be as important to the UK in 2035 In 2035,
route, access could become a security issue as the ship-building industry was in the the most
for the UK both at sea and in the air. Another 20th century. important
aspect is greater use of the Eastern Atlantic
and narrows such as the Dover Straits by Exclusive economic zones. The physical maritime
commercial shipping. UK responsibilities global commons allows access to exclusive security
for governance and secured access of these economic zones, territorial waters and all challenge
routes will need to be considered. In a more littoral regions. In 2035, the most important is likely to
confrontational future, some states could maritime security challenge is likely to centre
around exclusive economic zones.53 They
centre around
continue to develop capabilities for sea and
will be a focus for criminal activity as well exclusive
air control, although advances in technology
may also enhance our own capabilities as a source of friction between developed economic
and access, depending on our ability to and developing states, particularly as states zones.
”
exploit them. enforce their jurisdiction. As offshore energy
cultivation increases,54 these tensions are
Dependency on space. Every part of the likely to intensify.
UK’s critical national infrastructure relies
to some extent on space capabilities, and Governance. In 2035, shipping routes are
this dependency will increase greatly out likely to be increasingly contested amidst
to 2035. However, our reliance on space is a range of rising sovereignty claims. This is
not always obvious to users – and in many likely to lead to increasing friction between
cases the required capabilities are hosted by those who insist on freedom of the high
non-UK space service providers, increasing seas and navigation under the context
our national vulnerability. Access to space of international waters (supported by
is already highly competitive in both orbital international norms and convention) and
capacity and bandwidth: emerging those who do not.
space-faring nations, often with opposing
While international airspace is subject to
interests, will increasingly seek equitable
civil or military airspace control there is no
access to it. They are likely to contest the
agreement on how far airspace extends
established order by disputing treaties and
vertically towards space – although for
customary agreements and compete for
practical purposes the limit is currently
the best satellite orbits.50 De-conflicting
considered to be as high as aircraft can fly.
orbits will be a growing problem, as will
the proliferation of debris and collisions in
space. Low-cost launch capabilities will
52 For example, Surrey Satellite Technology
make access to space easier, including for Laboratory provides and operates a military
adversarial non-state actors and criminals. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Space launches will either serve mass-market space capability for Nigeria.
end-users such as satellite communications 53 The UK’s exclusive economic zones came into
(demanding increased bandwidth) or force in April 2014 and is the world’s fifth largest
provide bespoke services such as specialist behind the US, France, Australia and Russia.
geographic imagery.51 Military users of space 54 Offshore energy supplies will expand by 2035 –
offshore oil production is expected to be 48%
will continue to rely on civilian companies
of world supply and natural gas will see a 60%
increase. Offshore platforms will grow from 270
to over 600 over the next 20 years, with increases
50 UK Ministry of Defence, DCDC. (2013), ‘JDP 0-30, in the Arctic, Eastern Mediterranean, North Pacific,
Air and Space Doctrine’. West Africa and South-East Asia. There will be at
least 100 times as many wind farms as there are
51 Reuters (2014), ‘Global Spending on Space Falls,
today by 2035, and tidal farms may reach 22,000.
Emerging States are Spending More’.

Future urban operations will be hugely challenging
By 2035, technological advances will allow the governance and authority of nation states,
flight at ever-higher altitudes, blurring further or other autonomous or de facto governance
the distinction between air and space. structures. However, tensions arising across
These technologies may stretch our ability to the borders of some sovereign territories are
police international airspace and defend our likely to be more prevalent. Driven by the
sovereign territory from the air. need for access to resources and subsequently
exploiting and transporting them, the
Ambiguity, differing interpretations and sovereignty of some lands is likely to become
disagreements over norms of behaviours more directly contested. Changes as a result
and governance on the use of the global of climate change or intensified production
commons, exclusive economic zones, methods are likely to increase the severity of
international airspace and space may lead such tensions. Commercial interests, driven by
to confrontation. greater resource-scarcity, may also compete
directly with national interests, leading to a
Sovereign territory blurring of the national instruments of power.
Sovereign territory is characterised by the
concentration of people and their daily The complexity of actors in the land
pursuits on the land, in adjacent territorial environment. The land environment will be
waters and in the airspace above. Operating an increasingly complex tapestry of multiple
beyond the urban environment is likely to actors with shifting or ambiguous allegiances.
remain essential in 2035 and it will present Some of our most likely adversaries (extremist
armed forces with a range of diverse and non-state actors) can be expected to operate
challenging conditions: for example, arctic, in informally governed spaces, seeking to
desert, jungle, forest, riverine, coastal gain freedom of manoeuvre and, ultimately,
and mountainous. strategic advantage. They are unlikely to
be able to operate across all environments
In 2035, with the exception of Antarctica, all freely or concurrently. Out to 2035 they will
land masses are likely to remain declared and seek to identify and exploit our weaknesses,
internationally recognised as sovereign under creating favourable conditions for themselves,

probably using novel technologies and and globalisation. The effects of climate
cyberspace. Not all actors will be hostile, so change will be most keenly felt in densely
identifying threats and opportunities will populated coastal cities, leading to instability
be vital. Whilst the physical terrain may be and suffering.
transformed as a result of climate change
and urbanisation, it is amongst the human For our Armed Forces, the urban
terrain where the most dynamic and radical environment will be one of the most
change can be expected as a result of global challenging areas to operate in. The city, and
trends. Defence will need to respond with its surrounds, will become an increasingly
a comprehensive understanding of this complex and ambiguous tapestry of multiple
volatile and complex environment to shape actors with shifting allegiances, in which we
it effectively. may be required to operate in a variety of
ways, from major conflict at range to peace
The urban and littoral challenge support and humanitarian operations.
With increasing urbanisation, cities will be Where cities are located on the littoral
more physically, culturally and institutionally – a complex operating environment in its
complex, with major cities the key hubs of own right – the complexities of the urban
human activity in 2035. At their best, future environment will be amplified and even
cities will be information-rich environments more dynamic. This will exacerbate further
and centres for change, commerce, the operating challenges.
innovation and learning. Many will
represent the pinnacle of human efficiency.
Developed cities will be characterised by the Future legal aspects
latest high-tech transport systems, excellent Human rights law. Out to 2035, our Armed
medical facilities, thriving business sectors and Forces are likely to be increasingly constrained
modern, eco-friendly homes. Poorer urban by both national and international human
areas, though, will be unable to keep up with rights legislation. The precise understanding
the pace of growth and change, lacking the and applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict
necessary resilience and infrastructure. may present challenges in keeping pace with
Physically, cities in 2035 will remain technological developments, such as wider
characterised by a diverse range of use of more sophisticated automated systems.
infrastructure, from the glass and concrete ‘Soft’ laws, such as UN General Assembly
of a central business district to the tin shacks Resolutions and temporary international
and open sewers of slums, perhaps just a agreements, are likely to become more
short distance away. They will present a prevalent as a result. In general, the UK should
complex multi-dimensional challenge – expect greater domestic and international legal
containing the street level, roof tops, sewers scrutiny and criticism of military operations out
and tunnels, riverine, surface, sub-surface, air, to 2035, both informed and ill-informed.
space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic Lawfare and technology. ‘Lawfare’ – the
environment.55 The scale of the city strategy of using law, rather than traditional
challenge will be potentially overwhelming means, to achieve an operational objective
and every urban centre will be unique, – is likely to be used more prominently by
requiring a bespoke understanding. All cities 2035. The UK may employ lawfare itself,
will be vulnerable to disease outbreak and and we will also need to understand how
transmission, particularly in densely-packed an adversary may use the law against us.
poorer areas. Most cities will contain ports For example, adversaries may sponsor legal
and airports – essential for access, trade actions as a way of challenging our Armed
Forces using the legal process.
55 Dr Kilcullen, D. (2014), ‘Urbanisation: A briefing to
DCDC’.


Actors
In 2035 there is likely to be growing competition between states for access to,
and influence over, ever-scarcer resources.
Traditional state-on-state conflict cannot be ruled out over the next 20 years,
but state-sponsored terror attacks, use of proxies and cyber attacks are
more likely.
Three-way engagement between militaries, non-governmental organisations
and multinational corporations will become increasingly important out
to 2035. For urban operations, engagement with city authorities will be
particularly relevant.
Extremist non-state actors will be more able to exploit a wider array of
military capabilities, using innovative tactics that exploit our inherent
vulnerabilities, including any institutional inertia. They are likely to develop
ever-higher levels of lethality to counter our protection systems and may
even have access to weapons of mass effect.
Institutions
For the UK, NATO will remain the defence alliance of choice – providing the
continued commitment to Article 5 but also the means of interoperability
with a wide range of nations that could form coalitions of the willing.
In 2035, the UN is likely to work through regional organisations to achieve its
aims, including a greater role in upstream conflict prevention. The need for
large-scale UN operations – perhaps in Africa – and the UK’s involvement in
(and possible leadership of) them should not be discounted.
Culture and identity
The growth and proliferation of social media is likely to create new forms
of identity-based ‘turbulence’ or volatility, which gain strength by their
associations. This is likely to intensify and complicate battlespaces by
broadening audiences and energising ‘causes’ for which people fight, making
pragmatic compromise harder to accept.
Social media’s readily-available open-source intelligence-gathering
advantages are likely to be used for control, manipulation and targeting.
Faith-based ideologies will continue to shape many conflicts around the
world in 2035.
Tensions arising from differences of nationality and culture and a rise in
‘identity politics’ will carry a high risk of sectarian or communal violence.
Analysis and predictive modelling of social behaviour will increasingly
support operations.

Technology
The UK and other Western militaries, probably with the exception of the US,
will almost certainly have been overtaken in some technologies by 2035,
and may need to become accustomed to being overmatched by derived
military capabilities.
By 2035, a diverse range of actors will be able to access capabilities once
restricted to just a few states. Illicit and unregulated technology transfer will
exacerbate the threat to the UK.
Technological change will accelerate, serving to highlight inadequacies in less
adaptable procurement processes within Defence.
By 2035, proliferation will enable a wider range of our potential adversaries
to deploy weapons to deny our access to, and freedom of movement within,
operational areas. The aim of our adversaries is likely to be to deter Western
powers by raising the potential cost of action.
Automated systems, including those that are armed, will proliferate over the
next 20 years. Advances in technology will almost certainly enable swarm
attacks, allowing numerous devices to act in concert. This may serve to
counter the advantage of high-end systems.
Additive manufacturing may make our logistics chain lighter. This will be
key to operating in non-permissive environments, especially when the
support chain is long, expensive or threatened. It may also allow individuals,
non-state actors and developing states the capability to produce very large
numbers of cheap, precision weapons.
By 2035, physical and cognitive performance will be artificially enhanced
via biomechanical systems such as exo-skeletons or prosthetics, wearable
devices and sensors, and memory-enhancing drugs.
Synthetic biological components may lead to new pathogens being
deliberately or accidently created and released, potentially causing or
exacerbating pandemics. By 2035, it may even be possible to create
genetic weapons.
Defence will need to understand the impact on privacy, assurance,
jurisdiction and security for data stored on any foreign based servers. Such
data servers will become an important part of critical national infrastructure,
but may not have the type of protection afforded by UK sovereignty.
By 2035, persistent real-time, multi-sensor surveillance capabilities will be
ubiquitous, cheap and passive, offering considerable advantage to a range of
actors. This will have significant implications for operational security.

Cyberspace
Cyberspace will be ubiquitous by 2035, pervading every aspect of the
physical environments to a far higher degree than today.
Dominance of global cyberspace will be impossible: states will struggle to
control cyberspace, because its infrastructure is so widely dispersed.
Cyber activity may offer a credible way to provide deterrent effect that
complies with the principle of distinction, perhaps by threatening a state’s
critical infrastructure, rendering that state open to coercion.
Electromagnetic environment
Advanced electronic warfare capabilities will be ubiquitous and proliferate to
less capable adversaries, creating a broad range of electronic warfare threats.
Countermeasures and mitigation to electronic warfare attack will be
important. Reinvigorating and exploiting attack capabilities could ensure
Defence possesses operational advantage.
Physical environment
Maintaining UK access to the global commons will be essential for ensuring
global reach, national prosperity and to deliver strategic effect.
Increasing reliance on space-based technologies will increase our
electromagnetic spectrum vulnerability, partly because enabling capabilities
are often hosted by non-UK space service providers. Every part of the UK’s
critical national infrastructure relies to some extent on space capabilities, and
this dependency will increase greatly out to 2035.
Technological advances, by 2035, will allow flight at ever-higher altitudes,
blurring further the distinction between air and space. These technologies
may stretch our ability to police international airspace and defend our
sovereign territory from the air.
For our Armed Forces, the urban environment will be one of the most
challenging areas in which to operate. Cities will be complex and
multi-dimensional. Armed forces operating in future cities will have to
consider aspects of the environment as diverse as subterranean spaces and
cyberspace. The scale of this challenge will be potentially overwhelming and
every urban centre will be unique, requiring a bespoke understanding.
The effects of climate change will be most keenly felt in densely populated
coastal cities, leading to instability and suffering.
Where cities are located on the littoral, the inherent complexities of the urban
operating environment will be amplified.
Future legal aspects
The precise understanding and applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict
may present challenges in keeping pace with technological developments,
such as wider use of more sophisticated automated systems.

Chapter 3
Implications for Defence
Introduction. FOE 35 presents a the increased likelihood of military
challenging picture of the operating support for humanitarian assistance and
environment in 20 years time, but there is disaster relief;
much Defence can do to prepare for the the importance of maintaining the ability
future. Acknowledging that we will be to reconstitute capability; and
vulnerable to a growing range of threats
agility.
is essential. We can then take decisions to
mitigate these vulnerabilities – developing These implications are likely to have
ways and means that will give us a better significant consequences for future force
chance of safeguarding our interests. development and are illustrated in the
diagram on page 30.
Based on the analysis in Chapters 1 and 2,
the most significant implications for Defence
in 2035 concern: The challenge
the increased and vital importance of the Chapter 1 highlighted that Defence will
‘understand’ function; provide enduring support to the UK’s
technology and the utility of remote and National Security Strategy by protecting the
automated systems; UK mainland, our Overseas Territories and
citizens abroad; shaping the international
the need to overcome anti-access and environment through proactive global
area denial capabilities; engagement and capacity building; and
the urban and littoral challenge; responding to crises by projecting military
the blurring of UK mainland and overseas power. The characteristics of the future
threats; operating environment described in

Chapter 2 indicate both significant threats

and opportunities for Defence. On the basis The increased importance
of that analysis, FOE 35 suggests that our
immediate priorities should be: developing
of the ‘understand’
the required capability to generate and function
improve levels of understanding; a focus
Generating understanding. Achieving a
on the defence of the UK mainland; and
nuanced understanding of the operating
investment in emerging technologies,
environment will be more challenging – and
especially automated systems. To underpin
more important – out to 2035. Defence’s
conventional deterrence, for enduring
capacity to collect and process useful
campaigns and in mitigation of existential
intelligence lawfully from amongst a vast
threats, Defence must also focus on
and growing volume of information will be
reconstitution. Specifically, those capabilities
a key technical challenge over the next 20
that underpin the creation of greater force
years. It may be able to meet at least part
elements, particularly when the level of
of that challenge by using the sophisticated
response required exceeds our ability to
techniques of Big Data analytics.
do so with the core force. Thereafter, as
we move into 2035, we will need to exploit Although technology developments will
our new levels of understanding and offer opportunities, they will not provide
develop capabilities to meet a spectrum of the whole answer to the problems of the
challenges, from humanitarian aid operations future operating environment. Indeed, an
to overcoming complex anti-access and area over reliance on technical solutions may
denial threats, and operations in evermore undermine the ability of our personnel to
challenging urban environments. learn from, and adapt to, the challenges
they face and then exploit them to our
advantage. We will need to possess greater
Core characteristics
Technology
capable industrial base; responsive acquisition and resilience.
conventional deterrence; education; self-reliance; enhanced
joint action; interoperability and integration; research and a
novel means of generating mass and scale; an emphasis on
Deliver an agile and responsive force underpinned by:
• Fully exploit novel weapons and automated and remote systems

institutional agility; the ability to reconstitute, including
Generating a breadth and depth of understanding,
• Develop cyberspace operations to become a core activity
Access
• Mitigate the anti-access and area denial challenge to maintain
Cross-cutting requirement
The rate and span of change
using all available means
freedom of manoeuvre
Core drivers
Blurring of UK and overseas threats

• Identify and anticipate the complex challenges of: natural and
man-made threats; state and non-state actors, including extremists,
terrorists and criminals; cyberspace; and high- and low-end technology
The urban and littoral challenge

• Generate sufficient capability optimised for urban and littoral
operations
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

• Agree our role in relation to other departments and institutions

awareness of local and regional politics, to mask their true intentions, motivations or
law, human persuasion, behaviour and threats they pose.
culture, supplemented by a broad range
of experiences. Opportunities for overseas Understanding our own vulnerabilities.
engagement, further education and cultural A nuanced understanding of the operating
immersion will be just some of the ways this environment will need to include a full
can be achieved. Our diasporas will provide understanding of our own vulnerabilities.
a crucial source of knowledge. As a priority, With the blurring of the overseas and
Defence should access them through mainland threats, and the pervasive nature
recruiting and engagement opportunities. of cyber and space, the UK’s critical national
Defence needs to acknowledge that building and military infrastructure will become
the required level of understanding takes increasingly vulnerable; Defence must identify
time and this will have to occur in a highly and mitigate against such associated risks.
competitive and volatile space. This will
“
require genuine investment and, hence,
traditional attitudes towards career timelines
Remote and automated
and promotion are unlikely to be adequate. systems The
Defence’s ability to share understanding, and The proliferation of automated systems, and proliferation
be informed by others, will make it easier to their use by a variety of actors, will spawn of automated
operate in areas and regions that are outside a diverse range of applications across all systems and
our own experiences, greatly enhancing environments in 2035. In some applications
their utility will be optimised through
their use by
our future utility. To do this we will need
to change our ethos and behaviour, which augmenting human activity, while other a variety of
may often be at odds with our current applications may drive the replacement of actors will
requirements for operations security and humans. Their increased use in combat and spawn a
secrecy. The understanding that Defence support functions will reduce the risk to diverse range
generates must be shared as widely as of applications
possible, not only across UK Government,
but also between our key allies and partners, across all
with whom we will need to develop more environments
expansive sharing protocols. in 2035.
Better understanding and intelligence, if
exploited, will allow us to operate with
greater precision at the operational and
strategic level. It will also allow our senior
decision-makers to offer better military
”
advice and more informed options. An
increased level of understanding will enable
more informed and effective employment
of our Armed Forces. It will also be
fundamental in underpinning conventional
and nuclear deterrence as well as coercion.
Coercion will become increasingly important
in the face of emerging threats from state
and non-state actors. But this must come
with some caveats – our understanding
and intelligence will always be imperfect.
Others, including potential adversaries, will
be competing in the same single information
Optimising the human/machine interface...
environment, and may use ambiguous means

“
military personnel and thereby potentially freedom of manoeuvre and action, and our
change the threshold for the use of force. options for projecting power in response
Defence Fewer casualties may lower political risk to crises.
will need to and any public reticence for a military
be able to response, as could an increase in precision
targeting – which may reduce the impact The urban and
overcome the
challenges
on civilians. Automated systems offer
almost unlimited potential, yet using them
littoral challenge
posed by is likely to be more constrained by legal and Projecting military power into an urban
anti-access ethical concerns than by the limits of the environment (whether it is from maritime,
and area technology itself. However, some actors may land, air, cyberspace or the electromagnetic
not be bound by such concerns, potentially spectrum) will remain fraught with
denial, possibly difficulties, particularly in the littoral.
developing combat systems that may target
fighting to people indiscriminately. We may need novel ways and means to
gain access overcome them.
to the global Automated combat systems are likely to
be developed along two different paths: A range of state and non-state actors may
commons...
”
high-end, multi-role, exquisite capabilities deny our freedom to operate in highly
that seek to emulate and potentially replace congested environments. The scale of civil
high-end manned systems; and low-end maritime, air, land and information traffic in
systems that are highly specialised and limited 2035 is likely to be significant, especially if we
to one or two missions. High-end systems require access to commercial ports, airports
could be more challenging to develop (and and communication nodes from which to
more expensive to procure and operate) mount further operations. The competition
than manned systems. Conversely, low-end for freedom to base, operate and manoeuvre
systems may be better able to rapidly will be more challenging than today, as
exploit technology to fulfil new and specific will the challenges and consequences of
operational requirements. Defence will need operating in future cities.
to make exploiting emerging technology and
capability in automated systems a priority, as This may require us to conduct more of our
well as countering our opponents’ systems. activity remotely, or from a stand-off location,
so that we do not become embroiled in
lengthy and intensive urban operations.
Access, anti-access and On occasion, however, we may have no
choice but to operate in an urban area. This
area denial will be particularly true if our Armed Forces
The proliferation of weapons technology will are called upon to conduct a non-combatant
mean that many future adversaries will have evacuation operation, hostage rescue
capabilities designed to prevent our access or support a humanitarian operation
to the maritime, land, air, space, cyberspace within a city.
and electromagnetic environments. Defence
will need to be able to overcome the
challenges posed by anti-access and area
Blurring of UK and
denial, possibly fighting to gain access to the
global commons before further action can
overseas threats
take place. The range and survivability of Out to 2035, the UK mainland may need to
our systems and bases will become a critical be defended from a broad range of natural
factor. Investment in niche capabilities that and man-made threats, especially as those
exploit weakness in anti-access and area threats blur between state and non-state
denial systems will be required. Mitigating actors. Threats from terrorism will remain
the risks associated with these capabilities and may become more severe as our
will be essential if we are to maintain our adversaries exploit greater connectivity.

Our Armed Forces will still be expected to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations
The continuing drive to perform a develop adaptable countermeasures

‘spectacular’ attack, enabled by increased and situational awareness. Appropriately
proliferation, may mean the threat from targeted recruitment, education, training and
weaponised chemical, biological, radiological retention of personnel for cyber operations
or possibly nuclear agents will endure will be key, acknowledging that this will be a
and could increase. However, due to the mainstream activity.
inherent difficulty in conducting a mass
casualty attack involving chemical, biological,
radiological or even nuclear weapons, Humanitarian assistance
future terrorist attacks are more likely to be
low-tech and well-coordinated, perhaps
and disaster relief
including small arms and conventional The UK will be affected by more severe and
explosive devices. However, in 2035 we frequent weather events as a result of climate
will need to be mindful of empowered change. Such events could overwhelm local
and well-resourced terrorists able to resources, necessitating military support.
exploit the potential offered by There will be an enduring need for our
sophisticated technology. Armed Forces to provide niche capabilities
such as logistics and engineering capabilities
Given the ubiquitous and pervasive across all three Services. Defence may also
nature of cyberspace in 2035, threats will be required to generate a ready supply of
come from a range of actors, targeting manpower or use war-fighting equipment in
intellectual property as well as critical novel ways to aid the civilian population.
national infrastructure, such as data
servers. Countering the growing cyber More intense, frequent and longer extreme
threat will be critical to safeguarding climatic events will not only affect the UK out
economic prosperity and national security. to 2035. Humanitarian disasters across the
Government and industry will need to world will increasingly result from climate

“
change. Our Armed Forces, especially if mass effect and scale of effort in areas where
forward deployed, could be expected to our Armed Forces have potential deficits.
...humanitarian assist our allies and partners, most probably Reconstitution is one avenue of potentially
assistance and in support of other UK Government achieving this, provided all key elements are
disaster relief departments and non-governmental available. Others include: leveraging the
organisations. This assistance is likely to capabilities of our allies, particularly where
operations take the form of providing security, access, our interests coincide; and technological
may become lift and niche capabilities. Consequently, solutions, such as using large quantities of
more common humanitarian assistance and disaster relief low-cost automated systems. Mass effect
in 2035... operations may become more common in can also be delivered in cyberspace. In the
”
2035 than they are today. timeframe of 2035, Defence may need a
combination of all these.
Reconstitution
It is possible that there may be future Agility
state-on-state conflicts in which the UK Key to future success is agility, which
could be involved. In the event that an comprises adaptability and flexibility in both
unexpected existential threat emerges, capability and approach, and specifically in
our Armed Forces must have sufficient terms of our thinking. To adapt is to adjust
resilience within their structures, processes to new conditions and the ability to do this
and capabilities to be able to reconstitute quicker than our adversaries has always been
additional forces. Regeneration of important. Defence will need to become
capability by using Reserve forces will be a more effective learning organisation:
important, but we also need to be able to adjusting, responding and exploiting quickly
grow additional forces to create sustained in the face of a wider range of threats in an
resilience. The key elements of being able to increasingly volatile environment. Adaption
reconstitute will be: will be vital at all levels and in all activities
to overcome the rapidly developing and
sufficient ‘seed corn’ expertise, capable of varied technological, physical, cultural and
organising, training and educating new institutional challenges we will face in 2035.
and reserve units;
enough real estate, platforms and Human capability. Military strength
logistics to train the required personnel has traditionally been expressed in terms
and units on time; of equipment and uniformed personnel
numbers.56 Increasingly, military strength will
access to sufficient industrial capacity;
be expressed in terms of human capability
good links to industry, with an urgent across the Whole Force, and establishing
operational requirement purchasing the right mix of regulars, reserves, civilians
system that can provide additional and contractors will be critical. ‘Generation
platforms and equipment quickly Alpha’ – the young children of today who
(off-the-shelf where necessary); will become the potential recruits of 2035
the command and control structure – are likely to seek a portfolio approach to
to lead and direct reconstitution; and, career development. As our most important
where possible, asset becomes harder to recruit and retain
a national early warning system that in the future, Defence will need to access
can give us sufficient notice to take the
decision to reconstitute.
56 Publishers such as International Institute of
Generating mass effect and scale. In a Strategic Studies and Janes publish annual
state-on-state conflict or in an enduring assessments of military strength, with detailed
campaign, Defence may still need to deliver numerical statistics of equipment and personnel,
for example, the International Institute of
Strategic Studies ‘The Military Balance’.

The need to operate in austere environments will endure
the human potential they offer to maintain flexibly meet novel threats with suitably
our capability advantage. We will have to structured, trained and ready forces. The
compete in a global employment market ability to adapt at the tactical level will
where competition for talent is likely to be require highly trained, educated and
high. Having been recruited and received motivated Service personnel with a range
training, our personnel will require an agile of equipment and technology optimised
mind to face the challenges ahead. for the varied missions we may be asked
to deliver.
Young people will be increasingly ‘tech
savvy’ as users, but they may lack the Operating in austere environments.
know-how required to master the technical Our ability to operate in more austere
skills to engineer or programme systems. environments will remain essential in 2035.
The training requirements to keep pace Violent conflict and natural disasters will
with technology will be considerable. In continue to test the infrastructure and
particular, the critical role of networks and services many take for granted, in some
exploiting the information they bear will cases reducing the capacity of a host-nation
be a major challenge: it will require human to support deployed operations. Maximising
innovation, not just technological ones. our ability to be self-reliant, for what may
Our challenge will be to recruit and develop be extended periods of time, will be critical.
people who are comfortable with change Fully exploiting our overseas bases and
and can adapt as necessary. sea-basing, partnerships and alliances will
be an essential part of managing these
Education. Defence needs to become sustainment and austerity challenges, to gain
a better learning organisation that can and maintain theatre access. Technological
quickly adapt at the strategic level. At the solutions, particularly automation, additive
operational level, Defence must rapidly and

Credit: Aircraft Carrier Alliance

By 2035,
increased
global
connectivity
will mean
that any
unintended
consequences
of our joint
actions may
be more
far-reaching
and
damaging
than
previously
Projecting military power out to 2035 and beyond
envisaged.
” manufacturing and efficient forms of

propulsion and power generation will also
play a key role, as will the robustness of our
people and equipment.
more often and exploit collective efficiencies.
Exchanging personnel should not be limited
to exchanges between the Services but
more broadly; with the Diplomatic Service,
other UK Government departments and even
Enhancing joint action. Joint action is with the private sector. The flexibility innate
executed across all environments to affect in military command structures should be used
the capabilities and understanding of our more progressively, empowering commanders
adversaries, allowing us to impact their to develop their people in innovative ways
decision-making. Deterrence and coercion within the context of the Joint Force.
are key current examples of such action,
but fully exploiting cyberspace and the By 2035, increased global connectivity will
electromagnetic spectrum will be increasingly mean that any unintended consequences of
vital in pursuit of effective joint action in 2035. our joint actions may be more far-reaching
Our access and freedom of action within and damaging than previously envisaged.
them will be critical to operational success Conversely, there will be positive unintended
and overcoming anti-access and area denial. consequences and we must have the
Similarly our adversaries are likely to increase agility to exploit these to the fullest extent
their use of non-lethal methods across the across the whole joint spectrum, through
whole spectrum of joint activity (from direct both decentralised execution and mission
attacks to psychological operations), affecting command.
our own perceptions of the operating
environment and our behaviours within Interoperability and integration. In
it. Any mistakes we make are likely to be a multipolar world, future alliances and
ruthlessly exploited. partnerships are likely to be more dynamic.
New threats and crises will emerge
To enhance the potential of joint action, we quickly, often requiring the intervention
must train together, exchange personnel of departments across UK Government,

“
working with civil society. Existing alliances focuses on looking for opportunities in
and partnerships will remain important, technology and simultaneously seeking to
particularly NATO, but more ad hoc coalitions reduce the cost of delivering capabilities With a more
consisting of new partners, are likely to will be important. Defence will need to
diverse range
emerge to tackle specific crises. In 2035, we balance current programmes with long-term
will be presented with a more diverse and speculative research which may deliver no of actors
blurred mosaic of state and non-state actors, immediate exploitation.57 Technological and threats,
including non-governmental organisations, horizon scanning may help us to understand deterrence
large multinational corporations and private the changing context for future operations will become
security contractors. With more states and trends in technology development. increasingly
capable of intervention, more state agencies Risk will require to be mitigated in those
complicated.
”
will be involved in future crises. In these areas where we choose not to invest, or to
circumstances, our ability to integrate and invest less, by leveraging investment and
be interoperable with ad hoc coalitions influence with our allies and partners. A
and partnerships, spanning a range of coordinated (burden sharing) approach with
technological capabilities and actors, will allies may also allow broader harnessing of
be a key factor in success. UK Defence new technologies and capabilities. Similarly,
may be called upon to take part in, or lead, Defence will also need to forge strong links
such arrangements. with relevant civil areas of expertise.
Greater emphasis on conventional We are likely to use this knowledge to shape

deterrence. Defence’s primary tasks include our future capabilities. For example, by 2035,
deterring, containing and defeating threats fuel cells are likely to be cheap, lightweight
to the UK, its Overseas Territories, citizens and and compact (even wearable). Non-contact
interests. A key part of this deterrence is our power transfer to personnel, remote sensors
ability to project power using conventional or platforms will be widespread. Bio-fuels
means. Our people, force structures and could be available from locally-grown
capabilities must be both credible and materials or extracted from waste products.
capable of delivering this conventional Solar power generated from rucksack-sized
deterrence at the right time and place; this collapsible panels could recharge small devices.
capability must also be communicated.
With a more diverse range of actors and Wearable devices with multiple sensors or
threats, deterrence will become increasingly biological markers could augment sensory
complicated. We must therefore be capable data through new human-sensor interfaces
of meeting the most likely conventional and (Google Glass is a present-day example).
unconventional threats, with forces balanced High-energy lasers may provide air defence
accordingly. By 2035, this may not look like and possibly anti-satellite roles; precise
the balanced force of today – but we must non-lethal engagement will also be possible.
be agile enough to evolve. Radio frequency weapons will also have the
potential for persistent disruption or damage
Research and industrial base. Knowledge to electronically sophisticated equipment.
of technology will not be geographically Advanced sensors will detect difficult targets
distributed evenly in 2035. The last few (camouflaged, under foliage or in a cluttered
decades have seen rapid military urban environment) or distinguish decoys,
de-industrialisation of the UK. Our reliance and be adaptive for all-weather or degraded
on foreign suppliers and strategic, political atmospheric conditions.
and industrial partnerships has reduced
our independence. The UK will require access to, and an
understanding of, global science and
Defence will need to track future
technologies that may offer new capabilities
or pose threats. Instilling a culture that 57 UK Ministry of Defence. (2012), ‘National Security
Through Technology: Technology, Equipment and
Support for UK Defence and Security’.

“
In 2035
long-term
equipment
plans may
no longer be
viable...
”
technology information to inform national Future models for acquisition will require
strategies, educate people technically collaboration between Defence, programme
and develop our industry. The skills and managers, platform builders and a wide
strengths of the UK science and technology customer base to reduce development
community will play a greater role in costs, mitigate programme risks and
the Whole Force concept. Delivering share expertise. Effectively exploiting
basic and technical skills, in particular ‘system-houses’ (organisations that
resource availability and cost, will continue blend technologies and ideas to create
to cause challenges. We may also need new concepts) will offer advantages and
to review inadvertent education of efficiencies. ‘Plug and play’ architectures that
potential competitors. enable rapid modular upgrades will allow
an improved response to new threats and
Radical reform of our acquisition process. mitigate the risk of obsolescence with
In 2035, long-term equipment plans – with long-term equipment plans. A second,
10 to 20 year development programmes for parallel, highly responsive and adaptable
30 to 50 year life cycles – may no longer be acquisition process that deters potential
viable given the rate at which future threats non-peer adversaries will be needed to
will evolve. Defence must be prepared to contend with sudden and unexpected
tailor and adapt its forces for each campaign, events. This will also serve to generate
using new acquisition models where new capabilities and greater capacity
required. This may also involve adapting more quickly, outside the core equipment
and modifying existing equipment and its programme – even though such capabilities
current use in novel ways. Understanding may only be required for a specific purpose.
and intelligence will be vital to provide
sufficient warning time as threats emerge or Pursuing niche technological dominance
evolve. Defence will also need to be better will need to be constantly assessed and
able to understand and exploit the potential balanced against cheap, often commercial,
of emerging civil and defence technologies, low-tech systems that provide effective,
with agile and adaptive continuous and sometimes asymmetric, capability.
development of capabilities. It will be Constrained budgets will demand that
critical that capabilities respond to military Defence balances the cost of current
operational need and are supported by capability against a range of possible new
a modern and competitive defence threats. Again, this will require a highly agile
industrial base. procurement process.

Establishing resilience. Ensuring

system and infrastructure resilience
against disruption, and retaining sufficient
reversionary modes, will be critical out to
2035. Technological disruption is likely to
have an increasing impact on space and
cyberspace services and infrastructure.
Cyber resilience could be improved by
developing greater shared awareness of
threats across Government, industry and
allies. Ascertaining the UK’s dependence,
interdependence and co-dependence will be
necessary to understand our true vulnerability.
Defence is likely to increasingly rely on
commercial off-the-shelf systems, which
must be protected from disruption and meet
military hardening standards. Resilience will
be delivered by more than just technology.
Regular combined exercises could test and
improve systems and infrastructure, and
ensure that we train in reversionary modes.
Conclusion
With rising equipment and personnel costs
there will be difficult choices for Defence
over the next 20 years. The UK will still need Generating mass in the future?
the military capabilities to act unilaterally
to protect the mainland and Overseas
as lawfully exploiting new technologies
Territories. The range of threats to the UK
such as Big Data analytics. Understanding
mainland are likely to be far more diverse
will also underpin both conventional and
and ambiguous than today from traditional
nuclear deterrence. Attaining this level of
threats such as chemical, biological,
understanding, partly through proactive
radiological and nuclear, ballistic missile
forward engagement and peacetime
attack and natural disasters to hacktivists and
military posture, will support the UK’s efforts
offensive cyber. This indicates a continuing –
to shape the international environment
and potentially increasing – role for Defence
and support the UK’s wider prosperity.
in assisting civil authorities to ensure the
But we must also apply and exploit this
safety of the UK population and protect
understanding.
critical national infrastructure. We will also
need to retain our ability to evacuate UK Along with deterrence and forward
personnel from overseas, which in extremis engagement, the UK will need the capability
is still likely to require military means. to respond to events and project power
overseas to protect UK interests – either
The future calls for a far greater
alone or with allies. These operations
understanding of the potential operating
could be described as ‘forward defence’
environment. Understanding goes
– because they aim to prevent escalation
beyond gaining intelligence – and the
and reduce, or eliminate, the threat to the
military will have a role in developing that
UK or our interests. In the future operating
understanding, through both traditional
environment these responses will be more
means such as human intelligence, as well
challenging. The proliferation of technology

and advanced weapons systems will of support infrastructure and maintain our
provide many more states with effective freedom of action. These flexible logistic
anti-access and area denial capabilities hubs will allow us to operate across a range
that will impact on operations in every of activities, from conflict to humanitarian
environment. Defence will need to be and peace support operations.
able to mitigate these risks and overcome
defence systems to deliver the required Finally, the UK will need to consider how
effects. This will call for the innovative use it might reconstitute sufficient capability,
of cyber, precision and stand-off weapons, for example, to conduct state-on-state
as well as stealth, layered defence and conflict alongside its coalition partners.
automated systems – across land, sea, air Maintaining command and control, and
and cyberspace. These capabilities are niche capabilities, including joint enablers,
likely to offer significant utility in attritional supported by an adaptable and flexible
circumstances. Flexible joint logistic hubs industrial base and conceptual development,
(including the use of forward bases and will be key.
sea basing) – may reduce the vulnerability

The proliferation of military technology amongst potential adversaries
means that our key systems may be vulnerable to technical exploitation or
capability overmatch.
Understanding will be fundamental in underpinning conventional and
nuclear deterrence as well as coercion.
The UK mainland will face a broad range of natural and man-made threats.
It will be increasingly difficult to distinguish between threats from state and
non-state actors.
In the unlikely event that an existential threat to the UK emerges,
mechanisms will need to be in place to provide warning and rapidly
reconstitute sufficient forces to respond.
Achieving a nuanced understanding of the operating environment will be
more challenging – and more important – out to 2035.
Future systems must be able to operate and survive, at range, against more
sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities.
Interoperability and adaptability will be crucial as bespoke alliances and
partnerships become more important, both between nations and with
non-state actors.
Very long-term, inflexible procurement processes will no longer
be sustainable.
Increasingly, military strength will be expressed in terms of human
capability across the Whole Force, and establishing the right mix of
regulars, reserves, civilians and contractors will be critical.

A commander’s perspective: 2035
The operational commander in 2035 will
need to be as focused on cyber as on
traditional environmental factors; it will be a
mainstream element of joint and ‘combined
arms’ operations. A rebalancing of our
environmental focus and capabilities over
the next 20 years may be needed because
operational activity in 2035 will differ. It will
be more varied because threats in the future
are likely to come from a greater variety of
sources: some novel and some more potent
in relation to the actor’s status. Some threats
will be more complex and ambiguous, whilst
others may still emanate from the barrel
of the AK-47. Attacks may be launched by
civilians, such as hactivists concealed in cities
far from an operational theatre who may
seek to disrupt ongoing operations or attack
critical national infrastructure, perhaps out
of pure mischief. Swarm attacks could be
more prevalent, launched in the physical
environment through a combination of
mass, low technology and automated
systems, demanding a response to deal with
the high number of targets presented. But
in the virtual environment, swarm attacks
could be planned through crowd-sourcing
before being executed through multiple
access points in multiple countries, making
deterrence and defence against them almost they are likely to be able to exploit porous
impossible. These could be orchestrated borders more readily. So, the operational
by terrorists, who could equally draw upon commander must seek even more clarity on
conventional legacy equipment, additive potential threats because of the increased
printed weaponry or perhaps weapons complexity and ambiguity of the future
of mass effect. Attacks may also come in operational environment. The commander
the form of increasingly highly automated may, for example, be required to monitor
systems or ballistic missiles. social media in real time to judge social and
human dynamics, observe emerging threats
Yet more of these threats may come and even gauge and harness local public
increasingly in the form of a seemingly support for a mission. Our understanding of
unethical, unconstrained ‘collective of environments and actors must be sufficient
adversaries’. Such ‘collectives’ are likely to ensure we can protect, engage, coerce,
to morph over time, attracting allegiance deter (including by conventional means) and
of a transactional nature from all manner project military power, given the broader
of actors, from states to hactivists, armed array of potential adversaries and the
with an array of varying capabilities and complexity of environments in 2035. The as
intentions. These actors are likely to have yet unfathomed depths of cyberspace will
their own networks, which will be greater in be among those areas that require further
size and capability than is feasible today, and exploration, as a place where adversaries

may loiter – it will be of national importance catalyst for more rapidly changing events.
to ensure a response to a camouflaged cyber To contend with such dynamism, which
attack is directed at the actual perpetrator. will typify theatres increasingly due to
Big Data analytics, with its accompanying the rate of change of technology, a more
opportunities and challenges, may help increasingly agile, perhaps radical approach,
the commander pursue understanding, to may be required to policy-making to
overcome the risk of information overload. enable commanders to pursue policy ends
Increasingly powerful computers could effectively. The risk is that law and policy,
improve the ability to forecast and perhaps alongside ethical and moral considerations,
provide courses of action for the operational might lag behind thereby constraining the
commander – a capability that the adversary employment of cutting-edge technology.
might also enjoy. And yet, with the increased proliferation
of technology and information, some
While traditionally the operational adversaries will have the scope to be
commander has focused on a single increasingly agile and potent; perhaps
operational theatre, with the blurring of without the legal and moral constraints
mainland and overseas threats, attention that we are likely to face. The operational
is likely to be diverted to the UK mainland commander may seek to hold more
because of the implications of operations operational risk to attain their goals. Yet
abroad. Irrespective, the mainland, which technology trends will only serve to increase
will be more culturally complex, is likely to the potential for the compression of strategic
be more vulnerable over the next 20 years. to tactical levels. The commander may also
Threats could range from a cyber attack seek increased use of automated platforms
(citizens may, through their own personal and weapon systems to create effects:
misfortune, recognise the need to be more perhaps to create those effects previously
self-disciplined in cyberspace and may only attainable through ‘mass’, whilst
demand inbuilt defences in electronic devices minimising the risk of friendly casualties and
in the future) to a hostile non-state actor’s those of innocents through exploitation of
unmanned aerial vehicle over a major city, evermore precise weaponry.
perhaps targeting a VIP. If an attack comes
in the form of ballistic missiles, will we know In facing future threats and adversaries,
in advance what type of warhead is being particularly the ‘collective of adversaries’, the
projected by the missile? If not, how does employment of strategic communications
the UK appropriately escalate or respond will need to be increasingly agile and more
with force, or is defence the best approach? effectively targeted to contend with such
The deployed operational commander may an array. Even within such ‘collectives’,
have to have an increasing eye on mainland motivations and incentives may differ as
events, while drawing upon the knowledge of they might within an alliance or partnership.
diaspora to assist understanding of a foreign The operational commander must strive to
nationality or culture. identify these so actors can be influenced.
They will therefore require the very latest
With less time to respond to events due to a education and training to prevail in the
world increasingly interconnected, including complexity and ambiguity of the future
by social media, the risk of a miscalculated operating environment, particularly so
military response is heightened. A that emerging technologies can be
comprehensive understanding will be employed optimally.
paramount to help mitigate this risk, aided
by forward engagement and exploitation of The operational commander will require
the vast quantities of all-source information force elements to be increasingly resilient,
likely to be available in 2035. Of course, adaptable and agile. Our mindset must
any engagement by the military, even low support this, and our own forces might
level and benign in design, could be the need to be restructured more frequently

to allow opportunities to be seized. of other technologies that perhaps

Componency might hinder the execution of contribute to lowering the thresholds for
operations. But flatter command structures, military engagement, such as automated
enabled by communication developments, weapon systems. It is increasingly likely that
could provide the agility required. the commander may need to exploit certain
Fundamental exchanges could take place technologies and capabilities to fight merely
in space, denying access – with potentially to gain access to the global commons for
catastrophic impacts on communications deployment, let alone employment, of
and navigation. This is yet another force – as these are likely to be more highly
environment the operational commander contested by 2035.
will need to be increasingly cognisant of,
particularly if operating systems become So, for the operational commander, the
over reliant on space-based technologies future operating environment will be more
and therefore vulnerable to attack. complex and ambiguous, from physical to
electronic to human aspects. The jointery
There are exciting prospects ahead for of today will still be needed; but we will
operational commanders who relish such habitually be working in an even more
challenges. While these may appear combined, joint, inter-agency,
daunting, other developments may ease intra-governmental and multinational
the task in hand. Computer processing context to contend with the challenges.
power has already been mentioned. The Operations conducted thus far will look
commander may also be able to exploit relatively simple compared to some of those
lighter logistic chains, courtesy of additive required in the future operating environment
printing, or perhaps even hypersonic of 2035.
strategic air-lift. They may also make use

The ‘5Cs’
The ‘5Cs’ (congested, cluttered, contested, This may ultimately result in reducing
connected and constrained) were our legitimacy if we are unable to avoid
introduced in DCDC’s 2010 Future Character civilian casualties or other unintended
of Conflict to define the characteristics of consequences. However, new technologies
the joint battlespace in 2014. FOE 35, while may provide us with the opportunity to
recognising the utility of the ‘5Cs’ in some de-clutter the operating environment,
circumstances, recommends caution in perhaps by finding patterns in a mass of
their use. We should not assume that the information. Also, our adversaries may seek
‘5Cs’ will always apply to every environment. refuge in uncluttered remote or harsh
For example, consider an urban operating terrain, where they rely upon physical
environment that is congested (densely isolation for protection.
populated) but relatively uncluttered
(planned and orderly), or a peri-urban Contested. All environments are likely to
slum that could be uncongested (low be contested, to varying degrees, out to
density) but highly cluttered (informal 2035. The challenge will be in understanding
and disorderly). The most challenging where these contests are merely a result
urban environments are likely to be both of competition, or where they could lead
congested and cluttered-densely populated, to confrontation or conflict. Failing to
informal settlements. recognise the difference could lead to
miscalculation.
Considering ways in which the future
operating environment may – and may not Connected. The trends of interconnectivity
– be characterised by the ‘5Cs’ can provide and globalisation have resulted in dramatic
useful insights. increases in connectivity – across all
environments. This is especially evident across
Congested. All environments (land, sea, air the global commons and in cyberspace.
and space, cyber and the electromagnetic) However, these trends are not universal and
will be populated by civilian, commercial could be reversed. Therefore, the potential
and military activity. Armed forces may for operating environments to be deliberately
seek to avoid a densely populated or disconnected or simply poorly connected
congested operating environment as it will remain, even out to 2035.
limits their freedom of manoeuvre. Yet we
will need to bring military effects to bear Constrained. Our legal and societal norms
wherever they are needed – congested will continue to apply restraint to the
spaces are not always avoidable. By contrast, conduct of military operations, particularly
violent conflict and natural disasters may violent conflict, out to 2035. This will be
cause operating environments to rapidly particularly true where this applies to
decongest. Although as activity migrates new technologies such as automated
away from such areas, congestion may systems and novel weapons. Our potential
occur elsewhere. adversaries may not be so constrained, and
may operate without restraint.
Cluttered. Clutter leads to an inability to
easily distinguish individuals, items or events, Only by considering the numerous ways in
particularly in congested environments. which these characteristics interplay and
Clutter will challenge our precision and overlap, if at all, can we still apply them to
discrimination in applying military effects. the future operating environment.

Acknowledgements
Wide external consultation and review has been Research and international organisations
conducted to ensure Future Operating Environment
Brookings Institution.
2035 is both comprehensive and independent in its
Rand Europe.
view of the future. We have benefited enormously
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham
from the time and effort given generously by the
House).
individuals, organisations and institutions listed below.
Royal United Services Institution.
To all of those who contributed directly their valuable
International Institute of Strategic Studies.
knowledge and expertise – we are extremely grateful
International Committee of the Red Cross.
for your participation and regret that space does not
permit us to thank you all by name. We look forward
to working with you again in the future.
Industry
BAE Systems.
UK Government departments Boeing Defence UK.
Defence Growth Partnership.
Cabinet Office:
KBR.
National Security Secretariat. MBDA UK.
McKinsey & Company.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office:
Selex/Finmeccanica UK.
Conflict Department. Serco.
Defence and International Security Directorate. Shell.
Security Policy Department.
International defence organisations
Home Office:
Department of Defence, Australia.
Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism.
Capability Development Group.
Science, Engineering and Technology.
Joint Concepts, Defence Preparedness Branch.
Department for International Development:
Defence Force Headquarters, New Zealand.
Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department. Future Force Development, Capability Branch.
Stabilisation Unit.
Policy and Global Programmes. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Allied Command Transformation.
Academe
Department of Defence, Sweden.
Dr Tarak Barkawi, London School of Economics.
Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters.
Dr Huw Bennett, University of Aberystwyth.
Forsvarets Forsknings Institut (FOI).
Dr Phil Clark, School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London. Swedish National Defence College, Department of
Professor Paul Cornish, University of Exeter. Education, Sweden.
Professor Robert Cryer, University of Birmingham.
Dr Chris Donnelly (independent). Department of Defense, United States of America.
Dr Antulio Echeverria, Strategic Studies Institute, Joint Staff J7.
Army War College. National Intelligence Committee.
Dr Rob Johnson, Changing Character of Warfare, Naval Post Graduate School.
Oxford University. Army War College.
Professor Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics. Air War College, Air University.
Dr David Kilcullen (independent). National Defense University.
Professor Anthony King, University of Exeter. Research, Development and Engineering
William Owen (independent). Center, US Army.
Dr Patrick Porter, University of Reading.
Dr Hugo Slim, University of Oxford.
Dr David Sloggett (independent).

Contact details
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
Shrivenham
Swindon
SN6 8RF
Email: [email protected]

Notes

Notes

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Future Operating Environment 2035

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The Future Operating Environment 2035 comprises one element

This publication is the first edition of Future Operating Environment

The findings and deductions contained in this publication do not

This information is Crown copyright. The intellectual property

Future Operating Environment 2035 iiiiii

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Chapter 1 Strategic context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 2 Characteristics of the future operating environment . . . . . . . . 11

Chapter 3 Implications for Defence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

A commander’s perspective: 2035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Future Operating Environment 2035 v

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Aim commissions were produced. Subsequent

Future Operating Environment 2035 vii

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The challenge DCDC’s previous publication, the Future

viii Future Operating Environment 2035

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Future Operating Environment 2035 1

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less economically powerful state and

Demography. The global population is

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Future Operating Environment 2035 3

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Better control measures at the national

Relationships with the state. There will

Corruption and criminality. Corruption

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Although these three functions will remain

Future Operating Environment 2035 5

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As we compete within a larger peer group, UK influence could decline

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15 Nye, J. (2004), ‘Soft Power: The Means to Success

Future Operating Environment 2035 7

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Global stress map : 2035

Europe and North America

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Chapter 1 – Key points

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Future Operating Environment 2035 11

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will also persist. By 2035, extremists will

19 Hoffman, B. (1993), ‘Holy Terror: The Implications

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Future Operating Environment 2035 13