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C.

DIRECTORY STATUTES

As previously established, a directory statute has the following characteristics:

- It is permissive and discretionary in nature.


- It merely outlines an act to avoid injury.
- It can be accomplished differently from what was prescribed but may substantially have the
same result.
- It merely operates to confer the discretion of the person.
- In non-performance or irregularities, it may subject the official concerned to disciplinary or
administrative sanction.

Statutes prescribing guidance for officers.

- These statutes generally are in the form of regulations which guide officers in the conduct of
business devolved upon them.
- Designed to secure order, system and dispatch proceedings
- Its disregard may injuriously affect the rights of parties
- If accompanied by negative words, importing that the acts required shall not be done in any
other manner or time than that designated, they are to be regarded as MANDATORY

When regulations guiding officers become MANDATORY:


When the requisitions prescribed are intended for the protection of the citizen, and to prevent a
sacrifice of his property, and by a disregard of which his rights might be and generally would be
injuriously affected, they are not directory but mandatory. They must be followed or the acts done will
be invalid.

Statutes prescribing a manner of judicial action.


[To be merged]

Statutes requiring rendition of decision within prescribed period.


The Constitution (Section 15 (1), Art VIII, 1987 Constitution) provides that the maximum period
within which a case should or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall
be:
1. twenty-four (24) months for the SUPREME COURT;
2. twelve (12) months for LOWER COLLEGIATE COURTS; and
3. three (3) months for OTHER LOWER COURTS.
Constitutional time provision directory.
[to be merged]

True or False Questions:


1. When a period fixed by law is directory, it can be disregarded or ignored completely with
absolute immunity.
2. Where the contrary construction would lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences,
it should not be followed.
3. As a rule, failure to decide a case within the ninety-day period constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction against the prosecutor.

Answer Key:
1. False, Explanation: Absolute immunity cannot disregard or completely ignore such affixed
directory period.
2. True
3. False, Explanation: It is the judge that is sanctioned for failure to observe said rule.

CASE DIGESTS:

QUERUBIN v. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. L-2581, Dec. 2 1948

FIDEL C. QUERUBIN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Fourth Division) and FELIPE S.
MAMURI, respondents.

FACTS:

 Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to continue taking cognizance
of the appeal in the election case of Fidel C. Querubin vs. Felipe S. Mamuri, CA — 2843-R,
concerning the mayoralty of Ilagan, Isabela, because of the expiration of the three- month period
provided for in section 178 of the Revised Election Code.

 On May 22, 1948, the record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals.

 On August 23, 1948, petitioner led a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-
month period provided for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22,
1948, and that, consequently, the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case, invoking
to the effect the doctrine in Portillo vs. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) holding mandatory a former legal
provision that "all proceedings in electoral contest shall be terminated within one year."

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the election contest or appeal should be dismissed on the ground of loss of
jurisdiction of the court due to the expiration of the prescribed three-month period in the Revised
Electoral Code.

HOLDING:

 No. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of
hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the
constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time
provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the
system of judicial settlement of protests. As such, the petition is dismissed.

 The doctrine in the case of Portillo vs. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as
modified in the case of Cacho vs. Abad (61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme
Court "has assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which
arrived here after the expiration of the year period without any protest being made against
this practice."

BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. v. VILLAREAL


G.R. No. 181182. April 10, 2013.

BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC., petitioner, vs. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL (deceased)


substituted by Reynaldo P. Villareal, Jr.- spouse, Shekinah Marie Villareal-Azugue-daughter, Reynaldo
A. Villareal III-son, Shahani A. Villareal-daughter, and Billy Ray A. Villareal-son, respondents.

FACTS:

 Petitioner Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. (Boardwalk) is a duly organized and existing
domestic corporation engaged in the selling of ready-to-wear (RTW) merchandise.
 Respondent Elvira A. Villareal (Villareal), on the other hand, is one of Boardwalk's distributors
of RTW merchandise.
 On October 20, 2005, Boardwalk filed an Amended Complaint for replevin against Villareal
covering a 1995 Toyota Tamaraw FX, for the latter's alleged failure to pay a car loan obtained
from the former. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 160116, was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila and was assigned to Branch 27 thereof.
 MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Boardwalk, ruling that the Boardwalk (plaintiff) has the
right to the possession of the subject motor vehicle. Villareal moved for reconsideration but
failed.
 RTC of Manila, however, ruled in favor of Villareal, following her appeal and reversing the
decision of the MeTC. Boardwalk filed for reconsideration but was denied.
 After which, Boardwalk had filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review
with the Manila RTC and paid the docket fees.
 On March 7, 2007, Boardwalk then file a Petition for Review through mail with the CA but
was outrightly dismissed indicating in its disposition that the petitioner should have filed the
Motion for Extension with the CA and that the requested period of 30 days extension had
exceeded the reglementary period of 15-day period as provided in Rule 42. Moreover, the
petitioner had submitted a defective Verification and Certification against forum-shopping
due to a missing board resolution authorizing its representative signatory.
 Boardwalk thus, filed an instant Petition following the resolution.
 The petitioner argued that it should not be faulted for the error committed by its counsel's clerk in
wrongly filing the Motion for Extension and paying the docket fees with the RTC Clerk of Court
and indicating that the defective requirements were formal and not jurisdictional and thus valid.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the filed Petition for Review on the grounds that
the requirements of the Court were not jurisdictional.

HOLDING:
No. The petitioner failed to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the reglementary period and
paying the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court. These requirements are not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional, hence failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory.
"The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor [is it a component] of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.”

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