LaRace 2018 Verified Complaint-2

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
HAMPDEN, SS. LAND COURT DEPARTMENT

CA.NO.:
)
MARK A. LARACE )
TAMMY L. LARA CE )
)
Plaintiffs ) PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED
VS. ) COMPLAINT
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE )
FOR ABFC 2005-OPTI TRUST, ABFC ASSET- )
BACKED CERTIFICATES , SERIES 2005-OPTI )
AND THE CERTIFICA TEHOLDERS THEREOF, )
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, F/K/A )
HOMEWARD RESIDENTIAL, F/K/A/ AHMSI, )
F/K/A OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORP, )
BLACK KNIGHT FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC./)
F/K/A LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES, F/K/A)
FIDELITY NATIONAL FORECLOSURE )
SOLUTIONS, AND/OR FIDELITY )
INFORMATION SERVICES, INC.,; )
ASSURANT FIELD ASSET SERVICES, F/K/A )
FIELD ASSET SERVICES, INC., )
ABLITT & SCOFIELD P.C., F/K/A )
ABLITT LAW OFFICES, P.C., F/K/A )
ABLITT & CHARLTON, P.C, and )
MARTY'S REAL ESTATE )
)
Defendants )
________________ )
PREFATORY ALLEGATIONS
I. The Plaintiffs, Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") are individuals
with a usual place ofresidence at 6 Brookbum Street, Springfield, MA 01119, Hampden
County, in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
2. The Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., not in its individual capacity, but solely as trustee for
the Defendant New York Common Law Trust; ABFC 2005-OPT! TRUST, ABFC ASSET-
BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES OPT!, and the Defendant Certificateholders Thereof,
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with a principal business of8480 Stagecoach Circle. Frederick, MD 21701-4747.
3. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, fi'k/a Homeward Residential, f/k/a/ American Home Mortgage
Servicing, Inc. f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation ("Option One"), has a principal resident
agent business mailing address of Corporation Service Company, 84 State Street, Boston, MA
02109.
4. Lender Processing Services, f/k/a Fidelity National Foreclosure Solutions. ("LPS"). LPS is a
publicly traded corporation that provides mortgage services to various parties in the mortgage
industry. LPS has its principal place of business at 601Riverside Avenue Jacksonville, Florida
32204.
5. Assurant Field Asset Services, Inc., f/k/a Field Asset Services ("FAS") has a principal place of
business at 101 West Louis Henna Boulevard, Suite 400, Austin TX 78728
6. Ablitt & Scofield, P.C., f/k/a Ablitt Law Firm, f/k/a Ablitt & Charlton, P.C. ("Ablitt Law Firm")
has a principal business mailing address of 304 Cambridge Road, Woburn, MA O180 I.
7. Marty's Real Estate is a Real Estate Broker with a principle business address within the
Commonwealth of 200 Center Street, Suite 17C, Ludlow, MA 01056
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
8. Based upon the Law of the Case, the Defendant Trustee was/were an improper party(s) to act
under statute, at the time of the Defendant(s) June 2007 publications of auction or at the time of
the void foreclosure auction sale.
9. Defendants now rely on a purported second publication, where they seek to renew their failed
2008 attempt to utilize the statutory remedy as against Plaintiffs' under G.L. c. 244, §14, G.L. c.
183, §21, as well as the terms of the Plaintiffs' mortgage contract and further Massachusetts law
and regulation.
10. Plaintiffs also now rely upon a purported March 07, 2012 "assignment" that was never part of
any previous litigation between the parties, see Exhibit Z, at Bates LaRace-0322.
11. Defendants claim that the above 2012 purported "assignment" "confirms" the earlier 5/7/2008
assignment, [see "Certification" sent to Plaintiffs, at Exhibit Y, at Bates LaRace-0315, at*]
12. The above assignment conflicts with the President of the purported "assignor" sworn statement
under the penalties of perjury that as of March 18, 2009, Sand Canyon was no longer engaged in
mortgage servicing, not owned any mortgage loans, [see Exhibit Z, at Bates LaRace-0324]
13. There has never been any determination as to the Defendants claim that it rightfully possesses
ownership of the right of enforcement of Plaintiffs' note and mortgage.
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14. There has never been any judicial determination that Defendants have rightfully established that
the currently have met all revised statutory condition precedents to utilize G.L, c. 244, §14.
15. There has never been any judicial determination that purported Defendant foreclosing entity has
established that it possesses authority as a real party in interest to enforce the Plaintiffs' note
and/or mortgage.
16. In Plaintiff previous matter before this Court in 2009, it identified several issues related to the
Defendants' claims of ownership of the right to enforce Plaintiffs' Note and Mortgage, which
remain unexamined and undecided.
17. In Plaintiff previous matter before this Court in 2012 [that was subsequently removed to the
USDC], Under authority of Abate v. Fremont Investment & Loan, 470 Mass. 821 (2015),
Plaintiffs never had standing to bring their try title action under G.L. c. 240, §§ 1-5, where there
was never been any completed foreclosure auction sale, precluding the Plaintiffs from ever
invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.
18. Thus, Plaintiffs' try title action was a nullity.
19. Defendant(s) now further seek to initiate a new and completely distinct current 2018 wrongful
attempt to utilize the non-judicial foreclosure process against the Plaintiffs under G.L. c. 244, §
14,
20. The Massachusetts Land Court does not have the subject matter jurisdiction to entertain some of
the Plaintiffs' claims within the instant complaint, currently before this Court.
21. Plaintiffs herein will seek to have the Land Court Judge appointed to sit as a Superior Court
Department Judge to have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs' claims that are
outside the jurisdiction of the Land Court.
22. Unlike Plaintiffs' recent litigation related to claims associated with the wrongful 2008
foreclosure auction of their home, Plaintiffs' claims here are based upon the Defendants failure
to establish that they/it ever held the legal right to utilize the statutory remedy as against
Plaintiffs.
23. Unlike Plaintiffs' 2009, or recent, litigation related to claims associated with the wrongful 2008
foreclosure auction of their home, Plaintiffs' claims here are based upon the Defendants failure
to establish that they/it ever held the legal right to enforce Plaintiffs' Note and or the security
instrument mortgage related thereto.
24. Thus, res judicata does not apply to Plaintiffs claims within the instant complaint, as Plaintiffs
never had the opportunity to litigate Defendants' claim to be a proper party to currently utilize
the statutory remedy under the revised [post Eaton] construction ofG.L. c. 244, § 14.
25. Plaintiffs previous lawsuit only sought damages from the wrongful 2008 auction, and failed
appeal therefrom, was solely based upon the existing rulings at that time, none of which ever
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opined on whether the Defendants ultimately possessed standing to claim as a real party in
interest to enforce Plaintiffs' Note or mortgage.
26. The examination under G.L. c. 244, § 14 has now changed since the previous examination of that
statute by the SJC in U.S. Bank Nat'! Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011), as a result of the
later SJC ruling in Eaton v. Fed Nat'! Mortgage Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569 (2012), and therefore
Plaintiffs or no court examined issues relative to Plaintiffs' note within the context of G.L. c.
244, § I 4, as now required under revised statutory construction and interpretation.
27. Plaintiffs will establish that Defendants cannot satisfy their burden to show that all necessary
[and revised] strict statutory requirements have been complied with under Defendants continued
wrongful attempt to divest Plaintiffs from their family home.
28. In the alternative, Plaintiffs will also show that Defendants cannot show that they/it have/has any
demonstrable right to enforce Plaintiffs' Note, and therefore as a result cannot enforce the power
of sale under 122 of the Plaintiffs' mortgage contract.
29. Plaintiffs will also show that Defendants accelerated the "maturity date" of Plaintiffs Note in
2008, and never filed any extension under the requirements of G.L. c. 260, §33, subjecting
Defendants to the statutory provisions of the "Obsolete Mortgage" statute.
30. Plaintiffs will also show that Defendants also failed to comply with 209 C.M.R. 18.21A(2)(c),
where there was never any "Certification" provided by Defendants to Plaintiffs with regard to the
chain of title to Plaintiffs' note from the time of the recordation of the original mortgage through
to the foreclosing claimant.
31. Plaintiffs will also show that Defendants failed to comply with 209 C.M.R. 18.21A(2)(c), where
there was never any "Certification" provided to Plaintiffs with regard to the chain of title to their
note from the time of the recordation of the original mortgage through to the foreclosing
claimant at the time of receipt of the mandatory notice of auction sale under G.L. c. 244, § 14.
32. On the above basis, Plaintiffs will establish the foundational predicates for the entirety of their
claims against Defendants and their continued and ongoing attempt(s) to wrongfully remove
Plaintiffs from their premises
FACTS
33. On June 14, 2007, June 21, 2007, and June 28, 2007, under the direction of Defendant Black
Knight Financial/LPS foreclosure and bankruptcy solutions and/or Defendant Option One
Mortgage Corporation, Defendant Ablitt Law Firm on behalf of Defendant Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., as Trustee for the Defendant ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT, and its
beneficial Certificateholders, ("the Trustee") intentionally caused legally void publication(s) in
the Boston Globe; of a purported Notice of Mortgagee's Sale of Real Estate, concerning the
Plaintiffs' Premises. (See Exhibit A at LARACE-0002).
34. On June 17, 2007, Plaintiffs received an offer to purchase the Premises, in the amount of
$140,000.00, from one Brian Hebert, that also contained a Pre-Qualification approval from First
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Financial Lending Corporation for Mr. Hebert for a $170,000.00 mortgage loan, along with a
$500.00 deposit check (See Exhibit B at LARACE-0006-0009).
35. On July 05, 2007, Brian Hebert also executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement, accompanied by
an additional deposit in the amount of$1,000.00 earnest money. (See Exhibit Cat LARACE-
0011-0018).
36. On July 10, 2007, Plaintiffs', through their attorney, Bethzadia Sanabria-Vega, faxed the above
information to Option One Mortgage Corporation, (See Exhibit D at LARACE-0020-0030).
37. Option One never responded to the Plaintiffs' offer.
38. After almost one year of intentional delay, on July 05, 2008, Defendant(s), instead, intentionally
elected to conduct the void foreclosure auction of the Premises, where the Defendant Trustee
was the purported "highest bidder" at the said void foreclosure auction sale, in the amount of
$120,397.03 (See Foreclosure Deed at Exhibit E, at LARACE-0032).
39. The Defendant Trustee intentionally elected to go forward with the attempted "sale" of
Plaintiffs' premises, for $120,397.03, which completely ignored the Plaintiffs' liability under a
second mortgage that would have been satisfied from the executed Purchase and Sale agreement.
40. Option One Mortgage Company intentionally elected to ignore the Plaintiffs' presentment of Mr.
Hebert's offer to purchase the Premises for $140,000.00.
4 I. The intentional actions of Defendant(s) above; by failing to halt the foreclosure process, and
intentional election to ignore the bid of Mr. Hebert, were clearly not undertaken in the best
interest(s) of the Plaintiff mortgagors.
42. The Defendant(s) failure to have recorded a proper assignment at the time of the purported
foreclosure auction sale, also further chilled any active bidding on the Premises (See Transcript
of2008 hearing, at Exhibit M, at (LARACE-0112, LARACE-0115-0116).
43. By refusing to acknowledge Brian Hebert's fully prequalified offer of$140,000.00, Defendant(s)
intentionally failed to act in the best interest(s) of Plaintiffs, proximately causing them to suffer
the loss of the opportunity to extricate themselves from the potential foreclosure, reduce any
deficiency, and avoid the damages that have occurred related thereto.
44. During the intentionally filed 2008 wrongful quiet title action brought by Defendant(s) in the
Land Court, Defendant(s), through its/their counsel admitted that Defendant(s), in fact, had
scienter that their purported "highest bid" of $120,397.03, was for significantly less than the then
market value" of the Premises of $145,000.00. (See Exhibit J, at LARACE-0086, n. 44), see also
the "bidding instructions" at Exhibit L, at LARACE-0097). See also, the Land Court opinion at
Exhibit I, at LARACE-0047-0048.)
45. The Land Court Judge astutely observed precisely how "bidding the value of the mortgage" at
auction is only done in the best interests of Defendant(s), and not Plaintiffs as required under the
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historical ratio decidendi of the Commonwealth as enunciated in Sandler v. Silk 292 Mass. 493
(1934) (See Exhibit I, at LARACE-0054)
46. Defendant Ablitt Law Firm made the intentionally false inference to the Land Court Judge, that
the bid of $120,397.03 did not subject the Plaintiffs to any "deficiency judgment". (See Exhibit
M, at LARACE-0112).
4 7. Defendant Ablitt Law Firm intentionally failed to disclose the presence of a full priced offer to
purchase the premises for $140,000.00, which would have entitled the Plaintiffs' to a surplus
48. On May 12. 2008, Defendant Option One Mortgage Corporation as purported "Attorney In Fact"
through Defendant Ablitt Law Firm intentionally further caused to be placed upon the Plaintiffs'
title to the Premises at the Hampden County Registry of Deeds; a legally void "Foreclosure Deed
by Corporation", purportedly executed on May 07, 2008, and recorded on at Book 17291 Page
87. (See Exhibit D).
49. The above referenced purported "Foreclosure Deed by Corporation" and "Affidavit of Sale",
intentionally, and falsely assert in a "publication" that said document "complies with G.L. c. 244
§ 14". (See Exhibit Eat LARACE-0032, and Exhibit Fat LARACE-0035).
50. On May 12. 2008, Defendant(s) intentionally also caused to be placed upon the Plaintiffs' title to
the Premises at the Hampden County Registry of Deeds, a legally void "assignment" of the
Plaintiffs mortgage, recorded on at Book 17291 Page 84. (See Exhibit G at LARACE-0038).
51. The above referenced legally void document(s) have remained recorded upon the Plaintiffs' title
since 2008, despite the SJC ruling in Ibanez, thereby Slandering tne same.
52. Defendant LPS, provided Defendant Ablitt Law Firm with financial incentive(s) to file the said
void documents, to expedite the wrongful foreclosure of the Plaintiffs Premises; through the
Ablitt law firm's participation in the "APR Incentive Program", in which it is required to
maintain performance requirement(s) to remain eligible to participate. (See Exhibit N, at
LARACE-0126, and Exhibit 0, at LARACE-0149).
53. The Ablitt Law firm undertook actions on behalf of the mortgage servicer for the benefit of the
foreclosing claimant trustee for the benefit of the Trust and the certificateholders thereof.
54. The actions of the Ablitt law firm can be imputed to the foreclosing claimant and its other agents
jointly and severally.
55. Indeed, the Ablitt Law Firm admits that it took express direction from Black Knight/LPS in
intentionally creating void legal documents under an APR Award financial incentive; to
expediently liquidate the Premises, even though the Ablitt law firm admits it had scienter of the
potential legal deficiency(s) involved with the "brave new world of securitization". (See Exhibit
M, at LARACE-0109), See also the Land Court Judge's finding that "Fidelity National
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Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Solutions became involved, and acted on behalf of Option One, the
servicer of the loan" (See Exhibit J, at LARACE-0084-0085). 1
56. Further, LPS admits that as its operating protocol, it actively engaged in "surrogate executions"
of legal document(s), in its NewTrak System, through "Client Execution Teams", which is set up
"like a production line", evidenced in the instant matter by the purported void "assignment of
mortgage" that remain(s) wrongfully recorded upon the Plaintiffs' title. (See Exhibit 0, at
LARACE-0156-0157).
57. Indeed, the Ablitt Law Firm further freely admits its participation in NewTrak System. (See
Exhibit M, at LARACE-0108).
58. Indeed, the Ablitt law firm in fact was an APR Incentive Award Winner for Bankruptcy during
the second quarter of 2007. (See Exhibit N, at LARACE-0126).
59. The above award entitled the Ablitt law firm a financial incentive monetary reward of $20.00 per
billable file. (See Exhibit N, at LARACE-0126).
60. Indeed, LPS began to conduct random "audits" as to its Network law firms "performance and
reporting", where upon examination by LPS, if a firm failed these audits, they were removed
from the APR Incentive Award Program, and thus Ablitt law firm was subject to being "graded
on its performance". (See Exhibit 0, at LARACE-0149).
61. Indeed, the Ablitt Law Firm admits that in fact it is "graded on how quickly we can move these
things through, because, of course, in this industry like many; time is money" (See Exhibit M, at
LARACE-0108).
62. On October 30, 2008, Defendant Trustee, at the direction of First American Title, LPS, and/or
Option One Mortgage Corporation, through its counsel Defendant Ablitt law firm, intentionally
filed an action against Plaintiffs to Quiet Title under G.L. c. 240, §§6-11, in the Massachusetts
Land Court under Case Number 08 MISC 386755, naming the Defendant Trustee as Plaintiff in
that litigation. (See Exhibit H).
63. In the February 11, 2009 Motion Hearing before the Land Court, the Defendant Ablitt law firm
admits that it intentionally created, and intentionally filed, the said void purported "assignment
of mortgage" upon the Plaintiffs title, which was a central issue involved within the purported
litigation. (See Exhibit M, at LARACE-0108-0110. LARACE-0111,).
64. The Defendants later claimed that the recorded void assignment, purported to "confirm an earlier
assignment of mortgage.
65. The record provided to this court by Defendants in 08 MISC 386755 included an earlier
purported assignment, made out "in blank, i.e., containing no named assignee". [see Exhibit V, at
Bates LaRace-0240]
1 Please note, due to a scrivener's error, there is no Exhibit K.
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66. On March 26, 2009, the Honorable, Long, J., made the definitive finding that Defendant(s), in
fact, were not a proper party with jurisdiction or authority to enforce the power of sale at both the
time(s) of the void June 2007 foreclosure auction sale publication( s), or at the time of the July
05, 2008 void foreclosure auction sale, due to being in possession of a "void assignment". (See
Exhibit I, at LARACE-0044, 0066).
67. On October 14, 2009, the Honorable Long, J., issued a 27 page Memorandum and Order
Denying the Defendant(s) Motion to Vacate Judgment, and Affinning, that the Defendant
Trustee, did not have "superior title" at the time of the purported June 2007 publication(s), or
any title from the July 05, 2008 purported void foreclosure auction sale. (See Exhibit J, at
LARACE-0067-0093).
68. On October 30, 2009, Defendant Trustee, at the direction of First American Title, LPS, and/or
Option One Mortgage Corporation, through its counsel Defendant Ablitt law finn, intentionally
filed a Notice of Appeal regarding the above referenced Land Court case number 08 MISC
386755 to the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, under Ca. No.2010-P-0124, which Plaintiffs
were forced to unnecessarily defend.
69. On February 16, 2010, Defendant Trustee, at the direction of First American Title, LPS, and/or
Option One Mortgage Corporation, through its counsel Defendant Ablitt law finn, further
intentionally filed a Notice of Direct Appellate Review to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, under Ca. No. DAR-18531, which Plaintiffs were further unnecessarily forced to defend.
70. The Defendant(s) said. intentional filing of the application for Direct Appellate Review was
allowed and consolidated with unitary Ca. No.2010-P-0123.
71. On April 15, 2010, both matters were docketed at the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
under Ca. No. SJC- 10694 and entitled; U.S. Bank Nat 'I Ass 'n V Ibanez (and a consolidated
case), which Plaintiffs were further unnecessarily forced to extensively defend.
72. On January 07, 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Affirmed the Land Court
Ruling, that in fact the Defendant(s) purported June 2007 publication(s) of auction, and the
Defendant(s) July 05, 2008 purported void foreclosure auction sale; was/were in fact void ab
initio; for failure to comply with the strict requirements of G.L. c. 244 § 14, [See U.S. Bank Nat'/
Ass 'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (2011)]. (See Exhibit R, at LARACE-0177-0193).
73. Justice Cordy, submitted a concurring opinion, (in which Botsford, J.,joined), stating that he had
to write separately, to express his shock at the "utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks
documented titles to their assets" (See Exhibit R, at LARACE-0191).
74. Indeed, as Defendant(s) freely admit; their intentional course of conduct in the instant matter was
"merely a product of industry practice", Defendant(s) have intentionally and wrongfully
subjected thousands of Massachusetts mortgagors to similar egregious outcomes as attempted
against Plaintiffs here, that never came to light, since the Defendants act basically unopposed in
a non-judicial foreclosure jurisdiction such as Massachusetts.
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75. The said ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in US. Bank Nat'/ Ass 'n v. Ibanez,
458 Mass. 637 (2011)].; was not limited in application, and was thus, in fact, fully retroactive,
and fully applicable to the Defendant(s) intentional wrongfully unfair and deceptive action(s)
involved in the instant matter presently before this Court, which Plaintiffs were, and now are,
further forced to defend and prosecute.
76. The said ruling became, and currently remains to this day, the subject of numerous local,
national, and international; radio, television, internet, and financial industry, publication articles,
and/or numerous other law review and/or other scholarly articles, and in fact, as of the date of
filing the instant complaint, U.S. Bank Nat'/ Ass 'n v. Ibanez, remains among the most requested
cases on the Massachusetts Appeals Court website
77. On June 06, 2012, in response to the receipt ofa new Default Notice, Plaintiffs' filed a Try Title
action under G.L. c. 240, §§ 1-5 against the Defendant Trustee under Ca No 12 MISC 465484.
[see Exhibit V, at Bates LaRace-0206, see Petition at Exhibit V, at Bates LaRace-0234].
78. On August 20, 2012, the Defendants Removed this matter to the U.S. District Court for The
District of Massachusetts, under Ca. No.3:12-cv-11545-MAP. See Exhibit Vat Bates LaRace-
0209
79. On September 07, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss [Try Title Action Where No
Auction Had ever taken place]
80. On September 20, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Remand
81. On September 24, 2013, the Court Denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand and Granted Defendants
Motion to Dismiss. [see Exhibit Vat Bates LaRace-0215].
82. On October 22, 2013, Plaintiffs' filed their Notice of Appeal. [see Exhibit Vat Bates LaRace-
0213].
83. On March 09, 2015 the SJC enunciated its ruling in Abate v. Fremont Investment & Loan, 470
Mass. 821 (2015).
84. On July 21, 2015 the First Circuit Affirmed the USDC Order of Dismissal of the Plaintiffs' Try
Title matter in a one sentence "opinion", because of the holding in Abate, under Ca. No. 13-
2316, see Exhibit Vat Bates LaRace-0233].
85. On January 06, 2014, Plaintiffs filed litigation solely related to damages incurred through the
judicially determined failure to have properly conducted the 2008 statutory foreclosure auction
sale. [see Exhibit Wat Bates LaRace-0245, see complaint at Exhibit W, Bates-LaRace-0274]
86. The Defendants again Removed this matter to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts under Ca. No. 3:14-cv-30043-MAP [see Exhibit Wat Bates LaRace-0253]
87. On March 17, 2014, the Defendant Ablitt Scofield filed a Motion to Dismiss, which Plaintiffs'
Opposed.
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88. On April 09, 2014, Plaintiffs' filed a Motion to Remand, which was Opposed.
89. On December 04, 2014, the Trustee for the Defendant Ablitt Scofield filed a suggestion of
bankruptcy.
90. On February 11, 2015, the USDC entered a conditional order of stay, in order that Plaintiffs
could seek to lift the automatic stay.
91. On May 18, 2015, Plaintiffs' filed a status report notifying the Court that they had successfully
argued to lift the automatic stay as against Defendant Ablitt Scofield.
92. Thereafter the Court Ordered all Defendants to refile their Motions to Dismiss, and The Plaintiffs
to refile their Motion to Remand.
93. On January 21, 2016, The Hon. Ponsor, J. issued Orders denying the Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss, and Granting Plaintiff Motion to Remand [for Jack of diversity]. [see Exhibit Wat
Bates LaRace-0259]
94. On February 03, 2016, this matter was remanded to the Hampden County Superior Court, Ca.
No. 1479CV00012, [see Exhibit Wat Bates LaRace-0248]
95. On July 15, 2016, the Court allowed the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on the expiration
of the statute of limitations regarding this Court's 2009 Order [even though the Rescript from the
SJC was not entered until February 2014]. [see Exhibit Wat Bates LaRace-0264]
96. On August I 0, 20 I 6, Plaintiffs filed for an Appeal of the above ruling.
97. On October 11, 2016, the Court entered separate and final judgments under R. 54(b).
98. On October 25, 2016 the above Order was vacated due to clerical error.
99. On November 02, 20 I 6, Plaintiffs again filed their notice of appeal.
JOO. On November 03, 2016, the Order under paper 31 was vacated due to clerical error.
IO I. On November 03, 2016 Corrected Judgments were issued by the Court.
102. On November 07, 2016 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal
103. On November 30, 2016, Plaintiffs again filed their notice ofappeal
104. On March 10, 2017 Plaintiffs' appeal was docketed upon the Appeals Court docket under
Ca. No. 2017-P-0263.
105. On February 05, 2018, the Appeals Court issued a non-precedential 1:28 decision
affirming the trial court ruling based on Frankston v. Denniston, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 366,375,907
N .E.2d. 244 (2009), which facts were completely inapposite, [see I :28 decision at [see Exhibit
W at Bates LaRace-0270, and at n. 6 Bates LaRace-0272]
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I 06. Plaintiffs thereafter appealed said ruling to the Massachusetts Supreme Court under a
Petition for Further Appellate Review ("FAR"), Ca. No. FAR-25933.
107. On May 04, 2018, the SJC Denied the Plaintiff Petition for FAR, leaving only the
unpublished [and non-precedential, I :28 decision from the Appeals Court].
I 08. At no time during any of the above protracted litigation was there ever any examination
as to whether the foreclosing entity could utilize the statutory remedy [outside receiving a
purported "assignment" after the purported auction sale].
109. At no time was any inquiry ever conducted to determine whether the foreclosing entity
could establish demonstrable documentary indicia to support is claims of possession the right to
enforce Plaintiffs' note or mortgage
110. Under the previous litigation, the statutory requirements to foreclose were only examined
under a pre-Eaton paradigm, where no examination regarding Plaintiffs' Note was ever required,
as prospective only ruling by the SJC in Eaton v. Fed. Nat'/ Mortgage Ass 'n, 462 Mass. (2012),
was not decided until almost 18 months post Ibanez.
111. Defendants continue to rely upon the same proffered documentary indicia that was
previously provided to this Court in 2008, and to the SJC.
112. Wasting no time, in a letter dated May 21, 2018, the attorney [Orlans PC] acting at the
best of the mortgage servicer [Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, et. al.] sent correspondence to
Plaintiffs informing them that a purported statutory foreclosure auction sale of their residence at
6 Brookbum Street, Springfield was scheduled for June 20, 2018 [see notice at Exhibit Y].
113. The Defendants thereafter postponed said auction until July 03, 2018.
114. Thus, where Plaintiffs' current claims are based upon the challenge to the foreclosing
entity's claim of being in possession of statutory authority to utilize revised G.L. c. 244, §14,
such claim and current inquiry thereon, and challenge thereto could not have been argued by
Plaintiffs in 2008, or at any other time prior to the Defendants' current May 2018 publication of
auction sale.
I I 5. Thus, where Plaintiffs claims are also based upon a direct challenge to the foreclosing
entity's claim to possess current right of enforcement of Plaintiffs Note and Mortgage, such
claims were never examined under Plaintiffs' previous try-title matter [where they lacked
jurisdiction to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court], or under Plaintiffs more recent
civil lawsuit that was entirely based upon the SJC ruling in Ibanez, which also never reached
these issues.
116. Where there is not sufficient identicality of the issues between the parties does not
preclude Plaintiffs from advancing similar claims here, based upon a revised statutory
interpretation of G.L. c. 244, § 14, and under claims related to the challenge to Defendants claim
of being a real party in interest to enforce Plaintiffs' note and mortgage,
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117. Thus, as a direct and proximate cause of Defendant(s) continuing intentional, unfair,
deceptive, and wrongful action(s); has proximately caused Plaintiffs to suffer enduring damages
that include, but are not limited to; unwanted publicity, as a direct result of Defendant(s)
wrongfully initiating and conducting the void 2008 foreclosure auction sale, as well as it renewal
of such attempt here 10 years later.
118. The intentional actions of Defendant( s) proximately caused Plaintiffs to suffer monetary
damages that the purported auction garnered significantly less money that the full priced offer
from Brian Hebert. (See Exhibit(s) B, C, and D).
119. The intentional actions ofDefendant(s) proximately caused Plaintiffs further significant
and profound damages, as a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant(s) entire intentional
course of conduct, which resulted in a void foreclosure auction, and the resultant extenuated
appeal process, their forced exit from the Premises, and all other damages that extend from these
intention action(s).
120. The intentional actions ofDefendant(s) proximately caused Plaintiffs to have hired
undersigned counsel to stand vigilant and continually defend against the incoming shells of
destruction through the filing of protracted litigation to ward off the continuing assault on their
residential abode.
121. The intentional actions ofDefendant(s) also proximately caused Plaintiffs further
significant and profound damages manifesting themselves as emotional distress for Plaintiffs and
their children, as a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant(s) entire intentional course of
conduct, which resulted from the profound, extreme, and outrageous conduct of Defendant(s)
122. Defendants deceptively, unfairly, and intentionally, failed to act in the best interest(s) of
Plaintiffs' in the exercise of the non-judicial foreclosure process under the strict requirements of
G.L. C. 244 § 14. 2
Plaintiffs Were Wrongfully Forced to Vacate The Premises Proximately Caused Through
Reliance Upon The Materially False Assertion(s) of Defendant(s) Claim of Being A Proper
Party To Act Under Statute At The Time of The June 2007 Publication(s)
123. After the purported 2008 foreclosure auction sale, Plaintiffs fled their premises in fear
and were forced to pay for alternate housing during the pendency of the appeal of the 2009
Opinion from this Court.
2
Where a party or entity claim(s) to be a proper party under statute, the said party/entity is to act
as a "Trustee" for the mortgagor, in that the foreclosing entity owes a duty to the mortgagor to
achieve the highest possible bid for the property, as the mortgagor, remains subject to any
deficiency for any shortfall, and/or is entitled to any surplus achieved upon any legally validly
held non-judicial auction properly conducted under G.L. c. 244 § 14. See Sandler v. Silk, 292
Mass. 493,496 (1935), see also U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, 458 Mass 637, at. n. 16 (2011) ..
12
124. At the time the Plaintiffs vacated the Premises, it has now been judicially determined that
the Defendant(s) was/were not in fact any proper party to legally act under statute at that time.
125. Plaintiffs now seek various declaratory judgments from this Court that extend this finding
to include the fact that Defendants initiated the current publication, despite scienter of the fatal
deficiency(s) related to their claim to enforce the power of sale.
126. Plaintiffs' current claims are not subject to the statute of limitations, where Defendants
has/have initiated a new statutory procedure under revised interpretation of G.L. c. 244, § 14.
127. Through Defendant(s) intentionally wrongful asservation(s) to Plaintiffs' that it/they were
a proper party to act under the said statute referenced above, Plaintiffs detrimentally relied on the
said, and vacated the Premises. And were forced to subsequently seek, find, and immediately
secure; a rental property in another part of Springfield Massachusetts for Plaintiffs and their
children on an emergency basis.
128. Plaintiffs' rental property was located at 157 Goodwin Street, Springfield Massachusetts,
where Plaintiffs and their children occupied the same for approximately thirty (30) months.
129. Through Defendant(s) intentional wrongful asservation(s) ofbeing a proper party to act
under the said statute referenced above Plaintiffs' were unnecessarily forced to purchase new
furniture for the new rental abode ..
As an Improper Party(s) Under Statute, Defendant(s) Intentional Wrongful Foreclosure

And Intentional and/or Grossly Negligent Failure To Maintain The Plaintiffs Real
Property, Proximately Caused The Premises To Incurred Needless, and Significant,
Structural, and Interior Damage
130. The Defendant Trustee, through the intentional actions and at direction of; Defendant LPS
Defendant Option One Mortgage Corporation, and Defendant Ablitt Law Firm, wrongfully and
intentionally purported that it/they purchased the Plaintiffs' Premises on July 05, 2008, because of
the now judicially determined void purported 2008 foreclosure auction sale.
131. Subsequent to the wrongful July 05, 2008 purported auction sale, The Defendant Trustee,
through the actions of; Black Knight Financial/LPS, Defendant Option One Mortgage
Corporation, and/or Defendant Ablitt Law Firm; wrongfully and proximately, caused Plaintiffs
damages through the direction of an unauthorized entry of the Plaintiffs' property and Premises
by Field Asset Services ("FAS"), to wrongfully enter the property and Premises, to "change the
locks", and to wrongfully "secure" and "winterize" the Plaintiffs' Premises.
132. Marty's Real Estate in Ludlow, MA ("Marty's") was charged with the marketing of the
property and placed the lockbox on Plaintiffs' doors, where it had been judicially verified that
the purported 2008 foreclosure auction sale was a void.
133. Marty's never made any further attempt to market the property or inquire as to the
condition of the interior of the premises that was sealed like a sarcophagus and left to
decompose.
13
134. Marty's also initially challenged undersigned as to the Plaintiffs' rightful claim of
ownership of the premises, where Marty's repeatedly trespassed upon Plaintiffs' property to
place for sale signs on the front lawn, and only through great effort of the undersigned, Mart's
finally yielded and agreed to remove the lock boxes.
135. The foreclosing claimant's claim to renew its wrongful attempt to utilize revised G.L. c.
244, § 14, is an ongoing enterprise to wrongfully extricate the Plaintiffs' from their residence,
where it has never been established that Defendants ever had any demonstrable claim as any real
party in interest.
136. Additionally, FAS proceeded to further "secure" the Premises through "winterization" by
purporting to "secure the water supply" and placing all utility service solely in its name.
137. Upon Plaintiffs' return to the Premises they bore witness, and solemnly stood silently,
with mouths agape, stunned, and aghast, at the presence of pervasive and significant damage to
the Premises that had occurred as a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant(s) wrongful
foreclosure, and subsequent intentional, and/or grossly negligent, failure to properly maintain the
Premises and property
138. Plaintiffs' further discovered that there were water leaks that had occurred within the
Premises, that with only the barest of a minimum of due diligence, would have been discovered
and mitigated by Defendant(s).
139. Plaintiffs' further discovered that due to the failure of Defendant(s) to have maintained
the Premises, proximately caused the significant presence of toxic mold and mildew that
permeated the entirety of the Plaintiffs' Premises.
140. Plaintiffs' further discovered damage to the Plaintiffs' electrical system, kitchen flooring
that had cracked due to the cold temperatures in the "sealed" and neglected Premises, and further
discovered related damage to the bathroom rendering it completely inoperable.
141. Plaintiffs' further discovered damage to the Premises, including cracked windows, the
Premises roof, the furnace, which thereafter further "exploded" after Plaintiffs' returned to
occupy the Premises, further damaging the Premises by sending soot and ash throughout the
entirety of Plaintiffs' Premises.
142. Plaintiffs' further discovered damage to the property by Defendant(s) failure to maintain
the yard to the Premises, allowing it to become completely overgrown with plant and vegetation,
rendering the Premises and property completely uninhabitable.
143. Further, upon Plaintiffs return to the Premises, they unsuccessfully attempted to restore
utility service, which was refused due to the wrongful and continued assertion of Defendant(s)
that title had passed to it/them under the judicially determined void 2008 foreclosure auction
sale, and where the said utilities continued to intentionally remain in the name of FAS.
144. On November 23, 2009, Plaintiffs, through present counsel, due to the Defendant(s)
continued recalcitrance, were forced to contact the City of Springfield Water and Sewer
14
Commission, in order to have the water billing account returned to Plaintiffs' name in order to
restore service, and to further inform the City of Springfield, that in fact the Plaintiffs had
actually been returned to ownership and possession of the Premises, and further that an FAS
employee had identified [due to neglect, and/or gross negligence of the Defendant(s)), that the
"ball-valve" in the Water Main was "cracked and leaking like a sieve", which presented a
"serious health and safety concern not only to the Premises, but the entire neighborhood at large
where the Premises is located. (See Exhibit S, at LARACE-0195-0196).
145. On December 07, 2009, undersigned received an email from FAS, inquiring if this firm
was representing Mark LaRace. (See Exhibit U, at LARACE-0202-0204).
146. On December 08, 2009, undersigned, on behalf of Plaintiffs' was forced to contact the oil
company, in order that Plaintiffs could receive an oil delivery to finally supply the premises with
desperately needed heat, to prevent further damage to the Premises, and to further make the same
habitable for human occupation. (See Exhibit T, at LARACE-0198-0200).
147. Only to mitigate the Defendant(s) damages in this matter, and only after much family
discussion and several months of significant incurred costs, long hours of manual labor, and
further assistance from friends, and from undersigned, to render the Premises somewhat
habitable, did Plaintiffs' make a final decision to return to occupation of the Premises in January
of 2010, where they continue to currently reside.
148. Plaintiffs' have been the occupants and have been in possession of the premises for eight
and one-half (8 ½) years post Ibanez.
149. At no time did Defendant(s) ever make any attempt whatsoever to contact the Plaintiffs
about their continued wrongful claim to title to the Premises or rectify and/or mitigate any of the
above occurrence(s) and/or resultant damage(s).
150. At no time did Defendant(s) make any attempt whatsoever to correct or rectify the void
documents recorded upon the title to Plaintiffs' real property, such as the purported mortgage
assignment, and foreclosure deed associated with a judicially determined void foreclosure
auction sale, which remain to this day.
15 I. Therefore, the totality of the above described intentional action(s) of Defendant(s)

proximately have, (and continue to) caused Plaintiffs extensive and enduring damages.
CAUSES OF ACTION
Count I -Declaratory Judgment Under G.L. c. 231A Regarding The Parties Current Status
Under G.L. c. 244, §14 And Whether The Defendant(s) Have Established That They Are or
Ever Were Proper Parties To Utilize The Statutory Remedy Thereunder
Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. Larace

V.
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, NA., in its capacity as Trustee,
15
Defendant ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPTJ New York Common Law Trust,
and the Defendant beneficial Certificateholders thereof,
Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, jlk/a Homeward Residential,
jlkla/ AHMSl jlkla Option One Mortgage Corporation,
Lender Processing Services, jlkla LPS Foreclosure Solutions
Ablitt & Scofield, P. C., jlkla/ Ablitt Law Firm, flklal Ablitt & Charlton, P.C.
152. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as if set forth fully herein.
153. Defendant currently relies upon a purported "assignment" from Sand Canyon
Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation, executed on March 07, 2012, recorded on
March 14, 2012, upon the Hampden County Registry of Deeds at Book! 9162, Page 129, [see
Exhibit Z, at Bates LaRace-0322]
154. The above document was purportedly executed by One Dale Sugimoto, who had
submitted an Affidavit under oath in a bankruptcy matter before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court,
Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans, where Mr. Sugimoto stated under penalty of perjury
that as of March 18, 2009, Sand Canyon was no longer engaged in "mortgage servicing", nor
owned any mortgage loans, and its present business only involved "dealing with litigation
claims" [see Exhibit Z, at Bates LaRace-0324]
155. In the 209 C.M.R. 18.21 "Certification" provided to Plaintiffs, the Defendants reference
the above "assignment" as being a "confirmatory assignment" of the 5/7/2008 assignment to
"clarify the assignor name of said 5/7/2008 assignment", [see Exhibit Y, at Bates LaRace-0315].
156. The 5/7/2008 assignment relies upon an earlier "assignment of mortgage in blank",
reference Exhibit Vat Bates LaRace-0240, and LaRace-0241, compare discussion made by the
SJC in Ibanez at 458 Mass 637,643, "Option One executed an assignment of this mortgage in
blank"; and at p. 652; ""we have long held that a conveyance of real property, such as a
mortgage, that does not name the assignee conveys nothing and is void; we do not regard an
assignment ofland in blank as giving title in land to the bearer of the assignment"
157. The SJC stated in Ibanez, that a confirmatory assignment could only "confirm" an
assignment validly made earlier, see Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 654-655.
158. During Ibanez, Defendants repeatedly stated under oath to this Court and the SJC, that
they relied upon an "earlier assignment" of Plaintiffs' mortgage [in blank].
159. At the time of the 5/7/2008 purported assignment, Defendant's position was that it was
predicated upon the earlier [blank] assignment, and therefore the passage of time does not alter
Defendants sworn statements in this regard.
160. Defendant now seeks to sidestep this fatal impediment by relying upon a new and
improved 2012 "confirmatory assignment", however this document retails the fatal taint
associated with the 5/7/2008 "confirmatory" assignment, as well as the fatal admissions by Dale
16
Sugimoto found in Exhibit Z attached to this complaint.
161. Plaintiffs' challenge the purported March 7, 2012 "assignment" as being void for want of
"confirming" any earlier valid assignment.
162. Plaintiffs' also challenge the March 07, 2012 assignment for being void, based upon the
sworn statements of one Dale Sugimoto, and also challenge the signatures upon their Note under
G.L. c. 106, §3-308
163. Plaintiffs challenge the purported 05/07/2008 "assignment" as being void for want of
"confirming" the earlier assignment made "in blank", as indicated by the SJC in Ibanez.
164. On June 14, 2007, June 21, 2007, and June 28, 2007, Defendant Ablitt & Charlton, P.C.,
on behalf of Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for the Defendant ABFC Asset
Backed Certificates, Series 2005-0PTl New York Common Law Trust, and its beneficial
Certificateholders, intentionally caused a legally void publication(s) in the Boston Globe; of a
legally void Notice of Mortgagee's Sale of Real Estate.
165. On July 05, 2008, Defendant(s) intentionally hired one "Dan Wiener" of"Liberty
Auctions", and intentionally conducted the legally void foreclosure auction of the Plaintiffs'
Premises.
166. On January 07, 2011, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Affirmed the ruling of
the Honorable Long, J., in Ca. No. 08 MISC 386755 (See Exhibit R)
167. Therefore, Defendant(s) was/were not the proper holder of the Plaintiffs mortgage at the
time of the June 2007 publication(s) of the notice of sale, as historically contemplated by G.L. c.
244 § 14.
168. There was never any examination as to the foreclosing entity's claim to be in possession
of right(s) of enforcement to Plaintiffs' Note under the previous construction of G.L. c. 244, §14
at the time of the 2007 publication of auction sale.
169. Therefore, Defendant(s) was/were never judicially determined to be the owner of the
Plaintiffs mortgage or note, at the time of the July 05, 2008 void and purported foreclosure
auction sale, as historically contemplated by G.L. c. 244 § 14.
170. Therefore, in the June 2007 publication(s) of the notice of sale Defendant(s) intentionally
wrongfully asserted that it/they were proper party(s) to act under G.L. c. 244 § 14.
171. Therefore, Defendant(s) intentionally, and wrongfully, conducted a legally void

foreclosure auction of the Plaintiffs' Premises on July 05, 2008.
172. The Defendants now bring a renewed attempt to utilize the statutory remedy against
Plaintiffs ten years later, where it has never beenjudicially determined that Defendant has made
any showing that it can establish that it can seek the "acceleration? remedy under paragraph 22
17
of the Plaintiffs' mortgage contract, under authority ofG.L. c. 183, §2!.
173. Therefore, where Defendants cannot make a showing that they were ever a proper party
to utilize G.L. c. 244, § 14, the Defendant(s) are liable for the continuing damages that were and
continue to be, suffered by Plaintiffs, as a direct and proximate result ofDefendant(s) ongoing
actions related to the wrongful 2008 foreclosure, as well as the current statutory publication, and
the associated predicate act(s) related thereto as described in the above and below referenced
paragraphs.
174. Defendant is also not in current compliance with G.L. c. 244, §35, or 209 C.M.R.
l 8.2 IA(2)( c), and therefore the publication that Defendant relies upon is void.
175. The Plaintiffs herein respectfully request that this Court enter a declaratory judgment
making a finding that Defendants have not established that they could utilize the statutory
remedy against Plaintiffs' in 2008, or can currently do so under the renewed current 2018
statutory publication
Count II - Violation of G.L. c. 244, §35C
Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace

V.
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its capacity as Trustee,
Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, j!k!a Homeward Residential,
j!klal AHMSI, jlk/a Option One Mortgage Corporation,
Lender Processing Services, jlkla LPS Foreclosure Solutions
Ablitt & Scofield, P. C., jlklal Ablitt Law Firm, jlklal Ablitt & Charlton, P.C.
176. Plaintiffs herein repeat and reallege all of their plausible allegations above as if
more fully set out hereunder.
177. G.L. c. 244, §35C(d) states, "A creditor violates this chapter if the creditor makes
statements to a state or federal court related to foreclosure or compliance with this
chapter, orally or in writing, that it knows or should know are false",
178. G.L. c. 244, §35C(g) states "The division of banks may adopt, amend or repeal
rules and regulations for the administration and enforcement of this section."
179. The Division of Banks adopted 209 CMR 18.21A(2)(c) to amend, rules and
regulations regarding G.L. c. 244, §35C.
180. 209 C.M.R. 18.21A(2)(c), states:
(c) A third party loan servicer shall certify in writing the basis for asserting that the
foreclosing party has the right to foreclose, including but not limited to, certification of
18
the chain of title and ownership of the note and mortgage from the date of the
recording of the mortgage being foreclosed upon. The third party loan servicer
shall provide such certification to the borrower with the notice of foreclosure
provided pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 244, § 14, and shall also include a copy of the note
with all required endorsements
181. In the 209 C.M.R. 18.21 A(2)( c) Certification sent to Plaintiffs, there is No
Certification made as to the chain of title to Plaintiffs' Note, only that the Defendant
foreclosing entity is the "current owner", only supplying a "Certification" as to the
purported chain of title to the mortgage, [see Exhibit Y at Bates LaRace-0315].
182. 209 C.M.R. 18.21A(2)(c) clearly states that the Certification as to the chain of
title to Plaintiffs' note is to be provided to the borrower along with the statutory notice
under G.L. c. 244, §14.
183. Therefore, the 209 C.M.R. 18.2!A(2)(c) Certification is part of the mandatory
statutory notice to be provided to the borrower under the strict requirements ofG.L. c.
244,§14.
184. The Certification provided to Plaintiff indisputably fails to comply with 209 CMR
18.21A(2)(c), and G.L. c. 244, §35C(b), where the notice provided to Plaintiffs at the
time of the first publication of auction sale under G.L. c. 244, § 14, fails to include any
certification of the chain of title to Plaintiff note leading to the purported "possession"
by the foreclosing claimant Defendant.
185. The above regulation makes no "carve out" for Notes indorsed in blank.
186. The above regulation makes no "carve out" to omit providing any Certification of
the chain of title to Plaintiffs' Note, due to a claimed bearer instrument
187. It is indisputable that only one in physical possession of Plaintiffs' Note could
claim the right to enforce Plaintiffs Note within the chain of title to Plaintiffs' Note,
which claimants would need to be identified.
188. In the 2008 matter before this Court, and in the SJC ruling in Ibanez, the opinions
indisputably identify intermediary "sales" of Plaintiffs' mortgage loan which would
necessarily involve he identification of those named party(s)
189. Defendants have clearly failed to identify all possessors of Plaintiffs Note from
the date of the December 31, 2004 recordation of the original mortgage.
190. In the alternative, Plaintiffs' challenge the validity of all signatures upon their
Note under G.L. c. I 06, §3-308
19
191. G.L. c. 244, §35C(b) states "A creditor shall not cause publication of notice of
foreclosure, as required under section 14, when the creditor knows or should know that
the mortgagee is neither the holder of the mortgage note nor the authorized agent of the
note holder.
192. 209 CMR 18.21A (2)(c) amended the language in G.L. c. 244, §35C(b) to require
that the borrower also be provided with a certification of the chain of title of the
ownership of Plaintiffs' Note from the date of the December 31, 2004 recordation of the
Mortgage at the time of receipt of the statutory notice of foreclosure.
193. Creditor under G.L. c. 244, §35C is defined as including:
"Creditor", a person or entity that holds or controls, partially, wholly, indirectly, directly
or in a nominee capacity, a mortgage loan securing a residential property, including, but
not limited to, an originator, holder, investor, assignee, successor, trust, trustee, nominee
holder, Mortgage Electronic Registration System or mortgage servicer, including the
Federal National Mortgage Association or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation. The term creditor shall also include any servant, employee or agent of a
creditor.
194. Thus, the term "Creditor" would encompass the Defendant Trustee as well as its
agents named as Defendants in the caption to this matter above.
195. The Defendant has now caused another 2018 publication of auction [as the
initiation of the statutory foreclosure process], where it knew that it completely failed to
provide any Certification of the chain of title to Plaintiffs' Note.
196. These Defendants stand in violation of G.L. c. 244, §35C, and by extension G.L.
C. 244, § 14.
197. Plaintiffs herein respectfully request a declaratory judgment that Defendant is not
in current compliance with G.L. c. 244, §35, or 209 C.M.R. l8.21A(2)(c), and therefore
the publication that Defendant relies upon is void.
Count III - Declaratory Judgment Under G.L. c. 260, §33

V.
Defendant ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPTI New York Common Law Trust,
and the Defendant beneficial Certificateholders thereof
198. The Plaintiff incorporates all the above and below paragraphs of this complaint as
if alleged herein.
20
199. The Recorded Mortgage is also void [for statutory purposes], as it is Obsolete
under G.L. c. 260. §33, where Defendant accelerated Plaintiffs' Note in July of2007
200. There can be no dispute that the Defendant Trustee exercised its rights under
paragraph 22 of the mortgage contract, and which sale evidences that the foreclosing
claimant accelerated the maturity date of Plaintiffs' to advance the date when the debt
falls due to become due and payable in full.
201. The SJC has identified that the term "maturity date" stated in G.L. c. 260, §33,
references "maturity date" of the Note, and specifically "the date when the debt falls
due", see Deutsche Bank Nat'! Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, 471 Mass 248, 253-
258 (SJC 2015).
202. G.L. c. 260, §33 provides two different statutes of limitations 1) where the
"maturity date" is stated upon the face of the mortgage itself, there is a thirty five year
period; however where the mortgage only references the "maturity date" of the note,
there is a five (5) year limitations period regarding the maturity date of the note [the date
when the debt falls due", and the examination of the note controls the analysis
203. G.L. c. 260, §33, states that the mortgage security must be exercised within five
(5) years of the "maturity date" [of the Note], or an extension must be filed related
thereto.
204. G.L. c. 260, §33, specifically states that this [5 year] period shall not be extended
by reason of non-residence or disability of any person interested in the mortgage or the
real estate, or by any partial payment, agreement, extension, acknowledgment, affidavit
or other action not meeting the requirements of this section.
205. Plaintiffs Mortgage only references the "maturity date" of the Note and does not
individually identify that the mortgage itself as including any "maturity date", which
brings the instant fact pattern under the precise examination as undertaken by the SJC in
Deutsche Bank N. T. v. Fitchberg Capital, 471 Mass. 248 (2015).
206. The SJC in Deutsche Bank v. Fitchberg Capital, 471 Mass. 248 (2015), clearly
stated that where the mortgage relies upon the maturity date of the note, the maturity date
of the note controls the analysis under G.L. c. 260, §33.
207. G.L. c, 106, §3-l 18(a) stands for the proposition that the "maturity date" ofa note
may be accelerated, , see aced., Ferreira v. Yared, 32 Mass. App.Ct. 328, 330 (1992).
21
208. G.L. c, I 06, §3-ll 8(a) stands for the proposition thatthe "maturity date" of a note
may be accelerated,, see aced., Ferreira v. Yared, 32 Mass. App.Ct. 328, 330 (1992).
209. Plaintiffs do not rely upon G.L. c, l06, §3-1 lS(a) for a remedy, but rather offer
the same only for evidence that the maturity date of note may be "accelerated"
210. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court find that the Plaintiffs Mortgage
Obsolete, and discharged, under the Legislative wording ofG.L. c. 260, §33, where more
than five (5) years have expired from the time of"acceleration" of the Plaintiffs' Note,
and where no "extension" was ever filed by Defendant.
Count IV - Violation of G.L. c. 93A And Its Implementing Regulations
V.
Black Knight Financial/Lender Processing Services, flkla LPS Foreclosure Solutions;
Assurant Field Services, flk/al Field Assets Services;
Ablitt & Scofield, P. C., j!kla/ Ablitt Law Firm, j!kla/ Ablitt & Charlton, P C.,
211. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all paragraphs above as if set forth fully herein.
212. Plaintiffs will seek to have the Land Court Judge appointed to sit as a Superior
Court Judge to hear this claim, which would normally lie outside the subject matter
jurisdiction of this Court.
213. The necessity to send a Demand letter to the named Defendants to this Count
prior to litigation under G.L. c. 93A is obviated where these Defendants maintain no
assets or Office within the Commonwealth, see Moronta v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 88
Mass. App. Ct. 621,
n. 11 (2015); Moronta v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 476 Mass. 1017 (SJC 2016).
214. Plaintiffs are consumers as defined under G.L. c. 93A
215. Defendants have violated G.L. c. 93A and its implementing regulations by
making intentionally unfair and deceptive statements related to the assertion of being a
proper party to act under statute, at the time of the publications of June 2007 mandatory
publications, and at the time of the foreclosure auction sale, as well as under the current
purported 2018 publication of auction sale.
22
intentionally unfairly and deceptively, creating the continuing appearance of being a
proper party to act under G. L. c. 244 § 14, through its agent's creation and intentional
recordation of a legally void purported "assignment of mortgage".
intentionally unfairly, and deceptively not acting in the best interest(s) of the Plaintiff
mortgagors, by refusing a proffer made to Plaintiffs of a full priced offer to purchase the
Premises for $140,000.00, from a fully pre-qualified buyer, which intentional refusal
thereafter subjected the Plaintiffs to an unnecessary void foreclosure auction sale, and the
enduring protracted litigation thereof, as well as a shortfall from the self-dealing "credit
bid" admitted by Defendant(s) was for less than market value.
Defendant(s) by intentionally, unfairly, and deceptive; assertions to Plaintiffs (and the
world), that it/they were and are the unquestioned defeasible fee title holder to the
Premises, at the time of the void purported June 2007 publication(s) of foreclosure
auction, and under the current 2018 publication.
Defendant(s) intentional, unfair, and deceptive; assertions to Plaintiffs (and the world),
that it was the unquestioned fee title holder to the Premises, at the completion of the
purported July 05, 2008 void foreclosure auction sale.
220. Defendants have further violated G.L. c. 93A and its implementing regulations by
Defendant(s) repeated intentionally deceptive asservations to the Land Court, Appeals
Court, and SJC that it was the unquestioned fee title holder to the Premises, at the
completion of the purported July 05, 2008 foreclosure auction sale, and which foreclosure
deed remains encumbering the title to Plaintiffs' real property.
221. Such continuing wrongful assertions by Defendant to Plaintiff, the world, and to
the judicial venues involved in this matter, were legally incorrect when made to
Plaintiffs' and continue to this day.
222. Through Defendant(s) intentional wrongful assertion(s) of being a proper party to

act under the said statute referenced above; Plaintiffs' were unnecessarily forced to remit
rental payments for their approximately 30 months of use and occupancy of the rental
property located at 157 Goodwin Street.
223. Through Defendant( s) intentional wrongful assertion( s) of being a proper party to

act under the said statute referenced above; Plaintiffs' were unnecessarily deprived of the
use and occupancy of 6 Brookbum Street, Springfield Mass (Premises) during their 30
months of unnecessary use and occupancy of the rental property located at 157 Goodwin
Street.
23
224. Through Defendant(s) intentional wrongful assertion(s) of being a proper party to
act under the said statute referenced above; Plaintiffs' and their children were
unnecessarily and wrongfully subjected to the completely unnecessary turmoil, stress,
and anxiety, of moving on an expedited basis, as well as all other attendant issues related
to the unnecessary emergency wrongful vacation of the Premises.
225. During the past eight (8) years Defendants continued to sit on their rights, as no
litigation filed by Plaintiffs would have precluded the foreclosing entity from attempting
to renew a statutory action under G.L. c. 244, §14, or to have submitted an extension
under G.L. c. 260, §33.
226. Plaintiffs bring the above claims based on the instant complaint related to the
renewed attempt to utilize G.L. c. 244, §14, where Plaintiffs will show that Defendant(s)
and their gents never acted under the color of any authority [statutory, contractual or
otherwise] to foreclose upon Plaintiffs' home in 2008 or presently
227. Plaintiffs relied to their detriment upon these wrongfully unfair and deceptive
asservations, when they fled the premises.
228. Defendants have further violated G.L. c. 93A and its implementing regulations by
Defendant(s) intentionally failing to fully research the historical ratio decidendi related to
the purported 2008 exercise of the power of sale under statute, and instead taking express
directives from non-legal representatives and or an automated NewTrak System, from
LPS and/or Option One Mortgage Corporation as agents of the Defendant Trustee,
through deceptively electing to solely rely on "industry practice", instead of the
Massachusetts case law holdings on the subject.
Defendant Ablitt law firm as agent of the Defendant Trustee, having significant financial
incentives to not act in the best interest(s) of Plaintiffs, by intentionally expediently
liquidating the Plaintiffs' Premises which was related the potential ofreceiving
significant remuneration for such expedient liquidation through being an LPS Network
Attorney, through its APR Incentives.
Defendant Ablitt Law Firm as agent of the Defendant Trustee taking express direction
from LPS and/or Option One Mortgage Corporation to solely follow "industry practice"
in creating and filing legally invalid and deceptive legal document(s), including but not
limited to; the void "assignment of mortgage", void foreclosure deed, and void Affidavit
of Sale".
231. Plaintiffs relied upon the Defendant(s) intentionally legally deceptive assertions,
and intentionally created and filed legally void publication(s) and intentionally created
and filed legally void document(s) intentionally placed upon their title at the Hampden
County Registry of Deeds; to their detriment when they vacated the Premises.
24
Defendant(s) Defendant(s) intentional and continued wrongful possession, dominion,
and/or control over the Premises from the time the Plaintiffs' vacated the Premises in
June of 2007, until Plaintiffs returned to the same in January 2010, solely upon their own
initiative.
Defendant(s) intentional action(s) of hiring Field Asset Services, LLC as agent to the
Defendant Trustee to "winterize" the Premises, and thereby "wrongfully enter" and
Criminally Trespass upon Plaintiffs' real property and Premises.
Defendant(s) Defendant(s) intentionally deceptive assertions which Plaintiffs relied upon
to their detriment, unnecessarily forcing Plaintiffs' to discard their existing appliances,
and treasured furniture, as the same would not fit within the reduced confines of the new
rental abode.
Defendant(s), where Defendant(s) intentionally failed to maintain the Premises, during
the period of Defendant( s) wrongful legal claim of dominion and control over the title to
the Premises, and as a direct and proximate result caused profound and enduring damage
to the Premises, which rendered the Premises uninhabitable.
236. Defendants have violated G.L. c. 93A and its implementing regulations, where
Plaintiffs were forced to pay all costs, and expended substantial personal manual labor; to
remediate the Premises, and property, to again render it fit and habitable for human
occupation.
237. Plaintiffs further relied upon Defendant(s) deceptive assertions to their detriment
where Plaintiffs were thereafter unnecessarily forced to hire present counsel to defend the
Plaintiffs' right(s) in Defendant(s) 2008 wrongful action to "Quiet Title" to the Premises,
in the Land Court.
where Plaintiffs were unnecessarily forced to further hire present counsel to extensively
defend the decision from the Land Court before both the Massachusetts Appeals Court,
SJC, and currently before this Court.
where Plaintiffs were unnecessarily forced to be saddled with these excessive cost(s) of
the above referenced unnecessary litigation
Defendant(s) where Defendant(s) conduct was willful or knowing within the meaning of
G.L. C. 93A.
25
241. Plaintiffs continue to suffer, damages by these deceptive and unfair asservations,
under Defendants' present threat to utilize G.L. c. 244, § 14.
242. Due the entirety of all the wrongful deceptive and unfair action(s) and
transactions intentionally undertaken by all the participant(s) actions as described in the
above and below paragraph( s), the Plaintiffs now seek damages under Count I that are
more fully commensurate with the full gravity of the totality ofDefendant(s) extremely
grave, unfair and deceptive conduct.
24 3. The Plaintiffs herein request that damages be assessed as to the named Defendants
under this Count IV, jointly and severally for any finding(s) made by this Court solely
under G.L. c. 93A.
244. The Plaintiffs herein further respectfully request that said total damages under
Count I, Count II, and Count III below, also be assessed against Defendant(s) jointly and
severally, and further that such award be trebled under G.L. c. 93A, due to the willfully
pervasive, intentionally extreme, and outrageous course of conduct ofDefendant(s).
24 5. The Plaintiffs herein respectfully request that this Court award Plaintiffs
compensation for damages under the instant Count IV, in the amount of Seven Million,
Seven Hundred Thousand Dollars, and Zero Cents; ($7,700,000.00) from Defendant(s)
jointly and severally.
Count V - Slander of Title
V.
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its capacity as Trustee,

Defendant ABFC Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-OPT1 New York Common Law Trust,
246. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as if set forth fully herein.
24 7. "Slander of title is a tort action for damage to real property resulting from
interference with title to real estate by falsehoods which although not personally
defamatory, cause the Plaintiff pecuniary loss through interference with .... dominion
over his property" Salloom v. Lister 2004 WL 1836027, 18 Mass L. Rptr. 165 at *2
(Mass Super. 2004).
248. "In Massachusetts, a person is liable for slander of title, i.e. injurious falsehood",
if he or she (a) publishes a false statement, (b) that harms the interests of another; (c) with
the intent to harm the interests of another or "either recognizes or should recognize that it
is likely to do so, an (d) knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of
26
its truth or falsity". Dulgarian v. Stone, 652 N.E. 2d 603, 609 (Mass. 1995).
249. (a) Publication of false statement. Here it is unquestioned that the Defendant has
caused a false publication by way of a legally invalid "assignment of mortgage",
"foreclosure deed" and "certificate of entry" to remain publicly recorded upon the
Hampden County Registry of Deeds where Defendant(s) remain subject to the Law of the
Case as stated in Ibanez. Defendant has also recorded two legally inoperative documents
upon the title to the Plaintiffs' real property which wrongfully assert Defendant's
defeasible fee interest in said title.
250. (b) Harm to Plaintiff. It is unquestioned that Defendant (s) publication of the false
assertion that it was the current defeasible fee title holder of the Plaintiffs residence, and
conducted a proper auction under statute, caused significant financial, and devastating
emotional harm to the Plaintiffs, through their reliance upon these materially false
asservations.
251. (c) Intent of Defendant(s) to Harm Plaintiff. It is unquestioned that the

Defendant(s) intended to harm the interests of Plaintiff through its false publication and
continues to do so where Defendants have scienter of the void foreclosure auction.
252. (d) Scienter ofDefendant(s) of the wrongfulness of its actions. Defendant

continues to act in reckless disregard even though it admits (through the new foreclosure
action) that it has scienter of the falsity of said false publications on the Hampden County
Registry of Deeds and has scienter that the previous auction sale was defective. The
purported defective "assignment of mortgage" remains littering the title to the Plaintiffs
Premises
253. Thus, based upon the above numbered paragraphs, Plaintiffs have succinctly set
out, and successfully pied, the specific predicate acts by Defendant(s) which meet the
foundational elemental requirements to establish the tort of Slander of their Title by
Defendant( s).
254. Plaintiff seeks all damages allowable in tort, and/or otherwise allowable by this
court, for these transgressions by the Defendant(s).
Count VI - Negligence and Trespass
Mark and Tammy LaRace

V.
Marty's Real Estate
256. Plaintiffs will seek the Land Court Judge appointed to sit as a Superior Court
Judge to hear this claim, which would normally lie outside the subject matter jurisdiction
27
of this Court.
257. This Defendant owed a duty to the purported foreclosing claimant to undertake
reasonable steps to inspect the property to minimize damage to the premises after it
placed lock boxes on the premises.
258. Where the SJC made a judicial determination that the foreclosure auction sale was
void, this duty became owed to Plaintiffs, where title was restored to their name.
259. The Defendant breached that duty where it placed a lock box on the premises, and
then left it abandoned, never making any inspection as to the condition of the interior of
the premises.
260. As a proximate causation of the above breach of duty owned to Plaintiffs, the
Plaintiffs suffered damages that included not discovering water leakage that continued to
fester creating hazardous mold thought the interior of the premises, where an earlier
discovery would have minimized any damages.
261. As a proximate cause of the above breach of duty owed to Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs
suffered damages that included the boiler becoming compromised due to the extensive
water leakage, as well as allowing the yard to become completely overgrown with
vegetation, where a visit to the premises would have mitigated or minimized such
damages.
262. This Defendant also was charged with inquiry Notice when it entered upon
Plaintiffs' real property, where the land court had ruled the foreclosure auction sale
invalid, and which ruling was on appeal.
263. This Defendant intentionally entered without consent or permission of Plaintiffs

and intentionally placed a lock box on the premises doors, which precluded Plaintiffs and
any others from gaining access to the interior of the premises.
264. It was reasonably foreseeable that given the 2008 ruling by this court, that the
Plaintiffs were restored to their rightful superior title and right to possession of the
property.
265. Because of this Defendants intentional unauthorized entry, and subsequent

negligence of failing to make reasonable inspections as to the condition of the property,
proximately exacerbated and/or caused physical damages to the premises.
266. Plaintiffs seek monetary damages to compensate them from the extensive injury
incurred through this Defendant's negligence and trespass
267. Plaintiffs will prove damages at trial.
28
Count VI - Declaratory Judgment That The Defendant Is Not Currently Entitled To
Enforce Plaintiffs' Note, and Therefore Does Not Currently Possesses Authority To
Enforce The Security Instrument Mortgage Contract
V.

269. Plaintiffs specifically challenge all signatures, indorsement stamps, and or

allonges to the proffered Note, under G.L. c. 106, §3-308.
270. This Court noted in its October 14, 2009 ruling that it was not clear from the
record if American Home Mortgage was in fact "successor in interest" to Option One's
interest (Originator) in the mortgage, or whether it was able to make a valid assignment
of that mortgage, [see attached Exhibit J, at Bates LaRace-0086, n. 45; Bates LaRace-
0087, at n. 45].
271. There was never any examination as to when where or how Plaintiffs' Note was
transferred, sold, or conveyed from Option One to the named entities by the SJC in U.S.
Bank v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 643-644, [see attached Exhibit Rat Bates-LaRace-0185,
0186].
272. The above described transfers represent purported "sales" of the Plaintiffs' Note,
not merely a simple negotiation under G.L. c. 106, §3, which implicates G.L. c. 106, §9.
273. Defendants fail to escribe or identify the definition of"lnvestor" placed upon the
purported "Allonge" to Plaintiffs' Note, [see Exhibit Y, at last page].
274. Plaintiffs here in request a declaratory judgment from this Court that the
Defendant has failed to establish that it is currently legally possessed of the right to
enforce Plaintiffs' instrument of indebtedness.
275. Plaintiffs also challenge the purported signatures on the instrument of

indebtedness and challenge its legal effectiveness.
276. The SJC has held that a mortgage holder by itself is in possession of nothing of
value, without any connection to an underlying note, see Eaton v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n, 462 Mass 569, 577 (2012)
29
277. The SJC has held that the holder of a mortgage only, would only hold in a
reversionary trustee capacity, without the ability to undertake "affirmative acts", see
Eaton, at n. 10.
278. Thus, where Defendant cannot show demonstrable indicia of the ability to enforce
Plaintiffs' Note (post Eaton), it therefore cannot enforce the power of sale under
paragraph 22 of the mortgage contract, or under authority ofG.L. c. 183, §21.
279. The Defendant also relies upon a "confirmatory" assignment that was recorded in
blank, i.e. no named assignee, [see Exhibit V, at Bates LaRace-0240]
280. The SJC has held that a "confirmatory mortgage can only "confirm" an earlier
assignment that was validly made previously, [see Ibanez, at 654].
281. The SJC found that it has long held that a conveyance of real property, such as a
mortgage, that does not name the assignee conveys nothing and is void; we do not regard
an assignment of land in blank as giving legal title in land to the bearer of the assignment,
[compare Exhibit V, at Bates LaRace -0240]
282. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment from this Court that Defendant cannot
currently enforce the mortgage, where its purported "assignment" relies upon an earlier
assignment made "in blank".
Couut VII- Quiet Title
284. Plaintiffs seek to quiet title under G.L. c. 240, §§6-10.
285. Plaintiffs are owners of a parcel of land with improvements thereon, located at 6
Brookbum Street, Springfield, Hampden County in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
("Premises").
286. The Plaintiffs have been in continuous possession of the Premises since May 19,
2005.
287. Plaintiffs' challenge the purported March 7, 2012 "assignment" as being void for
want of "confirming" any earlier valid assignment.
288. Plaintiffs' also challenge the March 07, 2012 assignment for being void, based
upon the sworn statements of one Dale Sugimoto
289. Plaintiffs challenge the purported 05/07/2008 "assignment" as being void for want
of"confirming" the earlier assignment made "in blank", as indicated by the SJC in
Ibanez.
30
290. The SJC has held that mere recordation of a document upon a Registry of Deeds I
for notice purposes only and cannot magically transform an otherwise legally invalid
document to suddenly become valid, see Bevilacqua v Rodrigues, 460 Mass. 762, 771
(2011)
291. Wherefore Plaintiffs pray that a writ of entry issue that the 5/7/2008 assignment
and the March 07, 2012 assignment are legally inoperative and void
292. Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that a writ of entry issue upon this Count, and that this
Court should adjudge and decree that Defendant's right title and interest in the Premises
has been extinguished through failure to support its claim of any present legal interest in
the defeasible fee to the Premises, supported only by the legally inoperative and void
documents described above.
293. Wherefore, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that Plaintiffs be returned to their
rightful position as superior title holder, with Defendant's claim to the defeasible fee
interest thereto has been extinguished.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request:
a. That this Court award Plaintiff reasonable attorneys and expert fees, costs, and damages
pursuant to their claims as referenced in the totality of the paragraphs above in the
amount of $7,700,000.00, against Defendant(s) jointly and severally.
b. That this Court award Plaintiffs such reasonable additional attorney's fees and damages
pursuant to G.L. c. 93A, and that due to the species of willfulness present in the instant
fact pattern, that such above damages award be trebled under the said statute against
Defendant(s) jointly and severally.
c. That this Court make finding(s) of punitive and consequential damages related to the
totality of the actions of Defendant(s), against Defendant(s) jointly and severally,
d. That this Court award Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys and expert fees, costs, and damages
pursuant to their claims as referenced in Count I, and Count III, related to Wrongful
Foreclosure, and Slander of their title by Defendant(s), against Defendant(s) jointly and
severally.
e. That this Court issue any and/or all other such further and additional relief to Plaintiffs, as
it deems appropriate, just, and, meet under these extreme circumstances.
Respectfully submitted,
Plaintiffs,
By Their Attorney,
31
Glenn F R sell, Jr.
BBO# 6 914
Glenn F. Russell, Jr.
& Associates, P.C.
38 Rock Street, Suite # 12
Fall River, MA 02720
(508) 324-4545
P. (508) 324-4545
F. (508) 938-0244
[email protected]
Dated: June 29, 2018
32
VERIFICATION
We, Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace, being duly sworn, depose and state
that we have read a copy of this Verified Complaint, and that we have read the facts and
statements contained and hereby, and that we hereby attest that the facts and statements
contained within this Verified Complaint are true to the best of our knowledge and belief,
and that we have not omitted any material facts herein, on this the 27 th day ofJune, 2018.
~~ ~~£9?6?
Mark A. LaRace

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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

HAMPDEN, SS. LAND COURT DEPARTMENT

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

18. Thus, Plaintiffs' try title action was a nullity.

37. Option One never responded to the Plaintiffs' offer.

1 Please note, due to a scrivener's error, there is no Exhibit K.

80. On September 20, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Remand

96. On August I 0, 20 I 6, Plaintiffs filed for an Appeal of the above ruling.

99. On November 02, 20 I 6, Plaintiffs again filed their notice of appeal.

IO I. On November 03, 2016 Corrected Judgments were issued by the Court.

102. On November 07, 2016 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal

As an Improper Party(s) Under Statute, Defendant(s) Intentional Wrongful Foreclosure

15 I. Therefore, the totality of the above described intentional action(s) of Defendant(s)

Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. Larace

171. Therefore, Defendant(s) intentionally, and wrongfully, conducted a legally void

Count II - Violation of G.L. c. 244, §35C

Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace

180. 209 C.M.R. 18.21A(2)(c), states:

193. Creditor under G.L. c. 244, §35C is defined as including:

Count III - Declaratory Judgment Under G.L. c. 260, §33

Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace

Count IV - Violation of G.L. c. 93A And Its Implementing Regulations

Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace

214. Plaintiffs are consumers as defined under G.L. c. 93A

222. Through Defendant(s) intentional wrongful assertion(s) of being a proper party to

223. Through Defendant( s) intentional wrongful assertion( s) of being a proper party to

Count V - Slander of Title

Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its capacity as Trustee,

251. (c) Intent of Defendant(s) to Harm Plaintiff. It is unquestioned that the

252. (d) Scienter ofDefendant(s) of the wrongfulness of its actions. Defendant

Count VI - Negligence and Trespass

Mark and Tammy LaRace

263. This Defendant intentionally entered without consent or permission of Plaintiffs

265. Because of this Defendants intentional unauthorized entry, and subsequent

267. Plaintiffs will prove damages at trial.

Mark A. LaRace and Tammy L. LaRace

Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, NA., in its capacity as Trustee,

269. Plaintiffs specifically challenge all signatures, indorsement stamps, and or

275. Plaintiffs also challenge the purported signatures on the instrument of

Couut VII- Quiet Title

284. Plaintiffs seek to quiet title under G.L. c. 240, §§6-10.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request:

Dated: June 29, 2018

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